WO2014119669A1 - ログ分析装置、情報処理方法及びプログラム - Google Patents
ログ分析装置、情報処理方法及びプログラム Download PDFInfo
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- WO2014119669A1 WO2014119669A1 PCT/JP2014/052134 JP2014052134W WO2014119669A1 WO 2014119669 A1 WO2014119669 A1 WO 2014119669A1 JP 2014052134 W JP2014052134 W JP 2014052134W WO 2014119669 A1 WO2014119669 A1 WO 2014119669A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
- H04L43/04—Processing captured monitoring data, e.g. for logfile generation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
- H04L63/1425—Traffic logging, e.g. anomaly detection
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a log analysis device, an information processing method, and a program, and more particularly to a technique for detecting an attack related to network security.
- Patent Document 1 discloses that a large number of logs output by an intrusion detection device that logs abnormal access on a network are based on a simultaneous correlation between events in consideration of differences in event types and addresses as event attributes. A method for facilitating monitoring and analysis by grouping a plurality of events is disclosed.
- An object of the present invention is to provide a log analysis device, an information processing method, and a program for causing a computer to execute a computer that can comprehensively determine the presence or absence of unauthorized access based on log information and traffic information from a plurality of communication devices. It is to be.
- a log analysis apparatus of the present invention is a log analysis apparatus that performs network security management, A log information collection unit that collects log information and traffic information output from a plurality of communication devices included in the network; A normalization processing unit that normalizes log information and traffic information collected by the log information collection unit; A log information analysis processing unit that extracts related log information and traffic information from normalized log information and traffic information, analyzes them according to a predetermined rule, and determines whether there is unauthorized access; An event information notification unit that outputs event information including information indicating importance based on a result determined by the log information analysis processing unit; It is the structure which has.
- the information processing method of the present invention is an information processing method by a log analysis device that performs network security management, Collecting log information and traffic information output from a plurality of communication devices included in the network; Normalize the collected log information and traffic information, Extract relevant log information and traffic information from normalized log information and traffic information and analyze them according to predetermined rules to determine whether there is unauthorized access, Event information including information indicating importance based on the result of the determination is output.
- the program of the present invention is provided on a computer that performs network security management.
- the computer is caused to execute a procedure for outputting event information including information indicating importance based on the result of the determination.
- the present invention it is possible to comprehensively determine the importance of a problem caused by a communication connection due to an unauthorized access attack based on log information and traffic information output from a plurality of communication devices in the network.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration example of a network in which the log analysis apparatus according to the present embodiment performs security management.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration example of the log analysis apparatus according to the present embodiment.
- FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating an example of a log format.
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart showing an operation procedure of the log analysis apparatus according to the present embodiment.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration example of a network in which the log analysis apparatus according to the present embodiment performs security management.
- a user IP network 30 includes a user terminal 11, a proxy server 12, a DNS (Domain Name System) server 13, a mail server 14, a file server 15, a Web server 16, an IPS (Intrusion Prevention System) 17, A firewall 18, a switch 19, and a router 20 are included.
- DNS Domain Name System
- IPS Internet Prevention System
- a firewall 18, a switch 19, and a router 20 are included.
- the case of a single user terminal 11 is described for the sake of simplicity, but a plurality of user terminals may be provided in the user IP network 30.
- a proxy server 12, a DNS (Domain Name System) server 13, a mail server 14, a file server 15, a web server 16, and a user terminal 11 are connected to the switch 19.
- the switch 19 is connected to the Internet via the IPS 17, the firewall 18 and the router 20.
- the IPS 17 and the firewall 18 prevent unauthorized access from the Internet side and attacks by viruses.
- a log analyzer 10 that performs security management of the user IP network 30 is connected to the router 20.
- an unauthorized person attacks the security weakness of the user terminal 11 to use the user terminal 11 illegally or alters the data in the user terminal 11. For example, it may be possible to disable the user terminal 11.
- the Internet connected to the router 20 is an example of an external network, and the external network is not limited to the Internet.
- the user IP network 30 is an example of a network that is a security management target, and may be any network that can transmit data according to the IP, such as a LAN (Local Area Network).
- the information communication device included in the user IP network 30 is not limited to the configuration shown in FIG.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration example of the log analysis apparatus according to the present embodiment.
- the log analysis apparatus 10 includes a control unit 51 and a storage unit 52.
- the control unit 51 includes a log information collection unit 100, a normalization processing unit 101, a log information analysis processing unit 103, an event information notification unit 104, and an external information collection unit 102.
- the control unit 51 is provided with a CPU (Central Processing Unit) (not shown) for executing processing according to a program and a memory (not shown) for storing the program.
- the log information collection unit 100, the normalization processing unit 101, the log information analysis processing unit 103, the event information notification unit 104, and the external information collection unit 102 shown in FIG. 10 is virtually configured.
- the log information collection unit 100 When the log information collection unit 100 receives log information from the router 20, the switch 19, the firewall 18, the IPS 17, the Web server 16, the file server 15, the mail server 14, the DNS server 13, and the proxy server 12, the log information collection unit 100 acquires the log information. Log information is stored in the storage unit 52 for each piece of device identification information. When the log information collection unit 100 receives the log information from the user terminal 11, the log information collection unit 100 stores the log information in the storage unit 52 corresponding to the user ID (identifier) and the device identification information acquired from the log information.
- the user ID is an identifier that is different for each user of the user terminal.
- the log information collection unit 100 when the log information collection unit 100 receives the traffic information from the router 20, the switch 19 or the like, the log information collection unit 100 stores the traffic information in the storage unit 52 for each piece of device identification information acquired from the traffic information.
- the device identification information is information for identifying a communication device that is a transmission source of log information or traffic information, and is different information for each communication device.
- the normalization processing unit 101 performs normalization on the log information and traffic information collected in the storage unit 52 so as to uniformly organize the information into a data format that the log information analysis processing unit 103 can easily search and analyze. Do.
- the format of the traffic information output from the router 20 may be different from the format of the traffic information output from the switch 19.
- the normalization processing unit 101 performs items (for example, transmission source IP address, destination IP address, transmission source port information, destination port) included in log information and traffic information in accordance with a predetermined common category rule.
- the log information and the traffic information are updated so that the information, protocol information, device identification information, user ID, etc.) match the format common to all devices.
- the normalization processing unit 101 assigns a connection identifier, which is a different identifier for each connection, to the log information or traffic information of the same IP connection, and stores the connection identifier in the storage unit 52.
- log information or traffic information is a user ID, a source IP address, a destination IP address, a source port information, a destination port information, If the protocol information is the same, it is determined that the connection is the same even if the device identification information is different.
- connection identification information a hash value can be calculated and used. An example of the log format is shown in FIG.
- the external information collection unit 102 uses a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) as a network address indicating a malicious site for the log information analysis processing unit 103 to use for determination of communication direction (packet transmission direction) and analysis of attacks.
- External information including a black list in which IP addresses are listed and a user IP address is acquired from the outside and stored in the storage unit 52.
- the black list may be stored in a server (not shown) connected to the Internet, or may be stored in a server in the user IP network 30.
- the user IP address can be acquired from the user terminal 11.
- the log information analysis processing unit 103 analyzes the normalized log information and traffic information based on a predetermined analysis rule, and obtains a plurality of scores that serve as an index of the degree of importance as to whether it is a threat to the user. The total of a plurality of scores is compared with a predetermined reference value, and it is determined whether there is unauthorized access based on the comparison result. When the total score is larger than the reference value, the log information analysis processing unit 103 determines that there is an unauthorized access that is a threat.
- a score calculation method based on two types of analysis rules will be described.
- the first analysis rule is to give a score by comprehensively judging from time-series log information and traffic information for a certain time.
- the log information analysis processing unit 103 extracts and refers to time-series log information and traffic information for a predetermined time from the time stamp information, and the user IP address is any of the items of the source IP address and the destination IP address.
- the direction of communication is determined depending on whether it is described in the item.
- the log information and the traffic information may include communication direction information. In this case, the log information analysis processing unit 103 may use the information.
- the log information analysis processing unit 103 analyzes the extracted log information and traffic information based on the analysis rule whether there is a specified event that is an event having a specified characteristic. As a result of the analysis, when the log information analysis processing unit 103 detects the specified event, the log information analysis processing unit 103 assigns a score corresponding to the number of occurrences (occurrence frequency) of the specified event within the specified time, and calculates the score based on the occurrence interval of the specified event.
- scoring is stipulated for detecting phenomena caused by various unauthorized accesses without omission, but scoring is not limited to the above five phenomena.
- the score increases as the occurrence frequency of the designated event increases, and the score increases as the occurrence interval of the designated event decreases. Further, the closer the occurrence order of a plurality of designated events and the occurrence interval for each designated event are to the predetermined occurrence order and occurrence interval, the higher the score. The shorter the time during which the specified event does not occur within the specified time, the greater the score.
- the second analysis rule specifies a plurality of communication processes of the same connection, and comprehensively determines based on the specified plurality of communication processes and gives a score.
- the log information analysis processing unit 103 extracts log information and traffic information for a predetermined time with reference to time stamp information, and refers to the connection identification information given to the extracted log information and traffic information. Then, the log information analysis processing unit 103 recognizes that the log information and the traffic information that match the referred connection identification information are due to an event based on the same connection, and analyzes the recognized log information and the traffic information based on the analysis rule. Thus, a score corresponding to the presence / absence of detection of the designated event is assigned to each communication device, and the total score of the plurality of communication devices is obtained.
- the log information analysis processing unit 103 refers to the device identification information included in the log information and the traffic information recognized as the same connection, analyzes the log information or the traffic information for each device identification information, As a result, when a designated event is detected, a score is given to the communication device corresponding to the device identification information, and when a designated event is not detected, no score is given.
- Correlation between log information and traffic information to be analyzed is performed by a time series of a fixed time in the first analysis rule, and by the same connection identification information in the second analysis rule.
- the log information analysis processing unit 103 determines whether the log information and the traffic information include the URL or IP address of the black list. When the URL or IP address is included in the log information or traffic information, a predetermined value is added to the score.
- the event information notification unit 104 Based on the determination result of the log information analysis processing unit 103, the event information notification unit 104 outputs event information including total score information as information indicating the degree of importance regarding unauthorized access. In addition, when the log information analysis processing unit 103 determines that unauthorized access has been detected, the event information notification unit 104 notifies the security administrator that there is a risk that is greater than or equal to a predetermined threat level regarding unauthorized access.
- the log information and traffic information of a plurality of communication devices determined to be events based on the same connection are associated with the event information and output as related information.
- the event information notification unit 104 displays the event information on a display device (not shown) connected to the log analysis device 10 in order to warn the security administrator.
- the security administrator can determine whether or not there is a possibility of unauthorized access based on the total score included in the event information by referring to the event information output to the display device. Further, when the related information is attached to the event information, the security administrator can recognize that the unauthorized access as a threat has been detected and analyze the related information in detail.
- an information terminal (not shown) that can be operated by the security administrator is connected to the Internet, and the information terminal can communicate with the log analysis device 10. It only has to be.
- the event information notification unit 104 may transmit the event information to the information terminal via the router 20 and the Internet.
- the log information collection unit 100 when the CPU executes the program, the log information collection unit 100, the normalization processing unit 101, the log information analysis processing unit 103, the event information notification unit 104, and the external information collection unit 102 are virtually Although described in the case of the configuration, a part or all of these configurations may be configured by a dedicated circuit corresponding to each function.
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart showing an operation procedure of the log analysis apparatus of this embodiment.
- a display device (not shown) is connected to the log analysis device 10 and that the security administrator can operate the log analysis device 10.
- the firewall 18 and the IPS 17 monitor passing IP packets and transmit log information acquired from the IP packets to the log analyzer 10 via the router 20.
- the router 20 and the switch 19 transmit the information of the IP packet to be transferred to the log analysis device 10 as Netflow, sFlow (registered trademark) or traffic information of the IP packet.
- the proxy server 12, the DNS server 13, the mail server 14, the file server 15, the web server 16, and the user terminal 11 transmit access-related log information to the log analysis device 10.
- the log information collection unit 100 of the log analysis apparatus 10 collects log information and traffic information from communication devices in the user IP network 30, the information is stored in the storage unit 52 (step 201).
- the user terminal 11 is attacked by an attacker's information terminal via the Internet, is infected with a virus, and is in a “Bot” state operated by the attacker. It is assumed that an IP connection including an instruction from an attacker is transferred from the Internet side in the order of the user terminal 11 via the router 20, the firewall 18, the IPS 17, the switch 19, and the proxy server 12. At this time, regarding this IP connection, traffic information is transmitted from the router 20 and the switch 19 to the log analysis device 10, and log information is transmitted from the firewall 18, IPS 17, Proxy server 12, and user terminal 11 to the log analysis device 10.
- IP connection including an instruction from an attacker is transferred from the Internet side in the order of the user terminal 11 via the router 20, the firewall 18, the IPS 17, the switch 19, and the proxy server 12.
- traffic information is transmitted from the router 20 and the switch 19 to the log analysis device 10
- log information is transmitted from the firewall 18, IPS 17, Proxy server 12, and user terminal 11 to the log analysis device 10.
- the normalization processing unit 101 adds the user ID of the user terminal 11 and the connection identification information of this IP connection to the traffic information and log information related to the IP connection including the instruction from the attacker (step 202). Subsequently, the log information analysis processing unit 103 extracts the log information of the firewall 18 and the proxy server 12 with respect to the IP connection that matches the characteristic of the possibility of a specific attack in IPS 17, and based on the analysis rule. Then, it is analyzed whether it corresponds to the IP connection having the characteristics of the designated event. If the log information analysis processing unit 103 determines that the IP connection is applicable, the log information analysis processing unit 103 assigns a score.
- the log information analysis processing unit 103 performs the user-agent based on the analysis rule on the traffic information output from the router 20 and the switch 19 with respect to the IP connection suitable for the characteristic with the possibility of a specific attack. Analyzes abnormalities such as HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol) header abnormalities, and performs scoring when it is determined as abnormal.
- HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
- the log information analysis processing unit 103 performs the score based on the log information of the IPS 17, the score based on the log information of the firewall 18, the score based on the log information of the proxy server 12, and the traffic output from the router 20 and the switch 19. Find the total score for the information.
- the total score increases as the number of communication devices determined that the IP connection has a higher possibility of a specific attack.
- the possibility of unauthorized access is comprehensively determined by combining the score determined from the log information and traffic information output from multiple communication devices with regard to the threat level related to a connection that may be attacked. Is done.
- step 203 the case of another analysis rule in step 203 will be described.
- the log information analysis processing unit 103 analyzes the time-series log information and traffic information in a fixed time such as 24 hours or one week, thereby scoring corresponding to the number of times that the specified event has occurred within the specified time, the specified event Scoring based on the occurrence interval, scoring based on the order in which multiple specified events occurred and the occurrence interval for each specified event, scoring based on the time that the specified event does not occur within the specified time, for each of the specified items The scoring is performed based on the result of comparing the sum of the specified time. Subsequently, the log information analysis processing unit 103 obtains the sum of these scores.
- the log information analysis processing unit 103 may obtain a score based on each of these two types of analysis rules, and the larger one may be the processing result of step 203. .
- the log information analysis processing unit 103 determines whether the log information and traffic information include a blacklist URL or IP address (step 204). When the URL or IP address of the black list is included in the log information or traffic information, the log information analysis processing unit 103 adds a predetermined value to the score (step 205), and the URL and IP address of the black list are logged. If not included in the information and traffic information, the process proceeds to step 206.
- the log information analysis processing unit 103 compares the total score with a predetermined reference value, and determines whether the total score is larger than the reference value. (Step 206). If the total score is less than or equal to the reference value, the log information analysis processing unit 103 ends the process without doing anything. As a result of the determination in step 206, if the total score value is less than or equal to the reference value, the event information notification unit 104 outputs the event information to a display device (not shown) (step 207). As a result of the determination in step 206, when the total score value is larger than the reference value, the event information notification unit 104 outputs the related information together with the event information to the display device (not shown) (step 208).
- the log analyzer 10 repeats the procedure shown in FIG.
- the log information analysis processing unit 103 when analyzing time-series log information and traffic information in a fixed time in the process of step 203, the log information analysis processing unit 103 includes a transmission source IP address and a destination IP included in the log information and traffic information for one week. Scoring is performed corresponding to the difference in the amount of transmission / reception between addresses, and information leakage attack connection candidates are extracted. This is because if the transmission amount is extremely large compared to the reception amount when the transmission source IP address is the user IP address, it is considered that information leakage has occurred from the user terminal 11 to the outside. In this case, the score value increases.
- By analyzing log information and traffic information of a plurality of communication devices for the same fixed time for the extracted attack connection candidates in the same manner it is possible to output a determination result indicating a threat level.
- related log information and traffic information are extracted from log information and traffic information output from a plurality of communication devices in the network, and a plurality of log information and traffic information are extracted according to a predetermined analysis rule.
- a program describing a procedure for executing the information processing method of the present invention may be installed in a computer, and the computer may execute the information processing method of the present invention.
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Abstract
Description
前記ネットワークに含まれる複数の通信機器から出力されるログ情報及びトラフィック情報を収集するログ情報収集部と、
前記ログ情報収集部が収集したログ情報及びトラフィック情報を正規化する正規化処理部と、
正規化されたログ情報及びトラフィック情報から関連するログ情報及びトラフィック情報を抽出して予め決められたルールにしたがって分析し、不正アクセスがあるか否かを判定するログ情報分析処理部と、
前記ログ情報分析処理部が判定した結果に基づく、重要度を示す情報を含むイベント情報を出力するイベント情報通知部と、
を有する構成である。
前記ネットワークに含まれる複数の通信機器から出力されるログ情報及びトラフィック情報を収集し、
収集されたログ情報及びトラフィック情報を正規化し、
正規化されたログ情報及びトラフィック情報から関連するログ情報及びトラフィック情報を抽出して予め決められたルールにしたがって分析し、不正アクセスがあるか否かを判定し、
前記判定の結果に基づく、重要度を示す情報を含むイベント情報を出力するものである。
前記ネットワークに含まれる複数の通信機器から出力されるログ情報及びトラフィック情報を収集する手順と、
収集されたログ情報及びトラフィック情報を正規化する手順と、
正規化されたログ情報及びトラフィック情報から関連するログ情報及びトラフィック情報を抽出して予め決められたルールにしたがって分析し、不正アクセスがあるか否かを判定する手順と、
前記判定の結果に基づく、重要度を示す情報を含むイベント情報を出力する手順を前記コンピュータに実行させるものである。
11 ユーザ端末
12 Proxyサーバ
13 DNSサーバ
14 メールサーバ
15 ファイルサーバ
16 Webサーバ
17 IPS
18 ファイアーウォール
19 スイッチ
20 ルータ
100 ログ情報収集部
101 正規化処理部
102 外部情報収集部
103 ログ情報分析処理部
104 イベント情報通知部
Claims (8)
- ネットワークのセキュリティ管理を行うログ分析装置であって、
前記ネットワークに含まれる複数の通信機器から出力されるログ情報及びトラフィック情報を収集するログ情報収集部と、
前記ログ情報収集部が収集したログ情報及びトラフィック情報を正規化する正規化処理部と、
正規化されたログ情報及びトラフィック情報から関連するログ情報及びトラフィック情報を抽出して予め決められたルールにしたがって分析し、不正アクセスがあるか否かを判定するログ情報分析処理部と、
前記ログ情報分析処理部が判定した結果に基づく、重要度を示す情報を含むイベント情報を出力するイベント情報通知部と、
を有するログ分析装置。 - 請求項1に記載のログ分析装置において、
前記正規化処理部は、
収集された前記ログ情報及びトラフィック情報を予め決められた共通カテゴリールールに従って正規化し、正規化したログ情報及びトラフィック情報に含まれる複数の項目のうち、所定の項目が共通するログ情報及びトラフィック情報を同一のコネクションと特定し、コネクション毎に異なる識別子であるコネクション識別情報を該ログ情報及びトラフィック情報に付与する、ログ分析装置。 - 請求項2に記載のログ分析装置において、
前記ログ情報分析処理部は、
前記正規化されたログ情報及びトラフィック情報から一定時間内に収集されたログ情報及びトラフィック情報を抽出し、抽出したログ情報及びトラフィック情報に付与された前記コネクション識別情報を参照し、該コネクション識別情報が一致するログ情報及びトラフィック情報を同一コネクションに基づくイベントによるものと認識し、認識したログ情報及びトラフィック情報を前記ルールに基づいて分析することで、指定された特徴を持つイベントである指定イベントの検出の有無に応じたスコアを前記通信機器毎に付与し、付与したスコアの合計を求める、ログ分析装置。 - 請求項1に記載のログ分析装置において、
前記ログ情報分析処理部は、
前記正規化されたログ情報及びトラフィック情報から一定時間の時系列のログ情報及びトラフィック情報を抽出し、抽出したログ情報及びトラフィック情報を前記ルールに基づいて分析し、指定された特徴を持つイベントである指定イベントを検出すると、少なくとも、該指定イベントが指定時間内に発生した回数に対応するスコア、該指定イベントの発生間隔に基づくスコア、複数の該指定イベントが発生した順序及び指定イベント毎の発生間隔に基づくスコア、該指定イベントが指定時間内に発生しない時間に基づくスコア、及び複数の指定された項目毎に指定時間で足し合わせた量を比較した結果に基づくスコアの合計を求める、ログ分析装置。 - 請求項3又は4に記載のログ分析装置において、
悪質なサイトを示すネットワークアドレスが列挙されたブラックリストを外部から取得する外部情報収集部をさらに有し、
前記ログ情報分析処理部は、
前記ログ情報又はトラフィック情報に含まれるネットワークアドレスが前記ブラックリストに含まれていると、前記スコアの合計に所定の値を加算して前記スコアの合計を更新する、ログ分析装置。 - 請求項4に記載のログ分析装置において、
前記ログ情報分析処理部は、
前記スコアの合計と予め決められた基準値とを比較し、該スコアの合計が該基準値よりも大きいと不正アクセスがあると判定し、
前記イベント情報通知部は、
前記重要度を示す情報として前記スコアの合計の情報を含む前記イベント情報を出力し、前記ログ情報分析処理部により不正アクセスがあると判定された場合、同一のイベントに基づくログ情報及びトラフィック情報を関連情報として前記イベント情報と共に出力する、ログ分析装置。 - ネットワークのセキュリティ管理を行うログ分析装置による情報処理方法であって、
前記ネットワークに含まれる複数の通信機器から出力されるログ情報及びトラフィック情報を収集し、
収集されたログ情報及びトラフィック情報を正規化し、
正規化されたログ情報及びトラフィック情報から関連するログ情報及びトラフィック情報を抽出して予め決められたルールにしたがって分析し、不正アクセスがあるか否かを判定し、
前記判定の結果に基づく、重要度を示す情報を含むイベント情報を出力する、情報処理方法。 - ネットワークのセキュリティ管理を行うコンピュータに、
前記ネットワークに含まれる複数の通信機器から出力されるログ情報及びトラフィック情報を収集する手順と、
収集されたログ情報及びトラフィック情報を正規化する手順と、
正規化されたログ情報及びトラフィック情報から関連するログ情報及びトラフィック情報を抽出して予め決められたルールにしたがって分析し、不正アクセスがあるか否かを判定する手順と、
前記判定の結果に基づく、重要度を示す情報を含むイベント情報を出力する手順を前記コンピュータに実行させるためのプログラム。
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| US20150341389A1 (en) | 2015-11-26 |
| EP2953298A4 (en) | 2016-11-16 |
| EP2953298A1 (en) | 2015-12-09 |
| US9860278B2 (en) | 2018-01-02 |
| EP2953298B1 (en) | 2018-03-21 |
| CN104937886A (zh) | 2015-09-23 |
| CN104937886B (zh) | 2017-10-24 |
| JP6001689B2 (ja) | 2016-10-05 |
| JPWO2014119669A1 (ja) | 2017-01-26 |
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