WO2009155835A1 - 密钥衍生方法、设备及系统 - Google Patents

密钥衍生方法、设备及系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2009155835A1
WO2009155835A1 PCT/CN2009/072322 CN2009072322W WO2009155835A1 WO 2009155835 A1 WO2009155835 A1 WO 2009155835A1 CN 2009072322 W CN2009072322 W CN 2009072322W WO 2009155835 A1 WO2009155835 A1 WO 2009155835A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
base station
key
target
target base
cell
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/CN2009/072322
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
黄敏
陈璟
张爱琴
刘晓寒
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
Original Assignee
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Family has litigation
First worldwide family litigation filed litigation Critical https://patents.darts-ip.com/?family=41444023&utm_source=google_patent&utm_medium=platform_link&utm_campaign=public_patent_search&patent=WO2009155835(A1) "Global patent litigation dataset” by Darts-ip is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Priority to AT09768760T priority Critical patent/ATE549886T2/de
Priority to EP09768760.2A priority patent/EP2273818B2/en
Priority to BRPI0915001-3A priority patent/BRPI0915001B1/pt
Priority to DK09768760.2T priority patent/DK2273818T4/en
Priority to KR20107025682A priority patent/KR101147067B1/ko
Priority to EP12157621.9A priority patent/EP2461626B1/en
Application filed by Huawei Technologies Co Ltd filed Critical Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
Publication of WO2009155835A1 publication Critical patent/WO2009155835A1/zh
Priority to US12/942,494 priority patent/US7936880B2/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Priority to US13/073,420 priority patent/US8019083B2/en
Priority to US13/197,154 priority patent/US8320568B2/en
Priority to US13/667,944 priority patent/US9125116B2/en
Priority to US14/824,342 priority patent/US9661539B2/en
Priority to US15/601,398 priority patent/US10334492B2/en
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/0005—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off
    • H04W36/0011—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection
    • H04W36/0033—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information
    • H04W36/0038—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information of security context information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/0005—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off
    • H04W36/0083—Determination of parameters used for hand-off, e.g. generation or modification of neighbour cell lists
    • H04W36/0085—Hand-off measurements
    • H04W36/0088—Scheduling hand-off measurements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/08—Reselecting an access point
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/20—Manipulation of established connections
    • H04W76/27—Transitions between radio resource control [RRC] states

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of mobile communications, and in particular, to a key derivation method, device and system.
  • the user equipment UE in the connected state detects that the signal quality of the source cell is poor.
  • the base station of the source cell After receiving the measurement report sent by the UE, the base station of the source cell performs handover preparation, including deriving a key according to the target cell physical identifier.
  • Key_A sends the key Key_A to the base station X of the target cell A, and then sends a handover command to the UE. If the radio link fails, the radio link fails.
  • RLF Radio Resource Control
  • the UE when the base station of the target cell B that the UE attempts to access through the re-establishment process is the same as the base station of the target cell A, the UE will derive the key by using the physical identity of the target cell B. Key_B, and encrypts the message sent to the base station by using the key Key_B, and the base station X decrypts the message sent by the UE by using the key Key_A according to the saved context information of the UE, and the UE and the base station use the secret.
  • the keys are inconsistent, resulting in the UE and the base station failing to communicate normally.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a key derivation method, device, and system, which can solve the technical problem that the UE that attempts to access the target cell and the target base station do not communicate normally through the RRC re-establishment process.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a key derivation method, including: [11] The target base station receives a plurality of keys derived by the source base station, where the key is a key corresponding to a cell under the target base station;
  • the target base station After the target base station learns the target cell requested by the user equipment, the target base station selects a key corresponding to the target cell.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a key derivation device, including:
  • the first unit is configured to receive multiple keys derived by the source base station, where the key is a key corresponding to a cell under the target base station;
  • the second unit is configured to select a key corresponding to the target cell after the target cell that the user equipment requests to access is obtained.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a communication system, including a key derivation device provided by an embodiment of the present invention, and a user equipment that communicates with the key derivation device.
  • the user equipment and the network side device use the same key derivation parameter to perform key derivation, so that the keys derived by the user equipment and the network side equipment are consistent, and the user equipment and the network are ensured.
  • the normal communication of the side devices helps to reduce the call drop rate and improve the user's perception.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a method according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a method according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a method according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a device according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a device according to Embodiment 6 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of a device according to Embodiment 7 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of a system according to Embodiment 8 of the present invention.
  • the target base station when the target base station receives the target base according to the target At least one key ⁇ derived from the station identifier and/or the target cell physical identifier, receiving the RRC re-establishment request message, selecting a key A, and deriving the target base station identifier or target cell physics required for the key A
  • the identifier is provided to the UE, and the selected key A may be a key derived from the target base station identifier, or a target cell physical identifier corresponding to the cell where the user terminal that sends the RRC re-establishment request message is located, or the RRC is heavy.
  • the key derived from the physical identifier of the cell carried in the request message is established, so that the key derived by the UE is the same as the key determined by the target base station, and the normal communication between the UE and the base station is ensured, which is beneficial to reducing the call drop rate and improving the user's feeling.
  • the UE initiates a re-establishment process, and performs key derivation according to the target base station identifier or the target cell physical identifier provided by the target base station, thereby enabling the self-derived key. It is the same as the key used by the target base station to ensure normal communication between the UE and the base station, which is beneficial to reducing the call drop rate and improving the user's feeling.
  • the key derivation process is divided into a derivation process of generating a key KeNB* according to a parameter such as a target cell physical identity and a secondary derivation process of generating a KeNB** according to a key KeNB* generated by a derivation process.
  • the derivation process of the UE and the network side device in the embodiment of the present invention is a derivation process.
  • Applying the key derivation method provided by the embodiment of the present invention the key KeNB* generated by the UE and the network side device in a derivation process is the same.
  • the key KeNB** generated by the UE and the network side device secondary derivation process is also The same, thereby ensuring that the UE and the network side device can perform normal communication using the KeNB**. It can be understood by those skilled in the art that the key derivation method provided by the embodiment of the present invention can be combined with the method involved in the second derivative process in the prior art, and is not described herein.
  • FIG. 1 a schematic diagram of a method for deriving a key according to a first embodiment of the present invention, where a source eNodeB indicates a network side device currently serving a UE, and a target eNodeB
  • the network side device that provides the service for the UE selected by the source base station specifically includes the following steps:
  • Target eNodeB ID target base station identity
  • the key derived from the physical identity of the target cell is KeNB*l, according to the target base.
  • the key derived from the station identifier is KeNB*2.
  • the source base station sends the generated KeNB*1 and KeNB*2 to the target base station.
  • This step may carry a key by using an access layer message sent by the X2 interface between the source base station and the target base station, for example, an existing message (such as a handover request (Handover)
  • an existing message such as a handover request (Handover)
  • the message sent by the SI interface between the Entity, MME) carries the key, and the MME then provides the received key to the target base station.
  • the target base station saves the received key, and sends a Handover Request Ack message.
  • the source base station sends a handover command (Handover Command) to the UE.
  • a handover command (Handover Command)
  • the UE performs S106' (not shown), that is, derives a key KeNB*1 according to the target cell physical identifier; and because the KeNB*1 is saved with the target base station
  • the derived algorithm of KeNB* 1 and the parameters used are the same, so the KeNB* 1 ' is the same as KeNB* 1;
  • the re-establishment process initiated by the UE may include the following steps:
  • RRC Connection Reestablishment The UE sends an RRC reestablishment request (RRC Connection Reestablishment).
  • the target base station receives the re-establishment request message, and learns that the derived key corresponding to the UE is saved, and the target base station selects KeNB*2, and sends an RRC re-establishment to the UE (RRC Connection).
  • the target base station may query the context information saved by the target base station according to the UE information, so as to know whether it stores the derived key corresponding to the UE; the target base station selects KeNB*2 to mean that the target base station will be based on the KdNB. *2 Perform a secondary derivation process.
  • the target base station if the target base station queries the saved context information and learns that the derived key corresponding to the UE is not saved, the target base station can establish communication with the UE to obtain the context information of the UE and select to save. Without affecting the implementation of the present invention The implementation of the example is not mentioned here.
  • the UE receives the foregoing RRC re-establishment message, and performs key derivation using the obtained target base station identifier to generate a key KeNB*2'.
  • KeNB*2' in this step is the same as the derivative algorithm and the adopted parameters of KeNB*2 saved by the target base station.
  • the KeNB*2' is the same as KeNB*2; the KeNB*2' generated by the UE will be used for the secondary derivation process
  • the target base station identifier obtained by the UE may be from a system broadcast message, that is, the UE reads the target base station identifier carried in the system broadcast message before the UE starts the re-establishment process or after receiving the RRC re-establishment message;
  • the target base station identifier may also be from the RRC re-establishment message, that is, the RRC re-establishment message sent by the target base station to the UE in step 107 carries the target base station identifier, and the UE in step 108 reads the target base station identifier and performs key derivation without reading.
  • the system broadcast message is taken; the target base station identifier obtained by the UE may also be from other messages sent by the target base station to the UE.
  • Cell Global Identifier Cell Global Identifier
  • the CGI includes the target base station identification information. Therefore, the message carrying the target base station identifier in this embodiment may also be a message carrying the global identifier of the cell, and the receiving end first reads the target base station identification part in the global identifier of the cell, and then applies the target. Base station identification.
  • the source base station sends the derived two keys to the target base station.
  • the UE handover succeeds, the UE and the target base station use the key derived from the physical identifier of the target cell to communicate, when the UE occurs.
  • Radio link failure Radio Link Failure
  • Handover failure Handover failure
  • the UE and the target base station use the key derived from the target base station identifier to communicate, thereby ensuring normal communication between the UE and the network side.
  • the method provided in this embodiment does not need to change the air interface. Reduce call drop rate and increase user experience.
  • the second embodiment of the present invention is similar to the foregoing embodiment 1. The difference is that: the source base station performs key derivation based on the obtained target base station identifier (without key derivation according to the target cell physical identifier), and generates the generated key KeNB*.
  • the target base station carries the target base station identifier in the handover command sent to the UE, and the UE can normally receive the handover command, and the key Ke ⁇ *2' will be derived according to the target base station identifier, the KeNB*2 'The same as KeNB*2; in the case that the UE cannot receive the handover command and initiates the re-establishment procedure, the RRC re-establishment message sent by the target base station to the UE carries the target base station identifier, or The system broadcast message carries the target base station identifier, and the UE performs key derivation according to the target base station identifier read from the RRC re-establishment message or the system broadcast message to generate a key KeNB*2', the KeNB*2' and the Ke NB* 2 is the same.
  • the UE and the network side device in this embodiment use the target base station identifier as a parameter to perform key derivation, so that the keys derived by the UE and the network side are consistent, which ensures normal communication between the UE and the network side, and can be reduced. Call drop rate, improve user perception.
  • FIG. 2 a schematic diagram of a key derivation method according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention, where a source eNodeB indicates a network side device currently serving a UE, and a target eNodeB
  • the network side device that provides the service for the UE selected by the source base station specifically includes the following steps:
  • the source base station performs a handover decision, searches for a target physical identifier of the target cell according to the obtained target base station identifier, and performs key derivation according to the physical identifier of each target cell.
  • KeNB*l ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇
  • the source base station sends the generated KeNB*1, KeNB*2, and KeNB*3 to the target base station.
  • This step may carry a key by using an access layer message sent by the X2 interface between the source base station and the target base station, for example, an existing message (such as a handover request (Handover)
  • an existing message such as a handover request (Handover)
  • the alternate field or extension field of the message), or other newly added message; the key may also be carried by the message sent by the S1 interface between the source base station and the MME, and the MME then provides the received key to the target base station.
  • the source base station may carry multiple keys in one message for transmission, thereby facilitating resource saving and improving transmission efficiency.
  • the source base station may also carry multiple keys in different messages and respectively send them, thereby improving sending messages. Flexibility.
  • the target base station saves the received key, and sends a handover request acknowledgement message.
  • S205 The source base station sends a handover command to the UE.
  • the UE receives the handover command and obtains the target cell physical identity, such as Celll, the UE performs S206' (not shown), that is, derives the key KeNB*l' according to Celll ;
  • the KeNB*1' is the same as the derivation method and the adopted parameters of the KeNB*1 held by the target base station, the KeNB*1' is the same as the KeNB*1;
  • the process initiated by the UE may include the following steps:
  • the target base station receives the re-establishment request message, and learns that the UE requests access to the cell with the identifier of Cell2 under the target base station, that is, uses the derived key KeNB*2 corresponding to Cell2, and sends the RRC to the UE. Re-establish the message;
  • the UE receives the foregoing RRC re-establishment message, performs key derivation using the obtained target cell physical identifier Cell2, and generates a key KeNB*2'.
  • the KeNB*2' in this step is the same as the derivation method and the demodulation parameter of the KeNB*2 held by the target base station, and therefore the KeNB*2' is the same as the KeNB*2.
  • the target cell physical identifier obtained by the UE may be from the physical layer identifier of the system broadcast; or may be from the RRC re-establishment message, that is, the RRC re-establishment message sent by the target base station to the UE in step 207 carries the target cell physical identifier.
  • the UE in step 208 reads the physical identifier of the target cell and performs key derivation; the target cell physical identifier obtained by the UE may also be sent from other messages sent by the target base station to the UE.
  • the source base station sends all the keys derived from the physical identifiers of the target cells to the target base station, so that the target base station can select a key required for communication with the UE according to the cell that the UE is to access.
  • the success rate of the UE accessing the new cell is 100%.
  • the source base station may also select a key to be sent to the target base station according to certain conditions, for example, only the key derived from the physical identifier of the target cell of the higher priority cell; the source base station may also derive the key according to certain conditions.
  • the key for example, only derives the key according to the target cell physical identifier of the lower priority cell and sends the key to the target base station, so that the UE access success rate is increased, and the amount of information sent by the base station is also less, but the UE access success rate Will be less than 100%.
  • the UE when the UE fails to generate a radio link in the cell a ⁇ under the access target base station A, the UE can successfully access the cell a2 in the same target base station A through the re-establishment process.
  • the UE provides multiple access target base station information to the source base station in the measurement report.
  • the key derivation process of the source base station may be for multiple cells under multiple target base stations, except that in the process of key transmission, the key sent by the source base station to the target base station A only includes different cells under the target base station A.
  • the corresponding key of the present invention is therefore also applicable to the handover procedure of the UE between different target base stations.
  • FIG. 3 a schematic diagram of a method for deriving a key according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention, where a source eNodeB indicates a network side device currently serving a UE, and a target eNodeB The network side device that is selected by the source base station to provide the service for the UE.
  • the UE specifically includes the following steps:
  • the source base station performs a handover decision, and performs key derivation according to the obtained target cell physical identifier.
  • the key derived according to the target cell physical identifier Celll is KeNB*1, and the prior art
  • the various key derivation algorithms and methods provided are applicable to the key derivation process of this step, and are not mentioned here.
  • the source base station sends the generated KeNB*1 to the target base station.
  • the target base station saves the received key, and sends a handover request acknowledgement message.
  • the source base station sends a handover command to the UE.
  • the process initiated by the UE may include the following steps:
  • the UE sends an RRC re-establishment request message to the target base station.
  • the target base station After receiving the re-establishment request message, the target base station sends an RRC re-establishment message to the UE, where the message carries the physical identifier Cel1 of the target cell in the handover request message, and uses the Celll to perform key derivation and generate a secret.
  • RRC re-establishment message After receiving the re-establishment request message, the target base station sends an RRC re-establishment message to the UE, where the message carries the physical identifier Cel1 of the target cell in the handover request message, and uses the Celll to perform key derivation and generate a secret.
  • Key KeNB*l Key KeNB*l
  • the UE receives the foregoing RRC re-establishment message, and performs key derivation using the obtained cell physical identifier Cell1 to generate a key KeNB*1′, where the KeNB*1′ is the same as KeNB*1.
  • the target base station can use the saved key without re-deriving the key, and the UE performs key derivation according to the target cell physical identifier provided by the target base station, so that the key used by the UE and the network side is consistent. , ensuring normal communication between the UE and the network side, which can reduce the call drop rate and improve the user's feeling.
  • the network side device and the UE in the embodiment of the present invention may pre-appoint one or more of the following items: a method for deriving a key, and a method for selecting a key derivation parameter.
  • the method of sending the key-derived parameter, etc., the network side derives the key according to the agreed method, and sends the required parameter to the UE, and the UE receives the required parameter according to the agreed method and derives the key; the network side device and the UE may also ⁇ The method of deriving the key is determined in a negotiated manner, and the specific negotiation method does not affect the implementation of the embodiment of the present invention and solves the technical problem, and is not mentioned here.
  • a fifth embodiment of the present invention provides a key derivation device, where the device includes:
  • the receiving unit 41 is configured to receive at least one key, where the key is a key derived according to a target base station identifier and/or a target cell physical identifier;
  • the determining unit 42 is configured to receive an RRC re-establishment request message, and select a key A, where the key A may be a key derived by the target base station identifier, or a user terminal that sends the RRC re-establishment request message a key derived from the physical identifier of the target cell corresponding to the cell in which the cell is located, or a key derived from the physical identifier of the cell carried in the RRC re-establishment request message;
  • the sending unit 43 is configured to send the target base station identifier or the target cell physical identifier required to derive the key A.
  • the sixth embodiment of the present invention provides a key derivation device, where the device includes:
  • the triggering unit 51 is configured to initiate a re-establishment process, and trigger the receiving unit;
  • receiving unit 52 configured to receive the target base station identifier and/or the target cell physical identifier after being triggered by the trigger unit 51;
  • the key derivation unit 53 is configured to derive a key according to the target base station identity or the target cell physical identity received by the receiving unit 52.
  • a seventh embodiment of the present invention provides a key derivation device, which includes a first unit 61 and a second unit 62.
  • the first unit 61 is configured to receive multiple keys derived by the source base station, where the key is a key corresponding to the cell under the target base station.
  • the second unit 62 is configured to select a key corresponding to the target cell after the target cell that the user equipment requests to access is obtained. Further, the key selected by the second unit 62 here corresponding to the target cell is a key derived by the source base station according to the physical identity of the target cell.
  • the key corresponding to the cell under the target base station received by the first unit 61 refers to a key derived by the source base station according to the physical identity of the cell under the target base station.
  • the source base station sends all the keys derived from the physical identifiers of the target cells to the target base station, so that the target base station can select a key required for communication with the UE according to the cell that the UE is to access, and the UE accesses the new cell.
  • the success rate is 100%.
  • the source base station may also select a key to be sent to the target base station according to certain conditions, for example, only the key derived from the target cell physical identifier of the higher priority cell.
  • the source base station may further derive a key according to certain conditions, for example, only deriving a key according to a target cell physical identifier of a lower priority cell and transmitting the key to the target base station, so that the UE access success rate is increased, and the amount of information sent by the base station is increased. Also less, but the success rate of UE access will be less than 100%.
  • the first unit 61 is further configured to receive a radio resource control RRC re-establishment request message sent by the user equipment.
  • the key derivation device may further include a third unit 63, where the third unit 63 is configured to send the physical identifier of the target cell to the user equipment.
  • the key derivation device provided in this embodiment may be a base station.
  • Embodiment 8 of the present invention further provides another communication system, including the key derivation device 71 provided in Embodiment 7, and a user equipment that communicates with the key derivation device. 72.
  • the system may further include a mobility management entity MME 73, and the MME 73 is configured to receive a physical identifier of the target cell that is sent by the key derivation device to the user equipment, and forward the physical identifier of the target cell to the user equipment.
  • MME 73 is configured to receive a physical identifier of the target cell that is sent by the key derivation device to the user equipment, and forward the physical identifier of the target cell to the user equipment.
  • the key derivation device 71 in the system can serve as a target base station of the user equipment.
  • Embodiment 9 of the present invention further provides a communication system, where the system includes a user equipment and a network side device, where:
  • a user equipment configured to derive a key according to the received target base station identifier or a target cell physical identifier
  • the network side device configured to receive the received target base station according to the received RRC re-establishment request message And identifying the selected key A of the at least one key derived from the physical identifier of the target cell, and transmitting the target base station identifier or the target cell physical identifier required to derive the key A.
  • the system may further include a mobility management entity MME, configured to forward communication information between the network side device and the user equipment, for example, the target base station identifier or the target cell sent by the network side device.
  • the physical identifier is forwarded to the user equipment.
  • ROM Read Only Memory
  • RAM Random Access Memory
  • the key derivation device and the communication system provided by the embodiments of the present invention can ensure that the key used by the UE and the network side are consistent, and the normal communication between the UE and the network side is ensured, the call drop rate can be reduced, and the user's sensitivity is improved.

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Description

密钥衍生方法、 设备及系统
[1] 本申请要求于 2008年 6月 23日提交中国专利局、 申请号为 200810067995.8、 发明 名称为 "密钥衍生方法、 设备及系统"的中国专利申请的优先权， 其全部内容通过 引用结合在本申请中。
[2] 技术领域
[3] 本发明涉及移动通信领域， 特别是涉及密钥衍生方法、 设备及系统。
[4] 发明背景
在现有的长期演进系统 （Long Term
Evolution, LTE) 中， 处于连接状态的用户设备 UE检测到源小区信号质量较差 ， 则源小区的基站接收到 UE发送的测量报告后， 进行切换准备， 包括根据目标 小区物理标识衍生出密钥 Key_A并发送密钥 Key_A给目标小区 A的基站 X， 然后 发送切换命令给 UE, 若此吋出现无线链路失败 （Radio Link
Failure, RLF) ， 则 UE无法接收该切换命令， UE将重选一个合适的小区， 并发 起无线资源控制 （Radio Resource Control, RRC) 重建立过程 （Connection
Reestablishment procedure) 以恢复业务的连续性。
[6] 在实现本发明的过程中， 发明人发现：
[7] 现有技术提供的技术方案中， 当 UE通过重建立过程尝试接入的目标小区 B的基 站与上述目标小区 A的基站相同吋， UE将利用目标小区 B的物理标识衍生出密钥 Key_B， 并使用密钥 Key_B对向该基站发送的消息进行加密， 而基站 X将根据保 存的该 UE的上下文信息， 使用密钥 Key_A对该 UE发送的消息进行解密， 则 UE与 基站使用的密钥不一致， 从而导致 UE与基站无法正常通信。
[8] 发明内容
[9] 本发明实施例提供密钥衍生方法、 设备及系统， 能够解决通过 RRC重建立过程 尝试接入目标小区的 UE与目标基站使用的密钥不一致而导致的无法正常通信的 技术问题。
[10] 本发明的实施例提供一种密钥衍生方法， 包括： [11] 目标基站接收源基站衍生的多个密钥， 所述密钥为与所述目标基站下的小区相 应的密钥；
[12] 所述目标基站获知用户设备请求接入的目标小区后， 选定与所述目标小区相应 的密钥。
[13] 本发明的实施例提供一种密钥衍生设备， 包括：
[14] 第一单元， 用于接收源基站衍生的多个密钥， 所述密钥为与所述目标基站下的 小区相应的密钥； 及，
[15] 第二单元， 用于获知用户设备请求接入的目标小区后， 选定与所述目标小区相 应的密钥。
[16] 本发明的实施例提供一种通信系统， 包括本发明实施例提供的密钥衍生设备， 和与所述密钥衍生设备通信的用户设备。
[17] 本发明实施例中， 用户设备和网络侧设备釆用相同的密钥衍生参数进行密钥衍 生， 从而使用户设备和网络侧设备各自衍生出的密钥一致， 保证了用户设备和 网络侧设备的正常通信， 有利于减少掉话率， 提高用户的感受度。
[18] 附图简要说明
[19] 图 1为本发明实施例一的方法示意图；
[20] 图 2为本发明实施例三的方法示意图；
[21] 图 3为本发明实施例四的方法示意图；
[22] 图 4为本发明实施例五的设备示意图；
[23] 图 5为本发明实施例六的设备示意图；
[24] 图 6为本发明实施例七的设备示意图；
[25] 图 7为本发明实施例八的系统示意图。
[26] 实施本发明的方式
[27] 下面将结合本发明实施例中的附图， 对本发明实施例中的技术方案进行清楚、 完整地描述， 显然， 所描述的实施例仅是本发明的一部分实施例， 而不是全部 的实施例。 基于本发明中的实施例， 本领域普通技术人员在没有做出创造性劳 动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例， 都属于本发明保护的范围。
[28] 在本发明实施例提供的密钥衍生方法实施例中， 当目标基站接收到根据目标基 站标识和 /或目标小区物理标识衍生的至少一个密钥吋， 接收到 RRC重建立请求 消息吋， 选定一个密钥 A， 并将衍生该密钥 A所需的目标基站标识或目标小区物 理标识提供给 UE, 上述选定的密钥 A可以是由目标基站标识衍生的密钥， 或者 发送所述 RRC重建立请求消息的用户终端所在的小区对应的目标小区物理标识 ， 或者所述 RRC重建立请求消息携带的小区物理标识衍生的密钥， 从而使 UE衍 生的密钥与目标基站确定的密钥相同， 保证 UE和基站的正常通信， 有利于减少 掉话率， 提高用户的感受度。
[29] 在本发明实施例提供的密钥衍生方法实施例中， UE发起重建立过程， 并根据 目标基站提供的目标基站标识或目标小区物理标识进行密钥衍生， 从而使自身 衍生的密钥与目标基站使用的密钥相同， 保证 UE和基站的正常通信， 有利于减 少掉话率， 提高用户的感受度。
[30] 现有技术中将密钥衍生过程分为根据目标小区物理标识等参数生成密钥 KeNB* 的一次衍生过程和根据一次衍生过程生成的密钥 KeNB*生成 KeNB**的二次衍生 过程， 本发明实施例中 UE和网络侧设备的衍生过程均为一次衍生过程。 应用本 发明实施例提供的密钥衍生方法， UE和网络侧设备在一次衍生过程中所生成的 密钥 KeNB*相同， 因此， UE和网络侧设备二次衍生过程生成的密钥 KeNB**也相 同， 从而保证了 UE和网络侧设备能够使用 KeNB**进行正常通信。 本领域技术人 员可以理解的， 本发明实施例提供的密钥衍生方法能够与现有技术中的二次衍 生过程涉及的方法相结合， 本文不再赞述。
[31] 如图 1所示， 为本发明实施例一提供的一种密钥衍生方法示意图， 其中， 源基 站 （Source eNodeB) 表示当前为 UE提供服务的网络侧设备， 目标基站 （Target eNodeB) 表示源基站选择的下一个为 UE提供服务的网络侧设备， 本实施例具体 包括如下步骤：
[32] S101、 UE向源基站发送测量报告；
Figure imgf000005_0001
ID) 和目标基站标识 (Target eNodeB ID) 进行密钥衍生；
本步骤中， 假设根据目标小区物理标识衍生出的密钥为 KeNB*l， 根据目标基 站标识衍生出的密钥为 KeNB*2。
[35] 本领域技术人员能够理解的， 现有技术提供的各种密钥衍生算法和方法均适用 于本步骤的密钥衍生过程， 此处不再赞述。
[36] S103、 源基站将生成的 KeNB*l和 KeNB*2发送给目标基站；
[37] 本步骤可以通过源基站与目标基站之间 X2接口发送的接入层消息来携带密钥， 例如已有消息 （如切换请求 （Handover
Request) 消息） 的备用字段或者扩展字段， 或者新增的其他消息； 也可以通过 源基站与移动性管理实体 (Mobility Management
Entity, MME) 之间 SI接口发送的消息来携带密钥， MME再将接收到的密钥提 供给目标基站。
[38] S104、 目标基站保存接收到的密钥， 并发送切换请求确认 （Handover Request Ack) 消息；
[39] S105、 源基站发送切换命令 （Handover Command) 给 UE;
[40] 若 UE接收到该切换命令， 则 UE执行 S106' (图中未示出） ， 即根据目标小区物 理标识衍生出密钥 KeNB* 1，； 由于该 KeNB* 1，与目标基站保存的 KeNB* 1的衍生 算法和釆用的参数都相同， 因此该 KeNB* 1 '与 KeNB* 1是相同的；
[41] 若发生无线链路失败 （Radio Link Failure) 或切换失败 （Handover
Failure) 等情况， 则 UE发起的重建立过程可以包括如下步骤：
[42] S106、 UE发送 RRC重建立请求 (RRC Connection Reestablishment
Request) 消息给目标基站；
[43] S107、 目标基站接收到重建立请求消息， 获知保存了与该 UE对应的衍生密钥 ， 则目标基站选定 KeNB*2， 并向 UE发送 RRC重建立 （RRC Connection
Reestablishment) 消息；
[44] 本步骤中， 目标基站可以根据 UE信息査询自身保存的上下文信息， 从而获知 其是否保存与该 UE对应的衍生密钥； 目标基站选定 KeNB*2是指目标基站将根据 该 KdNB*2进行二次衍生过程。 本领域技术人员可以理解的， 如果目标基站査询 自身保存的上下文信息后获知未保存与该 UE对应的衍生密钥， 则目标基站可以 与 UE建立通信以获得该 UE的上下文信息并选择进行保存， 而不影响本发明实施 例的实现， 此处不再赞述。
[45] S108、 UE接收到上述 RRC重建立消息， 并利用获得的目标基站标识进行密钥 衍生， 生成密钥 KeNB*2'。
[46] 本步骤中的 KeNB*2'与目标基站保存的 KeNB*2的衍生算法和釆用的参数相同
， 因此该 KeNB*2'与 KeNB*2是相同的； UE生成的 KeNB*2'将用于二次衍生过程
[47] 本步骤中， UE获得的目标基站标识可以来自系统广播消息， 即 UE在重建立过 程开始之前或者接收到 RRC重建立消息后， 读取系统广播消息携带的目标基站 标识； UE获得的目标基站标识也可以来自 RRC重建立消息， 即步骤 107中目标基 站发送给 UE的 RRC重建立消息携带目标基站标识， 步骤 108中的 UE读取该目标 基站标识并进行密钥衍生， 而无需读取系统广播消息； UE获得的目标基站标识 还可以来自目标基站发送给 UE的其他消息。
本领域技术人员可以理解的， 小区全局标识 （Cell Global Identifier，
CGI) 中包含目标基站标识信息， 因此， 本实施例中携带目标基站标识的消息也 可以是携带小区全局标识的消息， 接收端先读取小区全局标识中的目标基站标 识部分， 再应用该目标基站标识。
在本发明实施例中， 源基站将衍生出的两个密钥都发送给目标基站， 当 UE切 换成功吋， UE和目标基站将利用目标小区物理标识衍生出的密钥进行通信， 当 UE发生无线链路失败 （Radio Link Failure) 或者发生切换失败 （Handover
Failure) 而进行重建立过程吋， UE和目标基站将利用目标基站标识衍生出的密 钥进行通信， 从而保证了 UE和网络侧的正常通信， 本实施例提供的方法无需空 口发生变化， 即可减少掉话率， 提高用户的感受度。
本发明实施例二与上述实施例一类似， 区别在于： 源基站仅根据获得的目标基 站标识进行密钥衍生 （而不根据目标小区物理标识进行密钥衍生） ， 并将生成 的密钥 KeNB*2发送给目标基站； 目标基站在发送给 UE的切换命令中携带目标基 站标识， 则 UE能够正常接收到切换命令吋， 将根据目标基站标识衍生出密钥 Ke ΝΒ*2' , 该 KeNB*2'与 KeNB*2相同； 在 UE无法接收到切换命令而发起重建立过 程的情况下， 目标基站向 UE发送的 RRC重建立消息携带目标基站标识， 或者， 由系统广播消息携带目标基站标识， 则 UE根据从 RRC重建立消息或者系统广播 消息中读取的目标基站标识进行密钥衍生， 生成密钥 KeNB*2'， 该 KeNB*2'与 Ke NB*2相同。
[51] 本实施例中的 UE和网络侧设备均以目标基站标识为参数进行密钥衍生， 使 UE 和网络侧各自衍生出的密钥一致， 保证了 UE和网络侧的正常通信， 能够减少掉 话率， 提高用户的感受度。
[52] 如图 2所示， 为本发明实施例三提供的一种密钥衍生方法示意图， 其中， 源基 站 （Source eNodeB) 表示当前为 UE提供服务的网络侧设备， 目标基站 （Target eNodeB) 表示源基站选择的下一个为 UE提供服务的网络侧设备， 本实施例具体 包括如下步骤：
[53] S201、 UE向源基站发送测量报告；
[54] S202、 源基站执行切换决定， 根据获得的目标基站标识査找与其对应的所有目 标小区物理标识， 并根据各目标小区物理标识进行密钥衍生；
[55] 本步骤中， 假设该目标基站下有共 3个小区， 即与该目标基站标识对应的目标 小区物理标识有 3个， 分别用 Celll、 Cell2、 Cell3表示， 则衍生出的密钥也为 3个
， 相应的用 KeNB*l、 KeNB*2、 KeNB*3表示。
[56] 本领域技术人员能够理解的， 现有技术提供的各种密钥衍生算法和方法均适用 于本步骤的密钥衍生过程， 此处不再赞述。
[57] S203、 源基站将生成的 KeNB*l、 KeNB*2和 KeNB*3发送给目标基站；
[58] 本步骤可以通过源基站与目标基站之间 X2接口发送的接入层消息来携带密钥， 例如已有消息 （如切换请求 （Handover
Request) 消息） 的备用字段或者扩展字段， 或者新增的其他消息； 也可以通过 源基站与 MME之间 S1接口发送的消息来携带密钥， MME再将接收到的密钥提供 给目标基站。 此外， 源基站可以将多个密钥携带在一条消息中进行发送， 从而 更有利于节约资源， 提高发送效率； 源基站也可以将多个密钥携带在不同消息 中分别发送， 从而提高发送消息的灵活性。
[59] S204、 目标基站保存接收到的密钥， 并发送切换请求确认消息；
[60] S205、 源基站发送切换命令给 UE; [61] 若 UE接收到该切换命令， 并获得目标小区物理标识， 如 Celll , 则 UE执行 S206' (图中未示出） ， 即根据 Celll衍生出密钥 KeNB*l' ;
由于该 KeNB*l '与目标基站保存的 KeNB*l的衍生方法和釆用的参数都相同， 因 此该 KeNB* 1 '与 KeNB* 1是相同的；
[62] 若发生无线链路失败等情况， 则 UE无法接收到该切换命令， 则 UE发起的重建 立过程可以包括如下步骤：
[63] S206、 UE发送 RRC重建立请求消息给目标基站；
[64] S207、 目标基站接收到重建立请求消息， 获知该 UE请求接入该目标基站下的 标识为 Cell2的小区， 即釆用与 Cell2相应的衍生密钥 KeNB*2， 并向 UE发送 RRC 重建立消息；
[65] S208、 UE接收到上述 RRC重建立消息， 利用获得的目标小区物理标识 Cell2进 行密钥衍生， 生成密钥 KeNB*2'。
[66] 本步骤中的 KeNB*2'与目标基站保存的 KeNB*2的衍生方法和釆用的参数相同 ， 因此该 KeNB*2'与 KeNB*2是相同的。
[67] 本步骤中， UE获得的目标小区物理标识可以来自系统广播的物理层标识； 也 可以来自 RRC重建立消息， 即步骤 207中目标基站发送给 UE的 RRC重建立消息携 带目标小区物理标识， 步骤 208中的 UE读取该目标小区物理标识并进行密钥衍生 ； UE获得的目标小区物理标识还可以来自目标基站发送给 UE的其他消息。
[68] 在本实施例中， 源基站将根据各目标小区物理标识衍生出的密钥全部发送给目 标基站， 使得目标基站可以根据 UE要接入的小区来选择与 UE通信所需的密钥， 则 UE接入新小区的成功率为 100%。 源基站也可以按照某些条件选择发送给目标 基站的密钥， 例如， 仅发送优先级较高的小区的目标小区物理标识所衍生出的 密钥； 源基站还可以按照某些条件来衍生密钥， 例如仅根据优先级较低的小区 的目标小区物理标识衍生密钥并发送给目标基站， 从而使得 UE接入成功率提高 ， 基站发送的信息量也更少， 但 UE接入的成功率将小于 100%。
[69] 应用本发明上述实施例提供的方法， UE在接入目标基站 A下的小区 al吋发生无 线链路失败， 则 UE通过重建立过程能够成功接入同在目标基站 A下的小区 a2。 需要指出的是， UE在测量报告中将多个可接入的目标基站信息提供给源基站， 源基站的密钥衍生过程可以是针对多个目标基站下的多个小区的， 只是在密钥 发送的过程中， 源基站发送给目标基站 A的密钥仅包含该目标基站 A下的不同小 区的相应密钥， 因此， 本发明上述实施例也适用于 UE在不同目标基站之间的切 换过程。
[70] 如图 3所示， 为本发明实施例四提供的一种密钥衍生方法示意图， 其中， 源基 站 （Source eNodeB) 表示当前为 UE提供服务的网络侧设备， 目标基站 （Target eNodeB) 表示源基站选择的下一个为 UE提供服务的网络侧设备， 本实施例中 UE 具体包括如下步骤：
[71] S301、 UE向源基站发送测量报告；
[72] S302、 源基站执行切换决定， 根据获得的目标小区物理标识进行密钥衍生； [73] 本步骤中， 假设根据目标小区物理标识 Celll衍生出的密钥为 KeNB*l， 现有技 术提供的各种密钥衍生算法和方法均适用于本步骤的密钥衍生过程， 此处不再 赞述。
[74] S303、 源基站将生成的 KeNB*l发送给目标基站；
[75] S304、 目标基站保存接收到的密钥， 并发送切换请求确认消息；
[76] S305、 源基站发送切换命令给 UE;
[77] 若发生无线链路失败等情况， 则 UE无法接收到该切换命令， 则 UE发起的重建 立过程可以包括如下步骤：
[78] S306、 UE发送 RRC重建立请求消息给目标基站；
[79] S307、 目标基站接收到的重建立请求消息后， 向 UE发送 RRC重建立消息， 该 消息携带切换请求消息中的目标小区的物理标识 Celll， 并利用该 Celll进行密钥 衍生， 生成密钥 KeNB*l ;
[80] S308、 UE接收到上述 RRC重建立消息， 并利用获得的小区物理标识 Celll进行 密钥衍生， 生成密钥 KeNB*l'， 则该 KeNB*l'与 KeNB*l相同。
[81] 本实施例中， 目标基站可以利用已保存的密钥， 而无需重新衍生密钥， UE根 据目标基站提供的目标小区物理标识进行密钥衍生， 使 UE和网络侧使用的密钥 一致， 保证了 UE和网络侧的正常通信， 能够减少掉话率， 提高用户的感受度。
[82] 本领域技术人员可以理解的， 本实施例既适用于 UE在同目标基站下的不同小 区之间的切换过程， 也适用于 UE在不同目标基站之间的切换过程。
[83] 此外， 本领域技术人员可以理解的， 本发明实施例中的网络侧设备与 UE可以 预先约定以下事项中的一个或多个： 衍生密钥的方法、 密钥衍生参数的选定方 法、 密钥衍生参数的发送方法等， 则网络侧按照约定方法衍生密钥， 并将所需 参数发送给 UE， UE按照约定方法接收所需参数并衍生密钥； 网络侧设备与 UE 还可以釆用协商的方式确定衍生密钥的方法等事项， 具体的协商方法不影响本 发明实施例的实现和解决技术问题， 此处不再赞述。
[84] 如图 4所示， 本发明实施例五提供一种密钥衍生设备， 该设备包括：
[85] 接收单元 41， 用于接收至少一个密钥， 上述密钥为根据目标基站标识和 /或目 标小区物理标识衍生的密钥；
[86] 确定单元 42， 用于接收 RRC重建立请求消息， 并选定密钥 A， 该密钥 A可以是 由目标基站标识衍生的密钥， 或者发送所述 RRC重建立请求消息的用户终端所 在的小区对应的目标小区物理标识衍生的密钥， 或者所述 RRC重建立请求消息 携带的小区物理标识衍生的密钥； 及
[87] 发送单元 43， 用于发送衍生上述密钥 A所需的目标基站标识或目标小区物理标 识。
[88] 如图 5所示， 本发明实施例六提供一种密钥衍生设备， 该设备包括：
[89] 触发单元 51， 用于发起重建立过程， 并触发接收单元；
[90] 接收单元 52， 用于受到触发单元 51的触发吋， 接收目标基站标识和 /或目标小 区物理标识； 及
[91] 密钥衍生单元 53， 用于根据接收单元 52接收的目标基站标识或目标小区物理标 识衍生密钥。
[92] 如图 6所示， 本发明实施例七提供一种密钥衍生设备， 该设备包括第一单元 61 和第二单元 62。
[93] 其中， 第一单元 61用于接收源基站衍生的多个密钥， 这里的密钥为与目标基站 下的小区相应的密钥。 第二单元 62， 用于获知用户设备请求接入的目标小区后 ， 选定与该目标小区相应的密钥。 进一步的， 这里第二单元 62选定的与目标小 区相应的密钥为源基站根据该目标小区的物理标识衍生的密钥。 [94] 进一步的， 第一单元 61接收的与目标基站下的小区相应的密钥是指源基站根据 目标基站下的小区的物理标识衍生的密钥。 例如， 源基站将根据各目标小区物 理标识衍生出的密钥全部发送给目标基站， 使得目标基站可以根据 UE要接入的 小区来选择与 UE通信所需的密钥， 则 UE接入新小区的成功率为 100%。 源基站 也可以按照某些条件选择发送给目标基站的密钥， 例如， 仅发送优先级较高的 小区的目标小区物理标识所衍生出的密钥。 源基站还可以按照某些条件来衍生 密钥， 例如仅根据优先级较低的小区的目标小区物理标识衍生密钥并发送给目 标基站， 从而使得 UE接入成功率提高， 基站发送的信息量也更少， 但 UE接入的 成功率将小于 100%。
[95] 进一步的， 第一单元 61还用于接收用户设备发送的无线资源控制 RRC重建立请 求消息。
[96] 进一步的， 该密钥衍生设备还可以包括第三单元 63， 该第三单元 63用于将目标 小区的物理标识发送给用户设备。
[97] 可选的， 本实施例提供的密钥衍生设备可以是基站。
[98] 如图 7所示， 本发明实施例八还提供另一种通信系统， 该通信系统括包括实施 例七提供的密钥衍生设备 71， 以及， 与该密钥衍生设备通信的用户设备 72。
[99] 进一步的， 该系统还可以包括移动性管理实体 MME73 , 该 MME73用于接收密 钥衍生设备发送给用户设备的目标小区的物理标识， 并将目标小区的物理标识 转发给用户设备。
[100] 进一步的， 该系统中的密钥衍生设备 71可以作为用户设备的目标基站。
[101] 本发明实施例九还提供一种通信系统， 该系统包括用户设备和网络侧设备， 其 中：
[102] 用户设备， 用于根据接收到的目标基站标识或目标小区物理标识衍生密钥； [103] 网络侧设备， 用于根据接收到的 RRC重建立请求消息， 从接收到的根据目标基 站标识和 /或目标小区物理标识衍生的至少一个密钥中选定密钥 A， 并发送衍生 上述密钥 A所需的目标基站标识或目标小区物理标识。
[104] 进一步的， 该系统还可以包括移动性管理实体 MME， 用于转发网络侧设备与 用户设备之间的通信信息， 例如将网络侧设备发送的目标基站标识或目标小区 物理标识转发给用户设备。
[105] 本领域普通技术人员可以理解实现上述实施例方法中的全部或部分流程， 是可 以通过计算机程序来指令相关的硬件来完成， 上述的程序可存储于一计算机可 读取存储介质中， 该程序在执行吋， 可包括如上述各方法的实施例的流程。 其 中， 上述的存储介质可为磁碟、 光盘、 只读存储记忆体 （Read-Only
Memory, ROM) 或随机存储记忆体 (Random Access Memory, RAM) 等。
[106] 本发明实施例提供的密钥衍生设备及通信系统能够保证 UE和网络侧使用的密 钥一致， 保证了 UE和网络侧的正常通信， 能够减少掉话率， 提高用户的感受度
[107] 以上仅是本发明的优选实施方式， 应当指出， 对于本技术领域的普通技术人员 来说， 在不脱离本发明原理的前提下， 还可以作出若干改进和润饰， 这些改进 和润饰也应视为本发明的保护范围。

Claims

权利要求书
[1] 一种密钥衍生方法， 其特征在于， 包括：
目标基站接收源基站衍生的多个密钥， 所述密钥为与所述目标基站下的小 区相应的密钥；
所述目标基站获知用户设备请求接入的目标小区后， 选定与所述目标小区 相应的密钥。
[2] 根据权利要求 1所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述与目标基站下的小区相应的 密钥包括：
根据所述目标基站下的小区的物理标识衍生的密钥。
[3] 根据权利要求 1或 2所述的方法， 其特征在于，
所述多个密钥为源基站根据所述目标基站下的全部小区的物理标识衍生的 密钥中的全部密钥或部分密钥； 其中， 所述部分密钥为所述源基站按照预 设条件选择发送给所述目标基站的密钥； 或者，
所述多个密钥为所述源基站根据所述目标基站下的部分优先级的小区的物 理标识衍生的密钥。
[4] 根据权利要求 1所述的方法， 其特征在于， 目标基站接收源基站发送的多个 密钥包括：
目标基站接收源基站发送的包括多个密钥的接入层消息； 或者， 目标基站接收移动性管理实体 MME发送的包括多个密钥的非接入层消息， 所述多个密钥由源基站提供给所述 MME。
[5] 根据权利要求 4所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述接入层消息为切换请求消息
[6] 根据权利要求 1所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述目标基站获知用户设备请求 接入的目标小区之后， 所述方法还包括：
所述目标基站接收用户设备发送的无线资源控制 RRC重建立请求消息。
[7] 根据权利要求 1所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述选定与所述目标小区相应的 密钥包括：
选定源基站根据所述目标小区的物理标识衍生的密钥。
[8] 根据权利要求 1所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述方法还包括： 所述目标基站将所述目标小区的物理标识发送给用户设备。
[9] 根据权利要求 8所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述目标基站将所述目标小区的 物理标识发送给用户设备包括：
所述目标基站发送包括所述目标小区的物理标识的系统广播； 或者， 所述目标基站发送包括所述目标小区的物理标识的 RRC重建立消息给所述 用户设备。
[10] 一种密钥衍生设备， 其特征在于， 包括：
第一单元， 用于接收源基站衍生的多个密钥， 所述密钥为与所述目标基站 下的小区相应的密钥； 及，
第二单元， 用于获知用户设备请求接入的目标小区后， 选定与所述目标小 区相应的密钥。
[11] 根据权利要求 10所述的密钥衍生设备， 其特征在于， 所述与目标基站下的 小区相应的密钥包括：
根据所述目标基站下的小区的物理标识衍生的密钥。
[12] 根据权利要求 10或 11所述的密钥衍生设备， 其特征在于，
所述多个密钥为源基站根据所述目标基站下的全部小区的物理标识衍生的 密钥中的全部密钥或部分密钥； 其中， 所述部分密钥为所述源基站按照预 设条件选择发送给所述目标基站的密钥； 或者，
所述多个密钥为所述源基站根据所述目标基站下的部分优先级的小区的物 理标识衍生的密钥。
[13] 根据权利要求 10所述的密钥衍生设备， 其特征在于， 所述第一单元还用于 接收所述用户设备发送的无线资源控制 RRC重建立请求消息。
[14] 根据权利要求 10所述的密钥衍生设备， 其特征在于， 所述与所述目标小区 相应的密钥为： 源基站根据所述目标小区的物理标识衍生的密钥。
[15] 根据权利要求 10所述的密钥衍生设备， 其特征在于， 还包括：
第三单元， 用于将所述目标小区的物理标识发送给所述用户设备。
[16] 根据权利要求 10所述的密钥衍生设备， 其特征在于，
所述密钥衍生设备为基站。
[17] 一种通信系统， 其特征在于， 包括如权利要求 10-16任一项所述的密钥衍生 设备， 和与所述密钥衍生设备通信的用户设备。
[18] 根据权利要求 17所述的系统， 其特征在于， 所述系统还包括： 移动性管理 实体 MME, 用于接收所述密钥衍生设备发送给所述用户设备的目标小区的 物理标识， 并将所述目标小区的物理标识转发给所述用户设备。
PCT/CN2009/072322 2008-06-23 2009-06-17 密钥衍生方法、设备及系统 Ceased WO2009155835A1 (zh)

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