WO2018177188A1 - 一种基于智能门锁系统的安全通信方法及其智能门锁系统 - Google Patents
一种基于智能门锁系统的安全通信方法及其智能门锁系统 Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2018177188A1 WO2018177188A1 PCT/CN2018/079999 CN2018079999W WO2018177188A1 WO 2018177188 A1 WO2018177188 A1 WO 2018177188A1 CN 2018079999 W CN2018079999 W CN 2018079999W WO 2018177188 A1 WO2018177188 A1 WO 2018177188A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- door lock
- encrypted data
- smart door
- mobile terminal
- data
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0822—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using key encryption key
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0492—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload by using a location-limited connection, e.g. near-field communication or limited proximity of entities
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
- H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
- H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3297—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
- G07C2009/00412—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the transmitted data signal being encrypted
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
- G07C2009/0042—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the transmitted data signal containing a code which is changed
Definitions
- the invention relates to a secure communication method and belongs to the field of smart home and security technology.
- the existing solutions include the following:
- the remote unlock function is prohibited.
- the smart door lock can generally send a password, a Bluetooth key, etc. remotely. If the server is compromised, the unlocking authority can be obtained by issuing a password and a Bluetooth key, and then unlocking is performed locally.
- Encrypted communication is used between the door lock and the server, and the user APP and the server also use encryption methods such as https. Although this method eliminates the data capture on the communication link, the attacker can obtain the password and the Bluetooth key from the server because the server stores key information such as a password and a Bluetooth key. At the same time, because there is no authentication, anti-replay, and anti-tampering functions, the server cannot be resolved, and the relevant commands are sent to the door lock or the mobile client.
- the object of the present invention is to overcome the above disadvantages and to provide a secure communication method based on a smart door lock system.
- the technical solutions adopted are as follows:
- a first aspect of the present application provides a secure communication method, the method being applied to a smart door lock system, the smart door lock system comprising a smart door lock and a mobile terminal, the method comprising:
- the sending end generates the data to be transmitted according to the operation instruction or the preset rule, and encrypts the data to be transmitted by using a preset encryption algorithm to obtain the encrypted data;
- the sending end is a smart door lock or a mobile terminal;
- the encryption key is obtained by the smart door lock being connected and exchanged with the mobile terminal through a preset secure communication channel;
- the secure communication channel is a short distance triggered by the smart door lock and the mobile terminal authorization.
- the sending end configures the encrypted data to uniquely identify the encrypted data with a unique identifier
- the sending end when the sending end is a smart door lock, the receiving end is a mobile terminal; when the sending end is a mobile terminal, the receiving end is a smart door lock.
- sending, by the sending end, the encrypted data with the unique identifier to the receiving end includes:
- the sending end sends the encrypted data with a unique identifier to the receiving end through a preset communication channel or a cloud server; the preset communication channel is a short-range wireless communication or a near-field communication channel.
- the encryption key is an initial encryption key generated by the smart door lock or the terminal in response to an authorization operation instruction of the user, and the smart door lock and the mobile terminal perform the initial encryption key Authenticating; wherein the initial encryption key is a key generated automatically or manually by the smart door lock or the mobile terminal; the initial encryption key is in the smart door lock and the smart communication channel
- the mobile terminals transmit between the mobile terminals.
- the encryption key is a first encryption key
- the data to be transmitted is encrypted by using a preset encryption algorithm by using an encryption key to obtain encrypted data
- the encrypted data includes:
- the preset key value is at least one of a current time stamp, a counter value, and a random code
- the encryption key stored by the sending end and the receiving end respectively includes a public key and a private key; and the data to be transmitted is encrypted by using a preset encryption algorithm by using an encryption key to obtain encrypted data, and the encrypted data includes:
- the transmitting end encrypts the data to be transmitted by using an asymmetric encryption algorithm by using the public key saved by itself, to obtain initial encrypted data;
- the preset key value is at least one of a current time stamp, a counter value, and a random code
- the method further includes:
- the standby mobile terminal obtains account login verification information, where the account login verification information is information for verifying the identity of the user; the standby mobile terminal is a backup device of the mobile terminal;
- the standby mobile terminal sends a first deletion instruction to the smart door lock to instruct the smart door lock to delete the locally saved specified encryption key information, in response to the user's authorized deletion operation. And/or, the standby mobile terminal sends a second deletion instruction to the cloud server to instruct the cloud server to delete the encryption key information saved by the mobile terminal, in response to the remote authorization deletion operation of the user.
- a second aspect of the present application provides a secure communication method, the method being applied to a smart door lock system, the smart door lock system comprising a smart door lock and a mobile terminal, the method comprising:
- the encryption key is obtained by the smart door lock being connected and exchanged with the mobile terminal through a preset secure communication channel;
- the secure communication channel is the smart door lock and the a short-range wireless communication channel or a near-field communication channel triggered by the mobile terminal authorization;
- the receiving end performs identity verification on the encrypted data with a unique identifier to obtain an identity verification result
- the receiving end decrypts the encrypted data by using the encryption key obtained by the exchange according to the identity verification result to obtain the data to be transmitted.
- the encryption key is a first encryption key
- the encrypted data is that the sending end encrypts the data to be transmitted by using a symmetric encryption algorithm by using the first encryption key to obtain initial encrypted data.
- the initial encrypted data is configured with a preset key value, and a verification signature is obtained for the initial encrypted data configured with the preset key value;
- decrypting the encrypted data by using the encryption key obtained by the exchange to obtain the data to be transmitted including:
- the receiving end verifies the verification signature of the encrypted data
- the receiving end acquires the initial encrypted data from the encrypted data, and uses the inverse algorithm of the symmetric encryption algorithm to perform the initial
- the encrypted data is decrypted to obtain the data to be transmitted.
- the encryption key stored by the sending end and the receiving end respectively includes a public key and a private key;
- the encrypted data is asymmetric by using the public key saved by the sending end by itself.
- the encryption algorithm encrypts the data to be transmitted to obtain initial encrypted data, configures a preset key value for the initial encrypted data, and adds the saved location of the initial encrypted data configured with the preset key value.
- the private key is obtained as a verification signature;
- decrypting the encrypted data by using the encryption key obtained by the exchange to obtain the data to be transmitted including:
- the receiving end verifies the verification signature of the encrypted data by using a public key stored by itself;
- the receiving end acquires the initial encrypted data from the encrypted data, and uses the asymmetric key to store the initial encryption by using the asymmetric encryption algorithm.
- the data is decrypted to obtain the data to be transmitted.
- the receiving end authenticating the encrypted data with the unique identifier includes:
- the receiving end extracts a unique identifier in the encrypted data with a unique identifier
- the identity verification result is determined according to the encryption key.
- a third aspect of the present invention provides a smart door lock system, including:
- the intelligent door lock is configured to encrypt the data to be transmitted and decrypt the encrypted data by using a preset encryption algorithm, and the smart door lock is provided with a short-range wireless communication module;
- a mobile terminal configured to encrypt the to-be-transmitted data and decrypt the received encrypted data by using a preset encryption algorithm identical to the smart door lock;
- the mobile terminal Also used to control the smart door lock, the mobile terminal is provided with a short-range wireless communication module for communicating with the smart door lock.
- the smart door lock further includes a configuration mode startup module, configured to start a configuration mode for generating and exchanging an encryption key, where the configuration mode startup module includes: a configuration button, a configuration mode touch key, and an input administrator. At least one of a touch screen of a password or a fingerprint collector for inputting a fingerprint of administrator rights.
- controlling, by the mobile terminal, the smart door lock specifically includes: controlling, by the APP for controlling the smart door lock, the smart door lock, wherein the APP for controlling the smart door lock is further provided with a startup configuration mode
- the virtual button is used to start the configuration mode of the mobile terminal.
- the smart door lock system-based secure communication method of the present application the smart door lock and the mobile terminal trigger the secure communication when the user authorizes, that is, the smart door lock and the APP of each mobile terminal are obtained.
- the encryption key is transmitted and exchanged through the short-range wireless communication channel or the near-field communication channel under the premise of the license to ensure the security key exchange; and the same or matching is set on the smart door lock end and the APP setting of each mobile terminal.
- Encryption algorithm which performs encryption and decryption processes locally, and implements end-to-end data encryption communication.
- the internal staff of the server or smart door lock manufacturer can not obtain the user's transmission information from the server side, ensuring data encryption, identity verification, anti-replay, and defense in the communication between the door lock and the mobile phone client even if the server is broken. Tampering is still valid, further ensuring the security of user information. And since the generation and exchange of the encryption key are completed by the short-range wireless communication or the near-field communication channel in the mobile terminal and the smart door lock, the server does not contain any related key, and the server cannot understand the data forwarded by the server.
- the security of the data is guaranteed; even if the server is attacked, the server, or the link communicating with the server, someone forges a command to send to the mobile client or the door lock, because the authentication cannot pass, the mobile client or the door lock will not Response; the server or the link communicating with the server is replayed or falsified by the command, and the mobile client or the door lock can be analyzed and not responded. If the above attack occurs, the mobile client or the door lock alerts the server or local alarm if necessary.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic structural view of a smart door lock system of the present application
- FIG. 2 is a schematic flow chart of a secure communication method based on a smart door lock system of the present application
- step S103 of the present application is a schematic flowchart of an embodiment of step S103 of the present application.
- FIG. 4 is a schematic flow chart of an embodiment of step S107 of the present application.
- Embodiments of the present invention provide a method for unlocking a smart door lock.
- FIG. 1 a schematic structural diagram of the smart door lock system of the present application, as shown in FIG. 1:
- the smart door lock system of the present application comprises: a smart door lock and a mobile terminal;
- the smart door lock is configured to encrypt the data to be transmitted and decrypt the encrypted data by using a preset encryption algorithm; the smart door lock is provided with a short-range wireless communication module; the Bluetooth communication module At least one of a zigbee communication module or a near field communication (NFC) communication module;
- the mobile terminal is configured to encrypt the to-be-transmitted data and decrypt the received encrypted data by using a preset encryption algorithm that is the same as the smart door lock;
- the mobile terminal is further configured to control the smart door lock, and the mobile terminal is provided with a short-range wireless communication module for communicating with the smart door lock.
- the short-range wireless communication module may include at least one of a Bluetooth communication module, a zigbee communication module, or a near field communication (NFC) communication module. Based on the short-range wireless communication module, a preset communication channel can be established, and the preset communication channel can be a short-range wireless communication or a near-field communication channel.
- the smart door lock and the mobile terminal can perform data transmission through a preset communication channel, for example, a smart door lock or a mobile terminal can transmit encrypted data through the preset communication.
- the smart door lock system may further include a cloud server, and the mobile terminal and the smart door lock may perform remote data transmission through the cloud server.
- the smart door lock further includes a configuration mode startup module, configured to start a configuration mode for generating and exchanging an encryption key, where the configuration mode module includes: a configuration button, a configuration mode touch key, a touch screen for inputting an administrator password, or At least one of a fingerprint collector for inputting a fingerprint of an administrator authority.
- a configuration mode startup module configured to start a configuration mode for generating and exchanging an encryption key
- the configuration mode module includes: a configuration button, a configuration mode touch key, a touch screen for inputting an administrator password, or At least one of a fingerprint collector for inputting a fingerprint of an administrator authority.
- the mobile terminal can control the smart door lock by using an APP for controlling the smart door lock, wherein the APP for controlling the smart door lock is further provided with a virtual button for starting the configuration mode for starting the configuration mode of the mobile terminal. .
- the smart door lock system is used to implement the following secure communication method based on a smart door lock system.
- FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart of a method for secure communication based on a smart door lock system according to the present application
- FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a secure communication method based on the smart door lock system provided by the embodiment of the present application, include:
- Step S102 The smart door lock and the mobile terminal are connected and exchange an encryption key through a preset secure communication channel;
- the secure communication channel is a communication channel triggered by the smart door lock and the mobile terminal, and the communication channel uses short-range wireless
- a communication channel or a near field communication channel may include one of a WIFI local area network, Bluetooth, zigbee, or NFC.
- one smart door lock may correspond to multiple mobile terminals, and the user may implement control of the smart door lock through any one of the plurality of mobile terminals. If a smart door lock is bound to three mobile terminals, each mobile terminal is installed with a smart door lock APP, and each APP can correspond to one account, then the smart door lock and the mobile terminal with the smart door lock APP are installed.
- the communication channel triggered by the smart door lock and the mobile terminal authorization, such as the smart door lock and the smart door lock APP set by the mobile terminal are authorized to enter the configuration mode, triggering an independent exchange through the short-range wireless communication channel or the near-field communication channel respectively.
- Encryption key the encryption key here is used to encrypt the data to be transmitted.
- the mobile terminal here includes but is not limited to: a smart phone, an tablet (IPAD), a smart watch or a wristband pre-equipped with a smart door lock APP, a small controller, etc.; the smart door lock and the mobile terminal can be configured according to settings Communication module.
- the mobile phone A with the smart door lock APP opens the Bluetooth module, and the smart door lock also turns on the Bluetooth module, and exchanges the pre-generated encryption key through Bluetooth communication. Since the generation and exchange of the encryption key are completed by the short-range wireless communication or the near-field communication channel locally in the mobile terminal and the smart door lock, the server contains any relevant key, and the server cannot understand the data forwarded by the server, and the guarantee is ensured. The security of the data.
- Step S103 The transmitting end generates data to be transmitted according to the operation instruction or the preset rule, and the data to be transmitted is encrypted by using a preset encryption algorithm to obtain encrypted data; the sending end is a smart door lock or a terminal.
- the smart door lock and the mobile terminal have the same encryption algorithm built in.
- an inverse algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm is built in, so that the encryption and decryption can be performed locally in the smart door lock and the mobile terminal. End-to-end data encryption communication reduces the risk of information leakage.
- the built-in encryption algorithm of the mobile terminal can be implemented in the smart door lock APP pre-installed by the mobile terminal.
- the sending end may be one of a smart door lock or a mobile terminal; when the mobile terminal is a sending end, the smart door lock may be a receiving end, and when the smart door lock is a transmitting end, the mobile terminal may For the receiving end, the sending end and the receiving end can be set according to requirements, which is not limited in this embodiment.
- the sending end may generate data to be transmitted according to an operation instruction or a preset rule, and perform encryption processing by using a preset encryption algorithm to obtain encrypted data.
- the operation instruction is an instruction for requesting data or requesting to perform a set action.
- the operation instruction may be an instruction to issue an unlock password, request a Bluetooth key, remotely unlock, delete a password, etc.
- the preset rule may be It is understood as a preset rule, such as a preset time rule, such as every 12 hours, etc. each time the lock is unlocked.
- the data to be transmitted is data that needs to be securely transmitted between the smart door lock and the mobile terminal.
- the data to be transmitted may be a smart door lock password, a Bluetooth key, an unlock record, a history, a sensor status, and the like.
- the data to be transmitted is generally sensitive, and has high security requirements for transmission. Therefore, the encryption key may be encrypted by using a preset encryption algorithm to obtain encrypted data, so that the data to be transmitted may be ciphertext.
- the form is transmitted between the smart door lock and the mobile terminal.
- the user can issue a lock password to the smart door lock through the cloud server through the pre-installed smart door lock APP, and the mobile terminal acts as the transmitting end, and the smart door lock serves as the receiving end. Then, the mobile terminal uses the unlock password as the data to be transmitted, and encrypts the data to be transmitted according to a preset encryption algorithm to obtain the encrypted data.
- the mobile terminal sends a request for issuing a unlocking key to the smart door lock via the pre-installed smart door lock APP via the cloud server, and the mobile terminal acts as the receiving end, and the smart door lock acts as the transmitting end, and when the smart door lock receives the mobile terminal
- a request for a Bluetooth key or the like is sent, the corresponding Bluetooth key is generated as the data to be transmitted according to the operation instruction, and the data to be transmitted is encrypted according to a preset encryption algorithm to obtain the encrypted data.
- the mobile terminal can issue an operation command or the like to the smart door lock through the built-in smart door lock APP, and the mobile terminal functions as a transmitting end, and the smart door lock serves as a receiving end; for example, the operation command of the mobile terminal is to add a password, a Bluetooth key, etc. ; remote unlock; delete password, Bluetooth key, fingerprint, etc., then use the operation command as data to be sent and encrypt according to a preset encryption algorithm to obtain encrypted data.
- the smart door lock is used as the sending end, and the designated mobile terminal is sent according to a preset rule of the user (for example, sending once every 12h or uploading after each door opening, timing retransmission, etc.) to the designated mobile terminal.
- Data such as unlocking records, history records, sensor status on the door, and even the situation of someone in the home, etc.
- the smart door lock as the transmitting end encrypts the unlocked record to be sent according to a preset encryption algorithm to obtain encrypted data.
- the unlocking record processing is performed to form encrypted data according to a preset rule (for example, every 12h or once after opening the door, timing retransmission, etc.).
- Step S104 The transmitting end configures the encrypted data to uniquely identify the encrypted data with the unique identifier.
- the sending end uniquely identifies the encrypted data to obtain the encrypted data with a unique identifier, where the unique identifier is used to identify the identity of the sending end, and the identifier is matched in the identity verification, and the unique identifier may be, for example, the MAC address of the sending end. IP address, specific tag, username or user ID, etc.
- Step S105 The transmitting end sends the encrypted number with a unique identifier to the receiving end.
- the sending end may send the encrypted data with the unique identifier to the receiving end through the preset communication channel or the cloud server; where the preset communication channel is a short-range wireless communication channel or a near-field communication channel, This includes but is not limited to one of WIFI LAN, Bluetooth, zigbee or Near Field Communication (NFC). Among them, local control can be realized through a preset communication channel, and remote control can be realized through a cloud server.
- the preset communication channel is a short-range wireless communication channel or a near-field communication channel, This includes but is not limited to one of WIFI LAN, Bluetooth, zigbee or Near Field Communication (NFC).
- NFC Near Field Communication
- local control can be realized through a preset communication channel
- remote control can be realized through a cloud server.
- the user can issue a lock password to the smart door lock through the cloud server through the pre-installed smart door lock APP, and the mobile terminal acts as the sender, and the smart door lock serves as the receiver.
- the mobile terminal uses the unlock password as the data to be transmitted, and encrypts the data to be transmitted according to a preset encryption algorithm to obtain encrypted data, and configures the unique identifier for the encrypted data, and then sends the data to the cloud server or the preset communication channel. Smart door lock.
- the smart door lock is used as the transmitting end, and the specified data (for example, unlocking record) is sent to the designated mobile terminal according to the preset rule of the user (for example, every 12h); that is, the smart door lock
- the sending end encrypts the unlocked record to be sent according to the preset encryption algorithm
- the encrypted data is obtained, and the unlocked record processing is formed into encrypted data according to a preset rule (for example, every 12 hours), and the unique identifier is configured, and then passed through the cloud server or preset.
- the communication channel transmits the mobile terminal.
- Step S106 The receiving end performs identity verification on the encrypted data with a unique identifier.
- the receiving end performs identity verification on the encrypted data with a unique identifier, including:
- Step S1061 The receiving end extracts a unique identifier in the encrypted data with a unique identifier
- the mobile terminal or the smart door lock is used as the receiving end to extract the encrypted data with the unique identifier to obtain the unique identifier carried by the mobile terminal; for example, the encrypted data with the unique identifier sent by the sending end, the receiving end extracts its unique identifier (for example, The unique identifier extracted may be the sender's MAC address, IP address, specific label, user name or user ID, etc.)
- Step S1062 Obtain an encryption key matching the unique identifier according to the unique identifier analysis
- an encryption key corresponding to the unique identifier according to the extracted unique identifier; wherein the mobile terminal or the smart door lock end has a correspondence between the unique identifier and the encryption key, and the encryption corresponding to the identifier is obtained according to the unique identifier matching.
- the key for example, a correspondence table of unique identifiers and encryption keys may be stored in both the mobile terminal and the smart door lock end; when the matching search is performed according to the unique identifier, the corresponding encryption key is obtained.
- Step S1063 Determine an identity verification result according to the encryption key.
- the identity verification result is the encrypted data sent by the sending end of the binding. If they are not the same or do not match, the authentication result is sent from the sender that is confirmed to be unbound. This application adds an authentication step to further secure communications.
- Step S107 The receiving end decrypts the encrypted data by using the encrypted encryption key according to the identity verification result.
- the encrypted data is decrypted by using the encrypted key obtained by the exchange to obtain the data to be transmitted; If the verification result is a mismatch, that is, the confirmation is sent by the unbound sender, the decryption may not be performed, and the alarm information may be further generated.
- the method of the present application further includes:
- Step S101 The smart door lock or the mobile terminal generates an initial encryption key, and the smart door lock and the mobile terminal authenticate the initial encryption key to obtain an encryption key in response to an authorization operation instruction of the user. .
- the initial encryption key may be a key generated automatically or manually by the smart door lock or the mobile terminal; after the initial encryption key is generated, the initial encryption key may be transmitted through the secure communication channel, thus, the smart door lock and the mobile terminal The initial encryption key is obtained, and the smart door lock and the mobile terminal can authenticate the initial encryption key to obtain an encryption key.
- the authorized operation instruction of the user may be, for example, a user manually pressing a configuration button or a configuration mode touch key or locally inputting a set administrator password or inputting an administrator authority fingerprint in the smart door lock (equivalent to a smart door lock) Open the configuration mode), the user opens the APP in the terminal to enter the configuration mode, and the user can confirm the security communication channel through the configuration mode; the smart door lock and the mobile terminal can adopt one of WIFI local area network, Bluetooth, zigbee or near field communication (NFC).
- NFC near field communication
- an initial encryption key can be generated by either party to obtain an encryption key after mutual authentication.
- the user presses the startup configuration button on the smart door lock end and inputs the authenticated administrator password, and the user opens the smart door lock APP on the mobile terminal to enter the configuration mode, and the smart door lock and the mobile phone are authorized by the user to confirm communication via Bluetooth.
- the initial encryption key can be generated by the smart door lock, sent to the mobile APP through the Bluetooth communication channel, the mobile APP confirms or exchanges the initial encryption key and exchanges with the smart door lock; or the smart door lock and the mobile APP respectively Generate a pair of public and private keys and exchange them.
- the encryption of the data to be transmitted may be implemented in multiple manners.
- symmetric encryption may be used, or asymmetric encryption may be used for encryption.
- asymmetric encryption may be used for encryption.
- the encryption and decryption processes of different encryption methods are described in detail below in conjunction with specific embodiments.
- the encryption key is a first encryption key
- the data to be transmitted is encrypted by using a preset encryption algorithm by using an encryption key to obtain encrypted data
- the encrypted data includes:
- Step S1031a encrypting the data to be transmitted by using a symmetric encryption algorithm by using a first encryption key to obtain initial encrypted data.
- the first encryption key is an encryption key respectively stored in the smart door lock and the mobile terminal; for example, if two mobile terminals are bound to the smart door lock, the mobile terminal A and the smart door lock are saved in the same manner.
- the encryption key (for example, may be KeyA); the mobile terminal B and the smart door lock have the same encryption key (for example, may be KeyB).
- One of the implementation manners is: when the mobile terminal A is used as the transmitting end, the generated data to be transmitted is encrypted by the symmetric encryption algorithm using the encryption key KeyA to obtain the initial encrypted data A.
- the smart door lock is used as the sending end, and the data to be transmitted is generated according to the operation instruction sent by the mobile terminal B, and the data to be transmitted is encrypted by the symmetric encryption algorithm using the encryption key KeyB to obtain the initial encryption.
- Data B is used as the sending end, and the data to be transmitted is generated according to the operation instruction sent by the mobile terminal B, and the data to be transmitted is encrypted by the symmetric encryption algorithm using the encryption key KeyB to obtain the initial encryption.
- Step S1032a configuring a preset key value for the initial encrypted data
- the preset key value is configured for the initial encrypted data obtained in the foregoing step, where the preset key value is at least one of a current timestamp timestamp, a counter count value, and a random code; for example, the current time is 2016-08. -11-20:21, this is configured as the default key value into the initial encrypted data.
- Step S1033a Adding a verification signature to the initial encrypted data configured with the preset key value to obtain encrypted data.
- the specific signature may generate a hash value as a signature according to the hash algorithm for verifying the integrity of the encrypted data at the time of decryption.
- the step S107 processes the encrypted data according to the identity verification result, including:
- Step S1071a if the identity verification result is that the verification result matches, the receiving end verifies the verification signature of the encrypted data;
- the specific receiving end verifies the integrity of the signature, preventing tampering and ensuring data integrity.
- Step S1072a if the verification signature matches, verifying whether the preset key value is legal;
- the receiving end analyzes whether the verification preset key value with the preset key value, such as the timestamp timestamp, the counter count value, or the random code is legal; specifically, the preset key value and the receiving The current local data or the saved data or the generated data is compared.
- the smart door lock compares the time stamp with the time saved by the clock module in the smart door lock; the clock chip internally used for the long-term supply of the button battery
- the smart door lock is powered by the No. 5 dry battery. Even if the battery is replaced before and after the No. 5 battery, the clock inside the door lock remains.
- the time in the clock module is the standard time for automatic matching update; for example, the current time is 17:00, then the clock module The time is also 17:00.
- the smart lock compares the time stamp with the time saved by the clock module in the smart door lock. If the deviation is that the difference between the time stamp of the encrypted data and the time saved by the clock module exceeds a defined threshold, the encrypted data is determined. It is an illegal data packet, and the verification result is fed back to the mobile terminal through Bluetooth or zigbee; the general setting threshold can be set within 15 min to 60 min according to the situation, for example, the set limit threshold is 20 min; if the deviation exceeds 20 min, If the encrypted data is an illegal data packet, the result of the check is that the encrypted data with the preset key value is invalid, and the verification result is fed back to the foregoing through a preset communication channel or a cloud server. Mobile terminal.
- the result of the check is that the encrypted data with the preset key value is legal.
- the mobile terminal is used as the receiving end, it is compared with the current time value of the mobile terminal, and details are not described herein again.
- the preset key value is a counter value. Then, when the smart door lock is used as the receiving end, the smart door lock compares the counter value of the encrypted data with the preset key value with the locally stored counter value;
- the check result is that the unlock verification code with the counter count value is legal; if the smart gate lock sends a counter value less than or equal to the locally saved value, If the data packet is replayed, the result of the check is that the encrypted data with the counter value is invalid, and the verification result is fed back to the mobile terminal through a preset communication channel or cloud server.
- the mobile terminal is the same as the receiving end, and will not be described here.
- Step S1073a If the preset key value is legal, the receiving end decrypts the initial encrypted data by using an inverse algorithm of the same symmetric encryption algorithm by using the first encryption key to obtain data to be transmitted.
- the receiving end verifies the legality of the preset key value of the initial encrypted data configured with the preset key value. If the preset key value is legal, the receiving end uses the same first encrypted key that is locally saved.
- the inverse algorithm of the symmetric encryption algorithm decrypts the initial encrypted data to obtain data to be transmitted. For example, if the same first encryption key stored locally is KeyA, KeyA uses the inverse algorithm of the same symmetric encryption algorithm to decrypt the initial encrypted data to obtain data to be transmitted.
- the encryption key includes a public key and a private key
- Step S1031b The transmitting end encrypts the data to be transmitted by using an asymmetric encryption algorithm by using the public key saved by itself, to obtain initial encrypted data.
- the encryption key saved by the sending end and the receiving end respectively includes a public key and a private key
- the encryption key saved by the sending end is a private key pri A and a public key pub B
- the encryption key corresponding to the end is the private key pri B and the public key pubA.
- the encryption key stored by the smart door lock as the sender is the private key pri A and the public key pub B
- the encryption key corresponding to the mobile terminal as the receiving end is the private key pri B and the public key pubA.
- the smart door lock is used as the transmitting end to encrypt the data to be transmitted by using the asymmetric key pub B stored by the public key to obtain the initial encrypted data.
- Step S1032b configuring a preset key value for the initial encrypted data;
- the preset key value is at least one of a current time stamp, a counter value, and a random code;
- a preset key value is configured for the initial encrypted data to be obtained in the foregoing step, where the preset key value is at least one of a current timestamp timestamp, a counter count value, and a random code; for example, the current time is 2016- 08-11-20:21, this is configured as the default key value into the initial encrypted data.
- Step S1033b Add the private key saved by the sender to the initial encrypted data configured with the preset key value as the verification signature to obtain the encrypted data.
- the encryption key saved by the sender is the private key pri A and the public key pub B; and the encryption key corresponding to the storage end is the private key pri B and the public key pubA.
- the encryption key stored by the smart door lock as the sender is the private key pri A and the public key pub B; then the encryption key corresponding to the mobile terminal as the receiving end is the private key pri B and the public key pubA.
- the private key pri A saved locally by the smart door lock is added as the verification key to obtain the encrypted data.
- processing the encrypted data includes:
- Step S1071b If the authentication result is that the verification result matches, the receiving end verifies the verification signature of the encrypted data by using the public key stored by the receiving end;
- the receiving end verifies the verification signature of the encrypted data by using the locally stored public key.
- the receiving end is a mobile terminal
- the encryption key stored locally by the mobile terminal as described above is the private key pri B and the public key pubA.
- the mobile terminal uses the locally stored pub A to verify the signature pri A carried in the encrypted data. If it is verified that it is the private key pri A corresponding to the locally stored public key pub A, the verification signature is matched, and if the private key corresponding to the public key pub A stored locally is not, the verification signature result is a mismatch.
- Step S1072b If the verification signature matches, verify whether the preset key value is legal;
- the receiving end analyzes whether the verification preset key value with the preset key value, such as the timestamp timestamp, the counter count value, or the random code is legal; specifically, the preset key value and the receiving The current local data or the saved data or the generated data is compared.
- the smart door lock compares the time stamp with the time saved by the clock module in the smart door lock; the clock chip internally used for the long-term supply of the button battery
- the smart door lock is powered by the No. 5 dry battery. Even if the battery is replaced before and after the No. 5 battery, the clock inside the door lock remains.
- the time in the clock module is the standard time for automatic matching update; for example, the current time is 17:00, then the clock module The time is also 17:00.
- the smart lock compares the time stamp with the time saved by the clock module in the smart door lock. If the deviation is that the difference between the time stamp of the encrypted data and the time saved by the clock module exceeds a defined threshold, the encrypted data is determined. It is an illegal data packet, and the verification result is fed back to the mobile terminal through Bluetooth or zigbee; the general setting threshold can be set within 15 min to 60 min according to the situation, for example, the set limit threshold is 20 min; if the deviation exceeds 20 min, If the encrypted data is an illegal data packet, the result of the check is that the encrypted data with the preset key value is invalid, and the verification result is fed back to the foregoing through a preset communication channel or a cloud server. Mobile terminal.
- the result of the check is that the encrypted data with the preset key value is legal.
- the mobile terminal is used as the receiving end, it is compared with the current time value of the mobile terminal, and details are not described herein again.
- the preset key value is a counter value. Then, when the smart door lock is used as the receiving end, the smart door lock compares the counter value of the encrypted data with the preset key value with the locally stored counter value;
- the check result is that the unlock verification code with the counter count value is legal; if the smart gate lock sends a counter value less than or equal to the locally saved value, If the data packet is replayed, the result of the check is that the encrypted data with the counter value is invalid, and the verification result is fed back to the mobile terminal through a preset communication channel or cloud server.
- the mobile terminal is the same as the receiving end, and will not be described here.
- Step S1073b If the preset key value is legal, the receiving end decrypts the initial encrypted data by using the same asymmetric encryption algorithm by using the private key stored by itself to obtain data to be transmitted.
- the data to be transmitted is encrypted, and the preset key value is added to prevent replay, and the signature configured to prevent the falsification of the data by the unscrupulous person to ensure data integrity is ensured locally.
- the internal staff of the server or smart door lock manufacturer cannot obtain the user's transmission information from the server side, ensuring that the identity verification, anti-replay, and anti-tampering in the communication between the door lock and the mobile phone client are still effective even if the server is broken. The security of user information is guaranteed.
- Steps S1071a-S1073a and steps S1071b-S1073b are some specific implementation manners for the receiver to decrypt the encrypted data.
- the receiving end receives the encrypted data with the unique identifier sent by the sending end, Then, the encrypted data with the unique identifier is authenticated to obtain an authentication result, and the receiving end can decrypt the encrypted data by using the encrypted encryption key according to the identity verification result to obtain the data to be transmitted.
- the manner of decrypting the encrypted data may be different according to the encryption method of the encrypted data. The embodiment of the present application does not limit this.
- the user may also initiate an authorization deletion operation by logging in to the standby mobile terminal, instructing the smart door lock and/or the cloud server to delete the relevant encryption key information, and preventing the encrypted encryption in the lost mobile terminal. Key information is leaked to reduce security risks.
- the secure communication method based on the smart door lock system further includes:
- Step 1081 The standby mobile terminal obtains account login verification information, where the account login verification information is information for verifying the identity of the user; and the standby mobile terminal is a backup device of the mobile terminal.
- the account login verification information includes, but is not limited to, user identity information (user name, user ID, etc., user identity information set by the user according to rules), a password, a verification code, and the like.
- Step 1082 If the account login verification information is passed, the standby mobile terminal sends a first deletion instruction to the smart door lock to instruct the smart door lock to delete the locally saved specified encryption in response to the authorized deletion operation of the user. Key information; and/or, the standby mobile terminal sends a second deletion instruction to the cloud server to instruct the cloud server to delete the encryption key information saved by the mobile terminal, in response to the remote authorization deletion operation of the user.
- the user can connect with the smart door lock through short-range wireless communication or near-field communication, and cooperate with the smart door lock to delete the original encryption key information matched with the account;
- the deletion operation of the encryption key saved in the lost mobile terminal is performed by the cloud server.
- Embodiment 1 is an embodiment of an application scenario in which a mobile terminal is used as a sending end, and an unlocking password is sent to the smart door lock to implement unlocking.
- the smart door lock is used as a sending end, and the unlocking record is sent to the designated mobile terminal according to a preset rule.
- An application scenario embodiment of data such as sensor status, and then the implementation process will be described in detail.
- a secure communication method based on a smart door lock system includes the following steps:
- the smart door lock and the mobile terminal respectively open a secure communication channel, and the secure communication channel is a communication channel triggered by the smart door lock and the authorization of the mobile terminal;
- the smart door lock or the mobile terminal generates an initial encryption key for authentication to obtain an encryption key;
- the initial encryption key is a smart door lock or a key automatically generated or manually input by the mobile terminal.
- the authorized operation instruction of the user may be, for example, a user manually pressing a configuration button or a configuration mode touch key or locally inputting a set administrator password or inputting an administrator authority fingerprint in the smart door lock (equivalent to a smart door lock) Open the configuration mode), the user opens the APP in the terminal to enter the configuration mode, and the user can confirm the security communication channel through the configuration mode; the smart door lock and the mobile terminal can adopt one of WIFI local area network, Bluetooth, zigbee or near field communication (NFC).
- NFC near field communication
- an initial encryption key can be generated by either party to obtain an encryption key after mutual authentication.
- the user presses the startup configuration button on the smart door lock end and inputs the authenticated administrator password, and the user opens the smart door lock APP on the mobile terminal to enter the configuration mode, and the smart door lock and the mobile phone are authorized by the user to confirm communication via Bluetooth.
- the initial encryption key can be generated by the smart door lock, sent to the mobile phone app through the Bluetooth communication channel, the mobile phone app confirms or exchanges the initial encryption key and exchanges with the smart door lock; or the smart door lock and the mobile APP respectively Generate a pair of public and private keys and exchange them
- the smart door lock and the mobile terminal enable Bluetooth communication, and the smart door lock and the smart door lock APP preset by the mobile terminal are connected through Bluetooth and exchange an encryption key;
- the mobile terminal acts as the transmitting end to generate data to be transmitted according to the unlocking password of the smart door lock APP preset by the mobile terminal;
- the data to be transmitted is encrypted by using a preset encryption algorithm by the encryption key to obtain encrypted data;
- the same encryption key key A and the same symmetric encryption algorithm are built in the smart door lock and the smart door lock APP pre-installed in the mobile terminal.
- the mobile terminal acts as the transmitting end, and the smart door lock serves as the receiving end, and the mobile terminal uses the unlocking password as the data to be transmitted, and then encrypts the data to be transmitted by using the encryption key KeyA through the symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the initial encrypted data A;
- the initial encrypted data A configures the current timestamp as the preset key value to obtain the initial encrypted data A configured with the preset key value; and adds the verification signature to the initial encrypted data configured with the preset key value to obtain the encrypted data.
- the mobile terminal uniquely identifies the encrypted data to obtain the encrypted data with the unique identifier, and the unique identifier may be the user ID of the mobile terminal pre-configured with the smart door lock APP.
- the mobile terminal sends the encrypted data with the unique identifier to the smart door lock through the cloud server.
- the smart door lock that receives the data authenticates the encrypted data with a unique identifier.
- the smart door lock may be used as a receiving end to extract the unique identifier carried by the encrypted data with a unique identifier; for example, the encrypted data with a unique identifier sent by the sending end, and extracting its unique identifier (for example, extracted to The unique identifier may be a MAC address of the sender, an IP address, a specific label, a user name or a user ID, etc.); matching according to the extracted unique identifier to obtain an encryption key corresponding to the unique identifier; wherein the mobile terminal or the smart gate
- the lock end has a correspondence between the unique identifier and the encryption key, and the encryption key corresponding to the identifier can be obtained according to the unique identifier; for example, the unique identifier and the encryption key can be saved on both the mobile terminal and the smart door lock end.
- the correspondence table when the matching search is performed according to the unique identifier, the corresponding encryption key is obtained.
- the identity verification result is determined according to the encryption key that matches the unique identifier.
- the specific encryption key obtained by the matching is the same as or corresponding to the encryption key existing in the receiving end. If the same or corresponding matching is performed, the identity verification result is the encrypted data sent by the transmitting end. If they are not the same or do not match, the authentication result is sent from the sender that is confirmed to be unbound. This application adds an authentication step to further secure communications.
- the receiving end verifies the verification signature of the encrypted data; the specific receiving end verifies the integrity of the signature, prevents tampering, and ensures data integrity.
- the smart door lock compares the time stamp with the time saved by the clock module in the smart door lock; the clock module internally uses the button battery for long-term power supply, for example, the smart door lock uses 5 The battery is powered by the dry battery. Even if the battery is replaced before and after the 5th battery, the clock inside the door lock remains.
- the time in the clock module is the standard time for automatic matching update. For example, the current time is 17:00, and the time of the clock module is also 17:00. .
- the smart lock compares the time stamp with the time saved by the clock module in the smart door lock. If the deviation is that the difference between the time stamp of the encrypted data and the time saved by the clock module exceeds a defined threshold, the encrypted data is determined. It is an illegal data packet, and the verification result is fed back to the mobile terminal through Bluetooth or zigbee; the general setting threshold can be set within 15 min to 60 min according to the situation, for example, the set limit threshold is 20 min; if the deviation exceeds 20 min, If the encrypted data is an illegal data packet, the result of the check is that the encrypted data with the preset key value is invalid, and the verification result is fed back to the foregoing through a preset communication channel or a cloud server. Mobile terminal.
- the smart door lock uses the same first encryption key saved locally to decrypt the initial encrypted data by the inverse algorithm of the same symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the data to be transmitted.
- a secure communication method based on a smart door lock system includes the following steps:
- the smart door lock and the mobile terminal respectively open a secure communication channel, and the secure communication channel is a communication channel triggered by the smart door lock and the authorization of the mobile terminal;
- the smart door lock or the mobile terminal generates an initial encryption key for authentication to obtain an encryption key;
- the initial encryption key is a smart door lock or a key automatically generated or manually input by the mobile terminal.
- the authorized operation instruction of the user may be, for example, a user manually pressing a configuration button or a configuration mode touch key or locally inputting a set administrator password or inputting an administrator authority fingerprint in the smart door lock (equivalent to a smart door lock) Open the configuration mode), the user opens the APP in the terminal to enter the configuration mode, and the user can confirm the security communication channel through the configuration mode; the smart door lock and the mobile terminal can adopt one of WIFI local area network, Bluetooth, zigbee or near field communication (NFC).
- NFC near field communication
- an initial encryption key can be generated by either party to obtain an encryption key after mutual authentication.
- the user presses the startup configuration button on the smart door lock end, and inputs the authenticated administrator password, and the user opens the smart door lock APP on the mobile terminal to enter the configuration mode, and the smart door lock and the mobile phone are authenticated by the user to confirm the communication through the NFC.
- the connection, the smart door lock and the mobile APP generate a pair of public and private keys respectively and exchange them through NFC communication.
- the smart door lock When the smart door lock is used as the sending end, for example, according to the preset rule of the user (for example, sending once every 12h or uploading every time after opening the door, timing retransmission, etc.), the specified data is sent to the designated mobile terminal (for example, an unlocking record, The history record, the state of the sensor on the door, and even the situation of someone in the home, etc.); that is, the smart door lock as the transmitting end encrypts the unlocked record to be sent according to a preset encryption algorithm to obtain encrypted data.
- the data to be transmitted is encrypted by the encryption key using a preset encryption algorithm.
- the smart key is used as the encryption key stored by the sender as the private key pri A and the public key pub B and asymmetric encryption.
- the algorithm; the encryption key corresponding to the mobile terminal as the receiving end is the private key pri B and the public key pubA and the same asymmetric encryption algorithm.
- the smart door lock is used as the transmitting end to encrypt the data to be transmitted by using the asymmetric encryption algorithm pub B to obtain the initial encrypted data; the initial encrypted data is configured with the counter value as a preset key value, and the preset is configured.
- the initial encrypted data of the key value; the private key is added to the initial encrypted data configured with the preset key value as the authentication signature to obtain the encrypted data.
- the encryption key saved by the sender is the private key pri A and the public key pub B; and the encryption key corresponding to the storage end is the private key pri B and the public key pubA.
- the encryption key stored by the smart door lock as the sender is the private key pri A and the public key pub B; then the encryption key corresponding to the mobile terminal as the receiving end is the private key pri B and the public key pubA. Then, for example, the smart door lock is used as the transmitting end, and the private key pri A saved locally by the smart door lock is added as the verification signature to obtain the encrypted data for the initial encrypted data with the preset key value.
- the smart door lock uniquely identifies the encrypted data to obtain encrypted data with a unique identifier, and the unique identifier may be the MAC address of the smart door lock.
- the smart door lock transmits the encrypted data with the unique identifier to the mobile terminal through the cloud server.
- the mobile terminal receiving the data authenticates the encrypted data with the unique identifier.
- the smart door lock may be used as a receiving end to extract the unique identifier carried by the encrypted data with a unique identifier; for example, the encrypted data with a unique identifier sent by the sending end, and extracting its unique identifier (for example, extracted to The unique identifier may be a MAC address of the sender, an IP address, a specific label, a user name or a user ID, etc.); matching according to the extracted unique identifier to obtain an encryption key corresponding to the unique identifier; wherein the mobile terminal or the smart gate
- the lock end has a correspondence between the unique identifier and the encryption key, and the encryption key corresponding to the identifier can be obtained according to the unique identifier; for example, the unique identifier and the encryption key can be saved on both the mobile terminal and the smart door lock end.
- the correspondence table when the matching search is performed according to the unique identifier, the corresponding encryption key is obtained.
- the identity verification result is determined according to the encryption key that matches the unique identifier.
- the specific encryption key obtained by the matching is the same as or corresponding to the encryption key existing in the receiving end. If the same or corresponding matching is performed, the identity verification result is the encrypted data sent by the transmitting end. If they are not the same or do not match, the authentication result is sent from the sender that is confirmed to be unbound. This application adds an authentication step to further secure communications.
- the receiving end verifies the verification signature of the encrypted data by using the stored public key. Specifically, if the authentication result is that the verification result matches, the receiving end verifies the verification signature of the encrypted data by using the locally stored public key.
- the receiving end is a mobile terminal, and the encryption key stored locally by the mobile terminal as described above is the private key pri B and the public key pubA. Then, the mobile terminal uses the locally stored pub A to verify the signature pri A carried in the encrypted data. If it is verified that it is the private key pri A corresponding to the locally stored public key pub A, the verification signature is matched, and if the private key corresponding to the public key pub A stored locally is not, the verification signature result is a mismatch. If the verification signature matches, when the mobile terminal is the receiving end, the mobile terminal compares the counter count value of the encrypted data with the preset key value with the locally saved counter count value;
- the check result is that the unlock verification code with the counter count value is legal; if the smart gate lock sends a counter value less than or equal to the locally saved value, If it is considered that the data packet is replayed, the result of the check is that the encrypted data with the counter value is invalid, and the verification result is fed back to the smart door lock and generates an early warning through a preset communication channel or cloud server transmission. information. If the preset key value is legal, the receiving end decrypts the initial encrypted data by using the stored private key by using the same asymmetric encryption algorithm to obtain data to be transmitted.
- the serial numbers of the embodiments of the present application are merely for the description, and do not represent the advantages and disadvantages of the embodiments.
- the disclosed technical contents may be implemented in other manners.
- the device embodiments described above are only schematic.
- the division of the unit may be a logical function division.
- there may be another division manner for example, multiple units or components may be combined or may be Integrate into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed.
- the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be an indirect coupling or communication connection through some interface, unit or module, and may be electrical or otherwise.
- the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, may be located in one place, or may be distributed to multiple units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of the embodiment.
- each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.
- the above integrated unit can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of a software functional unit.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
一种基于智能门锁系统的安全通信方法,智能门锁系统包括智能门锁和移动终端,方法包括:发送端生成待传输数据并通过加密密钥采用预设的加密算法进行加密得到加密数据(103);其中,加密密钥为智能门锁与移动终端通过预设的安全通信通道连接并交换得到(102);发送端为加密数据配置唯一标识(104),将带有唯一标识的加密数据发送至接收端(105)以便接收端对带有唯一标识的加密数据进行身份验证(106),根据身份验证结果利用交换得到的加密密钥处理加密数据(107)。本方法由于服务器不保存任何密钥,则服务器无法理解由其转发的数据,即使服务器被攻破,智能门锁与移动终端的通信中的数据加密、身份验证、防重放防篡改依然有效,保证了数据的安全性。
Description
本申请要求于2017年03月29日提交中国专利局、申请号为201710198457.1、申请名称为“一种基于智能门锁系统的安全通信方法及其智能门锁系统”的中国专利申请的优先权,其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
本发明涉及一种安全通信方法,属于智能家居和安防技术领域。
现有市场中大部分智能门锁均具备联网功能;使得智能门锁的信息可以上报给服务器,从而转发到用户使用的应用程序(Application,APP)等工具上;用户也可以远程通过服务器下发密码、设置权限等。随着智能门锁的安装量越大,远程通信的安全性就越重要。服务器作为转发的核心,被攻击的风险很大。进而导致门锁被攻击导致密码泄露或被打开等严重事故。
针对这一问题,目前已有的解决方法包括以下方式:
(1)禁止远程开锁功能。但是智能门锁一般可以远程下发密码、蓝牙密钥等,如果服务器被攻破,可以通过下发密码、蓝牙密钥的方式,获得开锁权限,而后在本地执行开锁操作。
(2)门锁与服务器之间采用加密通信,用户APP与服务器也采用https等加密方式。该方法虽然杜绝了通信链路上的数据抓取,但因为服务器上保存了密码、蓝牙密钥等关键信息,攻击者可以从服务器获得密码和蓝牙密钥。同时因为没有身份验证、防重放、防篡改功能,无法解决服务器被攻击后,下发相关命令给门锁或者手机客户端。
(3)服务器与手机客户端、门锁端的通信中,进一步增加防重放、防篡改功能。但因为服务器被攻破后,可以模拟服务器与两端的正常通信,对服务器端的身份校验无法拦截。
目前,市场上未发现能够实现可保证服务器端或者内部人员也无法从服务器端获得用户的传输信息,或即使服务器被攻破,门锁与手机客户端的通信中的身份验证、防重放、防篡改依然有效的安全的基于智能门锁的通信方法。
发明内容
本发明的目的就是克服上述缺点,提出一种基于智能门锁系统的安全通信方法,所采用的技术方案如下:
本申请第一方面提供了一种安全通信方法,所述方法应用于智能门锁系统,所述智能门锁系统包括智能门锁和移动终端,所述方法包括:
发送端根据操作指令或预设规则生成待传输数据,并对所述待传输数据通过加密密钥采用预设的加密算法进行加密处理得到加密数据;所述发送端为智能门锁或移动终端;所述加密密钥为所述智能门锁与所述移动终端通过预设的安全通信通道连接并交换得到;所述安全通信通道为经所述智能门锁和所述移动终端授权触发的短距离无线通信通道或近场通信通道;
所述发送端为所述加密数据配置唯一标识得到带有唯一标识的加密数据;
所述发送端将所述带有唯一标识的加密数据发送至接收端以便所述接收端所述对带有唯一标识的加密数据进行身份验证,并根据身份验证结果,利用交换得到的加密密钥对所述加密数据进行解密处理;
其中,所述发送端为智能门锁时,所述接收端为移动终端;所述发送端为移动终端时,所述接收端为智能门锁。
进一步的,所述发送端将所述带有唯一标识的加密数据发送至接收端包括:
所述发送端将所述带有唯一标识的加密数据通过预设通信通道或云服务器发送至接收端;所述预设通信通道为短距离无线通信或近场通信信道。
进一步的,所述加密密钥为所述智能门锁或终端响应于用户的授权操作指令,生成初始加密密钥,并由所述智能门锁和所述移动终端对所述初始加密密钥进行认证得到;其中,所述初始加密密钥为所述智能门锁或所述移动终端自动生成或手动输入的密钥;所述初始加密密钥通过所述安全通信通道在所述智能门锁和所述移动终端之间进行传输。
进一步的,所述加密密钥为第一加密密钥;所述对待传输数据通过加密密钥采用预设的加密算法进行加密处理得到加密数据包括:
通过所述第一加密密钥采用对称加密算法对待传输数据进行加密得到初始加密数据;
为所述初始加密数据配置预设密钥值;所述预设密钥值为当前时间戳、计数器值和随机码中的至少一种;
为配置有所述预设密钥值的初始加密数据添加验证签名得到加密数据。
进一步的,所述发送端和接收端分别保存的加密密钥包括一公开密钥和一私有密钥;所述对待传输数据通过加密密钥采用预设的加密算法进行加密处理得到加密数据包括:
发送端通过自身保存的所述公开密钥采用非对称加密算法对待传输数据进行加密得到初始加密数据;
为所述初始加密数据配置预设密钥值;所述预设密钥值为当前时间戳、计数器值和随机码中的至少一种;
为配置有所述预设密钥值的初始加密数据添加发送端保存的所述私有密钥作为验证签名得到加密数据。
进一步的,所述方法还包括:
备用移动终端获取账户登录验证信息,所述账户登录验证信息为用于验证用户身份的信息;所述备用移动终端为所述移动终端的备用设备;
若所述账户登录验证信息通过,则所述备用移动终端响应于用户的授权删除操作,向智能门锁发出第一删除指令,用于指示所述智能门锁删除本地保存的指定加密密钥信息;和/或,所述备用移动终端响应于用户的远程授权删除操作,向云服务器发出第二删除指令,用于指示所述云服务器删除所述移动终端保存的加密密钥信息。
本申请第二方面提供了一种安全通信方法,所述方法应用于智能门锁系统,所述智能门锁系统包括智能门锁和移动终端,所述方法包括:
所述接收端接收所述发送端发送的带有唯一标识的加密数据;所述发送端为智能门锁时,所述接收端为移动终端;所述发送端为移动终端时,所述接收端为智能门锁;所述带有唯一标识的加密数据为所述发送端根据操作指令或预设规则生成待传输数据,并对所述待传输数据通过加密密钥采用预设的加密算法进行加密,并配置唯一标识得到;所述加密密钥为所述智能门锁与所述移动终端通过预设的安全通信通道连接并交换得到;所述安全通信通道为经所述智能门锁和所述移动终端授权触发的短距离无线通信通道或近场通信通道;
所述接收端对所述带有唯一标识的加密数据进行身份验证,得到身份验证结果;
所述接收端根据所述身份验证结果,利用交换得到的所述加密密钥对所述加密数据进行解密处理得到所述待传输数据。
进一步的,所述加密密钥为第一加密密钥,所述加密数据为所述发送端通过所述第一加密密钥采用对称加密算法对所述待传输数据进行加密得到初始加密数据,为所述初始加密数据配置预设密钥值,为配置有所述预设密钥值的初始加密数据添加验证签名得到;
则所述接收端根据所述身份验证结果,利用交换得到的所述加密密钥对所述加密数据进行解密处理得到所述待传输数据包括:
若所述身份验证结果匹配,则所述接收端对所述加密数据的所述验证签名进行验证;
若所述验证签名匹配,则验证所述预设密钥值是否合法;
若所述预设密钥值合法,则所述接收端从所述加密数据中获取所述初始加密数据,并通过所述第一加密密钥采用所述对称加密算法的逆算法对所述初始加密数据进行解密得到所述待传输数据。
进一步的,所述发送端和所述接收端分别保存的加密密钥包括一公开密钥和一私有密钥;所述加密数据为所述发送端通过自身保存的所述公开密钥采用非对称加密算法对所述待传输数据进行加密得到初始加密数据,为所述初始加密数据配置预设密钥值,为配置有所述预设密钥值的初始加密数据添加所述发送端保存的所述私有密钥作为验证签名得到;
则所述接收端根据所述身份验证结果,利用交换得到的所述加密密钥对所述加密数据进行解密处理得到所述待传输数据包括:
若所述身份验证结果为匹配,则所述接收端采用自身存储的公开密钥对所述加密数据的所述验证签名进行验证;
若所述验证签名匹配,则验证所述预设密钥值是否合法;
若所述预设密钥值合法,则所述接收端从所述加密数据中获取所述初始加密数据,并通过自身存储的所述私有密钥采用所述非对称加密算法对所述初始加密数据进行解密得到所述待传输数据。
进一步的,所述接收端对所述带有唯一标识的加密数据进行身份验证包括:
所述接收端提取所述带有唯一标识的加密数据中的唯一标识;
根据所述唯一标识分析得到与所述唯一标识匹配的加密密钥;
根据所述加密密钥确定身份验证结果。
本发明第三方面还提供一种智能门锁系统,包括:
智能门锁,用于通过预设的加密算法,采用加密密钥对待传输数据进行加密以及对接收到的加密数据进行解密;所述智能门锁设有短距离无线通信模块;
移动终端,用于通过预设的与所述智能门锁相同的加密算法,采用所述加密密钥对所述待传输数据进行加密以及对接收到的所述加密数据进行解密;所述移动终端还用于控制所述智能门锁,所述移动终端设有短距离无线通信模块,用于和所述智能门锁通信。
进一步的,所述智能门锁还包括配置模式启动模块,用于启动配置模式进行加密密钥的生成和交换,所述配置模式启动模块包括:配置按钮、配置模式触摸键、用于输入管理员密码的触摸屏或用于输入管理员权限的指纹的指纹采集器中的至少一种。
进一步的,所述移动终端控制所述智能门锁具体包括通过用于控制智能门锁的APP对所述智能门锁进行控制,所述用于控制智能门锁的APP内还设置有启动配置模式的虚拟按键用于启动移动终端的配置模式。
本申请的基于智能门锁系统的安全通信方法,所述智能门锁和移动终端均是在用户授权的情况下触发安全通信,即所述智能门锁与每个移动终端的APP均是在获得授权许可的前提下通过短距离无线通信通道或近场通信通道发送和交换加密密钥,保证安全性的密钥交换;并在智能门锁端和每个移动终端的APP设置有相同或匹配的加密算法,在本地进行加密和解密过程,实现端到端的数据加密的通信方式。可以保证服务器端或者智能门锁厂家的内部工作人员亦无法从服务器端获得用户的传输信息,保证即使服务器被攻破,门锁与手机客户端的通信中的数据加密、身份验证、防重放、防篡改依然有效,进一步保证了用户信息的安全性。且由于加密密钥的生成和交换均在移动终端和智能门锁本地通过短距离无线通信或近场通信通道完成,则服务器中不包含任何相关密钥,服务器也无法理解由其转发的数据,保证了数据的安全性;即使服务器被攻击,服务器、或者与服务器通信的链路上,有人伪造命令发给手机客户端或者门锁,因为身份验证无法通过,手机客户端或者门锁均不会响应;服务器或者与服务器通信的链路上有人重放或者篡改命令,手机客户端或者门锁均可以分析并不做响应。如果发生了以上攻击,手机客户端或者门锁必要时向服务 器报警或者本地报警。
上述说明仅是本发明技术方案的概述,为了能够更清楚了解本发明的技术手段,而可依照说明书的内容予以实施,并且为了让本发明的上述和其它目的、特征和优点能够更明显易懂,以下特举本发明的具体实施方式。
通过阅读下文优选实施方式的详细描述,各种其他的优点和益处对于本领域普通技术人员将变得清楚明了。附图仅用于示出优选实施方式的目的,而并不认为是对本发明的限制。而且在整个附图中,用相同的参考符号表示相同的部件。在附图中:
图1为本申请的智能门锁系统的结构示意图;
图2为本申请的基于智能门锁系统的安全通信方法的流程示意图;
图3为本申请的步骤S103的一种实施例流程示意图;
图4为本申请的步骤S107的一种实施例流程示意图。
本发明实施例提供了一种智能门锁的开锁方法。
为了使本技术领域的人员更好地理解本发明方案,下面将结合本发明实施例中的附图,对本发明实施例中的技术方案进行清楚、完整地描述,显然,所描述的实施例仅仅是本发明一部分的实施例,而不是全部的实施例。基于本发明中的实施例,本领域普通技术人员所获得的所有其他实施例,都应当属于本发明保护的范围。
本发明的说明书和权利要求书及上述附图中的术语“第一”、“第二”、“第三”“第四”等(如果存在)是用于区别类似的对象,而不必用于描述特定的顺序或先后次序。应该理解这样使用的数据在适当情况下可以互换,以便这里描述的实施例能够以除了在这里图示或描述的内容以外的顺序实施。此外,术语“包括”和“具有”以及他们的任何变形,意图在于覆盖不排他的包含,例如,包含了一系列步骤或单元的过程、方法、系统、产品或设备不必限于清楚地列出的那些步骤或单元,而是可包括没有清楚地列出的或对于这些过程、方法、产品或设备固有的其它步骤或单元。下面将参照附图更详细地描述本公开的示例 性实施例。虽然附图中显示了本公开的示例性实施例,然而应当理解,可以以各种形式实现本公开而不应被这里阐述的实施例所限制。相反,提供这些实施例是为了能够更透彻地理解本公开,并且能够将本公开的范围完整的传达给本领域的技术人员。
请参阅图1本申请的智能门锁系统的结构示意图,如图1所示:
本申请的智能门锁系统包括:智能门锁和移动终端;
所述智能门锁,用于通过预设的加密算法,采用加密密钥对待传输数据进行加密以及对接收到的加密数据进行解密;所述智能门锁设有短距离无线通信模块;蓝牙通信模块、紫蜂协议(zigbee)通信模块或近场通信(NFC)通信模块中的至少一种;
所述移动终端,用于通过预设的与所述智能门锁相同的加密算法,采用所述加密密钥对所述待传输数据进行加密以及对接收到的所述加密数据进行解密;所述移动终端还用于控制所述智能门锁,所述移动终端设有短距离无线通信模块,用于和所述智能门锁通信。
其中,短距离无线通信模块可以包括蓝牙通信模块、zigbee通信模块或近场通信(NFC)通信模块中的至少一种。基于该短距离无线通信模块,可以建立预设通信信道,预设通信通道可以为短距离无线通信或近场通信信道。智能门锁和移动终端可以通过预设通信信道进行数据传输,例如,智能门锁或移动终端可以通过该预设通信传输加密数据。
在本申请实施例一些可能的实现方式中,智能门锁系统还可以包括云服务器,移动终端和智能门锁可以通过云服务器进行远程数据传输。
所述智能门锁还包括配置模式启动模块,用于启动配置模式进行加密密钥的生成和交换,所述配置模式模块包括:配置按钮、配置模式触摸键、用于输入管理员密码的触摸屏或用于输入管理员权限的指纹的指纹采集器中的至少一种。
所述移动终端可以通过用于控制智能门锁的APP对智能门锁进行控制,其中,用于控制智能门锁的APP内还设置有启动配置模式的虚拟按键,用于启动移动终端的配置模式。
所述智能门锁系统用于实现以下基于智能门锁系统的安全通信方法。
请参阅图2,图2为本申请的基于智能门锁系统的安全通信方法的流程示意图;如图2所示:为本申请实施例提供的一种基于上述智能门锁系统的安全 通信方法,包括:
步骤S102:智能门锁与移动终端通过预设的安全通信通道连接并交换加密密钥;所述安全通信通道为经智能门锁和移动终端授权触发的通信通道,所述通信通道采用短距离无线通信通道或近场通信通道;例如,可以包括WIFI局域网、蓝牙、zigbee或NFC等中的一种。
在本申请的实施方式中,一个智能门锁可以对应多个移动终端,用户可以通过多个移动终端的任意一个实现对智能门锁的控制。如一个智能门锁与3个移动终端绑定,则每个移动终端各安装一智能门锁的APP,每个APP可以对应一个账户,则智能门锁和安设有智能门锁APP的移动终端经智能门锁和移动终端授权触发的通信通道,例如智能门锁和移动终端设置的智能门锁APP均经授权进入配置模式,则触发通过短距离无线通信通道或近场通信通道分别交换一个独立的加密密钥;这里的加密密钥用于对待传输数据进行加密。这里的移动终端包括但不限于:智能手机,平板电脑(IPAD),智能手表或预设有智能门锁APP的手环、小型控制器等;所述智能门锁和移动终端可根据设置需要配置通信模块。例如安设有智能门锁APP的手机A开启蓝牙模块,所述智能门锁也开启蓝牙模块,通过蓝牙通信交换预生成的加密密钥。由于加密密钥的生成和交换均在移动终端和智能门锁本地通过短距离无线通信或近场通信通道完成,则服务器中包含任何相关密钥,服务器也无法理解由其转发的数据,保证了数据的安全性。
步骤S103:发送端根据操作指令或预设规则生成待传输数据,对待传输数据通过加密密钥采用预设的加密算法进行加密处理得到加密数据;所述发送端为智能门锁或终端。
具体的,智能门锁和移动终端内置有相同的加密算法,在有些情况下,还内置有与加密算法相对应的逆算法,如此,可以在智能门锁和移动终端本地进行加密和解密,实现端到端的数据加密的通信方式,降低信息泄露的风险。其中,移动终端内置加密算法,可以通过移动终端预装的智能门锁APP中实现。
在本申请的实施例中,发送端可以为智能门锁或移动终端中的一个;当移动终端为发送端时,智能门锁可以为接收端,当智能门锁为发送端时,移动终端可以为接收端,发送端和接收端可以根据需求进行设置,本实施例对此不作限定。发送端可以根据操作指令或预设规则生成待传输数据,通过加密密钥采用预设的加密算法进行加密处理得到加密数据。其中,操作指令为请求数据或 请求执行设定动作的指令,作为本申请的一些示例,操作指令可以为请求下发开锁密码、请求蓝牙密钥、远程开锁、删除密码等指令,预设规则可以理解为预先设定的规则,例如预设的时间规则,如每次开锁时,每12h等等。待传输数据即为需要在智能门锁与移动终端之间安全传输的数据。在本实施例中,待传输数据可以为智能门锁密码,蓝牙钥匙,开锁记录,历史记录,传感器状态等。
而上述待传输数据一般具有敏感性,对传输的安全性要求较高,因此,可以通过加密密钥采用预设的加密算法进行加密处理,得到加密数据,如此,可以将待传输数据以密文的形式在智能门锁和移动终端之间进行传输。
例如访客A希望现在能够开锁进入屋内,则用户可在移动终端通过预装的智能门锁APP经云服务器向智能门锁下发开锁密码,则移动终端作为发送端,而智能门锁作为接收端,则移动终端将开锁密码作为待传输数据,将待传输数据按照预设的加密算法进行加密处理即得到加密数据。
或者,移动终端通过预装的智能门锁APP经云服务器向智能门锁发出下发开锁钥匙的请求,则移动终端作为接收端,而智能门锁作为发送端,当智能门锁接收到移动终端发送的请求蓝牙钥匙等指令时,则根据操作指令生成对应的蓝牙钥匙作为待传输数据,将待传输数据按照预设的加密算法进行加密处理即得到加密数据。
又例如移动终端可以通过内置的智能门锁APP向智能门锁发出操作指令等,则移动终端作为发送端,智能门锁作为接收端;例如移动终端的操作指令为控制添加密码、蓝牙密钥等;远程开锁;删除密码、蓝牙密钥、指纹等,则将该操作指令作为待发送数据并根据预设的加密算法进行加密得到加密数据。
在本申请中的另一个实施例为,智能门锁作为发送端,按照用户的预设规则(例如每12h发送一次或每次开门后上传、定时补传等)向指定的移动终端发送指定的数据(例如开锁记录,历史记录、门上的传感器状态,甚至家中是否有人的情况等);即智能门锁作为发送端按照预设的加密算法对准备发送的开锁记录进行加密处理即得到加密数据,按照预设规则(例如每12h发送一次或每次开门后上传、定时补传等)将开锁记录处理形成加密数据。
步骤S104:所述发送端为加密数据配置唯一标识得到带有唯一标识的加密数据。
具体的是发送端将加密数据配置唯一标识得到带有唯一标识的加密数据, 该唯一标识用于表征发送端的身份,在身份验证中进行标识匹配,所述唯一标识例如可以是发送端的MAC地址,IP地址,特定标签,用户名或用户ID等等。
步骤S105:所述发送端将带有唯一标识的加密数发送至接收端。
在本实施例中,发送端可以将带有唯一标识的加密数据通过所述预设通信通道或云服务器发送至接收端;这里的预设通信通道为短距离无线通信通道或近场通信信道,包括但不限于WIFI局域网、蓝牙、zigbee或近场通信(NFC)中的一种。其中,通过预设通信通道可以实现本地控制,通过云服务器可以实现远程控制。
例如:访客A希望现在能够开锁进入屋内,则用户可在移动终端通过预装的智能门锁APP经云服务器向智能门锁下发开锁密码,则移动终端作为发送端,而智能门锁作为接收端,则移动终端将开锁密码作为待传输数据,将待传输数据按照预设的加密算法进行加密处理即得到加密数据,并为该加密数据配置唯一标识后通过云服务器或预设通信通道发送给智能门锁。
在本申请中的另一个实施例为,智能门锁作为发送端,按照用户的预设规则(例如每12h发送一次)向指定的移动终端发送指定的数据(例如开锁记录);即智能门锁作为发送端按照预设的加密算法对准备发送的开锁记录进行加密处理即得到加密数据,按照预设规则(例如每12h)将开锁记录处理形成加密数据并配置唯一标识后通过云服务器或预设通信通道发送移动终端。
步骤S106:所述接收端对带有唯一标识的加密数据进行身份验证;
具体的所述接收端对带有唯一标识的加密数据进行身份验证包括:
步骤S1061:所述接收端提取所述带有唯一标识的加密数据中的唯一标识;
移动终端或者智能门锁作为接收端,对带有唯一标识的加密数据进行提取,得到其携带的唯一标识;例如发送端发送的带有唯一标识的加密数据,则接收端提取其唯一标识(例如提取到的唯一标识可以是发送端的MAC地址,IP地址,特定标签,用户名或用户ID等等。)
步骤S1062:根据所述唯一标识分析得到与该唯一标识匹配的加密密钥;
根据提取到的唯一标识进行匹配得到该唯一标识对应的加密密钥;其中移动终端或智能门锁端均保存有唯一标识与加密密钥的对应关系,可根据唯一标识匹配得到该标识对应的加密密钥;例如,可以在移动终端和智能门锁端均保 存有唯一标识和加密密钥的对应关系表;当根据唯一标识进行匹配查找时,即可得到其对应的加密密钥。
步骤S1063:根据所述加密密钥确定身份验证结果。
具体的,根据匹配得到的加密密钥验证是否与接收端内存在的加密密钥相同或对应匹配,如相同或对应匹配,则身份验证结果为确认是绑定的发送端发来的加密数据。如不相同或不匹配,则身份验证结果为确认是非绑定的发送端发来的。本申请增加身份验证步骤以进一步保证通信安全。
步骤S107:所述接收端根据身份验证结果,利用交换得到的加密密钥对加密数据进行解密处理。
具体的,当身份验证结果为匹配,也即确认是与接收端绑定的发送端发来的加密数据,则利用交换得到的加密密钥对加密数据进行解密处理,得到待传输数据;当身份验证结果为不匹配,也即确认是非绑定的发送端发来的,则不作解密,还可以进一步生成报警信息。
其中,本申请的方法还包括:
步骤S101:响应于用户的授权操作指令,所述智能门锁或所述移动终端生成初始加密密钥,所述智能门锁和所述移动终端对所述初始加密密钥进行认证得到加密密钥。
其中,初始加密密钥可以为智能门锁或移动终端自动生成或手动输入的密钥;在生成初始加密密钥后,可以通过安全通信信道传输初始加密密钥,如此,智能门锁和移动终端均获得初始加密密钥,智能门锁和移动终端可以对初始加密密钥进行认证得到加密密钥。
具体的,用户的授权操作指令例如可以是用户手动按下配置按钮或配置模式触摸键或在智能门锁本地输入已设定的管理员密码或输入管理员权限的指纹等(相当于智能门锁开启配置模式),用户在终端开启APP进入配置模式,通过配置模式经用户授权确认开启安全通信通道;智能门锁和移动终端可采用WIFI局域网、蓝牙、zigbee或近场通信(NFC)中的一种作为安全通信通道连接,则可由任意一方生成初始加密密钥经过相互认证后得到加密密钥。例如:用户在智能门锁端按下启动配置按钮,并输入已认证的管理员密码,同时用户在手机端打开智能门锁的APP进入配置模式,智能门锁和手机经用户授权确认通过蓝牙通信连接,可以由智能门锁生成初始加密密钥,通过蓝牙通信通道发送至手机APP,手机APP进行确认或对初始加密密钥进行修改后与智能门 锁进行交换;或智能门锁和手机APP分别生成一对公钥和私钥并进行交换。
在上述实施例中,对待传输数据进行加密可以有多种实现方式,例如,可以采用对称加密的方式,也可采用非对称加密的方式进行加密。下面结合具体实施例对不同加密方式的加密、解密过程进行详细说明。
可选地,如图3所示,所述加密密钥为第一加密密钥;所述步骤S103对待传输数据通过加密密钥采用预设的加密算法进行加密处理得到加密数据包括:
步骤S1031a:通过第一加密密钥采用对称加密算法对待传输数据进行加密得到初始加密数据。
具体的,所述第一加密密钥为分别保存在智能门锁和移动终端的加密密钥;例如有2个移动终端与智能门锁绑定,则移动终端A与智能门锁保存有相同的加密密钥(例如可以为KeyA);移动终端B与智能门锁保存有相同的加密密钥(例如可以为KeyB)。其中一种实施方式为:当移动终端A作为发送端时,则将生成的待传输数据采用加密密钥KeyA通过对称加密算法进行加密得到初始加密数据A。其中另一种实施方式为,智能门锁作为发送端,其根据移动终端B发来的操作指令生成待传输数据,则将该待传输数据采用加密密钥KeyB通过对称加密算法进行加密得到初始加密数据B。
步骤S1032a:为初始加密数据配置预设密钥值;
具体的为上述步骤得到的初始加密数据配置预设的密钥值,所述预设密钥值为当前时间戳timestamp、计数器count值和随机码中的至少一种;例如当前时间为2016-08-11-20:21,则将此作为预设的密钥值配置到初始加密数据中。
步骤S1033a:为配置有预设密钥值的初始加密数据添加验证签名得到加密数据。
具体的签名可以根据哈希算法生成哈希值作为签名,用于在解密时验证加密数据的完整性。
则可选地,如图4所示:所述步骤S107根据身份验证结果处理加密数据包括:
步骤S1071a若身份验证结果为验证结果匹配,则所述接收端对加密数据的验证签名进行验证;
具体的接收端校验签名的完整性,防止被篡改,保证数据的完整性。
步骤S1072a若验证签名匹配,则验证预设密钥值是否合法;
具体的若验证签名匹配,则接收端分析带有预设密钥值的验证预设密钥值例如时间戳timestamp、计数器count值或随机码是否合法;具体的是将预设密钥值与接收端本地当前的数据或保存的数据或生成的数据做比对。其中一个实施例为:当智能门锁作为接收端时,所述智能门锁将时间戳与智能门锁内的时钟模块保存的时间做对比;所述时钟模块内部用纽扣电池长期供电的时钟芯片,例如智能门锁使用5号干电池供电,即使更换5号电池前后,门锁内部的时钟依然保持,时钟模块中的时间为自动匹配更新的标准时间;例如现在时间为17:00,则时钟模块的时间也为17:00。
所述智能锁将时间戳与智能门锁内的时钟模块保存的时间做对比,如果偏差即加密数据带有的时间戳与时钟模块保存的时间的差值超过限定阈值,则判断所述加密数据是非法的数据包,将验证结果通过蓝牙或zigbee等反馈至所述移动终端;一般设定阈值可根据情况设定在15min~60min内,例如设定限定阈值为20min;则如果偏差超过20min,则判断所述加密数据是非法的数据包,则检查结果为所述带有预设的密钥值的加密数据不合法,并将验证结果通过预设的通信通道或云服务器传输反馈给所述移动终端。
如果偏差未超过限定阈值,则检查结果为所述带有预设的密钥值的加密数据合法。同样的,当所述移动终端作为接收端时,则与移动终端的当前时间值进行比较验证,在此不再赘述。
其中另一个实施例为:所述预设的密钥值为计数器值。则当所述智能门锁作为接收端时,所述智能门锁将所述带有预设的密钥值的加密数据带有的计数器count值与本地保存的计数器count值比较;
如果所述加密数据带有的计数器值大于本地保存的值,则检查结果为所述带有计数器count值的开锁验证码合法;如果所述智能门锁发送的计数器值小于等于本地保存的值,则认为是数据包被重新播放,则检查结果为所述带有计数器值的加密数据为不合法,并将验证结果通过预设的通信通道或云服务器传输反馈给所述移动终端。移动终端作为接收端方式相同,在此不做赘述。
步骤S1073a若预设密钥值合法,则接收端通过第一加密密钥采用相同所述对称加密算法的逆算法对初始加密数据进行解密得到待传输数据。
具体地,经接收端验证配置有预设密钥值的初始加密数据的预设密钥值的合法性,若预设密钥值合法,则接收端通过本地保存的第一加密密钥采用相同 所述对称加密算法的逆算法对初始加密数据进行解密得到待传输数据。;例如本地保存的相同第一加密密钥为KeyA,则采用KeyA通过相同对称加密算法的逆算法对初始加密数据进行解密得到待传输数据。
可选地,所述加密密钥包括一公开密钥和一私有密钥;所述步骤S103对待传输数据通过加密密钥采用预设的加密算法进行加密处理得到加密数据包括:
步骤S1031b:发送端通过自身保存的所述公开密钥采用非对称加密算法对待传输数据进行加密得到初始加密数据;
具体的,所述发送端和接收端分别保存的加密密钥包括一公开密钥和一私有密钥,如发送端保存的加密密钥为私有密钥pri A和公开密钥pub B;则接收端对应保存的加密密钥为私有密钥pri B和公开密钥pubA。例如智能门锁作为发送端保存的加密密钥为私有密钥pri A和公开密钥pub B;则移动终端作为接收端对应保存的加密密钥为私有密钥pri B和公开密钥pubA。则智能门锁作为发送端通过其保存的公开密钥pub B采用非对称加密算法对待传输数据进行加密得到初始加密数据。
步骤S1032b:为初始加密数据配置预设密钥值;所述预设密钥值为当前时间戳、计数器值和随机码中的至少一种;
具体的为上述步骤的到的初始加密数据配置预设的密钥值,所述预设密钥值为当前时间戳timestamp、计数器count值和随机码中的至少一种;例如当前时间为2016-08-11-20:21,则将此作为预设的密钥值配置到初始加密数据中。
步骤S1033b:为配置有预设密钥值的初始加密数据添加发送端保存的所述私有密钥作为验证签名得到加密数据。
具体的,如上所述如发送端保存的加密密钥为私有密钥pri A和公开密钥pub B;则接收端对应保存的加密密钥为私有密钥pri B和公开密钥pubA。例如智能门锁作为发送端保存的加密密钥为私有密钥pri A和公开密钥pub B;则移动终端作为接收端对应保存的加密密钥为私有密钥pri B和公开密钥pubA。举例说明,智能门锁作为发送端,则为配有有预设密钥值的初始加密数据添加智能门锁本地保存的私有密钥pri A作为验证签名得到加密数据。
则可选地,所述步骤S107根据身份验证结果处理加密数据包括:
步骤S1071b:若身份验证结果为验证结果匹配,则所述接收端采用自身 存储的公开密钥对加密数据的验证签名进行验证;
具体的,若身份验证结果为验证结果匹配,则所述接收端采用本地存储的公开密钥对加密数据的验证签名进行验证。例如接收端是移动终端,如前所述移动终端本地存储的加密密钥为私有密钥pri B和公开密钥pubA。则移动终端采用本地存储的pub A对加密数据中携带的签名pri A进行验证。如经验证其为与本地存储的公开密钥pub A对应的私有密钥pri A,则验证签名匹配,若非本地存储的公开密钥pub A对应的私有密钥,则验证签名结果为不匹配。
步骤S1072b:若验证签名匹配,则验证预设密钥值是否合法;
具体的若验证签名匹配,则接收端分析带有预设密钥值的验证预设密钥值例如时间戳timestamp、计数器count值或随机码是否合法;具体的是将预设密钥值与接收端本地当前的数据或保存的数据或生成的数据做比对。其中一个实施例为:当智能门锁作为接收端时,所述智能门锁将时间戳与智能门锁内的时钟模块保存的时间做对比;所述时钟模块内部用纽扣电池长期供电的时钟芯片,例如智能门锁使用5号干电池供电,即使更换5号电池前后,门锁内部的时钟依然保持,时钟模块中的时间为自动匹配更新的标准时间;例如现在时间为17:00,则时钟模块的时间也为17:00。
所述智能锁将时间戳与智能门锁内的时钟模块保存的时间做对比,如果偏差即加密数据带有的时间戳与时钟模块保存的时间的差值超过限定阈值,则判断所述加密数据是非法的数据包,将验证结果通过蓝牙或zigbee等反馈至所述移动终端;一般设定阈值可根据情况设定在15min~60min内,例如设定限定阈值为20min;则如果偏差超过20min,则判断所述加密数据是非法的数据包,则检查结果为所述带有预设的密钥值的加密数据不合法,并将验证结果通过预设的通信通道或云服务器传输反馈给所述移动终端。
如果偏差未超过限定阈值,则检查结果为所述带有预设的密钥值的加密数据合法。同样的,当所述移动终端作为接收端时,则与移动终端的当前时间值进行比较验证,在此不再赘述。
其中另一个实施例为:所述预设的密钥值为计数器值。则当所述智能门锁作为接收端时,所述智能门锁将所述带有预设的密钥值的加密数据带有的计数器count值与本地保存的计数器count值比较;
如果所述加密数据带有的计数器值大于本地保存的值,则检查结果为所述带有计数器count值的开锁验证码合法;如果所述智能门锁发送的计数器值小 于等于本地保存的值,则认为是数据包被重新播放,则检查结果为所述带有计数器值的加密数据为不合法,并将验证结果通过预设的通信通道或云服务器传输反馈给所述移动终端。移动终端作为接收端方式相同,在此不做赘述。
步骤S1073b:若预设密钥值合法,则接收端通过自身存储的私有密钥采用相同所述非对称加密算法对初始加密数据进行解密得到待传输数据。
由于待传输的数据加密,以及为防止被重新播放而加入预设的密钥值,以及为防止不法人员对数据进行篡改而配置的签名以保证数据完整性等都是在本地完成,则可以保证服务器端或者智能门锁厂家的内部工作人员亦无法从服务器端获得用户的传输信息,保证即使服务器被攻破,门锁与手机客户端的通信中的身份验证、防重放、防篡改依然有效,进一步保证了用户信息的安全性。
步骤S1071a-S1073a和步骤S1071b-S1073b为接收端对加密数据进行解密的一些具体实施方式,在本申请实施例一些可能的实现方式中,接收端接收发送端发送的带有唯一标识的加密数据,然后对所述带有唯一标识的加密数据进行身份验证,得到身份验证结果,接收端可以根据身份验证结果,利用交换得到的加密密钥对加密数据进行解密处理得到待传输数据。根据加密数据的加密方式不同,对加密数据进行解密的方式可以是不同的,本申请实施例对此不作限定。
在有些情况下,如用户丢失了移动终端时,还可以通过登陆备用移动终端,发起授权删除操作,指示智能门锁和/或云服务器删除相关加密密钥信息,防止丢失的移动终端中加密密钥信息泄露,减小安全隐患。
可选地,所述基于智能门锁系统的安全通信方法还包括:
步骤1081:备用移动终端获取账户登录验证信息,所述账户登录验证信息为用于验证用户身份的信息;所述备用移动终端为所述移动终端的备用设备。
本申请的一个实施例为,当用户丢失预设有APP并保存有加密密钥的移动终端时,则用户可以通过设有智能门锁APP的备用移动终端,输入账户登陆验证信息实现账户登录,其中,账户登录验证信息包括但不限于:用户身份信息(用户名,用户ID等用户按照规则自行设定的用户身份标识信息),密码和验证码等。
步骤1082:若所述账户登录验证信息通过,则所述备用移动终端响应于用户的授权删除操作,向智能门锁发出第一删除指令,用于指示所述智能门锁 删除本地保存的指定加密密钥信息;和/或,所述备用移动终端响应于用户的远程授权删除操作,向云服务器发出第二删除指令,用于指示所述云服务器删除所述移动终端保存的加密密钥信息。
具体的,用户通过账户登陆认证后,可与智能门锁通过短距离无线通信或近场通信的连接方式连接,配合操作智能门锁端删除与该账户匹配的原加密密钥信息;同时也可通过云服务器执行丢失移动终端中保存的加密密钥的删除操作。
以上为为本申请实施例提供的一种安全通信方法的具体实现方式,为了便于理解,下面结合具体场景对本申请实施例进行介绍。其中,实施例1为移动终端作为发送端,向智能门锁发送开锁密码实现开锁的应用场景实施例,实施例2为智能门锁作为发送端,按照预设规则向指定移动终端发送开锁记录、传感器状态等数据的应用场景实施例,接下来对其实现过程进行详细说明。
场景实施例1:
一种基于智能门锁系统的安全通信方法,包括如下步骤:
(1)响应于用户的授权操作指令,所述智能门锁和移动终端分别开启安全通信通道,所述安全通信通道为经智能门锁和移动终端授权触发的通信通道;
所述智能门锁或移动终端生成初始加密密钥进行认证得到加密密钥;所述初始加密密钥为智能门锁或移动终端自动生成或手动输入的密钥。
具体的,用户的授权操作指令例如可以是用户手动按下配置按钮或配置模式触摸键或在智能门锁本地输入已设定的管理员密码或输入管理员权限的指纹等(相当于智能门锁开启配置模式),用户在终端开启APP进入配置模式,通过配置模式经用户授权确认开启安全通信通道;智能门锁和移动终端可采用WIFI局域网、蓝牙、zigbee或近场通信(NFC)中的一种作为安全通信通道连接,则可由任意一方生成初始加密密钥经过相互认证后得到加密密钥。例如:用户在智能门锁端按下启动配置按钮,并输入已认证的管理员密码,同时用户在手机端打开智能门锁的APP进入配置模式,智能门锁和手机经用户授权确认通过蓝牙通信连接,可以由智能门锁生成初始加密密钥,通过蓝牙通信通道发送至手机app,手机app进行确认或对初始加密密钥进行修改后与智能门锁进行交换;或智能门锁和手机APP分别生成一对公钥和私钥并进行交换
(2)所述智能门锁和移动终端开启蓝牙通信,智能门锁与移动终端预设 的智能门锁APP通过蓝牙连接并交换加密密钥;
(3)当移动终端作为发送端根据移动终端预设的智能门锁APP的开锁密码生成待传输数据;对待传输数据通过加密密钥采用预设的加密算法进行加密处理得到加密数据;具体的,在智能门锁和移动终端预装的智能门锁APP中内置有相同的加密密钥key A以及相同的对称加密算法。则移动终端作为发送端,而智能门锁作为接收端,则移动终端将开锁密码作为待传输数据,则将该待传输数据采用加密密钥KeyA通过对称加密算法进行加密得到初始加密数据A;对初始加密数据A配置当前时间戳作为预设的密钥值得到配置有预设密钥值的初始加密数据A;为配置有预设密钥值的初始加密数据添加验证签名得到加密数据。
(4)移动终端将加密数据配置唯一标识得到带有唯一标识的加密数据,唯一标识可以是移动终端预设有智能门锁APP的用户ID。
(5)移动终端将带有唯一标识的加密数据通过云服务器发送至智能门锁。
(6)接收数据的智能门锁对带有唯一标识的加密数据进行身份验证。具体的,可以是智能门锁作为接收端,对带有唯一标识的加密数据进行提取其携带的唯一标识;例如发送端发送的带有唯一标识的加密数据,则提取其唯一标识(例如提取到的唯一标识可以是发送端的MAC地址,IP地址,特定标签,用户名或用户ID等等。);根据提取到的唯一标识进行匹配得到该唯一标识对应的加密密钥;其中移动终端或智能门锁端均保存有唯一标识与加密密钥的对应关系,可根据唯一标识匹配得到该标识对应的加密密钥;例如,可以在移动终端和智能门锁端均保存有唯一标识和加密密钥的对应关系表;当根据唯一标识进行匹配查找时,即可得到其对应的加密密钥。根据所述与该唯一标识匹配的加密密钥确定身份验证结果。具体的根据匹配得到的加密密钥验证是否与接收端内存在的加密密钥相同或对应匹配,如相同或对应匹配,则身份验证结果为确认是绑定的发送端发来的加密数据。如不相同或不匹配,则身份验证结果为确认是非绑定的发送端发来的。本申请增加身份验证步骤以进一步保证通信安全。
(7)若身份验证结果为验证结果匹配,则所述接收端对加密数据的验证签名进行验证;具体的接收端校验签名的完整性,防止被篡改,保证数据的完整性。具体的若验证签名匹配,则所述智能门锁将时间戳与智能门锁内的时钟模块保存的时间做对比;所述时钟模块内部用纽扣电池长期供电的时钟芯片, 例如智能门锁使用5号干电池供电,即使更换5号电池前后,门锁内部的时钟依然保持,时钟模块中的时间为自动匹配更新的标准时间;例如现在时间为17:00,则时钟模块的时间也为17:00。
所述智能锁将时间戳与智能门锁内的时钟模块保存的时间做对比,如果偏差即加密数据带有的时间戳与时钟模块保存的时间的差值超过限定阈值,则判断所述加密数据是非法的数据包,将验证结果通过蓝牙或zigbee等反馈至所述移动终端;一般设定阈值可根据情况设定在15min~60min内,例如设定限定阈值为20min;则如果偏差超过20min,则判断所述加密数据是非法的数据包,则检查结果为所述带有预设的密钥值的加密数据不合法,并将验证结果通过预设的通信通道或云服务器传输反馈给所述移动终端。
如果偏差未超过限定阈值,则检查结果为所述带有预设的密钥值的加密数据合法。若预设密钥值合法,则智能门锁采用本地保存的相同第一加密密钥为KeyA通过相同对称加密算法的逆算法对初始加密数据进行解密得到待传输数据。
场景实施例2
一种基于智能门锁系统的安全通信方法,包括如下步骤:
(1)响应于用户的授权操作指令,所述智能门锁和移动终端分别开启安全通信通道,所述安全通信通道为经智能门锁和移动终端授权触发的通信通道;
所述智能门锁或移动终端生成初始加密密钥进行认证得到加密密钥;所述初始加密密钥为智能门锁或移动终端自动生成或手动输入的密钥。
具体的,用户的授权操作指令例如可以是用户手动按下配置按钮或配置模式触摸键或在智能门锁本地输入已设定的管理员密码或输入管理员权限的指纹等(相当于智能门锁开启配置模式),用户在终端开启APP进入配置模式,通过配置模式经用户授权确认开启安全通信通道;智能门锁和移动终端可采用WIFI局域网、蓝牙、zigbee或近场通信(NFC)中的一种作为安全通信通道连接,则可由任意一方生成初始加密密钥经过相互认证后得到加密密钥。例如:用户在智能门锁端按下启动配置按钮,并输入已认证的管理员密码,同时用户在手机端打开智能门锁的APP进入配置模式,智能门锁和手机经用户授权确认通过NFC通信连接,智能门锁和手机APP分别生成一对公钥和私钥并通过NFC通信进行交换。
(2)智能门锁与移动终端预设的智能门锁APP通过NFC连接并交换加密密钥;
(3)当智能门锁作为发送端,例如按照用户的预设规则(例如每12h发送一次或每次开门后上传、定时补传等)向指定的移动终端发送指定的数据(例如开锁记录,历史记录、门上的传感器状态,甚至家中是否有人的情况等);即智能门锁作为发送端按照预设的加密算法对准备发送的开锁记录进行加密处理即得到加密数据。对待传输数据通过加密密钥采用预设的加密算法进行加密处理得到加密数据;具体的,智能门锁作为发送端保存的加密密钥为私有密钥pri A和公开密钥pub B和非对称加密算法;则移动终端作为接收端对应保存的加密密钥为私有密钥pri B和公开密钥pubA及相同的非对称加密算法。则智能门锁作为发送端通过其保存的公开密钥pub B采用非对称加密算法对待传输数据进行加密得到初始加密数据;对初始加密数据配置计数器值作为预设的密钥值得到配置有预设密钥值的初始加密数据;为配置有预设密钥值的初始加密数据添加私有密钥做为验证签名得到加密数据。具体的,如上所述如发送端保存的加密密钥为私有密钥pri A和公开密钥pub B;则接收端对应保存的加密密钥为私有密钥pri B和公开密钥pubA。例如智能门锁作为发送端保存的加密密钥为私有密钥pri A和公开密钥pub B;则移动终端作为接收端对应保存的加密密钥为私有密钥pri B和公开密钥pubA。则这里例如智能门锁作为发送端,则为配有预设密钥值的初始加密数据添加智能门锁本地保存的私有密钥pri A作为验证签名得到加密数据。
(4)智能门锁将加密数据配置唯一标识得到带有唯一标识的加密数据,唯一标识可以是智能门锁的MAC地址。
(5)智能门锁将带有唯一标识的加密数据通过云服务器发送至移动终端。
(6)接收数据的移动终端对带有唯一标识的加密数据进行身份验证。具体的,可以是智能门锁作为接收端,对带有唯一标识的加密数据进行提取其携带的唯一标识;例如发送端发送的带有唯一标识的加密数据,则提取其唯一标识(例如提取到的唯一标识可以是发送端的MAC地址,IP地址,特定标签,用户名或用户ID等等。);根据提取到的唯一标识进行匹配得到该唯一标识对应的加密密钥;其中移动终端或智能门锁端均保存有唯一标识与加密密钥的对应关系,可根据唯一标识匹配得到该标识对应的加密密钥;例如,可以在移动终端和智能门锁端均保存有唯一标识和加密密钥的对应关系表;当根据唯一标 识进行匹配查找时,即可得到其对应的加密密钥。根据所述与该唯一标识匹配的加密密钥确定身份验证结果。具体的根据匹配得到的加密密钥验证是否与接收端内存在的加密密钥相同或对应匹配,如相同或对应匹配,则身份验证结果为确认是绑定的发送端发来的加密数据。如不相同或不匹配,则身份验证结果为确认是非绑定的发送端发来的。本申请增加身份验证步骤以进一步保证通信安全。
(7)若身份验证结果为验证结果匹配,则所述接收端采用存储的公开密钥对加密数据的验证签名进行验证。具体的,若身份验证结果为验证结果匹配,则所述接收端采用本地存储的公开密钥对加密数据的验证签名进行验证。例如接收端是移动终端,如前所述移动终端本地存储的加密密钥为私有密钥pri B和公开密钥pubA。则移动终端采用本地存储的pub A对加密数据中携带的签名pri A进行验证。如经验证其为与本地存储的公开密钥pub A对应的私有密钥pri A,则验证签名匹配,若非本地存储的公开密钥pub A对应的私有密钥,则验证签名结果为不匹配。若验证签名匹配,则当所述移动终端作为接收端时,所述移动终端将所述带有预设的密钥值的加密数据带有的计数器count值与本地保存的计数器count值比较;
如果所述加密数据带有的计数器值大于本地保存的值,则检查结果为所述带有计数器count值的开锁验证码合法;如果所述智能门锁发送的计数器值小于等于本地保存的值,则认为是数据包被重新播放,则检查结果为所述带有计数器值的加密数据为不合法,并将验证结果通过预设的通信通道或云服务器传输反馈给所述智能门锁并生成预警信息。若预设密钥值合法,则接收端通过存储的私有密钥采用相同所述非对称加密算法对初始加密数据进行解密得到待传输数据。上述本申请实施例序号仅仅为了描述,不代表实施例的优劣。
在本申请的上述实施例中,对各个实施例的描述都各有侧重,某个实施例中没有详述的部分,可以参见其他实施例的相关描述。
在本申请所提供的几个实施例中,应该理解到,所揭露的技术内容,可通过其它的方式实现。其中,以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的,例如所述单元的划分,可以为一种逻辑功能划分,实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式,例如多个单元或组件可以结合或者可以集成到另一个系统,或一些特征可以忽略,或不执行。另一点,所显示或讨论的相互之间的耦合或直接耦合或通信连接可以是通过一些接口,单元或模块的间接耦合或通信连接,可以是电性或其 它的形式。
所述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的,作为单元显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元,即可以位于一个地方,或者也可以分布到多个单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部单元来实现本实施例方案的目的。
另外,在本申请各个实施例中的各功能单元可以集成在一个处理单元中,也可以是各个单元单独物理存在,也可以两个或两个以上单元集成在一个单元中。上述集成的单元既可以采用硬件的形式实现,也可以采用软件功能单元的形式实现。
以上所述仅是本申请的优选实施方式,应当指出,对于本技术领域的普通技术人员来说,在不脱离本申请原理的前提下,还可以做出若干改进和润饰,这些改进和润饰也应视为本申请的保护范围。
Claims (13)
- 一种安全通信方法,其特征在于,所述方法应用于智能门锁系统,所述智能门锁系统包括智能门锁和移动终端,所述方法包括:发送端根据操作指令或预设规则生成待传输数据,并对所述待传输数据通过加密密钥采用预设的加密算法进行加密处理得到加密数据;所述发送端为所述智能门锁或所述移动终端;所述加密密钥为所述智能门锁与所述移动终端通过预设的安全通信通道连接并交换得到;所述安全通信通道为经所述智能门锁和所述移动终端授权触发的短距离无线通信通道或近场通信通道;所述发送端为所述加密数据配置唯一标识得到带有唯一标识的加密数据;所述发送端将所述带有唯一标识的加密数据发送至接收端,以便所述接收端对所述带有唯一标识的加密数据进行身份验证,并根据身份验证结果,利用交换得到的加密密钥对所述加密数据进行解密处理;其中,所述发送端为智能门锁时,所述接收端为移动终端;所述发送端为移动终端时,所述接收端为智能门锁。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述发送端将所述带有唯一标识的加密数据发送至接收端包括:所述发送端将所述带有唯一标识的加密数据通过预设通信通道或云服务器发送至接收端;所述预设通信通道为短距离无线通信或近场通信信道。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述加密密钥为所述智能门锁或所述移动终端响应于用户的授权操作指令,生成初始加密密钥,并由所述智能门锁和所述移动终端对所述初始加密密钥进行认证得到;其中,所述初始加密密钥为所述智能门锁或所述移动终端自动生成或手动输入的密钥;所述初始加密密钥通过所述安全通信通道在所述智能门锁和所述移动终端之间进行传输。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述加密密钥为第一加密密钥;所述对待传输数据通过加密密钥采用预设的加密算法进行加密处理得到加密数据包括:通过所述第一加密密钥采用对称加密算法对待传输数据进行加密得到初始加密数据;为所述初始加密数据配置预设密钥值;所述预设密钥值为当前时间戳、计数器值和随机码中的至少一种;为配置有所述预设密钥值的初始加密数据添加验证签名得到加密数据。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述发送端和接收端分别保存的加密密钥包括一公开密钥和一私有密钥;所述对待传输数据通过加密密钥采用预设的加密算法进行加密处理得到加密数据包括:发送端通过自身保存的所述公开密钥采用非对称加密算法对待传输数据进行加密得到初始加密数据;为所述初始加密数据配置预设密钥值;所述预设密钥值为当前时间戳、计数器值和随机码中的至少一种;为配置有所述预设密钥值的初始加密数据添加发送端保存的所述私有密钥作为验证签名得到加密数据。
- 根据权利要求1-5任意一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述方法还包括:备用移动终端获取账户登录验证信息,所述账户登录验证信息为用于验证用户身份的信息;所述备用移动终端为所述移动终端的备用设备;若所述账户登录验证信息通过,则所述备用移动终端响应于用户的授权删除操作,向智能门锁发出第一删除指令,用于指示所述智能门锁删除本地保存的指定加密密钥信息;和/或,所述备用移动终端响应于用户的远程授权删除操作,向云服务器发出第二删除指令,用于指示所述云服务器删除所述移动终端保存的加密密钥信息。
- 一种安全通信方法,其特征在于,所述方法应用于智能门锁系统,所述智能门锁系统包括智能门锁和移动终端,所述方法包括:所述接收端接收所述发送端发送的带有唯一标识的加密数据;所述发送端为智能门锁时,所述接收端为移动终端;所述发送端为移动终端时,所述接收端为智能门锁;所述带有唯一标识的加密数据为所述发送端根据操作指令或预设规则生成待传输数据,并对所述待传输数据通过加密密钥采用预设的加密算法进行加密,并配置唯一标识得到;所述加密密钥为所述智能门锁与所述移动终端通过预设的安全通信通道连接并交换得到;所述安全通信通道为经所述智能门锁和所述移动终端授权触发的短距离无线通信通道或近场通信通道;所述接收端对所述带有唯一标识的加密数据进行身份验证,得到身份验证结果;所述接收端根据所述身份验证结果,利用交换得到的所述加密密钥对所述 加密数据进行解密处理得到所述待传输数据。
- 根据权利要求7所述的方法,其特征在于,所述加密密钥为第一加密密钥,所述加密数据为所述发送端通过所述第一加密密钥采用对称加密算法对所述待传输数据进行加密得到初始加密数据,为所述初始加密数据配置预设密钥值,为配置有所述预设密钥值的初始加密数据添加验证签名得到;则所述接收端根据所述身份验证结果,利用交换得到的所述加密密钥对所述加密数据进行解密处理得到所述待传输数据包括:若所述身份验证结果匹配,则所述接收端对所述加密数据的所述验证签名进行验证;若所述验证签名匹配,则验证所述预设密钥值是否合法;若所述预设密钥值合法,则所述接收端从所述加密数据中获取所述初始加密数据,并通过所述第一加密密钥采用所述对称加密算法的逆算法对所述初始加密数据进行解密得到所述待传输数据。
- 根据权利要求7所述的方法,其特征在于,所述发送端和所述接收端分别保存的加密密钥包括一公开密钥和一私有密钥;所述加密数据为所述发送端通过自身保存的所述公开密钥采用非对称加密算法对所述待传输数据进行加密得到初始加密数据,为所述初始加密数据配置预设密钥值,为配置有所述预设密钥值的初始加密数据添加所述发送端保存的所述私有密钥作为验证签名得到;则所述接收端根据所述身份验证结果,利用交换得到的所述加密密钥对所述加密数据进行解密处理得到所述待传输数据包括:若所述身份验证结果为匹配,则所述接收端采用自身存储的公开密钥对所述加密数据的所述验证签名进行验证;若所述验证签名匹配,则验证所述预设密钥值是否合法;若所述预设密钥值合法,则所述接收端从所述加密数据中获取所述初始加密数据,并通过自身存储的所述私有密钥采用所述非对称加密算法对所述初始加密数据进行解密得到所述待传输数据。
- 根据权利要求7所述的安全通信方法,其特征在于,所述接收端对所述带有唯一标识的加密数据进行身份验证包括:所述接收端提取所述带有唯一标识的加密数据中的唯一标识;根据所述唯一标识分析得到与所述唯一标识匹配的加密密钥;根据所述加密密钥确定身份验证结果。
- 一种智能门锁系统,其特征在于,所述智能门锁系统包括:智能门锁,用于通过预设的加密算法,采用加密密钥对待传输数据进行加密以及对接收到的加密数据进行解密;所述智能门锁设有短距离无线通信模块;移动终端,用于通过预设的与所述智能门锁相同的加密算法,采用所述加密密钥对所述待传输数据进行加密以及对接收到的所述加密数据进行解密;所述移动终端还用于控制所述智能门锁,所述移动终端设有短距离无线通信模块,用于和所述智能门锁通信。
- 根据权利要求11所述的系统,其特征在于,所述智能门锁还包括配置模式启动模块,用于启动配置模式进行加密密钥的生成和交换,所述配置模式启动模块包括:配置按钮、配置模式触摸键、用于输入管理员密码的触摸屏或用于输入管理员权限的指纹的指纹采集器中的至少一种。
- 根据权利要求12所述的系统,其特征在于,所述移动终端控制所述智能门锁具体包括通过用于控制智能门锁的APP对所述智能门锁进行控制,所述用于控制智能门锁的APP内还设置有启动配置模式的虚拟按键用于启动移动终端的配置模式。
Priority Applications (5)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP2020502749A JP7152466B2 (ja) | 2017-03-29 | 2018-03-22 | セキュア通信方法及びそれに基づくスマートロックシステム |
| CN201880022578.3A CN110462692B (zh) | 2017-03-29 | 2018-03-22 | 一种基于智能锁系统的安全通信方法及其智能锁系统 |
| EP18774831.4A EP3605475A4 (en) | 2017-03-29 | 2018-03-22 | SECURE COMMUNICATION PROCESS BASED ON AN INTELLIGENT DOOR LOCK SYSTEM AND INTELLIGENT DOOR LOCK SYSTEM THEREFOR |
| US16/586,995 US11070364B2 (en) | 2017-03-29 | 2019-09-29 | Secure communication method and smart lock system based thereof |
| US17/379,973 US11997193B2 (en) | 2017-03-29 | 2021-07-19 | Secure communication method and smart lock system based thereof |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201710198457.1 | 2017-03-29 | ||
| CN201710198457.1A CN107038777B (zh) | 2017-03-29 | 2017-03-29 | 一种基于智能门锁系统的安全通信方法及其智能门锁系统 |
Related Child Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| US16/586,995 Continuation US11070364B2 (en) | 2017-03-29 | 2019-09-29 | Secure communication method and smart lock system based thereof |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| WO2018177188A1 true WO2018177188A1 (zh) | 2018-10-04 |
Family
ID=59533396
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/CN2018/079999 Ceased WO2018177188A1 (zh) | 2017-03-29 | 2018-03-22 | 一种基于智能门锁系统的安全通信方法及其智能门锁系统 |
Country Status (5)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US11070364B2 (zh) |
| EP (1) | EP3605475A4 (zh) |
| JP (1) | JP7152466B2 (zh) |
| CN (2) | CN107038777B (zh) |
| WO (1) | WO2018177188A1 (zh) |
Cited By (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN109889596A (zh) * | 2018-12-29 | 2019-06-14 | 珠海汇金科技股份有限公司 | 智能锁绑定方法、智能锁及智能锁绑定系统 |
| EP3736780A1 (en) * | 2019-05-06 | 2020-11-11 | Universitat Pompeu Fabra | A method for remotely controlling features of a device and a remote keyless entry instrument |
| WO2021135593A1 (zh) * | 2019-12-31 | 2021-07-08 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种分享设备的方法及电子设备 |
| CN113347613A (zh) * | 2021-04-15 | 2021-09-03 | 奇瑞商用车(安徽)有限公司 | 基于蓝牙数字钥匙的安全通信方法及系统 |
| EP3916701A4 (en) * | 2019-01-22 | 2022-10-19 | Bitkey Inc. | USAGE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, MANAGEMENT DEVICE, USAGE CONTROL DEVICE, USAGE MANAGEMENT METHOD AND COMPUTER READABLE PROGRAM |
| US12183136B2 (en) | 2021-02-12 | 2024-12-31 | Invue Security Products Inc. | Merchandise display security systems and methods |
Families Citing this family (97)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN107924476A (zh) | 2015-04-14 | 2018-04-17 | 第资本服务公司 | 用于动态交易卡的系统、方法和设备 |
| WO2016168409A1 (en) * | 2015-04-14 | 2016-10-20 | Capital One Services, LLC. | Automated bluetooth pairing |
| US20240257592A1 (en) * | 2021-06-30 | 2024-08-01 | 1Ahead Technologies | Access management system |
| US11997193B2 (en) | 2017-03-29 | 2024-05-28 | Yunding Network Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd. | Secure communication method and smart lock system based thereof |
| CN107038777B (zh) | 2017-03-29 | 2020-08-18 | 云丁网络技术(北京)有限公司 | 一种基于智能门锁系统的安全通信方法及其智能门锁系统 |
| CN107968781B (zh) * | 2017-11-23 | 2021-04-30 | 大陆投资(中国)有限公司 | 车辆共享业务的安全处理方法 |
| CN107977816A (zh) * | 2017-12-01 | 2018-05-01 | 移康智能科技(上海)股份有限公司 | 快件投递方法及服务器 |
| CN108049721B (zh) * | 2017-12-06 | 2023-06-13 | 云丁网络技术(北京)有限公司 | 电子锁及其控制方法、装置及系统 |
| WO2019109964A1 (zh) * | 2017-12-06 | 2019-06-13 | 云丁网络技术(北京)有限公司 | 电子锁及其控制方法、装置及系统 |
| CN108122316B (zh) * | 2017-12-21 | 2020-02-04 | 美智光电科技有限公司 | 基于安全芯片的门锁通信系统及方法 |
| CN108269334A (zh) * | 2018-01-10 | 2018-07-10 | 北京小米移动软件有限公司 | 开锁方法、终端设备以及智能锁 |
| CN110163995B (zh) * | 2018-02-12 | 2021-04-30 | 天扬精密科技股份有限公司 | 遥控电子锁系统 |
| JP2019190111A (ja) * | 2018-04-24 | 2019-10-31 | 株式会社東海理化電機製作所 | 鍵情報生成システム及び鍵情報生成方法 |
| CN108777015B (zh) * | 2018-05-25 | 2021-04-27 | 国网湖北省电力有限公司荆州供电公司 | 一种基于动态口令的门禁系统 |
| CN108877041B (zh) * | 2018-06-06 | 2020-07-31 | 常熟市恒仕达电器有限公司 | 一种智能售货终端及系统 |
| CN108810862A (zh) * | 2018-06-11 | 2018-11-13 | 深圳市长恩实业有限公司 | 用于智能门锁通讯方法和智能门锁系统 |
| CN109300201A (zh) * | 2018-06-14 | 2019-02-01 | 北京玛泰科技有限公司 | 一种智能安全锁及其加密系统和加密方法 |
| US11303449B2 (en) * | 2018-06-22 | 2022-04-12 | Salesforce.Com, Inc. | User device validation at an application server |
| CN110866999A (zh) * | 2018-08-09 | 2020-03-06 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | 一种智能门锁的控制方法、设备及存储介质 |
| CN109309568A (zh) * | 2018-09-07 | 2019-02-05 | 江苏恒宝智能系统技术有限公司 | 一种指纹授权方法及系统 |
| CN112740206A (zh) * | 2018-09-18 | 2021-04-30 | 亚萨合莱有限公司 | 使用户拍摄的图像与访问控制设备参考匹配以用于物理访问控制 |
| CN109410396B (zh) * | 2018-10-14 | 2021-01-01 | 浙江鸿利锁业有限公司 | 一种智能锁数据加密传输方法以及应用其的租赁设备 |
| CN109523664A (zh) * | 2018-10-26 | 2019-03-26 | 厦门摩洛克科技有限公司 | 一种智能门锁控制方法 |
| CN109493483A (zh) * | 2018-11-12 | 2019-03-19 | 上海庆科信息技术有限公司 | 智能锁系统及报警方法、装置、设备、计算机存储介质 |
| CN109330505B (zh) * | 2018-11-19 | 2021-06-29 | 南京特沃斯清洁设备有限公司 | 一种洗地机物联网系统 |
| CN109712278B (zh) * | 2018-11-27 | 2021-07-13 | 深圳市小石安防科技有限公司 | 智能门锁身份认证方法、系统、可读存储介质及移动终端 |
| KR102009863B1 (ko) * | 2018-12-05 | 2019-08-12 | 주식회사 후본 | 보안카드와 모바일 단말을 이용한 출입 보안 시스템 및 그 보안 방법 |
| CN109949461B (zh) * | 2019-03-15 | 2021-01-01 | 北京深思数盾科技股份有限公司 | 开锁方法及装置 |
| CN112017330B (zh) * | 2019-05-13 | 2023-05-05 | 浙江宇视科技有限公司 | 智能锁参数配置方法、装置、智能锁及存储介质 |
| CN112149083B (zh) * | 2019-06-26 | 2023-12-12 | 天地融科技股份有限公司 | 一种设备认证方法、安全键盘及办公系统 |
| CN112446982A (zh) * | 2019-08-10 | 2021-03-05 | 云丁网络技术(北京)有限公司 | 用于控制智能锁的方法、装置、计算机可读介质及设备 |
| WO2021023164A1 (zh) | 2019-08-02 | 2021-02-11 | 云丁网络技术(北京)有限公司 | 一种智能锁具控制方法和系统 |
| WO2021023276A1 (zh) | 2019-08-06 | 2021-02-11 | 云丁网络技术(北京)有限公司 | 一种智能锁控制方法和装置 |
| CN112351390A (zh) * | 2019-08-09 | 2021-02-09 | 华为技术有限公司 | 蓝牙设备互识或互信的方法 |
| CN110610570A (zh) * | 2019-09-24 | 2019-12-24 | 深圳好逸多科技有限公司 | 智能柜锁系统 |
| CN112562122A (zh) * | 2019-09-24 | 2021-03-26 | 上海奥宜电子科技有限公司 | 远程开锁方法、装置、终端、存储介质、及系统 |
| CN110610571A (zh) * | 2019-09-24 | 2019-12-24 | 深圳好逸多科技有限公司 | 具有数据收集功能的智能柜锁系统 |
| CN110942537B (zh) * | 2019-11-26 | 2021-10-15 | 珠海格力电器股份有限公司 | 一种智能门锁开锁系统、方法、装置和介质 |
| CN110942538A (zh) * | 2019-12-04 | 2020-03-31 | 国网上海市电力公司 | 一种带有加密算法的远程授权的实时蓝牙电子密钥 |
| CN110992533B (zh) * | 2019-12-09 | 2022-06-10 | 深圳Tcl数字技术有限公司 | Rfid卡验证方法、装置、设备及存储介质 |
| CN111147452B (zh) * | 2019-12-10 | 2020-12-25 | 珠海格力电器股份有限公司 | 一种门锁指令响应的方法、装置、门锁及存储介质 |
| CN111161454A (zh) * | 2020-01-09 | 2020-05-15 | 广州微盾科技股份有限公司 | 一种智能锁安全联网与控制的方法 |
| CZ202086A3 (cs) * | 2020-02-20 | 2021-02-03 | Petr Lakomý | Způsob ovládání elektronického trezorového zámku |
| CN113312326B (zh) * | 2020-02-26 | 2024-04-16 | 伊姆西Ip控股有限责任公司 | 用于存储管理的方法、电子设备和计算机程序产品 |
| CN113329399A (zh) * | 2020-02-28 | 2021-08-31 | 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 | 数据传输、配网与管理方法、设备、系统及存储介质 |
| CN111815813A (zh) * | 2020-06-22 | 2020-10-23 | 北京智辉空间科技有限责任公司 | 一种电子锁安全系统 |
| CN111815811B (zh) * | 2020-06-22 | 2022-09-06 | 合肥智辉空间科技有限责任公司 | 一种电子锁安全系统 |
| CN111815815B (zh) * | 2020-06-22 | 2022-06-24 | 合肥智辉空间科技有限责任公司 | 一种电子锁安全系统 |
| CN111669406B (zh) * | 2020-06-28 | 2021-05-28 | 山东大学 | 一种无创呼吸机数据安全传输方法及系统 |
| WO2022002146A1 (zh) * | 2020-06-30 | 2022-01-06 | 云丁网络技术(北京)有限公司 | 一种智能设备控制方法和系统 |
| CN111882707B (zh) * | 2020-07-15 | 2022-08-19 | 珠海优特电力科技股份有限公司 | 锁具控制方法和装置 |
| CN114155630B (zh) * | 2020-08-18 | 2024-08-23 | 浙江宇视科技有限公司 | 安全验证方法、电子设备和介质 |
| US11949778B1 (en) | 2020-09-16 | 2024-04-02 | Snap Inc. | Privacy-preserving multi-touch attribution |
| CN114254332B (zh) * | 2020-09-21 | 2024-10-29 | 中移物联网有限公司 | 一种资源授权方法、装置、电子设备和可读存储介质 |
| US11373239B1 (en) * | 2020-09-30 | 2022-06-28 | Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | Real-time currency exchange system |
| US12554885B1 (en) | 2020-09-30 | 2026-02-17 | Snap Inc. | Accurate and anonymized attribution |
| KR102229537B1 (ko) * | 2020-10-16 | 2021-03-18 | 패스테크 주식회사 | 도어락 영역정보 표시 기능을 가지는 스마트 도어락 시스템 및 그 제어 방법 |
| CN112434318B (zh) * | 2020-11-26 | 2024-11-01 | 江苏特思达电子科技股份有限公司 | 一种物联网远程设备加密方法及系统 |
| CN112767576B (zh) * | 2020-12-16 | 2023-05-02 | 珠海优特电力科技股份有限公司 | 锁具授权管理方法和锁具授权管理系统 |
| CN112738103B (zh) * | 2020-12-29 | 2022-03-22 | 北京深思数盾科技股份有限公司 | 信息校验方法、装置及电子设备 |
| CN112995137B (zh) * | 2021-02-03 | 2023-04-07 | 深圳市凯迪仕智能科技有限公司 | 一种智能锁的绑定方法及智能锁系统 |
| TW202243441A (zh) | 2021-04-15 | 2022-11-01 | 美商品譜公司 | 與諸如電子鎖之物聯網裝置的安全藍牙連接之建立 |
| CN113194465B (zh) * | 2021-04-20 | 2023-11-24 | 歌尔股份有限公司 | 终端间的ble连接验证方法、装置及可读存储介质 |
| CN113345135A (zh) * | 2021-04-26 | 2021-09-03 | 合肥美的智能科技有限公司 | 智能售货柜的控制方法、装置、电子设备及存储介质 |
| CN113298981A (zh) * | 2021-05-14 | 2021-08-24 | 北京千丁互联科技有限公司 | 门锁设备近距离通信解锁方法和门锁设备请求解锁方法 |
| CN113256853B (zh) * | 2021-06-21 | 2021-10-15 | 德施曼机电(中国)有限公司 | 一种信息传输方法、电子设备、门锁、服务器及存储介质 |
| CN113486372A (zh) * | 2021-07-05 | 2021-10-08 | 优车库网络科技发展(深圳)有限公司 | 数据备份方法、数据备份装置及服务器 |
| CN114120498B (zh) * | 2022-01-27 | 2022-05-10 | 云丁网络技术(北京)有限公司 | 用于迁移数据的方法和相关设备 |
| CN113674455B (zh) * | 2021-08-13 | 2023-08-04 | 京东科技信息技术有限公司 | 智能门锁远程控制方法、装置、系统、设备及存储介质 |
| CN113630772A (zh) * | 2021-08-17 | 2021-11-09 | 深圳市智莱科技股份有限公司 | 蓝牙数据传输方法、装置、蓝牙设备以及存储介质 |
| CN113808303B (zh) * | 2021-08-24 | 2023-04-07 | 珠海市安科电子有限公司 | 复合加密方法、门锁系统及存储介质 |
| CN113823024A (zh) * | 2021-11-23 | 2021-12-21 | 云丁网络技术(北京)有限公司 | 一种智能卡识别方法、装置及系统 |
| CN114241631B (zh) * | 2021-11-24 | 2024-09-03 | 新华三智能终端有限公司 | 一种智能门锁的管控方法、注册方法及相关装置 |
| CN114257999B (zh) * | 2021-11-29 | 2026-01-23 | 惠州高盛达科技有限公司 | 蓝牙共享设备借助手机接入网络云端的方法 |
| CN114170709B (zh) * | 2021-12-07 | 2024-10-11 | 中国建设银行股份有限公司 | 基于物联网的款箱管理方法和系统 |
| CN114338150A (zh) * | 2021-12-28 | 2022-04-12 | 北京纬百科技有限公司 | 物联网设备的配网方法、存储介质、电子设备及智能门锁 |
| CN114120497A (zh) * | 2021-12-28 | 2022-03-01 | 深圳市欧瑞博科技股份有限公司 | 智能门锁的通信方法、装置、智能门锁及存储介质 |
| CN114255533B (zh) * | 2022-01-28 | 2024-04-16 | 无锡融卡科技有限公司 | 智能锁系统及其实现方法 |
| CN114448727B (zh) * | 2022-04-02 | 2022-06-21 | 中国信息通信研究院 | 基于工业互联网标识解析体系的信息处理方法及系统 |
| CN114826574B (zh) * | 2022-04-19 | 2024-10-18 | 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 | 智能家居安全通信系统及通信方法 |
| CN114863590A (zh) * | 2022-04-20 | 2022-08-05 | 东风汽车集团股份有限公司 | 一种通过移动终端控制车载保险箱的开启方法及装置 |
| CN115171245B (zh) * | 2022-06-09 | 2024-03-12 | 郑州信大捷安信息技术股份有限公司 | 一种基于hce的门锁安全认证方法及系统 |
| CN117517809A (zh) * | 2022-07-27 | 2024-02-06 | 深圳市中科创激光技术有限公司 | 箱体检测方法及装置 |
| CN115601861A (zh) * | 2022-09-22 | 2023-01-13 | 济南量子技术研究院(Cn) | 基于量子随机数的智能汽车门锁开闭方法及控制系统 |
| CN115915078B (zh) * | 2022-09-30 | 2024-11-05 | 国网冀北电力有限公司计量中心 | 一种基于3des的蓝牙通信电能表安全通信认证方法 |
| CN115822384B (zh) * | 2022-11-22 | 2025-10-10 | 临沂大学 | 一种智能锁管理系统及使用方法 |
| CN116798167A (zh) * | 2023-08-25 | 2023-09-22 | 广东星云开物科技股份有限公司 | 共享娱乐设备启动方法、系统及存储介质 |
| CN117071992B (zh) * | 2023-09-08 | 2025-12-02 | 浙江德施曼科技智能股份有限公司 | 具备智能锁芯的智能锁、带有智能锁的门及解锁方法 |
| FR3155603A1 (fr) * | 2023-11-22 | 2025-05-23 | Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives | Communication en champ proche sécurisée |
| DE102023133858A1 (de) * | 2023-12-04 | 2025-06-05 | Deutsche Post Ag | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Feststellen, ob eine Information zum Zugang zu einem Fach einer Fachanlage berechtigt |
| TWI881685B (zh) * | 2024-01-26 | 2025-04-21 | 琺博工業有限公司 | 電子門鎖控制系統及方法 |
| CN117743631A (zh) * | 2024-02-21 | 2024-03-22 | 深圳市卓悦智能技术有限公司 | 智能门铃的控制方法、装置、智能门铃及存储介质 |
| CN118351615A (zh) * | 2024-05-23 | 2024-07-16 | 广东开放大学(广东理工职业学院) | 一种基于物联网的数据采集验证方法及系统 |
| CN118644914B (zh) * | 2024-07-11 | 2024-11-26 | 合肥智辉空间科技有限责任公司 | 一种无人物联区域门锁控制方法及系统 |
| CN119479116B (zh) * | 2024-11-15 | 2025-11-04 | 青岛海尔科技有限公司 | 信息更新方法及装置、存储介质、电子装置 |
| CN120375497B (zh) * | 2025-06-26 | 2025-08-29 | 江苏国保信息系统测评中心有限公司 | 一种智能门锁的密码离线管理方法及系统 |
| CN121011027A (zh) * | 2025-09-16 | 2025-11-25 | 国网山西省电力有限公司超高压变电分公司 | 一种基于wapi网络的变电站有源锁具控制方法及系统 |
Citations (7)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN103578165A (zh) * | 2013-03-08 | 2014-02-12 | 高潮 | 一种防盗系统 |
| CN104806085A (zh) * | 2015-03-20 | 2015-07-29 | 云丁网络技术(北京)有限公司 | 一种智能门锁系统及其智能提醒方法 |
| US20160042581A1 (en) * | 2014-08-06 | 2016-02-11 | Che-Ming KU | Control method for smart lock, a smart lock, and a lock system |
| WO2016023558A1 (en) * | 2014-08-14 | 2016-02-18 | Poly-Care Aps | Method for operating a door lock by encrypted wireless signals |
| CN106408697A (zh) * | 2016-08-30 | 2017-02-15 | 广东金大田家居股份有限公司 | 一种智能门锁系统 |
| CN106504391A (zh) * | 2016-11-24 | 2017-03-15 | 北京爱接力科技发展有限公司 | 一种智能门禁的控制方法、装置及系统 |
| CN107038777A (zh) * | 2017-03-29 | 2017-08-11 | 云丁网络技术(北京)有限公司 | 一种基于智能门锁系统的安全通信方法及其智能门锁系统 |
Family Cites Families (11)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JP4613969B2 (ja) | 2008-03-03 | 2011-01-19 | ソニー株式会社 | 通信装置、及び通信方法 |
| US9078021B2 (en) * | 2013-01-16 | 2015-07-07 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Information processing apparatus, content transmission method and storage medium |
| US20150045013A1 (en) * | 2013-08-09 | 2015-02-12 | Directed, Llc | Multi-level vehicle remote start authentication method & system |
| KR101710317B1 (ko) | 2013-11-22 | 2017-02-24 | 퀄컴 인코포레이티드 | 차량 내의 다수의 모바일 컴퓨팅 디바이스들에 의해 제공된 선호도들에 기초하여 차량의 내면을 구성하기 위한 시스템 및 방법 |
| CN104537735A (zh) * | 2014-12-11 | 2015-04-22 | 应骏 | 电子锁及其解锁和设置方法 |
| WO2016130386A1 (en) * | 2015-02-13 | 2016-08-18 | Candy House Inc. | Control method for smart lock, a smart lock, and a lock system |
| US9877123B2 (en) * | 2015-07-02 | 2018-01-23 | Gn Hearing A/S | Method of manufacturing a hearing device and hearing device with certificate |
| CN105654580B (zh) * | 2015-07-28 | 2018-06-15 | 宇龙计算机通信科技(深圳)有限公司 | 访问控制方法及系统、电子锁、管理及访客终端 |
| CN105096419B (zh) * | 2015-07-31 | 2021-10-08 | 小米科技有限责任公司 | 开锁方法、装置、门锁及智能穿戴设备 |
| CN105894627B (zh) * | 2016-03-30 | 2019-04-16 | 北京千丁互联科技有限公司 | 一种蓝牙门禁设备、蓝牙门禁管理系统及方法 |
| CN106097486B (zh) * | 2016-05-26 | 2018-04-17 | 深圳市前海速普得技术有限公司 | 一种基于声波传输的门禁口令的验证方法和验证系统 |
-
2017
- 2017-03-29 CN CN201710198457.1A patent/CN107038777B/zh active Active
-
2018
- 2018-03-22 EP EP18774831.4A patent/EP3605475A4/en active Pending
- 2018-03-22 JP JP2020502749A patent/JP7152466B2/ja active Active
- 2018-03-22 WO PCT/CN2018/079999 patent/WO2018177188A1/zh not_active Ceased
- 2018-03-22 CN CN201880022578.3A patent/CN110462692B/zh active Active
-
2019
- 2019-09-29 US US16/586,995 patent/US11070364B2/en active Active
Patent Citations (7)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN103578165A (zh) * | 2013-03-08 | 2014-02-12 | 高潮 | 一种防盗系统 |
| US20160042581A1 (en) * | 2014-08-06 | 2016-02-11 | Che-Ming KU | Control method for smart lock, a smart lock, and a lock system |
| WO2016023558A1 (en) * | 2014-08-14 | 2016-02-18 | Poly-Care Aps | Method for operating a door lock by encrypted wireless signals |
| CN104806085A (zh) * | 2015-03-20 | 2015-07-29 | 云丁网络技术(北京)有限公司 | 一种智能门锁系统及其智能提醒方法 |
| CN106408697A (zh) * | 2016-08-30 | 2017-02-15 | 广东金大田家居股份有限公司 | 一种智能门锁系统 |
| CN106504391A (zh) * | 2016-11-24 | 2017-03-15 | 北京爱接力科技发展有限公司 | 一种智能门禁的控制方法、装置及系统 |
| CN107038777A (zh) * | 2017-03-29 | 2017-08-11 | 云丁网络技术(北京)有限公司 | 一种基于智能门锁系统的安全通信方法及其智能门锁系统 |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
| Title |
|---|
| See also references of EP3605475A4 * |
Cited By (9)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN109889596A (zh) * | 2018-12-29 | 2019-06-14 | 珠海汇金科技股份有限公司 | 智能锁绑定方法、智能锁及智能锁绑定系统 |
| EP3916701A4 (en) * | 2019-01-22 | 2022-10-19 | Bitkey Inc. | USAGE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, MANAGEMENT DEVICE, USAGE CONTROL DEVICE, USAGE MANAGEMENT METHOD AND COMPUTER READABLE PROGRAM |
| US12170733B2 (en) | 2019-01-22 | 2024-12-17 | Bitkey Inc. | Utilization management system, management device, utilization control device, utilization management method, and computer-readable program |
| EP3736780A1 (en) * | 2019-05-06 | 2020-11-11 | Universitat Pompeu Fabra | A method for remotely controlling features of a device and a remote keyless entry instrument |
| WO2021135593A1 (zh) * | 2019-12-31 | 2021-07-08 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种分享设备的方法及电子设备 |
| US12101396B2 (en) | 2019-12-31 | 2024-09-24 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. | Device sharing method and electronic device |
| US12183136B2 (en) | 2021-02-12 | 2024-12-31 | Invue Security Products Inc. | Merchandise display security systems and methods |
| CN113347613A (zh) * | 2021-04-15 | 2021-09-03 | 奇瑞商用车(安徽)有限公司 | 基于蓝牙数字钥匙的安全通信方法及系统 |
| CN113347613B (zh) * | 2021-04-15 | 2024-01-30 | 奇瑞商用车(安徽)有限公司 | 基于蓝牙数字钥匙的安全通信方法及系统 |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| JP7152466B2 (ja) | 2022-10-12 |
| CN107038777B (zh) | 2020-08-18 |
| CN107038777A (zh) | 2017-08-11 |
| EP3605475A1 (en) | 2020-02-05 |
| CN110462692A (zh) | 2019-11-15 |
| US20200028672A1 (en) | 2020-01-23 |
| JP2020519208A (ja) | 2020-06-25 |
| EP3605475A4 (en) | 2020-04-15 |
| US11070364B2 (en) | 2021-07-20 |
| CN110462692B (zh) | 2022-02-22 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN110462692B (zh) | 一种基于智能锁系统的安全通信方法及其智能锁系统 | |
| US10965468B2 (en) | Authenticated external biometric reader and verification device | |
| US11997193B2 (en) | Secure communication method and smart lock system based thereof | |
| TWI491790B (zh) | 智慧鎖具及其操作方法 | |
| CN104167029B (zh) | 一种智能锁具及其操作方法 | |
| JP4621200B2 (ja) | 通信装置、通信システム及び認証方法 | |
| CN109903433B (zh) | 一种基于人脸识别的门禁系统及门禁控制方法 | |
| TWI295030B (en) | Method for bootstrapping applications and services at different layers in a communications stack, apparatus that provides a device introduction framework, method for an introduction process, method for introducing two devices, method for establishing tru | |
| US9953145B2 (en) | Configuration method, configuration device, computer program product and control system | |
| WO2018133832A1 (zh) | 智能门锁的开锁方法、移动终端、智能门锁及云服务器 | |
| CN108055235A (zh) | 一种智能锁的控制方法、相关设备及系统 | |
| CN109618334B (zh) | 控制方法及相关设备 | |
| TW200423671A (en) | Apparatus and method simplifying an encrypted network | |
| CN105678871A (zh) | 临时开锁方法和系统、移动终端 | |
| WO2019237502A1 (zh) | 一种采用分节传输的智能家居动态加密通讯方法及系统 | |
| CN112530053B (zh) | 智能锁的控制方法、系统、锁设备、服务器及存储介质 | |
| CN112425116B (zh) | 智能门锁无线通信方法、智能门锁、网关及通信设备 | |
| CN110932951B (zh) | 一种智能家居控制方法和装置 | |
| KR101451163B1 (ko) | 무선 네트워크 접속 인증 방법 및 그 시스템 | |
| CN109547303A (zh) | 控制方法及相关设备 | |
| CN113593088A (zh) | 一种智能开锁方法、智能锁、移动终端及服务器 | |
| JP2018067908A (ja) | ヘッドレス電子デバイスの復元 | |
| EP3556051A1 (en) | Apparatuses, system, and methods for controlling an actuator through a wireless communications system | |
| Papatsaroucha et al. | A cloud-based key rolling technique for alleviating join procedure replay attacks in LoRaWAN-based wireless sensor networks | |
| CN110661803A (zh) | 一种闸门加密控制系统及方法 |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application |
Ref document number: 18774831 Country of ref document: EP Kind code of ref document: A1 |
|
| ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 2020502749 Country of ref document: JP Kind code of ref document: A |
|
| NENP | Non-entry into the national phase |
Ref country code: DE |
|
| ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 2018774831 Country of ref document: EP Effective date: 20191029 |