WO2023087423A1 - 车内网ota安全通讯方法、装置、车载系统及存储介质 - Google Patents

车内网ota安全通讯方法、装置、车载系统及存储介质 Download PDF

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WO2023087423A1
WO2023087423A1 PCT/CN2021/135874 CN2021135874W WO2023087423A1 WO 2023087423 A1 WO2023087423 A1 WO 2023087423A1 CN 2021135874 W CN2021135874 W CN 2021135874W WO 2023087423 A1 WO2023087423 A1 WO 2023087423A1
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Prior art keywords
processor
sub
random number
vehicle
key
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English (en)
French (fr)
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陈禧
郑旭明
吴勇波
双建平
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Chengdu Kawa Technology Co Ltd
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Chengdu Kawa Technology Co Ltd
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Priority to EP21964568.6A priority Critical patent/EP4436102B1/en
Priority to US18/270,506 priority patent/US12513128B2/en
Publication of WO2023087423A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023087423A1/zh
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/088—Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/84—Vehicles
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/068—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/06—Protocols specially adapted for file transfer, e.g. file transfer protocol [FTP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the technical field of automobile panorama calibration, in particular to an OTA secure communication method, device, vehicle-mounted system and storage medium in a vehicle intranet.
  • OTA Over-the-Air Technology, over-the-air technology
  • this technology directly flashes the system versions of all ECUs equipped in the vehicle, which directly affects the safety of the vehicle, the safety protection of the OTA technology itself is particularly important.
  • OTA is mainly based on the Internet-based cloud pipe-end architecture and the in-vehicle network "cloud pipe-end" architecture.
  • the main function of the cloud pipe end of the Internet is to download the upgrade package to the main node ECU (Electronic Control Unit, Electronic Control Unit) in the vehicle through the interaction between the Internet and the cloud;
  • the ECU of the main node is a cloud, and the intranet communication is used as the management. It communicates with each sub-ECU, distributes each upgrade package to each sub-ECU and flashes the system version.
  • the security protection of OTA technology mainly focuses on the information security of the network connection between the vehicle and the cloud, while the communication security of the vehicle intranet is still almost in a state of "streaking".
  • OTA is mainly based on in-vehicle Ethernet and in-vehicle can (Controller Area Network, controller area network) bus communication.
  • in-vehicle Ethernet and in-vehicle can (Controller Area Network, controller area network) bus communication.
  • controller area network Controller Area Network, controller area network
  • the present invention provides an OTA secure communication method, device, vehicle system and storage medium in the vehicle intranet.
  • the present invention provides an OTA secure communication method in a vehicle network, which is applied to a vehicle-mounted system, and the vehicle-mounted system includes a main processor and a sub-processor, the main processor presets a root key, and the sub-processor The root key seed or root key is preset, and the main processor is connected to an external transmission to obtain an upgrade package online or offline; the method includes:
  • the temporary communication key is derived based on the random array to conduct encrypted communication with the sub-processor, and issue the upgrade package to the sub-processor;
  • the check code is a MAC value
  • the MAC value is a check value obtained by performing MAC calculation on the random number data based on the MAC algorithm and the root key.
  • the concatenation of the random numbers is formed by juxtaposing the first random numbers and the second random numbers into a data group.
  • said deriving the temporary communication key based on the random array to perform encrypted communication with the sub-processor, and issuing the upgrade package to the sub-processor includes:
  • the sub-processor requests an upgrade package from the main processor
  • the main processor returns the upgrade package to the sub-processor based on the upgrade package obtained by external transmission;
  • the subprocessor After the download is complete, the subprocessor sends a completion signal to the main processor;
  • the above-mentioned session transmissions all adopt temporary communication keys derived from random arrays for encrypted communication.
  • ending the session and performing an invalidation operation on the temporary key specifically includes:
  • the sub-processor After the upgrade of the upgrade package is completed, the sub-processor sends the session termination identifier to the main processor, and the temporary key is invalidated. There will be a new upgrade task in the future, and a new temporary key will be generated to encrypt the communication data.
  • the main processor obtains the upgrade package through online download from the cloud or offline download through a USB port.
  • check code verification method includes:
  • the check code is a MAC value.
  • the present invention provides a vehicle intranet OTA secure communication device, the communication device includes a main processor, and the main processor communicates with the sub-processor in the vehicle system through the above-mentioned vehicle intranet OTA secure communication method Connect to send an upgrade package to the sub-processor.
  • the present invention provides a vehicle-mounted system, including a sub-processor and the above-mentioned OTA security communication device for the intra-vehicle network.
  • the present invention also provides a storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the above-mentioned steps in the OTA secure communication method for the in-vehicle network are implemented.
  • the present invention uses random numbers and root keys to generate temporary keys in the in-vehicle network, and uses MAC values to perform integrity checks.
  • the OTA business Before the master node and each sub-node of the in-vehicle network perform OTA services, the identities of both parties need to be authenticated , the OTA business can only start after the certification is passed.
  • the data that needs to be exchanged between the master node and each sub-node includes various commands, upgrade package content, upgrade progress transmission, etc. All data will be encrypted, and the encryption key is randomly generated each time.
  • OTA services are different, so as to prevent key leakage and replay attacks, ensure the security of OTA communication in the vehicle network, and improve the security of the vehicle system.
  • FIG. 1 is a structural flowchart of an OTA secure communication method in a vehicle intranet in an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Fig. 2 is a flow chart of a specific implementation method of an OTA secure communication method in a vehicle intranet in an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a structural diagram of a data transmission package in an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Fig. 4 is a schematic diagram of random number assembling in the embodiment of the present invention.
  • first and second are used for descriptive purposes only, they are mainly used to distinguish different devices, elements or components (the specific types and structures may be the same or different), and are not used for The relative importance and quantity of the indicated means, elements or components are stated or implied, and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance.
  • Vehicle OTA is a process of flashing and updating each ECU system version of the vehicle based on the intranet.
  • the method in this embodiment is mainly used to prevent the system of each ECU from Be tampered with and brushed at will.
  • Fig. 1 shows the structural flow diagram of the OTA secure communication method in the vehicle intranet in this embodiment.
  • the present embodiment provides a method for OTA secure communication in the vehicle intranet, the method is applied in the vehicle system, and is mainly used to realize the information communication between the main processor and the sub-processor in the vehicle intranet, It is mainly to improve the OTA technology security protection of the vehicle itself, and prevent the main node or sub-node from being attacked during the distribution and transmission of the upgrade package in the vehicle intranet, and being used by the outside to carry out illegal OTA activities, thereby affecting the safety of the vehicle.
  • this solution is based on a vehicle-mounted system.
  • the vehicle-mounted system specifically includes a main processor and a sub-processor, wherein the main processor presets the root key, and the sub-processor presets the root key seed or root key. If If the root key seed is used, the root key needs to be generated through the root key seed.
  • the root key can be preset in the security chip or the security partition or the common partition according to the actual situation. More specifically, the main processor is connected to an external transmission, and the upgrade package is obtained online or offline.
  • the method in this embodiment uses the main processor to perform the following steps:
  • the sub-processor when the sub-processor wants to obtain the upgrade package, it communicates with the main processor, and the two generate a temporary key through the generated random number and the preset root key.
  • the specific temporary key generation method is that the main processor and the sub-processor generate a random number respectively, and through two transmissions, they respectively obtain a random array obtained by concatenating two random numbers , using this random array to form a temporary key.
  • this embodiment uses a check code to verify, wherein, the check code in this embodiment uses a MAC value (Media Access Control Address, Media Access control address).
  • the sender uses a random number to calculate a MAC value when sending, and sends the MAC value to the receiver.
  • the receiver After receiving the data, the receiver uses the preset root key to calculate the MAC value. If the MAC value is incorrect, it can be Know that the data has been tampered with, so as to verify it.
  • the main processor and the sub-processor will use the temporary key for communication during the subsequent upgrade session of the upgrade package, and after the upgrade package is sent, the temporary key will be invalidated, and the subsequent sessions will regenerate key to ensure the security of subsequent sessions and avoid key disclosure and replay attacks.
  • the main processor can obtain the upgrade package through online download from the cloud or offline download through the USB port.
  • the check code in this embodiment adopts the MAC value
  • the MAC value is a check value based on the MAC calculation of the random number data based on the MAC algorithm and the root key. After the session communication is hijacked , the MAC value will change, so it can be used as a check.
  • the concatenation of the random numbers is formed by juxtaposing the first random numbers and the second random numbers into a data group. For example, if the first random number is Ra and the second random number is Rb, then the spliced random array is RaRb.
  • the temporary communication key derived based on the random array is used for encrypted communication with the sub-processor, and issuing the upgrade package to the sub-processor includes:
  • the subprocessor requests an upgrade package from the main processor.
  • the main processor returns the upgrade package to the sub-processor based on the upgrade package acquired through external transmission.
  • the sub-processor After the download is completed, the sub-processor sends a completion signal to the main processor.
  • the above-mentioned session transmissions all adopt temporary communication keys derived from random arrays for encrypted communication.
  • the main processor can be divided into an FTP server end and a cloud communication end, wherein, the FTP (File Transfer Protocol, file transfer protocol) server is similar to an FTP server, which is convenient for the sub-processor to transfer from The main processor downloads the upgrade package file.
  • the cloud communication terminal is responsible for communicating with the cloud, responsible for downloading the upgrade files of all processors from the cloud to the main processor, and then each sub-processor downloads its own upgrade package files from the main processor through the FTP transfer protocol.
  • the subprocessor requests the upgrade package from the FTP server of the main processor through the temporary key, and receives it when the main processor returns the upgrade package, and returns a successful download signal after the download is successful, to End session.
  • ending the session and performing an invalidation operation on the temporary key specifically includes:
  • the sub-processor After the upgrade of the upgrade package is completed, the sub-processor sends the session termination identifier to the main processor, and the temporary key is invalidated. There will be a new upgrade task in the future, and a new temporary key will be generated to encrypt the communication data.
  • the sub-processor starts to upgrade after receiving the upgrade package.
  • the temporary key is used to encrypt the message of the completion of the upgrade and attach the completion mark to the main processor.
  • the temporary key becomes invalid and there is a new upgrade task to be generated later.
  • the new temporary key is used to encrypt communication data.
  • the verification code verification method includes:
  • the check code is a MAC value.
  • the role of the MAC value is mainly for integrity verification. If the transmitted message is hijacked and tampered with in the communication channel, then the receiving end will use the preset root key to calculate the MAC value after receiving the data, which will If the MAC value is found to be incorrect, it can be known that the data has been tampered with, thereby realizing verification.
  • this embodiment provides a specific implementation, please refer to Figure 2, wherein, the main ECU in Figure 2 is the main processor in this embodiment, and the sub-ECU is the sub-processing in this embodiment device, the specific steps are as follows:
  • the root key is preset in the main processor, and the root key seed or root key is preset in the sub-processor, wherein the root key can be preset in the security chip or the security partition or the common partition, depending on the actual situation.
  • the upgrade package can be downloaded to the main processor online, and can also be transferred to the main processor through an offline method such as USB.
  • the main processor when the upgrade package of the sub-processor is ready, the main processor sends a communication request to the sub-processor.
  • the subprocessor After receiving the communication request, the subprocessor generates the first random number Ra, uses a key derivation algorithm based on the root key seed, such as KDF (a key derivation function) algorithm, generates a root key, and then uses MAC
  • KDF a key derivation function
  • the algorithm calculates the MAC value of the message sent to the main processor.
  • the final message data structure is shown in Figure 3, where Data contains the random number Ra and other self-defined communication data fields.
  • the MAC value is based on the MAC algorithm and the root key pair Data The value resulting from the MAC calculation performed.
  • the main processor verifies the message sent by the sub-processor: obtain Data (Ra), calculate the MAC value based on the root key, and finally match it with the MAC value in the message.
  • the main processor After the verification is passed, the main processor generates a random number Rb, and splices Ra and Rb.
  • the splicing model is as shown in Figure 4. After the splicing is completed, the root key is used to calculate the MAC value of Data (RaRb), and then sent to the sub-processor.
  • the sub-processor verifies the message sent by the main processor based on the principle of step 3, obtains the random number RaRb if the verification is passed, and returns a message of passing the verification to the main processor.
  • both the main processor and the sub-processor have the random number RaRb, and the encrypted temporary keys used in subsequent communications all use temporary keys derived based on the random number RaRb.
  • the main processor After the main processor obtains the message of passing the verification, it uses the RaRb-derived temporary key to encrypt the message requesting the sub-processor to download the upgrade package and sends it to the sub-processor.
  • the sub-processor uses the RaRb-based temporary key to decrypt the message, and obtains Download the address of the upgrade package and other information, and use the temporary key to encrypt and return the message "OK" to the main processor.
  • the sub-processor initiates an upgrade package download request to the FTP service of the main processor based on the upgrade package download address, and the main processor loops back the upgrade package to the sub-processor until the upgrade package download is completed.
  • the sub-processor starts to upgrade after receiving the upgrade package. After the upgrade is completed, use the temporary key to encrypt the message of the upgrade completion and attach the Final logo to the main processor.
  • the temporary key for communication data encryption.
  • the advantage of this embodiment is that the secure communication method uses random numbers and root keys to generate temporary keys in the in-vehicle network, uses the MAC value to perform integrity verification, and the master node and each sub-node of the in-vehicle network perform OTA
  • the identities of both parties need to be authenticated before the business, and the OTA business can only start after the authentication is passed.
  • the data that needs to be exchanged between the master node and each sub-node includes various commands, upgrade package content, upgrade progress transmission, etc. All data will be encrypted, and the encryption key is randomly generated each time.
  • OTA services are different, so as to prevent key leakage and replay attacks, ensure the security of OTA communication in the vehicle network, and improve the security of the vehicle system.
  • This embodiment provides an OTA security communication device for the in-vehicle network.
  • the communication device includes a main processor.
  • the upgrade package obtained offline by the interface.
  • the communication method between the main processor and the sub-processor in the vehicle-mounted system adopts random numbers to generate temporary keys.
  • the communication device performs the following steps through the main processor:
  • the temporary communication key is derived based on the random array to conduct encrypted communication with the sub-processor, and issue the upgrade package to the sub-processor;
  • the communication method between the main processor and the sub-processor in the vehicle system adopts the OTA secure communication method of the vehicle intranet in the first embodiment.
  • the safety communication device generates a temporary key and uses the key to encrypt the communication of the upgrade package to complete the safety communication of the vehicle intranet, thereby effectively improving the security of the vehicle intranet.
  • This embodiment provides a vehicle-mounted system, the vehicle-mounted system includes a sub-processor and an OTA security communication device in the vehicle intranet in Embodiment 2, wherein the sub-processor in the vehicle-mounted system and the main processor in the security communication device use random numbers To generate a temporary key, the session is conducted with the temporary key, which ensures the security of OTA communication in the vehicle network.
  • This embodiment provides a storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, wherein, when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the OTA secure communication method for an intra-vehicle network in the first embodiment can be implemented.

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  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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Abstract

一种车内网OTA安全通讯方法、装置、车载系统及存储介质。该方法包括：向子处理器发送通信请求，接收子处理器生成的第一随机数和基于第一随机数和根密钥生成的校验码（101）；校验码验证无误后，生成第二随机数，和第一随机数拼接成随机数组，向子处理器发送随机数组和基于随机数组和根密钥生成的校验码（102）；接收子处理器验证无误的信息后，基于随机数组衍生临时通信密钥与子处理器进行加密通讯，向子处理器进行升级包发放（103）；升级包发送完成后，结束会话并对临时密钥做失效操作（104）。车内网通讯时每次加密的密钥是随机生成，每次OTA业务都不一样，从而防止密钥泄露和重放攻击，保证了车内网OTA通讯的安全性。

Description

车内网OTA安全通讯方法、装置、车载系统及存储介质 技术领域
本发明涉及汽车全景标定技术领域，尤其涉及一种车内网OTA安全通讯方法、装置、车载系统及存储介质。
背景技术
随着车联网的发展，OTA(Over-the-Air Technology，空中下载技术)在汽车中的应用逐渐增多，车企对于该技术越来越重视。由于该技术直接刷写车辆内所有搭载的ECU的系统版本，直接影响车辆的安全，所以OTA技术本身的安全防护尤为重要。OTA主要是架构为基于互联网的云管端架构与车内网“云管端”架构。互联网的云管端主要功能为车辆通过联网与云端交互将升级包下载到车内主节点ECU(Electronic Control Unit，电子控制单元)之中；而车内网的“云管端”则是以该主节点ECU为云，以车内网通信为管，与各个子ECU的端信，将各个升级包分发到各个子ECU并进行系统版本刷写。目前OTA技术安全防护主要关注在车辆和云端之间的网联信息安全，而车内网的通信的安全则目前几乎还处于“裸奔”状态。随着车内以太网的高速发展，车内通信速度越来越快，业务层的通信协议选择越来越多，且OTA也正在从基于传统车内can总线向车内以太网架构发展，越来越多的数据和信息基于车内网在各个ECU之间快速传输，其数据的安全性问题亟待解决。
目前OTA主要基于车内以太网和车内can(Controller Area Network，控制器域网)总线通信，主节点和各子节点之间在通信之前没有身份认证功能，所有的业务交互数据如升级包分发，升级命令，升级进度等数据都是明文传输，数据未经过任何加密，所以主节点或者子节点被攻击，都有可能进行非法的OTA活动，影响车辆安全。
发明内容
本发明为克服上述现有技术所述的至少一种缺陷(不足)，提供一种车内网OTA安全通讯方法、装置、车载系统及存储介质。
为解决上述技术问题，本发明的技术方案如下：
第一方面，本发明提供一种车内网OTA安全通讯方法，应用于车载系统，所述车载系统包括主处理器和子处理器，所述主处理器预置根密钥，所述子处理器预置根密钥种子或者根密钥，所述主处理器与外部传输连接，在线或离线获取升级包；所述方法包括：
向子处理器发送通信请求，接收子处理器生成的第一随机数和基于第一随机数和根密钥生成的校验码；
校验码验证无误后，生成第二随机数，和第一随机数拼接成随机数组，向子处理器发送随机数组和基于随机数组和根密钥生成的校验码；
接收子处理器验证无误的信息后，基于随机数组衍生临时通信密钥与子处理器进行加密通讯，向子处理器进行升级包发放；
升级包发送完成后，结束会话并对临时密钥做失效操作。
进一步的，所述校验码为MAC值，所述MAC值是基于MAC算法和根密钥对随机数数据进行的MAC计算而得出的校验值。
进一步的，随机数的拼接由第一随机数和第二随机数并列成数据组的方式形成。
进一步的，所述基于随机数组衍生临时通信密钥与子处理器进行加密通讯，向子处理器进行升级包发放包括：
子处理器向主处理器请求升级包；
主处理器基于外部传输获取的升级包向子处理器返回升级包；
下载完成后，子处理器向主处理器发送完成信号；
其中，上述会话传输均采用基于随机数组衍生临时通信密钥进行加密通讯。
进一步的，所述升级包发送完成后，结束会话并对临时密钥做失效操作具体包括：
在升级包升级完成后，子处理器发送会话终止标识给主处理器，临时密钥失效，后续有新的升级任务，再生成新的临时密钥进行通信数据加密。
进一步的，所述主处理器通过从云端在线下载或USB端口离线下载的方式获取升级包。
进一步的，所述校验码验证方法包括：
获取随机数数据；
利用随机数数据并基于根密钥计算校验码；
将计算得到的校验码和消息中的校验码进行匹配，匹配一致则验证通过，否则验证不通过；
其中，校验码为MAC值。
第二方面，本发明提供一种车内网OTA安全通讯装置，所述通讯装置包括主处理器，所述主处理器通过上述的车内网OTA安全通讯方法与车载系统中的子处理器通讯连接，向子处理器发送升级包。
第三方面，本发明提供一种车载系统，包括子处理器和上述的车内网OTA安全通讯装置。
第四方面，本发明还提供一种存储介质，所述存储介质上存储有计算机程序，所述计算机程序被处理器执行时实现上述的车内网OTA安全通讯方法中的步骤。
本发明在车内网利用随机数、根密钥进行临时密钥的生成，利用MAC值进行完整性校验，车内网的主节点和各个子节点进行OTA业务之前需要对双方的身份进行认证，认证通过后才能开始OTA业务。在业务进行时，主节点和各子节点之间需要交互的数据包括各种命令，升级包内容，升级进度传输等等一切数据都会经过加密，且每次加密的密钥是随机生成，每次OTA业务都不一样，从而防止密钥泄露和重放攻击，保证了车内网OTA通讯的安全度，提高了车载系统的安全性。
附图说明
图1为本发明实施例中车内网OTA安全通讯方法的结构流程图。
图2为本发明实施例中车内网OTA安全通讯方法具体实施方式的流程图。
图3为本发明实施例中数据传输封装结构图。
图4为本发明实施例中随机数拼装示意图。
具体实施方式
为了使本发明的目的、技术方案及优点更加清楚明白，以下结合附图及实施例，对本发明进行进一步详细说明。应当理解，此处所描述的具体实施例仅仅用以解释本发明，并不用于限定本发明。
本申请实施例的附图中相同或相似的标号对应相同或相似的部件；在本申请的描述中，需要理解的是，若有术语“上”、“下”、“左”、“右”、“顶”、“底”、“内”、“外”等指示的方位或位置关系为基于附图所示的方位或位置关系，仅是为了便于描述本申请和简化描述，而不是指示或暗示所指的装置或元件必须具有特定的方位、以特定的方位构造和操作，因此附图中描述位置关系的用语仅用于示例性说明，不能理解为对本专利的限制。
此外，若有“第一”、“第二”等术语仅用于描述目的，主要是用于区分不同的装置、元件或组成部分(具体的种类和构造可能相同也可能不同)，并非用于表明或暗示所指示装置、元件或组成部分的相对重要性和数量，而不能理解为指示或者暗示相对重要性。
实施例一
整车OTA是基于车内网对车辆各个ECU系统版本进行刷写更新的过程，针对目前车内网 通信几乎无任何安全措施的通信现状，本实施例中的方法主要用于防止各ECU的系统被随意篡改和刷写。
图1示出了本实施例中车内网OTA安全通讯方法的结构流程图。
如图1所示，本实施例提供了一种车内网OTA安全通讯方法，该方法应用于车载系统中，主要用于实现车内网中，主处理器和子处理器之间的信息通讯，主要来实现提高车辆本省的OTA技术安全防护，防止车内网升级包分发传输过程中，主节点或者子节点被攻击，被外部利用进行非法的OTA活动，进而影响车辆安全。
具体的，本方案基于车载系统，该车载系统具体包括有主处理器和子处理器，其中，主处理器预置根密钥，而子处理器则预置根密钥种子或者根密钥，若采用根密钥种子，则需要通过根密钥种子来生成根密钥，具体的，该根密钥可以根据实际情况预置在安全芯片或者安全分区或者普通分区。更为具体的，所述主处理器与外部传输连接，在线或离线获取升级包，本实施例中的方法利用主处理器来执行以下步骤：
101、向子处理器发送通信请求，接收子处理器生成的第一随机数和基于第一随机数和根密钥生成的校验码；
102、校验码验证无误后，生成第二随机数，和第一随机数拼接成随机数组，向子处理器发送随机数组和基于随机数组和根密钥生成的校验码；
103、接收子处理器验证无误的信息后，基于随机数组衍生临时通信密钥与子处理器进行加密通讯，向子处理器进行升级包发放；
104、升级包发送完成后，结束会话并对临时密钥做失效操作。
其中，在子处理器要获取升级包时，和主处理器进行通信请求，两者通过生成的随机数以及预置的根密钥来生成临时密钥。
如步骤101、102和103所述，具体的临时密钥生成方法为，主处理器和子处理器分别产生一个随机数，并通过两次传输使两者分别获取两个随机数拼接得到的随机数组，利用该随机数组形成临时密钥。
在随机数传输过程中，为了防止传输过程被劫持并篡改，本实施例通过校验码的方式来进行验证，其中，本实施例的校验码采用MAC值(Media Access Control Address，媒体存取控制位址)。具体的，发送端在发送时利用随机数计算得到一个MAC值，并将MAC值发送给接收端，接收端接收数据后再使用预置的根密钥计算MAC值，若MAC值不对，即可知道数 据有被篡改，从而以此进行验证。
临时密钥确认后，主处理器和子处理器后续的升级包升级会话过程中，均采用该临时密钥进行通讯，并在升级包发送完毕后，使临时密钥失效，后续会话在重新生成临时密钥，以确保后续会话的安全性，避免防止密钥泄露和重放攻击。
其中，作为前提，主处理器可以通过从云端在线下载或USB端口离线下载的方式获取升级包。
以下提供本实施例中的一些优选方案。
其中，优选的，本实施例中的校验码采用MAC值，该MAC值是基于MAC算法和根密钥对随机数数据进行的MAC计算而得出的校验值，在会话通讯被挟持后，该MAC值会发生变化，因此可以以此作为校验。
优选的，随机数的拼接由第一随机数和第二随机数并列成数据组的方式形成。例如，若第一随机数为Ra，第二随机数为Rb，则拼接完毕的随机数组为RaRb。
作为优选的，步骤103中的基于随机数组衍生临时通信密钥与子处理器进行加密通讯，向子处理器进行升级包发放包括：
201、子处理器向主处理器请求升级包。
202、主处理器基于外部传输获取的升级包向子处理器返回升级包。
203、下载完成后，子处理器向主处理器发送完成信号。
其中，上述会话传输均采用基于随机数组衍生临时通信密钥进行加密通讯。
在上述步骤中，主处理器可以分为一个FTP服务端和一个云端通讯端，其中，FTP(File Transfer Protocol，文件传输协议)服务端类似于一个FTP服务器，便于子处理器通过FTP传输协议从主处理器下载升级包文件。而云端通讯端是负责与云端通信的，负责从云端将所有处理器的升级文件下载到主处理器，然后各个子处理器再从主处理器通过FTP传输协议将各自的升级包文件下载下来。
在上述升级包请求中，子处理器通过临时密钥向主处理器的FTP服务端请求升级包，并在主处理器返回升级包时进行接收，并在下载成功后返回下载成功的信号，以结束会话。
优选的，步骤104中的升级包发送完成后，结束会话并对临时密钥做失效操作具体包括：
在升级包升级完成后，子处理器发送会话终止标识给主处理器，临时密钥失效，后续有新的升级任务，再生成新的临时密钥进行通信数据加密。
具体的，子处理器得到升级包后开始进行升级，升级完成后，使用临时密钥加密升级完成的消息并附带完成标识给主处理器，临时密钥失效，后续有新的升级任务，再生成新的临时密钥进行通信数据加密。
优选的，在本实施例的方法中，校验码验证方法包括：
301、获取随机数数据；
302、利用随机数数据并基于根密钥计算校验码；
303、将计算得到的校验码和消息中的校验码进行匹配，匹配一致则验证通过，否则验证不通过；
其中，校验码为MAC值。
在上述验证方法中，MAC值的作用主要是完整性校验，如果传输的消息在通信通道中被劫持并篡改，那么这个接收端接收数据后再使用预置的根密钥计算MAC值，会发现MAC值不对，即可知道数据有被篡改，从而实现验证。
为了更好的操作体验，本实施例提供一个具体的实施方式，请参阅图2，其中，图2中的主ECU为本实施例中的主处理器，子ECU为本实施例中的子处理器，具体步骤如下：
作为前提，首先，在进行升级包传输前：
主处理器内预置有根密钥，而子处理器预置根密钥种子或者根密钥，其中，根密钥可以预置在安全芯片或者安全分区或者普通分区，视实际情况而定。其次，升级包可通过在线下载到主处理器，也可以通过USB等离线方式传到主处理器。
在升级包传输过程中：
S1，当子处理器的升级包准备好后，主处理器发送通信请求给子处理器。
S2，子处理器在收到通信请求后，产生第一随机数Ra，基于根密钥种子利用密钥衍生算法，例如KDF(一种密钥派生函数)算法，生成根密钥，再使用MAC算法计算发送给主处理器的消息的MAC值，最后的消息数据结构如图3，其中，Data包含随机数Ra以及其他自定的通信数据字段，MAC值是基于MAC算法和根密钥对Data进行的MAC计算而得出的值。
S3，主处理器验证子处理器发过来的消息：获取Data(Ra),基于根密钥计算MAC值，最后和消息中的MAC值进行匹配，一样说明验证通过，不一样则验证不通过。
S4，验证通过后，主处理器产生随机数Rb，并拼接Ra和Rb，拼接模型如下图4。在拼接完成后，并使用根密钥计算Data(RaRb)的MAC值，然后发送给子处理器。
S5，子处理器基于步骤3的原理验证主处理器发送过来的消息，验证通过得到随机数RaRb，并返回验证通过的消息给主处理器。这样主处理器和子处理器都拥有随机数RaRb，后续的通信使用的加密临时密钥都使用基于随机数RaRb衍生的临时密钥。
6，主处理器获得验证通过的消息后，使用基于RaRb衍生的临时密钥加密请求子处理器下载升级包的消息发送给子处理器，子处理器使用基于RaRb的临时密钥解密消息，得到下载升级包的地址等信息，并使用临时密钥加密返回信息“OK”给主处理器。
7，子处理器基于升级包下载地址向主处理器的FTP服务发起升级包下载请求，主处理器循环返回升级包给子处理器，直到升级包下载完成。
8，子处理器下载完成后，使用临时密钥加密下载完成的消息给主处理器。
9，子处理器得到升级包后开始进行升级，升级完成后，使用临时密钥加密升级完成的消息并附带Final标识给主处理器，临时密钥失效，后续有新的升级任务，再生成新的临时密钥进行通信数据加密。
本实施例的好处在于，该安全通讯方法在车内网利用随机数、根密钥进行临时密钥的生成，利用MAC值进行完整性校验，车内网的主节点和各个子节点进行OTA业务之前需要对双方的身份进行认证，认证通过后才能开始OTA业务。在业务进行时，主节点和各子节点之间需要交互的数据包括各种命令，升级包内容，升级进度传输等等一切数据都会经过加密，且每次加密的密钥是随机生成，每次OTA业务都不一样，从而防止密钥泄露和重放攻击，保证了车内网OTA通讯的安全度，提高了车载系统的安全性。
实施例二
本实施例提供一种车内网OTA安全通讯装置，该通讯装置包括主处理器，主处理器能够与车载系统中的子处理器进行通讯连接，向子处理器发送从云端在线或者通过USB等接口离线获取的升级包。
其中，主处理器与车载系统中的子处理器的通讯方式采用随机数来产生临时密钥，具体通讯时，通讯装置通过主处理器，执行以下步骤：
向子处理器发送通信请求，接收子处理器生成的第一随机数和基于第一随机数和根密钥生成的校验码；
校验码验证无误后，生成第二随机数，和第一随机数拼接成随机数组，向子处理器发送随机数组和基于随机数组和根密钥生成的校验码；
接收子处理器验证无误的信息后，基于随机数组衍生临时通信密钥与子处理器进行加密通讯，向子处理器进行升级包发放；
升级包发送完成后，结束会话并对临时密钥做失效操作。
优选的，本实施例中主处理器与车载系统中的子处理器的通讯方式采用实施例一种的车内网OTA安全通讯方法。
其安全通讯装置通过产生临时密钥，利用该密钥加密升级包通讯的方式来完成车内网安全通讯，进而有效提高了汽车车内网的安全性。
实施例三
本实施例提供一种车载系统，该车载系统包括子处理器和实施例二中车内网OTA安全通讯装置，其中，车载系统内的子处理器和安全通讯装置中的主处理器采用随机数来产生临时密钥，以临时密钥来进行会话，保证了车内网OTA通讯的安全。
实施例四
本实施例提供一种存储介质，该存储介质上存储有计算机程序，其中，计算机程序被处理器执行时，能够实现实施例一中车内网OTA安全通讯方法的步骤。
显然，本发明的上述实施例仅是为清楚地说明本发明所作的举例，而并非是对本发明的实施方式的限定。对于所属领域的普通技术人员来说，在上述说明的基础上还可以做出其它不同形式的变化或变动。这里无需也无法对所有的实施方式予以穷举。凡在本发明的精神和原则之内所作的任何修改、等同替换和改进等，均应包含在本发明权利要求的保护范围之内。

Claims (10)

  1. 一种车内网OTA安全通讯方法，其特征在于，应用于车载系统，所述车载系统包括主处理器和子处理器，所述主处理器预置根密钥，所述子处理器预置根密钥种子或者根密钥，所述主处理器与外部传输连接，在线或离线获取升级包；所述方法包括：
    向子处理器发送通信请求，接收子处理器生成的第一随机数和基于第一随机数和根密钥生成的校验码；
    校验码验证无误后，生成第二随机数，和第一随机数拼接成随机数组，向子处理器发送随机数组和基于随机数组和根密钥生成的校验码；
    接收子处理器验证无误的信息后，基于随机数组衍生临时通信密钥与子处理器进行加密通讯，向子处理器进行升级包发放；
    升级包发送完成后，结束会话并对临时密钥做失效操作。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的车内网OTA安全通讯方法，其特征在于，所述校验码为MAC值，所述MAC值是基于MAC算法和根密钥对随机数数据进行的MAC计算而得出的校验值。
  3. 根据权利要求1所述的车内网OTA安全通讯方法，其特征在于，随机数的拼接由第一随机数和第二随机数并列成数据组的方式形成。
  4. 根据权利要求1所述的车内网OTA安全通讯方法，其特征在于，所述基于随机数组衍生临时通信密钥与子处理器进行加密通讯，向子处理器进行升级包发放包括：
    子处理器向主处理器请求升级包；
    主处理器基于外部传输获取的升级包向子处理器返回升级包；
    下载完成后，子处理器向主处理器发送完成信号；
    其中，上述会话传输均采用基于随机数组衍生临时通信密钥进行加密通讯。
  5. 根据权利要求1所述的车内网OTA安全通讯方法，其特征在于，所述升级包发送完成后，结束会话并对临时密钥做失效操作具体包括：
    在升级包升级完成后，子处理器发送会话终止标识给主处理器，临时密钥失效，后续有新的升级任务，再生成新的临时密钥进行通信数据加密。
  6. 根据权利要求1所述的车内网OTA安全通讯方法，其特征在于，所述主处理器通过从云端在线下载或USB端口离线下载的方式获取升级包。
  7. 根据权利要求1所述的车内网OTA安全通讯方法，其特征在于，所述校验码验证方法包括：
    获取随机数数据；
    利用随机数数据并基于根密钥计算校验码；
    将计算得到的校验码和消息中的校验码进行匹配，匹配一致则验证通过，否则验证不通过；
    其中，校验码为MAC值。
  8. 一种车内网OTA安全通讯装置，其特征在于，所述通讯装置包括主处理器，所述主处理器通过权利要求1-7任一项所述的车内网OTA安全通讯方法与车载系统中的子处理器通讯连接，向子处理器发送升级包。
  9. 一种车载系统，其特征在于，包括子处理器和权利要求8所述的车内网OTA安全通讯装置。
  10. 一种存储介质，其特征在于，所述存储介质上存储有计算机程序，所述计算机程序被处理器执行时实现如权利要求1-7任一项所述的车内网OTA安全通讯方法中的步骤。
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