WO2015061941A1 - 一种密钥配置方法和装置 - Google Patents

一种密钥配置方法和装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2015061941A1
WO2015061941A1 PCT/CN2013/086063 CN2013086063W WO2015061941A1 WO 2015061941 A1 WO2015061941 A1 WO 2015061941A1 CN 2013086063 W CN2013086063 W CN 2013086063W WO 2015061941 A1 WO2015061941 A1 WO 2015061941A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
shared key
shared
obtaining
password
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/CN2013/086063
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
庞高昆
丁志明
陆苏
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Huawei Device Co Ltd
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Huawei Device Co Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Huawei Device Co Ltd filed Critical Huawei Device Co Ltd
Priority to PCT/CN2013/086063 priority Critical patent/WO2015061941A1/zh
Priority to CN201380080486.8A priority patent/CN105684344B/zh
Priority to EP13896356.6A priority patent/EP3051744B1/en
Publication of WO2015061941A1 publication Critical patent/WO2015061941A1/zh
Priority to US15/139,749 priority patent/US10003966B2/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/002Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0827Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving distinctive intermediate devices or communication paths
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0841Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0863Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving passwords or one-time passwords
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/50Secure pairing of devices
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/80Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80Wireless
    • H04L2209/805Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/062Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying encryption of the keys
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/18Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security using different networks or channels, e.g. using out of band channels
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06Authentication
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00Connection management
    • H04W76/10Connection setup
    • H04W76/14Direct-mode setup

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of network communication technologies, and in particular, to a key configuration method and apparatus.
  • WiFi Wireless Fidelity, Wireless Fidelity Technology from the 1997 Wireless LAN Standard IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics) Engineers, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, since the release of 802.11, has been driven by the WiFi alliance of many leading companies in the industry, and has developed rapidly due to its rapid deployment, convenient use and high transmission rate.
  • WiFi technology is now widely used in various industries, now laptops, PDAs (Personal Digital WiFi technology is supported by Assistant, Pocket PC and mobile phones.
  • the access points of WiFi networks are spread throughout hotels, cafes, schools and hospitals. It can be said that WiFi technology is ubiquitous in life.
  • WPS WiFi Protected Setup
  • WiFi security is established
  • WPS WiFi Protected
  • the WPS application scenarios mainly include the following two types: the first one is an enrollee (registered party) terminal and the registrar (register) AP (Access)
  • the key is configured between the point and the access point so that subsequent terminals and the AP can perform data interaction based on the configured key.
  • the second is P2P (Peer to Peer, point-to-point authentication configuration process, P2P in WiFi technology is researched to enable end-to-end direct discovery between WiFi devices without the infrastructure such as cellular or hotspots.
  • one terminal acts as the client (client) and the other terminal acts as the GO (Group). Owner, the device of the leader), the key is configured between the client and the GO, so that the subsequent client and the GO can perform data interaction based on the configured key.
  • the key configuration method used in the prior art is mainly based on a key exchange algorithm, that is, the first device and the second device respectively generate a pair of public and private keys, and the first device and the second device exchange public keys through the air interface, that is, the first The device sends the public key to the second device through the air interface, and the second device sends the public key to the first device through the air interface.
  • the first device and the second device respectively generate the shared secret by using the public key of the other party and the private key of the second device. Key, and use the shared key for subsequent secure transmission.
  • the above-mentioned key configuration manner in the prior art is relatively vulnerable to attacks.
  • the attacker can easily intercept the public key sent between the devices in the air interface, and use the public key to perform the above-mentioned key with the first device and the second device respectively.
  • the switching algorithm that is, pretending that the second device establishes a secure connection with the first device, and pretending that the first device establishes a secure connection with the second device, so that the message sent between the first device and the second device is monitored by the attacker.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a key configuration method and apparatus for improving the security of interaction between a first device and a second device.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for configuring a key, where the method includes:
  • the first device acquires the public key of the second device through the secure medium
  • the first device sends information for obtaining the shared key to the second device;
  • the second device obtains the shared key by using its own private key and the information for obtaining the shared key
  • the first device obtains the shared key by using the information for obtaining a shared key or its own private key.
  • the acquiring, by the first device, the public key of the second device by using the security medium includes:
  • the first device acquires the public key of the second device from the second device by scanning the identifier, the USB mode, or the near field communication NFC.
  • the information used to obtain the shared key is specifically: a password generated by the first device;
  • the obtaining, by the first device, the shared key by using the information for obtaining a shared key comprises: the first device using the password as a shared key;
  • the first device sends the information for obtaining the shared key to the second device, where the first device encrypts the password and sends the password to the second device by using the public key of the second device;
  • the obtaining, by the second device, the shared key by using the private key of the second device and the information for obtaining the shared key includes: the second device uses the private key of the second device and the information generating device for obtaining the shared key
  • the shared key includes: the second device decrypts the encryption result by using its own private key to obtain the password, and uses the password as a shared key.
  • the information used to obtain the shared key is specifically: a public key of the first device;
  • the sending, by the first device, the information for obtaining the shared key to the second device includes: the first device encrypting the public key of the first device by using the public key of the second device, and sending the encrypted result to the first Two devices;
  • the obtaining, by the second device, the shared key by using the private key of the second device and the information for obtaining the shared key includes: after the second device decrypts the encrypted result by using the private key of the second device, Decoding a public key of the first device, and generating a password, using the password as a shared key, encrypting the password by using the public key of the first device, and transmitting the encrypted result to the first device;
  • the obtaining, by the first device, the shared key by using the private key of the first device includes: after the first device decrypts the received encryption result by using the private key of the first device, the obtained password is used as a shared key.
  • the first device and the second device reserve a key exchange algorithm
  • the information used to obtain the shared key is specifically: a public key of the first device;
  • the obtaining, by the first device, the shared key by using the private key of the first device includes: the first device generating a shared key according to the key exchange algorithm by using a public key of the second device and a private key thereof;
  • the obtaining, by the second device, the shared key by using the private key of the second device and the information for obtaining the shared key comprises: the second device using the public key of the first device and the private key of the second device according to the secret
  • the key exchange algorithm generates a shared key.
  • the first device and the second device perform a secure connection by using the shared key or a derived key of the shared key.
  • the method further includes:
  • the first device After obtaining the shared key, the first device encrypts a password by using a shared key or a derived key of the shared key, and sends the encrypted result to the second device; so that the second device obtains the second device by using the second device.
  • the shared key or the derived key of the shared key decrypts the received encrypted result to obtain a password; the password is used for a secure connection between the first device and the second device; or
  • the second device After obtaining the shared key, the second device encrypts a password by using a shared key or a derived key of the shared key, and sends the encrypted result to the first device; the first device uses the shared secret generated by itself. The key decrypts the received encryption result to obtain a password; the password is used for a secure connection between the first device and the second device.
  • the method further includes: the first device and the second device predetermined key exchange algorithm include:
  • the first device and the second device are pre-configured with parameters used by the key exchange algorithm; or
  • the first device and the second device receive parameters used by the key exchange algorithm sent by a configuration device of a third party.
  • the sending, by the first device, information for obtaining the shared key to the second device includes:
  • the first device After the first device encrypts the public key of the first device by using the public key of the second device, the first device sends the encryption result to the second device;
  • the second device decrypts the encryption result to obtain a public key of the first device.
  • the method further includes:
  • the first device After obtaining the shared key, the first device generates a first verification value by using at least one of a shared key, a derived key of the shared key, or a plaintext agreed in advance with the second device, and sends the first verification value.
  • a first verification value by using at least one of a shared key, a derived key of the shared key, or a plaintext agreed in advance with the second device, and sends the first verification value.
  • the second device generates the second verification value by using the shared key obtained by the second device, the derived key of the shared key, or the at least one of the plaintext agreed in advance with the first device, and the generated second verification value is received and received.
  • the first verification value is compared, and if the two are consistent, the verification is passed. If the verification is passed, the second device uses the shared key or the shared key of the shared key and the A device makes a secure connection.
  • the method further includes: receiving, by the first device, the first verification value sent by the second device, where the first verification value is that the second device uses the shared key, the derived key of the shared key, or the first a verification value generated by at least one of the pre-agreed plaintext of the device;
  • the first device generates a second verification value by using at least one of a shared key obtained by the first device, a derived key of the shared key, or a plaintext agreed in advance with the second device, and the generated second verification value is received and received.
  • the first verification value is compared. If the two are consistent, the verification is passed. If the verification is passed, the first device performs the use of the shared key or the derived key of the shared key with the second device. Secure connection.
  • the first device sends the information used to obtain a shared key by using a first message in a WPS authentication process
  • the first device sends a trigger message to the second device to notify the second device to start the WPS authentication process, and sends the information used to obtain the shared key by using a second message in the WPS authentication process;
  • the first device sends the information for obtaining a shared key by a trigger message informing the second device to start a four-way handshake process.
  • a method of key configuration comprising:
  • the second device provides the public key of the second device to the first device through the security medium
  • the second device obtains the shared key by using its own private key and the information for obtaining the shared key;
  • the first device obtains the shared key by using the information for obtaining a shared key or its own private key.
  • the providing, by the second device, the public key of the second device to the first device by using the security medium includes:
  • the second device provides the public key of the second device to the first device by providing the identifier for scanning by the first device, USB mode or NFC.
  • the information used to obtain the shared key is specifically: a password generated by the first device;
  • the obtaining, by the first device, the shared key by using the information for obtaining a shared key comprises: the first device using the password as a shared key;
  • the receiving, by the first device, the information for obtaining the shared key includes: receiving an encryption result that is sent by the first device by using the public key of the second device to encrypt the password;
  • the obtaining the shared key by using the private key of the user and the information for obtaining the shared key comprises: the second device decrypting the encrypted result by using a private key of the second device to obtain the password, and the password is used.
  • the second device decrypting the encrypted result by using a private key of the second device to obtain the password, and the password is used.
  • the information used to obtain the shared key is specifically: a public key of the first device;
  • the receiving, by the first device, the information for obtaining the shared key includes: receiving an encryption result that is sent by the first device by using a public key of the second device to encrypt the public key of the first device;
  • the obtaining the shared key by using the private key of the user and the information for obtaining the shared key includes: the second device decrypting the encrypted result by using the private key of the second device, and obtaining the first device a public key, and generating a password, using the password as a shared key, encrypting the password by using the public key of the first device, and transmitting the encrypted result to the first device;
  • the obtaining, by the first device, the shared key by using the private key of the first device includes: after the first device decrypts the received encryption result by using the private key of the first device, the obtained password is used as a shared key.
  • the method further includes: the first device and the second device predetermining a key exchange algorithm
  • the information for obtaining the shared key is specifically: a public key of the first device;
  • the obtaining, by the first device, the shared key by using the private key of the first device includes: the first device generating a shared key according to the key exchange algorithm by using a public key of the second device and a private key thereof;
  • the obtaining the shared key by using the private key of the user and the information for obtaining the shared key comprises: using, by the second device, the public key of the first device and the private key of the first device according to the key exchange algorithm Generate a shared secret.
  • the first device and the second device perform a secure connection by using the shared key or the derived key of the shared key.
  • the method further includes:
  • the second device receives the encryption result obtained by encrypting a password by using the shared key or the derived key of the shared key after the first device obtains the shared key, and uses the obtained shared key pair to obtain the encrypted result. Decrypting to obtain the password; the password is used for a secure connection between the first device and the second device; or
  • the second device After generating the shared key, the second device encrypts a password by using a shared key or a derived key of the shared key, and sends the encrypted result to the first device; so that the first device utilizes the obtained shared secret.
  • the key decrypts the received encryption result to obtain a password; the password is used for a secure connection between the first device and the second device.
  • the first device and the second device predetermined key exchange algorithm include:
  • the first device and the second device are pre-configured with parameters used by the key exchange algorithm; or
  • the first device and the second device receive parameters used by the key exchange algorithm sent by a configuration device of a third party.
  • the receiving, by the first device, information for obtaining a shared key includes:
  • the second device receives an encryption result that is encrypted by the first device by using a public key of the second device to encrypt the public key of the first device;
  • the method further includes:
  • the first device After obtaining the shared key, the first device generates a first verification value by using at least one of a shared key, a derived key of the shared key, or a plaintext agreed in advance with the second device, and sends the first verification value.
  • a first verification value by using at least one of a shared key, a derived key of the shared key, or a plaintext agreed in advance with the second device, and sends the first verification value.
  • the second device generates a second verification value by using at least one of a shared key obtained by the second device, a derivative key of the shared key, or a plaintext agreed in advance with the first device, and the generated second verification value is The received first verification value is compared, if the two are consistent, the verification is passed, and in the case that the verification is passed, the second device uses the shared key or the shared key of the shared key and the first A device makes a secure connection.
  • the second device After the second device obtains the shared key, the second device generates a third verification value by using at least one of a shared key, a derived key of the shared key, or a plaintext agreed in advance with the first device.
  • the third verification value is sent to the first device;
  • the fourth verification value generated by the first device is generated by using the shared key obtained by the first device, the derived key of the shared key, or the at least one of the plaintext agreed in advance by the second device. Comparing with the received third verification value, if the two are consistent, the verification is passed, and in the case that the verification is passed, the first device uses the shared key or the shared key of the shared key and the first The second device makes a secure connection.
  • the second device receives the information used to obtain the shared key by using a first message in the WPS authentication process
  • the second device receives the information for obtaining the shared key by a trigger message informing the second device to start a four-way handshake process.
  • the present invention provides a device for key configuration, the device being located in a first device, the device comprising:
  • a security acquiring unit configured to acquire a public key of the second device by using a secure medium
  • a key processing unit configured to send information for obtaining the shared key to the second device, and obtain the shared key by using the information for obtaining the shared key or the private key of the same;
  • the information for obtaining the shared key is used by the second device to obtain a shared key in combination with its own private key.
  • the security acquiring unit is specifically configured to acquire the public key of the second device from the second device by scanning the identifier, USB, or NFC.
  • the key processing unit includes:
  • a first key generation subunit configured to generate a password, and use the password as a shared key
  • a first key transmission subunit configured to: after encrypting the password by using a public key of the second device, send the encryption result to the second device, where the second device uses the private key of the second device Decrypting the encrypted result results in the password and the password as a shared key.
  • the key processing unit includes:
  • a second key transmission subunit configured to encrypt the public key of the first device by using the public key of the second device, and send the encryption result to the second device;
  • the second key generation subunit is configured to decrypt the encryption result by using the private key of the second device after receiving the encryption result sent by the second device, and use the obtained password as the shared key.
  • the key processing unit includes:
  • a third key generation subunit configured to generate a shared key according to a predetermined key exchange algorithm of the first device and the second device by using a public key of the second device and a private key of the first device;
  • a third key transmission subunit configured to send the public key of the first device to the second device, so that the second device uses the public key of the first device and the private key of the second device according to the key exchange
  • the algorithm generates a shared key.
  • the shared key or the derived key of the shared key is used for a secure connection between the first device and the second device.
  • the third key generation subunit is further configured to: after obtaining the shared key, encrypt a password by using a shared key or a derived key of the shared key;
  • the third key transmission subunit is further configured to send the encryption result of the third key generation subunit to the second device;
  • the third key transmission subunit is further configured to receive an encryption result sent by the second device;
  • the third key generation subunit is further configured to decrypt the encryption result received by the third key transmission subunit by using the obtained shared key to obtain a password;
  • the password is used for a secure connection between the first device and the second device.
  • the apparatus further includes: a parameter configuration unit, configured to store a parameter used by the pre-configured key exchange algorithm, or receive and store a third-party configuration device The parameters used by the key exchange algorithm.
  • the security acquiring unit is further configured to acquire address information of the second device by using a secure medium
  • the key processing unit is configured to send information used to obtain the shared key to the second device according to the address information of the second device.
  • the third key transmission subunit is configured to use the public key of the second device when the public key of the first device is sent to the second device. After the public key of the first device is encrypted, the encryption result is sent to the second device, so that the second device decrypts the encryption result to obtain the public key of the first device.
  • the apparatus further includes: a first verification unit, configured to use the shared key, the shared key of the shared key after the key processing unit obtains the shared key Or generating a first verification value by using at least one of the plain texts pre-agreed by the second device, and sending the first verification value to the second device,
  • the second device generates the second verification value by using the shared key obtained by the second device, the derived key of the shared key, or the at least one of the plaintext agreed in advance with the first device, and the generated second verification value is received and received. And the first verification value is compared, if the two are consistent, the verification is passed, and in the case that the verification is passed, the second device uses the shared key or the shared key of the shared key and the first The device makes a secure connection.
  • the apparatus further includes: a second verification unit, configured to receive the shared key generated by the key processing unit after receiving the third verification value sent by the second device And generating, by the at least one of the derived key of the shared key or the plaintext agreed in advance by the second device, a fourth verification value, and comparing the generated fourth verification value with the received third verification value, if both If the verification is successful, the first device performs a secure connection with the second device by using the shared key or the derived key of the shared key, where the third verification value is After the second device obtains the shared key, it is generated by using the shared key, the derived key of the shared key, or at least one of the plaintext agreed in advance with the first device.
  • a second verification unit configured to receive the shared key generated by the key processing unit after receiving the third verification value sent by the second device And generating, by the at least one of the derived key of the shared key or the plaintext agreed in advance by the second device, a fourth verification value, and comparing the generated fourth verification value with the received third verification value,
  • the key processing unit is configured to send the information for obtaining a shared key by using a first message in a WPS authentication process;
  • the information for obtaining the shared key is transmitted by a trigger message informing the second device to start the four-way handshake process.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a device for configuring a key, where the device is located in a second device, where the device includes:
  • a security sending unit configured to provide a public key of the second device to the first device by using a secure medium
  • a key processing unit configured to obtain a shared key by using its own private key and information sent by the first device for obtaining the shared key
  • the first device obtains the shared key by using the information for obtaining a shared key or its own private key.
  • the security sending unit is specifically configured to provide the public key of the second device to the first device by providing an identifier for scanning by the first device, a USB manner, or an NFC manner.
  • the key processing unit specifically includes:
  • a first information transmission subunit configured to receive an encryption result obtained by encrypting a password generated by the first device by using a public key of the second device, sent by the first device;
  • a first key generation subunit configured to decrypt the encryption result by using a private key of the second device to obtain the password, and use the password as a shared key.
  • the key processing unit specifically includes:
  • a second information transmission subunit configured to receive an encryption result obtained by the first device encrypting the public key of the first device by using the public key of the second device; and sending the encrypted result obtained by the second key generation subunit to the Determining the first device, so that the first device decrypts the received encryption result by using its own private key, and uses the obtained password as a shared key;
  • a second key generation subunit configured to decrypt the encryption result received by the second information transmission subunit by using its own private key, obtain a public key of the first device, and generate a password, and use the password as The shared key is encrypted by using the public key of the first device to obtain an encryption result.
  • the key processing unit specifically includes:
  • a third information transmission subunit configured to receive a public key of the first device sent by the first device
  • a third key generation subunit configured to generate a shared key according to a predetermined key exchange algorithm of the first device and the second device by using a public key of the first device and a private key of the first device.
  • the shared key is used for a secure connection between the first device and the second device.
  • the third information transmission subunit is further configured to receive, by the first device, the shared key according to the key exchange algorithm by using the public key of the second device and the private key of the second device. After the key, the encryption result obtained by encrypting a password by using the shared key or the derived key of the shared key; the third key generation subunit is further configured to use the obtained shared key to transmit the third information to the third information Decrypting the encrypted result received by the unit to obtain the password, wherein the key is used for a secure connection between the first device and the second device; or
  • the third key generation subunit is further configured to: after obtaining the shared key, encrypt a password by using a shared key or a derived key of the shared key to obtain an encryption result; and the third information transmission subunit is further used Transmitting the encryption result generated by the third key generation subunit to the first device, so that the first device generates the shared secret according to the key exchange algorithm by using the public key of the second device and the private key of the second device. After the key, the received encryption result is decrypted to obtain the password, wherein the key is used for a secure connection between the first device and the second device.
  • the apparatus further includes: a parameter configuration unit, configured to store a parameter used by the pre-configured key exchange algorithm, or receive and store the The parameters used by the key exchange algorithm.
  • the third information transmission subunit is specifically configured to receive an encryption result that is encrypted by using the public key of the second device and encrypted by the public key of the first device, sent by the first device Decrypting the encrypted result to obtain a public key of the first device.
  • the device further includes: a first verification unit, configured to use the shared secret obtained by the key processing unit if receiving the first verification value sent by the first device Generating a second verification value by using at least one of a key, a derived key of the shared key, or a plaintext agreed in advance with the first device, and comparing the generated second verification value with the received first verification value, if If the two are consistent, the verification is passed.
  • the second device uses the shared key or the derived key of the shared key to perform a secure connection with the first device.
  • the device further includes:
  • a second verification unit configured to generate a third verification by using at least one of a shared key, a derived key of the shared key, or a plaintext pre-agreed with the first device after the key processing unit obtains the shared key a value, the third verification value is sent to the first device;
  • the fourth verification value generated by the first device is generated by using the shared key obtained by the first device, the derived key of the shared key, or the at least one of the plaintext agreed in advance by the second device. Comparing with the received third verification value, if the two are consistent, the verification is passed, and in the case that the verification is passed, the first device uses the shared key or the shared key of the shared key and the first The second device makes a secure connection.
  • the key processing unit is configured to obtain, by using a first message in a WPS authentication process, the information used to obtain a shared key;
  • the information for obtaining the shared key is obtained by a trigger message informing the second device to start the four-way handshake process.
  • the first device obtains the public key of the second device through the security medium, and ensures that the public key of the second device reaches the first device, and the first device can be based on the public device of the second device.
  • the key generates a shared key, which prevents the attacker from pretending to be a second device to establish a secure connection with the first device, so that the attacker cannot monitor the message between the first device and the second device, thereby improving the first device and the second device.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart of a key configuration method according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart of a key configuration method according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of a key configuration method according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart of a key configuration method according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a key configuration method according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart of a key configuration method according to Embodiment 6 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a key configuration method according to Embodiment 7 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic structural diagram of a key configuration apparatus in a first device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic structural diagram of a second key configuration apparatus in a first device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic structural diagram of a third key configuration apparatus in a first device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic structural diagram of a key configuration apparatus in a second device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 12 is a schematic structural diagram of a second key configuration apparatus in a second device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 13 is a schematic structural diagram of a third key configuration apparatus in a second device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 14 is a schematic structural diagram of hardware of a first device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 15 is a schematic structural diagram of hardware of a second device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the core idea of the present invention includes: the first device acquires the public key of the second device by using the security medium, and sends information for obtaining the shared key to the second device; and the second device uses the information for obtaining the shared key And obtaining a shared key with the private key of the self; wherein the first device obtains the shared key by using the information for obtaining the shared key or its own private key.
  • the present invention can perform the configuration of the shared key by means of key exchange, or can perform the configuration of the shared key without using the key exchange.
  • the methods provided by the present invention are described in detail below by several specific embodiments.
  • the key exchange is used to perform the configuration of the shared key, and the first device and the second device reserve a key exchange algorithm, and the key exchange algorithm is that the subsequent first device and the second device generate the share.
  • the algorithm used in the key may be, but not limited to, a DH algorithm, an RSA algorithm, or an EIGam algorithm. According to different key exchange algorithms, pre-shared parameters are different.
  • the manner of the parameters used by the shared key exchange algorithm may include, but is not limited to, the following two types: the first mode: configuring the parameters used by the key exchange algorithm on the first device and the second device in advance; the second manner: The parameters used by the key exchange algorithm are sent to the first device and the second device by the third party device.
  • the DH algorithm is taken as an example.
  • the first device and the second device share the parameters g and P in advance, and the parameters g and P are shared in the first device and the second device in advance, where P is a prime number. g is the original root of P.
  • both the first device and the second device have their own public and private keys, the public and private keys on the first device are PkeyA and keyA, respectively, and the public and private keys on the second device are PkeyB and keyB.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart of a key configuration method according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 1 , the process may include the following steps:
  • Step 101 The first device acquires the public key PkeyB of the second device by using a security medium.
  • the security medium described in this step is a medium that can ensure that the public key PkeyB of the second device can reach the first device without being intercepted by an attacker in the middle, and may include but not limited to the following: by scanning the identifier, Via USB (Universal Serial Bus (Universal Serial Bus) or NFC (Near Field Communication).
  • USB Universal Serial Bus
  • NFC Near Field Communication
  • a method for scanning an identification code is used.
  • the first device scans an identification code of the second device, and the identification code may be, for example, a two-dimensional code, a barcode, or the like, and the public key PkeyB of the second device is included in the identification code.
  • the device information of the second device which is mainly address information, may also include, but is not limited to, the following device information: UUID (Universally Unique Identifier, universal unique identifier, manufacturer, serial number, device capability, channel information, etc.
  • UUID Universalally Unique Identifier, universal unique identifier, manufacturer, serial number, device capability, channel information, etc.
  • the channel information can help the first device quickly discover the second device through the Wifi network, thereby speeding up the execution efficiency of step 103.
  • the device capability refers to the algorithm, authentication method, device role information, and device type information supported by the device.
  • the device role information refers to the role that the device plays when registering, and may be enrollee, registrar, client, or GO.
  • the device type information may be a wireless terminal (such as a Wifi terminal, a Bluetooth terminal, a Zigbee terminal, etc., such as a mobile phone, a computer, a sensor, etc.), an access point (an AP in a Wifi network, a Bluetooth gateway in a Bluetooth network, or a Zigbee network) It is an IoT gateway, etc.), sensor nodes, central nodes, and so on.
  • Step 102 The first device generates a shared key DHkeyA by using the public key PkeyB of the second device and the private key key A of the second device.
  • the first device generates a shared key DHkey according to a key exchange algorithm shared with the second device in advance.
  • a key exchange algorithm shared with the second device in advance.
  • the public key PkeyA of the first device is:
  • PkeyA (g ⁇ keyA) mod(P), where keyA is the private key of the first device and is a random number.
  • the public key PkeyB of the second device is:
  • keyB is the private key of the second device, and is also a random number.
  • the shared key DHkeyA generated by PkeyA and keyA is:
  • DHkeyA ((PkeyB) ⁇ keyA)mod(P).
  • Step 103 The first device sends its own public key PkeyA to the second device according to the device information of the second device (ie, the address information of the second device).
  • the public key PkeyA of the second device may be encrypted by using the public key PkeyB of the second device, and the encryption result is sent to the second device, so that security may be improved.
  • the first encryption method If the public key is a public key for asymmetric encryption, it can be used directly for encryption, and the corresponding private key needs to be used for decryption.
  • the second encryption method using partial information of the public key when encrypting, or encrypting the information based on the public key as a symmetric key, and decrypting is performed by using a symmetric key.
  • the public key is a public key for key exchange or a public key for asymmetric encryption.
  • Subsequent encryption and decryption processes may use one of the above two encryption methods depending on the specific situation.
  • the encryption used here is the second encryption method.
  • the first device may further generate a verification value by using the generated shared key DHkeyA, a derivative key of DHkeyA, and at least one of the plaintext (the plaintext and the second device pre-agreed), and send the verification value to the first Two devices for verification by the second device.
  • the manner in which the verification value is generated is pre-agreed with the second device, for example by means of generating a hash value.
  • the above-mentioned plaintext may be, but not limited to, the public key PkeyB of the second device, the parameter shared in advance with the second device, and the parameter included in the device information acquired from the second device (for example, the field value nonce generated by the second device). Part of the content of the message sent by the first device to the second device, and so on.
  • the embodiment of the present invention is not limited to the manner in which the derived key is generated, as long as the first device and the second device agree in advance on the manner in which the derived key is generated.
  • the first device may hash the public key PkeyB of the second device to obtain a hash value, and send the hash value as a verification value to the second device.
  • the first device may generate the verification value by combining the shared key DHkeyA with a parameter shared with the second device, and then send the verification value to the second device.
  • Step 104 The second device receives the public key PkeyA of the first device, and generates a shared key DHkeyB by using PkeyA and its own private key keyB.
  • the second device Before the step, if the first device sends the encryption result to the second device, the second device first decrypts the encryption result to obtain the public key PkeyA of the first device.
  • the manner of the public key (PkeyB, keyB) generated by the second device can ensure that the result of the encryption with the public key PkeyB can be decrypted. This method is prior art and will not be described here.
  • the shared key DHkeyB generated by the second device is:
  • DHkeyA DHkeyB.
  • the generated value is generated by using at least one of the generated shared key DHkeyB, the derived key of DHkeyB, and the plaintext (the plaintext is pre-agreed with the first device).
  • the generated verification value is compared with the received verification value. If the verification is successful, the second device can subsequently interact with the first device by using the shared key DHkeyB.
  • the second device may generate a verification value by using at least one of the generated shared key DHkeyB, the derived key of DHkeyB, and the plaintext (the plaintext is pre-agreed with the first device), and send the verification value to the first device.
  • the first device After receiving the verification value, the first device also generates a verification value by using at least one of the generated key of the shared key DHkeyA, DHkeyA, and the plaintext (the plaintext and the second device pre-agreed), and the verification value is generated. The comparison is performed with the received verification value. If the verification is successful, the first device can subsequently interact with the second device by using the shared key DHkeyA.
  • the key configuration mode provided in the first embodiment can be applied to the WPS authentication process and the four-way handshake process.
  • the following describes the WPS authentication process by using the second embodiment and the third embodiment respectively.
  • Embodiment 5 corresponds to a process used in the four-way handshake process for detailed description.
  • the key configuration is applied to the WPS authentication process.
  • the first device plays the registrar role in the WPS authentication process
  • the second device is the enrollee, or the first device is the GO, and the second device is the client.
  • M1 messages must be sent from enrollee or client.
  • the process of the key configuration method provided by the second embodiment of the present invention is as shown in FIG. 2, and includes the following steps:
  • Step 201 is the same as step 101.
  • Step 202 is the same as step 102.
  • Step 203 The first device sends a trigger message to the second device.
  • the triggering message is used to notify the second device to start key configuration, and the triggering message may be included in other messages, such as being included in the discovery message or the broadcast message, for example, if the first device is an AP, it may be sent by using a broadcast message. If the first device is a wireless terminal, it can be sent by a discovery message.
  • Step 204 The second device sends an M1 message to the first device.
  • the M1 message includes a version number, a field value Nonce2 generated by the second device, and device information of the second device.
  • the second device may also send a verification value generated by using its own public key PkeyB, for example, a hash value of PkeyB, for the first device to perform verification. If the first device receives the verification value, the verification value is first generated by using the public key PkeyB of the second device, and the generated verification value is compared with the received verification value. If the verification is consistent, the verification is passed, and step 205 is performed.
  • a verification value generated by using its own public key PkeyB for example, a hash value of PkeyB
  • Step 205 The first device generates a derivative key by using DHkeyA, the field value Nonce2 of the second device, and the field value Nonce1 generated by the first device.
  • the shared key DHkeyA, the field value Nonce2 of the second device, and the field value Nonce1 generated by the first device may be used to generate the derived key, which may be as follows:
  • KDK HMAC-SHA-256 DHKey A (Nonce2
  • AuthKey
  • EMSK kdf(KDK, "Wi-Fi Easy And Secure Key Derivation", 640), ie AuthKey, KeyWrapKey, EMSK is the KDK combined string "Wi-Fi Easy And Secure Key Derivation" is a 640-bit key generated by iteration.
  • AuthKey takes 256 bits
  • KeyWrapKey takes 128 bits
  • EMSK takes 256 bits.
  • KDK, AuthKey KeyWrapKey and EMSK can be used as derived keys for shared keys.
  • Step 206 The first device sends an M2 message to the second device, where the M2 message includes public keys PkeyA, Nonce1 and Nonce2 of the first device.
  • the first device may further generate a verification value by using an M1 message and an M2 message in combination with the Authkey, for example, generating a hash value for verification by the second device. If the verification value is sent through the M2 message, the M2 message generating the verification value is the M2 message when the verification value is not included.
  • Step 207 The second device generates a shared key DHkeyB by using the public key PkeyA of the first device and its own private key keyB, and generates a derived key by using DHkeyB, Nonce1, and Nonce2.
  • step 205 The manner in which the derived key is generated herein can be referred to the description in step 205.
  • the second device receives the verification value, the M1 message, the M2 message (the M2 message without the verification value) is also used to generate the verification value in combination with the calculated derivative key Authkey, and the generated verification value is compared with the received verification value. If the verification is successful, the second device can subsequently interact with the first device by using the shared key DHkeyB.
  • the second device may further generate the verification value by using the Authkey, M2 message and the completion message generated by the self-generated Authkey, the M2 message, and the verification message, and send the verification value to the first device for verification, and the completion message used to generate the verification value is a verification value. Complete the message.
  • the first device uses the Authkey, M2 message and the completion message generated by the self-generated authentication value to compare the verification value generated by the first device with the received verification value. If the verification is consistent, the first device follows.
  • the shared key DHkeyB or the derived key of the shared key may be used to interact with the second device.
  • the first device may obtain the field value Nonce2 of the second device while acquiring the public key of the second device in step 201, so that the second device is in the M1 message sent to the first device. It is no longer possible to carry Nonce 2, in which case step 205 can be performed after step 202.
  • the key configuration is still applied to the WPS authentication process.
  • the first device is enrollee in the WPS authentication process and the registrar is in the WPS authentication process.
  • M1 messages must be sent from enrollee.
  • the process of the key configuration method provided in Embodiment 3 of the present invention is as shown in FIG. 3, and includes the following steps:
  • Step 301 is the same as step 101.
  • Step 302 is the same as step 102.
  • Step 303 The first device sends an M1 message to the second device, where the M1 message includes at least the public key PkeyA of the first device and the field value Nonce1 generated by the first device. It may also include a version number, device information of the first device, and the like.
  • Step 304 The second device generates a shared key DHkeyB by using the public key PkeyA of the first device and the private key key B of the first device, and generates a derivative key by using DHkeyB, the field value Nonce2 of the second device, and the field value Nonce1 generated by the first device. .
  • Step 305 The second device sends an M2 message to the first device, where the M2 message includes Nonce2 and Nonce1.
  • the second device may further generate a verification value by using an M1 message and an M2 message in combination with the Authkey, for example, generating a hash value for verification by the first device. If the verification value is sent through the M2 message, the M2 message generating the verification value is the M2 message when the verification value is not included.
  • Step 306 The first device generates a derived key by using DHkeyA, Nonce2, and Nonce1.
  • the M1 message, the M2 message are also used to generate the verification value in combination with the calculated derived key Authkey, and the generated verification value is compared with the received verification value. If the verification is successful, the first device can subsequently interact with the second device by using the shared key DHkeyB.
  • the first device may further generate a verification value by using the Authkey, the M2 message, and the completion message generated by the first device, and send the verification value to the second device for verification by using the completion message, and the completion message used for generating the verification value is not including the verification value.
  • Complete the message After receiving the verification value, the second device uses the Authkey, M2 message and the completion message generated by the self-generated authentication value to compare the verification value generated by the second device with the received verification value. If the verification is consistent, the second device follows.
  • the shared key DHkeyB or the derived key of the shared key may be used to interact with the first device.
  • the field value Nonce2 of the second device may also be obtained, so that the second device is in the M2 message sent to the first device. It is no longer possible to carry Nonce 2, in which case step 306 can be performed after step 302.
  • the key configuration is applied to the four-way handshake process as an example. It is assumed that the first device plays the role of an Authenticator (authenticator) in the four-way handshake process, and the second device acts as a supplicant (applicant) in the four-way handshake process.
  • the M1 message must be sent by the Authenticator.
  • the process of the key configuration method provided in Embodiment 4 of the present invention is as shown in FIG. 4, and includes the following steps:
  • Step 401 is the same as step 101.
  • Step 402 is the same as step 102.
  • Step 403 The first device sends an M1 message to the second device, where the M1 message includes its own public key PkeyA and its own generated random number ANonce (AP random value).
  • Step 404 The second device generates a shared key DHkeyB by using PkeyA and its own private key keyB, and generates a PTK (Pairwise) by using a random number SNonce generated by itself and a DHkeyB and ANonce. Transient Key, paired temporary key).
  • the derived keys of SNonce, ANonce, and DHkeyB can also be utilized.
  • the specific manner of generating the PTK can be adopted in the existing manner, and is not limited herein.
  • Step 405 The second device sends an M2 message to the first device, where the M2 message includes SNonce and the MIC of the M2 message (Message Integrity Code, message integrity coding).
  • the MIC of the M2 message may be a hash key of the DHkeyB or DHkeyB combined with the hash value of the M2 message, or the derived key of the PTK combined with the hash value of the M2 message, and is mainly used for performing integrity check of the message.
  • Step 406 The first device generates the MIC by using the DHkeyA and the M2 message, and uses the generated MIC to verify the received MIC. If they are consistent, the PTK is generated by using SNonce, ANonce, and DHkeyA (or the authentication key of DHkeyA).
  • the MIC is generated in step 405 using the derived key of DHkeyB in conjunction with the M2 message
  • the MIC is generated using the derived key of the DHkeyA and the M2 message; if the MIC is utilizing the PTK in step 405 The derived key is generated in combination with the M2 message.
  • the PTK can be generated first, and the MIC is generated by using the derived key of the PTK and the M2 message, and then the received MIC is verified by using the generated MIC.
  • the PTK can be generated and the MIC generated to verify.
  • Step 407 The first device uses the PTK to encrypt the credential, and sends the encrypted credential and the MIC value of the M3 message to the second device.
  • the MIC value is generated by hashing with DHkeyA and M3 messages.
  • Step 408 The second device generates a MIC value by using the DHkeyB and M3 messages, and uses the generated MIC value to verify the received MIC. If the verification is passed, the PTK generated by the self-decryption is used to obtain the credential.
  • Step 409 The second device sends the M4 message and the MIC of the message to the first device for confirmation.
  • the four-way handshake between the first device and the second device is completed.
  • the sharing of the shared key is completed in step 404, and the first device and the second device can utilize the shared key or the shared key.
  • the derived key performs subsequent interaction, and the subsequent steps 405 and 409 are the inherent processes of the four-way handshake, except that the shared key is utilized in the interaction process.
  • the key configuration is applied to the four-way handshake process as an example. It is assumed that the role of the first device is supplicant during the four-way handshake, and the second device acts as an Authenticator. The M1 message in the four-way handshake process must be sent by the Authenticator. Based on this, the process of the key configuration method provided in Embodiment 5 of the present invention is as shown in FIG. 5, and includes the following steps:
  • Step 501 is the same as step 401.
  • Step 502 is the same as step 402.
  • Step 503 The first device sends a trigger message to the second device, where the trigger message includes the public key PkeyA of the first device, and the second device is notified to start the four-way handshake process.
  • Step 504 The second device generates a shared key by using PkeyA and its own private key keyB.
  • Step 505 The second device sends an M1 message to the first device, where the M1 message includes a random number ANonce generated by the second device.
  • Step 506 The first device generates a PTK by using ANonce and its own generated SNonce and DHkeyA.
  • Step 507 The first device sends the MIC of the SNonce and the M2 message to the second device by using the M2 message.
  • the MIC of the M2 message may be a hash key of the DHkeyA or DHkeyA combined with the hash value of the M2 message, or a derivative message of the PTK combined with the hash value of the M2 message, and is mainly used for performing integrity check of the message.
  • Step 508 The second device generates the MIC by using the DHkeyB and the M2 message, and uses the generated MIC to verify the received MIC. If they are consistent, the PTK is generated by using ANonce, SNonce, and DHkeyB.
  • the MIC is generated in step 507 using the derived key of DHkeyA in conjunction with the M2 message, the MIC is generated in step 508 using the derived key of DHkeyB in conjunction with the M2 message, and then verified. If the MIC is generated in step 507 using the derived key of the PTK in conjunction with the M2 message, then in step 508, the PT is formed, and then the MIC is generated using the derived key of the PTK and the M2 message, and then verified. Of course, in either case, the PTK can be generated and the MIC generated to verify.
  • Step 509 The second device uses the PTK to encrypt the credential, and sends the encrypted credential and the MIC value of the M3 message to the first device.
  • the MIC value of the M3 message is generated using DHkeyB and M3 messages.
  • Step 510 The first device generates a MIC value by using the DHkeyA and M3 messages, and uses the generated MIC value to verify the received MIC. If the verification is passed, the PTK generated by the self-decryption is used to obtain the credential.
  • Step 511 The first device sends an M4 message and the MIC of the message is confirmed to the second device.
  • step 504 the sharing of the shared key is completed in step 504, and the first device and the second device can use the shared key for subsequent interaction.
  • steps 505 and 511 are the inherent processes of the four-way handshake, except that the shared key is utilized during the interaction.
  • the generated share may be utilized by one party.
  • the key or the derived key of the shared key encrypts a password and sends it to the other party.
  • the password may be a credential or a session key, etc., may be randomly generated, or may be generated according to an algorithm. Limit it.
  • the other party uses the shared key generated by itself or the derived key of the shared key to decrypt the password, and the two parties can use the password or the derived key of the password to perform the subsequent interaction process.
  • the key is configured in a key exchange manner.
  • the first device and the second device respectively have a pair of public and private keys, that is, the first device has a public key PkeyA and a private key keyA, and the second The device has a public key PkeyB and a private key keyB.
  • the method for generating the public key is not specifically limited.
  • the feature is that the public key PkeyA can be used to decrypt the result.
  • the public key PkeyB can be used to encrypt the result.
  • the private key keyB is used for decryption.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart of a key configuration method according to Embodiment 6 of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 6, the method includes the following steps:
  • Step 601 is the same as step 101.
  • the process proceeds from steps 602 to 604.
  • Step 602 The first device encrypts a password by using the public key PkeyB of the second device, and sends the encryption result to the second device.
  • the password may be a credential or a session key, and may be randomly generated or generated according to an algorithm, and is not limited herein.
  • the encryption method in this step can adopt the first encryption method described in Embodiment 1.
  • the first device may generate a verification value by using the public key PkeyB of the second device, for example, generating a hash value of the PkeyB and sending the hash value to the second device.
  • the second device After receiving the verification value, the second device first generates the public key PkeyB. The verification value is compared with the received verification value. If they are consistent, it is determined that the verification is passed, and step 603 is continued.
  • Step 603 The second device decrypts the encryption result by using its own private key keyB to obtain a password.
  • Step 604 The first device and the second device perform subsequent interaction by using the password or the derived key of the password.
  • the first device is a registrar, an AP, a GO, or a central node. If the second device is a registrar, an AP, a GO, or a central node, the process is performed according to the process shown in Embodiment 7.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic flowchart of a key configuration method according to Embodiment 7 of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 7, the method includes:
  • Step 701 is the same as step 101.
  • Step 702 The first device sends its own public key PkeyA to the second device.
  • the first device may encrypt the PkeyA by using the public key PkeyB of the second device, and then send the PkeyA to the second device, and the second device decrypts the PkeyA by using the private key keyB of the second device.
  • the encryption here can adopt the first encryption method described in the first embodiment.
  • Step 703 The second device encrypts a password by using the public key PkeyA of the first device, and sends the encryption result to the first device.
  • the password may be a credential or a session key, and may be randomly generated or generated according to an algorithm, and is not limited herein.
  • the encryption here can adopt the first encryption method described in the first embodiment.
  • the second device may generate a verification value by using the public key PkeyA of the first device, for example, generating a hash value of the PkeyA and sending the hash value to the first device.
  • the first device After receiving the verification value, the first device first generates a verification value by using the public key PkeyA. The generated verification value is compared with the received verification value. If they are consistent, it is determined that the verification is passed, and step 704 is continued.
  • Step 704 The first device decrypts the encryption result by using its own private key keyA to obtain a password.
  • Step 705 The first device and the second device perform subsequent interaction by using the above-mentioned password or password derived key.
  • the method in the sixth embodiment or the seventh embodiment may be adopted.
  • the information used to obtain the shared key in the sixth embodiment is the password generated by the first device, and the information used to obtain the shared key in the seventh embodiment is the public key of the first device.
  • Embodiment 6 and Embodiment 7 can also be applied to the WPS authentication process or the four-way handshake process, and only need to share the shared key involved in the WPS authentication process or the four-way handshake process.
  • the password in the sixth embodiment or the seventh embodiment may be replaced by a password, and details are not described herein again.
  • FIG. 8 is a structural diagram of a key configuration apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the key configuration apparatus is located in a first device, and includes: a security acquiring unit 10 and a key processing unit 20.
  • the security obtaining unit 10 is configured to acquire a public key of the second device by using a secure medium.
  • the security acquiring unit 10 may acquire the public key of the second device from the second device by, but not limited to, scanning the identifier, USB, or NFC.
  • the security acquiring unit 10 scans the identifier of the second device, and the identifier may be, for example, a two-dimensional code, a barcode, or the like, and the public key PkeyB of the second device is included in the identifier.
  • the device information including the second device is mainly address information, and may include but is not limited to the following device information: UUID, manufacturer, serial number, device capability, channel information, and the like.
  • the device capability refers to the algorithm, authentication method, device role information, and device type information supported by the device.
  • the device role information refers to the role that the device plays when registering, and may be enrollee, registrar, client, or GO.
  • the device type information may be a wireless terminal (such as a Wifi terminal, a Bluetooth terminal, a Zigbee terminal, etc.), an access point (an AP in a Wifi network, a Bluetooth gateway in a Bluetooth network, an IoT gateway in a Zigbee network, etc.), Sensor node, central node, etc.
  • the key processing unit 20 is configured to transmit information for obtaining the shared key to the second device; and obtain the shared key by using the information for obtaining the shared key or the private key of the self.
  • the second device can obtain the shared key in combination with its own private key and information for obtaining the shared key.
  • the first device and the second device may perform the configuration of the shared key by means of a key exchange, or may perform the configuration of the shared key without using a key exchange. Therefore, the corresponding key processing unit 20 may adopt the following two Ways to achieve:
  • the first implementation manner no key exchange is used, which corresponds to the content described in Embodiments 6 and 7.
  • the structure of the key processing unit 20 may be two types:
  • the structure 1) may include a first key generation subunit 81 and a first key transmission subunit 82.
  • the first key generation sub-unit 81 is configured to generate a password and use the password as a shared key.
  • the password may be a credential or a session key, and may be randomly generated or generated according to an algorithm, and is not limited herein.
  • the first key transmission sub-unit 82 is configured to encrypt the password by using the public key of the second device, and then send the encryption result to the second device, so that the second device decrypts the encryption result by using the private key of the second device to obtain the password. Use the password as a shared secret.
  • the structure 2) may include a second key transmission subunit 83 and a third key transmission subunit 84.
  • the second key transmission sub-unit 83 is configured to encrypt the public key of the first device by using the public key of the second device, and then send the encryption result to the second device.
  • the second device After receiving the decryption result, the second device decrypts the encryption result by using its own private key to obtain the public key of the first device, generates a password, uses the password as a shared key, and then utilizes the first device. After the public key encrypts the password, the encrypted result is sent to the first device.
  • the second key generation sub-unit 84 decrypts the encryption result by using its own private key, and uses the obtained password as a shared key.
  • the second implementation the key exchange method.
  • the first device and the second device predetermine a key exchange algorithm, and the structure of the key processing unit 20 at this time includes a third key generation subunit 91 and a third key transmission subunit 92 as shown in FIG.
  • the third key generation subunit 91 is configured to generate a shared key according to a key exchange algorithm by using a public key of the second device and a private key of the first device.
  • the shared key algorithm may be, but not limited to, a DH algorithm, an RSA algorithm, or an EIGam algorithm.
  • the third key transmission sub-unit 92 is configured to send the public key of the first device to the second device, so that the second device generates the shared key according to the key exchange algorithm by using the public key of the first device and the private key of the second device.
  • the shared key DHkeyB ((PkeyA) ⁇ keyB)mod(P)
  • PkeyA is the public key of the first device
  • keyB is the private key of the second device, which is known by the D-H algorithm
  • DHkeyA DHkeyB.
  • the apparatus may further include a parameter configuration unit 30, configured to store parameters used by the pre-configured key exchange algorithm, or to receive and store a key exchange algorithm sent by the third-party configuration device. parameter. That is to say, the parameters used by the key exchange algorithm can be pre-shared in two ways. The first one is in a pre-configured manner, that is, the static configuration mode, and the second is in a manner that is sent by a third-party configuration device. .
  • the third key generation sub-unit 92 can also be used to utilize the shared key after generating the shared key, in addition to the secure interaction of the first device and the second device.
  • the derived key of the shared key encrypts a password
  • the third key transmission subunit 91 is further configured to send the encrypted result of the third key generating subunit 92 to the second device, for the second device to utilize the shared generation generated by itself.
  • the key is decrypted to obtain the password.
  • the first device and the second device can use the password for subsequent secure connection, where the password can be a credential or a session key. or,
  • the second device encrypts a password with the shared key generated by itself, and sends the password to the first device.
  • the third key transmission subunit 91 described above receives the encryption result sent by the second device.
  • the third key generation sub-unit 92 decrypts the encryption result received by the third key transmission sub-unit 91 using the generated shared key to obtain a password (not shown in this case).
  • the first device and the second device can use the password for subsequent secure connection, where the password can be a credential or a session key.
  • the second key transmission sub-unit 92 may use the public key pair of the second device when transmitting the public key of the first device to the second device. After the public key of the first device is encrypted, the encryption result is sent to the second device, so that the second device decrypts the encryption result to obtain the public key of the first device.
  • the second implementation described above corresponds to the content described in the first embodiment.
  • the security acquiring unit 10 can obtain the device information of the second device by using the security medium, where the device information can include the address information of the second device, and the key processing unit 20 can be configured according to the address of the second device.
  • the information is sent to the second device for the information obtained by the shared key.
  • the apparatus may further include a first verification unit 40, configured to use the shared key, the derived key of the shared key, or the second device after the key processing unit 20 generates the shared key. At least one of the pre-agreed plaintext generates a verification value, and the verification value is sent to the second device.
  • the second device After receiving the verification value, the second device generates the verification value by using the generated shared key, the derived key of the shared key, or the at least one of the plaintext agreed in advance with the first device, and generates the verification value and the received value. The obtained verification values are compared. If they are consistent, it is determined that the verification is passed, and the second device can subsequently interact with the first device by using the shared key.
  • the device may further include a second verification unit 50, configured to receive the verification value sent by the second device, and then utilize the verification value sent by the second device, because the first device may also receive the verification value sent by the second device.
  • the shared key generated by the key processing unit 20, the derived key of the shared key, or at least one of the plaintext agreed in advance with the second device generates a verification value, and compares the generated verification value with the received verification value. If the verification is successful, the first device may subsequently interact with the second device by using the shared key or the derived key of the shared key.
  • the key configuration method described above can be applied to the WPS authentication process and the four-way handshake process.
  • the key processing unit 20 can pass the first message in the WPS authentication process (ie, the M1 message). Sending information for obtaining the shared key; or transmitting, by the first device to the second device, a trigger message notifying the second device to start the WPS authentication process, and the key processing unit 20 passes the second message in the WPS authentication process ( That is, the M2 message) transmits information for obtaining the shared key.
  • the first message in the WPS authentication process ie, the M1 message
  • Sending information for obtaining the shared key or transmitting, by the first device to the second device, a trigger message notifying the second device to start the WPS authentication process, and the key processing unit 20 passes the second message in the WPS authentication process ( That is, the M2 message) transmits information for obtaining the shared key.
  • the key processing unit 20 may transmit information for obtaining the shared key through the first message in the four-way handshake process (ie, the M1 message); or, by notifying the second device to start
  • the trigger message of the four-way handshake process sends information for obtaining the shared key.
  • the specific information about which message is used to obtain the shared key is related to the role of the first device. For details, refer to the content described in Embodiment 2 to Embodiment 5. Let me repeat.
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic structural diagram of a key configuration apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the key configuration apparatus is located in a second device. As shown in FIG. 11, the apparatus includes: a security sending unit 01 and a key processing unit 02.
  • the security sending unit 01 is configured to provide the public key of the second device to the first device by using a secure medium. Specifically, the security sending unit 01 may provide the public key of the second device to the first device by providing the identifier for scanning by the first device, USB mode or NFC. For example, a method for providing an identification code for scanning by a first device is provided.
  • the second device is provided with an identification code, such as a two-dimensional code, a barcode, etc., and the public key PkeyB of the second device is included in the identification code.
  • the device information of the second device which is mainly address information, may also include, but is not limited to, the following device information: UUID, manufacturer, serial number, device capability, channel information, and the like.
  • the device capability refers to the algorithm, authentication method, device role information, and device type information supported by the device.
  • the device role information refers to the role that the device plays when registering, and may be enrollee, registrar, client, or GO.
  • the device type information may be a wireless terminal (such as a Wifi terminal, a Bluetooth terminal, a Zigbee terminal, etc.), an access point (an AP in a Wifi network, a Bluetooth gateway in a Bluetooth network, an IoT gateway in a Zigbee network, etc.), Sensor node, central node, etc.
  • the key processing unit 02 is configured to obtain the shared key by using its own private key and the information sent by the first device for obtaining the shared key.
  • the key processing unit 02 can be implemented in the following two manners according to the manner in which the first device sends the information for obtaining the shared key:
  • the structure 1) may include a first information transmission subunit 11 and a first key generation subunit 12.
  • the first information transmission sub-unit 11 is configured to receive an encryption result obtained by the first device encrypting the password generated by the first device by using the public key of the second device.
  • the first key generation subunit 12 is configured to decrypt the encryption result by using the private key of the second device to obtain a password, and use the password as a shared key.
  • the first implementation described above corresponds to the content described in Embodiment 6.
  • the structure 2) may include a second information transmission subunit 31 and a second key generation subunit 32.
  • the second information transmission subunit 31 receives the encryption result obtained by the first device encrypting the public key of the first device by using the public key of the second device; and sending the encryption result obtained by the second key generation subunit 32 to The first device, so that the first device decrypts the received encryption result by using its own private key, and uses the obtained password as a shared key.
  • a second key generation subunit 32 configured to decrypt the encryption result received by the second information transmission subunit by using its own private key, obtain a public key of the first device, and generate a password, and generate the password
  • the password is encrypted by using the public key of the first device to obtain an encryption result.
  • the second implementation manner is a key exchange method.
  • the first device and the second device reserve a key exchange algorithm, and the information used to obtain the shared key is the public key of the first device.
  • the structure of the key processing unit 02 in the mode as shown in FIG. 13 specifically includes a third information transmission subunit 21 and a third key generation subunit 22.
  • the third information transmission subunit 21 is configured to receive the public key of the first device sent by the first device, and the third key generation subunit 22 is configured to use the public key of the first device and the private key of the first device according to the key exchange.
  • the algorithm generates a shared key.
  • the shared key algorithm in the embodiment of the present invention may be, but not limited to, a DH algorithm, an RSA algorithm, or an EIGam algorithm.
  • the apparatus may further include: the parameter configuration unit 03 is configured to store parameters used by the pre-configured key exchange algorithm, or receive and store parameters used by the key exchange algorithm sent by the third-party configuration device. . That is to say, the parameters used by the key exchange algorithm can be pre-shared in two ways. The first one is in a pre-configured manner, that is, the static configuration mode, and the second is in a manner that is sent by a third-party configuration device. .
  • the third information transmission subunit 21 receives the first device in the second device and uses the public key of the second device, and the second device and the second device perform the subsequent secure connection.
  • the encryption result obtained by encrypting a password may be further encrypted by using the shared key or the derived key of the shared key; the third key generation subunit 22 generates by itself.
  • the shared key decrypts the encrypted result received by the third information transmission subunit 21 to obtain a password.
  • the subsequent first device and the second device may use the password for secure interaction, where the password may be a credential or a session key.
  • the third key generation sub-unit 22 encrypts a password with the shared key or the derived key of the shared key to obtain an encryption result.
  • the third information transmission sub-unit 21 sends the encryption result generated by the third key generation sub-unit 22 to the first device; the first device obtains the password by using the shared key for decryption (not shown in the case diagram)
  • the subsequent first device and the second device may use the password for secure interaction, where the password may be a credential or a session key.
  • the third information transmission sub-unit 21 is further configured to receive, by using the public key of the second device, the public key of the first device sent by the first device.
  • the encrypted result is encrypted, and the encrypted result is decrypted to obtain the public key of the first device.
  • the second mode described above corresponds to the content described in the first embodiment.
  • the apparatus may further include: a first verification unit 04, configured to use the shared key generated by the key processing unit 02, the shared key, if the verification value sent by the first device is received And generating a verification value by using at least one of the derivation key or the plain text pre-agreed by the first device, and comparing the generated verification value with the received verification value. If the verification is consistent, the verification is passed, and the second device can be subsequently used.
  • the shared key or the derived key of the shared key interacts with the first device.
  • the device may further include: a second verification unit 05, configured to use the shared key after the key processing unit 02 generates the verification key, based on the foregoing two implementations, the second device may also send the verification value to the first device.
  • the shared key, the derived key of the shared key, or at least one of the plaintext agreed in advance with the first device generates a verification value, and the verification value is sent to the first device.
  • the key configuration method described above can be applied to the WPS authentication process and the four-way handshake process.
  • the key processing unit 02 can obtain the first message in the WPS authentication process for obtaining.
  • the information of the shared key; or, the information for obtaining the shared key is obtained through the second message in the WPS authentication process.
  • the key processing unit 02 may acquire information for obtaining the shared key through the first message in the four-way handshake process; or, by notifying the second device to start the four-way handshake process
  • the trigger message acquires information for obtaining the shared key.
  • the first device and the second device described above may be, for example, a personal computer, a notebook computer, a wireless telephone, a personal digital processing (PDA), a sensor node, an AP, or the like. It should be noted that the method and apparatus provided by the present invention are not limited to a WiFi network, and may be used for any wireless network such as Bluetooth, Zigbee, etc., and may even be applied to a key configuration in a wired network.
  • the first device as described above includes a processor, a memory, and a communication bus, and the processor is connected to the memory through a communication bus, where the memory stores instructions for implementing a key configuration method, and further, the The first device also includes a communication interface communicatively coupled to other devices via the communication interface.
  • the shared key is obtained by using the information for obtaining a shared key or its own private key.
  • the foregoing second device includes: a processor, a memory, and a communication bus, wherein the processor is connected to the memory through a communication bus, and the memory stores instructions for implementing a key configuration method, and further The second device further includes a communication interface communicatively coupled to other devices through the communication interface.
  • the first device obtains the shared key by using the information for obtaining a shared key or its own private key.
  • the device described in the present invention architecturally includes some basic components such as a bus, a processing system, a storage system, one or more input/output systems, and a communication interface.
  • the bus can include one or more wires to enable communication between components in the device.
  • a processing system includes various types of processors or microprocessors for executing instructions, processing processes, or threads.
  • the storage system may include a dynamic memory such as a random access memory (RAM) that stores dynamic information, and a static memory such as a read only memory (ROM) that stores static information, and a large-capacity memory including a magnetic or optical recording medium and a corresponding drive.
  • RAM random access memory
  • ROM read only memory
  • the input system is for the user to input information to the server or the terminal device, such as a keyboard, a mouse, a stylus, a voice recognition system, or a biometric system. If it is a headless device, the input system of the human-computer interaction function may not be included.
  • the output system can include a display, printer, speaker, indicator light, etc. for outputting information.
  • Communication interfaces are used to enable a server or terminal device to communicate with other systems or systems.
  • the communication interfaces can be connected to the network through a wired connection, a wireless connection, or an optical connection.
  • Each device contains operating system software for managing system resources, controlling the operation of other programs, and application software for implementing specific functions.

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Abstract

本发明提供了一种密钥配置的方法和装置,其中方法包括:第一设备通过安全媒介获取第二设备的公钥;第一设备将用于得到共享密钥的信息发送给第二设备;第二设备利用自身的私钥和用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥;其中所述第一设备利用所述用于得到共享密钥的信息或者自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥。本发明保证了第二设备的公钥到达第一设备,避免了攻击者冒充第二设备与第一设备建立安全连接,从而使得攻击者无法监听第一设备与第二设备之间的消息,提高了第一设备和第二设备之间交互的安全性。

Description

一种密钥配置方法和装置
【技术领域】
本发明涉及网络通信技术领域,特别涉及一种密钥配置方法和装置。
【背景技术】
WiFi(Wireless Fidelity,无线保真)技术从1997年无线局域网标准IEEE(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,电气和电子工程师协会)802.11发布以来,在拥有众多在业界领先的公司组成的WiFi联盟的大力推动下,同时以其具有的部署快速、使用便利和传输速率高等优势,发展迅猛。WiFi技术现在已经被广泛应用于各个行业,现在的笔记本电脑、PDA(Personal Digital Assistant,掌上电脑)和手机等都支持WiFi技术,WiFi网络的接入点遍布于酒店、咖啡厅、学校和医院等场所,可以说WiFi技术在生活中无所不在。
随着WiFi技术的发展和广泛应用,与之相关的安全技术需求也随之产生,WPS(WiFi Protected Setup,WiFi安全建立)就是为了保证建立WiFi连接时的安全技术之一。WPS主要强调两点:安全和简单,即配置过程要简单,配置后的网络要安全。现有的WPS主要基于密钥交换算法。
目前WPS应用的场景,主要包括以下两种:第一种是作为enrollee(被注册方)的终端与作为registrar(注册器)的AP(Access Point,接入点)之间进行密钥的配置,以便后续终端与AP之间能够基于配置的密钥进行数据交互。第二种是P2P(Peer to Peer,点到点)的认证配置过程,WiFi技术中P2P的研究是为了在没有诸如蜂窝网或热点等基础设施的情况下,终端设备之间也能够通过WiFi功能实现端到端的直接发现,在该场景下,一个终端作为client(客户端),另一个终端作为GO(Group Owner,组长设备),在client和GO之间进行密钥的配置,以便后续client和GO之间能够基于配置的密钥进行数据交互。
现有技术中采用的密钥配置方式主要是基于密钥交换算法,即第一设备和第二设备分别产生一对公私钥,第一设备和第二设备通过空口互相交换公钥,即第一设备将自身公钥通过空口发送给第二设备,第二设备将自身公钥通过空口发送给第一设备,第一设备和第二设备分别利用对方的公钥和自身的私钥分别生成共享密钥,并利用共享密钥进行后续的安全传输。
然而,现有技术中的上述密钥配置方式比较容易受到攻击,攻击者在空口很容易截获设备之间发送的公钥,利用自己的公钥分别与第一设备和第二设备执行上述密钥交换算法,即冒充第二设备与第一设备建立安全连接,并冒充第一设备与第二设备建立安全连接,使得第一设备与第二设备之间发送的消息被攻击者监听到。
【发明内容】
有鉴于此,本发明实施例提供了一种密钥配置方法和装置,用于提高第一设备和第二设备之间交互的安全性。
第一方面,本发明实施例提供了一种密钥配置的方法,该方法包括:
第一设备通过安全媒介获取第二设备的公钥;
第一设备将用于得到共享密钥的信息发送给第二设备;
以便所述第二设备利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥;
其中所述第一设备利用所述用于得到共享密钥的信息或者自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥。
根据上述第一方面的实现方式,所述第一设备通过安全媒介获取第二设备的公钥包括:
所述第一设备通过扫描识别码的方式、USB的方式或者近场通信NFC的方式从第二设备获取第二设备的公钥。
在第一方面的第一种实现方式中,所述用于得到共享密钥的信息具体为:第一设备生成的密码;
所述第一设备利用所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到所述共享密钥包括:所述第一设备将所述密码作为共享密钥;
所述第一设备将用于得到共享密钥的信息发送给第二设备包括:所述第一设备利用第二设备的公钥将所述密码进行加密后发送给所述第二设备;
以便所述第二设备利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥包括:以便所述第二设备利用自身的私钥以及用于得到共享密钥的信息生成所述共享密钥包括:所述第二设备利用自身的私钥对所述加密结果进行解密得到所述密码,将所述密码作为共享密钥。
在第一方面的第二种实现方式中,所述用于得到共享密钥的信息具体为:所述第一设备的公钥;
所述第一设备将用于得到共享密钥的信息发送给第二设备包括:所述第一设备利用第二设备的公钥将第一设备的公钥进行加密后,将加密结果发送给第二设备;
以便所述第二设备利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥包括:以便所述第二设备利用自身的私钥对所述加密结果进行解密后,得到所述第一设备的公钥,并且生成密码,将该密码作为共享密钥,利用所述第一设备的公钥将该密码进行加密后,将加密结果发送给所述第一设备;
所述第一设备利用自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥包括:所述第一设备利用自身的私钥对接收到的加密结果进行解密后,将得到的密码作为共享密钥。
在第一方面的第三种实现方式中,第一设备和第二设备预定密钥交换算法;
所述用于得到共享密钥的信息具体为:第一设备的公钥;
所述第一设备利用自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥包括:所述第一设备利用第二设备的公钥和自身的私钥按照所述密钥交换算法生成共享密钥;
以便所述第二设备利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥包括:以便所述第二设备利用第一设备的公钥以及自身的私钥按照所述密钥交换算法生成共享密钥。
根据上述任一种实现方式,所述第一设备和所述第二设备利用所述共享密钥或所述共享密钥的衍生密钥进行安全连接。
根据上述第一方面的第三种实现方式,该方法还包括:
所述第一设备在得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码,将加密结果发送给所述第二设备;以便所述第二设备利用第二设备得到的共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥对接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到密码;该密码用于第一设备和第二设备的安全连接;或者,
所述第二设备在得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码,将加密结果发送给所述第一设备;所述第一设备利用自身生成的共享密钥对接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到密码;该密码用于第一设备和第二设备之间的安全连接。
根据上述第一方面的第三种实现方式,所述方法还包括:所述第一设备和所述第二设备预定密钥交换算法包括:
所述第一设备和所述第二设备上预先配置有所述密钥交换算法所使用的参数;或者,
所述第一设备和所述第二设备接收第三方的配置设备发送的所述密钥交换算法所使用的参数。
根据上述第一方面的第三种实现方式,所述第一设备将用于得到共享密钥的信息发送给第二设备包括:
所述第一设备利用第二设备的公钥对所述第一设备的公钥进行加密后,将加密结果发送给所述第二设备;
以便所述第二设备对所述加密结果进行解密,得到所述第一设备的公钥。
结合上述任一种实现方式,该方法还包括:
所述第一设备得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第二设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第一验证值,将该第一验证值发送给第二设备;
以便第二设备利用第二设备得到的共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第二验证值,将生成的第二验证值与接收到的第一验证值进行比对,如果两者一致,则验证通过,在验证通过的情况下,所述第二设备利用所述共享密钥或共享密钥的衍生密钥与所述与第一设备进行安全连接。
结合上述任一种实现方式 ,该方法还包括:第一设备接收所述第二设备发送的第一验证值,所述第一验证值是所述第二设备利用共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成的验证值;
第一设备利用第一设备得到的共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第二设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第二验证值,将生成的第二验证值与接收到的第一验证值进行比对,如果两者一致,则验证通过,在验证通过的情况下所述第一设备利用所述共享密钥或共享密钥的衍生密钥与所述第二设备进行安全连接。
结合上述任一种实现方式,所述第一设备通过WPS认证过程中的第一消息发送所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
所述第一设备向所述第二设备发送通知所述第二设备开始WPS认证过程的触发消息,并通过WPS认证过程中的第二消息发送所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
所述第一设备通过四次握手过程中的第一消息发送所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
所述第一设备通过通知所述第二设备开始四次握手过程的触发消息发送所述用于得到共享密钥的信息。
第二方面,一种密钥配置的方法,该方法包括:
第二设备通过安全媒介将第二设备的公钥提供给第一设备;
第二设备接收第一设备发送来的用于得到共享密钥的信息;
第二设备利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥;
其中所述第一设备利用所述用于得到共享密钥的信息或者自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥。
第二方面的第一种实现方式中,所述第二设备通过安全媒介将第二设备的公钥提供给第一设备包括:
所述第二设备通过提供识别码供第一设备扫描的方式、USB的方式或者NFC的方式将第二设备的公钥提供给第一设备。
结合第二方面和第二方面的第一种实现方式,所述用于得到共享密钥的信息具体为:第一设备生成的密码;
所述第一设备利用所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到所述共享密钥包括:所述第一设备将所述密码作为共享密钥;
所述接收第一设备发送来的用于得到共享密钥的信息包括:接收所述第一设备利用第二设备的公钥将所述密码进行加密后发送来的加密结果;
所述利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥包括:所述第二设备利用自身的私钥对所述加密结果进行解密得到所述密码,将所述密码作为共享密钥。
结合第二方面和第二方面的第一种实现方式,所述用于得到共享密钥的信息具体为:所述第一设备的公钥;
所述接收第一设备发送来的用于得到共享密钥的信息包括:接收所述第一设备利用第二设备的公钥将第一设备的公钥进行加密后发送来的加密结果;
所述利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥包括:所述第二设备利用自身的私钥对所述加密结果进行解密后,得到所述第一设备的公钥,并且生成密码,将该密码作为共享密钥,利用所述第一设备的公钥将该密码进行加密后,将加密结果发送给所述第一设备;
所述第一设备利用自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥包括:所述第一设备利用自身的私钥对接收到的加密结果进行解密后,将得到的密码作为共享密钥。
结合第二方面和第二方面的第一种实现方式,所述方法还包括:所述第一设备和所述第二设备预定密钥交换算法;
所述用于得到共享密钥的信息具体为:所述第一设备的公钥;
所述第一设备利用自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥包括:所述第一设备利用第二设备的公钥和自身的私钥按照所述密钥交换算法生成共享密钥;
所述利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥包括:所述第二设备利用所述第一设备的公钥以及自身的私钥按照所述密钥交换算法生成共享密钥。
结合以上实现方式,所述第一设备和所述第二设备利用所述共享密钥或所述共享密钥的衍生密钥进行安全连接。
结合以上实现方式,该方法还包括:
所述第二设备接收所述第一设备在得到共享密钥后利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码所得到的加密结果,利用得到的共享密钥对接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到所述密码;该密码用于第一设备和第二设备的安全连接;或者,
所述第二设备在生成共享密钥后,利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码,将加密结果发送给所述第一设备;以便所述第一设备利用得到的共享密钥对接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到密码;该密码用于第一设备和第二设备之间的安全连接。
结合以上实现方式,所述第一设备和所述第二设备预定密钥交换算法包括:
所述第一设备和所述第二设备上预先配置有所述密钥交换算法所使用的参数;或者,
所述第一设备和所述第二设备接收第三方的配置设备发送的所述密钥交换算法所使用的参数。
结合以上实现方式,所述接收第一设备发送来的用于得到共享密钥的信息包括:
所述第二设备接收所述第一设备利用第二设备的公钥对所述第一设备的公钥进行加密后的加密结果;
对所述加密结果进行解密,得到所述第一设备的公钥。
结合以上实现方式,该方法还包括:
所述第一设备得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第二设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第一验证值,将该第一验证值发送给第二设备;
所述第二设备利用第二设备得到的共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第二验证值,将生成的第二验证值与接收到的第一验证值进行比对,如果两者一致,则验证通过,在验证通过的情况下,所述第二设备利用所述共享密钥或共享密钥的衍生密钥与所述第一设备进行安全连接。
结合以上实现方式,所述第二设备得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第三验证值,将该第三验证值发送给第一设备;
以便所述第一设备利用第一设备得到的共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第二设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第四验证值,将生成的第四验证值与接收到的第三验证值进行比对,如果两者一致,则验证通过,在验证通过的情况下所述第一设备利用所述共享密钥或共享密钥的衍生密钥与所述第二设备进行安全连接。
结合以上实现方式,所述第二设备通过WPS认证过程中的第一消息接收所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
所述第二设备接收所述第一设备发送的通知所述第二设备开始WPS认证过程的触发消息,并通过WPS认证过程中的第二消息接收所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
所述第二设备通过四次握手过程中的第一消息接收所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
所述第二设备通过通知所述第二设备开始四次握手过程的触发消息接收所述用于得到共享密钥的信息。
第三方面,本发明提供了一种密钥配置的装置,该装置位于第一设备中,该装置包括:
安全获取单元,用于通过安全媒介获取第二设备的公钥;
密钥处理单元,用于将用于得到共享密钥的信息发送给第二设备,以及利用所述用于得到共享密钥的信息或者自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥;
所述用于得到共享密钥的信息供所述第二设备结合自身的私钥得到共享密钥。
根据上述第三方面的实现方式,所述安全获取单元,具体用于通过扫描识别码的方式、USB的方式或者NFC的方式从第二设备获取第二设备的公钥。
在第三方面的第一种实现方式中,所述密钥处理单元包括:
第一密钥生成子单元,用于生成密码,将所述密码作为共享密钥;
第一密钥传输子单元,用于利用所述第二设备的公钥将所述密码进行加密后,将加密结果发送给所述第二设备,以供所述第二设备利用自身的私钥对所述加密结果进行解密得到所述密码并将所述密码作为共享密钥。
在第三方面的第二种实现方式中,所述密钥处理单元包括:
第二密钥传输子单元,用于利用第二设备的公钥将第一设备的公钥进行加密后,将加密结果发送给第二设备;
第二密钥生成子单元,用于接收到第二设备发送的加密结果后,利用自身的私钥对加密结果进行解密,将得到的密码作为共享密钥。
在第二方面的第三种实现方式中,所述密钥处理单元包括:
第三密钥生成子单元,用于利用第二设备的公钥和第一设备的私钥按照所述第一设备和所述第二设备预定的密钥交换算法生成共享密钥;
第三密钥传输子单元,用于将第一设备的公钥发送给所述第二设备,以供所述第二设备利用第一设备的公钥以及自身的私钥按照所述密钥交换算法生成共享密钥。
根据上述第三方面中的任一种实现方式,所述共享密钥或所述共享密钥的衍生密钥用于第一设备与第二设备之间进行的安全连接。
在第三方面的第三种实现方式中,所述第三密钥生成子单元,还用于在得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码;
所述第三密钥传输子单元,还用于将第三密钥生成子单元的加密结果发送给第二设备;或者,
所述第三密钥传输子单元,还用于接收第二设备发送来的加密结果;
所述第三密钥生成子单元,还用于利用得到的共享密钥对所述第三密钥传输子单元接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到密码;
其中,所述密码用于第一设备和第二设备的安全连接。
在第三方面的第三种实现方式中,该装置还包括:参数配置单元,用于存储预先配置的所述密钥交换算法所使用的参数,或者接收并存储第三方的配置设备发送的所述密钥交换算法所使用的参数。
根据上述第三方面中的任一种实现方式,所述安全获取单元,还用于通过安全媒介获取第二设备的地址信息;
所述密钥处理单元,具体用于依据所述第二设备的地址信息将用于得到共享密钥的信息发送给第二设备。
在第三方面的第三种实现方式中,所述第三密钥传输子单元在将第一设备的公钥发送给所述第二设备时,具体用于利用第二设备的公钥对所述第一设备的公钥进行加密后,将加密结果发送给所述第二设备,以供所述第二设备对所述加密结果进行解密后得到所述第一设备的公钥。
根据上述第三方面中的任一种实现方式,该装置还包括:第一验证单元,用于在所述密钥处理单元得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第二设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第一验证值,将该第一验证值发送给第二设备,
以便第二设备利用第二设备得到的共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第二验证值,将生成的第二验证值与接收到的第一验证值进行比对,如果两者一致,则验证通过,在验证通过的情况下,所述第二设备利用所述共享密钥或共享密钥的衍生密钥与所述第一设备进行安全连接。
根据上述第三方面中的任一种实现方式,该装置还包括:第二验证单元,用于接收到第二设备发送的第三验证值后,利用所述密钥处理单元生成的共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第二设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第四验证值,将生成的第四验证值与接收到的第三验证值进行比对,如果两者一致,则验证通过,在验证通过的情况下所述第一设备利用所述共享密钥或共享密钥的衍生密钥与所述第二设备进行安全连接,其中,所述第三验证值为所述第二设备得到共享密钥后,利用所述共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成的。
根据上述第三方面中的任一种实现方式,所述密钥处理单元,具体用于通过WPS认证过程中的第一消息发送所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
向所述第二设备发送通知所述第二设备开始WPS认证过程的触发消息,并通过WPS认证过程中的第二消息发送所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
通过四次握手过程中的第一消息发送所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
通过通知所述第二设备开始四次握手过程的触发消息发送所述用于得到共享密钥的信息。
第四方面,本发明实施例提供了一种密钥配置的装置,该装置位于第二设备中,该装置包括:
安全发送单元,用于通过安全媒介将第二设备的公钥提供给第一设备;
密钥处理单元,用于利用自身的私钥和第一设备发送来的用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥;
其中所述第一设备利用所述用于得到共享密钥的信息或者自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥。
根据上述第四方面的实现方式,所述安全发送单元,具体用于通过提供识别码供第一设备扫描的方式、USB的方式或者NFC的方式将第二设备的公钥提供给第一设备。
在第四方面的第一种实现方式中,所述密钥处理单元具体包括:
第一信息传输子单元,用于接收第一设备发送来的利用第二设备的公钥对第一设备生成的密码进行加密所得到的加密结果;
第一密钥生成子单元,用于利用第二设备的私钥对所述加密结果进行解密得到所述密码,将所述密码作为共享密钥。
在第四方面的第二种实现方式中,所述密钥处理单元具体包括:
第二信息传输子单元,用于接收第一设备利用第二设备的公钥将第一设备的公钥进行加密后得到的加密结果;将第二密钥生成子单元得到的加密结果发送给所述第一设备,以便所述第一设备利用自身的私钥对接收到的加密结果进行解密后,将得到的密码作为共享密钥;
第二密钥生成子单元,用于利用自身的私钥对所述第二信息传输子单元接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到所述第一设备的公钥,并且生成密码,将该密码作为共享密钥,利用所述第一设备的公钥将该密码进行加密后得到加密结果。
在第四方面的第三种实现方式中,所述密钥处理单元具体包括:
第三信息传输子单元,用于接收所述第一设备发送来的第一设备的公钥;
第三密钥生成子单元,用于利用第一设备的公钥以及自身的私钥按照所述第一设备和所述第二设备预定的密钥交换算法生成共享密钥。
根据上述第三方面的任一种实现方式,所述共享密钥用于第一设备和第二设备之间的安全连接。
根据第四方面的第三种实现方式,所述第三信息传输子单元,还用于接收第一设备在利用第二设备的公钥和自身的私钥按照所述密钥交换算法生成共享密钥后,利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码得到的加密结果;所述第三密钥生成子单元,还用于利用得到的共享密钥对所述第三信息传输子单元接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到所述密码,其中,所述密钥用于第一设备和第二设备之间的安全连接;或者,
所述第三密钥生成子单元,还用于在得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码得到加密结果;所述第三信息传输子单元,还用于将所述第三密钥生成子单元生成的加密结果发送给第一设备,以便所述第一设备在利用第二设备的公钥和自身的私钥按照所述密钥交换算法生成共享密钥后,对接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到所述密码,其中,所述密钥用于第一设备和第二设备之间的安全连接。
根据第四方面的第三种实现方式,该装置还包括:参数配置单元,用于存储预先配置的所述密钥交换算法所使用的参数,或者接收并存储第三方的配置设备发送的所述密钥交换算法所使用的参数。
根据第四方面的第三种实现方式,所述第三信息传输子单元,具体用于接收第一设备发送来的利用第二设备的公钥对第一设备的公钥进行加密后的加密结果,对该加密结果进行解密,得到所述第一设备的公钥。
在上述第三方面的任一种实现方式中,该装置还包括:第一验证单元,用于如果接收到第一设备发送的第一验证值,则利用所述密钥处理单元得到的共享密钥、该共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第二验证值,将生成的第二验证值与接收到的第一验证值进行比对,如果两者一致,则验证通过,在验证通过的情况下,所述第二设备利用所述共享密钥或共享密钥的衍生密钥与第一设备进行安全连接。
在上述第四方面的任一种实现方式中,该装置还包括:
第二验证单元,用于在所述密钥处理单元得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第三验证值,将该第三验证值发送给第一设备;
以便所述第一设备利用第一设备得到的共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第二设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第四验证值,将生成的第四验证值与接收到的第三验证值进行比对,如果两者一致,则验证通过,在验证通过的情况下所述第一设备利用所述共享密钥或共享密钥的衍生密钥与所述第二设备进行安全连接。
在上述第四方面的任一种实现方式中,所述密钥处理单元,具体用于通过WPS认证过程中的第一消息获取所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
通过WPS认证过程中的第二消息获取所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
通过四次握手过程中的第一消息获取所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
通过通知所述第二设备开始四次握手过程的触发消息获取所述用于得到共享密钥的信息。
由以上技术方案可以看出,在本发明中第一设备通过安全媒介获取第二设备的公钥,保证了第二设备的公钥到达第一设备,第一设备就能够根据第二设备的公钥生成共享密钥,避免了攻击者冒充第二设备与第一设备建立安全连接,从而使得攻击者无法监听第一设备与第二设备之间的消息,提高了第一设备和第二设备之间交互的安全性。
【附图说明】
图1为本发明实施例一提供的密钥配置方法的流程示意图;
图2为本发明实施例二提供的密钥配置方法的流程示意图;
图3为本发明实施例三提供的密钥配置方法的流程示意图;
图4为本发明实施例四提供的密钥配置方法的流程示意图;
图5为本发明实施例五提供的密钥配置方法的流程示意图;
图6为本发明实施例六提供的密钥配置方法的流程示意图;
图7为本发明实施例七提供的密钥配置方法的流程示意图;
图8为本发明实施例提供的一种位于第一设备中的密钥配置装置的结构示意图;
图9为本发明实施例提供的第二种位于第一设备中的密钥配置装置的结构示意图;
图10为本发明实施例提供的第三种位于第一设备中的密钥配置装置的结构示意图;
图11为本发明实施例提供的一种位于第二设备中的密钥配置装置的结构示意图;
图12为本发明实施例提供的第二种位于第二设备中的密钥配置装置的结构示意图;
图13为本发明实施例提供的第三种位于第二设备中的密钥配置装置的结构示意图;
图14为本发明实施例提供的第一设备的硬件结构示意图;
图15为本发明实施例提供的第二设备的硬件结构示意图。
【具体实施方式】
为了使本发明的目的、技术方案和优点更加清楚,下面结合附图和具体实施例对本发明进行详细描述。
本发明的核心思想包括,第一设备通过安全媒介获取第二设备的公钥,将用于得到共享密钥的信息发送给第二设备;第二设备利用所述用于得到共享密钥的信息和自身的私钥得到共享密钥;其中所述第一设备利用所述用于得到共享密钥的信息或者自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥。
本发明可以采用密钥交换的方式进行共享密钥的配置,也可以不采用密钥交换的方式进行共享密钥的配置。下面分别通过几个具体的实施例对本发明提供的方法进行详细描述。
实施例一、
在本实施例中,采用的是密钥交换的方式进行共享密钥的配置,第一设备和第二设备预定密钥交换算法,密钥交换算法是后续第一设备和第二设备在生成共享密钥时所采用的算法,可以采用但不限于:D-H算法、RSA算法或EIGamal算法等,根据不同的密钥交换算法,预先共享的参数有所不同。
共享密钥交换算法所使用的参数的方式可以包括但不限于以下两种:第一种方式:预先在第一设备和第二设备上配置密钥交换算法所使用的参数;第二种方式:通过第三方的设备将密钥交换算法所使用的参数发送给第一设备和第二设备。
在本发明的各实施例中均以D-H算法为例,第一设备和第二设备预先共享参数g和P,预先在第一设备和第二设备上共享参数g和P,其中P是素数,g是P的原根。另外,在第一设备和第二设备都具有各自的公钥和私钥,第一设备上的公钥和私钥分别为PkeyA和keyA,第二设备上的公钥和私钥分别为PkeyB和keyB。本发明后续实施例二至五中均存在上述配置,不再一一赘述。
图1为本发明实施例一提供的密钥配置方法的流程示意图,如图1所示,该流程可以包括以下步骤:
步骤101:第一设备通过安全媒介获取第二设备的公钥PkeyB。
本步骤中所述的安全媒介是能够保证第二设备的公钥PkeyB能够到达第一设备而不被中间的攻击者截取的媒介,可以包括但不限于以下几种:通过扫描识别码的方式,通过USB(Universal Serial Bus,通用串行总线)的方式或者通过NFC(Near Field Communication,近场通信)的方式。
其中图1中以扫描识别码的方式为例,第一设备扫描第二设备的识别码,该识别码可以是诸如二维码、条形码等,在识别码中包含有第二设备的公钥PkeyB,还可以包含第二设备的设备信息,主要是地址信息,还可以包括但不限于以下设备信息:UUID(Universally Unique Identifier,通用唯一识别码)、制造商、序列号、设备能力、信道信息等。其中信道信息可以帮助第一设备通过Wifi网络快速发现第二设备,从而加快步骤103的执行效率。设备能力指的是该设备支持的算法、认证方法、设备角色信息、设备类型信息等,其中设备角色信息是指该设备在注册时充当的角色,可以是enrollee、registrar、client或GO等。设备类型信息可以是无线终端(诸如Wifi终端、蓝牙终端、Zigbee终端等诸如手机、电脑、传感器等)、接入点(在Wifi网络中是AP,蓝牙网络中可以是蓝牙网关、Zigbee网络中可以是物联网网关等)、传感器节点、中心节点等。
步骤102:第一设备利用第二设备的公钥PkeyB和自身的私钥keyA生成共享密钥DHkeyA。
在此第一设备按照预先与第二设备共享的密钥交换算法来产生共享密钥DHkey,以D-H算法为例,第一设备的公钥PkeyA为:
PkeyA=(g^keyA)mod(P),其中keyA为第一设备的私钥,为随机数。
第二设备的公钥PkeyB为:
PkeyB=(g^keyB)mod(P),keyB为第二设备的私钥,也是随机数。
利用PkeyA和keyA生成的共享密钥DHkeyA为:
DHkeyA=((PkeyB)^keyA)mod(P)。
步骤103:第一设备依据第二设备的设备信息(即第二设备的地址信息)将自身的公钥PkeyA发送给第二设备。
可选地,可以利用第二设备的公钥PkeyB将第一设备的公钥PkeyA进行加密,将加密结果发送给第二设备,这样可以提高安全性。
利用公钥加密可以分为两种方式:
第一种加密方式:如果公钥是用于非对称加密的公钥,则可以直接用于加密,需要使用对应的私钥进行解密。
第二种加密方式:加密时采用公钥的部分信息,或者基于公钥衍生的信息作为对称密钥进行加密,解密时要采用对称密钥来解密。公钥是用于密钥交换的公钥或者用于非对称加密的公钥。
后续的加密和解密过程可以根据具体情况采用上述两种加密方式中的其中一种。此处加密采用的是第二种加密方式。
更进一步地,第一设备还可以利用生成的共享密钥DHkeyA、DHkeyA的衍生密钥以及明文(该明文与第二设备预先约定)中的至少一种生成验证值,将该验证值发送给第二设备,以供第二设备进行验证。生成验证值的方式与第二设备预先约定,例如采用生成hash(哈希)值的方式。
上述的明文可以采用但不限于:第二设备的公钥PkeyB,预先与第二设备共享的参数,从第二设备获取的设备信息所包含的参数(例如第二设备生成的现场值nonce),第一设备发送给第二设备的消息中的部分内容,等等。另外,本发明实施例并不限于衍生密钥的生成方式,只要第一设备和第二设备预先约定衍生密钥的生成方式即可。
举个例子,第一设备可以对第二设备的公钥PkeyB进行哈希后得到hash值,将该hash值作为验证值发送给第二设备。再举个例子,第一设备可以将共享密钥DHkeyA结合一个与第二设备共享的参数生成验证值后发送给第二设备。
步骤104:第二设备接收到第一设备的公钥PkeyA,利用PkeyA和自身的私钥keyB生成共享密钥DHkeyB。
在本步骤之前,如果第一设备发送给第二设备的是加密结果,则第二设备首先对该加密结果进行解密,得到第一设备的公钥PkeyA。这里第二设备生成的公私钥(PkeyB,keyB)的方式能够保证用公钥PkeyB加密的结果能够解密,该方式是现有技术,在此不再赘述。
同样以D-H算法为例,第二设备生成的共享密钥DHkeyB为:
DHkeyB=((PkeyA)^keyB)mod(P)
由D-H算法可知,DHkeyA= DHkeyB。
如果第二设备接收到第一设备发送的验证值,则同样利用生成的共享密钥DHkeyB、DHkeyB的衍生密钥和明文(该明文与第一设备预先约定)中的至少一种生成验证值,将生成的验证值与收到的验证值进行比对,如果一致,则验证通过,第二设备后续可以采用该共享密钥DHkeyB与第一设备进行交互。
更进一步地,第二设备可以利用生成的共享密钥DHkeyB、DHkeyB的衍生密钥和明文(该明文与第一设备预先约定)中的至少一种生成验证值,将该验证值发送给第一设备。第一设备接收到该验证值后,同样利用自身生成的共享密钥DHkeyA、DHkeyA的衍生密钥和明文(该明文与第二设备预先约定)中的至少一种生成验证值,将该验证值与接收到的验证值进行比对,如果一致,则验证通过,第一设备后续可以采用该共享密钥DHkeyA与第二设备进行交互。
实施例一提供的密钥配置方式可以很好的应用于WPS认证流程和四次握手流程中,下面分别通过实施例二和实施例三对应用于WPS认证流程进行详细描述,通过实施例四和实施例五对应用于四次握手流程中的过程进行详细描述。
实施例二、
本实施例中以密钥配置应用于WPS认证流程为例,假设第一设备在WPS认证过程中角色为registrar,第二设备为enrollee,或者第一设备为GO,第二设备为client,鉴于WPS认证的要求,M1消息必须从enrollee或client发出。基于此,本发明实施例二提供的密钥配置方法流程如图2所示,包括以下步骤:
步骤201同步骤101。
步骤202同步骤102。
步骤203:第一设备向第二设备发送触发消息。
该触发消息用于通知第二设备开始进行密钥配置,该触发消息可以包含在其他消息中发送,诸如包含在发现消息或者广播消息中,例如如果第一设备为AP,则可以通过广播消息发送,如果第一设备为无线终端,则可以通过发现消息发送。
步骤204:第二设备向第一设备发送M1消息。
该M1消息中包含版本号、第二设备生成的现场值Nonce2,第二设备的设备信息。
另外,第二设备还可以发送利用自身的公钥PkeyB生成的验证值,例如PkeyB的hash值,供第一设备进行验证。如果第一设备接收到验证值,则首先利用第二设备的公钥PkeyB生成验证值,将生成的验证值与接收到的验证值进行比较,如果一致,则验证通过,执行步骤205。
步骤205:第一设备利用DHkeyA、第二设备的现场值Nonce2以及第一设备生成的现场值Nonce1生成衍生密钥。
在此除了利用DHkeyA之外,并不限于第一设备生成衍生密钥的方式和参数,只要采用与第二设备约定的方式即可。为了最大限度地适应现有WPS认证过程,可以利用共享密钥DHkeyA、第二设备的现场值Nonce2以及第一设备生成的现场值Nonce1来生成衍生密钥,具体可以采用如下方式:
KDK = HMAC-SHA-256 DHKey A(Nonce2 || EnrolleeMAC || Nonce1),即KDK是DHKey A与Nonce2,第二设备的MAC地址以及Nonce1的hash结果。
AuthKey || KeyWrapKey || EMSK = kdf(KDK, “Wi-Fi Easy and Secure Key Derivation”, 640),即AuthKey ,KeyWrapKey,EMSK是KDK结合字符串“Wi-Fi Easy and Secure Key Derivation”进行迭代产生的640bit的密钥,AuthKey取其中256bit,KeyWrapKey取其中128bit,EMSK取其中256bit。KDK、AuthKey 、KeyWrapKey和EMSK都可以作为共享密钥的衍生密钥。
步骤206:第一设备向第二设备发送M2消息,该M2消息包含第一设备的公钥PkeyA、Nonce1和Nonce2。
另外,第一设备还可以利用M1消息、M2消息结合Authkey生成验证值,例如生成hash值,供第二设备进行验证。如果该验证值通过M2消息发送,那么生成验证值的M2消息为不包含该验证值时的M2消息。
步骤207:第二设备利用第一设备的公钥PkeyA和自己的私钥keyB生成共享密钥DHkeyB,并利用DHkeyB、Nonce1和Nonce2生成衍生密钥。
在此生成衍生密钥的方式可以参考步骤205中的描述。
第二设备如果接收到验证值,则同样利用M1消息、M2消息(不包含验证值的M2消息)结合计算得到的衍生密钥Authkey生成验证值,将生成的验证值与接收到的验证值进行比较,如果一致,则验证通过,第二设备后续可以采用该共享密钥DHkeyB与第一设备进行交互。
第二设备还可以进一步利用自己生成的Authkey、M2消息以及完成消息生成验证值,将该验证值通过完成消息发送给第一设备进行验证,生成验证值所利用的完成消息为不包含验证值的完成消息。第一设备接收到验证值后,利用自己生成的Authkey、M2消息以及完成消息生成验证值,将自己生成的验证值与接收到的验证值进行对比,如果一致,则验证通过,第一设备后续可以采用该共享密钥DHkeyB或共享密钥的衍生密钥与第二设备进行交互。
另外,在该实施例中,第一设备在步骤201中获取第二设备的公钥的同时,还可以获得第二设备的现场值Nonce2,这样第二设备在向第一设备发送的M1消息中就可以不再携带Nonce2,这种情况下,步骤205就可以在步骤202之后执行。
实施例三、
本实施例中仍以密钥配置应用于WPS认证流程为例,与实施例二不同的是,本实施例中假设第一设备在WPS认证过程中角色为enrollee,第二设备为registrar,鉴于WPS认证的要求,M1消息必须从enrollee发出。基于此,本发明实施例三提供的密钥配置方法流程如图3所示,包括以下步骤:
步骤301同步骤101。
步骤302同步骤102。
步骤303:第一设备向第二设备发送M1消息,该M1消息中至少包括第一设备的公钥PkeyA和第一设备生成的现场值Nonce1。还可以包含版本号、第一设备的设备信息等。
步骤304:第二设备利用第一设备的公钥PkeyA和自身的私钥keyB生成共享密钥DHkeyB,并利用DHkeyB、第二设备的现场值Nonce2以及第一设备生成的现场值Nonce1生成衍生密钥。
生成衍生密钥的方式与实施例二中描述的相同,在此不再赘述。
步骤305:第二设备向第一设备发送M2消息,该M2消息包含Nonce2和Nonce1。
另外,第二设备还可以利用M1消息、M2消息结合Authkey生成验证值,例如生成hash值,供第一设备进行验证。如果该验证值通过M2消息发送,那么生成验证值的M2消息为不包含该验证值时的M2消息。
步骤306:第一设备利用DHkeyA、Nonce2和Nonce1生成衍生密钥。
如果第一设备接收到验证值,同样利用M1消息、M2消息(不包含验证值的M2消息)结合计算得到的衍生密钥Authkey生成验证值,将生成的验证值与接收到的验证值进行比较,如果一致,则验证通过,第一设备后续可以采用该共享密钥DHkeyB与第二设备进行交互。
第一设备还可以进一步利用自己生成的Authkey、M2消息以及完成消息生成验证值,将该验证值通过完成消息发送给第二设备进行验证,生成验证值所利用的完成消息为不包含验证值的完成消息。第二设备接收到验证值后,利用自己生成的Authkey、M2消息以及完成消息生成验证值,将自己生成的验证值与接收到的验证值进行对比,如果一致,则验证通过,第二设备后续可以采用该共享密钥DHkeyB或者共享密钥的衍生密钥与第一设备进行交互。
另外,在本实施例中,第一设备在步骤301中获取第二设备的公钥的同时,还可以获得第二设备的现场值Nonce2,这样第二设备在向第一设备发送的M2消息中就可以不再携带Nonce2,这种情况下步骤306就可以在步骤302之后执行。
实施例四、
本实施例中以密钥配置应用于四次握手流程为例,假设第一设备在四次握手过程中角色为Authenticator(认证方),第二设备作为supplicant(申请方),四次握手流程中M1消息必须由Authenticator发送,基于此,本发明实施例四提供的密钥配置方法流程如图4所示,包括以下步骤:
步骤401同步骤101。
步骤402同步骤102。
步骤403:第一设备向第二设备发送M1消息,该M1消息包含自身的公钥PkeyA和自身产生的随机数ANonce(AP随机值)。
步骤404:第二设备利用PkeyA和自身的私钥keyB生成共享密钥DHkeyB,并且利用自身产生的随机数SNonce(站点随机值)以及DHkeyB和ANonce生成PTK(Pairwise Transient Key,成对临时密钥)。
在生成PTK时,也可以利用SNonce、ANonce以及DHkeyB的衍生密钥,具体生成PTK的方式可以采用现有方式,在此不加以限制。
步骤405:第二设备向第一设备发送M2消息,该M2消息中包含SNonce以及该M2消息的MIC(Message Integrity Code,消息完整性编码)。
其中M2消息的MIC可以是DHkeyB或者DHkeyB的衍生密钥结合M2消息的hash值,或者PTK的衍生密钥结合M2消息的hash值,主要用于进行消息的完整性校验。
步骤406:第一设备利用DHkeyA以及该M2消息生成MIC,利用生成的MIC验证接收到的MIC,如果一致,则利用SNonce、ANonce以及DHkeyA(或者DHkeyA的验证密钥)生成PTK。
如果该MIC在步骤405中是利用DHkeyB的衍生密钥结合M2消息生成的,那么在此步骤406中就利用DHkeyA的衍生密钥和M2消息生成MIC;如果该MIC在步骤405中是利用PTK的衍生密钥结合M2消息生成的,那么在此步骤406中就先可以生成PTK,利用PTK的衍生密钥和M2消息生成MIC,然后利用生成的MIC对接收到的MIC进行验证。当然,无论哪种情况也可以都生成PTK后再生成MIC进行验证。
步骤407:第一设备利用PTK加密信任状,将加密的信任状以及M3消息的MIC值发送给第二设备。
该MIC值是利用DHkeyA和M3消息进行hash后生成的。
步骤408:第二设备利用DHkeyB和M3消息生成MIC值,利用生成的MIC值对接收到的MIC进行验证,如果验证通过,利用自身生成的PTK解密获得信任状。
步骤409:第二设备发送M4消息以及该消息的MIC给第一设备进行确认。
至此就完成了第一设备和第二设备之间的四次握手,实际上在步骤404就已经完成了共享密钥的共享,第一设备和第二设备就能够利用共享密钥或共享密钥的衍生密钥进行后续交互,后续的步骤405和步骤409是四次握手的固有流程,只是在交互过程中利用了共享密钥。
实施例五、
本实施例中仍以密钥配置应用于四次握手流程为例,假设第一设备在四次握手过程中角色为supplicant,第二设备作为Authenticator,四次握手流程中M1消息必须由Authenticator发送,基于此,本发明实施例五提供的密钥配置方法流程如图5所示,包括以下步骤:
步骤501同步骤401。
步骤502同步骤402。
步骤503:第一设备向第二设备发送触发消息,该触发消息中包含第一设备的公钥PkeyA,通知第二设备开始四次握手过程。
步骤504:第二设备利用PkeyA和自身的私钥keyB生成共享密钥。
步骤505:第二设备向第一设备发送M1消息,该M1消息包含第二设备产生的随机数ANonce。
步骤506:第一设备利用ANonce和自己产生的SNonce、DHkeyA产生PTK。
步骤507:第一设备将SNonce以及M2消息的MIC通过M2消息发送给第二设备。
M2消息的MIC可以是DHkeyA或者DHkeyA的衍生密钥结合M2消息的hash值,或者PTK的衍生消息结合M2消息的hash值,主要用于进行消息的完整性校验。
步骤508:第二设备利用DHkeyB以及该M2消息生成MIC,利用生成的MIC验证接收到的MIC,如果一致,则利用ANonce、SNonce和DHkeyB生成PTK。
如果步骤507中利用DHkeyA的衍生密钥结合M2消息生成MIC,则在步骤508中利用DHkeyB的衍生密钥结合M2消息生成MIC,然后进行验证。如果步骤507中利用PTK的衍生密钥结合M2消息生成MIC,则在步骤508中先生成PTK,再利用PTK的衍生密钥和M2消息生成MIC,然后进行验证。当然,无论哪种情况也可以都生成PTK后再生成MIC进行验证。
步骤509:第二设备利用PTK加密信任状,将加密的信任状以及M3消息的MIC值发送给第一设备。M3消息的MIC值是利用DHkeyB和M3消息生成的。
步骤510:第一设备利用DHkeyA和M3消息生成MIC值,利用生成的MIC值对接收到的MIC进行验证,如果验证通过,利用自身生成的PTK解密获得信任状。
步骤511:第一设备发送M4消息以及该消息的MIC给第二设备进行确认。
至此就完成了第一设备和第二设备之间的四次握手,实际上在步骤504就已经完成了共享密钥的共享,第一设备和第二设备就能够利用共享密钥进行后续交互,后续的步骤505和步骤511是四次握手的固有流程,只是在交互过程中利用了共享密钥。
在上述实施例一至实施例五所述的各流程中,除了第一设备和第二设备利用共享密钥进行后续交互过程之外,在双方都产生共享密钥之后,可以由一方利用生成的共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码发送给另一方,其中该密码可以是信任状或者会话密钥等,可以是随机生成的,也可以是按照某个算法生成的,在此不加以限制。另一方利用自身生成的共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥进行解密得到密码,双方可以利用该密码或者该密码的衍生密钥进行后续交互过程。
实施例六、
本实施例不采用密钥交换的方式进行密钥配置,在本实施例中第一设备和第二设备分别存在一对公私钥,即第一设备上有公钥PkeyA和私钥keyA,第二设备上有公钥PkeyB和私钥keyB,公私钥的产生方式在此不具体限制,特征是,利用公钥PkeyA进行加密的结果能够采用私钥keyA进行解密,利用公钥PkeyB进行加密的结果能够采用私钥keyB进行解密。图6为本发明实施例六提供的密钥配置方法的流程示意图,如图6所示,该方法包括以下步骤:
步骤601同步骤101。
如果第一设备是registrar、AP、GO或者中心节点,那么按照步骤602至步骤604的流程执行。
步骤602:第一设备利用第二设备的公钥PkeyB加密一个密码,将加密结果发送给第二设备。其中该密码可以是信任状或者会话密钥等,可以是随机生成的,也可以是按照某个算法生成的,在此不加以限制。
本步骤中的加密方式可以采用实施例一中所述的第一种加密方式。
更进一步地,第一设备可以利用第二设备的公钥PkeyB生成一个验证值,例如生成PkeyB的hash值发送给第二设备,第二设备接收到验证值后,首先利用自身的公钥PkeyB生成验证值,将生成的验证值与接收到的验证值进行比对,如果一致,则确定验证通过,继续执行步骤603。
步骤603:第二设备利用自己的私钥keyB对加密结果进行解密,得到密码。
步骤604:第一设备和第二设备利用上述的密码或者该密码的衍生密钥进行后续的交互。
该实施例中是以第一设备是registrar、AP、GO或者中心节点为例的,如果第二设备是registrar、AP、GO或者中心节点,则按照实施例七中所示的流程执行。
实施例七、
图7为本发明实施例七提供的密钥配置方法的流程示意图,如图7所示,该方法包括:
步骤701同步骤101。
步骤702:第一设备向第二设备发送自身的公钥PkeyA。
在此,为了提高安全性,第一设备可以利用第二设备的公钥PkeyB加密PkeyA后发送给第二设备,第二设备利用自身的私钥keyB进行解密后得到PkeyA。
此处的加密可以采用实施例一中所述的第一种加密方式。
步骤703:第二设备利用第一设备的公钥PkeyA加密一个密码,将加密结果发送给第一设备。其中该密码可以是信任状或者会话密钥等,可以是随机生成的,也可以是按照某个算法生成的,在此不加以限制。
此处的加密可以采用实施例一中所述的第一种加密方式。
在此第二设备可以利用第一设备的公钥PkeyA生成一个验证值,例如生成PkeyA的hash值发送给第一设备,第一设备接收到验证值后首先利用自身的公钥PkeyA生成验证值,将生成的验证值与接收到的验证值进行比对,如果一致,则确定验证通过,继续执行步骤704。
步骤704:第一设备利用自己的私钥keyA对加密结果进行解密,得到密码。
步骤705:第一设备和第二设备利用上述的密码或者密码的衍生密钥进行后续的交互。
如果第一设备和第二设备的角色或类型是一致的,例如都是无线终端设备,或者都是enrollee等,那么无论采用实施例六还是实施例七中的方式均可。
在实施例六中用于得到共享密钥的信息就是第一设备生成的密码,实施例七中用于得到共享密钥的信息就是第一设备的公钥。
需要说明的是,上述实施例六和实施例七中所示的方式同样可以适用于WPS认证流程或四次握手流程,仅需将WPS认证流程中或四次握手流程中涉及到的共享密钥替换为实施例六或实施例七中的密码即可,在此不再赘述。
以上是对本发明所提供的方法进行的详细描述,在由第一设备和第二设备构成的系统中,下面分别对第一设备和第二设备进行详细描述。图8为本发明实施例提供的密钥配置装置的结构图,该密钥配置装置位于第一设备中,主要包括:安全获取单元10和密钥处理单元20。
其中安全获取单元10用于通过安全媒介获取第二设备的公钥。
具体地,安全获取单元10可以通过但不限于扫描识别码的方式、USB的方式或者NFC的方式从第二设备获取第二设备的公钥。以扫描识别码的方式为例,安全获取单元10扫描第二设备的识别码,该识别码可以是诸如二维码、条形码等,在识别码中包含有第二设备的公钥PkeyB,还可以包含第二设备的设备信息,主要是地址信息,还可以包括但不限于以下设备信息:UUID、制造商、序列号、设备能力、信道信息等。设备能力指的是该设备支持的算法、认证方法、设备角色信息、设备类型信息等,其中设备角色信息是指该设备在注册时充当的角色,可以是enrollee、registrar、client或GO等。设备类型信息可以是无线终端(诸如Wifi终端、蓝牙终端、Zigbee终端等)、接入点(在Wifi网络中是AP,蓝牙网络中可以是蓝牙网关、Zigbee网络中可以是物联网网关等)、传感器节点、中心节点等。
密钥处理单元20用于将用于得到共享密钥的信息发送给第二设备;以及利用所述用于得到共享密钥的信息或者自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥。
这样第二设备就能够结合自身的私钥和用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥。
第一设备和第二设备可以采用密钥交换的方式进行共享密钥的配置,也可以不采用密钥交换的方式进行共享密钥的配置,因此,对应的密钥处理单元20可以采用以下两种方式实现:
第一种实现方式:不采用密钥交换的方式,这种方式对应于上述方法实施例六和七中所描述的内容,此时密钥处理单元20的结构可以存在两种:
结构1)如图8中所示,可以包括:第一密钥生成子单元81和第一密钥传输子单元82。
其中第一密钥生成子单元81用于生成密码,将密码作为共享密钥。其中该密码可以是信任状或者会话密钥等,可以是随机生成的,也可以是按照某个算法生成的,在此不加以限制。
第一密钥传输子单元82用于利用第二设备的公钥将密码进行加密后,将加密结果发送给第二设备,以供第二设备利用自身的私钥对加密结果进行解密得到密码并将密码作为共享密钥。
结构2)如图9中所示,可以包括:第二密钥传输子单元83和第三密钥传输子单元84。
第二密钥传输子单元83用于利用第二设备的公钥将第一设备的公钥进行加密后,将加密结果发送给第二设备。
这样第二设备在接收到该解密结果后,利用自身的私钥对该加密结果进行解密后得到第一设备的公钥,生成一个密码,将该密码作为共享密钥,然后利用第一设备的公钥对该密码进行加密后,将该加密结果发送给第一设备。
这样,第二密钥生成子单元84接收到第二设备发送的加密结果后,利用自身的私钥对加密结果进行解密,将得到的密码作为共享密钥。
第二种实现方式:采用密钥交换的方式。第一设备和第二设备预定密钥交换算法,此时密钥处理单元20的结构如图10中所示包括:第三密钥生成子单元91和第三密钥传输子单元92。
第三密钥生成子单元91用于利用第二设备的公钥和第一设备的私钥按照密钥交换算法生成共享密钥。本发明实施例中共享密钥算法可以采用但不限于:D-H算法、RSA算法或EIGamal算法等,以D-H算法为例,共享密钥DHKeyA=((PkeyB)^keyA)mod(P),其中PkeyB为第二设备的公钥,keyA为第一设备的私钥,P为预先共享的密钥交换算法所使用的参数。
第三密钥传输子单元92用于将第一设备的公钥发送给第二设备,以供第二设备利用第一设备的公钥以及自身的私钥按照密钥交换算法生成共享密钥。类似地,共享密钥DHkeyB=((PkeyA)^keyB)mod(P),PkeyA为第一设备的公钥,keyB为第二设备的私钥,由D-H算法可知,DHkeyA= DHkeyB。
在该种方式中,该装置还可以进一步包括参数配置单元30,用于存储预先配置的密钥交换算法所使用的参数,或者接收并存储第三方的配置设备发送的密钥交换算法所使用的参数。也就是说,密钥交换算法所使用的参数可以采用两种方式预先共享,第一种是采用预先配置的方式,即静态配置的方式,第二种是采用由第三方的配置设备发送的方式。
第一设备和第二设备除了采用共享密钥进行安全交互之外,在该第二种实现方式中,第三密钥生成子单元92还可以用于在生成共享密钥后,利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码,第三密钥传输子单元91还用于将第三密钥生成子单元92的加密结果发送给第二设备,供第二设备利用自身生成的共享密钥进行解密后得到该密码。这种情况下,第一设备和第二设备可以利用该密码进行后续安全连接,这里的密码可以是信任状或会话密钥等。或者,
由第二设备利用自身生成的共享密钥加密一个密码,将该密码发送给第一设备。此时上述的第三密钥传输子单元91接收第二设备发送来的加密结果。第三密钥生成子单元92利用生成的共享密钥对第三密钥传输子单元91接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到密码(这种情况图中未示出)。这种情况下,第一设备和第二设备可以利用该密码进行后续安全连接,这里的密码可以是信任状或会话密钥等。
另外,在该第二种实现方式中,为了提高交互的安全性,第二密钥传输子单元92在将第一设备的公钥发送给第二设备时,可以利用第二设备的公钥对第一设备的公钥进行加密后,将加密结果发送给第二设备,以供第二设备对加密结果进行解密后得到第一设备的公钥。上述第二种实现方式对应于实施例一中所描述的内容。
基于以上两种实现方式,由于安全获取单元10能够通过安全媒介获取第二设备的设备信息,该设备信息中可以包含第二设备的地址信息,密钥处理单元20就可以依据第二设备的地址信息将用于得到共享密钥的信息发送给第二设备。
基于以上两种实现方式,该装置还可以进一步包括第一验证单元40,用于在密钥处理单元20生成共享密钥后,利用共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第二设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成验证值,将该验证值发送给第二设备。
第二设备收到该验证值后,利用自己生成的共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成验证值,将生成的验证值与接收到的验证值进行比对,如果一致,则确定验证通过,第二设备后续可以采用共享密钥与第一设备进行交互。
基于以上两种实现方式,由于第一设备也可能接收到第二设备发送的验证值,因此该装置还可以进一步包括第二验证单元50,用于接收到第二设备发送的验证值后,利用密钥处理单元20生成的共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第二设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成验证值,将生成的验证值与接收到的验证值进行比对,如果一致,则验证通过,第一设备后续可以采用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥与第二设备进行交互。
上述的密钥配置方式可以很好的应用于WPS认证过程和四次握手过程中,当应用于WPS认证过程时,密钥处理单元20可以通过WPS认证过程中的第一个消息(即M1消息)发送用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,由第一设备向第二设备发送通知第二设备开始WPS认证过程的触发消息,密钥处理单元20通过WPS认证过程中的第二个消息(即M2消息)发送用于得到共享密钥的信息。具体参见实施例二和实施例三中所描述的内容。
当应用于四次握手过程中时,密钥处理单元20可以通过四次握手过程中的第一个消息(即M1消息)发送用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,通过通知第二设备开始四次握手过程的触发消息发送用于得到共享密钥的信息。具体参见实施例四和实施例五所描述的内容。
在WPS认证过程和四次握手过程中,具体通过哪个消息发送用于得到共享密钥的信息与第一设备的角色有关,具体参见实施例二至实施例五中所描述的内容,在此不再赘述。
图11为本发明实施例提供的密钥配置装置的结构示意图,该密钥配置装置位于第二设备中,如图11所示,该装置包括:安全发送单元01和密钥处理单元02。
其中安全发送单元01用于通过安全媒介将第二设备的公钥提供给第一设备。具体地,安全发送单元01可以通过提供识别码供第一设备扫描的方式、USB的方式或者NFC的方式将第二设备的公钥提供给第一设备。以提供识别码供第一设备扫描的方式为例,在第二设备上设置有识别码,该识别码可以是诸如二维码、条形码等,在识别码中包含有第二设备的公钥PkeyB,还可以包含第二设备的设备信息,主要是地址信息,还可以包括但不限于以下设备信息:UUID、制造商、序列号、设备能力、信道信息等。设备能力指的是该设备支持的算法、认证方法、设备角色信息、设备类型信息等,其中设备角色信息是指该设备在注册时充当的角色,可以是enrollee、registrar、client或GO等。设备类型信息可以是无线终端(诸如Wifi终端、蓝牙终端、Zigbee终端等)、接入点(在Wifi网络中是AP,蓝牙网络中可以是蓝牙网关、Zigbee网络中可以是物联网网关等)、传感器节点、中心节点等。
密钥处理单元02用于利用自身的私钥和第一设备发送来的用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥。
根据第一设备发送用于得到共享密钥的信息的方式,密钥处理单元02可以采用以下两种方式实现:
第一种实现方式:不采用密钥交换的方式,此时密钥处理单元02的结构可以采用以下两种:
结构1)如图11中所示,可以包括:第一信息传输子单元11和第一密钥生成子单元12。
其中第一信息传输子单元11用于接收第一设备利用第二设备的公钥对第一设备生成的密码进行加密所得到的加密结果。第一密钥生成子单元12用于利用第二设备的私钥对加密结果进行解密得到密码,将密码作为共享密钥。上述第一种实现方式对应于实施例六所描述的内容。
结构2)如图12所示,可以包括:第二信息传输子单元31和第二密钥生成子单元32。
其中,第二信息传输子单元31接收第一设备利用第二设备的公钥将第一设备的公钥进行加密后得到的加密结果;将第二密钥生成子单元32得到的加密结果发送给所述第一设备,以便第一设备利用自身的私钥对接收到的加密结果进行解密后,将得到的密码作为共享密钥。
第二密钥生成子单元32,用于利用自身的私钥对所述第二信息传输子单元接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到所述第一设备的公钥,并且生成密码,将该密码作为共享密钥,利用所述第一设备的公钥将该密码进行加密后得到加密结果。
第二种实现方式,采用密钥交换的方式,这种方式下第一设备和第二设备预定密钥交换算法,此时用于得到共享密钥的信息为第一设备的公钥,这种方式下密钥处理单元02的结构如图13中所示具体包括:第三信息传输子单元21和第三密钥生成子单元22。
其中第三信息传输子单元21用于接收第一设备发送来的第一设备的公钥,第三密钥生成子单元22用于利用第一设备的公钥以及自身的私钥按照密钥交换算法生成共享密钥。本发明实施例中共享密钥算法可以采用但不限于:D-H算法、RSA算法或EIGamal算法等,以D-H算法为例,共享密钥DHKeyB=((PkeyA)^keyB)mod(P),其中PkeyA为第一设备的公钥,keyB为第二设备的私钥,P为预先共享的密钥交换算法所使用的参数。
该种方式中,该装置还可以进一步包括:参数配置单元03用于存储预先配置的密钥交换算法所使用的参数,或者接收并存储第三方的配置设备发送的密钥交换算法所使用的参数。也就是说,密钥交换算法所使用的参数可以采用两种方式预先共享,第一种是采用预先配置的方式,即静态配置的方式,第二种是采用由第三方的配置设备发送的方式。
第一设备和第二设备除了采用上述的共享密钥进行后续安全连接之外,在第二种实现方式下,第三信息传输子单元21在接收第一设备在利用第二设备的公钥和自身的私钥按照所述密钥交换算法生成共享密钥后,可以进一步利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码得到的加密结果;第三密钥生成子单元22利用自身生成的共享密钥对第三信息传输子单元21接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到密码。后续第一设备和第二设备可以采用该密码进行安全交互,这里的密码可以是信任状或会话密钥等。
或者,第三密钥生成子单元22在生成共享密钥后,利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码得到加密结果。第三信息传输子单元21将所述第三密钥生成子单元22生成的加密结果发送给第一设备;供第一设备利用共享密钥进行解密后得到该密码(该种情况图中未示出),后续第一设备和第二设备可以采用该密码进行安全交互,这里的密码可以是信任状或会话密钥等。
另外,在该第二种实现方式中,为了提高交互的安全性,第三信息传输子单元21还用于接收第一设备发送来的利用第二设备的公钥对第一设备的公钥进行加密后的加密结果,对该加密结果进行解密,得到第一设备的公钥。上述第二种方式对应于实施例一中所描述的内容。
基于以上两种实现方式,该装置还可以进一步包括:第一验证单元04,用于如果接收到第一设备发送的验证值,则利用密钥处理单元02生成的共享密钥、该共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成验证值,将生成的验证值与接收到的验证值进行比对,如果一致,则验证通过,第二设备后续可以采用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥与第一设备进行交互。
基于以上两种实现方式,由于第二设备也可能向第一设备发送验证值,因此该装置还可以进一步包括:第二验证单元05,用于在密钥处理单元02生成共享密钥后,利用共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成验证值,将该验证值发送给第一设备。
上述的密钥配置方式可以很好的应用于WPS认证过程和四次握手过程中,当应用于WPS认证过程时,密钥处理单元02可以通过WPS认证过程中的第一个消息获取用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,通过WPS认证过程中的第二个消息获取用于得到共享密钥的信息。具体参见实施例二和实施例三中所描述的内容。
当应用于四次握手过程中时,密钥处理单元02可以通过四次握手过程中的第一个消息获取用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,通过通知第二设备开始四次握手过程的触发消息获取用于得到共享密钥的信息。具体参见实施例四和实施例五所描述的内容。
上述的第一设备和第二设备可以是诸如个人计算机、笔记本电脑、无线电话、个人数字处理(PDA)、传感器节点、AP等。需要说明的是,本发明所提供的方法和装置并不限于WiFi网络,可以用于任意的诸如蓝牙、Zigbee等无线网络,甚至可以应用于有线网络中的密钥配置。
上述的第一设备如图14所示包括:处理器、存储器和通信总线,所述处理器通过通信总线与存储器连接,所述存储器中保存有实现密钥配置方法的指令,进一步地,所述第一设备还包括通信接口,通过通信接口与其他设备通信连接。
当处理器调取存储器中实现密钥配置方法的指令时,可以执行如下步骤:
通过安全媒介获取第二设备的公钥;
将用于得到共享密钥的信息发送给第二设备,以便所述第二设备利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥;
利用所述用于得到共享密钥的信息或者自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥。
当处理器调取存储器中实现密钥配置方法的指令时,可以执行前述方法实施例中第一设备所执行的步骤,具体可参考前述方法实施例,在此不再赘述。
另外,上述的第二设备如图15所示,包括:处理器、存储器和通信总线,所述处理器通过通信总线与存储器连接,所述存储器中保存有实现密钥配置方法的指令,进一步地,所述第二设备还包括通信接口,通过通信接口与其他设备通信连接。
当处理器调取存储器中实现密钥配置方法的指令时,可以执行如下步骤:
通过安全媒介将第二设备的公钥提供给第一设备;
接收第一设备发送来的用于得到共享密钥的信息;
利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥;
其中所述第一设备利用所述用于得到共享密钥的信息或者自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥。
当处理器调取存储器中实现密钥配置方法的指令时,可以执行前述方法实施例中第二设备所执行的步骤,具体可参考前述方法实施例,在此不再赘述。
本发明所描述的设备在架构上都包含一些基本组件,如总线、处理系统、存储系统、一个或多个输入/输出系统、和通信接口等。总线可以包括一个或多个导线,用来实现设备中各组件之间的通信。处理系统包括各类型的用来执行指令、处理进程或线程的处理器或微处理器。存储系统可以包括存储动态信息的随机访问存储器(RAM)等动态存储器,和存储静态信息的只读存储器(ROM)等静态存储器,以及包括磁或光学记录介质与相应驱动的大容量存储器。输入系统供用户输入信息到服务器或终端设备,如键盘、鼠标、手写笔、声音识别系统、或生物测定系统等,如果是无头设备,则可以不包含人机交互功能的输入系统。输出系统可以包括用来输出信息的显示器、打印机、扬声器、指示灯等。通信接口用来使服务器或终端设备与其它系统或系统进行通信。通信接口之间可通过有线连接、无线连接、或光连接连接到网络中。
各设备上均包含有用来管理系统资源、控制其它程序运行的操作系统软件,以及用来实现特定功能的应用软件。
以上所述仅为本发明的较佳实施例而已,并不用以限制本发明,凡在本发明的精神和原则之内,所做的任何修改、等同替换、改进等,均应包含在本发明保护的范围之内。

Claims (48)

  1. 一种密钥配置的方法,其特征在于,该方法包括:
    第一设备通过安全媒介获取第二设备的公钥;
    第一设备将用于得到共享密钥的信息发送给第二设备;
    以便所述第二设备利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥;
    其中所述第一设备利用所述用于得到共享密钥的信息或者自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一设备通过安全媒介获取第二设备的公钥包括:
    所述第一设备通过扫描识别码的方式、通用串行总线USB的方式或者近场通信NFC的方式从第二设备获取第二设备的公钥。
  3. 根据权利要求1或2所述的方法,其特征在于,所述用于得到共享密钥的信息具体为:第一设备生成的密码;
    所述第一设备利用所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到所述共享密钥包括:所述第一设备将所述密码作为共享密钥;
    所述第一设备将用于得到共享密钥的信息发送给第二设备包括:所述第一设备将利用第二设备的公钥对所述密码进行加密后的加密结果发送给所述第二设备;
    以便所述第二设备利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥包括:以便所述第二设备利用自身的私钥对所述加密结果进行解密得到所述密码,将所述密码作为共享密钥。
  4. 根据权利要求1或2所述的方法,其特征在于,所述用于得到共享密钥的信息为:第一设备的公钥;
    所述第一设备将用于得到共享密钥的信息发送给第二设备包括:所述第一设备利用第二设备的公钥将第一设备的公钥进行加密后,将加密结果发送给第二设备;
    以便所述第二设备利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥包括:以便所述第二设备利用自身的私钥对所述加密结果进行解密后,得到所述第一设备的公钥,并且生成密码,将该密码作为共享密钥,利用所述第一设备的公钥将该密码进行加密后,将加密结果发送给所述第一设备;
    所述第一设备利用自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥包括:所述第一设备利用自身的私钥对接收到的加密结果进行解密后,将得到的密码作为共享密钥。
  5. 根据权利要求1或2所述的方法,其特征在于,所述方法还包括:所述第一设备和所述第二设备预定密钥交换算法;
    所述用于得到共享密钥的信息具体为:所述第一设备的公钥;
    所述第一设备利用自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥包括:所述第一设备利用第二设备的公钥和自身的私钥按照所述密钥交换算法生成共享密钥;
    所述以便所述第二设备利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥包括:以便所述第二设备利用所述第一设备的公钥以及自身的私钥按照所述密钥交换算法生成共享密钥。
  6. 根据权利要求1至5任一权项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一设备和所述第二设备利用所述共享密钥或所述共享密钥的衍生密钥进行安全连接。
  7. 根据权利要求1至5任一权项所述的方法,其特征在于,该方法还包括:
    所述第一设备在得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码,将加密结果发送给所述第二设备;以便所述第二设备利用第二设备得到的共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥对接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到所述密码;该密码用于第一设备和第二设备的安全连接;或者,
    所述第二设备在得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码,将加密结果发送给所述第一设备;所述第一设备利用得到的共享密钥对接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到密码;该密码用于第一设备和第二设备之间的安全连接。
  8. 根据权利要求5所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一设备和所述第二设备预定密钥交换算法包括:
    所述第一设备和所述第二设备上预先配置有所述密钥交换算法所使用的参数;或者,
    所述第一设备和所述第二设备接收第三方的配置设备发送的所述密钥交换算法所使用的参数。
  9. 根据权利要求5所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一设备将用于得到共享密钥的信息发送给第二设备包括:
    所述第一设备利用第二设备的公钥对所述第一设备的公钥进行加密后,将加密结果发送给所述第二设备;
    以便所述第二设备对所述加密结果进行解密,得到所述第一设备的公钥。
  10. 根据权利要求1至9中任一权项所述的方法,其特征在于,该方法还包括:
    所述第一设备得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第二设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第一验证值,将该第一验证值发送给第二设备;
    以便第二设备利用所述第二设备得到的共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第二验证值,将生成的第二验证值与接收到的第一验证值进行比对,如果两者一致,则验证通过,在验证通过的情况下,所述第二设备利用所述共享密钥或共享密钥的衍生密钥与所述第一设备进行安全连接。
  11. 根据权利要求1至9任一权项所述的方法,其特征在于,该方法还包括:
    第一设备接收所述第二设备发送的第一验证值,所述第一验证值是所述第二设备利用共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成的验证值;
    第一设备利用所述第一设备得到的共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第二设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第二验证值,将生成的第二验证值与接收到的第一验证值进行比对,如果两者一致,则验证通过,在验证通过的情况下,所述第一设备利用所述共享密钥或共享密钥的衍生密钥与所述第二设备进行安全连接。
  12. 根据权利要求1至9中任一权项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一设备通过无线保真安全建立WPS认证过程中的第一消息发送所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
    所述第一设备向所述第二设备发送通知所述第二设备开始WPS认证过程的触发消息,并通过WPS认证过程中的第二消息发送所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
    所述第一设备通过四次握手过程中的第一消息发送所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
    所述第一设备通过通知所述第二设备开始四次握手过程的触发消息发送所述用于得到共享密钥的信息。
  13. 一种密钥配置的方法,其特征在于,该方法包括:
    第二设备通过安全媒介将第二设备的公钥提供给第一设备;
    第二设备接收第一设备发送来的用于得到共享密钥的信息;
    第二设备利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥;
    其中所述第一设备利用所述用于得到共享密钥的信息或者自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥。
  14. 根据权利要求13所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第二设备通过安全媒介将第二设备的公钥提供给第一设备包括:
    所述第二设备通过提供识别码供第一设备扫描的方式、通用串行总线USB的方式或者近场通信NFC的方式将第二设备的公钥提供给第一设备。
  15. 根据权利要求13或14所述的方法,其特征在于,所述用于得到共享密钥的信息具体为:第一设备生成的密码;
    所述接收第一设备发送来的用于得到共享密钥的信息包括:接收所述第一设备利用第二设备的公钥将所述密码进行加密后发送来的加密结果;
    所述利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥包括:所述第二设备利用自身的私钥对所述加密结果进行解密得到所述密码,将所述密码作为共享密钥。
  16. 根据权利要求13或14所述的方法,其特征在于,所述用于得到共享密钥的信息具体为:所述第一设备的公钥;
    所述接收第一设备发送来的用于得到共享密钥的信息包括:接收所述第一设备利用第二设备的公钥将第一设备的公钥进行加密后发送来的加密结果;
    所述利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥包括:所述第二设备利用自身的私钥对所述加密结果进行解密后,得到所述第一设备的公钥,并且生成密码,将该密码作为共享密钥,利用所述第一设备的公钥将该密码进行加密后,将加密结果发送给所述第一设备;
    所述第一设备利用自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥包括:所述第一设备利用自身的私钥对接收到的加密结果进行解密后,将得到的密码作为共享密钥。
  17. 根据权利要求13或14所述的方法,其特征在于,所述方法还包括:所述第一设备和所述第二设备预定密钥交换算法;
    所述用于得到共享密钥的信息具体为:所述第一设备的公钥;
    所述第一设备利用自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥包括:所述第一设备利用第二设备的公钥和自身的私钥按照所述密钥交换算法生成共享密钥;
    所述利用自身的私钥和所述用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥包括:所述第二设备利用所述第一设备的公钥以及自身的私钥按照所述密钥交换算法生成共享密钥。
  18. 根据权利要求13至17任一权项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一设备和所述第二设备利用所述共享密钥或所述共享密钥的衍生密钥进行安全连接。
  19. 根据权利要求13至17任一权项所述的方法,其特征在于,该方法还包括:
    所述第二设备接收所述第一设备在得到共享密钥后利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码所得到的加密结果,利用得到的共享密钥对接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到所述密码;该密码用于第一设备和第二设备的安全连接;或者,
    所述第二设备在生成共享密钥后,利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码,将加密结果发送给所述第一设备;以便所述第一设备利用得到的共享密钥对接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到密码;该密码用于第一设备和第二设备之间的安全连接。
  20. 根据权利要求17所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一设备和所述第二设备预定密钥交换算法包括:
    所述第一设备和所述第二设备上预先配置有所述密钥交换算法所使用的参数;或者,
    所述第一设备和所述第二设备接收第三方的配置设备发送的所述密钥交换算法所使用的参数。
  21. 根据权利要求17所述的方法,其特征在于,所述接收第一设备发送来的用于得到共享密钥的信息包括:
    所述第二设备接收所述第一设备利用第二设备的公钥对所述第一设备的公钥进行加密后的加密结果;
    对所述加密结果进行解密,得到所述第一设备的公钥。
  22. 根据权利要求13至21任一权项所述的方法,其特征在于,该方法还包括:
    所述第一设备得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第二设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第一验证值,将该第一验证值发送给第二设备;
    所述第二设备利用第二设备得到的共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第二验证值,将生成的第二验证值与接收到的第一验证值进行比对,如果两者一致,则验证通过,在验证通过的情况下,所述第二设备利用所述共享密钥或共享密钥的衍生密钥与所述第一设备进行安全连接。
  23. 根据权利要求13至21任一权项所述的方法,其特征在于,该方法还包括:所述第二设备得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第三验证值,将该第三验证值发送给第一设备;
    以便所述第一设备利用第一设备得到的共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第二设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第四验证值,将生成的第四验证值与接收到的第三验证值进行比对,如果两者一致,则验证通过,在验证通过的情况下所述第一设备利用所述共享密钥或共享密钥的衍生密钥与所述第二设备进行安全连接。
  24. 根据权利要求13至23任一权项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第二设备通过WPS认证过程中的第一消息接收所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
    所述第二设备接收所述第一设备发送的通知所述第二设备开始WPS认证过程的触发消息,并通过WPS认证过程中的第二消息接收所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
    所述第二设备通过四次握手过程中的第一消息接收所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
    所述第二设备通过通知所述第二设备开始四次握手过程的触发消息接收所述用于得到共享密钥的信息。
  25. 一种密钥配置的装置,该装置位于第一设备中,其特征在于,该装置包括:
    安全获取单元,用于通过安全媒介获取第二设备的公钥;
    密钥处理单元,用于将用于得到共享密钥的信息发送给第二设备,以及利用所述用于得到共享密钥的信息或者自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥;
    所述用于得到共享密钥的信息供所述第二设备结合自身的私钥得到共享密钥。
  26. 根据权利要求25所述的装置,其特征在于,所述安全获取单元,具体用于通过扫描识别码的方式、通用串行总线USB的方式或者近场通信NFC的方式从第二设备获取第二设备的公钥。
  27. 根据权利要求25或26所述的装置,其特征在于,所述密钥处理单元包括:
    第一密钥生成子单元,用于生成密码,将所述密码作为共享密钥;
    第一密钥传输子单元,用于利用所述第二设备的公钥将所述密码进行加密后,将加密结果发送给所述第二设备,以供所述第二设备利用自身的私钥对所述加密结果进行解密得到所述密码并将所述密码作为共享密钥。
  28. 根据权利要求25或26所述的装置,其特征在于,所述密钥处理单元包括:
    第二密钥传输子单元,用于利用第二设备的公钥将第一设备的公钥进行加密后,将加密结果发送给第二设备;
    第二密钥生成子单元,用于接收到第二设备发送的加密结果后,利用自身的私钥对加密结果进行解密,将得到的密码作为共享密钥。
  29. 根据权利要求25或26所述的装置,其特征在于,所述密钥处理单元包括:
    第三密钥生成子单元,用于利用第二设备的公钥和第一设备的私钥按照所述第一设备和所述第二设备预定的密钥交换算法生成共享密钥;
    第三密钥传输子单元,用于将第一设备的公钥发送给所述第二设备,以供所述第二设备利用第一设备的公钥以及自身的私钥按照所述密钥交换算法生成共享密钥。
  30. 根据权利要求25至29任一权项所述的装置,其特征在于,所述共享密钥或所述共享密钥的衍生密钥用于第一设备与第二设备之间进行安全连接。
  31. 根据权利要求29所述的装置,其特征在于,所述第三密钥生成子单元,还用于在得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码;
    所述第三密钥传输子单元,还用于将第三密钥生成子单元的加密结果发送给第二设备, 其中,所述密码用于第一设备和第二设备的安全连接;或者,
    所述第三密钥传输子单元,还用于接收第二设备在得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码后发送来的加密结果;
    所述第三密钥生成子单元,还用于利用得到的共享密钥对所述第三密钥传输子单元接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到所述密码,其中,所述密码用于第一设备和第二设备的安全连接。
  32. 根据权利要求29所述的装置,其特征在于,该装置还包括:参数配置单元,用于存储预先配置的所述密钥交换算法所使用的参数,或者接收并存储第三方的配置设备发送的所述密钥交换算法所使用的参数。
  33. 根据权利要求29所述的装置,其特征在于,所述第三密钥传输子单元在将第一设备的公钥发送给所述第二设备时,具体用于利用第二设备的公钥对所述第一设备的公钥进行加密后,将加密结果发送给所述第二设备,以供所述第二设备对所述加密结果进行解密后得到所述第一设备的公钥。
  34. 根据权利要求25至33任一权项所述的装置,其特征在于,该装置还包括:第一验证单元,用于在所述密钥处理单元得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第二设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第一验证值,将该第一验证值发送给第二设备;
    以便第二设备利用第二设备得到的共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第二验证值,将生成的第二验证值与接收到的第一验证值进行比对,如果两者一致,则验证通过,在验证通过的情况下,所述第二设备利用所述共享密钥或共享密钥的衍生密钥与所述第一设备进行安全连接。
  35. 根据权利要求25至33任一权项所述的装置,其特征在于,该装置还包括:第二验证单元,用于接收到第二设备发送的第三验证值后,利用所述密钥处理单元得到的共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第二设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第四验证值,将生成的第四验证值与接收到的第三验证值进行比对,如果两者一致,则验证通过,在验证通过的情况下所述第一设备利用所述共享密钥或共享密钥的衍生密钥与所述第二设备进行安全连接,其中,所述第三验证值为所述第二设备得到共享密钥后,利用所述共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成的。
  36. 根据权利要求25至35任一权项所述的装置,其特征在于,所述密钥处理单元,具体用于通过WPS认证过程中的第一消息发送所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
    向所述第二设备发送通知所述第二设备开始WPS认证过程的触发消息,并通过WPS认证过程中的第二消息发送所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
    通过四次握手过程中的第一消息发送所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
    通过通知所述第二设备开始四次握手过程的触发消息发送所述用于得到共享密钥的信息。
  37. 一种密钥配置的装置,该装置位于第二设备中,其特征在于,该装置包括:
    安全发送单元,用于通过安全媒介将第二设备的公钥提供给第一设备;
    密钥处理单元,用于利用自身的私钥和第一设备发送来的用于得到共享密钥的信息得到共享密钥;
    其中所述第一设备利用所述用于得到共享密钥的信息或者自身的私钥得到所述共享密钥。
  38. 根据权利要求37所述的装置,其特征在于,所述安全发送单元,具体用于通过提供识别码供第一设备扫描的方式、通用串行总线USB的方式或者近场通信NFC的方式将第二设备的公钥提供给第一设备。
  39. 根据权利要求37或38所述的装置,其特征在于,所述密钥处理单元具体包括:
    第一信息传输子单元,用于接收第一设备发送来的利用第二设备的公钥对第一设备生成的密码进行加密所得到的加密结果;
    第一密钥生成子单元,用于利用第二设备的私钥对所述加密结果进行解密得到所述密码,将所述密码作为共享密钥。
  40. 根据权利要求37或38所述的装置,其特征在于,所述密钥处理单元具体包括:
    第二信息传输子单元,用于接收第一设备利用第二设备的公钥将第一设备的公钥进行加密后得到的加密结果;将第二密钥生成子单元得到的加密结果发送给所述第一设备,以便所述第一设备利用自身的私钥对接收到的加密结果进行解密后,将得到的密码作为共享密钥;
    第二密钥生成子单元,用于利用自身的私钥对所述第二信息传输子单元接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到所述第一设备的公钥,并且生成密码,将该密码作为共享密钥,利用所述第一设备的公钥将该密码进行加密后得到加密结果。
  41. 根据权利要求37或38所述的装置,其特征在于,所述密钥处理单元具体包括:
    第三信息传输子单元,用于接收所述第一设备发送来的第一设备的公钥;
    第三密钥生成子单元,用于利用第一设备的公钥以及自身的私钥按照所述第一设备和所述第二设备预定的密钥交换算法生成共享密钥。
  42. 根据权利要求37至41任一权项所述的装置,其特征在于,所述共享密钥用于第一设备和第二设备之间的安全连接。
  43. 根据权利要求41所述的装置,其特征在于,
    所述第三信息传输子单元,还用于接收第一设备在利用第二设备的公钥和自身的私钥按照所述密钥交换算法生成共享密钥后,利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码得到的加密结果;所述第三密钥生成子单元,还用于利用得到的共享密钥对所述第三信息传输子单元接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到所述密码,其中,所述密钥用于第一设备和第二设备之间的安全连接;或者,
    所述第三密钥生成子单元,还用于在得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥或者共享密钥的衍生密钥加密一个密码得到加密结果;所述第三信息传输子单元,还用于将所述第三密钥生成子单元生成的加密结果发送给第一设备,以便所述第一设备在利用第二设备的公钥和自身的私钥按照所述密钥交换算法生成共享密钥后,对接收到的加密结果进行解密,得到所述密码,其中,所述密钥用于第一设备和第二设备之间的安全连接。
  44. 根据权利要求41或43所述的装置,其特征在于,该装置还包括:参数配置单元,用于存储预先配置的所述密钥交换算法所使用的参数,或者接收并存储第三方的配置设备发送的所述密钥交换算法所使用的参数。
  45. 根据权利要求41所述的装置,其特征在于,所述第三信息传输子单元,具体用于接收第一设备发送来的利用第二设备的公钥对第一设备的公钥进行加密后的加密结果,对该加密结果进行解密,得到所述第一设备的公钥。
  46. 根据权利要求37至45任一权项所述的装置,其特征在于,该装置还包括:第一验证单元,用于如果接收到第一设备发送的第一验证值,则利用所述密钥处理单元得到的共享密钥、该共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第二验证值,将生成的第二验证值与接收到的第一验证值进行比对,如果两者一致,则验证通过,在验证通过的情况下,所述第二设备利用所述共享密钥或共享密钥的衍生密钥与第一设备进行安全连接。
  47. 根据权利要求37至45任一权项所述的装置,其特征在于,该装置还包括:
    第二验证单元,用于在所述密钥处理单元得到共享密钥后,利用共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第一设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第三验证值,将该第三验证值发送给第一设备;
    以便所述第一设备利用第一设备得到的共享密钥、共享密钥的衍生密钥或者与第二设备预先约定的明文中的至少一种生成第四验证值,将生成的第四验证值与接收到的第三验证值进行比对,如果两者一致,则验证通过,在验证通过的情况下所述第一设备利用所述共享密钥或共享密钥的衍生密钥与所述第二设备进行安全连接。
  48. 根据权利要求37至45 任一权项所述的装置,其特征在于,所述密钥处理单元,具体用于通过WPS认证过程中的第一消息获取所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
    通过WPS认证过程中的第二消息获取所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
    通过四次握手过程中的第一消息获取所述用于得到共享密钥的信息;或者,
    通过通知所述第二设备开始四次握手过程的触发消息获取所述用于得到共享密钥的信息。
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CN108366057A (zh) * 2018-02-06 2018-08-03 武汉斗鱼网络科技有限公司 一种数据处理方法、客户端及电子设备
CN108241517B (zh) * 2018-02-23 2021-02-02 武汉斗鱼网络科技有限公司 一种软件升级方法、客户端及电子设备
CN108241517A (zh) * 2018-02-23 2018-07-03 武汉斗鱼网络科技有限公司 一种软件升级方法、客户端及电子设备
CN112241527A (zh) * 2020-12-15 2021-01-19 杭州海康威视数字技术股份有限公司 密钥生成方法、系统及电子设备
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CN115767541B (zh) * 2021-09-03 2026-03-17 荣耀终端股份有限公司 无线连接的建立方法、电子设备、程序产品和存储介质

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