WO2018027587A1 - 一种片上系统和处理设备 - Google Patents
一种片上系统和处理设备 Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2018027587A1 WO2018027587A1 PCT/CN2016/094226 CN2016094226W WO2018027587A1 WO 2018027587 A1 WO2018027587 A1 WO 2018027587A1 CN 2016094226 W CN2016094226 W CN 2016094226W WO 2018027587 A1 WO2018027587 A1 WO 2018027587A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- secure
- processor
- security
- memory
- bus
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
- G06Q20/322—Aspects of commerce using mobile devices [M-devices]
- G06Q20/3227—Aspects of commerce using mobile devices [M-devices] using secure elements embedded in M-devices
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F15/00—Digital computers in general; Data processing equipment in general
- G06F15/76—Architectures of general purpose stored program computers
- G06F15/78—Architectures of general purpose stored program computers comprising a single central processing unit
- G06F15/7807—System on chip, i.e. computer system on a single chip; System in package, i.e. computer system on one or more chips in a single package
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/32—User authentication using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voiceprints
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/52—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow
- G06F21/53—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F21/575—Secure boot
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/74—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information operating in dual or compartmented mode, i.e. at least one secure mode
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
- G06Q20/326—Payment applications installed on the mobile devices
- G06Q20/3263—Payment applications installed on the mobile devices characterised by activation or deactivation of payment capabilities
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
- G06Q20/327—Short range or proximity payments by means of M-devices
- G06Q20/3278—RFID or NFC payments by means of M-devices
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/356—Aspects of software for card payments
- G06Q20/3563—Software being resident on card
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
- G06Q20/4014—Identity check for transactions
- G06Q20/40145—Biometric identity checks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B5/00—Near-field transmission systems, e.g. inductive or capacitive transmission systems
- H04B5/20—Near-field transmission systems, e.g. inductive or capacitive transmission systems characterised by the transmission technique; characterised by the transmission medium
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B5/00—Near-field transmission systems, e.g. inductive or capacitive transmission systems
- H04B5/70—Near-field transmission systems, e.g. inductive or capacitive transmission systems specially adapted for specific purposes
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0861—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using biometrical features, e.g. fingerprint, retina-scan
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2149—Restricted operating environment
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q2220/00—Business processing using cryptography
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06V—IMAGE OR VIDEO RECOGNITION OR UNDERSTANDING
- G06V40/00—Recognition of biometric, human-related or animal-related patterns in image or video data
- G06V40/10—Human or animal bodies, e.g. vehicle occupants or pedestrians; Body parts, e.g. hands
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06V—IMAGE OR VIDEO RECOGNITION OR UNDERSTANDING
- G06V40/00—Recognition of biometric, human-related or animal-related patterns in image or video data
- G06V40/10—Human or animal bodies, e.g. vehicle occupants or pedestrians; Body parts, e.g. hands
- G06V40/12—Fingerprints or palmprints
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06V—IMAGE OR VIDEO RECOGNITION OR UNDERSTANDING
- G06V40/00—Recognition of biometric, human-related or animal-related patterns in image or video data
- G06V40/10—Human or animal bodies, e.g. vehicle occupants or pedestrians; Body parts, e.g. hands
- G06V40/16—Human faces, e.g. facial parts, sketches or expressions
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06V—IMAGE OR VIDEO RECOGNITION OR UNDERSTANDING
- G06V40/00—Recognition of biometric, human-related or animal-related patterns in image or video data
- G06V40/10—Human or animal bodies, e.g. vehicle occupants or pedestrians; Body parts, e.g. hands
- G06V40/18—Eye characteristics, e.g. of the iris
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B5/00—Near-field transmission systems, e.g. inductive or capacitive transmission systems
- H04B5/20—Near-field transmission systems, e.g. inductive or capacitive transmission systems characterised by the transmission technique; characterised by the transmission medium
- H04B5/24—Inductive coupling
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of chip technologies, and in particular, to a system of chip and a processing device.
- Mobile Payment refers to a service that allows users to pay for goods or services they consume using mobile terminals, such as mobile phones, tablets, or wearable devices.
- mobile terminals such as mobile phones, tablets, or wearable devices.
- SD Secure Digital
- SIM Subscriber Identity Module
- NFC Near Field Communication
- SE Full terminal solution.
- the all-terminal solution of near-field communication combined with security components is becoming the mainstream of mobile payment solutions.
- these solutions have begun to show a convergence trend.
- the secure element can also have a SIM function or other functionality.
- the mobile terminal 10 communicates with a Point of Sales (POS) machine 11 through its internal near field communication unit 101, a near field communication unit 101 and a POS machine 11
- the short-range wireless communication link 12 is a two-way path, and can be implemented by various suitable short-range wireless communication protocols to implement basic wireless communication functions in mobile payment.
- the communication link 12 can be used to transfer POS command data or the like from the POS machine 11 to the near field communication unit 101 inside the mobile terminal 10.
- the secure element 102 can be a component coupled to a separate Central Processing Unit (CPU) 103 for operating various functions related to the financial payment service and storing keys, certificates, etc. related to the banking service. data.
- CPU Central Processing Unit
- the secure element 102 receives the POS command data from the near field communication unit 101, parses the command data, and responds accordingly according to the financial transaction protocol. The response is fed back to the POS machine 11 by the near field communication unit 101 to complete the data transmission in the mobile payment to implement the function of the mobile terminal 10 as a transaction verification card.
- the central processing unit 103 is then run with general operating system software 1031, such as Android system software, for controlling the near field communication unit 101 and the secure element 102, such as controlling the opening or closing of the near field communication unit 101 and the secure element. 102.
- the mobile terminal 10 may include an input unit 104, inputting a single
- the element 104 can be a touch screen, which can be regarded as a user interface (UI) for interacting with the user, so that the user can input an operation instruction through the user interface software-driven input unit 104 to indicate the operating system software 1031.
- the POS machine 11 accesses the cloud server 14 on the network side through the Internet as a terminal device of the transaction to implement calculation and completion of the payment service by the server 14.
- the server 14 located on the network side is usually operated by a bank or an internet company or the like.
- All-terminal solutions can include online payments and offline payments.
- the mobile terminal 10 When paying offline, as shown in FIG. 1, the mobile terminal 10 performs a non-contact card swiping with the POS machine 11, that is, the mobile phone, and the near field communication unit 101 and the secure element 102 cooperate to complete the payment transaction.
- the central processing unit 103 and the secure element 102 can access the Internet through the mobile communication network to realize online payment, and the secure element 102 is equivalent to the bank U.
- the role of the shield is to store and verify the bank's certificate, so the near field communication unit 101 of Figure 1 above is optional. Specifically, referring to FIG.
- the mobile terminal 10 may further include a mobile communication unit 105 for replacing the role of the near field communication unit 101 when offline payment is applied to the radio access network (Radio Access).
- Network, RAN radio access network
- the radio access network 15 may specifically include a wireless access point, such as a base station.
- the mobile communication unit 105 accesses the Internet through the wireless access network 15, which is connected to the server 14 located in the Internet to enable the server 14 to receive command data or transmit information to the secure element 102.
- the secure element 102 parses the command data and responds accordingly in accordance with the financial transaction protocol to transmit data to the network side server 14 over the mobile internet via the mobile communication unit 105.
- the mobile communication unit 105 can now be a unit operating a wireless cellular communication protocol for accessing the mobile terminal 10 to the Internet via the cellular wireless communication link 13.
- the mobile communication unit 105 is also a cellular communication processor, specifically supporting Global System for Mobile (GSM), Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave) Access, WiMAX), Time Division-Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TSS), Code Division Multiple Access 2000 (CDMA2000), Long Term Evolution (LTE) Or a cellular wireless communication protocol such as 5G (fifth generation) to assist in implementing the mobile internet function of the mobile terminal 10.
- GSM Global System for Mobile
- UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
- WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave
- TSS Time Division-Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access
- CDMA2000 Code Division Multiple Access 2000
- LTE Long Term Evolution
- 5G fifth generation
- Chinese patent application 201510201343.9 provides a solution for integrating the secure element 102 with the central processing unit 103 (or optionally also the mobile communication unit 105) on the same semiconductor substrate, ie integrated into a master chip 106, and
- the secure element 102 can load general purpose operating system software, such as Android or Windows operating system software, required by the central processing unit 103 from a storage unit external to the main chip 106.
- general purpose operating system software such as Android or Windows operating system software
- the security component 102 runs more and more kinds of application software, and the application scenario of the security component 102 is not limited to mobile payment, and may also include some SIM card related software, such as a communication carrier customized application. software. Therefore, the complexity of SoCs implemented in an integrated manner is becoming higher and higher, and how to achieve a highly integrated and complex SoC and fully satisfy the security requirements becomes a problem.
- a security zone Trustzone, TZ
- TEE Trust Execute Environment
- the user can input some information related to security applications such as mobile payment under the TEE, and the TEE and the general operating system environment respectively implement different security level application operations, since the TEE is an environment generated by the central processing unit, Security still needs to be improved.
- the secure element 102 can interact with the peripheral device through the existing TEE with certain specific information.
- the secure element 102 interacts with the fingerprint sensor via the TEE and the fingerprint sensor. Since the transmission of the related information passes through the TEE, the information interaction is reduced. safety. Therefore, how to implement mobile payment service based on NFC communication on SoC under the premise of ensuring security becomes an urgent problem to be solved.
- Embodiments of the present invention provide an SoC and a processing device to improve the security of an NFC communication-based mobile payment service in a highly integrated SoC.
- an embodiment of the present invention provides an SoC, where the SoC is integrated in a first semiconductor On-chip, comprising: a system bus, at least one processor coupled to the system bus, and a secure processor system coupled to the system bus; there is security isolation between the secure processor system and the at least one processor
- the at least one processor includes at least one central processing unit for running general operating system software and operating through the system bus and the secure processing under the action of the general operating system software System communication;
- the secure processor system includes a security processor, a first memory, a plurality of interfaces, and a security bus, the security processor, the first memory, and the plurality of interfaces are coupled to the secure bus, and the a security bus coupled to the system bus; wherein the security processor is configured to run secure operating system software and at least one security application software based on the secure operating system software, the at least one security application software comprising Mobile payment software for mobile payment; said first memory for providing said security And storing, by the processor, the storage space required by the security operating system software and the at least one
- the NFC information includes at least one of a mobile payment instruction, mobile payment data, or NFC authentication information.
- the at least one processor cannot directly access at least one of the first memory or the secure processor system.
- the at least one processor and the secure processor system can be coupled by a dedicated interactive channel.
- the above SoC integrates the functions of the processor and the secure processor system, which can reduce the implementation cost and area of the entire system, and implements a function equivalent to a secure component in the secure processor system, capable of running at least the mobile payment software.
- a security application the security processor system integrates its own biometric input interface, which can conveniently obtain biometric data, and the security processor system is securely isolated from at least one processor.
- the solution is more secure than the scheme of transferring user biometric data to the secure processor system through the TEE of the central processing unit.
- the communication of the at least one central processing unit with the secure processor system comprises a data interaction or an instruction interaction.
- the instructions may be instructions for at least one central processing unit to control or operate the secure processor system, including but not limited to Start command, close command, restart command, sleep command, enter or exit low power state command, or suspend or resume work command.
- the secure processor system can be used to implement a function of a secure element or a SIM function.
- the security processor is equivalent to realize the function of the security element, and can further integrate other functions. Therefore, the at least one security application software may further include other security application software such as SIM software, and the security application scenario of the SoC may be extended by implementing the software functions in the security processor system.
- the first memory may be a power-down volatile memory, such as a random access memory (RAM).
- the first memory may be used to store the loaded security operating system software and the at least one security application software, and may further be used to store and run the security operating system software and the at least one security application software.
- Security temporary data is intermediate data or intermediate operation results generated by the security processor running the secure operating system software and the at least one security application software or other information related to the security application software or its operation that does not require long-term storage. .
- the RAM is therefore a power-down volatile storage device such as SRAM (Static Random Access Memory), DRAM (Dynamic Random Access Memory) or SDRAM (Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory), and is preferably SRAM. Since the RAM is integrated in the SoC, the RAM can use the same manufacturing process as the at least one central processing unit, and the process is relatively easy to implement.
- SRAM Static Random Access Memory
- DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
- SDRAM Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
- the multiple interfaces further include a security input interface, configured to receive user information input by the user related to mobile payment.
- the user information includes a password, a user instruction, or a financial transaction amount.
- the secure input interface is coupled to an input device to receive the user information via the input device.
- the input device can be a touch screen or a button.
- the multiple interfaces further include a peripheral interface for indicating to the user by the peripheral device that the mobile payment is performed.
- the peripheral A pointing device is provided, and the peripheral interface is coupled to the pointing device.
- the pointing device can be an indicator light, a speaker for playing sound, or a vibrator to alert the user that the mobile payment is or has been or will be performed.
- the peripheral interface is also integrated in the security processor system, the transmission of the indication information does not need to rely on the TEE of the central processing unit, so that higher security can be achieved.
- the security processor system further includes a non-power-down volatile second memory coupled to the secure bus for storing the secure operating system.
- Software and at least one security application software the security processor is configured to read the security operating system software and the at least one security application software from the second memory, and load the security operating system software and the at least one security application software Going to the first memory to run the secure operating system software and at least one secure application software. Since the second memory is also integrated in the SoC, all software executed by the security processor is stored in the second memory for a long time, and the security operating system software and the at least one security application need not be stored by relying on a memory external to the SoC. Software, high security.
- the security processor system further comprises a security isolation device coupled to the safety bus and configured to implement the security isolation
- the at least one processor is in communication with the secure processor system via the system bus and the secure isolation device.
- the secure isolation device includes at least one of an isolated memory or a bus bridge for implementing interaction data or instructions by at least one processor and the secure processor system.
- the at least one central processing unit can be coupled to the secure processor system via the system bus and the isolated memory or bus bridge by the general operating system software to interact with the secure processor system Communication, the content of which includes data or instructions.
- the bus bridge can be a bus that spans between the secure bus and the system bus.
- the at least one processor cannot directly access any component of the secure processor system other than the isolated memory or bus bridge. Since the at least one processor and the secure processor system only use any one of the isolated memory or the bus bridge as a dedicated interaction channel, or even a unique interaction channel, avoiding direct access by the at least one processor to the first memory Or any component or module in the secure processor system can improve security.
- the security processor system further Included is a secure boot memory coupled to the secure bus for storing bootstrapping instructions required for initialization of the secure processor; the secure processor passes before operating the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application software
- the bootstrap instructions are obtained from the secure boot memory to initialize the secure processor.
- the secure boot memory is a non-power-down volatile memory, such as a ROM, which is similar to a BIOS (Basic Input Output System) in a conventional PC (Personal Computer), guaranteeing the initial startup of the secure processor system each time. It is started from the secure boot memory to ensure the security of the boot. For example, when the secure processor system is powered on, the security processor is configured to read the boot program instructions from the secure boot memory, and load the secure operating system software under the boot program instructions Going to the first memory to run the secure operating system software.
- BIOS Basic Input Output System
- the boot program instruction is an encrypted boot program instruction; when the security processor acquires the boot program instruction from the secure boot memory, the boot program instruction is The decryption logic circuit decrypts to obtain a decrypted bootstrap program instruction that is used to initialize the secure processor. This solution further guarantees startup security.
- the secure processor system further includes an One Time Programable (OTP) memory coupled to the secure bus for storing the security
- OTP One Time Programable
- the security parameter including at least one of a root key, a calibration parameter, a configuration parameter, or an enable parameter.
- the root key is used to generate other keys needed for encryption and decryption by the secure processor system.
- the calibration parameters include parameters required to calibrate at least one component within the safety processor system.
- the configuration parameters include configuration parameters of at least one component within the secure processor system.
- the enabling parameter includes parameters that control at least one component of the safety processor system to be turned on or off.
- the security parameters may be programmed into the OTP memory to enable calibration, configuration or setup of the secure processor system, or to disable or disable some of the device functions within the secure processor system. Therefore, the OTP memory allows some functions within the corresponding secure processor system to be set or changed after the SoC is manufactured, which improves the design flexibility after the SoC is manufactured.
- the OTP memory is further configured to store a patch instruction of a boot program instruction required for the security processor to initialize.
- the patch instruction can be a guide Supplement to program instructions or replacement of some of them. For example, when the SoC is manufactured, if the boot program instruction is found to be insufficient, the shortage of the existing boot program instructions can be compensated by programming the patch instruction in the OTP memory, which makes the implementation more flexible.
- the security processor system further includes an attack defense sensor, configured to detect an abnormality of an operating parameter of the security processor system, and when the abnormality occurs Trimming at least one of: the security processor system performing an alert, the secure processor reset, or at least one of the first memory or the secure processor system being reset or emptied; the operating parameter Including at least one of voltage, current, clock frequency, temperature, or laser intensity.
- an attack defense sensor configured to detect an abnormality of an operating parameter of the security processor system, and when the abnormality occurs Trimming at least one of: the security processor system performing an alert, the secure processor reset, or at least one of the first memory or the secure processor system being reset or emptied; the operating parameter Including at least one of voltage, current, clock frequency, temperature, or laser intensity.
- the security processor system further includes an attack-resistant metal layer, where the attack-resistant metal layer is located in an upper layer or multiple layers of the first semiconductor chip, And covering at least a portion of the security processor system on a layout of the security; the attack-resistant metal layer is configured to detect a physical detection or attack from the outside, and generate an electrical signal when the physical detection or attack is detected, the electrical The signal is for triggering at least one of: the security processor system performing an alert, the secure processor reset, or at least one of the first memory or the secure processor system being reset or emptied.
- the attack-resistant metal layer technology is effectively applied to the SoC, so that the security of the secure processor system executing the security application software is further improved.
- the attack resistant metal layer is Shielding.
- the safety bus comprises at least one of an Advanced High Performance Bus (AHB) or an Advanced Peripheral Bus (APB).
- ALB Advanced High Performance Bus
- APIB Advanced Peripheral Bus
- different parts, components or circuits of the security processor system may be further divided into different security levels, and connected by using different levels of bus technology, which can meet the rate requirement and security of different components in the security processor system.
- the data or related address transmitted on the secure bus may be processed by one or more methods such as encryption, scrambling, or Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) to ensure data on the secure bus. And the privacy and integrity of the address.
- CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
- the security processor system further includes a direct memory access (DMA) controller coupled to the secure bus,
- DMA direct memory access
- the first memory reads data and outputs to the safety bus or through the security
- the full bus writes data to the first memory.
- the efficiency of data reading or writing is improved due to the presence of the DMA controller.
- the security processor system further includes a cipher system coupled to the secure bus, the cryptosystem comprising at least one of: an encryption and decryption device And for performing encryption and decryption processing on at least one of the data in the security processor system; an authentication device, configured to authenticate at least one data in the security processor system; and a random number generator for generating a random number used as a unique identifier for the seed or chip that generated the key; or a key manager for generating, distributing, or destroying the encryption or decryption process or The key required for authentication.
- the cryptosystem is a hardware accelerator capable of implementing fast secure operations or processing, and its processing security is higher than that performed by the secure processor running the software program to perform related processing.
- the authentication device is configured to perform the biometric-based user authentication.
- the user authentication can be performed by the security processor. It can be understood that the use of the authentication device to perform the user authentication is more efficient, but the cost is slightly improved.
- the at least one processor further includes: a communications processor, configured to send the first communications data to the wireless access point or the second communications data from the wireless access point; a voice signal processor for processing a voice signal from a user to generate the first communication data sent by the communication processor, or for processing the second communication data received by the communication processor Obtaining a voice signal required by the user; the encryption and decryption device is further configured to perform encryption processing on the first communication data or decryption processing on the second communication data.
- the encryption and decryption device in the security processor system that originally implements the security element function is also used to perform other functions, such as encryption and decryption processing of communication data based on voice signals, and realizes secure processing capability. diversification.
- the voice signal may be a PS (Packet Switched) domain voice signal or a CS (Circuit Switched) domain voice signal.
- the voice signal processor may include at least one of a HiFi (High Fidelity) processor or a voice codec (Codec).
- the HiFi processor can be used to implement echo cancellation, smoothing, timbre enhancement, and the like of the speech signal.
- the speech codec can be used to implement a speech codec operation to effect conversion between the speech signal in digital form and a natural analog speech signal (ordinary sound signal).
- the wireless access point may be a base station, and the communication processor is a cellular communication processor.
- the at least one processor may further comprise: a communication processor.
- the encryption and decryption device is further configured to perform encryption processing on the biometric identification data to obtain encrypted biometric identification data; and the communication processor is configured to send the encrypted biometric identification data to a wireless access point for use A server that performs the user authentication.
- the biometric data can be uploaded to the server by the communication processor, and the server is implemented by the server to save the authentication cost of the SoC.
- the communication processor comprises at least one of a cellular communication processor or a short range communication processor. That is to say, the manner of communication transmission can be implemented in many different ways.
- the cellular communication processor may support at least one of GSM, UMTS, WiMAX, TDS-CDMA, CDMA2000, LTE, or 5G.
- the short-range communication processor may support at least one of infrared, wireless fidelity (WIFI), Bluetooth, or LTE D2D (Device to Device).
- the at least one processor further includes at least one of the following: an image processing unit (GPU), a system power management unit, or a system peripheral interface.
- the GPU is for processing image signals.
- the system power management unit is configured to perform system power consumption control on the SoC, for example, managing and controlling clock and operating voltage of the SoC or at least one component thereof.
- the number of system peripheral interfaces may be multiple for coupling to a plurality of peripheral devices, respectively.
- the peripheral device may be at least one of a USB (Universal Serial Bus) device, a display, a sensor, a camera, a headphone, or a speaker.
- USB Universal Serial Bus
- the SoC further includes: the NFC processor.
- the NFC processor can also be external to the SoC.
- the manufacturing cost of the entire system can be further reduced.
- the security processor is further configured to perform the user authentication by using the biometric data.
- the secure processor system further includes: a biometric authenticator for performing the user authentication using the biometric data.
- a biometric authenticator for performing the user authentication using the biometric data.
- the biometric authenticator is equivalent to a hardware accelerator, and the user authentication function is actually equivalent to a dedicated accelerator, which is superior in security and speed.
- the secure processor is used to implement user authentication, the cost of manufacturing and designing a dedicated accelerator can be saved.
- the multiple interfaces further include a storage interface for coupling to a third memory;
- the third memory is configured to store the secure operating system Software and at least one security application software;
- the security processor is configured to read the secure operating system software and the at least one security application software from the third memory through the storage interface, the security operating system software and at least one A security application is loaded into the first memory to run the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application.
- the third memory is coupled to the secure processor system through the dedicated storage interface, such that the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application are read by the dedicated storage.
- the interface can achieve higher security without relying on the TEE of the central processing unit.
- the third memory is integrated on a second semiconductor chip different from the first semiconductor chip.
- the third memory is a non-power-down volatile memory, and may be a flash memory.
- the third memory is dedicated to storing the secure operating system software and the at least one security application software, and is not used for storing non-secure common software, thereby achieving higher security.
- the biometric identification includes at least one of the following: fingerprint recognition, iris recognition, voiceprint recognition, face recognition, or scent recognition.
- the biometric sensor may include at least one of a fingerprint sensor, an iris sensor, a voiceprint sensor, an image sensor, or an odor sensor.
- the biometric input interface may include at least one of the following: a fingerprint input interface, an iris data input interface, a voiceprint input interface, a face image input interface, or an scent data input interface.
- the embodiment of the present invention further provides a processing device, including the SoC of the first aspect or any one of the possible implementation manners.
- the processing device further includes a fourth memory integrated on the third semiconductor chip, the SoC and the fourth memory being coupled by an inter-chip interface, the fourth memory including a secure storage area and a common storage area isolated from each other;
- the secure storage area is configured to store the secure operating system software and at least one secure application software;
- the normal storage area is configured to store the general operating system software;
- the at least one central processing unit is configured to pass the chip
- the inter-interface obtains the general-purpose operating system software from the normal storage area and runs the general-purpose operating system software;
- the security processor is configured to use the inter-chip interface, the system bus, and the secure bus from the secure storage area Obtaining the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application software, and running the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application software.
- the fourth memory can simultaneously store the security software and the non-secure software, hardware multiplexing is realized, and the cost is reduced.
- the processing device is a mobile terminal.
- the fourth memory is non- Power-down volatile memory, such as EMMC (Embedded Multi Media Card) or UFS (Universal Flash Storage).
- the embodiment of the present invention further provides a data processing method, which is performed by the SoC described in the first aspect or any one of the possible implementation manners.
- the method at least includes: interacting with the NFC peer through the NFC interface with NFC information related to the mobile payment; receiving biometric data from a biometric sensor, the biometric data being used in the mobile payment based Biometric user authentication; displaying at least one display information to the user through a user interface (UI).
- the display information includes at least one of a user information input interface, a transaction interface of the mobile payment, or a transaction success interface.
- the user interface is driven by the UI software of the general operating system software that is run by the at least one central processing unit. Or formed by the security processor running the security user interface software in the at least one security application software.
- Embodiments of the present invention may enable the secure processor system to use its own dedicated interface to receive various types of information without relying on traditional TEE to improve security.
- FIG. 1 is a simplified schematic diagram of a simplified mobile terminal structure capable of running a secure mobile payment application in a mobile payment scenario provided by the prior art
- FIG. 2 is a simplified schematic diagram of a mobile terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 3 is a simplified schematic diagram of a security processor system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 4 is a simplified schematic diagram of an application manner of multiple interfaces of a security processor system according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 5 is a simplified schematic diagram of a secure storage manner of a bootloader instruction in a secure processor system according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 6 is a simplified schematic diagram of an anti-attack sensor according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 7 is a simplified schematic diagram of a layered layout of an attack-resistant metal layer on a semiconductor chip according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 8 is a simplified schematic diagram of an attack-resistant metal layer in a layout of a semiconductor chip according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 9 is a simplified schematic diagram of an application scenario of a memory using a system memory as a security operating system software and the at least one security application software according to an embodiment of the present disclosure
- FIG. 10 is a simplified schematic diagram of an application scenario of a memory using a dedicated secure memory as a secure operating system software and the at least one secure application software according to an embodiment of the present disclosure
- FIG. 11 is a schematic flowchart of a mobile payment related method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 12 is a simplified schematic diagram of an application scenario for performing voice signal encryption using a secure processor system according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 13 is a simplified schematic diagram of an application scenario of performing user authentication based on fingerprint data by a cloud side server according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 14 is a simplified schematic diagram of an application scenario for collecting and storing fingerprint data according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 15 is a schematic flowchart of a processing method in a mobile payment process according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- the mobile terminal may also be called a user equipment (UE), a wireless terminal, or a user terminal, and may enjoy the wireless access service of the service site or the wireless access point.
- the serving station or wireless access point is typically a base station, such as an eNodeB or NodeB in LTE (Long Term Evolution), or
- the access point for connecting the user equipment to the mobile communication network may also be a base station controller in the GSM mode or the like.
- the serving station may form one or more cells when providing access services for the mobile terminal, and a cell may geographically cover a certain range and occupy a segment of a carrier or a frequency band in the frequency domain.
- the mobile terminal and the service station can implement a communication process by running a wireless communication protocol, including but not limited to various types of cellular wireless communications such as GSM, UMTS, WiMAX, TDS-CDMA, CDMA2000, LTE, or 5G. protocol.
- a wireless communication protocol including but not limited to various types of cellular wireless communications such as GSM, UMTS, WiMAX, TDS-CDMA, CDMA2000, LTE, or 5G. protocol.
- FIG. 2 is a simplified schematic diagram of a mobile terminal 20 according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- the mobile terminal 20 can be a User Equipment (UE), such as a mobile phone, a tablet, or a wearable device.
- UE User Equipment
- the mobile terminal 20 may specifically include a system on chip 21 and a system memory 22, and the system on chip 21 and the system memory 22 may be coupled to each other through a dedicated interface.
- the system on chip (SoC) involved in the embodiments of the present invention is a system fabricated on the same semiconductor chip or semiconductor substrate by an integrated circuit process.
- a semiconductor chip also referred to simply as a chip, may be a collection of integrated circuits formed on a substrate of an integrated circuit (typically a semiconductor material such as silicon) fabricated using an integrated circuit process, the outer layers of which are typically packaged by a semiconductor package material.
- the integrated circuit may include various functional devices, each of which includes a logic gate circuit, a metal-oxide-semiconductor (MOS) transistor, a bipolar transistor or a diode, and may also include a capacitor and a resistor. Or other components such as inductors.
- MOS metal-oxide-semiconductor
- each functional device or module of the device mentioned in the embodiments of the present invention may be hardware, and each functional device may include a plurality of logic gate circuits or transistors.
- the system memory 22 and the system on chip 21 are respectively located on different semiconductor chips.
- system on chip 21 is located on a first semiconductor chip and system memory 22 is located on a third semiconductor chip.
- the system memory 22 is a non-power-down volatile memory such as EMMC or UFS.
- the system on chip 21 may include various types of functional devices, such as a system bus 210, at least one processor coupled to the system bus 210, and a secure processor system 23 coupled to the system bus 210.
- the secure processor system 23 is in safe isolation from other components within the system on chip 21, i.e., with the at least one processor.
- the at least one processor may optionally include at least one central processing unit 211, image processing unit 212, communication processor 213, voice signal processor 214, system peripheral interface 215, system power management unit 216, and image signal processing. (ISP, Image Signal Processor) 217.
- the secure processor system may include one or more interfaces 24, which may include an interface coupled to other components than the system on chip 21 or an interface coupled with other components within the system on chip 21.
- the secure isolation can be used to limit access by the at least one processor to devices or modules within the secure processor system 23.
- the at least one processor including the central processing unit 211 cannot directly access at least one of the random access memory 32 or the secure processor system 23, and thus cannot read the security processor arbitrarily. Data or information within system 23.
- the at least one central processing unit 211 is configured to run general purpose operating system software and communicate with the secure processor system 23 via the system bus 210 under the action of the general operating system software.
- the at least one central processing unit 211 can be implemented based on an Advanced RISC Machine (ARM) architecture or an Intel X86 architecture or a Million Instructions Per Second (MIPS) architecture. This embodiment does not limit this.
- ARM Advanced RISC Machine
- MIPS Million Instructions Per Second
- the general-purpose operating system software is a general-purpose software platform that runs a variety of common application software.
- the general operating system software may be an Android operating system, a Windows operating system, or an iOS operating system.
- the image processing unit 212 is configured to process image signals, such as processing video image signals or photo image signals, and may also selectively process 3D (3 Dimensions) image signals.
- the system power consumption management unit 216 is configured to perform system power consumption control on the system on chip 21, for example, to manage and control clock and operating voltage of the system on chip 21 or at least one component thereof, for example, performing AVS (from AVS) Adaptive Voltage Scaling, DVS (Dynamic Doltage Scaling) or clock frequency adjustment.
- the number of system peripheral interfaces 215 may be multiple for coupling to a plurality of peripheral devices of the mobile terminal 20 outside of the system on chip 21.
- the peripheral device can be at least one of a USB device, a display, a sensor, a camera, a headset, or a speaker.
- the sensor can be a gravity accelerometer, a gyroscope, or a light sensor.
- the image signal processor 217 can be used to process the image signals acquired by the camera of the mobile terminal 20 to obtain a processed acquired image, which can be further processed by the image processing unit 212.
- the communication processor 213 of FIG. 2 may include a plurality of processors that perform different communication functions.
- a cellular communication processor or a short range communication processor can alternatively be included.
- the cellular communication processor can support at least one cellular wireless communication protocol of GSM, UMTS, WiMAX, TDS-CDMA, CDMA2000, LTE, or 5G.
- the short range communication processor can support at least one of infrared, WIFI, Bluetooth, or LTE D2D.
- each communication processor may include an RF processor for performing radio frequency (RF) signal processing, and a baseband communication processor for performing baseband communication processing or communication protocol algorithms.
- each of the communication processors may include only a baseband communication processor, and the corresponding RF processor may be external to the system on chip 21. That is, if the system on chip 21 is integrated on the first semiconductor chip, the RF processor can be integrated on another chip different from the first semiconductor chip.
- the speech signal processor 214 of Figure 2 is for performing speech signal processing.
- the speech signal processor 214 can include at least one of a HiFi processor or a speech codec.
- the HiFi processor can be used to implement echo cancellation, smoothing, timbre enhancement, and the like of the speech signal.
- the speech codec can be used to implement a speech codec operation to effect conversion between the speech signal in digital form and a natural analog speech signal.
- voice signal processor 214 may only include a HiFi processor.
- the voice codec is implemented on the other semiconductor chip of the on-chip system 21 because it includes an analog circuit, which is not limited in this embodiment.
- FIG. 3 is a diagram of a security processor system 23 provided by an embodiment of the present invention.
- the secure processor system 23 can also implement more secure application functions in this embodiment as a schedule and execution of the secure processor system 23. Work at the center.
- the secure processor system 23 includes a secure bus 35, and a secure processor 31, random access memory (RAM) 32, secure boot memory 33, OTP memory 34, and the plurality of interfaces 24 coupled to the secure bus 35.
- the random access memory 32 is a power-down volatile memory
- the secure boot memory 33 is a non-power-down volatile memory.
- a random access memory 32, a secure boot memory 33, and an OTP memory 34 are included in one storage system.
- the respective memories may not be included in one system, but are each independently independent, and there is no close association in the circuit structure, and the specific implementation manner is not limited in this embodiment.
- the security processor 31 is configured to run a security operating system software and at least one security application software based on the security operating system software, where the at least one security application software comprises mobile payment software, and the security processor can be operated by The mobile payment software implements mobile payment.
- the at least one security application software may further include SIM card application software, including but not limited to virtual SIM software or a SIM feature application software customized by a communication carrier.
- the security processor 31 is equivalent to implement the functions of the security element in the prior art, and can further integrate other functions to expand the security application scenario of the system on chip 21.
- the random access memory 32 is configured to provide a storage space required by the security processor 31 to run the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application software.
- the random access memory 32 may be configured to store the loaded secure operating system software and the at least one secure application software, and may also be configured to store the generated by the running the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application software Secure temporary data.
- the security operating system software and the at least one security application software may be loaded into the random access memory 32 after the security processor 31 is powered on, and the corresponding software is run by using the internal storage space of the random access memory 32.
- the secure temporary data is intermediate data or intermediate operation results generated by the security processor 31 running the secure operating system software and the at least one security application software or other related to the security application software or its operation without long-term storage. Information such as various types of intermediate operation result data or configuration data in arithmetic processing.
- the random access memory 32 is equivalent to realizing the memory function in the computer, and is a power-down volatile storage device, which can be any one of SRAM, DRAM, SDRAM or DDR SDRAM (Double Rate Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory). . Since the random access memory 32 is integrated into the system on chip 21, the random access memory 32 can use the same manufacturing process as the other components in the system on chip 21, and the process is relatively easy to implement.
- the security processor 31 can be used to boot initialization of other components within the secure processor system 23 during power-on startup, and load the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application into the random access memory 32 to perform related operational operations. .
- the security processor 31 may be a processor with a lower computing speed or implementation complexity than the at least one central processing unit 211, but the power consumption is generally lower and the security is better, for example, it may be an ARM architecture processor, or It is another dedicated anti-attack processor, or it can be a digital signal processor (DSP).
- DSP digital signal processor
- the secure operating system software run by the security processor 31 may be an on-chip operating system (COS).
- COS also known as a COS image
- COS image may include functionality to host operating system software within a smart card or an integrated circuit (IC) card, where the secure processor system 23 includes conventional secure components, resident smart cards, or The function of a financial card, which is used to provide mobile cards such as swipe cards to external POS machines, card readers or financial servers on the cloud side.
- Pay for the data required by the business such as data related to the banking financial business or personal account data of the user, such as personal account number, password, and various types of verification information required for the bank server to verify the personal account.
- the COS image may also be an operation platform for receiving and processing external payment information (such as various payment information sent by a financial server or a card reader or a POS machine), and may be selectively used to execute various instructions sent by the outside world, such as Operations such as authentication operations.
- the COS is generally based on the JAVA computer programming language design, and can be preset not only in the secure processor system 23, but also the mobile terminal 20 can dynamically download and install various security application software, such as various financial application software, based on the COS.
- the specific design of the COS is part of the prior art and is outside the scope of this application.
- communication of the at least one central processing unit 211 with the secure processor system 23 includes data interaction or instruction interaction.
- the instructions may be instructions of at least one central processing unit 211 to control or operate the secure processor system 23, including but not limited to a start command, a close command, a restart command, a sleep command, an entry or exit of a low power state command, or
- the work order is suspended or resumed to instruct the secure processor system 23 to enter a state corresponding to each instruction, respectively.
- central processing unit 211 sends a sleep command to the secure processor system 23
- the secure processor system 23 can enter a sleep state in response to the instruction.
- the operational state of the secure processor system 23 can be controlled by the at least one central processing unit 211, but does not affect the security of the data in the secure processor system 23.
- the instructions may also be used to implement other control processes, such as controlling the operating state, and may specifically include controlling the operating voltage, operating clock frequency, or information processing rate of the security processor system 23 or at least some of the components therein. This embodiment does not limit this.
- the plurality of interfaces 24 in FIG. 3 can flexibly adapt to different usage scenarios, and can optionally include an NFC interface 241 and a fingerprint input interface 242.
- the NFC interface 241 is configured to exchange, by the NFC processor 41, NFC information related to the mobile payment with an NFC peer, where the NFC information includes a mobile payment instruction, a mobile payment data, or an NFC authentication. At least one of the information.
- the NFC processor 41 is a processor that performs NFC communication signal processing, which can be integrated in the communication processor 213 to reduce the manufacturing cost of the entire system, and can also be located outside the system on the chip 21 in the mobile terminal 20. Independent of the semiconductor chip.
- the NFC processor 41 can include at least one of an NFC baseband processor and an RF processor.
- the NFC processor 41 is also commonly referred to as an NFC controller for implementing short-range contactless data communication with the NFC peer to implement data. Read or write or interact.
- the NFC peer is a device that interacts with the NFC processor 41 within the mobile terminal 20 for NFC data and instructions, and may be a POS machine.
- the security processor 31 is configured to implement operations and processing related to mobile payment, and interact with the NFC processor 41 coupled to the NFC interface 241 via the secure bus 35, the NFC information being sent by the NFC processor 41 to The NFC peer receives or receives from the NFC peer.
- the NFC peer may be NFC authentication information related to mobile payment, mobile payment amount, mobile payment request or response information, and the like.
- the NFC processor 41 can support an NFC communication protocol or an RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) communication protocol.
- the security processor 31 runs the mobile payment software, and sends a mobile payment request to the NFC peer through the secure bus 35, the NFC interface 241, and the NFC processor 41, and receives the reverse payment.
- the mobile payment response from the NFC peer and further interact with the NFC peer to perform the NFC authentication information required for the two-way NFC authentication, and transmit the user-determined payment amount to the NFC peer.
- the NFC interface 241 can be a Single Wire Protocol (SWP) interface. Of course, it can also be other types of interfaces, such as Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI), General Purpose Input Output (GPIO). ) Interface or Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C) interface.
- SWP Single Wire Protocol
- SPI Serial Peripheral Interface
- GPIO General Purpose Input Output
- I2C Inter-Integrated Circuit
- the fingerprint input interface 242 is coupled to a fingerprint sensor 42 for receiving fingerprint data from the fingerprint sensor 42, the fingerprint data being used in the mobile payment for user authentication based on fingerprint recognition.
- the fingerprint sensor 42 is typically a device located within the mobile terminal 20 and located outside of the system on chip 21.
- the fingerprint sensor 42 collects fingerprint data of the user and transmits it to the secure processor 31 or other authentication component via the fingerprint input interface 242 to authenticate the identity of the user. Only when the user authentication based on fingerprint recognition passes, the mobile payment is executed or further executed.
- the fingerprint input interface 242 can be an SPI, and of course can be other types of interfaces.
- the fingerprint input interface 242 can be used to collect the fingerprint data of the user for the first time and further store the fingerprint data in the secure memory 45 through the storage interface 245 or transmit the fingerprint data to the line system bus 210 through the isolation memory 36 or the bus bridge. Further transfer to system memory 22 is saved.
- the security processor 31 or other component in the secure processor system 23, such as a fingerprint reader can read the saved fingerprint data from the secure memory 45 or system memory 22 and the newly acquired fingerprint data. Do comparisons to achieve user authentication.
- Port 242 can also be replaced by other types of interfaces, such as interfaces for transmitting iris data, voiceprint data, face data, or scent data.
- User authentication at this time is no longer based on fingerprint recognition, but may be Based on iris recognition, voiceprint recognition, face recognition, or odor recognition.
- Corresponding sensors can be: iris sensors, voiceprint sensors, image sensors for capturing facial images, or odor sensors. That is, by collecting user-specific biometric data and passing it to the secure processor system 23 through the relevant interface, authentication of the relevant user identity can be achieved.
- the secure processor system 23 may include a biometric input interface that supports all of the above types of biometric data to enable more flexible user identity authentication, and the figures referred to in the embodiments are for illustration only.
- biometric input interfaces may be SWP interfaces, and of course other types of interfaces, such as SPI interfaces or I2C interfaces.
- the plurality of interfaces 24 may further include a secure input interface 243, a peripheral interface 244, and a storage interface 245.
- the security input interface 243 is configured to receive user information related to mobile payment input by the user.
- the user information includes a password input by a user, a user instruction, or a financial transaction amount.
- the user instruction can be an instruction to agree, stop or continue to move the payment. Therefore, the secure input interface 243 needs to be coupled to an input device 43 to receive the user information through the input device 43.
- the input device 43 may be a touch screen or button located within the mobile terminal 20 for performing input.
- Peripheral interface 244 is configured to indicate to the user via peripheral device 44 that the mobile payment is being performed.
- the peripheral device 44 can be a pointing device and the peripheral interface 244 is coupled to the pointing device 44.
- the pointing device 44 can be an indicator light, a speaker or a vibrator for playing sound for alerting the user that the mobile payment is being or has been or will be performed by a light signal, sound or vibration.
- the secure input interface 243 can be an I2C interface or other type of interface.
- Peripheral interface 244 can be a GPIO interface or other type of interface.
- the storage interface 245 can be coupled to a secure memory 45 outside of the system on chip 21, which can be an SPI interface or other type of interface.
- the secure memory 245 can be used to store the secure operating system software and at least one secure application.
- the secure memory 45 includes memory with enhanced features such as physical and logical attacks for securely storing secure operating system software and at least one secure application.
- the security processor 31 is configured to read the security operating system software and the at least one security application software from the secure memory 45 through the storage interface 245, and run the security operating system software and the at least one security application software.
- the storage connection The port 245 is a dedicated interface
- the secure memory 45 is a processor dedicated to secure processing, so that the reading of the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application software is performed through the dedicated storage interface 245 without dependency.
- the secure memory 45 can be a rewritable non-volatile memory such as Flash.
- the secure memory 45 is integrated on a second semiconductor chip that is different from the first semiconductor chip on which the system on chip 21 is located. Since the secure memory 45 is dedicated to storing the secure operating system software and at least one secure application software, it is not used to store non-secure software, achieving higher security.
- the data stored in the secure memory 45 is different from intermediate data or temporary data and can be stored for a long time.
- the temporary data stored by the random access memory 32, or intermediate data or memory data is process data generated by running a software that does not need to be stored for a long period of time, but may be lost as the device or device loses power.
- the security processor 31 may trigger the loading of the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application software from the secure memory 45 into the random access memory 32 after power up or based on user indications or other conditions, the random access memory 32 being operationally related
- the software provides the storage space needed.
- the secure memory 45 function may also be replaced by an internal memory within the secure processor system 23 in the event that the storage process evolves.
- the internal memory may be an on-chip ROM, or an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) or other on-chip non-volatile memory for storing the secure operating system software.
- EEPROM electrically erasable programmable read-only memory
- the internal memory allows the secure processor system 23 to store the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application without relying on external memory, which is highly secure and only results in higher costs.
- a plurality of processors including the at least one central processing unit 211 and the secure processor system 23 are integrated, which can reduce the implementation cost and area of the entire system, and the secure processor system 23 Safety isolation from other non-secure components ensures safety.
- the NFC interface 241, the fingerprint input interface 242, and the secure input interface 243 and the peripheral interface 244 for inputting user information are integrated in the secure processor system 23, and the information collection related to these interfaces will no longer be like the conventional system.
- the transmission of NFC information, fingerprint data, user information, and the like is made more secure.
- the system bus 210 and the secure bus 35 are coupled by an isolated memory 36 under the security isolation. That is, located outside the secure processor system 23 At least one processor and the secure processor system 23 interact with data or instructions via the isolated memory 36.
- the at least one processor including central processing unit 211, cannot directly access any of the components of security processor system 23 other than isolation memory 36.
- the at least one central processing unit 211 can be coupled to the secure processor system 23 via the system bus 210 and the isolated memory 36 by the general operating system software to interact with the secure processor System 23 communicates, the content of which includes data or instructions, such as passing data to at least one component within secure processor system 23.
- the isolated memory 36 is a dedicated interaction channel for the security processor system 23 to interact with the outside world, or even a unique channel, that is, a mailbox box for realizing data or information interaction, avoiding being directly directly from the outside of the at least one processor. Access to any of the components or modules of the random access memory 32 or the secure processor system 23 may improve security.
- the isolated memory 36 is preferably a power-down volatile memory such as a RAM, but may be replaced with a non-power-down volatile memory such as a ROM.
- a non-power-down volatile memory such as a ROM.
- the isolated memory 36 of FIG. 3 of the present embodiment may be replaced by a other type of safety isolation device, such as a bus bridge.
- the bus bridge is a bus that spans between the secure bus 35 of the secure processor system 23 and the system bus 210.
- the bus bridge is dedicated to transferring data or information between two different security buses in place of the function of the isolated memory 36, coupling the system bus 210 to the secure bus 35.
- the data that can be transmitted on the bus bridge can be further processed to improve the security.
- the data transmitted on the bus bridge needs to undergo special encryption and decryption processing, which is not limited in this embodiment.
- Security isolation is achieved by isolating memory 36 or a safety isolation device such as a bus bridge, and at least one processor other than the secure processor system 23 is not free to access memory or registers within the secure processor system 23.
- the secure processor system 23 can selectively couple one to the system bus 210.
- the data read by the processor is transmitted to the processor through the secure isolation device, and the secure processor system 23 does not want the data acquired by the processor to be transmitted to the processor through the secure isolation device.
- the security processor system 23 does not want the data acquired by the processor to include fingerprint data acquired through the fingerprint input interface 242, or secure temporary data temporarily stored in the random access memory 32 or loaded in the random access memory 32.
- the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application software are examples of the data acquired by the processor to include fingerprint data acquired through the fingerprint input interface 242, or secure temporary data temporarily stored in the random access memory 32 or loaded in the random access memory 32.
- Security isolation can be achieved between the secure processor system 23 and the at least one processor via the dedicated pass lanes and by data or instruction interaction.
- the isolated memory 36 or bus bridge is one form of the dedicated interactive channel.
- the dedicated interaction channel can be the only channel coupled between the secure processor system 23 and the at least one processor.
- the secure processor system 23 in FIG. 3 or FIG. 4 may further include a secure boot memory 33 coupled to the secure bus 35.
- the secure boot memory 33 stores the boot program instructions required for the security processor 31 to initialize.
- the security processor 31 initializes the security processor 31 by reading the bootstrap program instructions from the secure boot memory 33 prior to running the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application software.
- at least one central processing unit 211 may first power up, and then trigger the security processor system 23 to power up.
- the secure boot memory 33 is similar to the BIOS in a conventional PC, and it can be guaranteed that each time the boot of the secure processor system 23 is read from the bootloader in the secure boot memory 33.
- the instruction starts and the startup is guaranteed to be safe.
- the secure boot memory 33 is preferably an on-chip ROM.
- the security processor 31 when the security processor system 23 is powered on, the security processor 31 is configured to read the boot program instructions from the secure boot memory 33, and the security is performed by the boot program instructions. Operating system software is loaded into the random access memory 32 to run the secure operating system software. Further, the security processor 31 may launch one or more security applications after the security processor system 23 is powered on, ie load one or more security applications into the random access memory 32 to run the security. Application system software. Alternatively, the security processor 31 can receive a trigger from a user command or other condition to launch the secure application.
- the security processor 31 when the security processor 31 reads the boot program instruction from the secure boot memory 33, it may undergo a decryption process. That is, stored in the secure boot memory 33 is an encrypted bootstrapping instruction.
- the boot program instruction 33 acquires the boot program instruction, the boot program instruction is decrypted by the decryption logic circuit 51 to obtain a decrypted boot program instruction, and the decrypted boot program instruction is used to initialize the secure processor 31, To further ensure startup security.
- the decryption logic circuit 51 can be hidden in the layout of the system on chip 21, that is, the various partial circuits in the decryption logic circuit 51 can be dispersed in different parts of the layout of the system on chip 21, so that it is difficult to be cracked by the outside world. Increased security.
- the OTP memory 34 in FIG. 3 is configured to store security parameters of the security processor system 23, and the security parameters may optionally include a root key, a calibration parameter, a configuration parameter, or an enable parameter. At least one.
- the root key is used to generate other keys required by the secure processor system 23 to perform at least one type of encryption and decryption.
- the calibration parameters include parameters required to calibrate at least one component of the safety processor system 23, such as calibration parameters of one or more anti-attack sensors 39, to calibrate the anti-attack sensor 39.
- the configuration parameters include configuration parameters of at least one component within the security processor system 23, such as configuration parameters of the random number generator 304, such as the configuration of the length of the random number generated by the random number generator 304.
- the enabling parameters include parameters that control at least one component of the safety processor system 23 to be turned “on” or "off".
- the enabling parameter may enable enabling control of a portion of the component, such as the anti-attack sensor 39.
- the configuration of the enable parameters is implemented by performing programming in the OTP memory 34.
- the enable parameter is configured to be active, related components, such as anti-attack sensor 39, are turned on so that after the system-on-chip 21 is manufactured, whether the functionality of at least one of its components is still available is configurable.
- the enabling parameters may also include life management cycle parameters for enabling management of portions of the secure processor system 23 at different times. For example, whether the partial key saved in the secure processor system 23 is readable can be configured by the life management cycle parameter.
- the OEM needs to read the relevant key due to the need for OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) debugging using the system on chip 21, and can be in the OTP memory 34 when the debugging is completed.
- the security parameters may be programmed into the OTP memory 34 to effect calibration, configuration or setup of the secure processor system 23, or for some of the device functions within the secure processor system 23. Can be turned off or disabled.
- the OTP memory 34 allows some functions within the secure processor system 23 to be set or changed after the system on chip 21 is manufactured, improving design flexibility after fabrication.
- the OTP memory 34 is further configured to store a patch instruction of the boot program instruction required by the security processor 31 to initialize.
- the patch instruction can be a supplement to the bootstrap instructions or a replacement for some of the programs.
- the system-on-chip 21 when the system-on-chip 21 is manufactured, if it is found that the boot program instructions applied to the secure processor system 23 are insufficient, and the information or data in the secure boot memory 33 is not rewritten, the death can still pass through the OTP memory 34. Burning related patch instructions to compensate for the lack of existing bootloader instructions or errors makes the implementation more flexible.
- the secure processor 31 When the secure processor 31 is booted, a portion of the patched program instructions can be read from the OTP memory 34 in place of at least a portion of the boot program instructions read from the secure boot memory 33.
- the security processor 31 when the security processor 31 reads a partial boot program instruction from the secure boot memory 33, it can jump to the OTP memory 34 to read the relevant patch command, and can jump back to read the secure boot memory 33 if necessary. Other bootstrap instructions for safe boot.
- OTP memory 34 can be further added to the OTP memory 34, such as authenticating data or information read from the OTP memory 34 by some security authentication devices, and performing power abnormality detection on the OTP memory 34.
- the alarm is improved by performing an error detection and alarm on the OTP memory 34, encrypting the read information in the OTP memory 34, or using the data storage address disorder in the OTP memory 34.
- OTP memory 34 can be a non-power-down volatile memory.
- the random access memory 32 in FIG. 3 is integrated in the system on chip 21, and is difficult to implement using EEPROM due to process and the like, but can be implemented by SRAM, DRAM, SDRAM or DDRSDRAM, etc.
- the capacity of KB (kilobytes).
- the data in the random access memory 32 may be encrypted data or its data security may be improved by security means such as data storage address out of order.
- the secure processor system 23 also includes a DMA controller 37 coupled to the secure bus 35.
- the DMA controller 37 is for reading data from the random access memory 32 and outputting it to the secure bus or writing data to the random access memory 32 through the secure bus.
- the DMA controller 37 functions to replace the security processor 31 for data transfer and relocation.
- the specific working principle can be referred to the description of the prior art, and details are not described herein.
- the secure processor system 23 also includes an anti-attack system to increase security.
- the anti-attack system can include various types of anti-attack means or devices, such as the attack-resistant metal layer 38 and the anti-attack sensor 39.
- the anti-attack sensor 39 is configured to detect whether there are abnormalities in various operating parameters of the secure processor system 23, and generate a trigger signal and transmit a trigger signal to the secure processor system 23 when the abnormality occurs. At least one of the following operations is triggered: the security processor system 23 performs an alert, the secure processor 31 resets, or at least one of the random access memory 32 or the secure processor system 23 is reset or emptied.
- the operating parameter includes at least one of voltage, current, clock frequency, temperature, or laser intensity. Therefore, as shown in FIG. 6, the anti-attack sensor 39 may include one or more of a voltage monitor 61, a current monitor 62, a clock frequency monitor 63, a temperature monitor 64, or a laser intensity detector 65, for The security of the secure processor system 23 is described.
- the voltage monitor 61 is configured to detect whether the voltage of the at least one component of the secure processor system 23 or its internals is normal, and to report the abnormality to the secure processor system 23 when there is an abnormality in the voltage.
- the voltage monitor 61 determining whether the voltage is abnormal may include comparing the detected voltage to a voltage threshold or matching the data to determine if the voltage is within a normal range or if a predetermined voltage threshold is reached. When the voltage is within the normal range or does not reach the preset voltage threshold, the abnormality is not reported or reported to the normal state; otherwise, the voltage monitor 61 reports an abnormality.
- the voltage monitor 61 may include a detecting part (ie, a sensor) for sensing a voltage and a determining part for comparing or matching processing.
- the security processor 31 or component can send an alarm instruction to the peripheral interface 244 through the safety bus 35, and send an alarm indication signal to the peripheral device 44 through the peripheral interface 244 to implement alarming to the user.
- the security processor 31 may perform a reset operation after receiving the abnormal report, or may selectively trigger the random access memory 32 or the secure processor system 23 in the secure processor system 23 by the secure processor 31 or the component.
- One or more registers are reset or cleared.
- the voltage monitor 61 can recognize the outside Boundary attacks, such as voltage anomalies caused by external voltage spike attacks and perform corresponding operations to prevent data or information leakage. Some of the calibration parameters of the voltage monitor 61 can be stored in the OTP memory 34.
- the current monitor 62 is configured to detect whether the current of the safety processor system 23 or at least one component thereof is abnormal, and may selectively include a component that detects the current and a component that determines the abnormality of the current, and executes when an abnormality occurs. Corresponding operations such as alarm operation, reset or emptying to accurately identify the current anomaly caused by external attacks.
- the clock frequency monitor 63 is configured to detect whether there is an abnormality in the operating clock frequency of the at least one component of the secure processor system 23 or therein, and perform a corresponding alarming operation or resetting operation when an abnormality occurs, and optionally include detecting the clock frequency
- the components and components that determine the abnormal clock frequency to accurately identify the abnormality or instability of the working clock caused by external attacks. Due to the complexity of the clock structure of the entire system, the clock frequency delivered to the secure processor system 23 is multi-frequency multiplied or divided, and the frequency attack is more difficult. Reducing the clock frequency is generally advantageous for external attacks, which makes it desirable for the outside world to more easily locate and change the clock frequency of the operating clock supplied to the secure processor system 23.
- the clock conversion of the complex system makes it difficult for the external device to accurately locate the clock of the specific security processor system 23, so the clock frequency monitor 63 can be used to detect the clock associated with the security processor system 23 to implement anti-attack detection. .
- the clock frequency monitor 63 can be used to detect not only the operating clock of the secure processor system 23 but also the source clock that generates the operating clock, that is, the divided or multiplied clock of the operating clock.
- the principle of the temperature monitor 64 is similar to that of other previously mentioned detectors for detecting whether the temperature of the safety processor system 23 or at least one component thereof is abnormal and performing a corresponding alarm operation when an abnormality occurs. Or a reset operation, which may selectively include a component that detects temperature and a component that determines an abnormal temperature, and recognizes an abnormal temperature change caused by an external attack to improve safety.
- the temperature monitor 64 for implementing the anti-attack can be multiplexed with other temperature sensors inside the system on the chip for implementing thermal protection or thermal retraction, in addition to the thermal protection function, and also prevents the external system from damaging the system with low temperature attacks.
- the laser intensity detector 65 is then used to detect whether the laser signal strength of the security processor system 23 or a portion thereof is beyond a preset threshold to identify an abnormality and perform a corresponding alarm, reset or clear operation when an abnormality occurs.
- the laser intensity detector 65 is mainly used to prevent external laser attacks. For example, when an external device invades the security processor system 23 by using a laser cutting technique, the laser intensity detector 65 can detect the laser signal, or detect that the intensity of the laser signal exceeds the threshold, and touch Send the corresponding operation, such as the alarm, reset or empty operation described earlier.
- the attack resistant metal layer 38 is formed based on a metal mask layer.
- FIG. 7 a schematic cross-sectional view of the first semiconductor chip 70 in the vertical direction is shown, and the first semiconductor chip 70 includes a semiconductor physical device 72 at the bottom layer.
- the semiconductor physical device 72 includes other parts of the system-on-chip 21 except the attack-resistant metal layer 38, including modules, functional devices, or circuits for implementing signal or information processing functions. For example, the description of the corresponding parts of FIGS. 2 to 4 is shown.
- Located above the semiconductor physical device 72 is usually one or more metal mask layers, wherein one or more metal mask layers are specially designed to form the anti-attack metal layer 38, and are fabricated by a semiconductor integrated circuit.
- the metal mask layer of the uppermost layer can be processed only to form the attack-resistant metal layer 38, and all of the multilayer metal mask layers can be used to form the attack-resistant metal layer 38.
- the attack resistant metal layer 38 can be one or more layers and overlying the semiconductor physical device 72. Therefore, it can be understood that the attack-resistant metal layer 38 in the system on chip 21 can be located at least one top layer of the plurality of semiconductor layers formed by the first semiconductor chip 70, except for the attack-resistant metal layer 38 in the system on chip 21. Other components or modules or units may be located on the bottom layer of the plurality of semiconductor layers. Wherein the at least one top layer is located above the bottom layer.
- FIG. 8 a schematic diagram of a layout layout of the first semiconductor chip 70 in the horizontal direction is illustrated, wherein the anti-attack metal layer 38 may cover at least the mesh structure of the first semiconductor chip 70 on the layout of the layout.
- the optional attack resistant metal layer 38 may be other shapes than the mesh structure in the layout of the layout.
- the attack-resistant metal layer 38 can detect the intrusion of the object and pass the SoC.
- the circuitry associated with the attack-resistant metal layer 38 performs an anti-attack operation such as alarming, resetting, or clearing.
- the attack resistant metal layer 38 can generate an electrical signal upon detection of the intrusion that can reflect changes in electrical characteristics on the attack resistant metal layer 38 caused by the intrusion, such as changes in voltage or current.
- the electrical signal can be detected by circuitry associated with the anti-attack metal layer 38 that is coupled to the secure processor system 23.
- the circuit can generate a trigger signal and transmit the trigger signal when receiving the electrical signal generated by the anti-attack metal layer 38.
- the attack-resistant metal layer 38 may be Shielding, which may cover all of the system-on-chips 21 located on the first semiconductor chip 70, or may cover all of the secure processor system 23 only on the layout layout. Or a critical portion of the secure processor system 23, such as only the security processor 31 or the random access memory 32, etc., to increase security and reduce the cost associated with arranging the attack resistant metal layer 38. As shown in FIG. 8, the attack-resistant metal layer 38 covers all of the secure processor system 23 on the layout layout to ensure security.
- system bus 210 or the secure bus 35 may each include at least one of an AHB or an APB.
- Different portions or elements or circuits in the secure processor system 23 can be further divided into different levels of security, and connections using different levels of bus technology can meet the rate requirements and security requirements of different components within the secure processor system.
- the security bus 35 can adopt the bus transmission mode in which the AHB and the APB are combined, the security level of the AHB and the APB is different, and the transmission rate may be different.
- the transmission rate of the AHB may be higher than the APB, but the security level may be lower than the APB.
- the coupling between different components may employ AHB technology, while the coupling between the security processor 31 and the cryptographic system 30 employs APB technology.
- the specific bus transmission mode may also have other implementation manners, which are not described herein.
- the data or related address transmitted on the secure bus 35 can be encrypted, scrambled or CRCed to avoid the related data or address being cracked by the outside, ensuring the privacy of the data and address on the secure bus 35 and Integrity.
- a read/write initiating component (Master) in the secure processor system 23 accesses another component (Slave) through the secure bus 35
- the read/write address of the secure bus 35 that is, the master occupying the secure bus 35
- the address of the device with Slave can also be handled securely such as scrambling or interleaving.
- the cryptosystem 30 includes at least one of the following: an encryption and decryption device 301, an authentication device 302, a key manager 303, and a random number generator 304.
- the encryption and decryption device 301 is configured to perform encryption and decryption processing or authentication processing on at least one of the data in the security processor system 23.
- the data stored in the random access memory 32 by the security processor 31 may be encrypted and encrypted.
- the latter data is stored in the random access memory 32; conversely, before the secure processor 31 reads the data from the random access memory 32, the encryption/decryption device 301 can decrypt the relevant data and provide the decrypted data to the secure processor 31.
- the secure processor 31 is enabled to process the decrypted data.
- the encryption and decryption device 301 can encrypt the data or information transmitted by the security processor system 23 to the external device through any one of the interfaces 24, and decrypt the data transmitted by the external device through the corresponding interface for the security processor system. 23 use.
- the encryption and decryption algorithm used by the encryption/decryption device 301 may be a symmetric or asymmetric encryption/decryption algorithm, or alternatively an authentication algorithm such as a hash algorithm.
- the encryption and decryption algorithms include, but are not limited to, various types of cryptographic algorithms specified by international or Chinese, such as DES (Data Encryption Algorithm), 3DES (Triple Data Encryption Standard, Triple DES), AES (Advanced Encryption Standard, Advanced Data Encryption). Standard), RSA algorithm, ECC (Elliptic Curves Cryptography), and the like.
- the hash algorithm may include MD5 (Message-Digest Algorithm 5), SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm), and the like.
- the encryption and decryption device 301 can also support private exclusive encryption and decryption algorithms of various countries, such as SM2, SM3 or SM4 issued by the China Cryptographic Office.
- the encryption and decryption device 301 also optionally supports an encryption/decryption algorithm combination mode, such as HMAC-SHA256 (Hash Message Authentication Code-Secure Hash Algorithm 256, Hash Message Authentication Code-Secure Hash Algorithm 256).
- HMAC-SHA256 Hash Message Authentication Code-Secure Hash Algorithm 256
- Hash Message Authentication Code-Secure Hash Algorithm 256 can also be designed to adopt the Side Channel Attack technology to enhance the security of the algorithm in the hardware circuit implementation.
- the authentication device 302 is configured to authenticate at least one of the data in the security processor system 23, and the authentication may include hash authentication, for example, interacting with the security processor system 23 through any interface.
- the data is processed for authentication.
- the authentication device 302 hashes the relevant data and writes the hashed data to the secure The memory 45; when the security processor 21 needs to read the data from the secure memory 45, the data is first sent to the authentication device 302 for de-hashing operation, and only if the hash-success authentication is successful, the data is considered not to be invaded or modified.
- the data is then sent to the security processor 21 for security.
- the authentication device 302 may be further configured to perform the fingerprint recognition based user authentication mentioned in the previous embodiment.
- a random number generator 304 is configured to generate a random number for use as a unique identifier of a seed or chip that generates a key required for at least one type of encryption, the unique identifier of the chip being used to identify the System on chip 21 or secure processor system 23.
- the random number may be a true random number or a pseudo random number.
- Key manager 303 for generating, distributing, or destroying in the secure processor system 23 The key required to perform the encryption and decryption process or authentication.
- the key manager 303 can receive the random number generated by the random number generator 304, and generate a key required for encryption and decryption based on the random number, and generate the relevant key. It is provided for use by the encryption/decryption device 301, and the key manager 303 can maintain the key valid for a preset time, and when the time is exceeded, the encryption/decryption device 301 is notified to prohibit the continued use of the key. That is to say, the key manager 303 destroys the key when a key expires, ensuring that the usage time of any one or more keys is limited, thereby improving security.
- the key manager 303 can acquire the seed from the random number generator 304 and generate a new key when a new seed is needed, and provide the new key to the encryption and decryption device 301 for use in place of the original key.
- one or more functions of the cryptographic system 30 can be implemented by the security processor 31 to reduce the cost, but if the independent cryptographic system 30 as shown in FIG. 3 is used to implement the related functions, it is equivalent to using high security.
- the hardware accelerator implements related functions, so that operations such as encryption and decryption can be separated from other operations of the security processor 31, and security can be improved.
- the security processor 31 is further configured to perform the user authentication by using the fingerprint data transmitted by the fingerprint input interface 242.
- the authentication function can be implemented by another fingerprint authenticator (not shown) in the secure processor system 23.
- the fingerprint authenticator is equivalent to a hardware accelerator for faster processing and security.
- the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application software are stored by the secure memory 45, and the secure operating system software can also be stored by the system memory 22, similar to FIG. And at least one security application.
- the system memory 22 can be located on another second semiconductor chip than the first semiconductor chip on which the system on chip 21 is located. As shown in FIG. 2, the system on chip 21 and the system memory 22 can be coupled through an inter-chip dedicated interface.
- the system memory 22 can include a secure storage area and a normal storage area that are isolated from each other.
- the secure storage area is configured to store the secure operating system software and at least one secure application software; the normal storage area is configured to store the general operating system software.
- the at least one central processing unit 211 is configured to acquire the general operating system software from the normal storage area and run the general operating system software through the inter-chip interface; the security processor 31 is configured to pass the The inter-chip interface, the system bus 210, and the secure bus 35 acquire secure operating system software and the at least one secure application software from the secure storage area, and run the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application software.
- Separate secure storage areas and normal storage areas mean that The general operating system software running on the central processing unit 211 or other common software based on the general operating system software can only read and write the normal storage area, and cannot read and write the secure storage area.
- the secure storage area is an area dedicated to executing a secure application, accessed and read and written by the secure processor 31. Since system memory 22 can store both secure and non-secure software, there is no need to rely on additional dedicated memory like secure memory 45, which reduces cost. Alternatively, system memory 22 and secure memory 45 may be Flash in various embodiments of the invention.
- the embodiment of the invention proposes a system on chip 21 that can support multiple security application services.
- the security processor system 23 can also be called a Security Protection Module (SPM), which is similar in function to the security components in the bank card, but achieves higher security and integration, and its security can be achieved.
- SPM Security Protection Module
- CC EAL4+ Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level 4+
- the central processing unit 211 and the secure processor system 23 in the on-chip system 21 adopt the same integrated circuit fabrication process, and the performance is more optimized.
- the solution of this embodiment integrates various external interfaces in the security processor system 23, and the transmission of related data is no longer dependent on the TEE of the central processing unit 211.
- FIG. 9 a schematic diagram of an application scenario of a system memory 22 as a secure operating system software and a memory of the at least one secure application software is presented.
- the usage scenario may not involve any dedicated secure memory, and the implementation cost is low.
- the secure processor 31 can access the system memory 22 via the secure bus 35, the isolated memory 36 (or bus bridge), and the system bus 210 to write data to the secure memory area in the system memory 22.
- the data in the secure storage area is read to enable reading or writing of the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application in the secure storage area.
- the data or information may be encrypted or authenticated when the secure storage area and the security processor 31 interact to ensure data privacy and data not to be tampered with.
- the secure processor system 23 has dedicated access rights required to access the secure storage area.
- the security processor 31 can be further coupled to the NFC processor 41 via the NFC interface 241 and interact with the NFC peer to interact with the NFC information associated with the mobile payment through the NFC processor 41, such as The mobile payment instruction, the mobile payment data, the NFC authentication information, and the like are executed, and the operation related to the mobile payment is executed, and the calculated result is stored in the secure storage area.
- the result includes payment information of the current mobile payment, such as transaction amount or transaction time.
- FIG. 10 a schematic diagram of an application scenario using a dedicated secure memory 45 as a secure operating system software and a memory of the at least one secure application is presented.
- the secure processor 31 can access the secure memory 45 via the secure bus 35 and the storage interface 245 to enable reading or writing of the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application.
- the security processor 31 receives NFC information related to the mobile payment from the NFC peer through the NFC processor 41, and performs a mobile payment operation processing operation, and stores the processed data result in the secure memory 45.
- the scenario of FIG. 10 is safer because it can prevent data from being transmitted on the system bus 210 with a lower security level, reducing the risk of exposure of data to be transmitted.
- a schematic flowchart of the method for performing the mobile payment related to the system on chip 21 may be as shown in FIG. 11, including: in S111, the central processing unit 211 is powered on. In S112, the central processing unit 211 further triggers the boot of the secure processor system 23 upon completion of booting, including launching the secure processor 31. In S113, the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application are loaded into the secure processor system 23, for example into the secure processor 31 or into the cryptographic system 30. Specifically, relevant software data can be obtained from the secure storage area of the dedicated secure memory 45 or the system memory 22 and loaded accordingly.
- the security processor 31 or the cryptographic system 30 performs secure authentication of the secure operating system software and the at least one secure application, such as at least one of performing a program integrity check and a signature check by the authentication device 302. Operation, such as optional CRC check, etc. If the check fails, then in S115, the secure processor system 23 is reset, for example, the secure processor system 23 can be selectively restarted. If the check passes, then in S116, the data of the relevant software is imported into the random access memory 32, so that the secure processor 31 performs the arithmetic operation of the related software using the storage space provided by the random access memory 32.
- the secure processor system 23 or some of its components, such as the security processor 31, can enter a low power state, i.e., a standby state.
- the security processor 31 can temporarily stop working in this state to save power.
- the mobile payment application software or NFC processor 41 wakes up the secure processor system 23 via the NFC interface 241.
- the NFC processor 41 or the mobile payment application can be used to wake up the secure processor system 23 such that the secure processor system 23 or the secure processor 31 therein recovers from a low power state to an awake state.
- the security processor 31 may determine whether the mobile payment application has been turned on.
- the security processor 31 needs to perform the determination to determine if the associated application has been turned on. If not, in S119, the security processor 31 needs to start the mobile payment application software, that is, read the relevant software data from the secure storage area of the external memory, such as the secure memory 45 or the system memory 22, and load it into the random access memory 32. In order to perform processing or operations related to the software application. If the mobile payment application has been turned on, then in S120, the security processor 31 performs normal payment transaction operations, including, for example, further information related to mobile payment interaction with the NFC processor 41, and performs with the storage space provided by the random access memory 32.
- the related software operation obtains an operation result regarding the mobile payment, and the operation result includes intermediate data related to the transaction or a transaction result, such as a transaction amount or a transaction time.
- the user may be required to enter an amount associated with the transaction or enter biometric data.
- the biometric data is collected by the biometric sensor in the mobile terminal 20 and transmitted to the secure processor system 23 via the biometric input interface for user authentication or user authentication on the cloud side.
- the fingerprint authentication-based user authentication can be implemented using a fingerprint input interface similar to that of FIG. 3, which is not described in this embodiment.
- the security processor 31 stores the transaction result in an external memory such as the secure memory 45 or the secure storage area previously described to record the transaction information.
- FIG. 12 a schematic diagram of an application scenario for performing voice signal encryption using secure processor system 23 is shown.
- Communication processor 213 can transmit first communication data to or receive second communication data from the wireless access point.
- the voice signal processor 214 may process the voice signal from the user to generate the first communication data transmitted by the communication processor 213, or to perform the second communication data received by the communication processor 213.
- the voice signal required by the user is obtained, and the signal transmission direction is shown by a broken line in FIG.
- the encryption and decryption device 301 in the cryptographic system 30 is further configured to perform encryption processing on the first communication data or decryption processing on the second communication data when the corresponding voice communication is performed. Therefore, the encryption/decryption device 301 can be used to perform encryption and decryption processing of communication data based on voice signals in addition to performing security operations related to mobile payment, and realizes diversification of security processing capabilities.
- the communication processor 213 may include a baseband communication processor and RF processor.
- the communication processor 213 can include a cellular communication processor or a short range communication processor. That is to say, the manner of communication transmission or the supported communication protocols can be various.
- the wireless access point may be a WIFi access point, such as a WIFi router, and the communication processor 213 is a WIFi communication processor.
- the wireless access point may also be a base station, such as a cellular communication access point supporting GSM, UMTS, WiMAX, TDS-CDMA, CDMA2000, LTE or 5G, where the communication processor 213 is one and the access. Point communication cellular communication processor.
- the cellular communication access point can be, for example, an LTE base station, such as an eNodeB.
- the speech signal can be a PS domain speech signal, such as a VoLTE speech signal.
- the voice signal may also be a CS domain voice signal, such as a GSM, WCDMA or CDMA2000 voice signal.
- the user can input a sound signal through an input device, such as a microphone, and transmit a sound signal to the voice signal processor 214 through the system peripheral interface 215 and the system bus 210, and the sound signal is processed by the voice signal processor 214.
- Memory 36 (or bus bridge) and system bus 210 are transmitted to communication processor 213 for transmission of the encrypted data to the wireless access point by communication processor 213 for increased security.
- the communication processor 213 receives the encrypted voice signal sent by the wireless access point, it will transmit to the encryption and decryption device 301 through a similar signal transmission path, and the decryption device 301 decrypts the voice information and transmits the voice information to the voice.
- the signal processor 214 processes the signal by the speech signal processor 214 to obtain a sound signal.
- the sound signal in this embodiment is an analog voice signal and can be played to the user through a speaker to realize the function of the user's secure call.
- the decryption function of the encryption/decryption device 301 can also be implemented by the security processor 31.
- FIG. 13 a schematic diagram of an application scenario in which user authentication based on fingerprint data is performed by a cloud side server is shown, and a specific signal transmission direction is shown by a broken line in FIG.
- the encryption and decryption device 301 is further configured to perform encryption processing on the fingerprint data collected by the fingerprint sensor 42 to obtain encrypted fingerprint data.
- the communication processor 213 sends the encrypted fingerprint data to a server for performing the user authentication through a wireless access point, and the server authenticates the fingerprint data to the communication processor 213 through the wireless access point.
- the authentication result is returned, and the authentication result is provided to the security processor 31 so that the security processor 31 continues to perform related security operations, such as continuing the mobile payment operation, upon learning that the fingerprint data-based user authentication is obtained.
- This type of authentication is also It is cloud side authentication, which reduces the overhead for the mobile terminal 20 to process authentication. Specifically, whether the user is authenticated by the security processor 31 or other components in the security processor system 23, or uploaded to the cloud side server for user authentication, the security processor system 23 needs to collect the fingerprint data collected by the fingerprint sensor 42. The pre-stored fingerprint data is compared to verify whether the authentication is passed.
- the security processor 31 After the fingerprint data collected by the fingerprint sensor 42, the security processor 31 is triggered to perform the relevant authentication operation, and the security processor 31 triggers the acquisition of the pre-stored fingerprint data from the external memory, for example, reading from the secure memory 45 through the storage interface 245 like FIG.
- the fingerprint data is taken or read through a secure storage area of system memory 22.
- the pre-stored fingerprint data may be fingerprint data of the user previously captured by the fingerprint sensor 42 and stored in an external memory for subsequent comparison.
- storing fingerprint data by using a dedicated secure memory 45 is a better choice.
- the security processor 31 can store the fingerprint data obtained from the fingerprint sensor 42 into the secure memory 45 for the first time when the user fingerprint data is collected, so that the subsequent fingerprint data can be used for comparison. Avoiding confidential fingerprint data is transmitted over the less secure system bus 210, reducing the likelihood of data leakage.
- a processing method in a mobile payment process is also provided, which is performed by the security processor system 23 in the aforementioned system on chip 21, wherein fingerprint authentication is taken as an example.
- the security processor system 23 interacts with the NFC peer (such as a communication device such as a POS device) through the NFC interface 241 with the NFC information related to the mobile payment, and the NFC information may include a mobile payment instruction, for example, by security.
- the processor system 23 requests the NFC peer to request a mobile payment request message or a connection setup message, and the security processor system 23 can further receive a response message from the NFC peer that agrees to establish a connection or request message.
- the NFC information may further include mobile payment data, such as transaction amount or transaction time information sent from the NFC peer.
- the NFC information may further include NFC authentication information, such as the security processor system 23 and the NFC peer performing mutual authentication to verify whether the other party is legitimate.
- the NFC information is an information interaction between the secure processor system 23 and the NFC peer in order to complete the mobile payment.
- the secure processor system 23 receives fingerprint data from the fingerprint sensor 42, which is used in the mobile payment for user authentication based on fingerprint recognition.
- the user authentication is used to verify whether the user using the mobile terminal 20 is a legitimate user, and the authentication may be performed by the secure processor system 23 or by the cloud side server.
- fingerprint recognition can also be replaced by other biometric authentication methods, such as iris recognition, voiceprint recognition, face recognition, or odor recognition. Due to the user's unique human characteristics, such as fingerprints or odors, the user can be distinguished from other users, thereby authenticating the user by comparing the data related to the feature with the pre-saved data.
- the secure processor system 23 displays at least one piece of display information to the user through a user interface (UI).
- the display information includes at least one of a user information input interface, a transaction interface of the mobile payment, or a transaction success interface.
- the user interface is used to display relevant display information of the mobile payment to the user, including transaction amount or transaction time, etc., and may also selectively implement some user input, which may be formed on a hardware device such as a touch screen or a display screen.
- the touch screen or display screen may be specifically coupled to the secure processor system 23 via a secure input interface 243. Or alternatively, the touch screen or display screen can be coupled to system bus 210 via system peripheral interface 215.
- the security processor system 23 needs to transmit the display information to be displayed to the system peripheral interface 215 via the secure bus 35, the isolated memory 36 (or bus bridge), and the system bus 210, and is transmitted to the system peripheral interface 215 through the system peripheral interface 215.
- the touch screen or the display screen is displayed so that the user can view the display information on the user interface formed by the touch screen or the display screen.
- the user interface is formed by a UI software driver running by the at least one central processing unit 211 based on the universal operating system software, or is executed by the security processor 31 in the at least one security application software. Secure UI software drivers are formed. It can be understood that steps S15, S152 and S153 in the method do not have a strict execution order.
- the related software functional unit may be A computer program product that can be stored in a computer readable storage medium.
- the computer program product may include all of the general operating system software mentioned in the previous embodiment, the general application software based on the general operating system software, the secure operating system software, and at least one security application software based on the secure operating system software. Or part of the software.
- At least part of the corresponding technical solution of the method can be embodied in the form of computer code, which can be stored in a storage medium, including a plurality of instructions for making a computer device (may be mentioned before) A mobile terminal, or a personal computer, etc.) performs all or part of the steps of the corresponding method.
- the foregoing storage medium includes: a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or A medium such as a compact disc that can store program code.
- a typical application scenario of the mobile terminal 20 mentioned in the embodiment of the present invention may be a mobile phone, such as various types of smart phones.
- Each component within the system on chip 21, such as at least one processor or secure processor system 23, may include multiple transistors or logic gates and may operate with the necessary software drivers. Alternatively, some devices may optionally operate without software, such as a pure hardware accelerator.
- the mobile payment in the embodiment of the present invention is a broad definition, which includes not only commercial and financial mobile payment services, but also other types of payment services such as public transportation, identity cards, and social security cards. That is to say, through mobile payment, the mobile terminal can connect with the communication peer to finally realize the interaction payment information with the server, and realize data transaction, data exchange or data settlement associated with one or more accounts in the mobile terminal.
- the unit of the data transaction, the exchange, or the data settlement may include not only the currency, but also other units that can be used for realizing payment, redemption, or transaction settlement, such as a virtual currency, various types of credits, or a credit line. This embodiment does not limit this.
- the account includes, but is not limited to, a personal account, a group account, or an organizational account. Compared with the payment behavior implemented only on the fixed terminal, the mobile payment implementation is more flexible, and the execution subject is the mobile terminal 20 shown in FIG. 2, which can better meet the requirement of performing payment anytime and anywhere.
- the system on chip 21 mentioned in the embodiment of the present invention is applied to one mobile terminal 20, but can be applied to other processing devices that do not have mobile communication functions, such as a handheld device without mobile communication capability. . Therefore, the functions of some of the devices or units in the system on chip 21 mentioned in the embodiments of the present invention are not necessary, for example, at least one of the processors may be omitted, such as the image processing unit 212, the communication processor 213, and the voice signal processor 214. One or more of system peripherals 215, or image signal processor 217, etc., may optionally be omitted.
- the central processing unit 211 or the system power management unit 216 may also be omitted and replaced by a control circuit that is simpler in function and design. Therefore, the form of the associated processing device including the system on chip 21 is also not limited.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
- Bioethics (AREA)
- Finance (AREA)
- Mathematical Physics (AREA)
- Biomedical Technology (AREA)
- Telephone Function (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims (25)
- 一种片上系统SoC,其特征在于,所述SoC集成于第一半导体芯片上,包括:系统总线、耦合于所述系统总线的至少一个处理器、和耦合于所述系统总线的安全处理器系统;所述安全处理器系统与所述至少一个处理器间存在安全隔离;所述至少一个处理器包括至少一个中央处理单元,所述至少一个中央处理单元用于运行通用操作系统软件,并在所述通用操作系统软件的作用下通过所述系统总线与所述安全处理器系统通信;所述安全处理器系统包括安全处理器、第一存储器、多个接口和安全总线,所述安全处理器、第一存储器和多个接口均耦合于所述安全总线,且所述安全总线耦合于所述系统总线;其中,所述安全处理器,用于运行安全操作系统软件和基于所述安全操作系统软件的至少一个安全应用软件,所述至少一个安全应用软件包括用于实现移动支付的移动支付软件;所述第一存储器,用于提供所述安全处理器运行所述安全操作系统软件和所述至少一个安全应用软件所需的存储空间;所述多个接口包括近场通信NFC接口和生物识别输入接口;其中,所述NFC接口,用于经由NFC处理器与NFC对端交互与所述移动支付相关的NFC信息;所述生物识别输入接口,用于从生物识别传感器接收生物识别数据,所述生物识别数据在所述移动支付中被用于做基于生物识别的用户认证。
- 根据权利要求1所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述多个接口还包括安全输入接口,用于接收用户输入的与所述移动支付相关的用户信息。
- 根据权利要求1或2所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述多个接口还包括外设接口,用于通过外围设备向用户指示所述移动支付被执行。
- 根据权利要求1至3中任一项所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述安全处理器系统还包括耦合于所述安全总线的非掉电易失性的第二存储器,用于存储所述安全操作系统软件和至少一个安全应用软件;所述安全处理器用于从所述第二存储器读取所述安全操作系统软件和至 少一个安全应用软件,并将所述安全操作系统软件和至少一个安全应用软件加载到所述第一存储器中以运行所述安全操作系统软件和至少一个安全应用软件。
- 根据权利要求1至4中任一项所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述安全处理器系统还包括耦合于所述安全总线且用于实现所述安全隔离的安全隔离器件,所述至少一个处理器通过所述系统总线和所述安全隔离器件与所述安全处理器系统通信。
- 根据权利要求5所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述安全隔离器件包括隔离存储器或总线桥中的至少一项;所述隔离存储器或总线桥用于实现至少一个处理器和所述安全处理器系统交互数据或指令。
- 根据权利要求1至6中任一项所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述安全处理器系统还包括耦合于所述安全总线的安全启动存储器,用于存储所述安全处理器初始化所需的引导程序指令;所述安全处理器在运行所述安全操作系统软件和至少一个安全应用软件前,通过从所述安全启动存储器获取所述引导程序指令以初始化所述安全处理器。
- 根据权利要求7所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述引导程序指令是经过加密的引导程序指令;在所述安全处理器从所述安全启动存储器获取所述引导程序指令时,所述引导程序指令被解密逻辑电路解密以得到解密后的引导程序指令,所述解密后的引导程序指令被用于初始化所述安全处理器。
- 根据权利要求1至8中任一项所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述安全处理器系统还包括耦合于所述安全总线的一次性可编程存储器,用于存储所述安全处理器系统的安全参数,所述安全参数包括根密钥、校准参数、配置参数、或使能参数中的至少一项。
- 根据权利要求9所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述一次性可编程存储器还用于存储所述安全处理器初始化所需的引导程序指令的补丁程序指令。
- 根据权利要求1至10中任一项所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述安全处理器系统还包括防攻击传感器,用于检测所述安全处理器系统的工作参数的 异常,并在发生所述异常时触发以下至少一项操作:所述安全处理器系统进行告警、所述安全处理器复位、或所述第一存储器或所述安全处理器系统中的至少一个寄存器被复位或清空;所述工作参数包括电压、电流、时钟频率、温度或激光强度中的至少一项。
- 根据权利要求1至11中任一项所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述安全处理器系统还包括防攻击金属层,该防攻击金属层位于所述第一半导体芯片中的最上一层或多层、并在版图布局上覆盖所述安全处理器系统的至少一部分;所述防攻击金属层用于检测来自外界的物理探测或攻击,并在检测到所述物理探测或攻击时产生电信号,该电信号用于触发以下至少一项操作:所述安全处理器系统进行告警、所述安全处理器复位、或所述第一存储器或所述安全处理器系统中的至少一个寄存器被复位或清空。
- 根据权利要求1至12中任一项所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述安全总线包括高级高性能总线AHB或高级外围总线APB中的至少一项。
- 根据权利要求1至13中任一项所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述安全处理器系统还包括耦合于所述安全总线的直接存储器存取DMA控制器,用于从所述第一存储器读取数据并输出至所述安全总线或通过所述安全总线将数据写入所述第一存储器。
- 根据权利要求1至14中任一项所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述安全处理器系统还包括耦合于所述安全总线的密码系统,所述密码系统包括如下至少一项:加解密器件,用于对所述安全处理器系统中的至少一种数据进行加解密处理;认证器件,用于对所述安全处理器系统中的至少一种数据进行认证;随机数产生器,用于产生随机数,该随机数用于作为生成密钥的种子或芯片的唯一标识;或密钥管理器,用于在所述安全处理器系统中生成、分发或销毁用于做所述加解密处理或认证所需的密钥。
- 根据权利要求15所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述至少一个处理器还包括:通信处理器,用于向无线接入点发送第一通信数据或从所述无线接入点接收第二通信数据;语音信号处理器,用于对来自用户的语音信号做处理生成由所述通信处理器发送的所述第一通信数据,或用于对所述通信处理器接收的所述第二通信数据做处理得到用户所需的语音信号;所述加解密器件还用于对所述第一通信数据进行加密处理或对第二通信数据进行解密处理。
- 根据权利要求15所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述至少一个处理器还包括:通信处理器;所述加解密器件还用于对所述生物识别数据进行加密处理得到加密后的生物识别数据;所述通信处理器,用于将所述加密后的生物识别数据通过无线接入点发送至用于进行所述用户认证的服务器。
- 根据权利要求16或17所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述通信处理器包括蜂窝通信处理器或短距离通信处理器中的至少一项。
- 根据权利要求1至18中任一项所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述安全处理器还用于利用所述生物识别数据执行所述用户认证。
- 根据权利要求1至19中任一项所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述安全处理器系统还包括:生物识别认证器,用于利用所述生物识别数据执行所述用户认证。
- 根据权利要求1至20中任一项所述的SoC,其特征在于,在所述安全隔离下,所述至少一个处理器无法直接访问所述第一存储器或所述安全处理器系统中的至少一个寄存器。
- 根据权利要求1至21中任一项所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述生物识别包括如下至少一项:指纹识别、虹膜识别、声纹识别、人脸识别、或气味识别。
- 根据权利要求1至22中任一项所述的SoC,其特征在于,所述多个接口还包括存储接口,用于耦合至第三存储器;所述第三存储器用于存储所述安全操作系统软件和至少一个安全应用软 件;所述安全处理器用于通过所述存储接口从所述第三存储器读取所述安全操作系统软件和至少一个安全应用软件,并将所述安全操作系统软件和至少一个安全应用软件加载到所述第一存储器中以运行所述安全操作系统软件和至少一个安全应用软件。
- 一种处理设备,其特征在于,包括根据权利要求23所述的SoC以及所述第三存储器,所述第三存储器集成于第二半导体芯片上。
- 一种处理设备,包括根据权利要求1至22中任一项所述的SoC、以及集成于第三半导体芯片上的第四存储器,所述SoC与所述第四存储器通过芯片间接口相耦合,所述第四存储器包括互相隔离的安全存储区域和普通存储区域;所述安全存储区域用于存储所述安全操作系统软件和至少一个安全应用软件;所述普通存储区域用于存储所述通用操作系统软件;所述至少一个中央处理单元,用于通过所述芯片间接口从所述普通存储区域获取所述通用操作系统软件并运行所述通用操作系统软件;所述安全处理器,用于通过所述芯片间接口、系统总线和安全总线从所述安全存储区域获取安全操作系统软件和所述至少一个安全应用软件,并运行所述安全操作系统软件和所述至少一个安全应用软件。
Priority Applications (7)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP16912042.5A EP3461016A4 (en) | 2016-08-09 | 2016-08-09 | SYSTEM ON CHIP AND PROCESSING DEVICE |
| PCT/CN2016/094226 WO2018027587A1 (zh) | 2016-08-09 | 2016-08-09 | 一种片上系统和处理设备 |
| KR1020187033145A KR20180135940A (ko) | 2016-08-09 | 2016-08-09 | 시스템 온 칩 및 처리 장치 |
| BR112018073991-0A BR112018073991A2 (pt) | 2016-08-09 | 2016-08-09 | sistema em chip e dispositivo de processamento |
| CN201680084559.4A CN109075815A (zh) | 2016-08-09 | 2016-08-09 | 一种片上系统和处理设备 |
| TW106126726A TWI633438B (zh) | 2016-08-09 | 2017-08-08 | 系統晶片和處理設備 |
| US16/268,294 US20190172047A1 (en) | 2016-08-09 | 2019-02-05 | System on chip and processing device |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/CN2016/094226 WO2018027587A1 (zh) | 2016-08-09 | 2016-08-09 | 一种片上系统和处理设备 |
Related Child Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| US16/268,294 Continuation US20190172047A1 (en) | 2016-08-09 | 2019-02-05 | System on chip and processing device |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| WO2018027587A1 true WO2018027587A1 (zh) | 2018-02-15 |
Family
ID=61161246
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/CN2016/094226 Ceased WO2018027587A1 (zh) | 2016-08-09 | 2016-08-09 | 一种片上系统和处理设备 |
Country Status (7)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US20190172047A1 (zh) |
| EP (1) | EP3461016A4 (zh) |
| KR (1) | KR20180135940A (zh) |
| CN (1) | CN109075815A (zh) |
| BR (1) | BR112018073991A2 (zh) |
| TW (1) | TWI633438B (zh) |
| WO (1) | WO2018027587A1 (zh) |
Cited By (7)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN112100016A (zh) * | 2020-07-27 | 2020-12-18 | 珠海亿智电子科技有限公司 | 一种系统异常场景下的soc诊断方法及系统 |
| CN112184974A (zh) * | 2020-09-27 | 2021-01-05 | 江苏天创科技有限公司 | 一种基于5g通讯节点的监测系统 |
| CN112309006A (zh) * | 2020-10-19 | 2021-02-02 | 深圳市信锐网科技术有限公司 | 一种门锁设备及信息处理方法、存储介质 |
| CN113902080A (zh) * | 2020-06-22 | 2022-01-07 | 三星电子株式会社 | 生物特征认证智能卡 |
| US11308495B2 (en) * | 2017-12-11 | 2022-04-19 | Feitian Technologies Co., Ltd. | Financial card with function of fingerprint verification and working method therefor |
| US11405202B2 (en) | 2018-06-14 | 2022-08-02 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. | Key processing method and apparatus |
| CN115130146A (zh) * | 2021-03-29 | 2022-09-30 | 广东跃昉科技有限公司 | Soc芯片及应用于soc芯片的数据处理方法 |
Families Citing this family (39)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US10897360B2 (en) | 2017-01-26 | 2021-01-19 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc | Addressing a trusted execution environment using clean room provisioning |
| US10897459B2 (en) * | 2017-01-26 | 2021-01-19 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc | Addressing a trusted execution environment using encryption key |
| US10972265B2 (en) | 2017-01-26 | 2021-04-06 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc | Addressing a trusted execution environment |
| CN109862553B (zh) * | 2017-11-30 | 2022-07-12 | 华为技术有限公司 | 终端和通信方法 |
| KR102635811B1 (ko) * | 2018-03-19 | 2024-02-13 | 삼성전자 주식회사 | 사운드 데이터를 처리하는 시스템 및 시스템의 제어 방법 |
| EP3570197A1 (en) * | 2018-05-16 | 2019-11-20 | Gemalto Sa | Electronic system and method for preventing malicious actions on a processing system of the electronic system |
| GB2578158B (en) * | 2018-10-19 | 2021-02-17 | Advanced Risc Mach Ltd | Parameter signature for realm security configuration parameters |
| JP2020087293A (ja) * | 2018-11-30 | 2020-06-04 | キヤノン株式会社 | 情報処理装置および情報処理装置の制御方法 |
| US11275820B2 (en) | 2019-03-08 | 2022-03-15 | Master Lock Company Llc | Locking device biometric access |
| KR102621645B1 (ko) * | 2019-03-12 | 2024-01-05 | 삼성전자주식회사 | 보안 집적 회로를 포함하는 전자 장치 |
| CN112020043B (zh) * | 2019-05-28 | 2024-11-05 | 瑞昱半导体股份有限公司 | 蓝牙装置与其操作方法及非瞬时计算机可读记录介质 |
| EP3761201B1 (en) * | 2019-07-03 | 2024-08-07 | Nokia Technologies Oy | Cryptographic memory attestation |
| WO2021087417A1 (en) * | 2019-11-01 | 2021-05-06 | Google Llc | Alert handling |
| CN111292716A (zh) * | 2020-02-13 | 2020-06-16 | 百度在线网络技术(北京)有限公司 | 语音芯片和电子设备 |
| WO2021167617A1 (en) * | 2020-02-21 | 2021-08-26 | Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Computing devices for encryption and decryption of data |
| TWI760703B (zh) * | 2020-03-05 | 2022-04-11 | 香港商冠捷投資有限公司 | 資料修復方法及模組及顯示裝置 |
| US11880454B2 (en) * | 2020-05-14 | 2024-01-23 | Qualcomm Incorporated | On-die voltage-frequency security monitor |
| KR102857871B1 (ko) * | 2020-06-22 | 2025-09-10 | 삼성전자주식회사 | 생체인증 기반 스마트카드 |
| CN111901363B (zh) * | 2020-08-12 | 2022-05-17 | 吉林大学 | 一种基于FPGA的5G—Profibus-DP数据加密传输装置 |
| CN112330852A (zh) * | 2020-09-08 | 2021-02-05 | 深圳晒尔科技有限公司 | 多功能物联门锁电路板及物联门锁装置 |
| WO2022055490A1 (en) * | 2020-09-11 | 2022-03-17 | Google Llc | Hardware-based save-and-restore controller |
| TWI758866B (zh) * | 2020-09-16 | 2022-03-21 | 英業達股份有限公司 | 系統單晶片產品的嚴重錯誤提供方法及嚴重錯誤識別方法 |
| US20220166762A1 (en) * | 2020-11-25 | 2022-05-26 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc | Integrated circuit for obtaining enhanced privileges for a network-based resource and performing actions in accordance therewith |
| CN116601629A (zh) * | 2021-01-25 | 2023-08-15 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种终端芯片及其度量方法 |
| JP7610428B2 (ja) * | 2021-03-02 | 2025-01-08 | 日立Astemo株式会社 | 制御装置 |
| CN113010470B (zh) * | 2021-03-30 | 2023-06-20 | 上海西井信息科技有限公司 | 边缘节点远程控制系统、方法、设备及存储介质 |
| WO2022226520A1 (en) | 2021-04-23 | 2022-10-27 | Google Llc | Secure serial peripheral interface communication |
| US12566835B2 (en) | 2021-09-24 | 2026-03-03 | Apple Inc. | Quick response codes for data transfer |
| FR3128545A1 (fr) * | 2021-10-25 | 2023-04-28 | STMicroelectronics (Grand Ouest) SAS | Procédé de transaction entre une application et un périphérique |
| CN113821834B (zh) * | 2021-11-24 | 2022-02-15 | 飞腾信息技术有限公司 | 数据处理方法、安全架构系统和计算设备 |
| CN114238946B (zh) * | 2022-02-23 | 2022-05-03 | 湖北芯擎科技有限公司 | 设备管理方法、装置、电子设备及计算机可读存储介质 |
| CN115455396A (zh) * | 2022-03-08 | 2022-12-09 | 神盾股份有限公司 | 用于处理指纹信息的方法、硬件加速器及指纹识别设备 |
| CN115174431B (zh) * | 2022-06-30 | 2023-09-05 | 无锡融卡科技有限公司 | 一种简易的swp全双工逻辑信号采集装置及方法 |
| KR102772789B1 (ko) * | 2022-08-16 | 2025-02-27 | 국방과학연구소 | 전자 장치 및 그의 물리 공격 모니터링 방법 |
| US20240231471A1 (en) * | 2023-01-11 | 2024-07-11 | Meta Platforms Technologies, Llc | Artificial reality system having a system on a chip with an integrated reduced power microcontroller and application transition |
| US12561440B2 (en) * | 2023-07-31 | 2026-02-24 | Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development Lp | Integrity validation of management devices |
| US12231580B1 (en) * | 2024-03-12 | 2025-02-18 | Citigroup Technology, Inc. | Systems and methods for establishing data provenance by generating one-time signatures |
| US20260087130A1 (en) * | 2024-09-26 | 2026-03-26 | Nvidia Corporation | Detecting and preventing frequency attacks |
| CN121187990B (zh) * | 2025-11-27 | 2026-03-20 | 四川华鲲振宇智能科技有限责任公司 | 解决安卓和X86系统在同一产品上切换Touchpad黄标的方法及系统 |
Citations (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101299228A (zh) * | 2008-01-26 | 2008-11-05 | 青岛大学 | 一种基于单cpu双总线的安全网络终端 |
| CN203057229U (zh) * | 2012-12-26 | 2013-07-10 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | 带指纹识别功能的pos手机 |
| CN104778794A (zh) * | 2015-04-24 | 2015-07-15 | 华为技术有限公司 | 移动支付装置和方法 |
| US20150324791A1 (en) * | 2014-05-06 | 2015-11-12 | Apple Inc. | Storage of credential service provider data in a security domain of a secure element |
| CN105354706A (zh) * | 2015-10-08 | 2016-02-24 | 广东欧珀移动通信有限公司 | Nfc安全支付方法和系统 |
Family Cites Families (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US9002014B2 (en) * | 2008-05-24 | 2015-04-07 | Via Technologies, Inc. | On-die cryptographic apparatus in a secure microprocessor |
| CN202093521U (zh) * | 2011-03-24 | 2011-12-28 | 重庆大学 | 一种计算机身份认证系统 |
| US20130054473A1 (en) * | 2011-08-23 | 2013-02-28 | Htc Corporation | Secure Payment Method, Mobile Device and Secure Payment System |
| US9436940B2 (en) * | 2012-07-09 | 2016-09-06 | Maxim Integrated Products, Inc. | Embedded secure element for authentication, storage and transaction within a mobile terminal |
| US20140244513A1 (en) * | 2013-02-22 | 2014-08-28 | Miguel Ballesteros | Data protection in near field communications (nfc) transactions |
| CN104268487B (zh) * | 2014-09-23 | 2017-04-26 | 杭州晟元数据安全技术股份有限公司 | 一种安全芯片的复位和自毁管理系统 |
-
2016
- 2016-08-09 BR BR112018073991-0A patent/BR112018073991A2/pt not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2016-08-09 KR KR1020187033145A patent/KR20180135940A/ko not_active Withdrawn
- 2016-08-09 EP EP16912042.5A patent/EP3461016A4/en not_active Withdrawn
- 2016-08-09 CN CN201680084559.4A patent/CN109075815A/zh active Pending
- 2016-08-09 WO PCT/CN2016/094226 patent/WO2018027587A1/zh not_active Ceased
-
2017
- 2017-08-08 TW TW106126726A patent/TWI633438B/zh not_active IP Right Cessation
-
2019
- 2019-02-05 US US16/268,294 patent/US20190172047A1/en not_active Abandoned
Patent Citations (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101299228A (zh) * | 2008-01-26 | 2008-11-05 | 青岛大学 | 一种基于单cpu双总线的安全网络终端 |
| CN203057229U (zh) * | 2012-12-26 | 2013-07-10 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | 带指纹识别功能的pos手机 |
| US20150324791A1 (en) * | 2014-05-06 | 2015-11-12 | Apple Inc. | Storage of credential service provider data in a security domain of a secure element |
| CN104778794A (zh) * | 2015-04-24 | 2015-07-15 | 华为技术有限公司 | 移动支付装置和方法 |
| CN105354706A (zh) * | 2015-10-08 | 2016-02-24 | 广东欧珀移动通信有限公司 | Nfc安全支付方法和系统 |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
| Title |
|---|
| See also references of EP3461016A4 |
Cited By (8)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US11308495B2 (en) * | 2017-12-11 | 2022-04-19 | Feitian Technologies Co., Ltd. | Financial card with function of fingerprint verification and working method therefor |
| US11405202B2 (en) | 2018-06-14 | 2022-08-02 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. | Key processing method and apparatus |
| CN113902080A (zh) * | 2020-06-22 | 2022-01-07 | 三星电子株式会社 | 生物特征认证智能卡 |
| CN112100016A (zh) * | 2020-07-27 | 2020-12-18 | 珠海亿智电子科技有限公司 | 一种系统异常场景下的soc诊断方法及系统 |
| CN112100016B (zh) * | 2020-07-27 | 2023-07-14 | 珠海亿智电子科技有限公司 | 一种系统异常场景下的soc诊断方法及系统 |
| CN112184974A (zh) * | 2020-09-27 | 2021-01-05 | 江苏天创科技有限公司 | 一种基于5g通讯节点的监测系统 |
| CN112309006A (zh) * | 2020-10-19 | 2021-02-02 | 深圳市信锐网科技术有限公司 | 一种门锁设备及信息处理方法、存储介质 |
| CN115130146A (zh) * | 2021-03-29 | 2022-09-30 | 广东跃昉科技有限公司 | Soc芯片及应用于soc芯片的数据处理方法 |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| EP3461016A1 (en) | 2019-03-27 |
| TWI633438B (zh) | 2018-08-21 |
| BR112018073991A2 (pt) | 2019-02-26 |
| EP3461016A4 (en) | 2019-06-12 |
| TW201805824A (zh) | 2018-02-16 |
| US20190172047A1 (en) | 2019-06-06 |
| CN109075815A (zh) | 2018-12-21 |
| KR20180135940A (ko) | 2018-12-21 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| TWI633438B (zh) | 系統晶片和處理設備 | |
| US10853519B2 (en) | System on chip and method for implementing secure operating system switching | |
| US10366237B2 (en) | Providing a trusted execution environment using a processor | |
| JP6517926B2 (ja) | モバイル支払い装置および方法 | |
| CN110741370B (zh) | 利用用户输入的生物识别认证 | |
| US9891969B2 (en) | Method and apparatus for device state based encryption key | |
| WO2017177814A1 (zh) | 一种控制多个安全应用软件的运行的装置和方法 | |
| KR20150034196A (ko) | 하드웨어 강제 액세스 보호 | |
| TW201706899A (zh) | 安全裝置及在其內提供安全服務至主機的方法、安全設備以及電腦軟體產品 | |
| KR102226665B1 (ko) | 다수의 사용자를 갖는 보안 요소 | |
| CN108875412A (zh) | 一种inSE安全模块 | |
| CN111736770A (zh) | 嵌入式安全存储器 | |
| EP4273722A1 (en) | Terminal chip and measurement method therefor |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 20187033145 Country of ref document: KR Kind code of ref document: A |
|
| REG | Reference to national code |
Ref country code: BR Ref legal event code: B01A Ref document number: 112018073991 Country of ref document: BR |
|
| 121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application |
Ref document number: 16912042 Country of ref document: EP Kind code of ref document: A1 |
|
| ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 2018567806 Country of ref document: JP Kind code of ref document: A |
|
| ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 2016912042 Country of ref document: EP Effective date: 20181221 |
|
| NENP | Non-entry into the national phase |
Ref country code: DE |
|
| ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 112018073991 Country of ref document: BR Kind code of ref document: A2 Effective date: 20181122 |