WO2001005090A1 - A method for protecting a portable card - Google Patents

A method for protecting a portable card Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2001005090A1
WO2001005090A1 PCT/EP2000/004627 EP0004627W WO0105090A1 WO 2001005090 A1 WO2001005090 A1 WO 2001005090A1 EP 0004627 W EP0004627 W EP 0004627W WO 0105090 A1 WO0105090 A1 WO 0105090A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
shift register
key
linear
loaded
data
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/EP2000/004627
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
Frank Muller
Gerrit Roelofsen
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Koninklijke KPN NV
Original Assignee
Koninklijke KPN NV
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Koninklijke KPN NV filed Critical Koninklijke KPN NV
Priority to JP2001510184A priority Critical patent/JP2003504958A/en
Priority to EP00927228A priority patent/EP1201056B1/en
Priority to US10/019,344 priority patent/US7159245B1/en
Priority to AU45674/00A priority patent/AU4567400A/en
Priority to CA002378703A priority patent/CA2378703A1/en
Priority to DE60035349T priority patent/DE60035349T2/en
Publication of WO2001005090A1 publication Critical patent/WO2001005090A1/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H03—ELECTRONIC CIRCUITRY
    • H03K—PULSE TECHNIQUE
    • H03K3/00—Circuits for generating electric pulses; Monostable, bistable or multistable circuits
    • H03K3/84—Generating pulses having a predetermined statistical distribution of a parameter, e.g. random pulse generators
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
    • G06K19/07309—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers
    • G06K19/07363—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers by preventing analysis of the circuit, e.g. dynamic or static power analysis or current analysis
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/065—Encryption by serially and continuously modifying data stream elements, e.g. stream cipher systems, RC4, SEAL or A5/3
    • H04L9/0656—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher
    • H04L9/0662—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher with particular pseudorandom sequence generator
    • H04L9/0668—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher with particular pseudorandom sequence generator producing a non-linear pseudorandom sequence
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/12—Transmitting and receiving encryption devices synchronised or initially set up in a particular manner

Definitions

  • a method for protecting a portable card is a method for protecting a portable card.
  • the invention relates to a method for protecting a portable card, provided with at least a crypto algorithm for enciphering data and/or authenticating the card, against deriving the secret key used from statistical analysis of its information leaking away to the outside world in the event of cryptographic operations, such as power consumption data, electromagnetic radiation and the like, the card being provided with at least a shift register having a linear and a non-linear feedback function for creating cryptographic algorithms, the method comprising loading data to be processed and a secret key in the shift register of the card.
  • Using a secret key to process input information and/or to produce output information is generally known in the event of cryptographic devices.
  • Using feedback shift registers is also generally known for creating cryptographic algorithms.
  • data to be consecutively processed and a secret key are loaded into one or more shift registers.
  • the sequence of loading data and the key is random.
  • the output of the shift register and possibly the the shift-register contents are applied, using linear and/or nonlinear-feedback, to determine the output of the entire algorithm.
  • the input of the shift register then, apart from the data and the key, also consists of a linear and a non-linear combination of the shift-register contents.
  • shift registers are generally applied in the event of portable cards, such as chip cards, calling cards, smart-card products and the like.
  • the invention now overcomes said drawback and provides a portable card which is resistant to such analyses and therefore provides a card which is safe to use.
  • the method according to the invention is characterised in that an algorithm is applied to the card which is constructed in such a manner that the collection of values of recorded leak-information signals is resistant to deriving the secret key by way of statistical analysis of said values.
  • the shift register is subsequently clocked on, during a specific period of time, several times, at least making use of the linear feedback function.
  • a suitable alternative according to the invention is loading only the key into the shift register in the event of a fixed content of the shift register.
  • the key is first loaded, subsequently the data is loaded into the shift register, making exclusive use of the linear feedback function and subsequently the clocking on is performed.
  • the data is first loaded, subsequently the key is loaded, making exclusive use of the linear feedback function, whereafter clocking on is performed.
  • FIG. 1 schematically shows a typical shift register as applied with a portable card, such as a chip card and the like.
  • FIG. 2 schematically shows an advantageous solution according to the invention.
  • FIG. 3 schematically shows another advantageous solution according to the invention.
  • a feedback shift register 1 which is applied in any way suitable for that purpose to a portable card, not shown for simplicity's sake, such as a chip card, calling card and the like, having an input 2 and an output 3.
  • the feedback shift register 1 comprises a shift register la, as well as a feedback function, which in this case consists of a linear function lb and a non-linear function lc having an output 3a.
  • a feedback shift register due to its relatively low costs, is eligible for being applied to, e.g., calling cards and the like.
  • the nonlinear function may see to it that each bit depends on each number of key bits.
  • Shift registers are generally known and their operation will therefore not be described in detail.
  • the shift register la consists of a series of bits.
  • the length of a shift register is expressed in bits; in the event of a length of n bits, it is called an n-bit shift register.
  • the output of the shift register is 1 bit, often the least significant bit.
  • the period of a shift register is the length of the output series before repetition starts .
  • Data is loaded by way of the input 2; the key is loaded, and results are produced by way of the output 3 or, if so desired, 3a.
  • FIG. 2 now shows an advantageous embodiment of the invention, the key first being loaded into the shift register, subsequently data being loaded, at least initially, exclusively using the linear- feedback function, and then the clocking on (e.g., 100 times or over) of the shift register taking place.
  • the non-linear function of the shift register is deactivated until the shift register has been sufficiently clocked on. Then, the non-linear function is switched on once again. In doing so, the linear-feedback function lb continues to be active.
  • Deactivating and activating, as the case may be, the non-linear function lc may take place in any way suitable for that purpose, e.g., using switches.
  • the shift register la is advantageously clocked on so many times that the content of all elements of the shift register depends on a large portion of the bits of the key.
  • DPA is only capable of being carried out if there takes place a non-linear operation of the data with the key. Since, in addition, the effort required for DPA rises exponentially with the number of key bits on which the bits in the shift register depend, it is achieved in this manner that, in the event of sufficient interim clocking on of the shift register la, applying DPA does not result in short-term success.
  • FIG. 3 there is shown an advantageous variant of the invention, the key having been loaded with a fixed content of the shift register (which may also consist purely of zeros) and clocking on the shift register taking place with an active linear and an active non-linear feedback function, but without data being loaded into the shift register during the clocking-on period.
  • the input of data into the shift register after loading the key is disconnected from the shift register and is reinstated again after a specific clocking-on period. Due to the fixed content of the shift register, it is not permitted to apply any modifications and an unauthorised third party shall not be capable of determining a collection of different values of leak data, such as power consumption, and subject it to statistical analysis in order to retrieve the key.
  • the key may therefore be loaded non-linearly, and deactivating the non-linear feedback function will not be required.
  • the key in the event that the key, after data has been loaded into the shift register, is not loaded with the fixed content of the shift register, the key is loaded into the shift register using only the linear- feedback function, whereafter subsequent clocking on is permitted to take place.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Nonlinear Science (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)
  • Holo Graphy (AREA)

Abstract

A method for protecting a portable card, provided with at least a crypto algorithm for enciphering data and/or authenticating the card, against deriving the secret key used from statistical analysis of its information leaking away to the outside world in the event of cryptographic operations, such as power-consumption data, electromagnetic radiation and the like. The card is provided with at least a shift register having a linear and a non-linear feedback funtion for creating cryptographic algorithms. An algorithm is applied to the card, which is constructed in such a manner that the collection of values of recorded leak-information signals is resistant to deriving the secret key from statistical analysis of said values. Advantageously, after the key has been loaded into the shift register, the shift register clocks on, using at least the linear-feedback function. A suitable alternative is loading only the key into the shift register in the event of a fixed content of the shift register.

Description

A method for protecting a portable card.
The invention relates to a method for protecting a portable card, provided with at least a crypto algorithm for enciphering data and/or authenticating the card, against deriving the secret key used from statistical analysis of its information leaking away to the outside world in the event of cryptographic operations, such as power consumption data, electromagnetic radiation and the like, the card being provided with at least a shift register having a linear and a non-linear feedback function for creating cryptographic algorithms, the method comprising loading data to be processed and a secret key in the shift register of the card.
Using a secret key to process input information and/or to produce output information is generally known in the event of cryptographic devices. Using feedback shift registers is also generally known for creating cryptographic algorithms.
In this connection, data to be consecutively processed and a secret key are loaded into one or more shift registers. Here, the sequence of loading data and the key is random. Subsequently, the output of the shift register and possibly the the shift-register contents are applied, using linear and/or nonlinear-feedback, to determine the output of the entire algorithm. The input of the shift register then, apart from the data and the key, also consists of a linear and a non-linear combination of the shift-register contents.
Such shift registers are generally applied in the event of portable cards, such as chip cards, calling cards, smart-card products and the like.
Since the secret key is not known to unauthorised third parties, it is basically impossible to derive either the input or the key from the output of the algorithm.
Now it has become apparent, however, that for chip cards and the like it is possible, in the event of computations, to derive the secret key used from a statistical analysis of the power consumption of the card. Such methods are known as "Differential Power Analysis" (= DPA) and are described in the Internet publication DPA Technical Information: "Introduction to Differential Power Analysis and Related Attacks" by P. Koc er et al., Cryptography Research, San Francisco, Said methods are based on the fact that, in practice, with cryptographic operations, information is leaking away to the outside world in the form of power-consumption data, electromagnetic radiation and the like. Thus, logical microprocessor units show regular transistor- switching patterns which externally (i.e., outside the microprocessor) noticeably produce electrical behaviour.
In this manner, it is possible to identify macro characteristics, such as microprocessor activity, by recording the power consumption and deriving information on the secret key used by way of statistical analysis of the data thus obtained.
The invention now overcomes said drawback and provides a portable card which is resistant to such analyses and therefore provides a card which is safe to use. The method according to the invention is characterised in that an algorithm is applied to the card which is constructed in such a manner that the collection of values of recorded leak-information signals is resistant to deriving the secret key by way of statistical analysis of said values. Advantageously, after loading the key into the shift register, the shift register is subsequently clocked on, during a specific period of time, several times, at least making use of the linear feedback function.
A suitable alternative according to the invention is loading only the key into the shift register in the event of a fixed content of the shift register.
In a first advantageous embodiment of the invention, there is first loaded the key, subsequently clocking on is performed, after which the data is loaded.
In another advantageous embodiment of the invention, the key is first loaded, subsequently the data is loaded into the shift register, making exclusive use of the linear feedback function and subsequently the clocking on is performed.
In yet another advantageous embodiment of the invention, the data is first loaded, subsequently the key is loaded, making exclusive use of the linear feedback function, whereafter clocking on is performed.
The invention will now be further explained with reference to the drawing and the description by way of non-limiting example.
FIG. 1 schematically shows a typical shift register as applied with a portable card, such as a chip card and the like. FIG. 2 schematically shows an advantageous solution according to the invention, and
FIG. 3 schematically shows another advantageous solution according to the invention. Referring now to FIG. 1, there is shown a feedback shift register 1 , which is applied in any way suitable for that purpose to a portable card, not shown for simplicity's sake, such as a chip card, calling card and the like, having an input 2 and an output 3.
The feedback shift register 1 comprises a shift register la, as well as a feedback function, which in this case consists of a linear function lb and a non-linear function lc having an output 3a. Such a feedback shift register, due to its relatively low costs, is eligible for being applied to, e.g., calling cards and the like. The nonlinear function may see to it that each bit depends on each number of key bits.
Shift registers are generally known and their operation will therefore not be described in detail. The shift register la consists of a series of bits. The length of a shift register is expressed in bits; in the event of a length of n bits, it is called an n-bit shift register.
Each time a bit is required, all bits in the shift register are shifted 1 bit to the right. The new left bit is calculated as a function of the bits remaining in the register and the input .
The output of the shift register is 1 bit, often the least significant bit. The period of a shift register is the length of the output series before repetition starts .
Data is loaded by way of the input 2; the key is loaded, and results are produced by way of the output 3 or, if so desired, 3a. In a similar situation, however, there may be carried out an attack on the secret key used by way of DPA, based on power variations of the system in the event of computations via statistical analysis of "leak data" and error-correcting techniques.
In this connection, it should be noted that, from a security viewpoint, it is desirable to load the key and the data non-linearly into the shift register. It has become apparent, however, that in the event of calculations, non-linearly loading the key and the data into the shift register increases the chance of deriving the secret key used through statistical analysis of the power consumption.
In FIG. 2 and FIG. 3, the same reference numerals as used in FIG. 1 refer to the same components. FIG. 2 now shows an advantageous embodiment of the invention, the key first being loaded into the shift register, subsequently data being loaded, at least initially, exclusively using the linear- feedback function, and then the clocking on (e.g., 100 times or over) of the shift register taking place. During loading the data and, if so desired, the subsequent clocking on, the non-linear function of the shift register is deactivated until the shift register has been sufficiently clocked on. Then, the non-linear function is switched on once again. In doing so, the linear-feedback function lb continues to be active.
Deactivating and activating, as the case may be, the non-linear function lc may take place in any way suitable for that purpose, e.g., using switches. The shift register la is advantageously clocked on so many times that the content of all elements of the shift register depends on a large portion of the bits of the key.
In another advantageous embodiment, after loading the key there is first clocked on until the content of all elements of the shift register depends on a large portion of the bits of the key. Only after said clocking on, the data in the shift register la is permitted to be loaded and non-linear operations on the content of the shift register are also permitted to be effected.
Clocking on takes place in any way known to those skilled in the art and will therefore not be explained in further detail .
For completeness1 sake, it should be noted that DPA is only capable of being carried out if there takes place a non-linear operation of the data with the key. Since, in addition, the effort required for DPA rises exponentially with the number of key bits on which the bits in the shift register depend, it is achieved in this manner that, in the event of sufficient interim clocking on of the shift register la, applying DPA does not result in short-term success.
In FIG. 3, there is shown an advantageous variant of the invention, the key having been loaded with a fixed content of the shift register (which may also consist purely of zeros) and clocking on the shift register taking place with an active linear and an active non-linear feedback function, but without data being loaded into the shift register during the clocking-on period. In doing so, the input of data into the shift register after loading the key is disconnected from the shift register and is reinstated again after a specific clocking-on period. Due to the fixed content of the shift register, it is not permitted to apply any modifications and an unauthorised third party shall not be capable of determining a collection of different values of leak data, such as power consumption, and subject it to statistical analysis in order to retrieve the key.
In this solution according to the invention, the key may therefore be loaded non-linearly, and deactivating the non-linear feedback function will not be required. In another advantageous embodiment of the invention, in the event that the key, after data has been loaded into the shift register, is not loaded with the fixed content of the shift register, the key is loaded into the shift register using only the linear- feedback function, whereafter subsequent clocking on is permitted to take place.
After the aforementioned description, various modifications of the method according to the invention will become apparent to those skilled in the art.
Such modifications shall be deemed to fall within the scope of the invention.

Claims

1. A method for protecting a portable card provided with at least a crypto algorithm for enciphering data and/or authenticating the card against deriving the secret key used from statistical analysis of its information leaking away to the outside world in the event of cryptographic operations, such as power-consumption data, electromagnetic radiation and the like, the card being provided with at least a shift register having a linear and a non-linear feedback function for creating cryptographic algorithms, the method comprising loading data to be processed and a secret key in the shift register of the card, characterised in that an algorithm is applied to the card which is constructed in such a manner that the collection of values of recorded leak-information signals is resistant to deriving the secret key by way of statistical analysis of said values.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterised in that, after the key has been loaded into the shift register, the shift register subsequently, during a specific period, clocks on several times, at least using the linear-feedback function.
3. The method according to claim 2, characterised in that the shift register is clocked on for so long that the content of all elements of the shift register largely depend on the bits of the key.
4. The method according to claim 2 or 3 , characterised in that, after the key has been loaded and after clocking on, the data is subsequently loaded into the shift register.
5. The method according to either of the claims 2 and 3 , characterised in that after the key has been loaded into the shift register, the data is loaded using only the linear-feedback function and the shift register subsequently clocks on.
6. The method according to any one of claims 2 to 5, characterised in that clocking on the shift register takes place with an active linear-feedback function and a non-active, non-linear feedback function of the shift register.
7. The method according to any one of claims 2 to 6, characterised in that clocking on the shift register takes place with an active linear and an active non-linear feedback function of the shift register, no data being loaded into the shift register, however, during, or prior to, the clocking-on period or prior to loading the key.
8. The method according to any one of claims 5 to 7, characterised in that the non-linear feedback function is deactivated by disconnecting the connections thereof with the shift register as well as, if so desired, with the input.
9. The method according to any one of the claims 4 to 8 , characterised in that the input of data into the shift register after loading the key into the shift register is disconnected from the shift register and is reinstated after the aforementioned specific period.
10. The method according to any one of the preceding claims 1 to 9, characterised in that the key is only loaded into the shift register in the event of a fixed content of the shift register.
11. The method according to any one of the preceding claims 1 to 9, characterised in that, if the key is not loaded with a fixed content of the shift register, the key is loaded into the shift register using only the linear-feedback function, whereafter clocking on takes place.
PCT/EP2000/004627 1999-07-13 2000-05-19 A method for protecting a portable card Ceased WO2001005090A1 (en)

Priority Applications (6)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP2001510184A JP2003504958A (en) 1999-07-13 2000-05-19 How to protect your mobile card
EP00927228A EP1201056B1 (en) 1999-07-13 2000-05-19 A method for protecting a portable card
US10/019,344 US7159245B1 (en) 1999-07-13 2000-05-19 Method for protecting a portable card
AU45674/00A AU4567400A (en) 1999-07-13 2000-05-19 A method for protecting a portable card
CA002378703A CA2378703A1 (en) 1999-07-13 2000-05-19 A method for protecting a portable card
DE60035349T DE60035349T2 (en) 1999-07-13 2000-05-19 PROCESS FOR PROTECTING A PORTABLE CARD

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
NL1012581 1999-07-13
NL1012581A NL1012581C2 (en) 1999-07-13 1999-07-13 Method of protecting a portable card.

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2001005090A1 true WO2001005090A1 (en) 2001-01-18

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PCT/EP2000/004627 Ceased WO2001005090A1 (en) 1999-07-13 2000-05-19 A method for protecting a portable card

Country Status (10)

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US (1) US7159245B1 (en)
EP (1) EP1201056B1 (en)
JP (2) JP2003504958A (en)
AT (1) ATE366006T1 (en)
AU (1) AU4567400A (en)
CA (1) CA2378703A1 (en)
DE (1) DE60035349T2 (en)
ES (1) ES2287014T3 (en)
NL (1) NL1012581C2 (en)
WO (1) WO2001005090A1 (en)

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US7526088B2 (en) 2002-03-05 2009-04-28 Cordes Rene-Michael Code generator and device for the synchronous or asynchronous and permanent identification or encoding and decoding of data of any particular length

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CN106548806B (en) * 2016-10-13 2019-05-24 宁波大学 A kind of shift register that DPA can be defendd to attack

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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
JP2005348453A (en) 2005-12-15
US7159245B1 (en) 2007-01-02
NL1012581C2 (en) 2001-01-16
DE60035349D1 (en) 2007-08-09
JP2003504958A (en) 2003-02-04
ES2287014T3 (en) 2007-12-16
EP1201056A1 (en) 2002-05-02
ATE366006T1 (en) 2007-07-15
AU4567400A (en) 2001-01-30
EP1201056B1 (en) 2007-06-27
CA2378703A1 (en) 2001-01-18
DE60035349T2 (en) 2008-03-13

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