WO2022199569A1 - 一种终端设备的配置方法、装置和通信设备 - Google Patents

一种终端设备的配置方法、装置和通信设备 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2022199569A1
WO2022199569A1 PCT/CN2022/082192 CN2022082192W WO2022199569A1 WO 2022199569 A1 WO2022199569 A1 WO 2022199569A1 CN 2022082192 W CN2022082192 W CN 2022082192W WO 2022199569 A1 WO2022199569 A1 WO 2022199569A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
message
server
request message
terminal device
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/CN2022/082192
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
田野
粟栗
何申
杜海涛
马洁
姜文姝
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
China Mobile Communications Group Co Ltd
Research Institute of China Mobile Communication Co Ltd
Original Assignee
China Mobile Communications Group Co Ltd
Research Institute of China Mobile Communication Co Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by China Mobile Communications Group Co Ltd, Research Institute of China Mobile Communication Co Ltd filed Critical China Mobile Communications Group Co Ltd
Priority to CA3213048A priority Critical patent/CA3213048A1/en
Priority to AU2022245724A priority patent/AU2022245724B2/en
Priority to BR112023019397A priority patent/BR112023019397A2/pt
Priority to EP22774225.1A priority patent/EP4297443B1/en
Priority to MX2023011195A priority patent/MX2023011195A/es
Priority to US18/551,861 priority patent/US12490093B2/en
Priority to JP2023558176A priority patent/JP7766706B2/ja
Publication of WO2022199569A1 publication Critical patent/WO2022199569A1/zh
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
    • H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0433—Key management protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/40—Security arrangements using identity modules
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
    • H04W12/72—Subscriber identity

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the technical field of Internet of Vehicles, and in particular, to a configuration method, device and communication device of a terminal device.
  • C-V2X Cellular-Vehicle to X
  • vehicle networking management systems including vehicle driving status, road condition events, signal light information, etc.
  • GBA Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
  • C-V2X Service Provider virtual box
  • the virtual box is for the CA server (the C-V2X application server (C-V2X Application Server) in the figure corresponds to the NAF/AP network element one-to-one), which is a pair of operators.
  • the GBA session key used by the CA server to communicate with the IoV device is stored in the NAF/AP network element, the security protection operations such as message encryption and decryption, integrity protection, etc. are performed by the NAF/AP device.
  • NAF/AP is developed in accordance with the security technical standards of the communication industry, so the CA server cannot flexibly use the GBA session key, and the security protection operations performed may not necessarily meet the security technical requirements of the C-V2X vehicle networking industry. Difficulties brought by the industrial application of GBA scheme.
  • the online configuration method to complete the digital certificate configuration has extremely high design requirements for the security implementation of the C-V2X device.
  • these information cannot be simply operated by the client application, and executed on the general-purpose central processing unit (CPU, Central Processing Unit), internal/external memory, etc. on the device. Instead, it should be processed in a trusted security environment in combination with the generation and acquisition method of the key.
  • the existing configuration scheme lacks the overall security design and implementation on the device side, and cannot ensure the configuration security of the digital certificate.
  • Embodiments of the present application provide a configuration method, apparatus, and communication device for a terminal device.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a method for configuring a terminal device, the method comprising:
  • the terminal device generates a second key based on the first key, and encrypts and/or integrity protects the certificate request message based on the second key;
  • the method further includes: receiving, by the terminal device, a first response message from a server, and performing an integrity checksum on the first response message based on the second key /or decryption to obtain the digital certificate carried in the first response message.
  • the terminal device includes: an application client, a baseband chip, and a global subscriber identity module (USIM);
  • an application client a baseband chip
  • a global subscriber identity module USIM
  • the terminal device generates a second key based on the first key, and encrypts and/or integrity protects the certificate request message based on the second key, including:
  • the application client triggers, through the baseband chip, the USIM to generate a second key based on the first key
  • the application client generates a first certificate request message, and sends the first certificate request message to the USIM through the baseband chip;
  • the USIM generates a public-private key pair, adds the public key in the public-private key pair to the first certificate request message, and signs the first certificate request message with the private key in the public-private key pair, obtain a second certificate request message;
  • the USIM encrypts and/or integrity protects the second certificate request message based on the second key, and adds a first check value to the second certificate request message;
  • the USIM sends the second certificate request message after the above processing to the application client through the baseband chip.
  • the sending the first request message includes: the application client sends a first request message to the server, where the first request message includes encryption with the second key and/or the integrity-protected second certificate request message; the first request message further includes: a bootstrap transaction identifier (B-TID) and/or a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the server.
  • B-TID bootstrap transaction identifier
  • FQDN fully qualified domain name
  • the terminal device includes: an application client, a baseband chip, and a USIM;
  • the terminal device receives the first response message from the server, performs integrity check and/or decryption on the first response message based on the second key, and obtains the number carried in the first response message Certificates, including:
  • the application client receives the first response message from the server, and sends the first response message to the USIM through the baseband chip;
  • the USIM performs integrity check and/or decryption on the first response message based on the second key
  • the USIM obtains the digital certificate carried in the first response message, and stores the digital certificate in the security component.
  • the method further includes: the terminal device performs a Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) authentication process or an application-oriented authentication or key management (AKMA) authentication process, and negotiates with the network device about the the first key.
  • GBA Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
  • AKMA application-oriented authentication or key management
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a method for configuring a terminal device, the method includes: the server receives a first request message from the terminal device; the first request message includes a second key encrypted and / or integrity-protected certificate request message;
  • the server obtains the second key from a network device; the second key is generated by the network device based on the first key;
  • the server performs integrity check and/or decryption on the first request message based on the second key, and issues a digital certificate after authorizing the first request message;
  • the server sends a first response message to the terminal device, where the first response message includes the digital certificate.
  • the server sends a first response message to the terminal device, including:
  • the server constructs a first response message containing the digital certificate, encrypts and/or integrity protects the first response message based on the second key, and adds a second response message to the first response message. check value;
  • the first request message further includes: a bootstrap transaction identifier (B-TID);
  • the server obtains the second key from the network device, including:
  • the server queries whether there is a second key corresponding to the B-TID
  • the second key from the network device is obtained.
  • the server obtains the second key from the network device, including:
  • the server receives a second response message sent by the network device, where the second response message includes the second key.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a method for configuring a terminal device, the method includes: a network device generates a second key based on a pre-negotiated first key, and sends the second key to a server.
  • the method further includes: the network device and the terminal device negotiate the first key with the terminal device by performing a GBA authentication process or an AKMA authentication process.
  • the network device generates a second key based on a pre-negotiated first key, and sends the second key to the server, including:
  • the network device generates a second key based on the pre-negotiated first key, and sends a second response message to the server, where the second response message includes the second key.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides an apparatus for configuring a terminal device, where the apparatus includes: a first generating unit and a first communication unit; wherein,
  • the first generating unit is configured to generate a second key based on the first key, and encrypt and/or integrity protect the certificate request message based on the second key;
  • the first communication unit is configured to send a first request message, where the first request message includes the certificate request message encrypted and/or integrity protected by the second key.
  • the first communication unit is further configured to receive a first response message from a server, and perform an integrity checksum on the first response message based on the second key /or decryption to obtain the digital certificate carried in the first response message.
  • the first generating unit includes: an application client, a baseband chip, and a USIM;
  • the application client is configured to trigger the USIM to generate a second key based on the first key through the baseband chip; and is also configured to generate a first certificate request message, and send the USIM to the USIM through the baseband chip sending the first certificate request message;
  • the USIM is configured to generate a public-private key pair, add the public key in the public-private key pair to the first certificate request message, and use the private key in the public-private key pair to pair the first certificate request message Signing to obtain a second certificate request message; encrypting and/or integrity-protecting the second certificate request message based on the second key, and adding a first check value to the second certificate request message ; sending the second certificate request message encrypted and/or integrity protected by the second key to the application client through the baseband chip.
  • the application client is configured to send a first request message to the server through the first communication unit, where the first request message includes encryption encrypted by the second key and/or the integrity-protected second certificate request message; the first request message further includes: B-TID and/or server FQDN.
  • the first generating unit includes: an application client, a baseband chip, and a USIM;
  • the application client is configured to receive a first response message from the server through the first communication unit, and send the first response message to the USIM through the baseband chip;
  • the USIM is configured to perform an integrity check and/or decryption on the first response message based on the second key; after the verification is passed, obtain the digital certificate carried in the first response message, and store it in the first response message.
  • the digital certificate is stored in the security component.
  • the apparatus further includes a first execution unit, configured to execute a GBA authentication process or an AKMA authentication process, and negotiate the first key with the network device.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides an apparatus for configuring a terminal device, the apparatus includes: a second communication unit and a first verification unit; wherein,
  • the second communication unit is configured to receive a first request message from a terminal device; the first request message includes a certificate request message encrypted and/or integrity-protected by the second key;
  • the first verification unit is configured to obtain the second key from a network device; the second key is generated by the network device based on the first key; and is also configured to be based on the second key Perform integrity check and/or decryption on the first request message, and issue a digital certificate after authorizing the first request message;
  • the second communication unit is further configured to send a first response message to the terminal device, where the first response message includes the digital certificate.
  • the second communication unit is configured to construct a first response message including the digital certificate, encrypt the first response message based on the second key and /or integrity protection, adding a second check value to the first response message, and sending the above-processed first response message to the terminal device.
  • the first request message further includes: a bootstrap transaction identifier (B-TID);
  • the device further includes a second execution unit configured to query whether there is a second key corresponding to the B-TID; when the query result is that the second key corresponding to the B-TID does not exist, The second key from the network device is obtained through the second communication unit.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides an apparatus for configuring a terminal device, where the apparatus includes a second generating unit and a third communication unit; wherein,
  • the second generating unit configured to generate a second key based on the pre-negotiated first key
  • the third communication unit is configured to send the second key to the server.
  • the apparatus further includes a third execution unit configured to negotiate the first key with the terminal device by executing the GBA authentication process or the AKMA authentication process with the terminal device.
  • the second generating unit is configured to generate a corresponding second key for each server based on the pre-negotiated first key
  • the third communication unit is configured to send the corresponding second key to each server respectively.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a method for configuring a terminal device, the method comprising: the terminal device generates a second key based on the first key, and based on the second key, a part of the first message is paired or all encrypted and/or integrity protected; send the first message.
  • the method further includes: receiving, by the terminal device, a second message from a server, and performing an integrity check on the second message based on the second key and/or decrypt.
  • the terminal device includes: an application client, a baseband chip, and a global subscriber identity module (USIM);
  • an application client a baseband chip
  • a global subscriber identity module USIM
  • the terminal device generates a second key based on the first key, and encrypts and/or integrity protects part or all of the first message based on the second key, including:
  • the application client triggers, through the baseband chip, the USIM to generate a second key based on the first key
  • the application client generates a first message, and sends the first message to the USIM through the baseband chip;
  • the USIM encrypts and/or integrity protects part or all of the first message based on the second key
  • the USIM sends the above-processed first message to the application client through the baseband chip.
  • the sending the first message includes: the application client sends the first message to the server;
  • the first message further includes: a bootstrap transaction identifier (B-TID) and/or a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the server; or includes: an application-oriented authentication or key management (AKMA) key identifier (A- KID) and/or FQDN.
  • B-TID bootstrap transaction identifier
  • FQDN fully qualified domain name
  • AKMA application-oriented authentication or key management
  • the terminal device includes: an application client, a baseband chip, and a global subscriber identity module (USIM);
  • an application client a baseband chip
  • a global subscriber identity module USIM
  • the terminal device receives the second message from the server, and performs integrity check and/or decryption on the second message based on the second key, including:
  • the application client receives the second message from the server, and sends the second message to the USIM through the baseband chip;
  • the USIM performs an integrity check and/or decryption of the second message based on the second key.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a method for configuring a terminal device, the method comprising:
  • the server receives the first message from the terminal device, part or all of the first message is encrypted and/or integrity protected by the second key;
  • the server obtains the second key from a network device; the second key is generated by the network device based on the first key;
  • the server performs an integrity check and/or decryption of the first message based on the second key.
  • the method further includes: the server encrypts and/or integrity protects part or all of the second message based on the second key; and sends the second message.
  • the first message further includes: a bootstrap transaction identifier (B-TID), or an application-oriented authentication or key management (AKMA) key identifier (A-KID) );
  • B-TID bootstrap transaction identifier
  • AKMA application-oriented authentication or key management
  • A-KID application-oriented authentication or key management
  • the server obtains the second key from the network device, including:
  • the server queries whether there is a second key corresponding to the B-TID or the A-KID;
  • the second key from the network device is obtained.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides an apparatus for configuring a terminal device, the apparatus includes: a third generating unit and a fourth communication unit; wherein,
  • the third generating unit is configured to generate a second key based on the first key, and encrypt and/or integrity protect part or all of the first message based on the second key;
  • the fourth communication unit is configured to send the first message.
  • the fourth communication unit is further configured to receive a second message from a server, and perform an integrity check on the second message based on the second key and/or decrypt.
  • the third generating unit includes: an application client, a baseband chip, and a global subscriber identity module (USIM);
  • an application client a baseband chip
  • a global subscriber identity module USIM
  • the application client is configured to trigger the USIM to generate a second key based on the first key through the baseband chip; and is also configured to generate a first message and send the information to the USIM through the baseband chip. the first message;
  • the USIM is configured to encrypt and/or integrity protect a part or all of the first message based on the second key; and is also configured to send a message that has undergone the above-mentioned processing to the application client through the baseband chip after the first message.
  • the application client is further configured to send the first message to the server;
  • the first message further includes: a bootstrap transaction identifier (B-TID) and/or a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the server; or includes: an application-oriented authentication or key management (AKMA) key identifier (A- KID) and/or FQDN.
  • B-TID bootstrap transaction identifier
  • FQDN fully qualified domain name
  • AKMA application-oriented authentication or key management
  • the third generating unit includes: an application client, a baseband chip, and a global subscriber identity module (USIM);
  • an application client a baseband chip
  • a global subscriber identity module USIM
  • the application client configured to receive the second message from the server, and send the second message to the USIM through the baseband chip;
  • the USIM is configured to perform integrity check and/or decryption on the second message based on the second key.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides an apparatus for configuring a terminal device, the apparatus includes: a fifth communication unit and a second verification unit; wherein,
  • the fifth communication unit is configured to receive a first message from the terminal device, and part or all of the first message is encrypted and/or integrity protected by the second key;
  • the second verification unit is configured to obtain the second key from a network device; the second key is generated by the network device based on the first key; and is also configured to be based on the second key Perform integrity check and/or decryption on the first message.
  • the apparatus further includes a fourth generating unit configured to encrypt and/or integrity protect part or all of the second message based on the second key;
  • the fifth communication unit is further configured to send a second message.
  • the first message further includes: a bootstrap transaction identifier (B-TID), or an application-oriented authentication or key management (AKMA) key identifier (A-KID) );
  • B-TID bootstrap transaction identifier
  • AKMA application-oriented authentication or key management
  • A-KID application-oriented authentication or key management
  • the apparatus further includes a fourth execution unit configured to query whether there is a second key corresponding to the B-TID or the A-KID;
  • the second verification unit is configured to, when the query result obtained by the fourth execution unit is that there is no second key corresponding to the B-TID or the A-KID, pass the Five communication units obtain the second key from the network device.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored, and when the program is executed by a processor, implements the first aspect, the second aspect, and the third aspect of the embodiment of the present application , the steps of the method of the seventh aspect or the eighth aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a communication device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor, where the processor implements the present application when the processor executes the program Embodiments of the method of the first aspect, the second aspect, the third aspect, the seventh aspect or the eighth aspect.
  • the terminal device In the configuration method, apparatus, and communication device of a terminal device provided by the embodiments of the present application, the terminal device generates a second key based on a first key, and encrypts and/or integrity protects a certificate request message based on the second key; Sending a request message, the request message includes the certificate request message encrypted and/or integrity protected by the second key; the server receives the request message from the terminal device; the request message includes the certificate request message encrypted and/or integrity-protected by the second key; key encryption and/or integrity protected certificate request message; obtain the second key from the network device; the second key is generated by the network device based on the first key; based on the second key Perform integrity check and/or decryption on the request message, and issue a digital certificate after the request message is authorized; send a response message to the terminal device, where the response message includes the digital certificate.
  • the secure configuration of the digital certificate of the C-V2X terminal device can be realized in a "one-key configuration" manner, without the need to transform the security environment of the production line, nor to perform irrigation by a professional security agency. It can improve the flexibility of digital certificate configuration, reduce deployment difficulty and investment cost.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the GBA architecture
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart 1 of a configuration method of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a GBA enhanced architecture in an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of an optional architecture of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 5 is a second schematic flowchart of a configuration method for a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 6 is a third schematic flowchart of a configuration method for a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram 1 of an interaction flow of a configuration method for a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram 1 of the composition structure of a configuration apparatus of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 9 is a second schematic diagram of the composition and structure of a configuration apparatus of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 10 is a third schematic structural diagram of a configuration of a configuration apparatus of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 11 is a fourth schematic flowchart of a configuration method for a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 12 is a fifth schematic flowchart of a configuration method for a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 13 is a second schematic diagram of an interaction flow of a configuration method for a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 14 is a fourth schematic diagram of the composition and structure of a configuration apparatus of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 15 is a schematic diagram 5 of the composition structure of a configuration apparatus of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 16 is a schematic structural diagram of a hardware composition of a communication device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart 1 of a configuration method for a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application; as shown in FIG. 2 , the method includes:
  • Step 101 The terminal device generates a second key based on the first key, and encrypts and/or integrity protects the certificate request message based on the second key;
  • Step 102 Send a first request message, where the first request message includes the certificate request message encrypted and/or integrity protected by the second key.
  • the configuration method (hereinafter referred to as the method) of a terminal device in this embodiment is applied to a terminal device, and the terminal device may specifically be a car networking terminal device (also referred to as a C-V2X Device).
  • the IoV terminal device may be, for example, an on-board unit (OBU, On Board Unit), a roadside unit (RSU, Road Side Unit), etc.; in other optional embodiments, the IoV terminal device may also be Pedestrian handheld devices, wearable devices, etc.
  • the method further includes: the terminal device performs a GBA authentication process or an application-oriented authentication and key management (AKMA, Authentication and Key Management for Applications) authentication process, and communicates with the network device The first key is negotiated.
  • AKMA application-oriented authentication and key management
  • the network device here may specifically be a NAF or an AP under the GBA authentication process. Furthermore, under the AKMA authentication process, the network device may be a Network Exposure Function (NEF, Network Exposure Function), and the NEF is used to open network capabilities to other network elements.
  • NEF Network Exposure Function
  • a possible implementation manner for the terminal and the network device to negotiate the first key in advance is (here, the GBA-based authentication process of the C-V2X device is taken as an example):
  • the C-V2X device performs AKA authentication with the BSF, and after the BSF returns a 200 OK response, the C-V2X device generates a GBA session key, that is, the first key. Subsequently, when the C-V2X device accesses the NAF/AP, the NAF/AP requests the BSF to negotiate and generate the same GBA session key, that is, the first key.
  • the NAF/AP here provides GBA services to C-V2X service providers (eg, C-V2X application servers). The NAF/AP obtains the GBA session key, that is, the first key, from the BSF, thereby completing the process of negotiating the first key between the terminal and the network device.
  • the C-V2X device When the C-V2X device needs to securely interact with the server for service messages (such as applying for a digital certificate), the C-V2X device initiates an application request to the server.
  • the server accesses the NAF/AP through a pre-established secure connection with the network device, requests the NAF/AP to generate a second key for the current service based on the first key, and obtains the generated second key.
  • the C-V2X terminal and the server can perform security processing such as encryption and integrity protection on the exchanged service messages, which is equivalent to establishing a secure communication channel between the C-V2X terminal and the server.
  • the server here may be a C-V2X application server (C-V2X application server), and the C-V2X application server may be a CA server (CA is Certificate Authority, that is, a certificate authority).
  • CA Certificate Authority
  • the CA server can be: a registered CA server or an authorized CA server. That is, if the C-V2X device wants to apply for a registration certificate, the server should be the registration CA server (Enrolment CA server or ECA); if the C-V2X device wants to apply for an authorization certificate or an application certificate or an identity certificate, the server should be an authorized CA server (Enrolment CA server or ECA).
  • Authorization CA server or ACA Authorization CA server or ACA).
  • the CA server can be deployed by the MNO itself or by a third party, so that it can provide certificate services for C-V2X devices.
  • the establishment of a secure communication channel between the C-V2X terminal and the server means that the terminal device will obtain a first key after passing the above GBA authentication process, and will subsequently generate a second key based on the first key.
  • the server side can obtain the second key from the network device (the network device NAF/AP has negotiated the first key with the terminal in advance, and when the server needs the second key, it generates the second key based on the first key. key, return the second key to the server, and this process will be described in detail later).
  • both the terminal device and the server have obtained the second key, and based on the second key, the security protection and transmission and reception of messages are performed, so that a secure channel (or referred to as a secure connection, a secure chain, or a secure channel) is actually established between the terminal device and the server. route, etc.) for well-protected messages sent and received based on the second key.
  • a secure channel or referred to as a secure connection, a secure chain, or a secure channel
  • the first key here may also be called a shared session key; the second key is generated based on the first key, and the second key may also be called an application session key or a session key.
  • the terminal device applying this method can be deployed in the GBA enhanced architecture as shown in FIG. 3 .
  • the network device NAF/AP is shared by a few C-V2X application servers (such as CA servers) (see the C-V2X Service Provider (C-V2X Service Provider) virtual box in Figure 3, the virtual box It does not include NAF/AP network elements, but NAF/AP network elements are deployed on the mobile network operator (MNO, Mobile Network Operator) side, and multiple CA servers (C-V2X Application Server (C-V2X Application Server) in the figure Server)) share a NAF/AP network element). It is not difficult to understand that sharing one NAF/AP network element with multiple CA servers can greatly reduce deployment costs and maintenance difficulties.
  • C-V2X application servers such as CA servers
  • the network device NAF/AP further provides each C-V2X application server (such as CA server) derives the GBA application session key (represented by K*), and shares K* with the CA server.
  • each C-V2X application server such as CA server
  • the C-V2X device also obtains the same K* from the local as in the GBA boot process, and then provides K* to the upper-layer C-V2X Application Client (C-V2X Application Client) call.
  • the CA server and the C-V2X device share the same GBA application session key K*. They can use K* to achieve mutual authentication, protect transmitted messages, establish secure channels, etc., and then use the shared GBA application session key K* to protect the C-V2X certificate application and issuance process.
  • the method of this embodiment can allow the user to realize the digital certificate configuration through a "one-click" trigger.
  • the user can easily trigger the terminal to start the certificate configuration by clicking the trigger on the human-machine interface on the terminal or triggering through other interface software. operate.
  • the terminal After receiving the trigger command, the terminal can automatically complete access authentication, secure channel establishment, key generation, digital certificate application, and subsequent digital certificate download and secure storage operations with the server to realize the initial security configuration of the terminal device.
  • this method has a high degree of automation, lower application and maintenance costs, fewer manual operation steps, and is easy to popularize.
  • the terminal device includes: an application client (which may also be referred to as a C-V2X application client), a baseband chip (which may also be referred to as a Device modem, which is used to access 4G or 5G network) and a global subscriber identity module (USIM, Universal Subscriber Identity Module); the terminal device generates a second key based on the first key, and encrypts and/or completes the certificate request message based on the second key protection, including: the application client triggers the USIM to generate a second key based on the first key through the baseband chip; the application client generates a first certificate request message, and sends a The USIM sends the first certificate request message; the USIM generates a public-private key pair, adds the public key in the public-private key pair in the first certificate request message, and uses the private key in the public-private key pair.
  • an application client which may also be referred to as a C-V2X application client
  • a baseband chip which may also be referred to as
  • the first certificate request message is signed by the key to obtain the second certificate request message; the USIM encrypts and/or integrity protects the second certificate request message based on the second key, and the second certificate request message is encrypted and/or integrity protected by the USIM based on the second key.
  • a first check value is added to the second certificate request message; the USIM sends the second certificate request message that has undergone the above processing to the application client through the baseband chip.
  • the second key here may be composed of only one key or multiple keys (that is, the multiple keys here are all generated based on the first key, collectively referred to as the second key ).
  • the second key is composed of a variety of keys, for example, an encryption key and/or an integrity protection key may be included, and of course other types of keys may also be included according to actual needs.
  • the process that the USIM encrypts the second certificate request message based on the second key includes: the USIM encrypts the plaintext second certificate request message by using the encryption key in the second key to make it become ciphertext.
  • the process that the USIM performs integrity protection on the second certificate request message based on the second key includes: the USIM performs integrity protection on the message by using the integrity protection key in the second key, for example, it can be A first check value is calculated for the encrypted message by using the integrity protection key, and then the calculated first check value is added to the second certificate request message.
  • the first check value can be a hash operation message authentication code (HMAC, Hash-based Message Authentication Code) value
  • HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of an optional architecture of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in FIG. 4 , the terminal device may include an application (Application) layer, a user library (User libraries), a Linux kernel (Linux Kernel), and hardware ( Hardware) layer and so on.
  • the application layer can include CA management application and V2X application;
  • the user library includes GBA interface library, USIM interface library, hardware security module (HSM, Hardware Security Module) interface library and LTE-V2X interface library, etc.;
  • hardware layer includes HSM, LTE-V2X communication module and LTE-Uu communication module, LTE-Uu communication module may include baseband chip and USIM.
  • the LTE-Uu communication module, LTE-V2X communication module and HSM are implemented as discrete modules or components, or can also be packaged and integrated into one module/module, but this does not affect the logical function division between them .
  • the CA management application (that is, the CA application client) is the control software for the terminal device (such as the C-V2X terminal device) to realize the "initial security one-key configuration", which is responsible for the logic of the entire business process control.
  • V2X application also known as C-V2X application
  • C-V2X application is a service application module for terminal equipment to realize V2X direct communication through the PC5/V5 interface, and is responsible for the sending and receiving control of direct communication service messages. It accesses the LTE-V2X communication module at the hardware layer by calling the LTE-V2X interface library, and realizes C-V2X service interaction with other terminal devices.
  • the GBA interface library, the USIM interface library, and the HSM interface library are the calling interfaces opened by the underlying hardware modules of the terminal to the upper-layer applications. They are respectively used to call the GBA security access authentication capability supported by the LTE-Uu communication module and the digital certificate management application provided by the USIM. capabilities and security capabilities, as well as secure storage and computing capabilities provided by HSMs.
  • composition architecture of the terminal device in the embodiment of the present application is not limited to that shown in FIG. 4 , and other architectural forms may also fall within the protection scope of the embodiment of the present application.
  • the application client in this embodiment is responsible for implementing the function of the CA management application, and is responsible for the management of the digital certificate of the terminal device. For details, refer to the CA management application in FIG. 4 .
  • the application client triggers the USIM to generate the second key based on the first key by calling the USIM interface library through the baseband chip.
  • the application client can generate a first certificate request message according to the "one-key trigger", call the USIM reconstruction certificate request interface (that is, the first USIM interface), and send the first certificate request message to the USIM through the baseband chip;
  • the first USIM interface described in this embodiment is not limited to being a USIM reconstruction certificate request interface, and other interface names used for reconstructing a certificate request may also be within the protection scope of this embodiment of the present application.
  • the USIM After receiving the first certificate request message, the USIM can generate a public-private key pair based on the random number generator inside the Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC, Universal Integrated Circuit Card), and complete the certificate request according to the requirements of the protocol format of the relevant C-V2X specifications message, add the public key in the public-private key pair to the first certificate request message, and use the private key in the public-private key pair to sign the first certificate request message to obtain the second certificate request message.
  • USIM is based on the first certificate request message.
  • the second certificate request is encrypted and/or integrity protected by the second key.
  • the USIM sends the second certificate request message processed above to the application client through the baseband chip and through the interface library.
  • the UICC here is a kind of security hardware with a security level of EAL 4+, based on which the USIM function can be implemented, and the security of Ks_int_NAF (that is, the first key) can be guaranteed.
  • UICC can be understood as a general architecture, or can be understood as a security carrier.
  • the USIM function is realized, that is, it becomes a USIM.
  • UICC can also implement many applications, that is, the architecture can support the implementation of many functions.
  • the USIM is implemented, so the USIM also has high security, and then the certificate public and private key pairs are generated in the USIM.
  • the digital certificate in this embodiment may also be called an Enrollment Certificate (EC, Enrollment Certificate), which is used to identify a trusted terminal device. Therefore, it is necessary to implement the initial security of the digital certificate on the terminal device in a safe method. configuration.
  • the server in this embodiment may be an ECA server, that is, an authorized CA server.
  • the sending the first request message includes: the application client sends a first request message to the server, where the first request message includes encryption with the second key and/or the integrity-protected second certificate request message; the first request message also includes: a bootstrapping transaction identifier (B-TID, Bootstrapping-Transaction Identifier) and/or a server fully qualified domain name (FQDN, Fully Qualified Domain Name) Domain Name).
  • B-TID bootstrapping transaction identifier
  • FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name
  • the method further includes: receiving, by the terminal device, a first response message from a server, and performing an integrity checksum on the first response message based on the second key /or decryption to obtain the digital certificate carried in the first response message.
  • the first response message may be carried by a HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP, HyperText Transfer Protocol) message, for example, may be carried by an HTTP 200 OK message.
  • HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
  • the terminal device includes: an application client, a baseband chip, and a USIM; the terminal device receives a first response message from the server, and based on the second key pair all performing integrity check and/or decryption on the first response message to obtain the digital certificate carried in the first response message, including: receiving, by the application client, the first response message from the server, and The baseband chip sends the first response message to the USIM; the USIM performs integrity verification and/or decryption on the first response message based on the second key; after the verification is passed, the USIM obtains The digital certificate carried in the first response message, and the digital certificate is stored in the security component.
  • the application client receives the first response message from the CA server, and calls the USIM security check interface (ie the second USIM interface) to send the first response message to the USIM through the baseband chip; of course, , the second USIM interface described in this embodiment is not limited to being a USIM security verification interface, and other interfaces used for security verification may also be within the protection scope of this embodiment of the present application.
  • the USIM performs integrity check and/or decryption on the first response message based on the second key, wherein the first response message carries a second check value, and the integrity check is to verify the The second check value carried in the first response message; wherein, optionally, the second check value may also be an HMAC value.
  • the USIM may calculate based on some bits in the message to obtain a check value, and then compare the check value with the second check value, and if the comparison is consistent, it indicates that the integrity check is passed. After the verification is passed, the USIM obtains the digital certificate carried in the first response message.
  • the USIM stores the digital certificate in a security component.
  • the USIM (which may also include the HSM) is a local security entity/module of the terminal device, and can provide a reliable security environment for data computing, storage, and processing.
  • keys such as the first key, sensitive parameters such as public and private keys
  • FIG. 5 is a second schematic flowchart of a configuration method for a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application; as shown in FIG. 5 , the method includes:
  • Step 201 the server receives the first request message from the terminal device; the first request message includes the certificate request message encrypted and/or integrity protected by the second key;
  • Step 202 Obtain the second key from a network device; the second key is generated by the network device based on the first key;
  • Step 203 Perform integrity check and/or decryption on the first request message based on the second key, and issue a digital certificate after authorizing the first request message;
  • Step 204 Send a first response message to the terminal device, where the first response message includes the digital certificate.
  • the terminal device can automatically complete server access authentication, establishment of a secure channel, key generation, application for a digital certificate and subsequent digital certificate based on the GBA technical mechanism or the AKMA authentication mechanism. Operations such as certificate download and secure storage realize the initial security configuration of the terminal device.
  • the server receives the first request message from the terminal device through the secure channel established above.
  • the server may receive the first request message from the terminal device through the network device, that is, the first request message is sent by the terminal device, arrives at the network device, and then sends the first request message to the server via the network device.
  • the server since the first request message includes a certificate request message encrypted and/or integrity-protected by the second key, the server needs to obtain the above-mentioned second key.
  • the server obtains the second key from a network device.
  • the terminal device performs the GBA authentication process or the AKMA authentication process
  • the terminal device and the network device negotiate a first key, and the first key may also be referred to as a shared session key.
  • the obtaining, by the server, the second key from the network device includes: the server sending a second request message to the network device, where the second request message is used to request the network device second key; the server receives a second response message sent by the network device, where the second response message includes the second key.
  • the server may send a second request message to the network device, where the second request message is used to request the second key; then, after the network device receives the second request message, based on the pre-negotiated first key The key generates a second key, and then sends a second response message to the server, where the second response message includes the second key, thereby enabling the server to obtain the second key.
  • the network device may also generate a second key based on the pre-negotiated first key, and send the second key to the server after sending it to the server. During the process of the first request message, the second key is sent to the server.
  • the first request message further includes: B-TID; the server obtaining the second key from the network device includes: the server querying whether there is a connection with the The second key corresponding to the B-TID is obtained; when the query result is that there is no second key corresponding to the B-TID, the second key from the network device is obtained.
  • the server may obtain the second key corresponding to the B-TID in advance. Then after receiving the first request message, you can first query whether there is a second key corresponding to the B-TID through the B-TID carried in the first request message; In the case of the second key corresponding to the TID, the second key from the network device is obtained; in the case where the second key corresponding to the B-TID exists, the B-TID corresponding to the B-TID can be directly obtained the second key.
  • the server since the message sent by the terminal device is encrypted and/or integrity protected by the second key, after obtaining the second key, the server completes the first request message based on the second key. and/or decryption, and issue a digital certificate after the authorization of the first request message is passed.
  • the certificate request message further includes a first check value
  • the first check value may be a HAMC value
  • the server may calculate based on some bits in the first request message to obtain a check value, and then compare the check value with the first check value, and if the comparison is consistent, it indicates that the integrity check is passed.
  • the sending, by the server, a first response message to the terminal device includes: the server constructing, by the server, a first response message including the digital certificate, based on the second key Encryption and/or integrity protection are performed on the first response message, a second check value is added to the first response message, and the first response message processed above is sent to the terminal device.
  • the addition of the second check value here is also a part of the integrity protection process for the first response message. In order to explain more clearly how subsequent terminals process based on the first response message, this embodiment will only add This step of the second check value is emphasized.
  • the server constructs a first response message (or certificate response message) according to the protocol format requirements of the relevant C-V2X specifications, and calculates based on some bits in the first response message, The second check value is obtained, the second check value is added to the first response message, and the first response message processed above is sent to the terminal device.
  • the first response message may be carried by an HTTP message, for example, may be carried by an HTTP 200 OK message.
  • FIG. 6 is a third schematic flowchart of a configuration method for a terminal device according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in FIG. 6 , the method includes:
  • Step 301 the network device generates a second key based on the pre-negotiated first key
  • Step 302 Send the second key to the server.
  • the network device may specifically be a NAF/AP.
  • the terminal device performs the GBA authentication process or the AKMA authentication process, and starts to establish a secure access connection (or secure channel, secure link, etc.) with the server. After the authentication is completed, the terminal device and the network device have negotiated the first key.
  • the first key may also be referred to as a shared session key.
  • the network device may receive a second request message from the server, where the second request message is used to request a second key, and the network device generates the second key based on the pre-negotiated first key. key, and then send a second response message to the server, where the second response message includes the second key, thereby enabling the server to obtain the second key.
  • the network device may also generate a second key based on the pre-negotiated first key, and send it to the server During the process of the first request message, the second key is sent to the server.
  • the method further includes: the network device and the terminal device negotiate the first key with the terminal device by performing a GBA authentication process or an AKMA authentication process.
  • the secure configuration of the digital certificate of the C-V2X terminal device can be realized in a "one-key configuration" manner, without the need to transform the security environment of the production line, nor to perform irrigation by a professional security agency. It can improve the flexibility of digital certificate configuration, reduce deployment difficulty and investment cost.
  • the terminal device is a C-V2X device (C-V2X Device) and the network device is a NAF/AP as an example for description.
  • the C-V2X device includes a USIM, a baseband chip and an application client; the baseband chip may also be called a Device Modem, and the application client may also be called a (C-V2X Application Client).
  • the CA server is called the application server or C-V2X Application Server (C-V2X Application Server) in this example.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram 1 of an interaction flow of a configuration method of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application; as shown in FIG. 7 , the method includes:
  • Step 401 The C-V2X application client initiates a GBA start request to the baseband chip.
  • the application client invokes the underlying baseband chip through the GBA interface library to start the GBA authentication process, and starts to establish a secure access connection to the CA server (such as the ECA server).
  • CA server such as the ECA server
  • Step 402 Execute the GBA authentication process, and negotiate the shared session key Ks_int_NAF (ie, the first key in the foregoing embodiment) with the NAF/AP.
  • Ks_int_NAF the shared session key
  • Step 403 The baseband chip sends a GBA response corresponding to the GBA start request to the C-V2X application client.
  • Steps 404 to 408 In the case of using the GBA enhancement technology, the C-V2X application client transmits a message to the USIM through an interface call, that is, calling the USIM interface library (for example, the USIM reconstruction certificate request interface), to trigger the USIM to generate a message based on Ks_int_NAF
  • the application session key K* (ie the second key)
  • the USIM returns through the baseband chip and the interface, that is, the USIM interface library is called to transmit a message to the C-V2X application client to inform the C-V2X application client that the application session has been generated Key K*.
  • the message sent by the C-V2X application client to the USIM may carry the B-TID, IMPI and NAF identifier (ID); after receiving the message, the USIM generates the application session key K* based on Ks_int_NAF.
  • the C-V2X application client composes a certificate request message (ie, the aforementioned first certificate request message), and prepares to apply for a digital certificate from the CA server.
  • the C-V2X application client calls through the interface, that is, calls the USIM reconstruction certificate request interface, and transmits a message to the USIM through the baseband chip.
  • the transmitted message carries the prepared certificate request message (that is, the first certificate request in the foregoing embodiment). information).
  • Step 411 After receiving the certificate request message, the USIM generates a public-private key pair, adds the public key in the public-private key pair to the certificate request message, and signs the certificate request message with the private key in the public-private key pair, Obtaining a second certificate request message; encrypting and/or integrity-protecting the second certificate request message based on the second key, and adding an HMAC value to the second certificate request message.
  • the USIM performs the following operations:
  • Steps 412 to 413 the USIM returns through the baseband chip and the interface, that is, by calling the USIM interface library to transmit a message to the C-V2X application client, and the transmitted message contains the application session key K* encryption and/or integrity protection. the second certificate request message.
  • Step 414 The C-V2X application client sends a request message to the CA server, and the request message carries the K*-protected second certificate request message, B-TID, Server FQDN and other information.
  • the request message is transmitted to the CA server via the NAF/AP.
  • Steps 415 to 417 The CA server interacts with the NAF/AP through the pre-established security channel, requests the NAF/AP to generate the application session key K* based on Ks_int_NAF, and obtains the application session key K* and related information.
  • the relevant information may include, for example, the lifetime of the application session key K* and the like.
  • NAF/AP can send application session key K* and related information to CA server through HTTP 200 OK response message.
  • the request message sent by the CA server to the NAF/AP may further include information such as B-TID, server FQDN (Server FQDN).
  • Step 418 after the CA server obtains the application session key K*, performs integrity check and/or decryption on the request message based on the application session key K*, and issues a digital certificate after authorizing the request message;
  • the response message of the digital certificate is encrypted and/or integrity protected based on the application session key K*, and the HMAC value is added to the response message.
  • the CA server can perform the following operations:
  • Step 419 The CA server returns a response message protected by the application session key K* to the C-V2X application client; exemplarily, the response message may be carried by an HTTP 200 OK message.
  • Step 420-Step 421 the C-V2X application client calls through the interface, that is, calls the USIM security check interface, and transmits a message to the USIM via the baseband chip, and the transmitted message carries the above-mentioned response message protected by the application session key K* .
  • Step 422-Step 424 the USIM uses the application session key K* to perform integrity verification and/or decryption on the response message; after the verification is successful, the USIM securely stores the digital certificate issued by the CA server in the security component, and passes the interface Return, transmit the result status indication to the C-V2X application client via the baseband chip.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram 1 of the composition structure of a configuration apparatus of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application; as shown in FIG. 8 , the apparatus includes: a first generation unit 11 and a first communication unit 12; wherein,
  • the first generating unit 11 is configured to generate a second key based on the first key, and encrypt and/or integrity protect the certificate request message based on the second key;
  • the first communication unit 12 is configured to send a first request message, where the first request message includes the certificate request message encrypted and/or integrity protected by the second key.
  • the first communication unit 12 is further configured to receive a first response message from a server, and perform an integrity check on the first response message based on the second key and/or decryption to obtain the digital certificate carried in the first response message.
  • the first generating unit 11 includes: an application client, a baseband chip, and a USIM;
  • the application client is configured to trigger the USIM to generate a second key based on the first key through the baseband chip; and is also configured to generate a first certificate request message, and send the USIM to the USIM through the baseband chip sending the first certificate request message;
  • the USIM is configured to generate a public-private key pair, add the public key in the public-private key pair to the first certificate request message, and use the private key in the public-private key pair to pair the first certificate request message Signing to obtain a second certificate request message; encrypting and/or integrity-protecting the second certificate request message based on the second key, and adding a first check value to the second certificate request message ; sending the second certificate request message encrypted and/or integrity protected by the second key to the application client through the baseband chip.
  • the application client is configured to send a first request message to the server through the first communication unit 12, where the first request message includes the second key
  • the encrypted and/or integrity-protected second certificate request message; the first request message further includes: B-TID and/or server FQDN.
  • the first generating unit 11 includes: an application client, a baseband chip, and a USIM;
  • the application client is configured to receive the first response message from the server through the first communication unit 12, and send the first response message to the USIM through the baseband chip;
  • the USIM is configured to perform an integrity check and/or decryption on the first response message based on the second key; after the verification is passed, obtain the digital certificate carried in the first response message, and store it in the first response message.
  • the digital certificate is stored in the security component.
  • the apparatus further includes a first execution unit, configured to execute a GBA authentication process or an AKMA authentication process, and negotiate the first key with the network device.
  • the first generation unit 11, the first communication unit 12 and the first execution unit in the device can all be composed of a central processing unit (CPU, Central Processing Unit), a digital signal processor ( DSP, Digital Signal Processor), Microcontroller Unit (MCU, Microcontroller Unit) or Programmable Gate Array (FPGA, Field-Programmable Gate Array) combined with communication modules (including: basic communication kits, operating systems, communication modules, standardized interfaces and protocol, etc.) and transceiver antenna implementation.
  • CPU Central Processing Unit
  • DSP Digital Signal Processor
  • MCU Microcontroller Unit
  • FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array
  • FIG. 9 is a second schematic structural diagram of the configuration of a terminal device configuration apparatus according to an embodiment of the present application; as shown in FIG. 9 , the apparatus includes: a second communication unit 21 and a verification unit 22 ; wherein,
  • the second communication unit 21 is configured to receive a first request message from a terminal device; the first request message includes a certificate request message encrypted and/or integrity protected by the second key;
  • the verification unit 22 is configured to obtain the second key from a network device; the second key is generated by the network device based on the first key; and is also configured to be based on the second key pair
  • the first request message is subjected to integrity check and/or decryption, and a digital certificate is issued after the authorization of the first request message is passed;
  • the second communication unit 21 is further configured to send a first response message to the terminal device, where the first response message includes the digital certificate.
  • the second communication unit 21 is configured to construct a first response message including the digital certificate, and encrypt the first response message based on the second key and/or integrity protection, adding a second check value to the first response message, and sending the above-processed first response message to the terminal device.
  • the first request message further includes: B-TID;
  • the device further includes a second execution unit configured to query whether there is a second key corresponding to the B-TID; when the query result is that the second key corresponding to the B-TID does not exist, The second key from the network device is obtained through the second communication unit.
  • the second communication unit 21 is configured to send a second request message to the network device, where the second request message is used to request the second key;
  • the second response message sent by the network device includes the second key.
  • the second communication unit 21, the verification unit 22 and the second execution unit in the device can be combined with a communication module (including a basic communication suite) by a CPU, a DSP, an MCU or an FPGA in practical applications. , operating system, communication modules, standardized interfaces and protocols, etc.) and transceiver antenna implementation.
  • a communication module including a basic communication suite
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram 3 of a configuration structure of a configuration apparatus of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in FIG. 10 , the apparatus includes a second generation unit 31 and a third communication unit 32; wherein,
  • the second generating unit 31 is configured to generate a second key based on the pre-negotiated first key
  • the third communication unit 32 is configured to send the second key to the server.
  • the apparatus further includes a third execution unit configured to negotiate the first key with the terminal device by executing the GBA authentication process or the AKMA authentication process with the terminal device.
  • the second generating unit 31 is configured to generate a corresponding second key for each server based on the pre-negotiated first key
  • the third communication unit 32 is configured to send the corresponding second key to each server respectively.
  • the third communication unit 32 is configured to receive second request information sent by the server, where the second request message is used to request the second key; The server sends a second response message, where the second response message includes the second key generated by the second generating unit 31 .
  • the second generation unit 31, the third communication unit 32 and the third execution unit in the device can be combined with a communication module (including basic communication module) by CPU, DSP, MCU or FPGA in practical applications. kits, operating systems, communication modules, standardized interfaces and protocols, etc.) and transceiver antenna implementation.
  • a communication module including basic communication module
  • CPU, DSP, MCU or FPGA in practical applications. kits, operating systems, communication modules, standardized interfaces and protocols, etc.
  • FIG. 11 is a fourth schematic flowchart of a configuration method for a terminal device according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in FIG. 11 , the method includes:
  • Step 501 The terminal device generates a second key based on the first key, and encrypts and/or integrity protects part or all of the first message based on the second key;
  • Step 502 Send a first message.
  • the configuration method (hereinafter referred to as the method) of a terminal device in this embodiment is applied to a terminal device, and the terminal device may specifically be a car networking terminal device (also referred to as a C-V2X Device).
  • the terminal device may specifically be a car networking terminal device (also referred to as a C-V2X Device).
  • the IoV terminal device may be, for example, an OBU, an RSU, etc.; in other optional embodiments, the IoV terminal device may also be a pedestrian's handheld device, a wearable device, and the like.
  • the method further includes: the terminal device performs a GBA authentication process or an AKMA authentication process, and negotiates the first key with a network device.
  • the terminal device performs a GBA authentication process or an AKMA authentication process, and negotiates the first key with a network device.
  • the terminal device includes: an application client, a baseband chip, and a USIM; the terminal device generates a second key based on the first key, and pairs the first key based on the second key.
  • Part or all of a message is encrypted and/or integrity protected, including: the application client triggers the USIM to generate a second key based on the first key through the baseband chip; the application client generates a second key the first message, and send the first message to the USIM through the baseband chip; the USIM encrypts and/or integrity protects part or all of the first message based on the second key;
  • the USIM sends the above-processed first message to the application client through the baseband chip.
  • the second key may be composed of only one key, or may be composed of multiple keys (that is, the multiple keys here are all generated based on the first key, which are collectively referred to as the second key key).
  • the second key is composed of a variety of keys, for example, an encryption key and/or an integrity protection key may be included, and of course other types of keys may also be included according to actual needs.
  • the USIM encrypts and/or integrity protects part or all of the first message based on the second key, and the specific process of the encryption and/or integrity protection can be referred to as described in the foregoing embodiments, here No longer.
  • the first message may be any message, information, etc. sent by the terminal device to the server.
  • the sending the first message includes: the application client sends the first message to the server; the first message further includes: the B-TID and/or the server or include: AKMA Key Identifier (A-KID) and/or FQDN.
  • A-KID AKMA Key Identifier
  • the method further includes: receiving, by the terminal device, a second message from a server, and performing an integrity check on the second message based on the second key and/or decrypt.
  • the second message may be any message, information, etc. sent by the server to the terminal device.
  • the terminal device includes: an application client, a baseband chip, and a USIM; the terminal device receives a second message from a server, and pairs the second message with the second key based on the second key.
  • Performing integrity check and/or decryption on the message including: the application client receives the second message from the server, and sends the second message to the USIM through the baseband chip; the USIM is based on the The second key performs integrity check and/or decryption on the second message.
  • the application client receives the second message from the server, and invokes the USIM security check interface to send the second message to the USIM through the baseband chip; of course, the interface in this embodiment is not limited to USIM security check interface, and other interfaces used for security verification may also be within the protection scope of the embodiments of the present application.
  • the USIM performs integrity check and/or decryption on the second message based on the second key, and the specific process of the integrity check and/or decryption may refer to the foregoing embodiments, which will not be repeated here. Further, the USIM returns the plaintext information and/or processing result obtained by decryption to the application client.
  • FIG. 12 is a fourth schematic flowchart of a configuration method for a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application; as shown in FIG. 12 , the method includes:
  • Step 601 the server receives the first message from the terminal device, and part or all of the first message is encrypted and/or integrity protected by the second key;
  • Step 602 the server obtains the second key from a network device; the second key is generated by the network device based on the first key;
  • Step 603 The server performs integrity check and/or decryption on the first message based on the second key.
  • the terminal device can automatically complete server access authentication, establishment of a secure channel and key generation based on the GBA technical mechanism or the AKMA authentication mechanism, so as to realize the initial security of the terminal device. configuration.
  • the server receives the first message from the terminal device through the above established secure channel.
  • the server may receive the first message from the terminal device through the network device, that is, the first request message is sent by the terminal device, arrives at the network device, and then sends the first message to the server via the network device.
  • the server since part or all of the first message is encrypted and/or integrity protected by the second key, the server needs to obtain the above-mentioned second key.
  • the server obtains the second key from a network device.
  • the terminal device performs the GBA authentication process or the AKMA authentication process
  • the terminal device and the network device negotiate a first key, and the first key may also be referred to as a shared session key.
  • the obtaining, by the server, the second key from the network device includes: the server sending a third message to the network device, where the third message is used to request the second key key; the server receives a fourth message sent by the network device, where the fourth message includes the second key.
  • the server may send a third message to the network device, where the third message is used to request the second key; after receiving the third message, the network device generates the first key based on the pre-negotiated first key. second key, and then send a fourth message to the server, where the fourth message includes the second key, thereby enabling the server to obtain the second key.
  • the network device may also generate a second key based on the pre-negotiated first key, and in the process of sending the first message to the server, Sending the second key to the server.
  • the first message further includes: a B-TID, or an AKMA key identifier (A-KID); the server obtains the second key from a network device key, including: the server queries whether there is a second key corresponding to the B-TID or the A-KID; when the query result is that there is no second key corresponding to the B-TID or the A-KID In the case of a second key, the second key is obtained from the network device.
  • a B-TID or an AKMA key identifier (A-KID)
  • A-KID AKMA key identifier
  • the server may obtain the second key corresponding to the B-TID in advance. Then after receiving the first request message, you can first query whether there is a second key corresponding to the B-TID through the B-TID carried in the first request message; In the case of the second key corresponding to the TID, the second key from the network device is obtained; in the case where the second key corresponding to the B-TID exists, the B-TID corresponding to the B-TID can be directly obtained the second key.
  • the method further includes: the server encrypts and/or integrity protects part or all of the second message based on the second key; and sends the second message.
  • the server when the server is to send the second message to the terminal device, the server constructs the second message according to the protocol format requirements of the relevant specifications, and specifically encrypts part or all of the second message based on the second key and/or
  • the specific process of encryption and/or integrity protection can be referred to as described in the foregoing embodiments, and details are not repeated here.
  • the terminal device is UE and the network device is AF as an example for description.
  • the UE includes a USIM, a baseband chip and an application client; the baseband chip may also be called a Device Modem, and the application client may also be called a (C-V2X Application Client).
  • the example is called Application Server or C-V2X Application Server.
  • FIG. 13 is a schematic diagram 2 of an interaction flow of a configuration method for a terminal device according to an embodiment of the present application; as shown in FIG. 13 , the method includes:
  • Step 701 the UE starts AKMA.
  • the application client invokes the underlying baseband chip through the GBA interface library to start the GBA authentication process, and starts to establish a secure access connection to the CA server (such as the ECA server).
  • CA server such as the ECA server
  • Step 702 Execute the AKMA authentication process, and negotiate with the AF to share the session key K AF (ie, the first key in the foregoing embodiment).
  • Step 703 The UE obtains the shared session key K AF .
  • Steps 704 to 705 the UE generates an application session key K* based on the shared session key K AF , and uses the application session key K* to encrypt and/or integrity protect the message (uplink message).
  • the application client transmits a message to the USIM through the baseband chip, and the message may carry information such as B-TID; after receiving the message, the USIM generates the application session key K* based on the shared session key K AF , and uses the application session key K*.
  • the key K* encrypts or protects part or all of the message, and sends the processed message to the application client through the baseband chip.
  • Step 706 The UE sends a message (that is, an uplink message) to the application server, and the message carries the uplink message protected by the application session key K*, B-TID, server FQDN (Server FQDN) and other information.
  • a message that is, an uplink message
  • the message carries the uplink message protected by the application session key K*, B-TID, server FQDN (Server FQDN) and other information.
  • the message is transmitted to the application server via the AF.
  • Steps 707 to 709 the application server interacts with the AF through a pre-established secure channel, requests the AF to generate the application session key K* based on the shared session key K AF , and obtains the application session key K* and related information.
  • the relevant information may include, for example, the lifetime of the application session key K* and the like.
  • the AF can send the application session key K* and related information to the application server through the HTTP 200 OK response message.
  • the request message sent by the application server to the AF may further include information such as B-TID and server FQDN (Server FQDN).
  • Step 710 After acquiring the application session key K*, the application server performs integrity check and/or decryption on the message using the application session key K*.
  • the above is the transmission process of the uplink message between the terminal and the application server.
  • Step 711 the application server encrypts and/or integrity protects the message (downlink message) using the application session key K*.
  • Step 712 the application server sends a message (downlink message) to the UE.
  • Step 713 The UE performs integrity check and/or decryption on the message using the application session key K*.
  • Step 714 The application session key K* can be used to securely transmit uplink and downlink messages between the UE and the application server.
  • FIG. 14 is a fourth schematic structural diagram of the configuration of a terminal device configuration apparatus according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in FIG. 14 , the apparatus includes: a third generation unit 51 and a fourth communication unit 52; wherein,
  • the third generating unit 51 is configured to generate a second key based on the first key, and encrypt and/or integrity protect part or all of the first message based on the second key;
  • the fourth communication unit 52 is configured to send the first message.
  • the fourth communication unit 52 is further configured to receive a second message from a server, and perform an integrity checksum/ or decrypt.
  • the third generating unit 51 includes: an application client, a baseband chip, and a USIM;
  • the application client is configured to trigger the USIM to generate a second key based on the first key through the baseband chip; and is also configured to generate a first message and send the information to the USIM through the baseband chip. the first message;
  • the USIM is configured to encrypt and/or integrity protect a part or all of the first message based on the second key; and is also configured to send a message that has undergone the above-mentioned processing to the application client through the baseband chip after the first message.
  • the application client is further configured to send the first message to the server;
  • the first message further includes: the B-TID and/or the FQDN of the server; or includes: the AKMA key identifier (A-KID) and/or the FQDN.
  • A-KID AKMA key identifier
  • the third generating unit 51 includes: an application client, a baseband chip, and a USIM;
  • the application client configured to receive the second message from the server, and send the second message to the USIM through the baseband chip;
  • the USIM is configured to perform integrity check and/or decryption on the second message based on the second key.
  • the third generation unit 51 and the fourth communication unit 52 in the device can be combined with a communication module (including: basic communication suite, operating system, Communication modules, standardized interfaces and protocols, etc.) and transceiver antenna implementation.
  • a communication module including: basic communication suite, operating system, Communication modules, standardized interfaces and protocols, etc.
  • transceiver antenna implementation including: basic communication suite, operating system, Communication modules, standardized interfaces and protocols, etc.
  • FIG. 15 is a fourth schematic diagram of the composition and structure of a configuration apparatus of a terminal device according to an embodiment of the application; as shown in FIG. 15 , the apparatus includes: a fifth communication unit 61 and a second verification unit 62; wherein,
  • the fifth communication unit 61 is configured to receive a first message from a terminal device, part or all of the first message is encrypted and/or integrity protected by a second key;
  • the second verification unit 62 is configured to obtain the second key from a network device; the second key is generated by the network device based on the first key; and is also configured to be based on the second key.
  • the key performs integrity check and/or decryption on the first message.
  • the apparatus further includes a fourth generating unit configured to encrypt and/or integrity protect part or all of the second message based on the second key;
  • the fifth communication unit 61 is further configured to send a second message.
  • the first message further includes: a B-TID, or an AKMA key identifier (A-KID);
  • the apparatus further includes a fourth execution unit configured to query whether there is a second key corresponding to the B-TID or the A-KID;
  • the second verification unit 62 is configured to, when the query result obtained by the fourth execution unit is that there is no second key corresponding to the B-TID or the A-KID, pass the The fifth communication unit 61 obtains the second key from the network device.
  • the fifth communication unit 61, the second verification unit 62 and the third execution unit in the device can be combined with a communication module (including: basic CPU, DSP, MCU or FPGA) in practical applications.
  • a communication module including: basic CPU, DSP, MCU or FPGA
  • Communication suites, operating systems, communication modules, standardized interfaces and protocols, etc. and transceiver antenna implementation.
  • FIG. 16 is a schematic diagram of a hardware structure of a communication device according to an embodiment of the application.
  • the communication device includes a memory 42 , a processor 41 , and a computer program stored in the memory 42 and running on the processor 41 .
  • the processor 41 executes the program, it implements the steps of the configuration method of the terminal device in the terminal device according to the embodiment of the present application; or, when the processor 41 executes the program, implements the steps of the aforementioned method for configuring a terminal device in a network device in the embodiment of the present application,
  • the communication device may also include one or more network interfaces 43 .
  • the various components in the communication device are coupled together by the bus system 44 .
  • the bus system 44 is used to implement the connection communication between these components.
  • the bus system 44 also includes a power bus, a control bus and a status signal bus.
  • the various buses are designated as bus system 44 in FIG. 16 .
  • the memory 42 may be either volatile memory or non-volatile memory, and may include both volatile and non-volatile memory.
  • the non-volatile memory can be a read-only memory (ROM, Read Only Memory), a programmable read-only memory (PROM, Programmable Read-Only Memory), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM, Erasable Programmable Read-only memory) Only Memory), Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM, Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory), Magnetic Random Access Memory (FRAM, ferromagnetic random access memory), Flash Memory (Flash Memory), Magnetic Surface Memory , CD-ROM, or CD-ROM (Compact Disc Read-Only Memory); magnetic surface memory can be disk memory or tape memory.
  • RAM Random Access Memory
  • SRAM Static Random Access Memory
  • SSRAM Synchronous Static Random Access Memory
  • DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
  • SDRAM Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
  • DDRSDRAM Double Data Rate Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
  • ESDRAM Enhanced Type Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
  • SLDRAM Synchronous Link Dynamic Random Access Memory
  • DRRAM Direct Rambus Random Access Memory
  • the memory 42 described in the embodiments of the present application is intended to include, but not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.
  • the methods disclosed in the above embodiments of the present application may be applied to the processor 41 or implemented by the processor 41 .
  • the processor 41 may be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capability. In the implementation process, each step of the above-mentioned method can be completed by a hardware integrated logic circuit in the processor 41 or an instruction in the form of software.
  • the above-mentioned processor 41 may be a general-purpose processor, a DSP, or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, and the like.
  • the processor 41 may implement or execute the methods, steps, and logical block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of this application.
  • a general purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor or the like.
  • the steps of the method disclosed in the embodiments of the present application can be directly embodied as being executed by a hardware decoding processor, or executed by a combination of hardware and software modules in the decoding processor.
  • the software module may be located in a storage medium, and the storage medium is located in the memory 42, and the processor 41 reads the information in the memory 42, and completes the steps of the foregoing method in combination with its hardware.
  • the communication device may be implemented by one or more Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC, Application Specific Integrated Circuit), DSP, Programmable Logic Device (PLD, Programmable Logic Device), Complex Programmable Logic Device (CPLD, Complex Programmable Logic Device), FPGA, general-purpose processor, controller, MCU, Microprocessor (Microprocessor), or other electronic components implemented for performing the aforementioned method.
  • ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
  • DSP Digital Signal processor
  • PLD Programmable Logic Device
  • CPLD Complex Programmable Logic Device
  • FPGA general-purpose processor
  • controller MCU
  • Microprocessor Microprocessor
  • the embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium, such as a memory 42 including a computer program, and the computer program can be executed by the processor 41 of the communication device to complete the steps of the foregoing method.
  • the computer-readable storage medium can be memory such as FRAM, ROM, PROM, EPROM, EEPROM, Flash Memory, magnetic surface memory, optical disk, or CD-ROM; it can also be various devices including one or any combination of the above memories.
  • the embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, and when the program is executed by the processor, implements the steps of the aforementioned configuration method of the terminal device applied to the terminal device in the embodiment of the present application; or , when the program is executed by the processor, it implements the steps of the configuration method of the embodiment of the present application applied to the terminal device in the server; or, when the program is executed by the processor, it realizes the aforementioned embodiment of the present application. the steps of the configuration method.
  • the disclosed apparatus and method may be implemented in other manners.
  • the device embodiments described above are only illustrative.
  • the division of the units is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods.
  • multiple units or components may be combined, or Can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored, or not implemented.
  • the coupling, or direct coupling, or communication connection between the components shown or discussed may be through some interfaces, and the indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units may be electrical, mechanical or other forms. of.
  • the unit described above as a separate component may or may not be physically separated, and the component displayed as a unit may or may not be a physical unit, that is, it may be located in one place or distributed to multiple network units; Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution in this embodiment.
  • each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may all be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may be separately used as a unit, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit; the above integration
  • the unit can be implemented either in the form of hardware or in the form of hardware plus software functional units.
  • the aforementioned program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when the program is executed, execute It includes the steps of the above method embodiments; and the aforementioned storage medium includes: a removable storage device, a ROM, a RAM, a magnetic disk or an optical disk and other media that can store program codes.
  • the above-mentioned integrated units of the present application are implemented in the form of software function modules and sold or used as independent products, they may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium.
  • the computer software products are stored in a storage medium and include several instructions for A computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) is caused to execute all or part of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present application.
  • the aforementioned storage medium includes: a removable storage device, a ROM, a RAM, a magnetic disk or an optical disk and other mediums that can store program codes.

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Abstract

本申请实施例公开了一种终端设备的配置方法、装置和通信设备，所述方法包括：终端设备基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护；发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息中包括经所述第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的所述证书请求消息。

Description

一种终端设备的配置方法、装置和通信设备
相关申请的交叉引用
本申请基于申请号为202110304444.4、申请日为2021年03月22日的中国专利申请以及申请号为202111217636.8、申请日为2021年10月19日的中国专利申请提出，并要求该中国专利申请的优先权，该中国专利申请的全部内容在此以引入方式并入本申请。
技术领域
本申请涉及车联网技术领域，具体涉及一种终端设备的配置方法、装置和通信设备。
背景技术
蜂窝车联网(C-V2X，Cellular-Vehicle to X)车联网中，车辆、交通设施、车联网管理系统之间传递大量的实时交通信息，包括车辆行驶状态、路况事件、信号灯信息等，这些关键的交通信息直接关系着公共交通安全与司乘人员的生命安全，在根本上决定着C-V2X技术能否产业落地。
为了保障信息的安全性，引入了数字证书，并基于数字证书对C-V2X系统中用户与设备的真实性、传递信息的真实性进行保障。因此，保障数字证书的安全性就成为C-V2X技术落地的关键。
目前的生产流程中，需要在车辆或车联网设备的生产过程中离线配置数字证书，这种方法对车辆厂商、C-V2X终端设备厂商有较高的安全生产要求，要么需要改造生产线以满足离线灌装的物理环境安全要求，要么需要将设备送到专业的安全机构进行灌装，因此该方法投资成本高，灵活性较差，部署难度大，技术实施的难度较大。
此外，采用现有标准通用引导架构(GBA，Generic Bootstrapping Architecture)方法，如图1所示，车辆或车联网设备和CA服务器间能够建立起安全连接，C-V2X设备可通过在线方式完成数字证书配置，但是标准方案要求网络运营商为每一个CA服务器部署一个网络应用功能(NAF，Network Application Function)/认证代理(AP，Authentication Proxy)网元来提供GBA服务(参加图1中C-V2X服务提供者(C-V2X Service Provider)虚框，虚框中对于CA服务器(图中为C-V2X应用服务器(C-V2X Application Server))与NAF/AP网元一一对应)，这对运营商而言增加了巨大的网络运营及维护的成本。除此之外，由于CA服务器与车联网设备通信所使用的GBA会话密钥是由NAF/AP网元中存储的，消息加解密、完整性保护等安全保护操作是由NAF/AP设备执行的，而NAF/AP是按照通信行业安全技术标准研发的，因此CA服务器不能够灵活使用GBA会话密钥，所执行的安全保护操作也不一定能够符合C-V2X车联网行业安全技术要求，这给GBA方案的产业应用带来的困难。
另外，在线配置方式完成数字证书配置对C-V2X设备的安全实现有着极高的设计要求。为了保证数字证书及敏感参数在设备侧的安全性，这些信息不能够简单地由客户端应用操作，在设备上通用中央处理器(CPU，Central Processing Unit)、内/外部存储器等上运算执行，而应结合密钥的生成获取方式在可信的安全环境中处理。然而，现有配置方案缺乏设备侧整体安全设计与实现，无法确保数字证书的配置安全。
总而言之，如何安全、便捷地将数字证书及敏感安全参数在C-V2X设备上安全部署配置是当前C-V2X车联网行业在安全领域面临的一大挑战。
发明内容
本申请实施例提供一种终端设备的配置方法、装置和通信设备。
本申请实施例的技术方案是这样实现的：
第一方面，本申请实施例提供了一种终端设备的配置方法，所述方法包括：
终端设备基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护；
发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息中包括经所述第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的所述证书请求消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述终端设备接收来自服务器的第一响应消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，获得所述第一响应消息中携带的数字证书。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述终端设备包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和全球用户识别模块(USIM)；
所述终端设备基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护，包括：
所述应用客户端通过所述基带芯片触发所述USIM基于所述第一密钥生成第二密钥；
所述应用客户端生成第一证书请求消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一证书请求消息；
所述USIM生成公私钥对，在所述第一证书请求消息中添加所述公私钥对中的公钥，并利用所述公私钥对中的私钥对所述第一证书请求消息进行签名，获得第二证书请求消息；
所述USIM基于所述第二密钥对所述第二证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护，在所述第二证书请求消息中添加第一校验值；
所述USIM通过所述基带芯片向所述应用客户端发送经上述处理后的所述第二证书请求消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述发送第一请求消息，包括：所述 应用客户端向服务器发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息中包括经所述第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的所述第二证书请求消息；所述第一请求消息中还包括：引导事务标识(B-TID)和/或服务器的全限定域名(FQDN)。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述终端设备包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和USIM；
所述终端设备接收来自所述服务器的第一响应消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，获得所述第一响应消息中携带的数字证书，包括：
所述应用客户端接收来自所述服务器的第一响应消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一响应消息；
所述USIM基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行完整性校验和/或解密；
校验通过后，所述USIM获得所述第一响应消息中携带的数字证书，并在安全组件中存储所述数字证书。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述终端设备执行通用引导架构(GBA)认证流程或面向应用的认证或密钥管理(AKMA)认证流程，与网络设备协商所述第一密钥。
第二方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置方法，所述方法包括：服务器接收来自终端设备的第一请求消息；所述第一请求消息中包括经第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的证书请求消息；
所述服务器获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥；所述第二密钥由所述网络设备基于第一密钥生成；
所述服务器基于所述第二密钥对所述第一请求消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，并在对所述第一请求消息授权通过后签发数字证书；
所述服务器向所述终端设备发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息中 包括所述数字证书。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述服务器向所述终端设备发送第一响应消息，包括：
所述服务器构建包含有所述数字证书的第一响应消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行加密和/或完整性保护，在所述第一响应消息中添加第二校验值；
向所述终端设备发送经上述处理后的第一响应消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一请求消息中还包括：引导事务标识(B-TID)；
所述服务器获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥，包括：
所述服务器查询是否存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥；
在查询结果为不存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥的情况下，获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述服务器获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥，包括：
所述服务器向所述网络设备发送第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息用于请求所述第二密钥；
所述服务器接收所述网络设备发送的第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息中包括所述第二密钥。
第三方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置方法，所述方法包括：网络设备基于预先协商的第一密钥生成第二密钥，向服务器发送所述第二密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述网络设备与所述终端设备通过执行GBA认证流程或AKMA认证流程，与所述终端设备协商所述第一密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述网络设备基于预先协商的第一密钥生成第二密钥，向服务器发送所述第二密钥，包括：
所述网络设备接收所述服务器发送的第二请求信息，所述第二请求消息用于请求所述第二密钥；
所述网络设备基于预先协商的第一密钥生成第二密钥，向所述服务器发送第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息中包括所述第二密钥。
第四方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置装置，所述装置包括：第一生成单元和第一通信单元；其中，
所述第一生成单元，配置为基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护；
所述第一通信单元，配置为发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息中包括经所述第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的所述证书请求消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一通信单元，还配置为接收来自服务器的第一响应消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，获得所述第一响应消息中携带的数字证书。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一生成单元包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和USIM；
所述应用客户端，配置为通过所述基带芯片触发所述USIM基于所述第一密钥生成第二密钥；还配置为生成第一证书请求消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一证书请求消息；
所述USIM，配置为生成公私钥对，在所述第一证书请求消息中添加所述公私钥对中的公钥，并利用所述公私钥对中的私钥对所述第一证书请求消息进行签名，获得第二证书请求消息；基于所述第二密钥对所述第二证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护，并在所述第二证书请求消息中添加第一校验值；通过所述基带芯片向所述应用客户端发送经所述第二密钥加 密和/或完整性保护的所述第二证书请求消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述应用客户端，配置为通过所述第一通信单元向服务器发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息中包括经所述第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的所述第二证书请求消息；所述第一请求消息中还包括：B-TID和/或服务器FQDN。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一生成单元包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和USIM；
所述应用客户端，配置为通过所述第一通信单元接收来自所述服务器的第一响应消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一响应消息；
所述USIM，配置为基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行完整性校验和/或解密；校验通过后，获得所述第一响应消息中携带的数字证书，并在安全组件中存储所述数字证书。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述装置还包括第一执行单元，配置为执行GBA认证流程或AKMA认证流程，与网络设备协商所述第一密钥。
第五方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置装置，所述装置包括：第二通信单元和第一校验单元；其中，
所述第二通信单元，配置为接收来自终端设备的第一请求消息；所述第一请求消息中包括经第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的证书请求消息；
所述第一校验单元，配置为获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥；所述第二密钥由所述网络设备基于第一密钥生成；还配置为基于所述第二密钥对所述第一请求消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，并在对所述第一请求消息授权通过后签发数字证书；
所述第二通信单元，还配置为向所述终端设备发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息中包括所述数字证书。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第二通信单元，配置为构建包含有所述数字证书的第一响应消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行加密和/或完整性保护，在所述第一响应消息中添加第二校验值，向所述终端设备发送经上述处理后的第一响应消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一请求消息中还包括：引导事务标识(B-TID)；
所述装置还包括第二执行单元，配置为查询是否存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥；在查询结果为不存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥的情况下，通过所述第二通信单元获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥。
第六方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置装置，所述装置包括第二生成单元和第三通信单元；其中，
所述第二生成单元，配置为基于预先协商的第一密钥生成第二密钥；
所述第三通信单元，配置为向服务器发送所述第二密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述装置还包括第三执行单元，配置为与终端设备通过执行GBA认证流程或AKMA认证流程，与所述终端设备协商所述第一密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第二生成单元，配置为基于预先协商的第一密钥，为每个服务器生成对应的第二密钥；
所述第三通信单元，配置为分别向每个服务器发送所述对应的第二密钥。
第七方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置方法，所述方法包括：终端设备基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对第一消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；发送第一消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述终端设备接收来自服务器的第二消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第二消息进行完整性校 验和/或解密。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述终端设备包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和全球用户识别模块(USIM)；
所述终端设备基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对第一消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护，包括：
所述应用客户端通过所述基带芯片触发所述USIM基于所述第一密钥生成第二密钥；
所述应用客户端生成第一消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一消息；
所述USIM基于所述第二密钥对所述第一消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；
所述USIM通过所述基带芯片向所述应用客户端发送经上述处理后的所述第一消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述发送第一消息，包括：所述应用客户端向服务器发送所述第一消息；
所述第一消息中还包括：引导事务标识(B-TID)和/或服务器的全限定域名(FQDN)；或者包括：面向应用的认证或密钥管理(AKMA)密钥标识符(A-KID)和/或FQDN。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述终端设备包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和全球用户识别模块(USIM)；
所述终端设备接收来自服务器的第二消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第二消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，包括：
所述应用客户端接收来自所述服务器的第二消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第二消息；
所述USIM基于所述第二密钥对所述第二消息进行完整性校验和/或解 密。
第八方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置方法，所述方法包括：
服务器接收来自终端设备的第一消息，所述第一消息的部分或全部经第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护；
所述服务器获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥；所述第二密钥由所述网络设备基于第一密钥生成；
所述服务器基于所述第二密钥对所述第一消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述服务器基于所述第二密钥对第二消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；发送第二消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一消息中还包括：引导事务标识(B-TID)，或者包括面向应用的认证或密钥管理(AKMA)密钥标识符(A-KID)；
所述服务器获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥，包括：
所述服务器查询是否存在与所述B-TID或所述A-KID对应的第二密钥；
在查询结果为不存在与所述B-TID或所述A-KID对应的第二密钥的情况下，获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥。
第九方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置装置，所述装置包括：第三生成单元和第四通信单元；其中，
所述第三生成单元，配置为基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对第一消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；
所述第四通信单元，配置为发送第一消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第四通信单元，还配置为接收来自服务器的第二消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第二消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第三生成单元包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和全球用户识别模块(USIM)；
所述应用客户端，配置为通过所述基带芯片触发所述USIM基于所述第一密钥生成第二密钥；还配置为生成第一消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一消息；
所述USIM，配置为基于所述第二密钥对所述第一消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；还配置为通过所述基带芯片向所述应用客户端发送经上述处理后的所述第一消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述应用客户端，还配置为向服务器发送所述第一消息；
所述第一消息中还包括：引导事务标识(B-TID)和/或服务器的全限定域名(FQDN)；或者包括：面向应用的认证或密钥管理(AKMA)密钥标识符(A-KID)和/或FQDN。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第三生成单元包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和全球用户识别模块(USIM)；
所述应用客户端，配置为接收来自所述服务器的第二消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第二消息；
所述USIM，配置为基于所述第二密钥对所述第二消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
第十方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置装置，所述装置包括：第五通信单元和第二校验单元；其中，
所述第五通信单元，配置为接收来自终端设备的第一消息，所述第一 消息的部分或全部经第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护；
所述第二校验单元，配置为获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥；所述第二密钥由所述网络设备基于第一密钥生成；还配置为基于所述第二密钥对所述第一消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述装置还包括第四生成单元，配置为基于所述第二密钥对第二消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；
所述第五通信单元，还配置为发送第二消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一消息中还包括：引导事务标识(B-TID)，或者包括面向应用的认证或密钥管理(AKMA)密钥标识符(A-KID)；
所述装置还包括第四执行单元，配置为查询是否存在与所述B-TID或所述A-KID对应的第二密钥；
所述第二校验单元，配置为在所述第四执行单元获得的查询结果为不存在与所述B-TID或所述A-KID对应的第二密钥的情况下，通过所述第五通信单元获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥。
第十一方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，该程序被处理器执行时实现本申请实施例第一方面、第二方面、第三方面、第七方面或第八方面所述方法的步骤。
第十二方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种通信设备，包括存储器、处理器及存储在存储器上并可在处理器上运行的计算机程序，所述处理器执行所述程序时实现本申请实施例第一方面、第二方面、第三方面、第七方面或第八方面所述方法的步骤。
本申请实施例提供的终端设备的配置方法、装置和通信设备，终端设备基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护；发送请求消息，所述请求消息中包括经所述第二密钥 加密和/或完整性保护的所述证书请求消息；服务器接收来自终端设备的请求消息；所述请求消息中包括经第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的证书请求消息；获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥；所述第二密钥由所述网络设备基于第一密钥生成；基于所述第二密钥对所述请求消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，并在对所述请求消息授权通过后签发数字证书；向所述终端设备发送响应消息，所述响应消息中包括所述数字证书。采用本申请实施例的技术方案，基于GBA机制，可通过“一键配置”的方式实现C-V2X终端设备的数字证书的安全配置，无需生产线安全环境的改造，也无需专业的安全机构进行灌装，提升数字证书配置的灵活性、降低部署难度以及投资成本。
附图说明
图1为GBA架构示意图；
图2为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置方法的流程示意图一；
图3为本申请实施例中的GBA增强架构示意图；
图4为本申请实施例的终端设备的一种可选架构示意图；
图5为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置方法的流程示意图二；
图6为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置方法的流程示意图三；
图7为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置方法的交互流程示意图一；
图8为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置装置的组成结构示意图一；
图9为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置装置的组成结构示意图二；
图10为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置装置的组成结构示意图三；
图11为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置方法的流程示意图四；
图12为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置方法的流程示意图五；
图13为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置方法的交互流程示意图二；
图14为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置装置的组成结构示意图四；
图15为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置装置的组成结构示意图五；
图16为本申请实施例的通信设备的硬件组成结构示意图。
具体实施方式
下面结合附图及具体实施例对本申请作进一步详细的说明。
本申请实施例提供了一种终端设备的配置方法。图2为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置方法的流程示意图一；如图2所示，所述方法包括：
步骤101：终端设备基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护；
步骤102：发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息中包括经所述第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的所述证书请求消息。
本实施例的终端设备的配置方法(以下简称方法)应用于终端设备中，所述终端设备具体可以是车联网终端设备(也可以称为C-V2X Device)，在一些可选实施例中，所述车联网终端设备例如可以是车载单元(OBU，On Board Unit)、路侧单元(RSU，Road Side Unit)等等；在另一些可选实施例中，所述车联网终端设备也可以是行人的手持设备、可穿戴设备等等。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述终端设备执行GBA认证流程或面向应用的认证和密钥管理(AKMA，Authentication and Key Management for Applications)认证流程，与网络设备协商所述第一密钥。
具体来说，这里的网络设备在GBA认证流程下具体可以是NAF或AP。进而，在AKMA认证流程下，网络设备可以是网络开放功能实体(NEF，Network Exposure Function)，NEF用于将网络能力开放给其他网元使用。
终端与网络设备预先协商第一密钥的一种可能的实现方式为(这里以C-V2X设备基于GBA认证流程为例)：
C-V2X设备与BSF进行AKA认证，BSF返回200OK响应后，C-V2X设备生成GBA会话密钥，也即所述第一密钥。随后，在C-V2X设备访问 NAF/AP时，NAF/AP请求BSF为其协商生成同样的GBA会话密钥，也即所述第一密钥。这里的NAF/AP向C-V2X服务提供者(例如C-V2X应用服务器)提供GBA服务。NAF/AP从BSF获得该GBA会话密钥，也即所述第一密钥，从而完成了终端与网络设备协商第一密钥的过程。
在C-V2X设备需要与服务器安全地进行业务消息交互(如申请数字证书)时，C-V2X设备向服务器发起应用请求。此时，服务器通过与网络设备预先建立的安全连接访问NAF/AP，请求NAF/AP基于第一密钥为本次业务生成第二密钥，并获取生成的第二密钥。基于第二密钥，C-V2X终端与服务器间可对交互的业务消息进行加密、完整性保护等安全处理，相当于在C-V2X终端与服务器间建立起安全的通信通道。
其中，这里的服务器可以为C-V2X应用服务器(C-V2X application server),C-V2X应用服务器可以是CA服务器(CA为Certificate Authority，也即证书颁发机构)。在这一架构下CA服务器可以：为注册CA服务器或授权CA服务器。也即如果C-V2X设备要申请注册证书，则服务器相应为注册CA服务器(Enrolment CA server或ECA)；如果C-V2X要申请授权证书或应用证书或身份证书，则服务器相应为授权CA服务器(Authorization CA server或ACA)。CA服务器可由MNO自己部署或第三方部署，从而可以为C-V2X设备提供证书服务。
这里的C-V2X终端与服务器间建立起安全的通信通道是指：终端设备通过上述GBA认证流程后，会获得第一密钥，后续会基于第一密钥生成第二密钥。而服务器侧可以从网络设备处获得第二密钥(网络设备NAF/AP已经预先与终端协商好了第一密钥，并在服务器需要第二密钥时，基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，将第二密钥返回给服务器，后续会对这一流程进行详细说明)。可见，终端设备与服务器都获得了第二密钥，并且基于第二密钥进行消息的安全保护及收发，从而终端设备与服务器之间实际建立了一 个安全通道(或称为安全连接、安全链路等)，用于基于第二密钥对所收发的消息进行良好地保护。
此外，这里的所述第一密钥也可称为共享会话密钥；基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，所述第二密钥也可称为应用会话密钥或会话密钥。
需要说明的是，应用该方法的终端设备可以部署在如图3所示的GBA增强架构中。在增强的架构中，网络设备NAF/AP由少数几个C-V2X应用服务器(例如CA服务器)共享(参见图3中C-V2X服务提供者(C-V2X Service Provider)虚框，虚框中不包含NAF/AP网元，而是将NAF/AP网元部署在移动网络运营商(MNO，Mobile Network Operator)侧，且多个CA服务器(图中为C-V2X应用服务器(C-V2X Application Server))共享一个NAF/AP网元)。不难理解，多个CA服务器共享一个NAF/AP网元能够大大降低部署成本，降低维护难度。
进一步的，基于引导服务器功能(BSF，Bootstrapping Server Function)在GBA引导的安全关联过程中提供的GBA会话密钥(例如Ks_int_NAF)，网络设备NAF/AP进一步为每个C-V2X应用服务器(例如CA服务器)派生出GBA应用会话密钥(用K*表示)，并将K*共享给CA服务器。同时，C-V2X设备(C-V2X Device)也从本地获取与GBA引导过程中相同的K*，然后提供K*给上层的C-V2X应用客户端(C-V2X Application Client)调用。这样，CA服务器和C-V2X设备共享相同的GBA应用会话密钥K*。他们可以使用K*实现相互认证，保护传输的消息，建立安全通道等，然后用共享的GBA应用会话密钥K*对C-V2X证书申请及发放过程进行保护。
本实施例的方法可允许用户通过“一键”触发方式实现数字证书配置，具体来说，用户通过终端上的人机界面点击触发或者通过其他接口软件触发，可以很容易地触发终端启动证书配置操作。接收到触发命令后，终端可自动与服务器完成接入认证、安全通道建立、密钥生成、数字证书申请 以及后续的数字证书下载及安全存储等操作，实现终端设备的初始安全配置。该方式相比于现有的离线部署以及在线部署方式来说，自动化程度高、应用及维护成本较低、人工操作步骤少、易于推广。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述终端设备包括：应用客户端(也可以称为C-V2X application client)、基带芯片(也可以称为设备调制解调器Device modem，用于接入4G或5G网络)和全球用户识别模块(USIM，Universal Subscriber Identity Module)；所述终端设备基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护，包括：所述应用客户端通过所述基带芯片触发所述USIM基于所述第一密钥生成第二密钥；所述应用客户端生成第一证书请求消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一证书请求消息；所述USIM生成公私钥对，在所述第一证书请求消息中添加所述公私钥对中的公钥，并利用所述公私钥对中的私钥对所述第一证书请求消息进行签名，获得第二证书请求消息；所述USIM基于所述第二密钥对所述第二证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护，在所述第二证书请求消息中添加第一校验值；所述USIM通过所述基带芯片向所述应用客户端发送经过上述处理的所述第二证书请求消息。
其中，这里的第二密钥可以仅由一种密钥组成，也可以由多种密钥组成(也即这里的多种密钥都是基于第一密钥生成的，统称为第二密钥)。一种可行的实施方式中，第二密钥由多种密钥组成，例如可以包括加密密钥和/或完整性保护密钥，当然还可以根据实际需要包括其他类型的密钥，此处不再赘述。进而，USIM基于所述第二密钥对所述第二证书请求消息进行加密的过程包括：USIM利用第二密钥中的加密密钥对明文的第二证书请求消息进行加密，使其变成密文。和/或，USIM基于所述第二密钥对所述第二证书请求消息进行完整性保护的过程包括：USIM利用第二密钥中的完整 性保护密钥对消息进行完整性保护，例如可以对加密后的消息利用完整性保护密钥计算出第一校验值，然后将计算出的第一校验值添加到所述第二证书请求消息中。其中，可选地，所述第一校验值可以是哈希运算消息认证码(HMAC，Hash-based Message Authentication Code)值，示例性的，USIM可基于消息中的某些比特位进行计算，得到所述第一校验值。需要说明的是，“将计算出的第一校验值添加到请求消息中”其实是消息完整性保护过程的一个步骤，这里为了能够更清晰的说明后续如何对于第二证书请求消息进行保护，才将此步骤重点强调。
图4为本申请实施例的终端设备的一种可选架构示意图；如图4所示，终端设备可包括应用(Application)层、用户库(User libraries)、Linux内核(Linux Kernel)以及硬件(Hardware)层等等。其中，应用层可包括CA管理应用和V2X应用；用户库包括GBA接口库、USIM接口库、硬件安全模块(HSM，Hardware Security Module)接口库以及LTE-V2X接口库等等；硬件层包括HSM、LTE-V2X通信模组和LTE-Uu通信模组，LTE-Uu通信模组中可包括基带芯片和USIM。其中，LTE-Uu通信模组、LTE-V2X通信模组以及HSM以分立模块或元器件的方式实现，或者也可封装集成为一个模块/模组，但这不影响它们之间的逻辑功能划分。
本示例中，CA管理应用(也即CA应用客户端(CA application client))是终端设备(例如C-V2X终端设备)实现“初始安全一键配置”的控制软件，它负责整个业务流程的逻辑控制。V2X应用(也可称为C-V2X应用)是终端设备通过PC5/V5接口实现V2X直连通信的业务应用模块，负责直连通信业务消息的收发控制。它通过调用LTE-V2X接口库访问硬件层的LTE-V2X通信模组，与其他终端设备实现C-V2X业务交互。
GBA接口库、USIM接口库，HSM接口库是终端底层硬件模块开放给上层应用的调用接口，分别用于调用LTE-Uu通信模组支持的GBA安全接 入认证能力、USIM提供的数字证书管理应用能力和安全能力以及HSM提供的安全存储及运算能力。
当然，本申请实施例中的终端设备的组成架构不限于图4中所示，其他的架构形式也可在本申请实施例的保护范围之内。
本实施例中的应用客户端负责实现CA管理应用的功能，负责终端设备数字证书的管理，具体可参照图4中的CA管理应用。
本实施例中，应用客户端通过所述基带芯片、调用USIM接口库触发所述USIM基于所述第一密钥生成第二密钥。应用客户端可根据“一键触发”生成第一证书请求消息，调用USIM重构证书请求接口(即第一USIM接口)、通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一证书请求消息；当然，本实施例中所述第一USIM接口不限于是USIM重构证书请求接口，其他用于重构证书请求的接口名称也可在本申请实施例的保护范围之内。USIM接收到第一证书请求消息后，可基于通用集成电路卡(UICC，Universal Integrated Circuit Card)内部的随机数发生器生成公私钥对，按照C-V2X相关规范的协议格式的要求，完善证书请求消息，在第一证书请求消息中添加公私钥对中的公钥，并利用所述公私钥对中的私钥对所述第一证书请求消息进行签名，获得第二证书请求消息，USIM基于第二密钥对第二证书请求进行加密和/或完整性保护。接着，USIM通过所述基带芯片并通过接口库向所述应用客户端发送经上述处理的所述第二证书请求消息。
其中，这里的UICC是一种安全级别达到EAL 4+的安全硬件，可基于它实现USIM功能，可以保证Ks_int_NAF(也即第一密钥)的安全性。具体来说，UICC可以理解为是一种通用架构，或者可以理解为是一种安全载体，当USIM功能(function)被实施在这一通用架构中，则实现了USIM功能，也即成为USIM。UICC其实还可以实现很多应用，也即该架构中可以支持实施很多功能，在本申请实施例中实现的是USIM，因此USIM也具 有很高的安全性，进而在USIM中进行证书公私钥对生成、密码运算、安全存储等操作能够有效保证终端的安全性。避免出现现有技术中，由于密钥在不安全的终端CPU、内存等器件中运算、存储所带来的敏感信息泄露之类的安全隐患。且通过将已有的USIM作为终端上的安全器件进行上述安全操作，能够避免在终端上增加新的安全硬件，从而降低终端的硬件实现成本。
示例性的，本实施例中的数字证书也可称为注册证书(EC，Enrollment Certificate)，用于标识一个可信的终端设备，因此需要以安全的方法实现数字证书在终端设备上的初始安全配置。相应的，本实施例中的服务器可以为ECA服务器，也即授权CA服务器。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述发送第一请求消息，包括：所述应用客户端向服务器发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息中包括经所述第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的所述第二证书请求消息；所述第一请求消息中还包括：引导事务标识(B-TID，Bootstrapping-Transaction Identifier)和/或服务器全限定域名(FQDN，Fully Qualified Domain Name)。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述终端设备接收来自服务器的第一响应消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，获得所述第一响应消息中携带的数字证书。
本实施例中，示例性的，所述第一响应消息可通过超文本传输协议(HTTP，HyperText Transfer Protocol)消息承载，例如可通过HTTP 200 OK消息承载。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述终端设备包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和USIM；所述终端设备接收来自所述服务器的第一响应消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，获得所述第一响应消息中携带的数字证书，包括：所述应用客户端接收来自所述服务 器的第一响应消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一响应消息；所述USIM基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行完整性校验和/或解密；校验通过后，所述USIM获得所述第一响应消息中携带的数字证书，并在安全组件中存储所述数字证书。
本实施例中，应用客户端接收来自所述CA服务器的第一响应消息，调用USIM安全检验接口(即第二USIM接口)通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一响应消息；当然，本实施例中所述第二USIM接口不限于是USIM安全检验接口，其他用于安全检验的接口也可在本申请实施例的保护范围之内。USIM基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，其中，第一响应消息中携带第二校验值，所述完整性校验即校验所述第一响应消息中携带的第二校验值；其中，可选地，所述第二校验值也可以是HMAC值，示例性的，USIM可基于消息中的某些比特位进行计算，得到一个校验值，再将该校验值与所述第二校验值进行比对，比对一致则表明所述完整性校验通过。校验通过后，所述USIM获得所述第一响应消息中携带的数字证书。
本实施例中，所述USIM在安全组件中存储所述数字证书。示例性的，USIM(还可包括HSM)是终端设备本地的安全实体/模块，能够为数据的运算、存储、处理提供可靠的安全环境。为了确保V2X业务数据的安全性，密钥(例如第一密钥、公私钥对等敏感参数)、数字证书等以及涉及它们的运算通常应在终端设备本地的安全实体/模块中处理，因此保证C-V2X终端设备数字证书安全配置过程的安全性。
基于前述实施例，本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置方法。图5为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置方法的流程示意图二；如图5所示，所述方法包括：
步骤201：服务器接收来自终端设备的第一请求消息；所述第一请求消 息中包括经第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的证书请求消息；
步骤202：获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥；所述第二密钥由所述网络设备基于第一密钥生成；
步骤203：基于所述第二密钥对所述第一请求消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，并在对所述第一请求消息授权通过后签发数字证书；
步骤204：向所述终端设备发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息中包括所述数字证书。
本实施例中，在用户的“一键”触发下，终端设备可基于GBA技术机制或AKMA认证机制自动完成服务器接入认证以及安全通道的建立、密钥生成以及数字证书的申请以及后续的数字证书的下载及安全存储等操作，实现终端设备的初始安全配置。
本实施例中，所述服务器通过上述建立的安全通道接收来自终端设备的第一请求消息。示例性的，所述服务器可通过网络设备接收来自终端设备的第一请求消息，即，第一请求消息经终端设备发出、到达网络设备，再经由网络设备将第一请求消息发送至服务器。
本实施例中，由于第一请求消息中包括经第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的证书请求消息，则服务器需要获得上述第二密钥。示例性的，服务器从网络设备处获得所述第二密钥。在终端设备执行GBA认证流程或AKMA认证流程过程中，终端设备与网络设备协商第一密钥，所述第一密钥也可称为共享会话密钥。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述服务器获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥，包括：所述服务器向所述网络设备发送第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息用于请求所述第二密钥；所述服务器接收所述网络设备发送的第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息中包括所述第二密钥。
本实施例中，服务器可向网络设备发送第二请求消息，所述第二请求 消息用于请求第二密钥；则网络设备接收到所述第二请求消息后，基于预先协商的第一密钥生成第二密钥，再向服务器发送第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息中包括所述第二密钥，由此使得服务器获得所述第二密钥。
在另一些可选实施方式中，网络设备在接收到终端设备发送的用于请求数字证书的第一请求消息后，也可基于预先协商的第一密钥生成第二密钥，在向服务器发送该第一请求消息的过程中，将所述第二密钥发送至所述服务器。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一请求消息中还包括：B-TID；所述服务器获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥，包括：所述服务器查询是否存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥；在查询结果为不存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥的情况下，获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥。
本实施例中，服务器中可能预先获得与B-TID对应的第二密钥。则在接收到第一请求消息后，可先通过第一请求消息中携带的B-TID查询是否存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥；在查询结果为不存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥的情况下，获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥；在存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥的情况下，可直接获得所述B-TID对应的第二密钥。
本实施例中，由于终端设备发送的消息是经过第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的，服务器获得第二密钥后，基于所述第二密钥对所述第一请求消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，并在对所述第一请求消息授权通过后签发数字证书。
本实施例中，所述证书请求消息中还包括第一校验值，所述第一校验值可以是HAMC值，所述服务器可基于第一请求消息中的某些比特位进行计算，得到一个校验值，再将该校验值与所述第一校验值进行比对，比对一致则表明完整性校验通过。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述服务器向所述终端设备发送第一响应消息，包括：所述服务器构建包含有所述数字证书的第一响应消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行加密和/或完整性保护，在所述第一响应消息中添加第二校验值，向所述终端设备发送经过上述处理的第一响应消息。同样的，这里的添加第二校验值也属于对第一响应消息进行完整性保护过程的一部分，为便于更清晰的说明后续终端如何基于第一响应消息进行处理，本实施例中才将添加第二校验值这一步骤重点强调。
本实施例中，服务器在签发数字证书后，按照C-V2X相关规范的协议格式要求，构建第一响应消息(或证书响应消息)，并基于第一响应消息中的某些比特位进行计算，得到第二校验值，将第二校验值添加至所述第一响应消息中，并向所述终端设备发送经上述处理的第一响应消息。示例性的，所述第一响应消息可通过HTTP消息承载，例如可通过HTTP 200OK消息承载。
基于前述实施例，本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置方法。图6为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置方法的流程示意图三；如图6所示，所述方法包括：
步骤301：网络设备基于预先协商的第一密钥生成第二密钥；
步骤302：向服务器发送所述第二密钥。
本实施例中，所述网络设备具体可以是NAF/AP。终端设备执行GBA认证流程或AKMA认证流程，开始建立与服务器之间的安全访问连接(或安全通道、安全链路等等)，认证完成后，终端设备与网络设备已协商好第一密钥，所述第一密钥也可称为共享会话密钥。
在一些可选实施例中，网络设备可接收服务器的第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息用于请求第二密钥，则所述网络设备基于预先协商的第一密钥生成第二密钥，再向服务器发送第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息中包 括所述第二密钥，由此使得服务器获得所述第二密钥。在另一些可选实施例中，网络设备在接收到终端设备发送的用于请求数字证书的第一请求消息后，也可基于预先协商的第一密钥生成第二密钥，在向服务器发送该第一请求消息的过程中，将所述第二密钥发送至所述服务器。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述网络设备与终端设备通过执行GBA认证流程或AKMA认证流程，与所述终端设备协商所述第一密钥。
采用本申请实施例的技术方案，基于GBA机制，可通过“一键配置”的方式实现C-V2X终端设备的数字证书的安全配置，无需生产线安全环境的改造，也无需专业的安全机构进行灌装，提升数字证书配置的灵活性、降低部署难度以及投资成本。
下面结合具体的场景对本申请实施例的终端设备的配置方法进行说明。
本示例中，以终端设备为C-V2X设备(C-V2X Device)、网络设备为NAF/AP为例进行说明。其中，C-V2X设备中包括USIM、基带芯片和应用客户端；基带芯片也可称为设备调制解调器(Device Modem)，应用客户端也可称为(C-V2X Application Client)，上述实施例中的CA服务器在本示例中称为应用服务器或C-V2X应用服务器(C-V2X Application Server)。图7为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置方法的交互流程示意图一；如图7所示，所述方法包括：
步骤401、C-V2X应用客户端向基带芯片发起GBA启动请求。
在需要对C-V2X设备进行初始化、配置数字证书时，应用客户端通过GBA接口库调用底层基带芯片启动GBA认证流程，开始建立至CA服务器(如ECA服务器)的安全访问连接。
步骤402、执行GBA认证流程，与NAF/AP协商共享会话密钥 Ks_int_NAF(即前述实施例中的第一密钥)。
步骤403、基带芯片向C-V2X应用客户端发送对应于GBA启动请求的GBA响应。
步骤404-步骤408、在采用GBA增强技术的情况下，C-V2X应用客户端通过接口调用，即调用USIM接口库(例如USIM重构证书请求接口)向USIM传送消息，以触发USIM基于Ks_int_NAF生成应用会话密钥K*(即第二密钥)；USIM通过基带芯片以及接口返回，即调用USIM接口库向C-V2X应用客户端进行消息传送，以告知C-V2X应用客户端已生成应用会话密钥K*。
示例性的，C-V2X应用客户端向USIM传送的消息可携带B-TID、IMPI和NAF标识(ID)；USIM接收到消息后，基于Ks_int_NAF生成应用会话密钥K*。
步骤409-步骤410、C-V2X应用客户端组建证书请求消息(即前述第一证书请求消息)，准备向CA服务器申请数字证书。C-V2X应用客户端通过接口调用，即调用USIM重构证书请求接口、通过基带芯片向USIM进行消息传送，传送的消息中携带准备好的证书请求消息(即前述实施例中的第一证书请求消息)。
步骤411、接收到证书请求消息后，USIM生成公私钥对，在证书请求消息中添加所述公私钥对中的公钥，并利用所述公私钥对中的私钥对证书请求消息进行签名，获得第二证书请求消息；基于所述第二密钥对所述第二证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护，在所述第二证书请求消息中添加HMAC值。
具体的，USIM执行如下操作：
1)使用UICC内部的随机数发生器为EC数字证书生成所需的密码公私钥对；
2)按照C-V2X相关规范的协议要求，完善证书请求消息，其中增加所生成的公私钥对中的公钥；
3)使用公私钥对中的私钥对证书请求消息进行签名；
4)使用应用会话密钥K*对证书请求消息进行加密及完整性保护，并将HMAC值加入到消息中，得到第二证书请求消息。
步骤412-步骤413、USIM通过基带芯片以及接口返回，即通过调用USIM接口库向C-V2X应用客户端进行消息传送，传送的消息中包含经过应用会话密钥K*加密和/或完整性保护的第二证书请求消息。
步骤414、C-V2X应用客户端向CA服务器发送请求消息，请求消息中携带受K*保护的第二证书请求消息以及B-TID、Server FQDN等信息。
其中，示例性的，所述请求消息经NAF/AP传输至CA服务器。
步骤415-步骤417、CA服务器通过预先建立的安全通道与NAF/AP交互，请求NAF/AP基于Ks_int_NAF生成应用会话密钥K*，并获取应用会话密钥K*及其相关信息。所述相关信息例如可包括应用会话密钥K*的生存时间等等。
其中，NAF/AP可通过HTTP 200 OK响应消息向CA服务器发送应用会话密钥K*及其相关信息。
其中，CA服务器向NAF/AP发送的请求消息中还可包括B-TID、服务器FQDN(Server FQDN)等信息。
步骤418、CA服务器获取应用会话密钥K*之后，基于应用会话密钥K*对请求消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，并在对请求消息授权通过后签发数字证书；构建包含有所述数字证书的响应消息，基于应用会话密钥K*对所述响应消息进行加密和/或完整性保护，在所述响应消息中添加HMAC值。
具体的，CA服务器可执行如下操作：
1)使用应用会话密钥K*校验请求消息的HMAC值，解密消息；
2)对证书请求消息进行授权检验；在授权检验通过的情况下，为C-V2X设备签发数字证书；
3)按照C-V2X相关规范的协议要求，构建响应消息，响应消息中包含签发的数字证书；
4)使用应用会话密钥K*对响应消息进行加密及完整性保护，并将HMAC值加入到响应消息中。
步骤419、CA服务器向C-V2X应用客户端返回经应用会话密钥K*保护的响应消息；示例性的，该响应消息可通过HTTP 200 OK消息承载。
步骤420-步骤421、C-V2X应用客户端通过接口调用，即调用USIM安全检验接口、并经基带芯片向USIM进行消息传送，传送的消息中携带上述经应用会话密钥K*保护的响应消息。
步骤422-步骤424、USIM使用应用会话密钥K*对响应消息进行完整性校验和/或解密；校验成功之后，USIM将CA服务器签发的数字证书在安全组件中安全存储，并通过接口返回、经基带芯片向C-V2X应用客户端传送结果状态指示。
本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置装置，应用于终端设备中。图8为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置装置的组成结构示意图一；如图8所示，所述装置包括：第一生成单元11和第一通信单元12；其中，
所述第一生成单元11，配置为基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护；
所述第一通信单元12，配置为发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息中包括经所述第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的所述证书请求消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一通信单元12，还配置为接收来自服务器的第一响应消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行 完整性校验和/或解密，获得所述第一响应消息中携带的数字证书。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一生成单元11包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和USIM；
所述应用客户端，配置为通过所述基带芯片触发所述USIM基于所述第一密钥生成第二密钥；还配置为生成第一证书请求消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一证书请求消息；
所述USIM，配置为生成公私钥对，在所述第一证书请求消息中添加所述公私钥对中的公钥，并利用所述公私钥对中的私钥对所述第一证书请求消息进行签名，获得第二证书请求消息；基于所述第二密钥对所述第二证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护，并在所述第二证书请求消息中添加第一校验值；通过所述基带芯片向所述应用客户端发送经所述第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的所述第二证书请求消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述应用客户端，配置为通过所述第一通信单元12向服务器发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息中包括经所述第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的所述第二证书请求消息；所述第一请求消息中还包括：B-TID和/或服务器FQDN。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一生成单元11包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和USIM；
所述应用客户端，配置为通过所述第一通信单元12接收来自所述服务器的第一响应消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一响应消息；
所述USIM，配置为基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行完整性校验和/或解密；校验通过后，获得所述第一响应消息中携带的数字证书，并在安全组件中存储所述数字证书。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述装置还包括第一执行单元，配置 为执行GBA认证流程或AKMA认证流程，与网络设备协商所述第一密钥。
本申请实施例中，所述装置中的第一生成单元11、第一通信单元12和第一执行单元，在实际应用中均可由中央处理器(CPU，Central Processing Unit)、数字信号处理器(DSP，Digital Signal Processor)、微控制单元(MCU，Microcontroller Unit)或可编程门阵列(FPGA，Field－Programmable Gate Array)结合通信模组(包含：基础通信套件、操作系统、通信模块、标准化接口和协议等)及收发天线实现。
本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置装置，应用于服务器中。图9为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置装置的组成结构示意图二；如图9所示，所述装置包括：第二通信单元21和校验单元22；其中，
所述第二通信单元21，配置为接收来自终端设备的第一请求消息；所述第一请求消息中包括经第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的证书请求消息；
所述校验单元22，配置为获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥；所述第二密钥由所述网络设备基于第一密钥生成；还配置为基于所述第二密钥对所述第一请求消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，并在对所述第一请求消息授权通过后签发数字证书；
所述第二通信单元21，还配置为向所述终端设备发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息中包括所述数字证书。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第二通信单元21，配置为构建包含有所述数字证书的第一响应消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行加密和/或完整性保护，在所述第一响应消息中添加第二校验值，向所述终端设备发送经上述处理后的第一响应消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一请求消息中还包括：B-TID；
所述装置还包括第二执行单元，配置为查询是否存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥；在查询结果为不存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥的情况 下，通过所述第二通信单元获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第二通信单元21，配置为向所述网络设备发送第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息用于请求所述第二密钥；接收所述网络设备发送的第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息中包括所述第二密钥。
本申请实施例中，所述装置中的第二通信单元21、校验单元22和第二执行单元，在实际应用中均可由CPU、DSP、MCU或FPGA结合通信模组(包含：基础通信套件、操作系统、通信模块、标准化接口和协议等)及收发天线实现。
本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置装置，应用于网络设备中。图10为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置装置的组成结构示意图三；如图10所示，所述装置包括第二生成单元31和第三通信单元32；其中，
所述第二生成单元31，配置为基于预先协商的第一密钥生成第二密钥；
所述第三通信单元32，配置为向服务器发送所述第二密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述装置还包括第三执行单元，配置为与终端设备通过执行GBA认证流程或AKMA认证流程，与所述终端设备协商所述第一密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第二生成单元31，配置为基于预先协商的第一密钥，为每个服务器生成对应的第二密钥；
所述第三通信单元32，配置为分别向每个服务器发送所述对应的第二密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第三通信单元32，配置为接收所述服务器发送的第二请求信息，所述第二请求消息用于请求所述第二密钥；向所述服务器发送第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息中包括所述第二生成单元31生成的所述第二密钥。
本申请实施例中，所述装置中的第二生成单元31、第三通信单元32和第三执行单元，在实际应用中均可由CPU、DSP、MCU或FPGA结合通信模组(包含：基础通信套件、操作系统、通信模块、标准化接口和协议等)及收发天线实现。
需要说明的是：上述实施例提供的终端设备的配置装置在进行配置时，仅以上述各程序模块的划分进行举例说明，实际应用中，可以根据需要而将上述处理分配由不同的程序模块完成，即将装置的内部结构划分成不同的程序模块，以完成以上描述的全部或者部分处理。另外，上述实施例提供的终端设备的配置装置与终端设备的配置方法实施例属于同一构思，其具体实现过程详见方法实施例，这里不再赘述。
本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置方法。图11为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置方法的流程示意图四；如图11所示，所述方法包括：
步骤501：终端设备基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对第一消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；
步骤502：发送第一消息。
本实施例的终端设备的配置方法(以下简称方法)应用于终端设备中，所述终端设备具体可以是车联网终端设备(也可以称为C-V2X Device)，在一些可选实施例中，所述车联网终端设备例如可以是OBU、RSU等等；在另一些可选实施例中，所述车联网终端设备也可以是行人的手持设备、可穿戴设备等等。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述终端设备执行GBA认证流程或AKMA认证流程，与网络设备协商所述第一密钥。具体过程可参见前述实施例中终端设备的配置方法的详细记载，这里不再赘述。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述终端设备包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和USIM；所述终端设备基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二 密钥对第一消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护，包括：所述应用客户端通过所述基带芯片触发所述USIM基于所述第一密钥生成第二密钥；所述应用客户端生成第一消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一消息；所述USIM基于所述第二密钥对所述第一消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；所述USIM通过所述基带芯片向所述应用客户端发送经上述处理后的所述第一消息。
本实施例中，第二密钥可以仅由一种密钥组成，也可以由多种密钥组成(也即这里的多种密钥都是基于第一密钥生成的，统称为第二密钥)。一种可行的实施方式中，第二密钥由多种密钥组成，例如可以包括加密密钥和/或完整性保护密钥，当然还可以根据实际需要包括其他类型的密钥，此处不再赘述。进而，USIM基于所述第二密钥对所述第一消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护，其加密和/或完整性保护的具体过程可参照前述实施例中所述，这里不再赘述。
本实施例中，所述第一消息可以是终端设备发送给服务器的任意消息、信息等。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述发送第一消息，包括：所述应用客户端向服务器发送所述第一消息；所述第一消息中还包括：B-TID和/或服务器的FQDN；或者包括：AKMA密钥标识符(A-KID)和/或FQDN。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述终端设备接收来自服务器的第二消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第二消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
本实施例中，所述第二消息可以是服务器发送给终端设备的任意消息、信息等。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述终端设备包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和USIM；所述终端设备接收来自服务器的第二消息，基于所述第二 密钥对所述第二消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，包括：所述应用客户端接收来自所述服务器的第二消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第二消息；所述USIM基于所述第二密钥对所述第二消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
本实施例中，应用客户端接收来自服务器的第二消息，调用USIM安全检验接口通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第二消息；当然，本实施例中接口不限于是USIM安全检验接口，其他用于安全检验的接口也可在本申请实施例的保护范围之内。USIM基于所述第二密钥对所述第二消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，其完整性校验和/或解密的具体过程可参照前述实施例中所述，这里不再赘述。进而，USIM将解密获得的明文信息和/或处理结果返回给应用客户端。
基于上述实施例，本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置方法。图12为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置方法的流程示意图四；如图12所示，所述方法包括：
步骤601：服务器接收来自终端设备的第一消息，所述第一消息的部分或全部经第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护；
步骤602：所述服务器获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥；所述第二密钥由所述网络设备基于第一密钥生成；
步骤603：所述服务器基于所述第二密钥对所述第一消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
本实施例中，在用户的“一键”触发下，终端设备可基于GBA技术机制或AKMA认证机制自动完成服务器接入认证以及安全通道的建立和密钥生成等操作，实现终端设备的初始安全配置。
本实施例中，所述服务器通过上述建立的安全通道接收来自终端设备的第一消息。示例性的，所述服务器可通过网络设备接收来自终端设备的 第一消息，即，第一请求消息经终端设备发出、到达网络设备，再经由网络设备将第一消息发送至服务器。
本实施例中，由于第一消息的部分或全部经第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护处理，则服务器需要获得上述第二密钥。示例性的，服务器从网络设备处获得所述第二密钥。在终端设备执行GBA认证流程或AKMA认证流程过程中，终端设备与网络设备协商第一密钥，所述第一密钥也可称为共享会话密钥。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述服务器获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥，包括：所述服务器向所述网络设备发送第三消息，所述第三消息用于请求所述第二密钥；所述服务器接收所述网络设备发送的第四消息，所述第四消息中包括所述第二密钥。
本实施例中，服务器可向网络设备发送第三消息，所述第三消息用于请求第二密钥；则网络设备接收到所述第三消息后，基于预先协商的第一密钥生成第二密钥，再向服务器发送第四消息，所述第四消息中包括所述第二密钥，由此使得服务器获得所述第二密钥。
另一些可选实施方式中，网络设备在接收到终端设备发送的第一消息后，也可基于预先协商的第一密钥生成第二密钥，在向服务器发送该第一消息的过程中，将所述第二密钥发送至所述服务器。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一消息中还包括：B-TID，或者包括AKMA密钥标识符(A-KID)；所述服务器获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥，包括：所述服务器查询是否存在与所述B-TID或所述A-KID对应的第二密钥；在查询结果为不存在与所述B-TID或所述A-KID对应的第二密钥的情况下，获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥。
本实施例中，服务器中可能预先获得与B-TID对应的第二密钥。则在接收到第一请求消息后，可先通过第一请求消息中携带的B-TID查询是否 存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥；在查询结果为不存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥的情况下，获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥；在存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥的情况下，可直接获得所述B-TID对应的第二密钥。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述方法还包括：所述服务器基于所述第二密钥对第二消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；发送第二消息。
本实施例中，服务器在待向终端设备发送第二消息时，按照相关规范的协议格式要求，构建第二消息，具体是基于第二密钥对第二消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护，其加密和/或完整性保护的具体过程可参照前述实施例中所述，这里不再赘述。
下面结合具体的场景对本申请实施例的终端设备的配置方法进行说明。
本示例中，以终端设备为UE、网络设备为AF为例进行说明。其中，UE中包括USIM、基带芯片和应用客户端；基带芯片也可称为设备调制解调器(Device Modem)，应用客户端也可称为(C-V2X Application Client)，上述实施例中的服务器在本示例中称为应用服务器(Application Server)或C-V2X应用服务器(C-V2X Application Server)。图13为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置方法的交互流程示意图二；如图13所示，所述方法包括：
步骤701、UE启动AKMA。
在需要对C-V2X设备进行初始化、配置数字证书时，应用客户端通过GBA接口库调用底层基带芯片启动GBA认证流程，开始建立至CA服务器(如ECA服务器)的安全访问连接。
步骤702、执行AKMA认证流程，与AF协商共享会话密钥K AF(即前述实施例中的第一密钥)。
步骤703、UE获得共享会话密钥K AF。
步骤704-步骤705、UE基于共享会话密钥K AF生成应用会话密钥K*，使用应用会话密钥K*对消息(上行消息)进行加密和/或完整性保护。
示例性的，应用客户端通过基带芯片向USIM传送消息，消息中可携带B-TID等信息；USIM接收到消息后，基于共享会话密钥K AF生成应用会话密钥K*，并利用应用会话密钥K*对消息的部分或全部进行加密或完整性保护，通过基带芯片向应用客户端发送经上述处理后的消息。
步骤706、UE向应用服务器发送消息(即上行消息)，消息中携带受应用会话密钥K*保护的上行消息以及B-TID、服务器FQDN(Server FQDN)等信息。
其中，示例性的，所述消息经AF传输至应用服务器。
步骤707-步骤709、应用服务器通过预先建立的安全通道与AF交互，请求AF基于共享会话密钥K AF生成应用会话密钥K*，并获取应用会话密钥K*及其相关信息。所述相关信息例如可包括应用会话密钥K*的生存时间等等。
其中，AF可通过HTTP 200 OK响应消息向应用服务器发送应用会话密钥K*及其相关信息。
其中，应用服务器向AF发送的请求消息中还可包括B-TID、服务器FQDN(Server FQDN)等信息。
步骤710、应用服务器获取应用会话密钥K*之后，使用应用会话密钥K*对消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
以上为终端与应用服务器之间的上行消息的传输过程。
步骤711、应用服务器使用应用会话密钥K*对消息(下行消息)进行加密和/或完整性保护。
步骤712、应用服务器向UE发送消息(下行消息)。
步骤713、UE使用应用会话密钥K*对消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
步骤714、UE与应用服务器之间可使用应用会话密钥K*安全传输上下行消息。
基于上述实施例，本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置装置，应用于终端设备中。图14为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置装置的组成结构示意图四；如图14所示，所述装置包括：第三生成单元51和第四通信单元52；其中，
所述第三生成单元51，配置为基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对第一消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；
所述第四通信单元52，配置为发送第一消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第四通信单元52，还配置为接收来自服务器的第二消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第二消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第三生成单元51包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和USIM；
所述应用客户端，配置为通过所述基带芯片触发所述USIM基于所述第一密钥生成第二密钥；还配置为生成第一消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一消息；
所述USIM，配置为基于所述第二密钥对所述第一消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；还配置为通过所述基带芯片向所述应用客户端发送经上述处理后的所述第一消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述应用客户端，还配置为向服务器发送所述第一消息；
所述第一消息中还包括：B-TID和/或服务器的FQDN；或者包括：AKMA密钥标识符(A-KID)和/或FQDN。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第三生成单元51包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和USIM；
所述应用客户端，配置为接收来自所述服务器的第二消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第二消息；
所述USIM，配置为基于所述第二密钥对所述第二消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
本申请实施例中，所述装置中的第三生成单元51和第四通信单元52，在实际应用中均可由CPU、DSP、MCU或FPGA结合通信模组(包含：基础通信套件、操作系统、通信模块、标准化接口和协议等)及收发天线实现。
本申请实施例还提供了一种终端设备的配置装置，应用于服务器中。图15为本申请实施例的终端设备的配置装置的组成结构示意图四；如图15所示，所述装置包括：第五通信单元61和第二校验单元62；其中，
所述第五通信单元61，配置为接收来自终端设备的第一消息，所述第一消息的部分或全部经第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护；
所述第二校验单元62，配置为获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥；所述第二密钥由所述网络设备基于第一密钥生成；还配置为基于所述第二密钥对所述第一消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述装置还包括第四生成单元，配置为基于所述第二密钥对第二消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；
所述第五通信单元61，还配置为发送第二消息。
在本申请的一些可选实施例中，所述第一消息中还包括：B-TID，或者包括AKMA密钥标识符(A-KID)；
所述装置还包括第四执行单元，配置为查询是否存在与所述B-TID或所述A-KID对应的第二密钥；
所述第二校验单元62，配置为在所述第四执行单元获得的查询结果为不存在与所述B-TID或所述A-KID对应的第二密钥的情况下，通过所述第五通信单元61获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥。
本申请实施例中，所述装置中的第五通信单元61、第二校验单元62和第三执行单元，在实际应用中均可由CPU、DSP、MCU或FPGA结合通信模组(包含：基础通信套件、操作系统、通信模块、标准化接口和协议等)及收发天线实现。
需要说明的是：上述实施例提供的终端设备的配置装置在进行配置时，仅以上述各程序模块的划分进行举例说明，实际应用中，可以根据需要而将上述处理分配由不同的程序模块完成，即将装置的内部结构划分成不同的程序模块，以完成以上描述的全部或者部分处理。另外，上述实施例提供的终端设备的配置装置与终端设备的配置方法实施例属于同一构思，其具体实现过程详见方法实施例，这里不再赘述。
本申请实施例还提供了一种通信设备。图16为本申请实施例的通信设备的硬件组成结构示意图，如图16所示，所述通信设备包括存储器42、处理器41及存储在存储器42上并可在处理器41上运行的计算机程序，所述处理器41执行所述程序时实现本申请实施例前述应用于终端设备中的终端设备的配置方法的步骤；或者，所述处理器41执行所述程序时实现本申请实施例前述应用于服务器中的终端设备的配置方法的步骤；或者，所述处理器41执行所述程序时实现本申请实施例前述应用于网络设备中的终端设备的配置方法的步骤，
可选地，通信设备还可包括一个或多个网络接口43。可以理解，通信设备中的各个组件通过总线系统44耦合在一起。可理解，总线系统44用于实现这些组件之间的连接通信。总线系统44除包括数据总线之外，还包括电源总线、控制总线和状态信号总线。但是为了清楚说明起见，在图16 中将各种总线都标为总线系统44。
可以理解，存储器42可以是易失性存储器或非易失性存储器，也可包括易失性和非易失性存储器两者。其中，非易失性存储器可以是只读存储器(ROM，Read Only Memory)、可编程只读存储器(PROM，Programmable Read-Only Memory)、可擦除可编程只读存储器(EPROM，Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory)、电可擦除可编程只读存储器(EEPROM，Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory)、磁性随机存取存储器(FRAM，ferromagnetic random access memory)、快闪存储器(Flash Memory)、磁表面存储器、光盘、或只读光盘(CD-ROM，Compact Disc Read-Only Memory)；磁表面存储器可以是磁盘存储器或磁带存储器。易失性存储器可以是随机存取存储器(RAM，Random Access Memory)，其用作外部高速缓存。通过示例性但不是限制性说明，许多形式的RAM可用，例如静态随机存取存储器(SRAM，Static Random Access Memory)、同步静态随机存取存储器(SSRAM，Synchronous Static Random Access Memory)、动态随机存取存储器(DRAM，Dynamic Random Access Memory)、同步动态随机存取存储器(SDRAM，Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory)、双倍数据速率同步动态随机存取存储器(DDRSDRAM，Double Data Rate Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory)、增强型同步动态随机存取存储器(ESDRAM，Enhanced Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory)、同步连接动态随机存取存储器(SLDRAM，SyncLink Dynamic Random Access Memory)、直接内存总线随机存取存储器(DRRAM，Direct Rambus Random Access Memory)。本申请实施例描述的存储器42旨在包括但不限于这些和任意其它适合类型的存储器。
上述本申请实施例揭示的方法可以应用于处理器41中，或者由处理器41实现。处理器41可能是一种集成电路芯片，具有信号的处理能力。在实 现过程中，上述方法的各步骤可以通过处理器41中的硬件的集成逻辑电路或者软件形式的指令完成。上述的处理器41可以是通用处理器、DSP，或者其他可编程逻辑器件、分立门或者晶体管逻辑器件、分立硬件组件等。处理器41可以实现或者执行本申请实施例中的公开的各方法、步骤及逻辑框图。通用处理器可以是微处理器或者任何常规的处理器等。结合本申请实施例所公开的方法的步骤，可以直接体现为硬件译码处理器执行完成，或者用译码处理器中的硬件及软件模块组合执行完成。软件模块可以位于存储介质中，该存储介质位于存储器42，处理器41读取存储器42中的信息，结合其硬件完成前述方法的步骤。
在示例性实施例中，通信设备可以被一个或多个应用专用集成电路(ASIC，Application Specific Integrated Circuit)、DSP、可编程逻辑器件(PLD，Programmable Logic Device)、复杂可编程逻辑器件(CPLD，Complex Programmable Logic Device)、FPGA、通用处理器、控制器、MCU、微处理器(Microprocessor)、或其他电子元件实现，用于执行前述方法。
在示例性实施例中，本申请实施例还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，例如包括计算机程序的存储器42，上述计算机程序可由通信设备的处理器41执行，以完成前述方法所述步骤。计算机可读存储介质可以是FRAM、ROM、PROM、EPROM、EEPROM、Flash Memory、磁表面存储器、光盘、或CD-ROM等存储器；也可以是包括上述存储器之一或任意组合的各种设备。
本申请实施例还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，该程序被处理器执行时实现本申请实施例前述应用于终端设备中的终端设备的配置方法的步骤；或者，该程序被处理器执行时实现本申请实施例前述应用于服务器中的终端设备的配置方法的步骤；或者，该程序被处理器执行时实现本申请实施例前述应用于网络设备中的终端设备的配置 方法的步骤。
本申请所提供的几个方法实施例中所揭露的方法，在不冲突的情况下可以任意组合，得到新的方法实施例。
本申请所提供的几个产品实施例中所揭露的特征，在不冲突的情况下可以任意组合，得到新的产品实施例。
本申请所提供的几个方法或设备实施例中所揭露的特征，在不冲突的情况下可以任意组合，得到新的方法实施例或设备实施例。
在本申请所提供的几个实施例中，应该理解到，所揭露的设备和方法，可以通过其它的方式实现。以上所描述的设备实施例仅仅是示意性的，例如，所述单元的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，如：多个单元或组件可以结合，或可以集成到另一个系统，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。另外，所显示或讨论的各组成部分相互之间的耦合、或直接耦合、或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，设备或单元的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性的、机械的或其它形式的。
上述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是、或也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是、或也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，也可以分布到多个网络单元上；可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或全部单元来实现本实施例方案的目的。
另外，在本申请各实施例中的各功能单元可以全部集成在一个处理单元中，也可以是各单元分别单独作为一个单元，也可以两个或两个以上单元集成在一个单元中；上述集成的单元既可以采用硬件的形式实现，也可以采用硬件加软件功能单元的形式实现。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解：实现上述方法实施例的全部或部分步骤可以通过程序指令相关的硬件来完成，前述的程序可以存储于一计算机可读取存储介质中，该程序在执行时，执行包括上述方法实施例的步骤； 而前述的存储介质包括：移动存储设备、ROM、RAM、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
或者，本申请上述集成的单元如果以软件功能模块的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时，也可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解，本申请实施例的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机、服务器、或者网络设备等)执行本申请各个实施例所述方法的全部或部分。而前述的存储介质包括：移动存储设备、ROM、RAM、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
以上所述，仅为本申请的具体实施方式，但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此，任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本申请揭露的技术范围内，可轻易想到变化或替换，都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。因此，本申请的保护范围应以所述权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims (44)

  1. 一种终端设备的配置方法，所述方法包括：
    终端设备基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护；
    发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息中包括经所述第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的所述证书请求消息。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备接收来自服务器的第一响应消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，获得所述第一响应消息中携带的数字证书。
  3. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，所述终端设备包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和全球用户识别模块USIM；
    所述终端设备基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护，包括：
    所述应用客户端通过所述基带芯片触发所述USIM基于所述第一密钥生成第二密钥；
    所述应用客户端生成第一证书请求消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一证书请求消息；
    所述USIM生成公私钥对，在所述第一证书请求消息中添加所述公私钥对中的公钥，并利用所述公私钥对中的私钥对所述第一证书请求消息进行签名，获得第二证书请求消息；
    所述USIM基于所述第二密钥对所述第二证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护，在所述第二证书请求消息中添加第一校验值；
    所述USIM通过所述基带芯片向所述应用客户端发送经上述处理后的所述第二证书请求消息。
  4. 根据权利要求3所述的方法，其中，所述发送第一请求消息，包括：
    所述应用客户端向服务器发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息中包括经所述第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的所述第二证书请求消息；
    所述第一请求消息中还包括：引导事务标识B-TID和/或服务器的全限定域名FQDN。
  5. 根据权利要求2所述的方法，其中，所述终端设备包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和USIM；
    所述终端设备接收来自所述服务器的第一响应消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，获得所述第一响应消息中携带的数字证书，包括：
    所述应用客户端接收来自所述服务器的第一响应消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一响应消息；
    所述USIM基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行完整性校验和/或解密；
    校验通过后，所述USIM获得所述第一响应消息中携带的数字证书，并在安全组件中存储所述数字证书。
  6. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备执行通用引导架构GBA认证流程或面向应用的认证或密钥管理AKMA认证流程，与网络设备协商所述第一密钥。
  7. 一种终端设备的配置方法，所述方法包括：
    服务器接收来自终端设备的第一请求消息；所述第一请求消息中包括经第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的证书请求消息；
    所述服务器获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥；所述第二密钥由所述网络设备基于第一密钥生成；
    所述服务器基于所述第二密钥对所述第一请求消息进行完整性校验和/ 或解密，并在对所述第一请求消息授权通过后签发数字证书；
    所述服务器向所述终端设备发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息中包括所述数字证书。
  8. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其中，所述服务器向所述终端设备发送第一响应消息，包括：
    所述服务器构建包含有所述数字证书的第一响应消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行加密和/或完整性保护，在所述第一响应消息中添加第二校验值；
    向所述终端设备发送经上述处理后的第一响应消息。
  9. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其中，所述第一请求消息中还包括：引导事务标识B-TID；
    所述服务器获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥，包括：
    所述服务器查询是否存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥；
    在查询结果为不存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥的情况下，获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥。
  10. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其中，所述服务器获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥，包括：
    所述服务器向所述网络设备发送第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息用于请求所述第二密钥；
    所述服务器接收所述网络设备发送的第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息中包括所述第二密钥。
  11. 一种终端设备的配置方法，所述方法包括：
    网络设备基于预先协商的第一密钥生成第二密钥，向服务器发送所述第二密钥。
  12. 根据权利要求11所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述网络设备与所述终端设备通过执行通用引导架构GBA认证流程或面向应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA认证流程，与所述终端设备协商所述第一密钥。
  13. 根据权利要求11所述的方法，其中，所述网络设备基于预先协商的第一密钥生成第二密钥，向服务器发送所述第二密钥，包括：
    所述网络设备基于预先协商的第一密钥，为每个服务器生成对应的第二密钥，向每个服务器发送所述对应的第二密钥。
  14. 根据权利要求11至13任一项所述的方法，其中，所述网络设备基于预先协商的第一密钥生成第二密钥，向服务器发送所述第二密钥，包括：
    所述网络设备接收所述服务器发送的第二请求信息，所述第二请求消息用于请求所述第二密钥；
    所述网络设备基于预先协商的第一密钥生成第二密钥，向所述服务器发送第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息中包括所述第二密钥。
  15. 一种终端设备的配置装置，所述装置包括：第一生成单元和第一通信单元；其中，
    所述第一生成单元，配置为基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护；
    所述第一通信单元，配置为发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息中包括经所述第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的所述证书请求消息。
  16. 根据权利要求15所述的装置，其中，所述第一通信单元，还配置为接收来自服务器的第一响应消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，获得所述第一响应消息中携带的数字证书。
  17. 根据权利要求15所述的装置，其中，所述第一生成单元包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和全球用户识别模块USIM；
    所述应用客户端，配置为通过所述基带芯片触发所述USIM基于所述第一密钥生成第二密钥；还配置为生成第一证书请求消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一证书请求消息；
    所述USIM，配置为生成公私钥对，在所述第一证书请求消息中添加所述公私钥对中的公钥，并利用所述公私钥对中的私钥对所述第一证书请求消息进行签名，获得第二证书请求消息；基于所述第二密钥对所述第二证书请求消息进行加密和/或完整性保护，并在所述第二证书请求消息中添加第一校验值；通过所述基带芯片向所述应用客户端发送经所述第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的所述第二证书请求消息。
  18. 根据权利要求17所述的装置，其中，所述应用客户端，配置为通过所述第一通信单元向服务器发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息中包括经所述第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的所述第二证书请求消息；所述第一请求消息中还包括：引导事务标识B-TID和/或服务器全限定域名FQDN。
  19. 根据权利要求16所述的装置，其中，所述第一生成单元包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和全球用户识别模块USIM；
    所述应用客户端，配置为通过所述第一通信单元接收来自所述服务器的第一响应消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一响应消息；
    所述USIM，配置为基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行完整性校验和/或解密；校验通过后，获得所述第一响应消息中携带的数字证书，并在安全组件中存储所述数字证书。
  20. 根据权利要求15所述的装置，其中，所述装置还包括第一执行单元，配置为执行通用引导架构GBA认证流程或面向应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA认证流程，与网络设备协商所述第一密钥。
  21. 一种终端设备的配置装置，所述装置包括：第二通信单元和第一 校验单元；其中，
    所述第二通信单元，配置为接收来自终端设备的第一请求消息；所述第一请求消息中包括经第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护的证书请求消息；
    所述第一校验单元，配置为获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥；所述第二密钥由所述网络设备基于第一密钥生成；还配置为基于所述第二密钥对所述第一请求消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，并在对所述第一请求消息授权通过后签发数字证书；
    所述第二通信单元，还配置为向所述终端设备发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息中包括所述数字证书。
  22. 根据权利要求21所述的装置，其中，所述第二通信单元，配置为构建包含有所述数字证书的第一响应消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第一响应消息进行加密和/或完整性保护，在所述第一响应消息中添加第二校验值，向所述终端设备发送经上述处理后的第一响应消息。
  23. 根据权利要求21所述的装置，其中，所述第一请求消息中还包括：引导事务标识B-TID；
    所述装置还包括第二执行单元，配置为查询是否存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥；在查询结果为不存在与所述B-TID对应的第二密钥的情况下，通过所述第二通信单元获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥。
  24. 一种终端设备的配置装置，所述装置包括第二生成单元和第三通信单元；其中，
    所述第二生成单元，配置为基于预先协商的第一密钥生成第二密钥；
    所述第三通信单元，配置为向服务器发送所述第二密钥。
  25. 根据权利要求24所述的装置，其中，所述装置还包括第三执行单元，配置为与终端设备通过执行通用引导架构GBA认证流程或面向应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA认证流程，与所述终端设备协商所述第一密钥。
  26. 根据权利要求24所述的装置，其中，所述第二生成单元，配置为基于预先协商的第一密钥，为每个服务器生成对应的第二密钥；
    所述第三通信单元，配置为分别向每个服务器发送所述对应的第二密钥。
  27. 一种终端设备的配置方法，所述方法包括：
    终端设备基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对第一消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；
    发送第一消息。
  28. 根据权利要求27所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备接收来自服务器的第二消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第二消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
  29. 根据权利要求27所述的方法，其中，所述终端设备包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和全球用户识别模块USIM；
    所述终端设备基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对第一消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护，包括：
    所述应用客户端通过所述基带芯片触发所述USIM基于所述第一密钥生成第二密钥；
    所述应用客户端生成第一消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一消息；
    所述USIM基于所述第二密钥对所述第一消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；
    所述USIM通过所述基带芯片向所述应用客户端发送经上述处理后的所述第一消息。
  30. 根据权利要求29所述的方法，其中，所述发送第一消息，包括：
    所述应用客户端向服务器发送所述第一消息；
    所述第一消息中还包括：引导事务标识B-TID和/或服务器的全限定域名FQDN；或者包括：面向应用的认证或密钥管理AKMA密钥标识符A-KID和/或FQDN。
  31. 根据权利要求28所述的方法，其中，所述终端设备包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和全球用户识别模块USIM；
    所述终端设备接收来自服务器的第二消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第二消息进行完整性校验和/或解密，包括：
    所述应用客户端接收来自所述服务器的第二消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第二消息；
    所述USIM基于所述第二密钥对所述第二消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
  32. 一种终端设备的配置方法，所述方法包括：
    服务器接收来自终端设备的第一消息，所述第一消息的部分或全部经第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护；
    所述服务器获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥；所述第二密钥由所述网络设备基于第一密钥生成；
    所述服务器基于所述第二密钥对所述第一消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
  33. 根据权利要求32所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述服务器基于所述第二密钥对第二消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；
    发送第二消息。
  34. 根据权利要求32所述的方法，其中，所述第一消息中还包括：引导事务标识B-TID，或者包括面向应用的认证或密钥管理AKMA密钥标识符A-KID；
    所述服务器获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥，包括：
    所述服务器查询是否存在与所述B-TID或所述A-KID对应的第二密钥；
    在查询结果为不存在与所述B-TID或所述A-KID对应的第二密钥的情况下，获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥。
  35. 一种终端设备的配置装置，所述装置包括：第三生成单元和第四通信单元；其中，
    所述第三生成单元，配置为基于第一密钥生成第二密钥，基于所述第二密钥对第一消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；
    所述第四通信单元，配置为发送第一消息。
  36. 根据权利要求35所述的装置，其中，所述第四通信单元，还配置为接收来自服务器的第二消息，基于所述第二密钥对所述第二消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
  37. 根据权利要求35所述的装置，其中，所述第三生成单元包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和全球用户识别模块USIM；
    所述应用客户端，配置为通过所述基带芯片触发所述USIM基于所述第一密钥生成第二密钥；还配置为生成第一消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第一消息；
    所述USIM，配置为基于所述第二密钥对所述第一消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；还配置为通过所述基带芯片向所述应用客户端发送经上述处理后的所述第一消息。
  38. 根据权利要求37所述的装置，其中，所述应用客户端，还配置为向服务器发送所述第一消息；
    所述第一消息中还包括：引导事务标识B-TID和/或服务器的全限定域名FQDN；或者包括：面向应用的认证或密钥管理AKMA密钥标识符A-KID 和/或FQDN。
  39. 根据权利要求36所述的装置，其中，所述第三生成单元包括：应用客户端、基带芯片和全球用户识别模块USIM；
    所述应用客户端，配置为接收来自所述服务器的第二消息，并通过所述基带芯片向所述USIM发送所述第二消息；
    所述USIM，配置为基于所述第二密钥对所述第二消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
  40. 一种终端设备的配置装置，所述装置包括：第五通信单元和第二校验单元；其中，
    所述第五通信单元，配置为接收来自终端设备的第一消息，所述第一消息的部分或全部经第二密钥加密和/或完整性保护；
    所述第二校验单元，配置为获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥；所述第二密钥由所述网络设备基于第一密钥生成；还配置为基于所述第二密钥对所述第一消息进行完整性校验和/或解密。
  41. 根据权利要求40所述的装置，其中，所述装置还包括第四生成单元，配置为基于所述第二密钥对第二消息的部分或全部进行加密和/或完整性保护；
    所述第五通信单元，还配置为发送第二消息。
  42. 根据权利要求40所述的装置，其中，所述第一消息中还包括：引导事务标识B-TID，或者包括面向应用的认证或密钥管理AKMA密钥标识符A-KID；
    所述装置还包括第四执行单元，配置为查询是否存在与所述B-TID或所述A-KID对应的第二密钥；
    所述第二校验单元，配置为在所述第四执行单元获得的查询结果为不存在与所述B-TID或所述A-KID对应的第二密钥的情况下，通过所述第五 通信单元获得来自网络设备的所述第二密钥。
  43. 一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，该程序被处理器执行时实现权利要求1至6任一项所述方法的步骤；或者，
    该程序被处理器执行时实现权利要求7至10任一项所述方法的步骤；或者，
    该程序被处理器执行时实现权利要求11至14任一项所述方法的步骤；或者，
    该程序被处理器执行时实现权利要求27至31任一项所述方法的步骤；或者，
    该程序被处理器执行时实现权利要求32至34任一项所述方法的步骤。
  44. 一种通信设备，包括存储器、处理器及存储在存储器上并可在处理器上运行的计算机程序，所述处理器执行所述程序时实现权利要求1至6任一项所述方法的步骤；或者，
    所述处理器执行所述程序时实现权利要求7至10任一项所述方法的步骤；或者，
    所述处理器执行所述程序时实现权利要求11至14任一项所述方法的步骤；或者，
    所述处理器执行所述程序时实现权利要求27至31任一项所述方法的步骤；或者，
    所述处理器执行所述程序时实现权利要求32至34任一项所述方法的步骤。
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