WO2017084399A1 - 一种列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构及通信方法 - Google Patents

一种列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构及通信方法 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2017084399A1
WO2017084399A1 PCT/CN2016/095646 CN2016095646W WO2017084399A1 WO 2017084399 A1 WO2017084399 A1 WO 2017084399A1 CN 2016095646 W CN2016095646 W CN 2016095646W WO 2017084399 A1 WO2017084399 A1 WO 2017084399A1
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Prior art keywords
network
trusted
train
vehicle
level
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PCT/CN2016/095646
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
徐燕芬
姜仕军
薛树坤
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CRRC Qingdao Sifang Rolling Stock Research Institute Co Ltd
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CRRC Qingdao Sifang Rolling Stock Research Institute Co Ltd
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Priority to JP2017558406A priority Critical patent/JP6397585B2/ja
Priority to RU2017131566A priority patent/RU2653261C1/ru
Priority to US15/572,774 priority patent/US10056985B2/en
Priority to EP16865577.7A priority patent/EP3244577B1/en
Publication of WO2017084399A1 publication Critical patent/WO2017084399A1/zh
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
    • B61L15/0027—Radio-based, e.g. using GSM-R
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
    • B61L15/0036—Conductor-based, e.g. using CAN-Bus, train-line or optical fibres
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0072—On-board train data handling
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/70—Details of trackside communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
    • H04B10/80—Optical aspects relating to the use of optical transmission for specific applications, not provided for in groups H04B10/03 - H04B10/70, e.g. optical power feeding or optical transmission through water
    • H04B10/85—Protection from unauthorised access, e.g. eavesdrop protection
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H04L12/42—Loop networks
    • H04L12/437—Ring fault isolation or reconfiguration
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/06—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications
    • H04L41/0654—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications using network fault recovery
    • H04L41/0668—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications using network fault recovery by dynamic selection of recovery network elements, e.g. replacement by the most appropriate element after failure
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
    • H04L63/0227—Filtering policies
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L65/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication
    • H04L65/60—Network streaming of media packets
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L65/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication
    • H04L65/80—Responding to QoS
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04Q—SELECTING
    • H04Q11/00—Selecting arrangements for multiplex systems
    • H04Q11/0001—Selecting arrangements for multiplex systems using optical switching
    • H04Q11/0062—Network aspects
    • H04Q11/0066—Provisions for optical burst or packet networks
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60L—PROPULSION OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; SUPPLYING ELECTRIC POWER FOR AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; ELECTRODYNAMIC BRAKE SYSTEMS FOR VEHICLES IN GENERAL; MAGNETIC SUSPENSION OR LEVITATION FOR VEHICLES; MONITORING OPERATING VARIABLES OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; ELECTRIC SAFETY DEVICES FOR ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES
    • B60L2200/00—Type of vehicles
    • B60L2200/26—Rail vehicles
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04Q—SELECTING
    • H04Q11/00—Selecting arrangements for multiplex systems
    • H04Q11/0001—Selecting arrangements for multiplex systems using optical switching
    • H04Q11/0062—Network aspects
    • H04Q2011/0079—Operation or maintenance aspects
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04Q—SELECTING
    • H04Q2213/00—Indexing scheme relating to selecting arrangements in general and for multiplex systems
    • H04Q2213/13339—Ciphering, encryption, security

Definitions

  • the invention belongs to the technical field of train network communication, and relates to a communication network architecture, in particular to a broadband communication network architecture for train control and service common network, and a train communication method using the same.
  • the train communication network can be divided into a train control network and a train service network.
  • the main function of the train control network is to control the in-vehicle equipment dispersed in each vehicle of the train, so that it can work together and share information to realize the fault detection and maintenance of the vehicle equipment.
  • the main function of the train service network is to provide train-related staff and passengers with Information services, functions such as vehicle and land communication.
  • the train communication network has the following problems:
  • the train control network adopts MVB, CAN, HDLC and other control buses. As the data volume of train communication increases sharply, the control communication can be guaranteed in real time, but the communication of large data volume cannot be satisfied;
  • the twisted pair cable is used as the Ethernet cable, and the transmission distance and transmission quality of the twisted pair cable become the bottleneck of the solution.
  • the object of the present invention is to provide a network architecture with high data transmission security level, transmission of a train control network and a service network, and a train communication using the network architecture for communication according to the deficiencies of the prior art. method.
  • the technical solution of the present invention is: a broadband communication network architecture for train control and service sharing, including a trusted network and an untrusted network;
  • the trusted network includes a trusted vehicle-level network element disposed in each vehicle (the train usually Including the head car, the tail car and the intermediate car, each of which includes the head car, the tail car and the intermediate car), in the head car and the tail car, in addition to the trusted vehicle-level network element, there are also separate trusted trains Level network element;
  • untrusted network includes untrusted train-level network elements respectively set in the head and tail cars; a trusted train-level network element communicates with an untrusted train-level network element via a security gateway, and multiple security gateways interact with each other; For redundancy.
  • the trusted train-level network element in the first vehicle communicates with the untrusted train-level network element in the head vehicle via the primary security gateway; in the trusted network, the trusted train-level network element in the tail vehicle passes through Untrusted train-level network elements in the secondary security gateway and tail car Communication; the primary security gateway and the secondary security gateway are mutually redundant. Under normal circumstances, the trusted train-level network element of the first vehicle communicates with the untrusted train-level network element via the primary security gateway. When the communication line of the primary security gateway fails, the communication line between the tail vehicle and the secondary security gateway is activated.
  • At least one trusted vehicle-level network element is disposed in each vehicle, and all trusted vehicle-level network elements in each vehicle form a trusted vehicle-level network element in each vehicle.
  • the trusted train-level network element in the first vehicle and the trusted train-level network element in the tail vehicle are interconnected to form a trusted ring network structure;
  • the trusted vehicle-level network element groups in each vehicle are respectively Communication with trusted train-level network elements in the first car and trusted train-level network elements in the tail car; untrusted train-level network elements in the first car and untrusted train-level network elements in the tail car in the untrusted network
  • the two ends are interconnected to form an untrusted ring network architecture.
  • the trusted vehicle-level network element group includes two trusted vehicle-level network elements: that is, within each vehicle, the trusted vehicle-level network element group includes the trusted vehicle-level network element I and the trusted vehicle-level network element II.
  • Two trusted vehicle-level network elements are interconnected, that is, the trusted vehicle-level network element I and the trusted vehicle-level network element II in each vehicle are interconnected, and the trusted vehicle-level network element I in each vehicle Both are connected to the trusted train-level network elements in the first vehicle, and the trusted vehicle-level network elements II in each vehicle are connected to the trusted train-level network elements in the tail vehicle.
  • each vehicle has a trusted vehicle-level network element group (interconnected trusted vehicle-level network element I, trusted vehicle-level network element II) and a trusted vehicle-level network element and tail vehicle in the first vehicle.
  • the trusted vehicle-level network elements together constitute a trusted ring network architecture.
  • At least one trusted vehicle-level network element and at least one trusted train-level network element are disposed in each vehicle to form a trusted network element group, and the trusted network element in each vehicle
  • the groups are connected in series to form a trusted linear network architecture; in the untrusted network, in addition to the head car and the tail car, each vehicle (each intermediate car except the head car and the tail car) is also provided with an untrusted train.
  • Level network elements from the first car to the tail car, the untrusted train-level network elements of each vehicle (including the head car, tail car and intermediate car) are connected in turn to form an untrusted linear network structure; or each car (including the head car, The untrusted train-level network elements on the tail car and the intermediate car are connected end to end in sequence, forming an untrusted ring network architecture.
  • untrusted train-level network elements in the head car and the tail car are interconnected to form a ring network.
  • each vehicle is provided with a trusted vehicle-level network element and two trusted train-level network elements, which are connected end to end to form a ring network structure within the vehicle.
  • each vehicle includes a trusted vehicle-level network element, a trusted vehicle-level network element I, and a trusted vehicle-level network element II, and a trusted vehicle-level network element I and a trusted vehicle-level network element II are interconnected, and Both the trusted vehicle-level network element I and the trusted vehicle-level network element II communicate with the trusted train-level network element to form a ring network architecture.
  • the trusted train-level network elements in any vehicle can communicate with the untrusted train-level network elements through the security gateway to enhance network redundancy.
  • each intermediate car is also provided with untrusted train-level network elements
  • the trusted train-level network elements in each intermediate vehicle also pass through the security gateway.
  • the trusted train-level network element is not trusted in the middle vehicle. Train-level network element communication. When the communication between the trusted train-level network element in the head or tail vehicle and the untrusted train-level network element fails, the network communication in the train is affected.
  • the communication ports of the trusted train-level network element and the untrusted train-level network element are all optical ports
  • the connection medium between the trusted train-level network element in the head vehicle and the trusted train-level network element in the tail vehicle is the optical cable.
  • the connection medium between the untrusted train-level network element in the first car and the untrusted train-level network element in the tail car is the optical cable.
  • the optical fiber transmission bandwidth and communication capacity are large; the transmission loss is low, and other communication cables can be used in addition to the optical cable.
  • the method of data communication for the broadband communication network architecture of train control and service network, the train control network and the train service network are divided into a trusted network and an untrusted network, including a communication method in a trusted network, a trusted network and an untrusted network.
  • the data transmitted in the trusted network includes control data, monitoring data and diagnostic information data in the train control network, and also includes passenger information data and video information data in the train service network; setting different priorities, controlling data, and monitoring for different data.
  • the priority of the data and diagnostic information data type process data is higher than the priority of the passenger information data and the video information data, and the transmission data is automatically cached and transmitted according to the priority level;
  • the inter-network transmission data between the untrusted network and the trusted network is transmitted bidirectionally between the untrusted train-level network element and the trusted train-level network element via the security gateway; the data transmitted by the trusted network to the untrusted network includes the train driving data and the vehicle. Internal and external temperature data; data transmitted by the untrusted network to the trusted network includes: ground audio data transmitted to the emergency alarm device, terrestrial video data transmitted to the set top box; and when inter-network communication, the security gateway first performs device authentication on the device that issues the data If the device meets the authentication conditions, it performs packet authentication on the data packet.
  • the network architecture provided by the present invention is a train control network and a train service network common network structure, which can realize co-network transmission of train control, monitoring and diagnosis information with passenger information and video information, that is, a passenger information service system network.
  • the co-network transmission with the data of the train control network satisfies the requirements of the network bandwidth of the passenger information service system and ensures the stability of the train network.
  • the control and service common network structure is divided into trusted network and untrusted network, control data, monitoring data and diagnosis in the train control network.
  • Information data and passenger information data and video information data in the train service network are transmitted on the common network in the trusted network, vehicle driving data, vehicle interior and exterior temperature data, ground audio data transmitted to the emergency alarm device, and ground video data transmitted to the set top box.
  • the data is authenticated by the security gateway, it is transmitted between the trusted network and the untrusted network.
  • the untrusted network is also responsible for the communication between the train and the vehicle, and the WIFI access between the vehicle and the train, and the wireless network and the train physical network. Isolation improves the security of train network data transmission.
  • the present invention adopts an in-line ring network method, which is different from the conventional ring-hopping method.
  • Each car can be equipped with multiple trusted vehicle-level network elements, and dual-network ports are used to access redundant and trusted vehicle-level network elements, and the trusted vehicle-level network elements and the core trusted train-level network elements form a ring network, even if The communication failure of the car in this section will not affect the communication of other cars. Better fault isolation and redundancy.
  • the method of inscribed in the ring network means that all the ring centers constituting the ring inscribed are located on the same side of the tangent point, and the tangent points serve as a common constituent node of all the rings. Taking the head and tail vehicle network equipment as the cut-off point, the network equipment and the intermediate vehicle network equipment are cut to form an in-loop network.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic view 1 of the structure of Embodiment 1;
  • Figure 2 is a schematic view 2 of the structure of Embodiment 1;
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a connection structure of a trusted vehicle-level network element of the moving vehicle of Embodiment 1;
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a connection structure of a trusted vehicle-level network element of the trailer of Embodiment 1;
  • Figure 5 is a schematic view showing the structure of Embodiment 2.
  • 1-untrusted train-level network element 2-trusted train-level network element, 3-trusted vehicle-level network element, 4-security gateway, 5-head vehicle, 6-tail vehicle
  • a broadband communication network architecture for train control and service sharing network can realize common network data transmission of a train control network and a train service network, and the network architecture divides the train control network and the service network into trusted Network and untrusted network, wherein the data transmitted in the trusted network includes control data, monitoring data and diagnostic information data in the train control network, and also includes passenger information data and video information data in the train service network; trusted network and The communication network communicates via the security gateway.
  • the data transmitted includes train driving data, temperature data inside and outside the vehicle, ground audio data transmitted to the emergency alarm device, and ground video data transmitted to the set-top box.
  • the untrusted network is also responsible for the vehicle. Ground connection, to achieve vehicle-to-ground communication and WIFI connection between the vehicle and the vehicle, this part of the risk is high, it is likely to become the entrance of criminals invading the train network.
  • the trusted network includes a trusted vehicle disposed in each vehicle.
  • the untrusted network includes the first set car 5 and the tail car 6 respectively.
  • the trusted train-level network element 2 in the head vehicle 5 communicates with the untrusted network train-level network element 1 in the head vehicle 5 via the security gateway 4;
  • the trusted network The trusted train-level network element 2 in the tail car 6 communicates with the untrusted network train-level network element 1 in the tail car 6 via the security gateway 4.
  • the two security gateways are divided into a primary security gateway and a secondary security gateway, which are mutually redundant.
  • the security gateway 4 connected to the head car 5 is defined as the primary security gateway.
  • the trusted vehicle level network element 2 of the first vehicle 5 is The primary security gateway communicates with the untrusted train-level network element. When the communication line of the primary security gateway is faulty or the device fails, the communication line between the tail car 6 and the secondary security gateway is started.
  • TC motor car
  • M trailer
  • M motor car
  • TC motor car
  • M trailer
  • TC motor car
  • the two moving cars are the head car and the tail car
  • the two trailers are the middle car. Since the network element in the head car and the tail car is responsible for communication between the trusted network and the untrusted network, the setting of the network element between the head car, the tail car and the intermediate car is different.
  • the head and tail cars are the intersection of trusted and untrusted networks, covering trusted and untrusted networks, inside the head and tail cars, except for two trusted vehicle-level network elements 3 (trusted vehicles)
  • the level network element I3 and the trusted vehicle level network element II3 form a trusted vehicle level network element group), and also have a trusted train level network element 2 and an untrusted train level network element 1, and at the same time, is also provided with security.
  • Gateway 4 as a tool for network communication authentication.
  • the trusted vehicle-level network element I3 and the trusted vehicle-level network element II3 are respectively connected in series, the trusted vehicle-level network element I3 and the trusted vehicle-level network element II3 They are mutually redundant, ensuring equipment-level redundancy.
  • the two are connected by 100 Mbps Ethernet twisted pair.
  • the trusted vehicle-level network element I3 in each vehicle is connected to the trusted train-level network element 2 of the first vehicle.
  • the trusted vehicle-level network element II3 in each vehicle is connected to the trusted train-level network element 2 of the tail car. As shown in FIG.
  • the network connection shown by the solid line and the network connection shown by the dotted line form a mutually redundant trusted network ring network architecture, one being the primary line and the other being the backup line.
  • the main line works.
  • the backup line is activated and the backup line works.
  • the trusted train-level network element 2 in the head vehicle and the trusted train-level network element 2 in the tail vehicle also have two mutual Connected ports, the two interconnected through the interconnect ports to form a trusted ring network architecture.
  • the trusted train-level network element 2 in the first vehicle passes the untrusted train-level network element in the security gateway 4 and the head vehicle 1 connected, in the same way, the trusted train-level network element 2 in the tail car is connected to the untrusted train-level network element 1 in the tail car via the security gateway 4, so as to realize communication between the trusted network and the untrusted network.
  • the untrusted train-level network element 1 in the first vehicle and the untrusted train-level network element 1 in the tail vehicle also have two interconnection ports respectively, and the two are interconnected through the interconnection port to form two ends.
  • Untrusted ring network architecture The ports used for communication by the trusted train-level network element and the untrusted train-level network element are all optical ports.
  • the train bus adopts 1000Base-LX, supports full-duplex mode, and the transmission rate is 1000 Mbit/s.
  • the connection medium between the trusted train-level network element in the head vehicle and the trusted train-level network element in the tail vehicle is the optical cable; the connection medium between the untrusted train-level network element in the head vehicle and the untrusted train-level network element in the tail vehicle is also For fiber optic cable.
  • the trusted vehicle-level network element 3 has a routing and network address translation function, and is responsible for realizing the reconfiguration of the network after the train is reconnected and de-programmed.
  • the devices in the trusted network are in the same local area network, and mainly transmit train control, monitoring and diagnostic information and passenger information and video information. Different data have different priorities, and process data such as train control, monitoring and diagnostic information has the highest priority, video information has a relatively low priority, and transmission data is automatically buffered and transmitted according to priority.
  • the trusted vehicle-level network element 3 uses a 24 Mbps electrical port + 2 gigabit optical port two-layer switch, and the switch uses optical port links. As shown in FIG.
  • the driver room human-machine interface HMI, the train control unit VCU, the remote input/output module RIOM, and the brake control unit BCU key terminal equipment dual network ports are simultaneously mounted to two redundant vehicle-level switches.
  • the passenger information system controller and the car controller single network port device are respectively mounted on the two switches as needed.
  • the trusted vehicle-level network element 3 uses a 24 Gigabit electrical port + 2 Gigabit optical port Layer 2 switch, and the optical port link is used between the switches.
  • the traction control unit DCU and the remote input/output module RIOM use a dual network port to access the redundant switch.
  • the car controller, LCD electronic map, emergency alarm device, car controller, and car network switching unit in the PIS system are respectively linked to two switches as needed.
  • devices related to the vehicle-to-ground communication and WIFI service network in the PIS system such as a central server, WIFI access, etc.
  • a central server In an untrusted network, devices related to the vehicle-to-ground communication and WIFI service network in the PIS system, such as a central server, WIFI access, etc., are arranged in an untrusted network.
  • the train-level bandwidth adopts 1000M
  • full-duplex mode In the untrusted network, the train-level bandwidth adopts 1000M, full-duplex mode
  • the vehicle-level equipment adopts 100-megabit full-duplex mode.
  • a WIFI hotspot is arranged in each of the trains and trailers, and the central server is arranged in the train.
  • the security gateway connects the untrusted network and the trusted network through the 100 Mbps port. Packets passing through the security gateway can be divided into two categories:
  • Data stream transmitted by an untrusted network to a trusted network terrestrial audio data transmitted to the emergency alert device, terrestrial video data transmitted to the set top box.
  • the data flow transmitted by the trusted network to the untrusted network train driving data, temperature inside and outside the vehicle.
  • the security gateway has device authentication and packet authentication.
  • a terminal device that communicates over the network needs to pass the device authentication of the security gateway first.
  • the packets passing through the security gateway need to meet the predefined format. That is, packets that meet the predefined format can be transmitted between the trusted network and the untrusted network through the security gateway.
  • This embodiment provides another broadband communication network architecture for train control and service sharing.
  • the network architecture is still divided into a trusted network and an untrusted network, and is different from Embodiment 1. It is the specific structure of the network architecture.
  • the specific implementation manner of the network architecture is described by taking 2 trains and 2 towed trains as an example.
  • the four groups are in the form of: motor car (TC) - trailer (M) - trailer (M) - motor car (TC), of which two cars are the head car and the tail car, and the two trailers are the intermediate car.
  • the network elements in the head and tail vehicles are responsible for communication between the trusted network and the untrusted network.
  • the network design is divided into two levels: train-level and vehicle-level architecture, including trusted train-level networks and trusted vehicle-level networks.
  • each vehicle the number of trusted vehicle-level network elements can be determined according to the number of terminal devices.
  • each vehicle is configured with a trusted vehicle-level network element 3 and two trusted train-level network elements 2, three of which are The loops are connected end to end to form a redundant ring network structure; that is, in the vehicle-level network, the trusted vehicle-level network element forms a ring network with the trusted train-level network elements in the host vehicle. Two of the trusted train-level network elements 2 are redundant with each other.
  • the communication within the vehicle is realized by the trusted vehicle-level network element 3 or the trusted train-level network element 2; any two trusted train-level network elements 2 in each vehicle and the trusted train-level network elements of the adjacent vehicles respectively 2 Connected in series to form a trusted linear network architecture.
  • the link aggregation mode is adopted, and the trusted train-level network element 2 supporting the bypass function is formed into a linear network.
  • the first car, the tail car and the intermediate car are each provided with an untrusted train-level network element 1, from the first car to the tail car, and the untrusted train-level network element 1 is connected in turn to form an untrusted linear network.
  • the untrusted train-level network element 1 in the head and tail cars and the trusted train-level network element 2 in the head and tail vehicles are connected and communicated via the security gateway 4.
  • the security gateway in the head car and the tail car is divided into a primary security gateway and a secondary security gateway.
  • the primary security gateway is responsible for communication between the trusted network and the untrusted network.
  • the line where the secondary security gateway is located is responsible for communication.
  • the solution places the redundant security gateways in the head and tail vehicles. In practical applications, the location of the security gateway can be configured as needed, not limited to which vehicle to place. If the security gateway is configured in the intermediate vehicle, the trusted vehicle-level network element 2 in the intermediate vehicle is connected to the security gateway to form a trusted network. A communication connection between a network and an untrusted network. That is, the trusted vehicle-level network element 2 in the intermediate vehicle communicates with the untrusted train-level network element 2 in the intermediate-car via the security gateway.
  • the network can be a ring, linear or star network depending on the actual situation.
  • a linear network of linear connections of one train-level network element in each vehicle is used.
  • the communication interface between the network elements can be configured as needed, and the transmission medium between the trusted network and the untrusted network is not limited to the optical fiber cable.
  • the train-level network uses a 24-port, two-tier, two-layer switch.
  • the driver's room man-machine interface HMI, train control unit VCU, remote input and output module RIOM, brake control unit BCU key terminal equipment dual network port are simultaneously mounted to two redundant train-level switches.
  • the data communication method between the trusted network and between the trusted network and the untrusted network is the same as that in the first embodiment.

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Abstract

一种列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构，包括可信网络和不可信网络；所述可信网络包括设置在每辆车内的可信车辆级网元，头车和尾车中，除可信车辆级网元外，还分别设置有可信列车级网元；所述不可信网络包括分别设置在头车和尾车中的不可信列车级网元；一个可信列车级网元与一个不可信列车级网元经安全网关通信，多个安全网关互为冗余。采用本发明提供的网络架构是一种列车控制网络和服务网络共网网络架构，可实现列车控制、监视及诊断信息与旅客信息、视频信息的共网传输，旅客信息服务系统网络与列车网络的共网传输，满足旅客信息服务系统网络带宽的要求，保证列车网络的稳定性。

Description

一种列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构及通信方法 技术领域
本发明属于列车网络通信技术领域，涉及一种通信网络架构，具体的说，涉及一种列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构，及采用该架构的列车通信方法。
背景技术
列车通信网络可分为列车控制网络和列车服务网络。列车控制网络的主要功能是控制分散在列车各个车辆中的车载设备，使之协同工作、信息共享，实现车载设备的故障检测及维护；列车服务网络的主要功能是为列车相关工作人员及旅客提供信息服务、实现车地通信等功能。
现有技术中，列车通信网络存在以下问题：
(1)大部分列车，控制网络和服务网络通常采用各自独立的网络架构；
(2)列车控制网络采用MVB、CAN、HDLC等控制总线，随着列车通信的数据量剧增，在实时性可以保证控制通讯，但无法满足大数据量的通讯；
(3)在提供WIFI无线上网服务的列车上，有采用列车控制网络和列车服务网络共网的方案，但由于缺少安全措施，没有保障列车网络通信安全的策略；
(4)在应用以太网作为轨道车辆通信网络架构设计中，采用双绞线作为以太网电缆，而双绞线的传输距离、传输质量都成为方案的瓶颈。
发明内容
本发明的目的在于根据现有技术的不足，提供一种数据传输安全级别高，列车控制网络和服务网络共网的传输的网络架构，同时还提供了一种采用该网络架构进行通信的列车通信方法。
本发明的技术方案是：一种列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构，包括可信网络和不可信网络；可信网络包括设置在每辆车内的可信车辆级网元(列车通常包括头车、尾车和中间车，所述的每辆车包括头车、尾车和中间车)，头车和尾车中，除可信车辆级网元外，还分别设置有可信列车级网元；不可信网络包括分别设置在头车和尾车中的不可信列车级网元；一个可信列车级网元与一个不可信列车级网元经安全网关通信，多个安全网关互为冗余。
例如：可信网络中，头车中的可信列车级网元经主安全网关与头车中的不可信列车级网元通信；可信网络中，尾车中的可信列车级网元经辅安全网关与尾车中的不可信列车级网元 通信；主安全网关和辅安全网关互为冗余。正常情况下，头车可信列车级网元经主安全网关与不可信列车级网元通信，当主安全网关所在通信线路发生故障的情况下，启动尾车和辅安全网关的通信线路。
优选的是：可信网络中，每辆车内均设置有至少一个可信车辆级网元，每辆车内的所有可信车辆级网元在每辆车内分别形成可信车辆级网元组，头车中的可信列车级网元和尾车中的可信列车级网元的两端互连，形成可信环网架构；每辆车内的可信车辆级网元组均分别与头车中的可信列车级网元和尾车中的可信列车级网元通信；不可信网络中，头车中的不可信列车级网元和尾车中的不可信列车级网元两端互连，形成不可信环网架构。
更进一步的：可信车辆级网元组包括两个可信车辆级网元：即每辆车内，可信车辆级网元组包括可信车辆级网元I和可信车辆级网元II，两个可信车辆级网元互连，即每辆车内的可信车辆级网元I和可信车辆级网元II之间互联，且每辆车内的可信车辆级网元I均与头车中的可信列车级网元相连，每辆车内的可信车辆级网元II均与尾车中的可信列车级网元相连。
具体的说，每辆车内的可信车辆级网元组(互联的可信车辆级网元I、可信车辆级网元II)与头车中的可信车辆级网元、尾车中的可信车辆级网元共同构成了可信环网架构。
优选的是：可信网络中，每辆车内均设置有至少一个可信车辆级网元和至少一个可信列车级网元，构成可信网元组，每辆车内的可信网元组顺次串联，形成可信线性网络架构；不可信网络中，除头车和尾车外，每辆车(除头车和尾车外的每辆中间车)内也分别设置有不可信列车级网元，由头车到尾车，每辆车(包括头车、尾车和中间车)的不可信列车级网元依次相连，形成不可信线性网络架构；或每辆车(包括头车、尾车和中间车)上的不可信列车级网元顺次首尾相连，形成不可信环形网络架构。
具体的说，与不可信线性网络架构不同的是，不可信环形网络架构中，头车和尾车中的不可信列车级网元之间互联，以形成环形网络。
更进一步的：可信网络中，每辆车内设置有一个可信车辆级网元和两个可信列车级网元，顺次首尾相连，形成车辆内的环形网络结构。
例如，每辆车内包括可信车辆级网元、可信车辆级网元I和可信车辆级网元II，可信车辆级网元I和可信车辆级网元II之间互联，且可信车辆级网元I和可信车辆级网元II均与可信列车级网元通信，以形成环形网络架构。
更进一步的：除头车和尾车外，任一车辆内的可信列车级网元均可与不可信列车级网元通过安全网关通信，增强网络的冗余性。
具体的说，由于每个中间车内也均设置有不可信列车级网元，各个中间车辆内的可信列车级网元也都通过安全网关可信列车级网元所在中间车内的不可信列车级网元通信。避免头车或尾车中的可信列车级网元与不可信列车级网元之间的通信发生故障时，影响列车内的网络通信。
优选的是：可信列车级网元、不可信列车级网元的通信端口均为光口，头车中可信列车级网元与尾车中可信列车级网元间的连接介质为光缆；头车中不可信列车级网元与尾车中不可信列车级网元间的连接介质为光缆。光缆传输频带宽、通信容量大；传输损耗低，除采用光缆外，也可以采用其他的通信线缆。
列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构进行数据通信的方法，将列车控制网络和列车服务网络分为可信网络和不可信网络，包括可信网络内通信方法、可信网络与不可信网络间的通信方法：
可信网络内传输的数据包括列车控制网络中的控制数据、监视数据及诊断信息数据，还包括列车服务网络中的旅客信息数据及视频信息数据；为不同数据设置不同优先级，控制数据、监视数据及诊断信息数据类过程数据的优先级高于旅客信息数据及视频信息数据的优先级，传输数据自动缓存，根据优先级高低传输；
不可信网络和可信网络间的网间传输数据经安全网关在不可信列车级网元和可信列车级网元间双向传输；可信网络传递到不可信网络的数据包括列车行车数据、车内外温度数据；不可信网络传递到可信网络的数据包括：传送到紧急报警装置的地面音频数据、传送到机顶盒的地面视频数据；跨网通信时，安全网关首先对发出数据的设备进行设备认证，若设备满足认证条件，在对数据报文进行报文认证。
本发明的有益效果是：
(1)本发明提供的网络架构是一种列车控制网络和列车服务网络共网网络架构，可实现列车控制、监视及诊断信息与旅客信息、视频信息的共网传输，即旅客信息服务系统网络与列车控制网络的数据的共网传输，满足旅客信息服务系统网络带宽的要求，保证列车网络的稳定性。
(2)根据列车控制网络和列车服务网络中传输数据的安全等级的不同，将控制、服务共网网络架构划分为可信网络与不可信网络，列车控制网络中的控制数据、监视数据及诊断信息数据及列车服务网络中的旅客信息数据及视频信息数据在可信网络中共网传输，车行车数据、车内外温度数据、传送到紧急报警装置的地面音频数据、传送到机顶盒的地面视频数据 等数据经安全网关认证后在可信网络和不可信网络之间传输，同时不可信网络还负责列车和车地通信，及车下与列车之间的WIFI接入，将无线网络与列车物理网络进行隔离，提高了列车网络数据传输的安全性。
(3)本发明采用内切环网方式，与传统的跳环方式不同。每节车厢可设置多个可信车辆级网元，采用双网口接入冗余可信车辆级网元，且可信车辆级网元都与核心可信列车级网元构成环网，即使本节车厢通信故障，也不会影响到其他车厢的通信。具备更好的故障隔离功能和冗余性。具体的说，内切环网的方式是指，构成环内切的所有环圆心位于切点同侧，切点作为所有环共同的组成节点。以头、尾车网络设备为切点，切点网络设备与各中间车网络设备，构成环内切环网。
附图说明
图1为实施例1的结构示意图1；
图2为实施例1的结构示意图2；
图3为实施例1动车可信车辆级网元连接结构示意图；
图4为实施例1拖车可信车辆级网元连接结构示意图；
图5为实施例2结构示意图。
其中，1-不可信列车级网元，2-可信列车级网元，3-可信车辆级网元，4-安全网关，5-头车，6-尾车
具体实施方式
以下结合附图对本发明的具体实施方式进行进一步说明。
实施例1
一种列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构(以下简称网络架构)，可以实现列车控制网络和列车服务网络的共网数据传输，所述网络架构将列车控制网络和服务网络分为可信网络和不可信网络，其中可信网络内传输的数据包括列车控制网络中的控制数据、监视数据及诊断信息数据，还包括列车服务网络中的旅客信息数据及视频信息数据；可信网络和不可信网络之间经安全网关进行数据通信，传输的数据包括列车行车数据、车内外温度数据、传送到紧急报警装置的地面音频数据、传送到机顶盒的地面视频数据；同时，不可信网络还负责车地连接，实现车地通信及车地之间的WIFI连接，这一部分风险性较高，极大可能成为不法分子入侵列车网络的入口。
所述网络架构的具体结构如下：如图1所示，可信网络包括设置在每辆车内的可信车辆 级网元3，头车5和尾车6中，除可信车辆级网元3外，还分别设置有可信列车级网元2；不可信网络包括分别设置在头车5和尾车6中的不可信列车级网元1；可信网络中，头车5中的可信列车级网元2经安全网关4与头车5中的不可信网络列车级网元1通信；可信网络中，尾车6中的可信列车级网元2经安全网关4与尾车6中的不可信网络列车级网元1通信。两个安全网关4分为主安全网关和辅安全网关，互为冗余，例如定义头车5相连的安全网关4为主安全网关，正常情况下，头车5可信列车级网元2经主安全网关与不可信列车级网元通信，当主安全网关所在通信线路发生线路故障或设备故障的情况下，启动尾车6和辅安全网关的通信线路。
如图2所示，具体以2动2拖4辆编组列车为例，来描述该网络架构的具体实施方式。4辆编组形式为：动车(TC)-拖车(M)-拖车(M)-动车(TC)。其中，两辆动车分别为头车和尾车，两辆拖车为中间车。由于头车和尾车中的网元负责可信网络与不可信网络之间的通信，头车、尾车与中间车之间网元的设置不同。
网元设置：中间车内(本实施例中的两辆拖车内)，覆盖的网络为可信网络，每辆车内均设置有两个可信车辆级网元，即可信车辆级网元I3和可信车辆级网元II3，形成可信车辆级网元组，这里需要说明的是，采用两个可信车辆级网元的冗余设计，利于搭建冗余网络架构，保证网络通信的稳定性，根据网络架构的需求，可信车辆级网元的数量并不局限于两个，也可以为一个，三个或更多个。头车和尾车为可信网络和不可信网络的交汇处，覆盖可信网络和不可信网络，头车和尾车内部，除设置有两个可信车辆级网元3外(可信车辆级网元I3和可信车辆级网元II3，形成可信车辆级网元组)，还设置有一个可信列车级网元2及一个不可信列车级网元1，同时，还设置有安全网关4，作为网络通信认证的工具。
网络结构：两辆拖车内、头车和尾车内，可信车辆级网元I3和可信车辆级网元II3均分别串联，可信车辆级网元I3和可信车辆级网元II3之间互为冗余，确保设备级冗余，二者之间采用百兆以太网双绞线连接，每辆车内的可信车辆级网元I3均连接到头车的可信列车级网元2，每辆车内的可信车辆级网元II3均连接到尾车的可信列车级网元2。如图2所示，实线所示的网络连接与虚线所示的网络连接形成互为冗余的可信网环网架构，一个为主线路，另一个为备份线路。正常情况下，主线路工作，在主线路发生故障时，激活备份线路，备份线路工作。除与每辆车内的可信车辆级网元3之间的连接端口外，头车中的可信列车级网元2和尾车中的可信列车级网元2还分别具有两个互连端口，二者通过互连端口实现两端互连，形成可信环网架构。头车中的可信列车级网元2经安全网关4与头车中的不可信列车级网元 1相连，同理，尾车中的可信列车级网元2经安全网关4与尾车中的不可信列车级网元1相连，实现可信网络与不可信网络间的通信。不可信网络中，头车中的不可信列车级网元1和尾车中的不可信列车级网元1也分别具有两个互连端口，二者通过互连端口实现两端互连，形成不可信环网架构。可信列车级网元、不可信列车级网元的用于通信的端口均为光口，列车级网元间的连接网络中，列车总线采用1000Base-LX，支持全双工模式，传输速率为1000Mbit/s。头车中可信列车级网元与尾车中可信列车级网元间的连接介质为光缆；头车中不可信列车级网元与尾车中不可信列车级网元间的连接介质也为光缆。
与车载设备之间的连接及通信方法：
在可信网络内，可信车辆级网元3具备路由、网络地址转换功能，负责实现列车重联和解编后，网络的重新配置。可信网络中的设备处于同一局域网内，主要传输列车控制、监视及诊断信息与旅客信息、视频信息。不同的数据具备不同的优先级，列车控制、监视及诊断信息等过程数据具备最高优先级，视频信息优先级相对较低，传输数据自动缓存，根据优先级高低传输。在动车中，可信车辆级网元3采用24百兆电口+2千兆光口二层交换机，交换机间采用光口链接。如图3所示，司机室人机接口HMI、列车控制单元VCU、远程输入输出模块RIOM、制动控制单元BCU关键终端设备双网口同时挂载到两个冗余车辆级交换机。烟火报警系统FAS、列车数据记录仪ERM、走行部诊断系统TDS、辅助控制单元SIV、门控单元EDCU、空调控制单元HVAC、PIS系统中投影主机、端部屏、摄像机、紧急报警装置、LCD地图、旅客信息系统控制器、车厢控制器单网口设备根据需要分别挂载到两个交换机上。
在拖车中，可信车辆级网元3采用24百兆电口+2千兆光口二层交换机，交换机间采用光口链接。如图4所示，牵引控制单元DCU、远程输入输出模块RIOM采用双网口接入冗余交换机。PIS系统中的车厢控制器、LCD电子地图、紧急报警装置、车厢控制器、车厢网络交换单元根据需要分别链接到两个交换机上。
不可信网络中，将PIS系统中，与车地通信、WIFI服务网络相关的设备：如中心服务器、WIFI接入等，布置在不可信网络中。不可信网中，列车级带宽采用1000M，全双工模式，车辆级设备采用百兆全双工模式。在每辆动车、拖车车内布置WIFI热点，中心服务器布置在动车。
安全网关通过百兆口连接不可信网与可信网络。经过安全网关的报文可分为两类：
不可信网络往可信网络传输的数据流：传送到紧急报警装置的地面音频数据、传送到机顶盒的地面视频数据。
可信网络往不可信网络传输的数据流：列车行车数据、车内外温度。
安全网关具备设备认证功能和报文认证功能。跨网通信的终端设备，需要先通过安全网关的设备认证。经过安全网关的报文，需要满足预先定义的格式。即满足预定义格式的报文，可通过安全网关在可信网络和不可信网络间传输。
实施例2
本实施例提供了另外一种列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构，与实施例1相同的是，所述网络构架仍分为可信网络与不可信网络，与实施例1不同之处在于网络架构的具体结构。
如图5所示，仍以2动2拖4辆编组列车为例，来描述该网络架构的具体实施方式。4辆编组形式为：动车(TC)-拖车(M)-拖车(M)-动车(TC)，其中，两辆动车分别为头车和尾车，两辆拖车为中间车。头车和尾车中的网元负责可信网络与不可信网络之间的通信。
案例实施中，可信网络中，网络设计分为列车级、车辆级两层架构，即包括可信列车级网络和可信车辆级网络。
每辆车内可根据终端设备数量决定可信车辆级网元数量，本实施例中，每辆车内配置一个可信车辆级网元3与两个可信列车级网元2，三者之间顺次首尾相连，形成冗余环形网络结构；即车辆级网络中，可信车辆级网元与本车辆内的可信列车级网元形成环形网络。其中两个可信列车级网元2互为冗余关系。
车辆内的通信，通过可信车辆级网元3或者可信列车级网元2实现；每辆车内的任意两个可信列车级网元2分别与其相邻车的可信列车级网元2顺次串联连接，形成可信线性网络架构。
列车级网络中采用链路聚合的方式，将支持旁路功能的可信列车级网元2组成线性网络。不可信网络中，头车、尾车及中间车，每辆车内分别设置有不可信列车级网元1，由头车到尾车，不可信列车级网元1依次相连，形成不可信线性网络架构；头车和尾车中的不可信列车级网元1与头车和尾车中的可信列车级网元2经安全网关4连接、通信。与实施例1中的原理相同，头车和尾车中的安全网关分为一个主安全网关和一个辅安全网关，正常情况下，主安全网关负责可信网络与不可信网络间的通信，当主安全网关所在的通信线路发生线路故障或设备故障时，辅安全网关所在的线路负责通信。还需要说明，本方案将互为冗余的安全网关放置在头尾车，实际应用中，可根据需要配置安全网关的位置，不限于放置哪个车辆。如果安全网关配置在中间车，则中间车内的可信车辆级网元2与安全网关相连，形成可信网 络与不可信网络间的通信连接。即中间车内的可信车辆级网元2通过安全网关与通一中间车内的不可信列车级网元2通信。
不可信网络中，根据实际情况网络可以为环形、线性或者星型网络。在本案例实施中，采用每节车辆内一个列车级网元线性连接的线性网络。
可根据需要配置网元间的通信接口，可信网络、不可信网络间的传输介质不限于光纤光缆。
可信网络中，列车级网络采用24口百兆二层交换机。司机室人机接口HMI、列车控制单元VCU、远程输入输出模块RIOM、制动控制单元BCU关键终端设备双网口同时挂载到两个冗余列车级交换机。辅助控制单元SIV、门控单元EDCU、空调控制单元HVAC、PIS系统中投影主机、端部屏、摄像机、紧急报警装置、LCD地图、旅客信息系统控制器、车厢控制器单网口设备根据需要分别挂载到两个冗余列车级交换机上。
可信网络间、可信网络与不可信网络间的数据通信方法与实施例1同。

Claims (10)

  1. 一种列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构，其特征在于：包括可信网络和不可信网络；
    所述可信网络包括设置在每辆车内的可信车辆级网元，头车和尾车中，除可信车辆级网元外，还分别设置有可信列车级网元；
    所述不可信网络包括分别设置在头车和尾车中的不可信列车级网元；
    一个可信列车级网元与一个不可信列车级网元经安全网关通信，多个安全网关互为冗余。
  2. 如权利要求1所述的列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构，其特征在于：可信网络中，每辆车内均设置有至少一个可信车辆级网元，形成可信车辆级网元组，头车中的可信列车级网元和尾车中的可信列车级网元的两端互连，形成可信环网架构；每辆车内的可信车辆级网元组均分别与头车中的可信列车级网元和尾车中的可信列车级网元通信；不可信网络中，头车中的不可信列车级网元和尾车中的不可信列车级网元两端互连，形成不可信环网架构。
  3. 如权利要求2所述的列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构，其特征在于：可信车辆级网元组包括两个可信车辆级网元：可信车辆级网元I和可信车辆级网元II，两个可信车辆级网元互连，且每辆车内的可信车辆级网元I均与头车中的可信列车级网元相连，每辆车内的可信车辆级网元II均与尾车中的可信列车级网元相连。
  4. 如权利要求1所述的列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构，其特征在于：可信网络中，每辆车内均设置有至少一个可信车辆级网元和一个可信列车级网元，每辆车内的可信列车级网元与相邻车辆内的可信列车级网元顺次串联，形成可信列车级线性网络架构；不可信网络中，除头车和尾车外，每辆车内也分别设置有不可信列车级网元。
  5. 如权利要求4所述的列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构，其特征在于：由头车到尾车，不可信列车级网元依次相连，形成不可信线性网络架构；或每辆车上的不可信列车级网元顺次首尾相连，形成不可信环形网络架构。
  6. 如权利要求4所述的列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构，其特征在于：可信网络中，每辆车内设置有一个可信车辆级网元和两个可信列车级网元，顺次首尾相连，形成车辆内 的环形网络结构。
  7. 如权利要求4所述的列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构，其特征在于：除头车和尾车外，任一车辆内的可信列车级网元均可与不可信列车级网元通过安全网关通信。
  8. 如权利要求1-5中任意一项所述的列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构，其特征在于：可信列车级网元、不可信列车级网元的通信端口均为光口，头车中可信列车级网元与尾车中可信列车级网元间的连接介质为光缆；头车中不可信列车级网元与尾车中不可信列车级网元间的连接介质为光缆。
  9. 采用权利要求1所述的列车控制、服务共网的宽带通信网络架构进行数据通信的方法，其特征在于，包括可信网络内通信方法、可信网络与不可信网络间的通信方法：
    可信网络内传输的数据包括列车控制网络中的控制数据、监视数据及诊断信息数据，还包括列车服务网络中的旅客信息数据及视频信息数据；为不同数据设置不同优先级，控制数据、监视数据及诊断信息数据类过程数据的优先级高于旅客信息数据及视频信息数据的优先级，传输数据自动缓存，根据优先级高低传输；
  10. 不可信网络和可信网络间的网间传输数据经安全网关在不可信列车级网元和可信列车级网元间双向传输；可信网络传递到不可信网络的数据包括列车行车数据、车内外温度数据；不可信网络传递到可信网络的数据包括：传送到紧急报警装置的地面音频数据、传送到机顶盒的地面视频数据；跨网通信时，安全网关首先对发出数据的设备进行设备认证，若设备满足认证条件，在对数据报文进行报文认证。
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