WO2024093923A1 - 通信方法和通信装置 - Google Patents

通信方法和通信装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2024093923A1
WO2024093923A1 PCT/CN2023/127793 CN2023127793W WO2024093923A1 WO 2024093923 A1 WO2024093923 A1 WO 2024093923A1 CN 2023127793 W CN2023127793 W CN 2023127793W WO 2024093923 A1 WO2024093923 A1 WO 2024093923A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
network element
certificate
information
management
service
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Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/CN2023/127793
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
李论
郭燕飞
吴义壮
李�赫
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Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
Original Assignee
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
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Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Huawei Technologies Co Ltd filed Critical Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
Priority to EP23884853.5A priority Critical patent/EP4614874A4/en
Publication of WO2024093923A1 publication Critical patent/WO2024093923A1/zh
Priority to US19/195,066 priority patent/US20250279901A1/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H04L9/3268—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/40—Network security protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H04W12/086—Access security using security domains

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the field of communications, and more specifically, to a communication method and a communication device.
  • the certificate management related topics in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) define a certificate application management framework (CEMAF), which includes a certificate management function (CeMF), a certificate issuance function (CeEF), and a network function (NF) that needs to request a service certificate.
  • CEMAF certificate application management framework
  • the communication interface between NF and CeEF is used to register programs related to certificate deployment and update; the communication interface between NF and CeMF is used for certificate status check.
  • the present application provides a communication method, and proposes an initial trust establishment process for a certificate management framework composed of CeEF and CeMF to achieve security protection for certificate issuance.
  • a communication method including: a certificate application network element sends a first request message to a certificate issuing network element, the first request message is used to request authentication of the certificate application network element, the first request message includes an identifier and first information of the certificate application network element, and the first information is used to authenticate the certificate application network element; the certificate issuing network element sends a second request message to a management network element, the second request message is used to request verification of the first information, the second request message includes the first information; the management network element verifies the first information according to second information locally recorded by the management network element, the second information is information related to the certificate application network element; the management network element sends first indication information to the certificate issuing network element, the first indication information is used to indicate whether the first information has passed verification; the certificate issuing network element determines whether the certificate application network element is a trusted network element according to the first indication information.
  • the certificate issuing network element verifies the certificate applying network element through the management network element to determine whether the certificate applying network element is a trusted network element. Therefore, the certificate issuing network element can approve the certificate application application of the certificate applying network element if the certificate applying network element passes the verification (for example, it is a trusted network element) and issue a certificate to the network element that needs to issue a certificate. That is to say, before issuing a certificate, trust is established between the certificate issuing network element and the certificate applying network element, so that security protection for certificate issuance can be achieved.
  • the certificate issuing network element requests the management network element to assist in completing the verification of the certificate application network element, and the management network element can complete the verification through locally recorded information related to the certificate application network element (such as the initialization information of the certificate application network element, the configuration information of the certificate application network element, or the management information of the certificate application network element, etc.), thereby completing the verification without the need for additional information configuration.
  • the management network element can complete the verification through locally recorded information related to the certificate application network element (such as the initialization information of the certificate application network element, the configuration information of the certificate application network element, or the management information of the certificate application network element, etc.), thereby completing the verification without the need for additional information configuration.
  • the first information includes at least one of the following information: a network element identification list, a domain identification, or an initialization certificate list, the network element identification list is used to indicate at least one network element managed by the certificate application network element, the domain identification is used to indicate the domain in which the certificate application network element is located, and the initialization certificate list is used to indicate at least one initialization certificate configured for at least one network element managed by the certificate application network element.
  • the certificate application network element may carry multiple information for assisting verification in the message requesting verification, thereby improving the flexibility of the solution.
  • the certificate issuing network element determines whether the certificate application network element is a trusted network element based on the first indication information, including: when the first indication information indicates that the first information has passed verification, the certificate issuing network element determines that the certificate application network element is a trusted network element; or, when the first indication information indicates that the first information has not passed verification, the certificate issuing network element determines that the certificate application network element is an untrusted network element.
  • the first indication information further includes a signature of the management network element, The signature of the management network element is used to verify whether the first indication information is credible.
  • the first indication information sent by the management network element to the certificate issuing network element may carry the signature of the management network element, so that the certificate issuing network element can verify whether the first indication information is credible based on the signature of the management network element, thereby improving the security of information transmission.
  • the method further includes: the certificate issuing network element sends a first response message to the certificate application network element, and the first response message is used to indicate whether the certificate application network element is a trusted network element of the certificate issuing network element.
  • the certificate issuing network element can notify the certificate applying network element of the verification result through the first response message to avoid the certificate applying network element being unable to obtain the verification result in time, resulting in repeated application for verification and causing waste of resources.
  • the method also includes: the first network element sends a service certificate request message to the certificate application network element, and the service certificate request message is used to request the certificate application network element to apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element; the certificate application network element determines whether to respond to the request of the first network element for applying for a service certificate according to the rules.
  • the certificate application network element can determine whether it needs to apply for a certificate from the certificate issuing network element on behalf of the first network element according to local pre-configured rules, so as to avoid the situation where the certificate application network element still applies for a certificate from the certificate issuing network element on behalf of the first network element when the application of the first network element is unreasonable (for example, the type of certificate applied for is unreasonable), resulting in a waste of resources.
  • the service certificate request message includes an identifier of the first network element and at least one of the following information: a public key corresponding to the first network element, a private key corresponding to the first network element, an initialization certificate configured with the first network element, or service type indication information.
  • the method also includes: the certificate application network element sends a failure indication to the first network element, and the failure indication is used to indicate that the request for the business certificate by the first network element is invalid; or, the certificate application network element sends a business certificate application message to the certificate issuing network element, and the business certificate application message is used to request the certificate issuing network element to issue a business certificate.
  • the certificate application network element judging according to a rule whether to respond to the request of the first network element to apply for a service certificate includes: the certificate application network element verifies, according to the rule, whether the first network element can apply for a first type of service certificate; when the verification fails, the certificate application network element sends the failure indication to the first network element. The certificate application network element sends the failure indication to the first network element.
  • the service certificate application message includes an identifier of the certificate application network element and at least one of the following information: a public key corresponding to the first network element, a private key corresponding to the first network element, an initialization certificate configured with the first network element, an identifier of the first network element, or a signature of the certificate application network element.
  • the management network element determines that the first information passes the verification; or, when the first information is the initialization certificate list, and the initialization certificates corresponding to one or more network elements managed by the certificate application network element locally recorded by the management network element constitute the initialization certificate list, and the initialization certificates in the initialization certificate list are all valid, the management network element determines that the first information passes the verification; or, when the first information is the domain identification, and the identification of the domain to which the certificate application network element belongs locally recorded by the management network element is the domain identification, the management network element determines that the first information passes the verification.
  • the management network element can verify the information of the certificate application network element in different ways to improve the flexibility of the solution.
  • a communication method is provided, which can be executed by a certificate issuing network element, or can also be executed by a chip or circuit configured in the certificate issuing network element, which is not limited in this application.
  • a certificate issuing network element or can also be executed by a chip or circuit configured in the certificate issuing network element, which is not limited in this application.
  • the following description is taken as an example of execution by a certificate issuing network element.
  • the communication method includes: a certificate issuing network element receives a first request message from a certificate application network element, the first request message is used to request authentication of the certificate application network element, the first request message includes an identifier and first information of the certificate application network element, and the first information is used to authenticate the certificate application network element; the certificate issuing network element sends a second request message to a management network element, the second request message is used to request verification of the first information, and the second request message includes the first information; the certificate issuing network element receives first indication information from the management network element, the first indication information is used to indicate whether the first information has passed verification; the certificate issuing network element determines whether the certificate application network element is a trusted network element based on the first indication information.
  • the first information includes at least one of the following information: a network element identification list, a domain identification, or an initialization certificate list, the network element identification list is used to indicate at least one network element managed by the certificate application network element, the domain identification is used to indicate the domain in which the certificate application network element is located, and the initialization certificate list is used to indicate at least one initialization certificate configured for at least one network element managed by the certificate application network element.
  • the certificate issuing network element determines whether the certificate application network element is a trusted network element based on the first indication information, including: when the first indication information indicates that the first information has passed verification, the certificate issuing network element determines that the certificate application network element is a trusted network element; or, when the first indication information indicates that the first information has not passed verification, the certificate issuing network element determines that the certificate application network element is an untrusted network element.
  • the first indication information also includes a signature of a management network element, and the signature of the management network element is used to verify whether the first indication information is credible.
  • the method also includes: the certificate issuing network element sends a first response message to the certificate application network element, and the first response message is used to indicate whether the certificate application network element is a trusted network element of the certificate issuing network element.
  • a communication method which can be executed by a certificate application network element, or can also be executed by a chip or circuit configured in the certificate application network element, which is not limited in this application.
  • a certificate application network element can also be executed by a chip or circuit configured in the certificate application network element, which is not limited in this application.
  • the following description is taken as an example of execution by a certificate application network element.
  • the communication method includes: a certificate application network element sends a first request message to a certificate issuing network element, the first request message is used to request authentication of the certificate application network element, the first request message includes an identifier and first information of the certificate application network element, the first information is used to authenticate the certificate application network element; the certificate application network element receives a first response message from the certificate issuing network element, the first response message is used to indicate whether the certificate application network element is a trusted network element, wherein the certificate issuing network element determines whether the certificate application network element is a trusted network element based on the first indication information, and the first indication information is feedback information of the certificate issuing network element requesting the management network element to verify the first information.
  • the first information includes at least one of the following information: a network element identification list, a domain identification, or an initialization certificate list, the network element identification list is used to indicate at least one network element managed by the certificate application network element, the domain identification is used to indicate the domain in which the certificate application network element is located, and the initialization certificate list is used to indicate at least one initialization certificate configured for at least one network element managed by the certificate application network element.
  • the method also includes: the certificate application network element receives a service certificate request message from a first network element, and the service certificate request message is used to request the certificate application network element to apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element; the certificate application network element determines whether to respond to the request of the first network element to apply for a service certificate according to the rules.
  • the service certificate request message includes an identifier of the first network element and at least one of the following information: a public key corresponding to the first network element, a private key corresponding to the first network element, an initialization certificate configured with the first network element, or service type indication information.
  • the method also includes: the certificate application network element sends a failure indication to the first network element, and the failure indication is used to indicate that the request of the first network element for applying for a business certificate is invalid; or, the certificate application network element sends a business certificate application message to the certificate issuing network element, and the business certificate application message is used to request the certificate issuing network element to issue a business certificate.
  • the service certificate application message includes an identifier of the certificate application network element and at least one of the following information: a public key corresponding to the first network element, a private key corresponding to the first network element, an initialization certificate configured with the first network element, an identifier of the first network element, or a signature of the certificate application network element.
  • a communication method is provided, which can be executed by a management network element, or can also be executed by a chip or circuit configured in the management network element, which is not limited in this application.
  • a communication method is provided, which can be executed by a management network element, or can also be executed by a chip or circuit configured in the management network element, which is not limited in this application.
  • the following description is taken as an example of execution by the management network element.
  • the communication method includes: a management network element receives a second request message from a certificate issuing network element, the second request message is used to request verification of the first information, and the second request message includes the first information; the management network element verifies the first information based on second information locally recorded by the management network element, and the second information is information related to the certificate application network element; the management network element sends first indication information to the certificate issuing network element, and the first indication information is used to indicate whether the first information has passed the verification.
  • the first information includes at least one of the following information: a network element identification list, a domain identification, or an initialization certificate list, the network element identification list is used to indicate at least one network element managed by the certificate application network element, the domain identification is used to indicate the domain in which the certificate application network element is located, and the initialization certificate list is used to indicate at least one initialization certificate configured for at least one network element managed by the certificate application network element.
  • the management network element determines that the first information has passed the verification; or, when the first information is the initialization certificate list, and the initialization certificates corresponding to one or more network elements managed by the certificate application network element recorded locally by the management network element constitute the initialization certificate list, and the initialization certificates in the initialization certificate list are all valid, the management network element determines that the first information has passed the verification; or, when the first information is the domain identifier, and the identifier of the domain to which the certificate application network element belongs recorded locally by the management network element is the domain identifier, the management network element determines that the first information has passed the verification.
  • the first indication information also includes a signature of a management network element, and the signature of the management network element is used to verify whether the first indication information is credible.
  • the technical effects of the method shown in the fourth aspect and its possible design can refer to the technical effects in the first aspect and its possible design.
  • a communication method including: a certificate application network element receives a service certificate request message from a first network element, the service certificate request message is used to request the certificate application network element to apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element; the certificate application network element sends a third request message to a management network element, the third request message is used to request the management network element to verify whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element; the management network element verifies whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element based on second information locally recorded by the management network element, the second information is information related to the certificate application network element; the management network element sends second indication information to the certificate application network element, the second indication information is used to indicate whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element, the second indication information includes a signature and an event identifier of the management network element, wherein the signature of the management network element is a signature based on the event
  • the certificate application network element can verify through the management network element whether it can apply for a business certificate from the certificate issuing network element on behalf of the first network element. That is to say, in this technical scheme, before the certificate application network element requests the certificate issuing network element to issue a certificate, it determines through the management network element whether it can apply for certificate issuance, thereby avoiding initiating an application for business certificate issuance when the first network element does not have the authority to apply for a certain type of network element certificate, thereby achieving security protection for certificate issuance.
  • the method also includes: the certificate application network element sends a business certificate application message to the certificate issuing network element, the business certificate application message is used to request the certificate issuing network element to issue a business certificate for the first network element, and the business certificate application message includes the identifier of the certificate application network element and the signature of the management network element.
  • the method also includes: the certificate issuing network element sends a query message to the management network element, the query message is used to query whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element, and the query message includes an identifier of the certificate application network element and the event identifier; the certificate issuing network element receives a query response message sent from the management network element, and the query response message is used to indicate whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element.
  • the certificate issuing network element can query the management network element through a query message whether the certificate applying network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element, thereby avoiding issuing a certificate when the first network element does not have the authority to apply for a certain type of network element certificate.
  • the method also includes: when the third request message includes the identifier of the first network element, the management network element verifies whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element, including: when the identifiers of one or more network elements managed by the certificate application network element locally recorded by the management network element include the identifier of the first network element, the management network element determines that the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element; or, when the second request message includes the initialization certificate corresponding to the first network element, the management network element verifies whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element, including: when the initialization certificates corresponding to one or more network elements managed by the certificate application network element locally recorded by the management network element include the corresponding initialization certificate of the first network element, the management network element determines that the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element.
  • the management network element can verify whether the certificate application network element can apply for the service certificate on behalf of the first network element through different verification methods, thereby improving the flexibility of the solution.
  • a communication method is provided, which can be executed by a certificate issuing network element, or can also be executed by a chip or circuit configured in the certificate issuing network element, which is not limited in this application.
  • a certificate issuing network element or can also be executed by a chip or circuit configured in the certificate issuing network element, which is not limited in this application.
  • the following description is taken as an example of execution by a certificate issuing network element.
  • the communication method includes: a certificate issuing network element receives a service certificate application message from a certificate application network element, wherein the service certificate application message is used to request the certificate issuing network element to issue a service certificate, and the service certificate application message includes an identifier of the certificate application network element and a signature of a management network element; the certificate issuing network element issues a service certificate to a first network element; wherein the signature of the management network element is a signature based on an event identifier, and the event identifier is used to identify that the certificate application network element requests to apply for a service certificate for the first network element.
  • the method further includes: the certificate issuing network element sends a query message to the management network element, the query message is used to query whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element, and the query message includes an identifier of the certificate application network element and the event identifier; the certificate issuing network element receives the query message sent from the management network element The query response message is used to indicate whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element.
  • a communication method which can be executed by a certificate application network element, or can also be executed by a chip or circuit configured in the certificate application network element, and this application does not limit this.
  • this application does not limit this.
  • the following description is taken as an example of execution by a certificate application network element.
  • the communication method includes: a certificate application network element receives a service certificate request message from a first network element, the service certificate request message is used to request the certificate application network element to apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element; the certificate application network element sends a third request message to a management network element, the third request message is used to request the management network element to verify whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element; the certificate application network element receives second indication information from the management network element, the second indication information is used to indicate whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element, the second indication information includes a signature and an event identifier of the management network element, wherein the signature of the management network element is a signature based on the event identifier, and the event identifier is used to identify that the certificate application network element requests to apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element.
  • the method also includes: the certificate application network element sends a business certificate application message to the certificate issuing network element, the business certificate application message is used to request the certificate issuing network element to issue a business certificate for the first network element, and the business certificate application message includes the identifier of the certificate application network element and the signature of the management network element.
  • a communication method which can be executed by a management network element, or can also be executed by a chip or circuit configured in the management network element, and this application does not limit this.
  • a management network element can be executed by a management network element, or can also be executed by a chip or circuit configured in the management network element, and this application does not limit this.
  • the following description is taken as an example of execution by a management network element.
  • the communication method includes: a management network element receives a third request message from a certificate application network element, the third request message is used to request the management network element to verify whether the certificate application network element can apply for a business certificate on behalf of the first network element; the management network element verifies whether the certificate application network element can apply for a business certificate on behalf of the first network element based on second information locally recorded by the management network element, the second information is information related to the certificate application network element; the management network element sends second indication information to the certificate issuing network element, the second indication information is used to indicate whether the certificate application network element can apply for a business certificate on behalf of the first network element, the second indication information includes a signature and an event identifier of the management network element, wherein the signature of the management network element is a signature based on the event identifier, and the event identifier is used to identify that the certificate application network element requests to apply for a business certificate on behalf of the first network element.
  • the management network element verifies whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element, including: when the identifiers of one or more network elements managed by the certificate application network element locally recorded by the management network element include the identifier of the first network element, the management network element determines that the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element; or, when the second request message includes the initialization certificate corresponding to the first network element, the management network element verifies whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element, including: when the initialization certificates corresponding to one or more network elements managed by the certificate application network element locally recorded by the management network element include the corresponding initialization certificate of the first network element, the management network element determines that the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element.
  • the method also includes: the management network element receives a query message from the certificate issuing network element, the query message is used to query whether the certificate application network element can apply for the issuance of a business certificate on behalf of the first network element, and the query message includes the identifier of the certificate application network element and the event identifier; the management network element sends a query response message to the certificate issuing network element, and the query response message is used to indicate whether the certificate application network element can apply for the issuance of a business certificate on behalf of the first network element.
  • a communication method which can be executed by a certificate issuing network element, or can also be executed by a chip or circuit configured in the certificate issuing network element, and this application does not limit this.
  • a certificate issuing network element or can also be executed by a chip or circuit configured in the certificate issuing network element, and this application does not limit this.
  • the following description is taken as an example of execution by a certificate issuing network element.
  • the communication method includes: a certificate issuing network element receives a first message from a management network element, the first message including information related to at least one certificate application network element locally recorded by the management network element; the certificate issuing network element receives a service certificate application message from the certificate application network element, the service certificate application message is used to request the certificate issuing network element to issue a service certificate; the certificate issuing network element determines whether to issue a service certificate based on the first message.
  • the certificate issuing network element receives information related to at least one certificate application network element from the management network element. Therefore, after receiving a business certificate application message from a certificate issuing network element, it can determine whether to agree to the certificate issuing network element's request for certificate issuance based on the locally stored initialization information of the certificate issuing network element and the information provided by the certificate issuing network element through the business certificate application message, thereby achieving security protection for certificate issuance.
  • the certificate issuing network element can locally refer to the information sent by the management network element to verify the certificate applying network element when issuing the certificate, without the need for additional signaling, thereby reducing signaling overhead.
  • the first message includes a correspondence between an identifier of the certificate application network element and at least one of the following information: a network element identifier, a domain identifier, an initialization certificate identifier, or a network element type.
  • a communication device for implementing the method shown in the second aspect above.
  • the device includes: a transceiver module, which is used to receive a first request message from a certificate application network element, the first request message is used to request authentication of the certificate application network element, the first request message includes an identifier and first information of the certificate application network element, and the first information is used to authenticate the certificate application network element; the transceiver module is also used to send a second request message to a management network element, the second request message is used to request verification of the first information, and the second request message includes the first information; the transceiver module is also used to receive first indication information from the management network element, the first indication information is used to indicate whether the first information has passed verification; a processing module is used to determine whether the certificate application network element is a trusted network element according to the first indication information.
  • the first information includes at least one of the following information: a network element identification list, a domain identification, or an initialization certificate list, the network element identification list is used to indicate at least one network element managed by the certificate application network element, the domain identification is used to indicate the domain in which the certificate application network element is located, and the initialization certificate list is used to indicate at least one initialization certificate configured for at least one network element managed by the certificate application network element.
  • the processing module determines whether the certificate application network element is a trusted network element based on the first indication information, including: when the first indication information indicates that the first information has passed verification, the processing module determines that the certificate application network element is a trusted network element; or, when the first indication information indicates that the first information has not passed verification, the processing module determines that the certificate application network element is an untrusted network element.
  • the first indication information also includes a signature of a management network element, and the signature of the management network element is used to verify whether the first indication information is credible.
  • the transceiver module is also used to send a first response message to the certificate application network element, and the first response message is used to indicate whether the certificate application network element is a trusted network element of the certificate issuing network element.
  • a communication device for implementing the method shown in the third aspect.
  • the device includes:
  • a transceiver module is used to send a first request message to a certificate issuing network element, wherein the first request message is used to request authentication of the communication device, and the first request message includes an identifier and first information of the communication device, and the first information is used to authenticate the communication device; the transceiver module is also used to receive a first response message from the certificate issuing network element, wherein the first response message is used to indicate whether the communication device is a trusted network element, wherein the certificate issuing network element determines whether the communication device is a trusted network element based on the first indication information, and the first indication information is feedback information of the certificate issuing network element requesting the management network element to verify the first information.
  • the first information includes at least one of the following information: a network element identification list, a domain identification, or an initialization certificate list, the network element identification list is used to indicate at least one network element managed by the communication device, the domain identification is used to indicate the domain in which the communication device is located, and the initialization certificate list is used to indicate at least one initialization certificate configured with at least one network element managed by the communication device.
  • the transceiver module is also used to receive a service certificate request message from a first network element, and the service certificate request message is used to request the communication device to apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element; the processing module is used to determine whether to respond to the request for the service certificate from the first network element according to the rules.
  • the service certificate request message includes an identifier of the first network element and at least one of the following information: a public key corresponding to the first network element, a private key corresponding to the first network element, an initialization certificate configured with the first network element, or service type indication information.
  • the transceiver module is further used to send a failure indication to the first network element, and the failure indication is used to indicate that the request for the business certificate by the first network element is invalid; or, the transceiver module is further used to send a business certificate application message to the certificate issuing network element, and the business certificate application message is used to request the certificate issuing network element to issue a business certificate.
  • the service certificate application message includes an identifier of the communication device and at least one of the following information: a public key corresponding to the first network element, a private key corresponding to the first network element, an initialization certificate configured with the first network element, an identifier of the first network element, or a signature of the communication device.
  • a communication device for implementing the method shown in the fourth aspect.
  • the device includes: a transceiver module, configured to receive a second request message from a certificate issuing network element, wherein the second request message is used to request verification of the first information, and the second The request message includes the first information; a processing module is used to verify the first information based on second information locally recorded by the communication device, and the second information is information related to the certificate application network element; the transceiver module is also used to send first indication information to the certificate issuing network element, and the first indication information is used to indicate whether the first information has passed the verification.
  • the first information includes at least one of the following information: a network element identification list, a domain identification, or an initialization certificate list, the network element identification list is used to indicate at least one network element managed by the certificate application network element, the domain identification is used to indicate the domain in which the certificate application network element is located, and the initialization certificate list is used to indicate at least one initialization certificate configured with at least one network element managed by the certificate application network element.
  • the processing module determines that the first information passes the verification; or, when the first information is the initialization certificate list, and the initialization certificates corresponding to one or more network elements managed by the certificate application network element locally recorded by the communication device constitute the initialization certificate list, the processing module determines that the first information passes the verification; or, when the first information is the domain identification, and the identification of the domain to which the certificate application network element locally recorded by the communication device belongs is the domain identification, the processing module determines that the first information passes the verification.
  • the first indication information also includes a signature of the communication device, and the signature of the communication device is used to verify whether the first indication information is authentic.
  • a communication device which is used to implement the method shown in the sixth aspect.
  • the device includes: a transceiver module, which is used to receive a service certificate application message from a certificate application network element, wherein the service certificate application message is used to request the communication device to issue a service certificate, and the service certificate application message includes an identifier of the certificate application network element and a signature of a management network element; the transceiver module is also used to issue a service certificate to a first network element; wherein the signature of the management network element is a signature based on an event identifier, and the event identifier is used to identify that the certificate application network element requests to apply for a service certificate for the first network element.
  • the transceiver module is also used to send a query message to the management network element, the query message is used to query whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element, and the query message includes the identifier of the certificate application network element and the event identifier; the transceiver module is also used to receive a query response message sent from the management network element, and the query response message is used to indicate whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element.
  • a communication device which is used to implement the method shown in the seventh aspect.
  • the device includes: a transceiver module, which is used to receive a service certificate request message from a first network element, and the service certificate request message is used to request the communication device to apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element; the transceiver module is also used to send a third request message to a management network element, and the third request message is used to request the management network element to verify whether the communication device can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element; the transceiver module is also used to receive second indication information from the management network element, and the second indication information is used to indicate whether the communication device can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element, and the second indication information includes a signature and an event identifier of the management network element, wherein the signature of the management network element is a signature based on the event identifier, and the event identifier is used to identify that the communication device requests to apply for a service certificate on
  • the transceiver module is also used to send a business certificate application message to the certificate issuing network element, and the business certificate application message is used to request the certificate issuing network element to issue a business certificate for the first network element, and the business certificate application message includes the identifier of the communication device and the signature of the management network element.
  • a communication device for implementing the method shown in the eighth aspect.
  • the device includes: a transceiver module, which is used to receive a third request message from a certificate application network element, and the third request message is used to request the communication device to verify whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element; a processing module, which is used to verify whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element according to the second information locally recorded by the management network element, and the second information is information related to the certificate application network element; the transceiver module is also used to send a second indication information to the certificate issuing network element, and the second indication information is used to indicate whether the certificate application network element can wait for the first network element to apply for a service certificate, and the second indication information includes a signature and an event identifier of the communication device, wherein the signature of the communication device is a signature based on the event identifier, and the event identifier is used to identify that the certificate application network
  • the processing module verifies whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element, including: when the identifiers of one or more network elements managed by the certificate application network element locally recorded by the communication device include the identifier of the first network element, the processing module The block determines that the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element; or, when the second request message includes the initialization certificate corresponding to the first network element, the processing module verifies whether the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element, including: when the initialization certificates corresponding to one or more network elements managed by the certificate application network element locally recorded by the communication device include the initialization certificate corresponding to the first network element, the processing module determines that the certificate application network element can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element.
  • the transceiver module is further used to receive a query message from a certificate issuing network element, the query message being used to query whether the certificate application network element can apply for the issuance of a service certificate on behalf of the first network element, the query message including the identifier of the certificate application network element and the event identifier; the transceiver module is further used to send a query response message to the certificate issuing network element, the query response message being used to indicate whether the certificate application network element can apply for the issuance of a service certificate on behalf of the first network element.
  • a communication device which is used to implement the method shown in the ninth aspect.
  • the device includes: a transceiver module, which is used to receive a first message from a management network element, wherein the first message includes information related to at least one certificate application network element locally recorded by the management network element; the transceiver module is also used to receive a service certificate application message from the certificate application network element, wherein the service certificate application message is used to request the communication device to issue a service certificate; the processing module is used to determine whether to issue a service certificate according to the first message.
  • the first message includes a correspondence between an identifier of the certificate application network element and at least one of the following information: a network element identifier, a domain identifier, an initialization certificate identifier, or a network element type.
  • a communication system including a certificate application network element, a certificate issuing network element and a management network element, wherein the certificate issuing network element is used to execute the method shown in the second aspect above, the certificate application network element executes the method shown in the third aspect above, and the management network element is used to execute the method shown in the tenth aspect above.
  • a communication system including a certificate application network element, a certificate issuing network element and a management network element, wherein the certificate issuing network element is used to execute the method shown in the sixth aspect above, the certificate application network element executes the method shown in the seventh aspect above, and the management network element is used to execute the method shown in the eighth aspect above.
  • a communication device which includes: a memory for storing programs; a processor for executing the programs stored in the memory, and when the programs stored in the memory are executed, the processor is used to execute the methods provided in the above aspects.
  • the present application provides a processor for executing the methods provided in the above aspects.
  • the process of sending the above information and obtaining/receiving the above information in the above methods can be understood as the process of the processor outputting the above information and the process of the processor receiving the input above information.
  • the processor When outputting the above information, the processor outputs the above information to the transceiver so that it can be transmitted by the transceiver. After being output by the processor, the above information may also need to be processed otherwise before reaching the transceiver.
  • the transceiver obtains/receives the above information and inputs it into the processor. Furthermore, after the transceiver receives the above information, the above information may need to be processed otherwise before being input into the processor.
  • the receiving request message mentioned in the above method can be understood as the processor receiving input information.
  • the processor may be a processor specifically used to execute these methods, or a processor that executes computer instructions in a memory to execute these methods, such as a general-purpose processor.
  • the memory may be a non-transitory memory, such as a read-only memory (ROM), which may be integrated with the processor on the same chip or may be separately arranged on different chips.
  • ROM read-only memory
  • a computer-readable storage medium which stores a program code for execution by a device, and the program code includes a method for executing the methods provided in the above aspects.
  • a computer program product comprising instructions is provided.
  • the computer program product is run on a computer, the computer is used to execute the methods provided in the above aspects.
  • a chip which includes a processor and a communication interface, and the processor reads instructions stored in a memory through the communication interface to execute the methods provided in the above aspects.
  • the chip may further include a memory, in which instructions are stored, and the processor is used to execute the instructions stored in the memory.
  • the processor is used to execute the methods provided by the above aspects.
  • FIG1 is a schematic diagram of a network architecture 100 provided in the present application.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a CEMAF.
  • FIG3 is a schematic flow chart of a communication method provided in the present application.
  • FIG4 is a schematic flow chart of another communication method provided by the present application.
  • FIG5 is a schematic flow chart of yet another communication method provided by the present application.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic block diagram of a communication device 10 provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of another communication device 20 provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG8 is a schematic diagram of a chip system 30 provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • the technical solution provided in this application can be applied to various communication systems, such as: new radio (NR) system, long term evolution (LTE) system, LTE frequency division duplex (FDD) system, LTE time division duplex (TDD) system, etc.
  • NR new radio
  • LTE long term evolution
  • FDD frequency division duplex
  • TDD time division duplex
  • D2D device to device
  • V2X vehicle to everything
  • M2M machine to machine
  • MTC machine type communication
  • IoT Internet of things
  • PLMN public land mobile network
  • MNO mobile network operators
  • 3GPP networks generally include but are not limited to 5G networks, fourth-generation mobile communication (4th-generation, 4G) networks, and other future communication systems, such as (6th-generation, 6G) networks, etc.
  • FIG1 is a schematic diagram of a network architecture 100 provided by the present application, taking the 5G network architecture based on the service-based architecture SBA in the non-roaming scenario defined in the 3GPP standardization process as an example.
  • the network architecture may include three parts, namely, the terminal device part, the DN and the operator network PLMN part. The functions of the network elements of each part are briefly described below.
  • the terminal equipment part may include a terminal device 110, which may also be referred to as a user equipment (UE).
  • the terminal device 110 in the present application is a device with wireless transceiver functions, which may communicate with one or more core network (CN) devices via an access network device (or may also be referred to as an access device) in a radio access network (RAN) 140.
  • CN core network
  • the terminal device 110 may also be referred to as an access terminal, terminal, user unit, user station, mobile station, mobile station, remote station, remote terminal, mobile device, user terminal, user agent or user device, etc.
  • the terminal device 110 may be deployed on land, including indoors or outdoors, handheld or vehicle-mounted; it may also be deployed on the water (such as a ship, etc.); it may also be deployed in the air (such as an airplane, balloon, and satellite, etc.).
  • the terminal device 110 may be a cellular phone, a cordless phone, a session initiation protocol (SIP) phone, a smart phone, a mobile phone, a wireless local loop (WLL) station, a personal digital assistant (PDA), etc.
  • SIP session initiation protocol
  • WLL wireless local loop
  • PDA personal digital assistant
  • the terminal device 110 may also be a handheld device with wireless communication function, a computing device or other device connected to a wireless modem, a vehicle-mounted device, a wearable device, a drone device, or a terminal in the Internet of Things or the Internet of Vehicles, a terminal of any form in a 5G network and future networks, a relay user device, or a terminal in a future evolving 6G network, etc.
  • the relay user device may be, for example, a 5G residential gateway (RG).
  • the terminal device 110 may be a virtual reality (VR) terminal, an augmented reality (AR) terminal, a wireless terminal in industrial control, a wireless terminal in self-driving, a wireless terminal in remote medical, a wireless terminal in smart grid, a wireless terminal in transportation safety, a wireless terminal in smart city, a wireless terminal in smart home, etc.
  • the terminal device here refers to a 3GPP terminal.
  • the embodiments of the present application do not limit the type or category of the terminal device. For ease of explanation, the present application will be described later using UE as an example to refer to the terminal device.
  • the operator network PLMN part may include but is not limited to a (radio) access network ((R)AN) 120 and a core network (CN) part.
  • (R)AN radio access network
  • CN core network
  • (R)AN 120 can be regarded as a sub-network of the operator network, and is an implementation system between the service nodes in the operator network and the terminal device 110.
  • the terminal device 110 To access the operator network, the terminal device 110 first passes through (R)AN 120, and then can be connected to the service node of the operator network through (R)AN 120.
  • the access network device (RAN device) in the embodiment of the present application is a device that provides wireless communication functions for the terminal device 110, and can also be called a network device.
  • the RAN device includes but is not limited to: the next generation node base station (gNB) in the 5G system, the evolved node B (eNB) in the long term evolution (LTE), the radio network controller (RNC), the node B (NB), the base station controller (BSC), the base transceiver station (BTS), the home base station (e.g., home evolved node B, or home node B, HNB), the base band unit (BBU), the transmission point (TRP), the transmitting point (TP), the small base station device (pico), the mobile switching center, or the network device in the future network.
  • the name of the device with the access network device function may be different.
  • the above-mentioned device providing wireless communication function for the terminal device 110 is collectively referred to as access network equipment or RAN or AN for short. It should be understood that the specific type of access network equipment is not limited herein.
  • the CN part may include but is not limited to the following NFs: user plane function (UPF) 130, network exposure function (NEF) 131, network function repository function (NRF) 132, policy control function (PCF) 133, unified data management function (UDM) 134, unified data repository function (UDR) 135, network data analysis function (NWDAF) 136, authentication server function (AUSF) 137, access and mobility management function (AMF) 138, session management function (SMF) 139.
  • UPF user plane function
  • NEF network exposure function
  • NRF network function repository function
  • PCF policy control function
  • UDM unified data management function
  • UDR unified data repository function
  • NWDAF authentication server function
  • AMF access and mobility management function
  • SMSF session management function
  • the data network DN 140 which may also be referred to as a packet data network (PDN), is usually a network located outside the operator network, such as a third-party network.
  • the DN may also be deployed by the operator, that is, the DN is part of the PLMN. This application does not restrict whether the DN belongs to the PLMN.
  • the operator network PLMN may access multiple data networks DN 140, and multiple services may be deployed on the data network DN 140, which may provide data and/or voice services to the terminal device 110.
  • the data network DN 140 may be a private network of a smart factory, and the sensors installed in the workshop of the smart factory may be the terminal devices 110.
  • the control server of the sensors is deployed in the data network DN 140, and the control server may provide services for the sensors.
  • the sensors may communicate with the control server, obtain instructions from the control server, and transmit the collected sensor data to the control server according to the instructions.
  • the data network DN 140 may be an internal office network of a company, and the mobile phones or computers of the employees of the company may be the terminal devices 110, and the mobile phones or computers of the employees may access information, data resources, etc. on the internal office network of the company.
  • the terminal device 110 can establish a connection with the operator network through an interface (such as N1, etc.) provided by the operator network and use data and/or voice services provided by the operator network.
  • the terminal device 110 can also access the data network DN 140 through the operator network and use the operator services deployed on the data network DN 140 and/or services provided by a third party.
  • UPF 130 is a gateway provided by the operator and is the gateway for the operator network to communicate with the data network DN 140.
  • UPF network function 130 includes user-plane related functions such as packet routing and transmission, packet detection, service usage reporting, quality of service (QoS) processing, legal monitoring, uplink packet detection, downlink packet storage, etc.
  • QoS quality of service
  • NEF 131 is a control plane function provided by the operator. It mainly enables third parties to use the services provided by the network, supports the network to open its capabilities, event and data analysis, provides PLMN security configuration information from external applications, and converts the interactive information inside and outside the PLMN. It provides an API interface for the operator network to be open to the outside world, and provides it for the interaction between external servers and internal operator networks.
  • NRF 132 is a control plane function provided by the operator, which can be used to maintain real-time information of network functions and services in the network. For example, it supports network service discovery, maintains the services supported by the NF configuration data (NF profile) of the NF instance, supports service discovery of the communication proxy (SCP), maintains the SCP configuration data (SCP profile) of the SCP instance, sends notifications about newly registered, deregistered, and updated NFs and SCPs, and maintains the health status of NF and SCP operations.
  • NF profile the services supported by the NF configuration data
  • SCP communication proxy
  • SCP profile SCP configuration data
  • PCF 133 is a control plane function provided by the operator. It supports a unified policy framework to govern network behavior, provide policy rules to other control functions, contract information related to policy decisions, etc.
  • UDM 134 is a control plane function provided by the operator, responsible for storing the subscriber permanent identifier (SUPI), the generic public subscription identifier (GPSI), credentials and other information of the subscribers in the operator network.
  • the SUPI will be encrypted during transmission, and the encrypted SUPI is called a hidden subscriber subscription identifier (SUCI).
  • the information stored by the UDM network function 134 can be used for authentication and authorization of the terminal device 110 to access the operator network.
  • the subscribers of the above-mentioned operator network can be specifically Users who use the services provided by the operator network, such as users who use China Telecom's subscriber identity module (SIM) card, or users who use China Mobile's SIM card, etc.
  • SIM subscriber identity module
  • the credentials of the above-mentioned contracted users can be a small file storing long-term keys stored in the mobile phone SIM card or information related to the encryption of the mobile phone SIM card, which is used for authentication and/or authorization. It should be noted that permanent identifiers, credentials, security contexts, authentication data (cookies), and tokens are equivalent to verification/authentication and authorization-related information. In the embodiments of the present application, no distinction or restriction is made for the convenience of description.
  • UDR 135 is a control plane function provided by the operator. It provides the functions of storing and retrieving contract data for UDM, storing and retrieving policy data for PCF, and storing and retrieving user's NF group ID (group ID) information.
  • NWDAF 136 is a control plane function provided by the operator. Its main function is to collect data from NF, external application function AF and operation, administration and maintenance (OAM) system, and provide NWDAF service registration, data opening and analysis data to NF and AF.
  • OAM administration and maintenance
  • AUSF 137 is a control plane function provided by the operator, which is usually used for primary authentication, i.e., authentication between the terminal device 110 (subscriber) and the operator network. After receiving the authentication request initiated by the subscriber, the AUSF network function 137 can authenticate and/or authorize the subscriber through the authentication information and/or authorization information stored in the UDM network function 134, or generate the authentication and/or authorization information of the subscriber through the UDM network function 134. The AUSF network function 137 can feed back the authentication information and/or authorization information to the subscriber.
  • AMF 138 is a control plane network function provided by the operator network, responsible for access control and mobility management of the terminal device 110 accessing the operator network, including, for example, mobility status management, allocation of temporary user identities, authentication and authorization of users, etc.
  • AMF 138 is used to establish NAS connection with UE and has the same 5G NAS security context as UE.
  • the 5G NAS security context includes KAMF, key identification information with the same NAS layer key, UE security capability, and uplink and downlink NAS COUNT values.
  • NAS layer keys include NAS encryption keys and NAS integrity protection keys, which are used for confidentiality protection and integrity protection of NAS messages respectively.
  • SMF 139 is a control plane network function provided by the operator network, responsible for managing the PDU session of the terminal device 110.
  • the PDU session is a channel for transmitting PDUs.
  • the terminal device needs to transmit PDUs to and from the data network DN 140 through the PDU session.
  • the PDU session is established, maintained, and deleted by the SMF network function 139.
  • the SMF network function 139 includes session management (such as session establishment, modification, and release, including tunnel maintenance between the user plane function UPF 130 and (R)AN 120), selection and control of the UPF network function 130, service and session continuity (SSC) mode selection, roaming, and other session-related functions.
  • session management such as session establishment, modification, and release, including tunnel maintenance between the user plane function UPF 130 and (R)AN 120
  • SSC service and session continuity
  • AF 141 is a control plane network function provided by the operator network, which is used to provide application layer information. It can interact with the policy framework through the network open function network element or directly interact with the policy framework to make policy decision requests, etc. It can be located inside or outside the operator network.
  • a NF can be implemented by hardware or software.
  • Nnef, Nnrf, Npcf, Nudm, Nudr, Nnwdaf, Nausf, Namf, Nsmf, N1, N2, N3, N4, and N6 are interface serial numbers.
  • the meaning of the above interface serial numbers can be found in the meaning defined in the 3GPP standard protocol, and this application does not limit the meaning of the above interface serial numbers.
  • the interface name between the various network functions in the figure is only an example.
  • the interface name of the system architecture may also be other names, which is not limited in this application.
  • the name of the message (or signaling) transmitted between the above network elements is only an example and does not constitute any limitation on the function of the message itself.
  • network functions (such as NEF 131 ... SMF139) are collectively referred to as NFs, that is, the NFs described later in the embodiments of the present application can be replaced by any network functions.
  • FIG. 1 only schematically describes some network functions, and the NFs described later are not limited to the network functions shown in FIG. 1.
  • the above-mentioned network architecture applied to the embodiment of the present application is only a network architecture described from the perspective of a service-oriented architecture, and the network architecture applicable to the embodiment of the present application is not limited to this. Any network architecture that can realize the functions of the above-mentioned network elements is applicable to the embodiment of the present application.
  • AMF, SMF, UPF, NEF, AUSF, NRF, PCF, and UDM shown in the figure can be understood as network elements used to implement different functions in the core network, for example, they can be combined into network slices as needed.
  • These core network network elements can be independent devices or integrated into the same device to implement different functions. This application does not limit the specific form of the above network elements.
  • CA Certification Authority
  • CA responsible for managing the entire life cycle of the public key, including issuing certificates, defining certificate validity periods, and revoking certificates.
  • CA may also include a registration authority (RA), which is used to obtain and authenticate the user's identity and then submit a certificate issuance request to the CA.
  • RA can be a function integrated in CA or deployed separately. This application assumes that CA integrates the RA function.
  • the certificate enrolment function (CeEF) involved below may be part of the interactive function module in CA or RA.
  • Certificate management protocol for public key infrastructure: It is an Internet protocol used to obtain digital certificates that comply with the X.509 standard in a public key infrastructure (PKI) system. Specifically, CMP provides online interactions between PKI components, including interactions between CA and client systems, and protocol message definitions are used for certificate creation and management.
  • the term "certificate” in CMP refers to the X.509v3 certificate defined in X509. It is described in detail in existing technical documents (e.g., IETF RFC4210), and will not be described in detail in this application.
  • X.509 certificate The X.509 standard specifies what information a certificate can contain and describes the method (data format) of recording information.
  • the relevant certificate profile is defined in existing technical documents (e.g., RFC5280).
  • the X.509 certificate includes the following information listed in Table 1:
  • Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of CEMAF.
  • CEMAF includes a certificate management network element (Certificate management Function, CeMF) and CeEF, wherein CeEF is the network element of the operator, used to issue certificates.
  • CeEF is the network element of the operator, used to issue certificates.
  • the function of CeEF in this application can refer to the function of CA shown in the previous text; CeMF is a network element in the trust domain, used to manage and apply for certificates.
  • CeMF is a network element in the trust domain, used to manage and apply for certificates.
  • CeMFs can be located in different trust domains or in the same trust domain.
  • the communication interface between NF and CeEF (such as the ce1 interface shown in FIG. 2 ) is used to register programs related to certificate deployment and update; the communication interface between NF and CeMF (such as the ce2 interface shown in FIG. 2 ) is used for certificate status checking.
  • CEMAF the corresponding functions in CEMAF have been divided into two network elements (eg, CeEF and CeMF).
  • the registration function network element (CeEF) of CEMAF is used to issue certificates.
  • the management network element (CeMF) of CEMAF is used to manage and apply for certificates.
  • CeEF and CeMF can be deployed in the certificate network management entity. Examples are not given here one by one.
  • Business certificate refers to the certificate required by NF for user plane or signaling plane user transmission, which can also be called formal certificate or actual certificate, etc.
  • TLS Transport Layer Security
  • IPSEC Internet Protocol Security
  • Initial trust In order to achieve automated certificate management of NF in service-based architecture (SBA), initial trust needs to be established between NF and operator CA, which is a prerequisite for the business certificate registration procedure.
  • SBA service-based architecture
  • used for indication may include being used for direct indication and being used for indirect indication.
  • indication information When describing that a certain indication information is used for indicating A, it may include that the indication information directly indicates A or indirectly indicates A, but it does not mean that A must be included in the indication information.
  • the information indicated by the indication information is called the information to be indicated.
  • the information to be indicated can be sent as a whole, or divided into multiple sub-information and sent separately, and the sending period and/or sending time of these sub-information can be the same or different.
  • the specific sending method is not limited in this application. Among them, the sending period and/or sending time of these sub-information can be pre-defined, for example, pre-defined according to the protocol, or can be configured by the transmitting device by sending configuration information to the receiving device.
  • the "storage” involved in the embodiments of the present application may refer to storage in one or more memories.
  • the one or more memories may be separately set or integrated in an encoder or decoder, a processor, or a communication device.
  • the one or more memories may also be partially separately set and partially integrated in a decoder, a processor, or a communication device.
  • the type of memory may be any form of storage medium, which is not limited by the present application.
  • the “protocol” involved in the embodiments of the present application may refer to a standard protocol in the communication field, for example, it may include an LTE protocol, an NR protocol, and related protocols used in future communication systems, and the present application does not limit this.
  • RRC radio resource control
  • the term "and/or" in this article is only a description of the association relationship of the associated objects, indicating that there can be three relationships.
  • a and/or B can mean: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone.
  • the character "/" in this article generally indicates that the associated objects before and after are in an "or" relationship.
  • a solution for NF and operator CA to establish initial trust is: through the initial certificate issued by the private CA to the NF, the security protection of the process of NF registering the business certificate with the operator CA is realized.
  • the solution uses the initial certificate issued by the Private CA in the same security domain (or trust domain) as the NF.
  • This Private CA acts as the initial trust anchor of the NF in the initial registration.
  • the root certificate of the Private CA should be configured as the trust anchor point in the CA in the operator PKI.
  • the prerequisite for establishing the initial trust between the NF and the operator CA in this solution is to create a private CA and deploy it in the same network security (trust) domain of the NF in the 5GC SBA, and the root certificate of the Private CA needs to be pre-configured in the CA in the operator PKI.
  • initial trust In the above-mentioned NF initial certificate scheme required to establish initial trust between NF and operator CA, initial trust must be established through Private CA, so this method cannot be used in scenarios without Private CA.
  • the scheme of establishing initial trust through Private CA requires that the root certificate of Private CA needs to be pre-configured in the CA in the operator PKI, which requires a pre-configuration process.
  • the present application provides a communication method, which can be applied in the certificate management framework composed of CeEF and CeMF as shown in FIG2 , wherein CeMF Apply for a certificate for NF, and when verifying that CeMF is authorized, CeEF will return a valid NF certificate to NF through CeMF. There is no need to establish initial trust through Private CA.
  • the communication method provided in the embodiments of the present application can be applied to a 5G system, for example, the communication system shown in FIG. 1 .
  • the embodiments shown below do not particularly limit the specific structure of the execution subject of the method provided in the embodiments of the present application, as long as it is possible to communicate according to the method provided in the embodiments of the present application by running a program that records the code of the method provided in the embodiments of the present application.
  • the execution subject of the method provided in the embodiments of the present application may be a network element, or a functional module in the network element that can call and execute the program.
  • FIG3 is a schematic flow chart of a communication method provided by the present application. The method comprises the following steps:
  • the certificate application network element sends a first request message to the certificate issuing network element, or in other words, the certificate issuing network element receives the first request message from the certificate application network element.
  • the first request message is used to request authentication of whether the certificate application network element is a trusted network element.
  • the certificate application network element sending the first request message to the certificate issuing network element can be understood as: the certificate application network element requests to establish initial trust, that is, the certificate application network element requests the certificate issuing network element to verify the certificate application network element through the first request message. If the certificate issuing network element verifies that the certificate application network element is a trusted network element, it means that the certificate issuing network element trusts the certificate application network element and can agree to the certificate application sent by the certificate application network element.
  • the first request message in this embodiment can also be called an initial trust establishment request message.
  • the certificate application network element may be the CeMF shown in FIG. 2 above, and the certificate issuance network element may be the CeEF shown in FIG. 2 above.
  • the name of the certificate application network element is not limited in this embodiment, and any network element that can be used to apply for a service certificate for a functional network element (such as NF) can be considered as the certificate application network element involved in this embodiment; similarly, the name of the certificate issuance network element is not limited in this embodiment, and any network element that can be used to issue a service certificate for a functional network element (such as NF) can be considered as the certificate issuance network element involved in this embodiment.
  • the following description is made by taking the certificate application network element as CeMF and the certificate issuance network element as CeEF as an example.
  • the first request message includes an identifier (identify, ID) of the CeMF.
  • the CeMF ID can be the IP address of CeMF.
  • the CeMF ID can be the instance ID of CeMF.
  • CeMF ID can also be other information that can be used to identify CeMF, for example, it can be the type information of CeMF; for example, it can be the location information of CeMF, etc., which will not be explained one by one here.
  • the above-mentioned first request message may also include first information, and the first information is used to authenticate CeMF.
  • the first information includes at least one of the following information: a network element identification list (NF ID list), a domain identification (Domain ID), and an initialization certificate list.
  • NF ID list is a list of one or more NFs managed by CeMF
  • NF ID is the identification information of NF, including but not limited to the IP address of NF, instance ID of NF, and other information used to identify NF.
  • CeMF and one or more NFs indicated by the NF ID list are provided by the same manufacturer, and CeMF can provide proxy services for the NFs indicated by the NF ID list (e.g., requesting service certificates on behalf of them).
  • CeMF and NF#1, NF#2, and NF#3 are provided by the same manufacturer, and the identifiers of NF#1, NF#2, and NF#3 are "#1", "#2", and "#3", respectively.
  • CeMF can provide proxy services for NF#1, NF#2, and NF#3, and the NF ID list information is information indicating "#1", "#2", and "#3".
  • Domain ID is used to indicate the domain where CeMF is located. For example, if CeMF is located in a trust domain, Domain ID is the trust domain identifier. Domain ID can be the ID of a certain area, including but not limited to: Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) ID; Domain ID can be the ID of a specific equipment vendor, including but not limited to: Vendor ID; Domain ID can be the identifier of a certain area of the operator, including but not limited to: Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) ID.
  • VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
  • PLMN Public Land Mobile Network
  • the initialization certificate list is the initialization certificate corresponding to the NF managed by CeMF.
  • the initialization certificate list may be pre-configured in CeMF, or may be sent to CeMF by the NF managed by CeMF (e.g., NF sends a request message #1 to CeMF, and the request message #1 is used to request a service certificate, and the request message #1 carries the initialization certificate of NF).
  • the above-mentioned initialization certificate list information may be the identification information of the initialization certificate included in the initialization certificate list.
  • the NF managed by CeMF includes NF#1, NF#2, and NF#3, and the initialization certificates corresponding to NF#1, NF#2, and NF#3 are initialization certificate #1, initialization certificate #2, and initialization certificate #3, respectively.
  • the initialization certificate list information is information for identifying initialization certificate #1, initialization certificate #2, and initialization certificate #3.
  • CeEF after CeEF receives the first request message sent by CeMF, it may send a second request message to the management network element, and the second request message is used to request the management network element to verify the first information sent by CeMF. It should be noted that in this embodiment, after CeEF receives the first request message sent by CeMF, it may not send the second request message, but other network elements may send the second request message to the management network element to request the management network element to verify the first information. For example, CeEF sends the second request message through other network elements; for example, The other devices learn the first information and request the management network element to verify the first information.
  • the embodiment focuses on the management network element verifying the first information, and there is no limitation on how to trigger the management network element to verify the first information. It can be triggered by CeEF or other network elements. For the convenience of description, the following takes CeEF triggering the management network element to verify the first information as an example.
  • the method flow shown in FIG3 also includes:
  • the CeEF sends a second request message to the management network element, or the management network element receives the second request message from the CeEF.
  • the management network element is a general term for the network management system.
  • the management network element can be an EMS, a network management station (Network Management System, NMS), a MANO, or a part of an OSS/BSS, or one or more.
  • NMS Network Management System
  • MANO Network Management System
  • OSS/BSS Backbone Service Set
  • MnF Management Network Function
  • OAM OAM
  • management network element involved in this application includes but is not limited to the following functions: network device (network element) initialization management, network configuration management, network performance management, network fault management, network optimization management, or network routing management.
  • network device network element
  • the management network element can record network element initialization information.
  • CeEF sending the second request message to the management network element can be understood as CeEF requesting the management network element to verify the information sent by CeMF, that is, CeEF requests the management network element to verify the first information sent by CeMF through the second request message.
  • the second request message can also be called a verification request message.
  • the second request message includes CeMF ID and CeEF ID, wherein CeMF ID is used to identify CeMF.
  • CeMF ID has been explained in the above step S410 regarding the CeMF ID carried in the first request message, which will not be repeated here.
  • CeEF ID is used to identify CeEF.
  • CeEF ID includes but is not limited to the IP address of CeEF, the instance ID of CeEF and other information used to identify CeEF.
  • the second request message also includes the first information, such as at least one of the following information: NF ID list, Domain ID, and initialization certificate list.
  • NF ID list the NF ID list, Domain ID, initialization certificate list, etc. have been explained in the above step S410 regarding the information carried in the first request message, and will not be repeated here.
  • the second request message also carries the first information
  • the first information may be at least one of NF ID list information, Domain ID information, and initialization certificate list information. That is to say, in this embodiment, CeEF may transparently transmit the first information sent by CeMF to MnF, and MnF verifies the first information sent by CeMF.
  • MnF After receiving the second request message from CeEF, MnF may perform verification.
  • the method flow shown in FIG3 further includes:
  • MnF will record and allocate the relationship between CeMF and NF during the NF initialization process. Specifically, MnF locally records the NF ID. Optionally, if the NF is pre-configured with an initialization certificate, MnF locally records the NF's initialization certificate.
  • the initialization certificate of NF is pre-configured for MnF and recorded in MnF.
  • MANO in the device domain configures the initialization certificate to the implementation layer of NF (e.g., Virtualized Network Function (VNF) instance) and records it in MnF.
  • VNF Virtualized Network Function
  • the NF initialization certificate is issued by the Private CA dedicated to the equipment manufacturer/operator through a private interface.
  • the MnF may verify the information sent by the CeMF through different verification methods, for example, including but not limited to:
  • MnF can determine the Domain ID#1 of the Domain configured during the CeMF initialization configuration process based on the CeMF ID carried in the second request message, and obtain the verification result by comparing the Domain ID carried in the second request message with the determined Domain ID#1.
  • the network management MnF will identify the device initialization trust domain to which CeMF is initialized, that is, the association relationship between the Domain ID and the CeMF ID. MnF can determine the Domain ID#1 configured during the initialization configuration of the CeMF according to the CeMF ID carried in the second request message. If the Domain ID carried in the second request message is Domain ID#1, MnF determines that the information sent by CeMF has passed the verification, otherwise it determines that the information sent by CeMF has not passed the verification.
  • the MnF can determine the initialization certificate list #1 corresponding to the managed NF configured during the CeMF initialization configuration process according to the CeMF ID carried in the second request message, and obtain the verification result by comparing the initialization certificate list carried in the second request message with the determined initialization certificate list #1.
  • the MnF when the device layer or virtualization layer of the NF is initialized, the MnF will record the initialization certificate configured by the NF.
  • the initialization certificate can be configured by the equipment manufacturer or the operator.
  • the association between the relevant certificate information and the NF ID is preconfigured in the MnF.
  • the MnF can determine the initialization certificate list #1 corresponding to the NF managed during the initialization configuration of the CeMF according to the CeMF ID carried in the second request message. If the initialization certificate list carried in the second request message is the initialization certificate list #1, the MnF determines that the information sent by the CeMF has passed the verification, otherwise it determines that the information sent by the CeMF has not passed the verification.
  • MnF when the second request message carries the information of the initialization certificate list, MnF first determines the manufacturer (Vendor1) corresponding to the CeMF ID through the local configuration document, and then MnF verifies the signature of each certificate to see if it is signed by Vendor1. And verify the validity of the signature. If MnF determines that 90% of the certificates are successfully verified, it determines that the information sent by CeMF has passed the verification based on the pre-configured value rule (verification success rate>85%).
  • MnF can determine the NF ID list#1 corresponding to the NF managed during the initialization configuration of the CeMF according to the CeMF ID carried in the second request message, and obtain the verification result by comparing the NF ID list carried in the second request message with the determined NF ID list#1.
  • MnF when the NF layer device layer or virtualization layer is initialized, MnF will record the NF ID. MnF can determine the NF corresponding to NF ID list#1 configured and managed during the CeMF initialization configuration process according to the CeMF ID carried in the second request message. If the NF ID list carried in the second request message is NF ID list#1, MnF determines that the information sent by CeMF has passed the verification.
  • MnF determines that the verification result is the number of different NF IDs in NF ID list#1 and NF ID list#2.
  • MnF queries the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) server of the Private CA to inquire whether the initialization certificate included in the initialization certificate list is a revoked initialization certificate. If it is a revoked initialization certificate, it is determined that the information sent by CeMF has failed the verification.
  • OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
  • the information recorded locally by MnF (such as the initialization information of the certificate application network element, the configuration information of the certificate application network element, or the management information of the certificate application network element, etc.) is used to assist in the process of verifying CeMF.
  • the process of pre-configuration information such as the root certificate of Private CA is pre-configured in the CA in the operator's PKI
  • the information recorded by MnF can be directly used.
  • the MnF may notify the CeEF through the first indication information.
  • the method flow shown in FIG3 further includes:
  • S440 The MnF sends first indication information to the CeEF, or the CeEF receives the first indication information from the MnF.
  • the first indication information is used to indicate whether the first information carried in the second request message passes verification.
  • the first indication information directly indicates whether the first information passes the verification.
  • the first indication information is 1 bit, and a value of "1" indicates that the first information passes the verification; a value of "0" indicates that the first information fails the verification.
  • the first indication information indirectly indicates whether the first information has passed the verification.
  • the first indication information indicates whether the first information has passed the verification by indicating whether the first information carried in the second request message is the same as the second information recorded locally by the MnF. If the first indication information indicates that the first information and the second information are different, it is understood that the first information has not passed the verification; or, if the first indication information indicates that the first information and the second information are the same, it is understood that the first information has passed the verification; or, if the first indication information indicates that the first information and the second information are different but the degree of difference meets the threshold requirement, it is understood that the first information has passed the verification.
  • the first indication information may further carry indication information #1, where indication information #1 is used to indicate the degree of difference between the first information and the second information.
  • the first information carried in the second request message is Domain ID#1
  • the ID of the Domain to which CeMF belongs recorded locally by MnF is Domain ID#1
  • MnF indicates through the first indication information that the first information has passed the verification.
  • the first information carried in the second request message is NF ID list#1, and the IDs of one or more NFs managed by CeMF recorded locally by MnF are NF ID list#2, then MnF indicates through the first indication information that the first information has not passed the verification.
  • the MnF may also indicate the difference between NF ID list#1 and NF ID list#2 by carrying indication information #1 in the first indication information.
  • indication information #1 may indicate that the difference between NF ID list#1 and NF ID list#2 is that there is a different NF ID.
  • the first information carried in the second request message is an initialization certificate list
  • the MnF checks the initialization certificates in the initialization certificate list. The book is verified, and if the verification result is that the verification is passed, the MnF indicates through the first indication information that the first information has passed the verification.
  • the first indication information may also carry the signature of the MnF.
  • the signature of the MnF may be carried to assist the CeEF in verifying whether the first indication information is credible.
  • CeEF may determine whether CeMF is credible according to the received first indication information, and the method flow shown in FIG3 further includes:
  • CeEF determines whether CeMF is credible.
  • the CeEF determines that the CeMF is not trustworthy.
  • the CeEF determines that the CeMF is credible.
  • the CeEF determines that the CeMF is trustworthy.
  • the CeEF may also determine whether the first indication information sent by the management network element is credible in the following manner:
  • the first indication information is transmitted via a secure connection (such as SSL), and CeEF ensures that the first indication information is credible.
  • CeEF can determine whether the first indication information is credible according to the type of the first indication information (such as the first indication information is Success_response).
  • CeEF As another possible way, there is no direct secure channel between CeEF and MnF, and the signature of MnF can be carried in the first indication information. If CeEF is pre-configured with the public key or certificate of MnF, then CeEF can verify whether the first indication information is credible through the signature of MnF carried in the first indication information.
  • CeEF determines that the received first indication information is a credible message, and does not constitute any limitation on the protection scope of the present application.
  • CeEF can also determine whether the received first indication information is a credible message in other ways, for example, CeEF locally maintains a list of trusted devices and determines that MnF is a trusted device. Examples are not given here one by one.
  • CeEF determines whether CeMF is trustworthy, it may notify CeMF through a first response message.
  • the method flow shown in FIG3 further includes:
  • CeEF sends a first response message to CeMF, or CeMF receives the first response message from CeEF.
  • the first response message carries the CeEF ID, and the first response message is used to indicate whether CeEF trusts CeMF.
  • the first response message is used to indicate that initial trust is successfully established between CeMF and CeEF, or in other words, the first response message indicates that CeEF trusts CeMF.
  • the first response message is used to indicate that the initial trust establishment between CeMF and CeEF fails, or in other words, the first response message indicates that CeEF does not trust CeMF.
  • the method flow shown in FIG3 may also include a process of requesting issuance of a service certificate.
  • the method flow shown in FIG3 may also include:
  • the first NF sends a service certificate request message to CeMF, or CeMF receives the service certificate request message from the first NF.
  • the service certificate request message is used to request to obtain a service certificate.
  • the first NF and CeMF are network elements in the same trust domain, which can be understood as: the first NF applies for a service certificate on behalf of the first NF through CeMF.
  • the business certificate request message carries the first NF ID.
  • the first NF ID refers to the ID used by the first NF to apply for a business certificate. It can be the instance ID of the first NF, the sender identity field (sender KID) in the business certificate request message, or any information used to identify the first NF.
  • the service certificate request message may also carry at least one of the following information: a public key, a private key, an initialization certificate, or a service type, etc.
  • the public key and the private key are generated by the first NF when requesting a business certificate, and are carried by the first NF in the business certificate request message.
  • the first NF when requesting a business certificate, the first NF generates a public key and a private key (or a public-private key pair pk/sk), then the first NF can carry the public key and private key corresponding to the first NF in the business certificate request message requesting the business certificate; or, for another example, when requesting a business certificate, the first NF generates a public key, then the first NF can carry the public key corresponding to the first NF in the business certificate request message requesting the business certificate.
  • the initialization certificate is a certificate pre-configured in the first NF. If the first NF is configured with an initialization certificate during the initialization process, the first NF can carry the initialization certificate in the service certificate request message.
  • the initialization certificate of the first NF is a certificate pre-configured by the MnF during the initialization process. Configured in the first NF; for example, the initialization certificate of the first NF is issued by a Private CA dedicated to the equipment manufacturer/operator through a private interface.
  • the service type explicitly or implicitly indicates the type of the requested service certificate, and CeMF or CeEF can determine the type of the applied service certificate according to the service type. It should be understood that when the service certificate request message does not carry the service type, CeMF or CeEF can determine the type of the service certificate according to other information (such as historical request information, etc.), which will not be repeated here.
  • step S411 may be performed before step S410, which may be understood as CeMF initiating the initial trust establishment request after receiving the service certificate request of the first NF.
  • step S411 may be performed after step S410, such as after step S460. It can be understood that the first NF initiates the service certificate request only after the initial trust establishment between CeMF and CeEF is completed.
  • the above two implementation methods are only examples of the timing when the first NF initiates a business certificate request, and do not constitute any limitation on the scope of protection of this application.
  • the first NF can initiate a business certificate request at any time, and examples will not be given one by one here.
  • CeMF may determine whether to respond to the request of the first network element to apply for a service certificate according to the rule.
  • the method flow shown in FIG3 may also include:
  • CeMF determines whether to respond to the request of the first NF to apply for a service certificate.
  • the CeMF may judge the request of the first NF to apply for a service certificate according to a preconfigured rule, and determine whether to respond to the request of the first NF to apply for a service certificate.
  • the type of the service certificate applied for by the first NF is the first type
  • the CeMF verifies whether the first NF can apply for the first type of service certificate according to a preconfigured rule.
  • the first NF cannot apply for a first type of service certificate. If the service certificate request message requests an application for a first type of service certificate, the CeMF determines to reject the service certificate application of the first NF.
  • the type of the first NF is the second type, and the CeMF verifies whether the first NF can apply for a service certificate according to a preconfigured rule.
  • the first NF when the first NF is an SMF, it may have an IPSec certificate. If the first NF ID or the initialization certificate indicates that the first NF is not an SMF, the CeMF determines to reject the business certificate application of the first NF.
  • the CeMF determines to apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first NF.
  • the CeMF makes a judgment on the request of the first NF to apply for a service certificate according to the preconfigured rules, including but not limited to:
  • the CeMF directly judges the request of the first NF to apply for a service certificate according to the pre-configured rules, and determines whether to respond to the request of the first NF to apply for a service certificate; or,
  • CeMF can also verify whether the certificate application request of the first NF is valid through other network elements or network management according to the pre-configured rules. For example, CeMF can request CeEF to assist in verifying whether the certificate application request of the first NF is valid.
  • the specific process can refer to steps S410-S440 (e.g., the function of the first request message is defined as verifying whether the certificate application request of the first NF is valid), which will not be repeated here.
  • CeMF determines to reject the service certificate application of the first NF (such as when CeMF determines that the certificate request of the first NF is invalid or unreasonable), and CeMF sends a failure indication to the first NF, where the failure indication is used to indicate that the request of the first NF for the service certificate is invalid.
  • the failure indication may also indicate the reason for the failure in requesting the service certificate, such as the failure indication carries a reason value, which indicates that the service certificate applied for by the first NF is not usable or the reason value indicates that the service certificate type does not match the first NF type.
  • CeMF may determine a CeEF to issue a service certificate to the first NF according to the requested service certificate type, because CeMF may establish an association with multiple CeEFs, and each CeEF may only issue a specific certificate.
  • the method flow shown in FIG3 may also include:
  • CeMF sends a service certificate application message to CeEF, or CeEF receives the service certificate application message from CeMF.
  • the certificate application request carries the CeMF ID.
  • the certificate application request also includes at least one of the following information:
  • Public key private key
  • first NF ID initialization certificate
  • CeMF signature CeMF signature
  • the first NF ID or initialization certificate is used to prevent repeated application for service certificates, or to prevent repeated application for service certificates using multiple CeMFs.
  • the CeMF signature is used to prevent a third party from tampering with the service certificate application. It should be understood that when the CeEF presets the public key or certificate of the CeMF, the CeMF signature may not be carried, or when there is a secure connection between the CeMF and the CeEF, the CeMF signature may not be carried.
  • the public key and private key pair are parameters for applying for a service certificate, which can be carried by the first NF in the service certificate request message, or generated by CeMF on behalf of the first NF.
  • CeMF can also generate a public key and/or private key corresponding to the first NF on behalf of the first NF for certificate application, which is not limited in this application.
  • CeEF can respond to the request of CeMF, and the method process shown in FIG3 further includes:
  • CeEF issues a service certificate to the first NF.
  • CeEF issues a service certificate to the first NF in response to the service certificate application request of CeMF.
  • the CeEF may directly send the service certificate to the first NF.
  • the CeEF may send the service certificate to the first NF indirectly, for example, by forwarding the service certificate to the first NF through other devices.
  • the message carrying the business certificate may also carry the CeMF ID.
  • CeEF and CeMF establish initial trust before issuing the certificate, and MnF performs auxiliary verification, so that business certificate issuance can be completed in the scenario without Private CA.
  • the present application also provides a communication method.
  • CeEF can verify MnF or pre-set MnF certificate
  • offline verification of CeMF can be implemented.
  • the communication method is described in detail below in conjunction with FIG. 4 .
  • FIG4 is a schematic flow chart of another communication method provided by the present application, comprising the following steps:
  • the first NF sends a service certificate request message to the CeMF, or the CeMF receives the service certificate request message from the first NF.
  • step S411 in FIG. 3 Please refer to the description of step S411 in FIG. 3 , which will not be repeated here.
  • the CeMF may request the MnF to verify the service certificate request.
  • the method flow shown in FIG4 also includes:
  • CeMF sends a third request message to MnF, or in other words, MnF receives the third request message from CeMF.
  • the third request message is used to request the MnF to verify the service certificate request initiated by the first NF.
  • the third request message can be understood as a verification request message.
  • the third request message includes the CeMF ID and the first NF ID.
  • the third request message also includes the Domain ID and/or the initialization certificate corresponding to the first NF.
  • the information carried in the third request message sent by CeMF to MnF in the embodiment shown in FIG. 4 is different from the information carried in the first request message sent by CeMF to CeEF in the embodiment shown in FIG. 3 in that: the information carried is the NF ID of the NF requesting the service certificate, rather than the NF ID list; similarly, the third request message carries the initialization certificate corresponding to the first NF requesting the service certificate, rather than the initialization certificate list.
  • CeMF triggers the request to MnF for auxiliary verification based on the service certificate request of the NF. That is to say, in the embodiment shown in FIG.
  • the request of CeMF to MnF for verification is initiated by a certain NF, rather than verification for CeMF. If verification is performed for CeMF, the CeMF may manage one or more NFs, so it carries the NF ID list or the initialization certificate list.
  • the MnF involved in the embodiment shown in FIG4 is the same as the MnF involved in the embodiment shown in FIG3, and can record the relevant configuration information during the NF initialization process.
  • CeEF and CeMF may perform interaction.
  • CeMF After CeMF receives the service certificate request message sent by NF, it directly sends a service certificate application message to CeEF. After CeEF receives the service certificate application message sent by CeMF, CeEF will request CeMF to assist in verification through request message #1, and request message #1 includes MnF ID. Optionally, the request message #1 may also include a fresh value, which is used to ensure the real-time nature of the information conveyed.
  • the MnF After receiving the third request message, the MnF performs verification, and the method flow shown in FIG4 further includes:
  • the process of MnF performing verification can refer to the description of MnF performing verification in step S430 in Figure 3. The difference is that the process of MnF performing verification in this embodiment is based on the initialization certificate or the first NF ID carried in the third request message, rather than the initialization certificate list or NF ID list.
  • the initialization certificate carried in the third request message is initialization certificate #1.
  • MnF can determine the initialization certificate #2 configured during the initialization process of the first NF based on the first NF ID of the first NF carried in the third request message. If initialization certificate #1 and initialization certificate #2 are the same initialization certificate, MnF determines that CeMF can apply for a business certificate on behalf of the first NF.
  • the first NF ID carried in the third request message is NF ID#1.
  • MnF can determine the IDs corresponding to one or more NFs managed by the CeMF based on the CeMF ID carried in the third request message. If NF ID#1 belongs to the IDs corresponding to the one or more NFs, MnF determines that the information sent by CeMF can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first NF.
  • the initialization certificate carried in the third request message is initialization certificate #1.
  • MnF queries the OCSP server of Private CA to check whether initialization certificate #1 is a revoked initialization certificate. If it is a revoked initialization certificate, it is determined that CeMF cannot apply for a business certificate on behalf of the first NF.
  • the CeMF may be notified of the verification result through the second indication information.
  • the method flow shown in FIG4 further includes:
  • S540 The MnF sends second indication information to the CeMF, or the CeMF receives the second indication information from the MnF.
  • the MnF determines that the information sent by the CeMF cannot apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first NF, and the second indication information is used to notify the verification failure.
  • MnF determines that CeMF can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first NF, which can be understood as successful verification. MnF returns the signature of MnF to verify the trusted credential through the second indication information to CeMF, and indicates successful verification.
  • the second indication information includes CeMF ID, MnF signature and event ID.
  • the MnF may cache the verification event locally in the MnF, which is beneficial for the CeEF to perform subsequent verification.
  • the CeMF may send a service certificate application message to the CeEF.
  • the method flow shown in FIG4 further includes:
  • CeMF sends a service certificate application message to CeEF, or CeEF receives the service certificate application message from CeMF.
  • the service certificate application message carries an indication to verify the trusted credentials. If CeMF has completed the interaction with CeEF after sending the third request line message to MnF, CeMF will send the verification trusted credentials to CeEF after receiving the second indication information of MnF.
  • the business certificate application message carries CeMF ID, pk/sk, and MnF signature (event ID).
  • CeEF may respond and issue a service certificate.
  • the method flow shown in FIG4 further includes:
  • CeEF issues a service certificate to the first NF.
  • step S414 in FIG. 3 Please refer to the description of step S414 in FIG. 3 , which will not be repeated here.
  • the CeEF may request the MnF to verify whether a service certificate can be issued to the first NF.
  • the method flow shown in FIG4 may further include:
  • the CeEF sends a query message to the MnF, or the MnF receives the query message from the CeEF.
  • the query message is used to request the MnF to verify whether the CeMF can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first NF.
  • the MnF sends a query response message to the CeEF, or the CeEF receives the query response message from the MnF.
  • the query response message is used to indicate whether the authentication passed or failed.
  • CeEF after receiving the service certificate request message, CeEF sends a query message to MnF, which carries the event ID and CeMF ID, to query whether the CeMF indicated by the CeMF ID can execute the event indicated by the event ID. For example, if the CeMF indicated by the CeMF ID applies for a service certificate on behalf of the first NF, and the verification event cached locally by MnF indicates that CeMF can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first NF, then the query response notifies CeEF that the event is executable, and CeEF can issue a service certificate to the first NF.
  • the CeEF can request the MnF to verify whether service certificates can be issued to multiple NFs respectively for multiple events.
  • CeEF sends a query message to MnF, which carries event ID#1, CeMF ID#1, event ID#2, and CeMF ID#2, wherein event ID#1 and CeMF ID#1 indicate that CeMF#1 indicated by CeMF ID#1 requests the issuance of a business certificate to NF#1, and event ID#2 and CeMF ID#2 indicate that CeMF#2 indicated by CeMF ID#2 requests the issuance of a business certificate to NF#2.
  • CeEF is notified through a query response message that event #1 indicated by event ID#1 is executable, and CeEF can issue a service certificate to NF#1; if MnF indicates that CeMF#2 cannot apply for a service certificate for NF#2 based on the verification event indication in the local cache, then CeEF is notified through a query response message that event #2 indicated by event ID#2 is not executable, and CeEF may not issue a service certificate to NF#2.
  • the present application also provides a communication method, which can verify CeMF by pre-configuring relevant information in CeMF.
  • the communication method is described in detail below in conjunction with FIG. 5 .
  • FIG5 is a schematic flow chart of another communication method provided by the present application, comprising the following steps:
  • the first message includes the CeMF ID and information corresponding to the CeMF ID.
  • the information corresponding to the CeMF ID includes at least one of the following information:
  • NF ID list initialization certificate list
  • domain ID or NF type initialization certificate list
  • CeEF receives and stores the first message sent by MnF. That is to say, CeEF preconfigures the trust domain mapping information where CeMF and NF are located.
  • CeEF locally maintains the trust domain mapping information of CeMF and NF as shown in Table 2 below:
  • the first NF sends a service certificate request message to the CeMF, or the CeMF receives the service certificate request message from the first NF.
  • step S411 in FIG. 3 Please refer to the description of step S411 in FIG. 3 , which will not be repeated here.
  • CeMF sends a service certificate application message to CeEF, or CeEF receives the service certificate application message from CeMF.
  • CeEF After receiving the service certificate application message from CeMF, CeEF matches the information in the table to see if it is consistent with the information carried in the service certificate application message sent by CeMF. If they are consistent, CeEF issues a service certificate.
  • the CeMF ID carried in the service certificate application message indicates that the CeMF requesting the issuance of the service certificate is CeMF1, and the NF ID carried in the service certificate application message is 1000001.
  • CeEF determines that the NF with NF ID 1000001 is managed by CeMF1 based on the mapping relationship cached locally (as shown in Table 2), and then issues a service certificate to the first NF.
  • the information locally configured by CeEF can configure the NF Type, indicating that CeEF can determine whether the first NF has the conditions to apply for the certificate based on the type.
  • the service certificate application message sent by CeMF in step S630 carries the NF ID and requests an IPSec certificate.
  • CeEF determines, based on the local table, that the Type corresponding to the NF ID is AMF, and according to the pre-configured rules, this Type does not require an IPSec certificate. In this case, a failure response can be sent to indicate that the first NF certificate application request has applied for the wrong certificate.
  • the method flow shown in FIG5 further includes:
  • CeEF issues a service certificate to the first NF.
  • step S414 in FIG. 3 Please refer to the description of step S414 in FIG. 3 , which will not be repeated here.
  • the devices in the existing network architecture are mainly used as examples for exemplary description (such as NF, MnF, etc.), and it should be understood that the specific form of the device is not limited in the embodiments of the present application. For example, devices that can achieve the same function in the future are applicable to the embodiments of the present application.
  • the methods and operations implemented by the device can also be implemented by the device components (such as chips or circuits).
  • the communication method provided by the embodiment of the present application is described in detail above in conjunction with Figures 3 to 5.
  • the above communication method is mainly introduced from the perspective of interaction between various protocol layers of the terminal device. It is understandable that in order to implement the above functions, the terminal device includes a hardware structure and/or software module corresponding to each function.
  • the embodiment of the present application can divide the functional modules of the transmitting end device or the receiving end device according to the above method example.
  • each functional module can be divided corresponding to each function, or two or more functions can be integrated into one processing module.
  • the above integrated module can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional modules. It should be noted that the division of modules in the embodiment of the present application is schematic and is only a logical functional division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation. The following is an example of dividing each functional module corresponding to each function.
  • FIG6 is a schematic block diagram of a communication device 10 provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • the device 10 includes a transceiver module 11 and a processing module 12.
  • the transceiver module 11 can implement corresponding communication functions, and the processing module 12 is used to perform data processing, or in other words, the transceiver module 11 is used to perform operations related to receiving and sending, and the processing module 12 is used to perform other operations besides receiving and sending.
  • the transceiver module 11 can also be called a communication interface or a communication unit.
  • the device 10 may further include a storage module 13, which may be used to store instructions and/or data.
  • the processing module 12 may read the instructions and/or data in the storage module so that the device implements the actions of the devices in the aforementioned method embodiments.
  • the device 10 may correspond to the CeEF in the above method embodiment, or be a component (such as a chip) of the CeEF.
  • the device 10 can implement the steps or processes corresponding to the CeEF execution in the above method embodiment, wherein the transceiver module 11 can be used to perform operations related to the transmission and reception of CeEF in the above method embodiment, and the processing module 12 can be used to perform operations related to the processing of CeEF in the above method embodiment.
  • the transceiver module 11 is used to receive a first request message from a certificate application network element, wherein the first request message is used to request authentication of the certificate application network element, and the first request message includes an identifier and first information of the certificate application network element, and the first information is used to authenticate the certificate application network element; the transceiver module 11 is also used to send a second request message to a management network element, wherein the second request message is used to request verification of the first information, and the second request message includes the first information; the transceiver module 11 is also used to receive first indication information from the management network element, and the first indication information is used to indicate whether the first information has passed verification; the processing module 12 is used to determine whether the certificate application network element is a trusted network element based on the first indication information.
  • the transceiver module 11 is used to receive a business certificate application message from a certificate application network element, wherein the business certificate application message is used to request the communication device to issue a business certificate, and the business certificate application message includes an identifier of the certificate application network element and a signature of a management network element; the transceiver module 11 is also used to issue a business certificate to a first network element; wherein the signature of the management network element is a signature based on an event identifier, and the event identifier is used to identify that the certificate application network element requests to apply for a business certificate for the first network element.
  • the transceiver module 11 is used to receive a first message from a management network element, wherein the first message includes information related to at least one certificate application network element locally recorded by the management network element; the transceiver module 11 is also used to receive a business certificate application message from the certificate application network element, wherein the business certificate application message is used to request the communication device to issue a business certificate; and the processing module 12 is used to determine whether to issue a business certificate based on the first message.
  • the transceiver module 11 can be used to execute the steps of sending and receiving information in the method, such as steps S410, S420, S460, S413 and S414; the processing module 12 can be used to execute the processing steps in the method, such as step S450.
  • the transceiver module 11 may be used to execute the steps of sending and receiving information in the method, such as steps S550 , S560 , S570 , and S580 ; the processing module 12 may be used to execute the processing steps in the method.
  • the transceiver module 11 may be used to execute the steps of sending and receiving information in the method, such as steps S610 and S630 ; the processing module 12 may be used to execute the processing steps in the method, such as step S640 .
  • the device 10 may correspond to the CeMF in the above method embodiment, or be a component (such as a chip) of the CeMF.
  • the device 10 can implement the steps or processes executed by the CeMF in the above method embodiment, wherein the transceiver module 11 can be used to perform the operations related to the transceiver of the CeMF in the above method embodiment, and the processing module 12 can be used to perform the operations related to the processing of the CeMF in the above method embodiment.
  • the transceiver module 11 is used to send a first request message to a certificate issuing network element, wherein the first request message is used to request authentication of the communication device, and the first request message includes an identifier and first information of the communication device, and the first information is used to authenticate the communication device; the transceiver module 11 is also used to receive a first response message from the certificate issuing network element, wherein the first response message is used to indicate whether the communication device is a trusted network element, wherein the certificate issuing network element determines whether the communication device is a trusted network element based on the first indication information, and the first indication information is feedback information of the certificate issuing network element requesting the management network element to verify the first information.
  • the transceiver module 11 is used to receive a service certificate request message from a first network element, wherein the service certificate request message is used to request a communication device to apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element; the transceiver module 11 is also used to send a third request message to a management network element, wherein the third request message is used to request the management network element to verify whether the communication device can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element; the transceiver module 11 is also used to receive second indication information from the management network element, wherein the second indication information is used to indicate whether the communication device can apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element, wherein the second indication information includes a signature and an event identifier of the management network element, wherein the signature of the management network element is a signature based on an event identifier, and the event identifier is used to identify that the communication device requests to apply for a service certificate on behalf of the first network element.
  • the transceiver module 11 can be used to execute the steps of sending and receiving information in the method, such as steps S410, S460, S411, S413 and S414; the processing module 12 can be used to execute the processing steps in the method, such as step S412.
  • the transceiver module 11 may be used to execute the steps of sending and receiving information in the method, such as steps S510 , S520 , S540 , and S550 ; the processing module 12 may be used to execute the processing steps in the method.
  • the transceiver module 11 may be used to execute the steps of sending and receiving information in the method, such as steps S620 and S630 ; and the processing module 12 may be used to execute the processing steps in the method.
  • the device 10 may correspond to the MnF in the above method embodiment, or may be a component (such as a chip) of the MnF.
  • the device 10 can implement the steps or processes executed by the MnF in the above method embodiment, wherein the transceiver module 11 can be used to perform the operations related to the transceiver of the MnF in the above method embodiment, and the processing module 12 can be used to perform the operations related to the processing of the MnF in the above method embodiment.
  • the transceiver module 11 is used to receive a second request message from a certificate issuing network element, where the second request message is used to request verification of the first information, and the second request message includes the first information; the processing module 12 is used to verify the first information based on second information locally recorded by the communication device, where the second information is information related to the certificate application network element; the transceiver module 11 is also used to send first indication information to the certificate issuing network element, where the first indication information is used to indicate whether the first information has passed the verification.
  • the transceiver module 11 is used to receive a third request message from a certificate application network element, wherein the third request message is used to request the communication device to verify whether the certificate application network element can apply for a business certificate on behalf of the first network element; the processing module 12 is used to verify whether the certificate application network element can apply for a business certificate on behalf of the first network element based on second information locally recorded by the management network element, wherein the second information is information related to the certificate application network element; the transceiver module 11 is also used to send a second indication message to the certificate issuing network element, wherein the second indication message is used to indicate whether the certificate application network element can apply for a business certificate on behalf of the first network element, and the second indication message includes a signature and an event identifier of the communication device, wherein the signature of the communication device is a signature based on the event identifier, and the event identifier is used to identify that the certificate application network element requests to apply for a business certificate on behalf of the first network element.
  • the transceiver module 11 may be used to execute the steps of sending and receiving information in the method, such as steps S420 and S440 ; the processing module 12 may be used to execute the processing steps in the method, such as step S430 .
  • the transceiver module 11 can be used to execute the steps of sending and receiving information in the method, such as steps S520, S540, S570 and S580; the processing module 12 can be used to execute the processing steps in the method, such as step S530.
  • the transceiver module 11 may be used to execute the steps of sending and receiving information in the method, such as step S610:
  • the processing module 12 may be used to execute the processing steps in the method.
  • module here may refer to an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), an electronic circuit, a processor (such as a shared processor, a dedicated processor or a group processor, etc.) and a memory for executing one or more software or firmware programs, a merged logic circuit and/or other suitable components that support the described functions.
  • ASIC application specific integrated circuit
  • processor such as a shared processor, a dedicated processor or a group processor, etc.
  • memory for executing one or more software or firmware programs, a merged logic circuit and/or other suitable components that support the described functions.
  • the device 10 can be specifically the mobile management network element in the above-mentioned embodiment, and can be used to execute the various processes and/or steps corresponding to the mobile management network element in the above-mentioned method embodiments; or, the device 10 can be specifically the terminal device in the above-mentioned embodiment, and can be used to execute the various processes and/or steps corresponding to the terminal device in the above-mentioned method embodiments. To avoid repetition, it will not be repeated here.
  • the device 10 of each of the above schemes has the function of implementing the corresponding steps performed by the device (such as terminal device, network device) in the above method.
  • This function can be implemented by hardware, or by hardware executing the corresponding software implementation.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the above functions; for example, the transceiver module can be replaced by a transceiver (for example, the sending unit in the transceiver module can be replaced by a transmitter, and the receiving unit in the transceiver module can be replaced by a receiver), and other units, such as processing modules, can be replaced by processors to respectively perform the transceiver operations and related processing operations in each method embodiment.
  • the transceiver module 11 may also be a transceiver circuit (for example, may include a receiving circuit and a sending circuit), and the processing module may be a processing circuit.
  • FIG7 is a schematic diagram of another communication device 20 provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • the device 20 includes a processor 21, and the processor 21 is used to execute a computer program or instruction stored in a memory 22, or read data/signaling stored in the memory 22 to execute the method in each method embodiment above.
  • the processor 21 is used to execute a computer program or instruction stored in a memory 22, or read data/signaling stored in the memory 22 to execute the method in each method embodiment above.
  • the device 20 further includes a memory 22, and the memory 22 is used to store computer programs or instructions and/or data.
  • the memory 22 can be integrated with the processor 21, or can also be separately arranged.
  • the memory 22 is one or more.
  • the device 20 further includes a transceiver 23, and the transceiver 23 is used for receiving and/or sending signals.
  • the processor 21 is used to control the transceiver 23 to receive and/or send signals.
  • the device 20 is used to implement the operations performed by CeEF in the above method embodiments.
  • the device 20 is used to implement the operations performed by the CeMF in the above various method embodiments.
  • the device 20 is used to implement the operations performed by MnF in the above method embodiments.
  • processors mentioned in the embodiments of the present application may be a central processing unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC), field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc.
  • DSP digital signal processors
  • ASIC application-specific integrated circuits
  • FPGA field programmable gate arrays
  • a general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor may also be any conventional processor, etc.
  • the memory mentioned in the embodiments of the present application may be a volatile memory and/or a non-volatile memory.
  • the non-volatile memory may be a read-only memory (ROM), a programmable read-only memory (PROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or a flash memory.
  • the volatile memory may be a random access memory (RAM).
  • a RAM may be used as an external cache.
  • RAM includes the following forms: static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDR SDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous link DRAM (SLDRAM), and direct rambus RAM (DR RAM).
  • SRAM static RAM
  • DRAM dynamic RAM
  • SDRAM synchronous DRAM
  • DDR SDRAM double data rate SDRAM
  • ESDRAM enhanced SDRAM
  • SLDRAM synchronous link DRAM
  • DR RAM direct rambus RAM
  • the processor is a general-purpose processor, DSP, ASIC, FPGA or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic device, discrete hardware component, the memory (storage module) can be integrated into the processor.
  • memory described herein is intended to include, but is not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.
  • FIG8 is a schematic diagram of a chip system 30 provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • the chip system 30 (or also referred to as a processing system) includes a logic circuit 31 and an input/output interface 32.
  • the logic circuit 31 may be a processing circuit in the chip system 30.
  • the logic circuit 31 may be coupled to the storage unit to call the storage unit.
  • the instructions in the storage unit enable the chip system 30 to implement the methods and functions of each embodiment of the present application.
  • the input/output interface 32 can be an input/output circuit in the chip system 30, outputting information processed by the chip system 30, or inputting data or signaling information to be processed into the chip system 30 for processing.
  • the chip system 30 is used to implement the operations performed by CeEF, CeMF, or MnF in the above method embodiments.
  • the logic circuit 31 is used to implement the processing-related operations performed by CeEF, CeMF, or MnF in the above method embodiments;
  • the input/output interface 32 is used to implement the sending and/or receiving-related operations performed by CeEF, CeMF, or MnF in the above method embodiments.
  • the embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium on which are stored computer instructions for implementing the methods executed by CeEF, CeMF, or MnF in the above method embodiments.
  • the computer when the computer program is executed by a computer, the computer can implement the method performed by CeEF, CeMF, or MnF in each embodiment of the above method.
  • the embodiments of the present application further provide a computer program product, comprising instructions, which, when executed by a computer, implement the methods performed by CeEF, CeMF, or MnF in the above-mentioned method embodiments.
  • the embodiment of the present application further provides a communication system, including the aforementioned CeEF, CeMF and MnF.
  • the disclosed devices and methods can be implemented in other ways.
  • the device embodiments described above are only schematic.
  • the division of the units is only a logical function division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation, such as multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed.
  • the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.
  • the computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable devices.
  • the computer can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.
  • the computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium, for example, the computer instructions can be transmitted from a website site, computer, server or data center by wired (e.g., coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) mode to another website site, computer, server or data center.
  • the computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that a computer can access or a data storage device such as a server or data center that contains one or more available media integrations.
  • the available medium may be a magnetic medium (e.g., a floppy disk, a hard disk, a magnetic tape), an optical medium (e.g., a DVD), or a semiconductor medium (e.g., a solid state disk (SSD)).
  • the aforementioned available medium includes, but is not limited to, various media that can store program codes, such as a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk.

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Abstract

一种通信方法，包括：证书申请网元在向证书颁发网元发送证书申请消息代第一网元申请证书之前，证书申请网元和证书颁发网元之间建立初始的信任，具体地，证书申请网元和证书颁发网元之间建立初始的信任需要管理网元协助完成。以使得在证书颁发网元确定证书申请网元为可信任的网元的前提下为第一网元颁发证书，保证证书颁发过程的安全性。

Description

通信方法和通信装置
本申请要求于2022年11月04日提交国家知识产权局、申请号为202211378354.0、发明名称为“通信方法和通信装置”的中国专利申请的优先权，其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本申请涉及通信领域，并且更具体地，涉及一种通信方法和通信装置。
背景技术
第三代合作伙伴计划(3rd Generation Partnership Project，3GPP)中证书管理相关课题定义了一种证书申请管理框架(Certificate Enrolment and MAnagement Framework，CEMAF)，该CEMAF中包括证书管理网元(Certificate management Function，CeMF)、证书颁发网元(Certificate enrolment Function，CeEF)和需要请求业务证书的功能网元(network function，NF)。具体地，NF和CeEF之间的通信接口用于注册与证书调配和更新相关的程序；NF和CeMF之间的通信接口用于证书状态检查。
但是目前针对CeEF和CeMF构成的证书管理框架，尚没有定论如何基于此架构设置一个安全的证书申请协议。
发明内容
本申请提供一种通信方法，针对CeEF和CeMF构成的证书管理框架提出初始的信任建立流程，以实现证书颁发的安全保护。
第一方面，提供了一种通信方法，包括：证书申请网元向证书颁发网元发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息用于请求认证所述证书申请网元，所述第一请求消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和第一信息，所述第一信息用于对所述证书申请网元进行认证；所述证书颁发网元向管理网元发送第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息用于请求验证所述第一信息，所述第二请求消息中包括所述第一信息；所述管理网元根据所述管理网元本地记录的第二信息对所述第一信息进行验证，所述第二信息为所述证书申请网元相关的信息；所述管理网元向所述证书颁发网元发送第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第一信息是否通过验证；所述证书颁发网元根据所述第一指示信息确定所述证书申请网元是否为可信的网元。
基于上述方案，证书颁发网元通过管理网元对证书申请网元进行校验，确定证书申请网元是否为可信任的网元。从而证书颁发网元可以在证书申请网元验证通过(如，为可信任的网元)的情况下，同意证书申请网元的证书颁发申请，为需要颁发证书的网元颁发证书，也即是说在颁发证书之前建立证书颁发网元和证书申请网元之间的信任，从而可以实现证书颁发的安全保护。
另外，需要说明的是，上述方案中证书颁发网元是请求管理网元协助完成证书申请网元的校验，而管理网元可以通过本地记录的证书申请网元相关的信息(如，证书申请网元的初始化信息、证书申请网元的配置信息、或证书申请网元的管理信息等)完成校验，从而无需进行额外的信息配置即可完成校验。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，所述第一信息包括以下信息中的至少一项：网元标识列表、域标识、或初始化证书列表，所述网元标识列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元，所述域标识用于指示所述证书申请网元所位于的域，所述初始化证书列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元被配置的至少一个初始化证书。
基于上述方案，证书申请网元在请求对其进行校验的消息中携带的用于协助校验的信息可以有多种可能，提高方案的灵活性。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，所述证书颁发网元根据所述第一指示信息确定所述证书申请网元是否为可信的网元，包括：在所述第一指示信息指示所述第一信息通过验证的情况下，所述证书颁发网元确定所述证书申请网元为可信的网元；或者，在所述第一指示信息指示所述第一信息未通过验证的情况下，所述证书颁发网元确定所述证书申请网元为不可信的网元。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，所述第一指示信息中还包括管理网元的签名，所述 管理网元的签名用于验证所述第一指示信息是否可信。
基于上述方案，管理网元向证书颁发网元发送的第一指示信息中可以携带管理网元的签名，以使得证书颁发网元可以基于该管理网元的签名验证所述第一指示信息是否可信，提高信息传输的安全性。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，所述方法还包括：所述证书颁发网元向所述证书申请网元发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息用于指示所述证书申请网元是否为所述证书颁发网元可信的网元。
基于上述方案，证书颁发网元可以通过第一响应消息通知证书申请网元校验的结果，以避免证书申请网元无法及时获知校验结果而导致重复申请校验，造成资源浪费。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，所述方法还包括：第一网元向所述证书申请网元发送业务证书请求消息，所述业务证书请求消息用于请求所述证书申请网元代所述第一网元申请业务证书；所述证书申请网元根据规则判断是否响应所述第一网元申请业务证书的请求。
基于上述方案，证书申请网元在接收到第一网元的业务证书请求消息之后，可以根据本地预配置的规则确定是否需要代第一网元向证书颁发网元申请证书，以避免在第一网元的申请不合理的情况下(如，申请的证书类型不合理)，证书申请网元仍然代第一网元向证书颁发网元申请证书，导致资源浪费。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，所述业务证书请求消息中包括所述第一网元的标识和以下信息中的至少一项：所述第一网元对应的公钥、所述第一网元对应的私钥、所述第一网元被配置的初始化证书、或业务类型指示信息。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，所述方法还包括：所述证书申请网元向所述第一网元发送失败指示，所述失败指示用于指示所述第一网元申请业务证书的请求无效；或者，所述证书申请网元向所述证书颁发网元发送业务证书申请消息，所述业务证书申请消息用于请求所述证书颁发网元颁发业务证书。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中在所述业务证书请求消息请求的业务证书的类型为第一类型的情况下，所述证书申请网元根据规则判断是否响应所述第一网元申请业务证书的请求包括：所述证书申请网元根据规则验证所述第一网元是否可以申请第一类型的业务证书；在验证失败时，所述证书申请网元向所述第一网元发送所述失败指示。元向所述第一网元发送所述失败指示。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，所述业务证书申请消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和以下信息中的至少一项：所述第一网元对应的公钥、所述第一网元对应的私钥、所述第一网元被配置的初始化证书、所述第一网元的标识、或所述证书申请网元的签名。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，在所述第一信息为所述网元标识列表，且所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元的标识构成所述网元标识列表时，所述管理网元确定所述第一信息通过验证；或者，在所述第一信息为所述初始化证书列表，且所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元对应的初始化证书构成所述初始化证书列表，所述初始化证书列表中的初始化证书均有效时，所述管理网元确定所述第一信息通过验证；或者，在所述第一信息为所述域标识，且所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元所属的域的标识为所述域标识时，所述管理网元确定所述第一信息通过验证。
基于上述方案，管理网元可以通过不同的方式对证书申请网元的信息进行校验，提高方案的灵活性。
第二方面，提供了一种通信方法，该方法可以由证书颁发网元执行，或者，也可以由配置于证书颁发网元中的芯片或电路执行，本申请对此不作限定。为了方便，以下以证书颁发网元执行为例进行说明。
该通信方法包括：证书颁发网元接收来自证书申请网元的第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息用于请求认证所述证书申请网元，所述第一请求消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和第一信息，所述第一信息用于对所述证书申请网元进行认证；所述证书颁发网元向管理网元发送第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息用于请求验证所述第一信息，所述第二请求消息中包括所述第一信息；所述证书颁发网元接收来自所述管理网元的第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第一信息是否通过验证；所述证书颁发网元根据所述第一指示信息确定所述证书申请网元是否为可信的网元。
结合第二方面，在第二方面的某些实现方式中，所述第一信息包括以下信息中的至少一项：网元标识列表、域标识、或初始化证书列表，所述网元标识列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元，所述域标识用于指示所述证书申请网元所位于的域，所述初始化证书列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元被配置的至少一个初始化证书。
结合第二方面，在第二方面的某些实现方式中，所述证书颁发网元根据所述第一指示信息确定所述证书申请网元是否为可信的网元，包括：在所述第一指示信息指示所述第一信息通过验证的情况下，所述证书颁发网元确定所述证书申请网元为可信的网元；或者，在所述第一指示信息指示所述第一信息未通过验证的情况下，所述证书颁发网元确定所述证书申请网元为不可信的网元。
结合第二方面，在第二方面的某些实现方式中，所述第一指示信息中还包括管理网元的签名，所述管理网元的签名用于验证所述第一指示信息是否可信。
结合第二方面，在第二方面的某些实现方式中，所述方法还包括：所述证书颁发网元向所述证书申请网元发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息用于指示所述证书申请网元是否为所述证书颁发网元可信的网元。
以上第二方面及其可能的设计所示方法的技术效果可参照第一方面及其可能的设计中的技术效果。
第三方面，提供了一种通信方法，该方法可以由证书申请网元执行，或者，也可以由配置于证书申请网元中的芯片或电路执行，本申请对此不作限定。为了方便，以下以证书申请网元执行为例进行说明。
该通信方法包括：证书申请网元向证书颁发网元发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息用于请求认证所述证书申请网元，所述第一请求消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和第一信息，所述第一信息用于对所述证书申请网元进行认证；所述证书申请网元接收来自所述证书颁发网元的第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息用于指示所述证书申请网元是否为可信的网元，其中，所述证书颁发网元是基于第一指示信息确定所述证书申请网元是否为可信的网元的，且所述第一指示信息是所述证书颁发网元请求管理网元对第一信息进行校验的反馈信息。
结合第三方面，在第三方面的某些实现方式中，所述第一信息包括以下信息中的至少一项：网元标识列表、域标识、或初始化证书列表，所述网元标识列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元，所述域标识用于指示所述证书申请网元所位于的域，所述初始化证书列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元被配置的至少一个初始化证书。
结合第三方面，在第三方面的某些实现方式中，所述方法还包括：所述证书申请网元接收来自第一网元的业务证书请求消息，所述业务证书请求消息用于请求所述证书申请网元代所述第一网元申请业务证书；所述证书申请网元根据规则判断是否响应所述第一网元申请业务证书的请求。
结合第三方面，在第三方面的某些实现方式中，所述业务证书请求消息中包括所述第一网元的标识和以下信息中的至少一项：所述第一网元对应的公钥、所述第一网元对应的私钥、所述第一网元被配置的初始化证书、或业务类型指示信息。
结合第三方面，在第三方面的某些实现方式中，所述方法还包括：所述证书申请网元向所述第一网元发送失败指示，所述失败指示用于指示所述第一网元申请业务证书的请求无效；或者，所述证书申请网元向所述证书颁发网元发送业务证书申请消息，所述业务证书申请消息用于请求所述证书颁发网元颁发业务证书。
结合第三方面，在第三方面的某些实现方式中，所述业务证书申请消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和以下信息中的至少一项：所述第一网元对应的公钥、所述第一网元对应的私钥、所述第一网元被配置的初始化证书、所述第一网元的标识、或所述证书申请网元的签名。
以上第三方面及其可能的设计所示方法的技术效果可参照第一方面及其可能的设计中的技术效果。
第四方面，提供了一种通信方法，该方法可以由管理网元执行，或者，也可以由配置于管理网元中的芯片或电路执行，本申请对此不作限定。为了方便，以下以管理网元执行为例进行说明。
该通信方法包括：管理网元接收来自证书颁发网元的第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息用于请求验证所述第一信息，所述第二请求消息中包括所述第一信息；所述管理网元根据所述管理网元本地记录的第二信息对所述第一信息进行验证，所述第二信息为所述证书申请网元相关的信息；所述管理网元向所述证书颁发网元发送第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第一信息是否通过验证。
结合第四方面，在第四方面的某些实现方式中，所述第一信息包括以下信息中的至少一项：网元标识列表、域标识、或初始化证书列表，所述网元标识列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元，所述域标识用于指示所述证书申请网元所位于的域，所述初始化证书列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元被配置的至少一个初始化证书。
结合第四方面，在第四方面的某些实现方式中，在所述第一信息为所述网元标识列表，且所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元的标识构成所述网元标识列表时，所述管理网 元确定所述第一信息通过验证；或者，在所述第一信息为所述初始化证书列表，且所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元对应的初始化证书构成所述初始化证书列表，所述初始化证书列表中的初始化证书均有效时，所述管理网元确定所述第一信息通过验证；或者，在所述第一信息为所述域标识，且所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元所属的域的标识为所述域标识时，所述管理网元确定所述第一信息通过验证。
结合第四方面，在第四方面的某些实现方式中，所述第一指示信息中还包括管理网元的签名，所述管理网元的签名用于验证所述第一指示信息是否可信。
以上第四方面及其可能的设计所示方法的技术效果可参照第一方面及其可能的设计中的技术效果。
第五方面，提供了一种通信方法，包括：证书申请网元接收来自第一网元的业务证书请求消息，所述业务证书请求消息用于请求证书申请网元代所述第一网元申请业务证书；所述证书申请网元向管理网元发送第三请求消息，所述第三请求消息用于请求所述管理网元验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书；所述管理网元根据所述管理网元本地记录的第二信息，验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，所述第二信息为所述证书申请网元相关的信息；所述管理网元向所述证书申请网元发送第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，所述第二指示信息中包括所述管理网元的签名和事件标识，其中，所述管理网元的签名为基于事件标识的签名，所述事件标识用于标识所述证书申请网元代所述第一网元申请业务证书。
基于上述方案，证书申请网元在接收到第一网元的业务证书请求消息之后，可以通过管理网元验证是否可以代第一网元向证书颁发网元申请业务证书，也就是说该技术方案中证书申请网元在向证书颁发网元请求颁发证书之前，通过管理网元确定是否可以进行证书颁发申请，避免在第一网元没有权限申请某种类型的网元证书的情况下发起业务证书颁发的申请，从而可以实现证书颁发的安全保护。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，所述方法还包括：所述证书申请网元向证书颁发网元发送业务证书申请消息，所述业务证书申请消息用于请求所述证书颁发网元为所述第一网元颁发业务证书，所述业务证书申请消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和所述管理网元的签名。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，所述方法还包括：所述证书颁发网元向所述管理网元发送查询消息，所述查询消息用于查询所述证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请业务证书，所述查询消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和所述事件标识；所述证书颁发网元接收来自所述管理网元发送查询响应消息，所述查询响应消息用于指示所述证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请业务证书。
基于上述方案，证书颁发网元在颁发证书之前可以通过查询消息向管理网元查询证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请业务证书，从而避免在第一网元没有权限申请某种类型的网元证书的情况下颁发证书。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，所述方法还包括：在所述第三请求消息包括所述第一网元的标识的情况下，所述管理网元验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，包括：所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元的标识包括所述第一网元的标识时，所述管理网元确定所述证书申请网元能代所述第一网元申请业务证书；或者，在所述第二请求消息包括所述第一网元对应的初始化证书的情况下，所述管理网元验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，包括：所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元对应的初始化证书包括所述第一网元的对应的初始化证书时，所述管理网元确定所述证书申请网元能代所述第一网元申请业务证书。
基于上述方案，管理网元可以通过不同的验证方式验证证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请业务证书，提高方案的灵活性。
第六方面，提供了一种通信方法，该方法可以由证书颁发网元执行，或者，也可以由配置于证书颁发网元中的芯片或电路执行，本申请对此不作限定。为了方便，以下以证书颁发网元执行为例进行说明。
该通信方法包括：证书颁发网元接收来自证书申请网元的业务证书申请消息，所述业务证书申请消息用于请求所述证书颁发网元颁发业务证书，所述业务证书申请消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和管理网元的签名；所述证书颁发网元向第一网元颁发业务证书；其中，所述管理网元的签名为基于事件标识的签名，所述事件标识用于标识所述证书申请网元请求为所述第一网元申请业务证书。
结合第六方面，在第六方面的某些实现方式中，所述方法还包括：所述证书颁发网元向所述管理网元发送查询消息，所述查询消息用于查询所述证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请业务证书，所述查询消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和所述事件标识；所述证书颁发网元接收来自所述管理网元发送查询 响应消息，所述查询响应消息用于指示所述证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请业务证书。
以上第六方面及其可能的设计所示方法的技术效果可参照第五方面及其可能的设计中的技术效果。
第七方面，提供了一种通信方法，该方法可以由证书申请网元执行，或者，也可以由配置于证书申请网元中的芯片或电路执行，本申请对此不作限定。为了方便，以下以证书申请网元执行为例进行说明。
该通信方法包括：证书申请网元接收来自第一网元的业务证书请求消息，所述业务证书请求消息用于请求证书申请网元代所述第一网元申请业务证书；所述证书申请网元向管理网元发送第三请求消息，所述第三请求消息用于请求所述管理网元验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书；所述证书申请网元接收来自所述管理网元的第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述证书申请网元能否待所述第一网元申请业务证书，所述第二指示信息中包括所述管理网元的签名和事件标识，其中，所述管理网元的签名为基于事件标识的签名，所述事件标识用于标识所述证书申请网元请求代所述第一网元申请业务证书。
结合第七方面，在第七方面的某些实现方式中，所述方法还包括：所述证书申请网元向证书颁发网元发送业务证书申请消息，所述业务证书申请消息用于请求所述证书颁发网元为所述第一网元颁发业务证书，所述业务证书申请消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和所述管理网元的签名。
以上第七方面及其可能的设计所示方法的技术效果可参照第五方面及其可能的设计中的技术效果。
第八方面，提供了一种通信方法，该方法可以由管理网元执行，或者，也可以由配置于管理网元中的芯片或电路执行，本申请对此不作限定。为了方便，以下以管理网元执行为例进行说明。
该通信方法包括：管理网元接收来自证书申请网元的第三请求消息，所述第三请求消息用于请求所述管理网元验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书；所述管理网元根据所述管理网元本地记录的第二信息，验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，所述第二信息为所述证书申请网元相关的信息；所述管理网元向所述证书颁发网元发送第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述证书申请网元能否待所述第一网元申请业务证书，所述第二指示信息中包括所述管理网元的签名和事件标识，其中，所述管理网元的签名为基于事件标识的签名，所述事件标识用于标识所述证书申请网元请求代所述第一网元申请业务证书。
结合第八方面，在第八方面的某些实现方式中，在所述第三请求消息包括所述第一网元的标识的情况下，所述管理网元验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，包括：所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元的标识包括所述第一网元的标识时，所述管理网元确定所述证书申请网元能代所述第一网元申请业务证书；或者，在所述第二请求消息包括所述第一网元对应的初始化证书的情况下，所述管理网元验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，包括：所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元对应的初始化证书包括所述第一网元的对应的初始化证书时，所述管理网元确定所述证书申请网元能代所述第一网元申请业务证书。
结合第八方面，在第八方面的某些实现方式中，所述方法还包括：所述管理网元接收来自证书颁发网元的查询消息，所述查询消息用于查询所述证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请颁发业务证书，所述查询消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和所述事件标识；所述管理网元向所述证书颁发网元发送查询响应消息，所述查询响应消息用于指示所述证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请颁发业务证书。
以上第八方面及其可能的设计所示方法的技术效果可参照第五方面及其可能的设计中的技术效果。
第九方面，提供了一种通信方法，该方法可以由证书颁发网元执行，或者，也可以由配置于证书颁发网元中的芯片或电路执行，本申请对此不作限定。为了方便，以下以证书颁发网元执行为例进行说明。
该通信方法包括：证书颁发网元接收来自管理网元的第一消息，所述第一消息中包括所述管理网元本地记录的至少一个证书申请网元相关的信息；所述证书颁发网元接收来自证书申请网元的业务证书申请消息，所述业务证书申请消息用于请求所述证书颁发网元颁发业务证书；所述证书颁发网元根据所述第一消息确定是否颁发业务证书。
基于上述方案，证书颁发网元从管理网元接收到至少一个证书申请网元相关的信息，从而在接收到某个证书颁发网元的业务证书申请消息之后，可以根据本地保存的该证书颁发网元的初始化信息和该证书颁发网元通过业务证书申请消息提供的信息确定是否同意该证书颁发网元的请求颁发证书，从而可以实现证书颁发的安全保护。
另外，证书颁发网元可以在颁发证书时在本地参照管理网元发送的信息实现针对证书申请网元的校验，无需额外信令，降低信令开销。
结合第九方面，在第九方面的某些实现方式中，所述第一消息中包括证书申请网元的标识和以下至少一种信息的对应关系：网元的标识、域标识、初始化证书标识、或网元类型。
第十方面，提供了一种通信装置，用于实现上述第二方面所示的方法。该装置包括：收发模块，用于接收来自证书申请网元的第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息用于请求认证所述证书申请网元，所述第一请求消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和第一信息，所述第一信息用于对所述证书申请网元进行认证；所述收发模块，还用于向管理网元发送第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息用于请求验证所述第一信息，所述第二请求消息中包括所述第一信息；所述收发模块，还用于接收来自所述管理网元的第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第一信息是否通过验证；处理模块，用于根据所述第一指示信息确定所述证书申请网元是否为可信的网元。
结合第十方面，在第十方面的某些实现方式中，所述第一信息包括以下信息中的至少一项：网元标识列表、域标识、或初始化证书列表，所述网元标识列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元，所述域标识用于指示所述证书申请网元所位于的域，所述初始化证书列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元被配置的至少一个初始化证书。
结合第十方面，在第十方面的某些实现方式中，所述处理模块根据所述第一指示信息确定所述证书申请网元是否为可信的网元，包括：在所述第一指示信息指示所述第一信息通过验证的情况下，所述处理模块确定所述证书申请网元为可信的网元；或者，在所述第一指示信息指示所述第一信息未通过验证的情况下，所述处理模块确定所述证书申请网元为不可信的网元。
结合第十方面，在第十方面的某些实现方式中，所述第一指示信息中还包括管理网元的签名，所述管理网元的签名用于验证所述第一指示信息是否可信。
结合第十方面，在第十方面的某些实现方式中，所述收发模块，还用于向所述证书申请网元发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息用于指示所述证书申请网元是否为所述证书颁发网元可信的网元。
以上第十方面及其可能的设计所示方法的技术效果可参照第二方面及其可能的设计中的技术效果。
第十一方面，提供了一种通信装置，用于实现上述第三方面所示的方法。该装置包括：
收发模块，用于向证书颁发网元发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息用于请求认证所述通信装置，所述第一请求消息中包括所述通信装置的标识和第一信息，所述第一信息用于对所述通信装置进行认证；所述收发模块，还用于接收来自所述证书颁发网元的第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息用于指示所述通信装置是否为可信的网元，其中，所述证书颁发网元是基于第一指示信息确定所述通信装置是否为可信的网元的，且所述第一指示信息是所述证书颁发网元请求管理网元对第一信息进行校验的反馈信息。
结合第十一方面，在第十一方面的某些实现方式中，所述第一信息包括以下信息中的至少一项：网元标识列表、域标识、或初始化证书列表，所述网元标识列表用于指示所述通信装置管理的至少一个网元，所述域标识用于指示所述通信装置所位于的域，所述初始化证书列表用于指示所述通信装置管理的至少一个网元被配置的至少一个初始化证书。
结合第十一方面，在第十一方面的某些实现方式中，所述收发模块，还用于接收来自第一网元的业务证书请求消息，所述业务证书请求消息用于请求所述通信装置代所述第一网元申请业务证书；处理模块，用于根据规则判断是否响应所述第一网元申请业务证书的请求。
结合第十一方面，在第十一方面的某些实现方式中，所述业务证书请求消息中包括所述第一网元的标识和以下信息中的至少一项：所述第一网元对应的公钥、所述第一网元对应的私钥、所述第一网元被配置的初始化证书、或业务类型指示信息。
结合第十一方面，在第十一方面的某些实现方式中，所述收发模块，还用于向所述第一网元发送失败指示，所述失败指示用于指示所述第一网元申请业务证书的请求无效；或者，所述收发模块，还用于向所述证书颁发网元发送业务证书申请消息，所述业务证书申请消息用于请求所述证书颁发网元颁发业务证书。
结合第十一方面，在第十一方面的某些实现方式中，所述业务证书申请消息中包括所述通信装置的标识和以下信息中的至少一项：所述第一网元对应的公钥、所述第一网元对应的私钥、所述第一网元被配置的初始化证书、所述第一网元的标识、或所述通信装置的签名。
以上第十一方面及其可能的设计所示方法的技术效果可参照第三方面及其可能的设计中的技术效果。
第十二方面，提供了一种通信装置，用于实现上述第四方面所示的方法。该装置包括：收发模块，用于接收来自证书颁发网元的第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息用于请求验证所述第一信息，所述第二 请求消息中包括所述第一信息；处理模块，用于根据所述通信装置本地记录的第二信息对所述第一信息进行验证，所述第二信息为所述证书申请网元相关的信息；所述收发模块，还用于向所述证书颁发网元发送第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第一信息是否通过验证。
结合第十二方面，在第十二方面的某些实现方式中，所述第一信息包括以下信息中的至少一项：网元标识列表、域标识、或初始化证书列表，所述网元标识列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元，所述域标识用于指示所述证书申请网元所位于的域，所述初始化证书列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元被配置的至少一个初始化证书。
结合第十二方面，在第十二方面的某些实现方式中，在所述第一信息为所述网元标识列表，且所述通信装置本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元的标识构成所述网元标识列表时，所述处理模块确定所述第一信息通过验证；或者，在所述第一信息为所述初始化证书列表，且所述通信装置本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元对应的初始化证书构成所述初始化证书列表时，所述处理模块确定所述第一信息通过验证；或者，在所述第一信息为所述域标识，且所述通信装置本地记录的所述证书申请网元所属的域的标识为所述域标识时，所述处理模块确定所述第一信息通过验证。
结合第十二方面，在第十二方面的某些实现方式中，所述第一指示信息中还包括通信装置的签名，所述通信装置的签名用于验证所述第一指示信息是否可信。
以上第十二方面及其可能的设计所示方法的技术效果可参照第四方面及其可能的设计中的技术效果。
第十三方面，提供了一种通信装置，用于实现上述第六方面所示的方法。该装置包括：收发模块，用于接收来自证书申请网元的业务证书申请消息，所述业务证书申请消息用于请求所述通信装置颁发业务证书，所述业务证书申请消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和管理网元的签名；所述收发模块，还用于向第一网元颁发业务证书；其中，所述管理网元的签名为基于事件标识的签名，所述事件标识用于标识所述证书申请网元请求为所述第一网元申请业务证书。
结合第十三方面，在第十三方面的某些实现方式中，所述收发模块，还用于向所述管理网元发送查询消息，所述查询消息用于查询所述证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请业务证书，所述查询消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和所述事件标识；所述收发模块，还用于接收来自所述管理网元发送查询响应消息，所述查询响应消息用于指示所述证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请业务证书。
以上第十三方面及其可能的设计所示方法的技术效果可参照第六方面及其可能的设计中的技术效果。
第十四方面，提供了一种通信装置，用于实现上述第七方面所示的方法。该装置包括：收发模块，用于接收来自第一网元的业务证书请求消息，所述业务证书请求消息用于请求通信装置代所述第一网元申请业务证书；所述收发模块，还用于向管理网元发送第三请求消息，所述第三请求消息用于请求所述管理网元验证所述通信装置能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书；所述收发模块，还用于接收来自所述管理网元的第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述通信装置能否待所述第一网元申请业务证书，所述第二指示信息中包括所述管理网元的签名和事件标识，其中，所述管理网元的签名为基于事件标识的签名，所述事件标识用于标识所述通信装置请求代所述第一网元申请业务证书。
结合第十四方面，在第十四方面的某些实现方式中，所述收发模块，还用于向证书颁发网元发送业务证书申请消息，所述业务证书申请消息用于请求所述证书颁发网元为所述第一网元颁发业务证书，所述业务证书申请消息中包括所述通信装置的标识和所述管理网元的签名。
以上第十四方面及其可能的设计所示方法的技术效果可参照第七方面及其可能的设计中的技术效果。
第十五方面，提供了一种通信装置，用于实现上述第八方面所示的方法。该装置包括：收发模块，用于接收来自证书申请网元的第三请求消息，所述第三请求消息用于请求所述通信装置验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书；处理模块，用于根据所述管理网元本地记录的第二信息，验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，所述第二信息为所述证书申请网元相关的信息；所述收发模块，还用于向所述证书颁发网元发送第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述证书申请网元能否待所述第一网元申请业务证书，所述第二指示信息中包括所述通信装置的签名和事件标识，其中，所述通信装置的签名为基于事件标识的签名，所述事件标识用于标识所述证书申请网元请求代所述第一网元申请业务证书。
结合第十五方面，在第十五方面的某些实现方式中，在所述第三请求消息包括所述第一网元的标识的情况下，所述处理模块验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，包括：所述通信装置本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元的标识包括所述第一网元的标识时，所述处理模 块确定所述证书申请网元能代所述第一网元申请业务证书；或者，在所述第二请求消息包括所述第一网元对应的初始化证书的情况下，所述处理模块验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，包括：所述通信装置本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元对应的初始化证书包括所述第一网元的对应的初始化证书时，所述处理模块确定所述证书申请网元能代所述第一网元申请业务证书。
结合第十五方面，在第十五方面的某些实现方式中，所述收发模块，还用于接收来自证书颁发网元的查询消息，所述查询消息用于查询所述证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请颁发业务证书，所述查询消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和所述事件标识；所述收发模块，还用于向所述证书颁发网元发送查询响应消息，所述查询响应消息用于指示所述证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请颁发业务证书。
以上第十五方面及其可能的设计所示方法的技术效果可参照第八方面及其可能的设计中的技术效果。
第十六方面，提供了一种通信装置，用于实现上述第九方面所示的方法。该装置包括：收发模块，用于接收来自管理网元的第一消息，所述第一消息中包括所述管理网元本地记录的至少一个证书申请网元相关的信息；所述收发模块，还用于接收来自证书申请网元的业务证书申请消息，所述业务证书申请消息用于请求所述通信装置颁发业务证书；所述处理模块，用于根据所述第一消息确定是否颁发业务证书。
结合第十六方面，在第十六方面的某些实现方式中，所述第一消息中包括证书申请网元的标识和以下至少一种信息的对应关系：网元的标识、域标识、初始化证书标识、或网元类型。
以上第十六方面及其可能的设计所示方法的技术效果可参照第九方面及其可能的设计中的技术效果。
第十七方面，提供了一种通信系统，包括证书申请网元、证书颁发网元和管理网元，其中，证书颁发网元用于执行上述第二方面所示的方法，所述证书申请网元执行上述第三方面所示的方法，所述管理网元用于执行上述第十方面所示的方法。
第十八方面，提供了一种通信系统，包括证书申请网元、证书颁发网元和管理网元，其中，证书颁发网元用于执行上述第六方面所示的方法，所述证书申请网元执行上述第七方面所示的方法，所述管理网元用于执行上述第八方面所示的方法。
第十九方面，提供一种通信装置，该装置包括：存储器，用于存储程序；处理器，用于执行存储器存储的程序，当存储器存储的程序被执行时，处理器用于执行上述各方面提供的方法。
第二十方面，本申请提供一种处理器，用于执行上述各方面提供的方法。在执行这些方法的过程中，上述方法中有关发送上述信息和获取/接收上述信息的过程，可以理解为由处理器输出上述信息的过程，以及处理器接收输入的上述信息的过程。在输出上述信息时，处理器将该上述信息输出给收发器，以便由收发器进行发射。该上述信息在由处理器输出之后，还可能需要进行其他的处理，然后再到达收发器。类似的，处理器接收输入的上述信息时，收发器获取/接收该上述信息，并将其输入处理器。更进一步的，在收发器收到该上述信息之后，该上述信息可能需要进行其他的处理，然后再输入处理器。
基于上述原理，举例来说，前述方法中提及的接收请求消息可以理解为处理器接收输入的信息。
对于处理器所涉及的发射、发送和获取/接收等操作，如果没有特殊说明，或者，如果未与其在相关描述中的实际作用或者内在逻辑相抵触，则均可以更加一般性的理解为处理器输出和接收、输入等操作，而不是直接由射频电路和天线所进行的发射、发送和接收操作。
在实现过程中，上述处理器可以是专门用于执行这些方法的处理器，也可以是执行存储器中的计算机指令来执行这些方法的处理器，例如通用处理器。上述存储器可以为非瞬时性(non-transitory)存储器，例如只读存储器(read only memory，ROM)，其可以与处理器集成在同一块芯片上，也可以分别设置在不同的芯片上，本申请实施例对存储器的类型以及存储器与处理器的设置方式不做限定。
第二十一方面，提供一种计算机可读存储介质，该计算机可读介质存储用于设备执行的程序代码，该程序代码包括用于执行上述各方面提供的方法。
第二十二方面，提供一种包含指令的计算机程序产品，当该计算机程序产品在计算机上运行时，使得计算机用于执行上述各方面提供的方法。
第二十三方面，提供一种芯片，该芯片包括处理器与通信接口，该处理器通过该通信接口读取存储器上存储的指令，用于执行上述各方面提供的方法。
可选地，作为一种实现方式，该芯片还可以包括存储器，该存储器中存储有指令，该处理器用于执行该存储器上存储的指令，当该指令被执行时，该处理器用于执行上述各方面提供的方法。
附图说明
图1是本申请提供的网络架构100的示意图。
图2是一种CEMAF示意图。
图3是本申请提供的一种通信方法的示意性流程图。
图4是本申请提供的另一种通信方法的示意性流程图。
图5是本申请提供的又一种通信方法的示意性流程图。
图6是本申请实施例提供的通信装置10的示意性框图。
图7是本申请实施例提供另一种通信装置20的示意图。
图8是本申请实施例提供一种芯片系统30的示意图。
具体实施方式
下面将结合附图，对本申请中的技术方案进行描述。
本申请提供的技术方案可以应用于各种通信系统，例如：新无线(new radio，NR)系统、长期演进(long term evolution，LTE)系统、LTE频分双工(frequency division duplex，FDD)系统、LTE时分双工(time division duplex，TDD)系统等。本申请提供的技术方案还可以应用于设备到设备(device to device，D2D)通信，车到万物(vehicle-to-everything，V2X)通信，机器到机器(machine to machine，M2M)通信，机器类型通信(machine type communication，MTC)，以及物联网(internet of things，IoT)通信系统或者其他通信系统。
在通信系统中，由运营者运营的部分可称为公共陆地移动网络(public land mobile network，PLMN)，也可以称为运营商网络等。PLMN是由政府或其所批准的经营者为公众提供陆地移动通信业务目的而建立和经营的网络，主要是移动网络运营商(mobile network operator，MNO)为用户提供移动宽带接入服务的公共网络。本申请实施例中所描述的PLMN，具体可为符合3GPP标准要求的网络，简称3GPP网络。3GPP网络通常包括但不限于5G网络、第四代移动通信(4th-generation，4G)网络，以及未来的其他通信系统，例如(6th-generation，6G)网络等。
为了方便描述，本申请实施例中将以PLMN或5G网络为例进行说明。
图1是本申请提供的网络架构100的示意图，以3GPP标准化过程中定义的非漫游场景下，基于服务化架构SBA的5G网络架构为例。如图所示，该网络架构可以包括三部分，分别是终端设备部分、DN和运营商网络PLMN部分。下面对各部分的网元的功能进行简单说明。
终端设备部分可以包括终端设备110，该终端设备110也可以称为用户设备(user equipment，UE)。本申请中的终端设备110是一种具有无线收发功能的设备，可以经无线接入网(radio access network，RAN)140中的接入网设备(或者也可以称为接入设备)与一个或多个核心网(core network，CN)设备进行通信。终端设备110也可称为接入终端、终端、用户单元、用户站、移动站、移动台、远方站、远程终端、移动设备、用户终端、用户代理或用户装置等。终端设备110可以部署在陆地上，包括室内或室外、手持或车载；也可以部署在水面上(例如轮船等)；还可以部署在空中(例如飞机、气球和卫星上等)。终端设备110可以是蜂窝电话(cellular phone)、无绳电话、会话启动协议(session initiation protocol，SIP)电话、智能电话(smart phone)、手机(mobile phone)、无线本地环路(wireless local loop，WLL)站、个人数字处理(personal digital assistant，PDA)等。或者，终端设备110还可以是具有无线通信功能的手持设备、计算设备或连接到无线调制解调器的其它设备、车载设备、可穿戴设备、无人机设备或物联网、车联网中的终端、5G网络以及未来网络中的任意形态的终端、中继用户设备或者未来演进的6G网络中的终端等。其中，中继用户设备例如可以是5G家庭网关(residential gateway，RG)。例如终端设备110可以是虚拟现实(virtual reality，VR)终端、增强现实(augmented reality，AR)终端、工业控制(industrial control)中的无线终端、无人驾驶(self driving)中的无线终端、远程医疗(remote medical)中的无线终端、智能电网(smart grid)中的无线终端、运输安全(transportation safety)中的无线终端、智慧城市(smart city)中的无线终端、智慧家庭(smart home)中的无线终端等。这里的终端设备指的是3GPP终端。本申请实施例对终端设备的类型或种类等并不限定。为便于说明，本申请后续以UE代指终端设备为例进行说明。
运营商网络PLMN部分可以包括但不限于(无线)接入网((radio)access network，(R)AN)120和核心网(core network，CN)部分。
(R)AN 120可以看作是运营商网络的子网络，是运营商网络中业务节点与终端设备110之间的实施系统。终端设备110要接入运营商网络，首先是经过(R)AN 120，进而可通过(R)AN 120与运营商网络的业务节点连接。本申请实施例中的接入网设备(RAN设备)，是一种为终端设备110提供无线通信功能的设备，也可以称为网络设备，RAN设备包括但不限于：5G系统中的下一代基站节点(next generation node base station，gNB)、长期演进(long term evolution，LTE)中的演进型节点B(evolved node B，eNB)、无线网络控制器(radio network controller，RNC)、节点B(node B，NB)、基站控制器(base station controller，BSC)、基站收发台(base transceiver station，BTS)、家庭基站(例如，home evolved nodeB，或home node B，HNB)、基带单元(base band unit，BBU)、传输点(transmitting and receiving point，TRP)、发射点(transmitting point，TP)、小基站设备(pico)、移动交换中心，或者未来网络中的网络设备等。采用不同无线接入技术的系统中，具备接入网设备功能的设备的名称可能会有所不同。为方便描述，本申请所有实施例中，上述为终端设备110提供无线通信功能的装置统称为接入网设备或简称为RAN或AN。应理解，本文对接入网设备的具体类型不作限定。
CN部分可以包括但不限于如下NF：用户面功能(user plane function，UPF)130、网络开放功能(network exposure function，NEF)131、网络功能存储库功能(network function repository function，NRF)132、策略控制功能(policy control function，PCF)133、统一数据管理功能(unified data management，UDM)134、统一数据存储库功能(unified data repository，UDR)135、网络数据分析功能(network data analytics function，NWDAF)136、认证服务器功能(authentication server function，AUSF)137、接入与移动性管理功能(access and mobility management function，AMF)138、会话管理功能(session management function，SMF)139。
数据网络DN 140，也可以称为分组数据网络(packet data network，PDN)，通常是位于运营商网络之外的网络，例如第三方网络。当然，在一些实现方式中，DN也可以由运营商进行部署，即DN属于PLMN中的一部分。本申请对DN是否属于PLMN不作限制。运营商网络PLMN可以接入多个数据网络DN 140，数据网络DN 140上可部署多种业务，可为终端设备110提供数据和/或语音等服务。例如，数据网络DN 140可以是某智能工厂的私有网络，智能工厂安装在车间的传感器可以是终端设备110，数据网络DN 140中部署了传感器的控制服务器，控制服务器可为传感器提供服务。传感器可与控制服务器通信，获取控制服务器的指令，根据指令将采集的传感器数据传送给控制服务器等。又例如，数据网络DN140可以是某公司的内部办公网络，该公司员工的手机或者电脑可为终端设备110，员工的手机或者电脑可以访问公司内部办公网络上的信息、数据资源等。终端设备110可通过运营商网络提供的接口(例如N1等)与运营商网络建立连接，使用运营商网络提供的数据和/或语音等服务。终端设备110还可通过运营商网络访问数据网络DN 140，使用数据网络DN 140上部署的运营商业务，和/或第三方提供的业务。
下面对CN包含的NF功能进行进一步简要说明。
1、UPF 130是由运营商提供的网关，是运营商网络与数据网络DN 140通信的网关。UPF网络功能130包括数据包路由和传输、数据包检测、业务用量上报、服务质量(quality of service，QoS)处理、合法监听、上行数据包检测、下行数据包存储等用户面相关的功能。
2、NEF 131是由运营商提供的控制面功能，主要使能第三方使用网络提供的服务，支持网络开放其能力、事件及数据分析、从外部应用给PLMN安全配备信息、PLMN内外交互信息的转换，提供运营商网络对外开放的API接口，提供给外部服务端与内部运营商网络的交互等。
3、NRF 132是由运营商提供的控制面功能，可用于维护网络中网络功能、服务的实时信息。例如支持网络服务发现、维护NF实例的NF配置数据(NF profile)支持的服务、支持通信代理(service communication proxy，SCP)的服务发现、维护SCP实例的SCP配置数据(SCP profile)、发送有关新注册、去注册、更新的NF和SCP的通知、维护NF和SCP运行的健康状态等。
4、PCF 133是由运营商提供的控制面功能，它支持统一的策略框架来治理网络行为、向其他控制功能提供策略规则、策略决策相关的签约信息等。
5、UDM 134是由运营商提供的控制面功能，负责存储运营商网络中签约用户的用户永久标识符(subscriber permanent identifier，SUPI)、签约用户的公开使用的签约标识(generic public subscription identifier，GPSI)，信任状(credential)等信息。其中SUPI在传输过程中会先进行加密，加密后的SUPI被称为隐藏的用户签约标识符(subscription concealed identifier，SUCI)。UDM网络功能134所存储的这些信息可用于终端设备110接入运营商网络的认证和授权。其中，上述运营商网络的签约用户具体可为 使用运营商网络提供的业务的用户，例如使用中国电信的手机芯卡(subscriber identity module，SIM)卡的用户，或者使用中国移动的手机芯卡的用户等。上述签约用户的信任状可以是手机芯卡中存储的长期密钥或者跟手机芯卡加密相关的信息等存储的小文件，用于认证和/或授权。需要说明的是，永久标识符、信任状、安全上下文、认证数据(cookie)、以及令牌等同验证/认证、授权相关的信息，在本申请实施例中，为了描述方便起见不做区分、限制。
6、UDR 135是由运营商提供的控制面功能，为UDM提供存储和获取签约数据的功能、为PCF提供存储和获取策略数据、存储和获取用户的NF群组ID(group ID)信息等。
7、NWDAF 136是由运营商提供的控制面功能，其主要功能是从NF、外部应用功能AF以及运维管理(operations，administration and maintenance，OAM)系统等处收集数据，对NF和AF提供NWDAF业务注册、数据开放和分析数据等。
8、AUSF 137是由运营商提供的控制面功能，通常用于一级认证，即终端设备110(签约用户)与运营商网络之间的认证。AUSF网络功能137接收到签约用户发起的认证请求之后，可通过UDM网络功能134中存储的认证信息和/或授权信息对签约用户进行认证和/或授权，或者通过UDM网络功能134生成签约用户的认证和/或授权信息。AUSF网络功能137可向签约用户反馈认证信息和/或授权信息。
9、AMF 138是由运营商网络提供的控制面网络功能，负责终端设备110接入运营商网络的接入控制和移动性管理，例如包括移动状态管理，分配用户临时身份标识，认证和授权用户等功能。
AMF 138用于与UE进行NAS连接，拥有与UE相同的5G NAS安全上下文。5G NAS安全上下文包括KAMF、NAS层级密钥与其相同的密钥标识信息、UE安全能力，以及上下行NAS COUNT值。NAS层级密钥包括NAS加密密钥和NAS完整性保护密钥，分别用于NAS消息的机密性保护和完整性保护。
10、SMF 139是由运营商网络提供的控制面网络功能，负责管理终端设备110的PDU会话。PDU会话是一个用于传输PDU的通道，终端设备需要通过PDU会话与数据网络DN 140互相传送PDU。PDU会话由SMF网络功能139负责建立、维护和删除等。SMF网络功能139包括会话管理(例如会话建立、修改和释放，包含用户面功能UPF 130和(R)AN 120之间的隧道维护)、UPF网络功能130的选择和控制、业务和会话连续性(service and session continuity，SSC)模式选择、漫游等会话相关的功能。
11、AF 141是由运营商网络提供的控制面网络功能，用于提供应用层信息，可以通过网络开放功能网元，与策略框架交互或直接与策略框架交互进行策略决策请求等。可以位于运营商网络内，或位于运营商网络外。
可以理解的是，上述网元或者功能既可以是硬件设备中的物理实体，也可以是在专用硬件上运行的软件实例，或者是共享平台(例如，云平台)上实例化的虚拟化功能。简单来说，一个NF可以由硬件来实现，也可以由软件来实现。
图1中Nnef、Nnrf、Npcf、Nudm、Nudr、Nnwdaf、Nausf、Namf、Nsmf、N1、N2、N3、N4，以及N6为接口序列号。示例性的，上述接口序列号的含义可参见3GPP标准协议中定义的含义，本申请对于上述接口序列号的含义不做限制。需要说明的是，图中的各个网络功能之间的接口名称仅仅是一个示例，在具体实现中，该系统架构的接口名称还可能为其他名称，本申请对此不作限定。此外，上述各个网元之间的所传输的消息(或信令)的名称也仅仅是一个示例，对消息本身的功能不构成任何限定。
为方便说明，本申请实施例中将网络功能(如NEF 131…SMF139)统称/简称为NF，即本申请实施例中后文所描述的NF可替换为任一个网络功能。另外，图1仅示意性地描述了部分网络功能，后文所描述的NF不局限于图1中示出的网络功能。
应理解，上述应用于本申请实施例的网络架构仅是从服务化架构的角度描述的网络架构，适用本申请实施例的网络架构并不局限于此，任何能够实现上述各个网元的功能的网络架构都适用于本申请实施例。
还应理解，图中所示的AMF、SMF、UPF、NEF、AUSF、NRF、PCF、UDM可以理解为核心网中用于实现不同功能的网元，例如可以按需组合成网络切片。这些核心网网元可以各自独立的设备，也可以集成于同一设备中实现不同的功能，本申请对于上述网元的具体形态不作限定。
还应理解，上述命名仅为便于区分不同的功能而定义，不应对本申请构成任何限定。本申请并不排除在5G网络以及未来其它的网络中采用其他命名的可能。例如，在6G网络中，上述各个网元中的部分或全部可以沿用5G中的术语，也可能采用其他名称等。
为便于理解本申请实施例，对本申请涉及的一些基本概念做简要说明。应理解，下文所介绍的基本 概念是以NR协议中规定的基本概念为例进行说明，但并不限定本申请实施例只能够应用于NR系统。因此，以NR系统为例描述时出现的标准名称，都是功能性描述，具体名称并不限定，仅表示设备的功能，可以对应扩展到未来的其它系统。
1、证书颁发机构(Certification Authority，CA)：负责管理公钥的整个生命周期，包括发放证书、定义证书有效期和吊销证书。需要说明的是，CA还可包括注册机构(registration authority，RA)，RA用于获取并认证用户身份后向CA提出证书签发请求。其中，RA可以是集成在CA的一项功能，也可单独部署，本申请中假设CA集成了RA的功能。下文中涉及的证书颁发网元(Certificate enrolment Function，CeEF)可能是CA或RA中的部分交互功能模块。
2、公钥基础设施证书管理协议(Certificate management protocol，CMP)：是一个互联网协议，用于在公钥基础设施(Public Key Infrastructure，PKI)体系中获取符合X.509标准的数字证书。具体地，CMP提供PKI组件之间的在线交互，包括CA和客户端系统之间的交互，协议消息定义用于证书创建和管理。CMP中的术语“证书”是指X509中定义的X.509v3证书。现有技术文档中(如，IETF RFC4210)对其进行了详细的描述，本申请中对此不做详细介绍。
3、X.509证书：X.509标准规定了证书可以包含什么信息，并说明了记录信息的方法(数据格式)，现有技术文档中(如，RFC5280)中对相关的证书profile进行了定义。X.509证书中包括如下表1中所列举的信息：
表1：X509的证书格式
4、证书申请管理框架(Certificate Enrolment and MAnagement Framework，CEMAF)：
具体地，第三代合作伙伴计划(3rd Generation Partnership Project，3GPP)中证书管理相关课题定义的证书管理框架如图2所示，图2是一种CEMAF示意图。
从图2中可以看出，CEMAF中包括证书管理网元(Certificate management Function，CeMF)和CeEF，其中，CeEF为运营商的网元，用于颁发证书在本申请中CeEF的功能可以参考前文所示的CA的功能；CeMF为信任域中的网元，用于管理和申请证书CEMAF中CeMF可以有多个(如图2中所示的CeMF#1、CeMF#2、…、CeMF#n)，不同的CeMF可以位于不同的信任域，也可以位于相同的信任域。
具体地，NF和CeEF之间的通信接口(如图2中所示的ce1接口)用于注册与证书调配和更新相关的程序；NF和CeMF之间的通信接口(如图2中所示的ce2接口)用于证书状态检查。
也就是说，CEMAF中相应的功能已被划分为两个网元(如，CeEF和CeMF)。其中CEMAF的注册功能网元(CeEF)用于颁发证书。CEMAF的管理网元(CeMF)用于管理和申请证书。
应理解，CeEF和CeMF具体的部署形态比较自由，例如，可以是网络中的网元，或者也可以是CA中的功能。还例如，CeEF也可能是专门负责和CA(或RA)联络的专用网元，在运营商网络中部署(即CeEF不包含在CA中)。又例如，CeEF和CeMF可以部署在证书网络管理实体中。这里不再一一举例说明。
5、业务证书：是指NF需要进行用户面或信令面用户传输所需要的证书，也可以称为正式证书或者实际证书等。例如，NF之间建立安全连接所需要的传输层安全(Transport Layer Security，TLS)证书，或者是建立网际协议安全(Internet Protocol Security，IPSEC)通道所需要的证书，本申请对此不做限制。
6、初始信任：为了实现基于服务的架构(Service-Based Architecture，SBA)中NF的自动化证书管理，NF和运营商CA之间需要建立初始信任，这是进行业务证书注册程序的先决条件。
此外，为了便于理解本申请实施例，做出以下几点说明。
第一，在本申请中，“用于指示”可以包括用于直接指示和用于间接指示。当描述某一指示信息用于指示A时，可以包括该指示信息直接指示A或间接指示A，而并不代表该指示信息中一定包括有A。
将指示信息所指示的信息称为待指示信息，则具体实现过程中，对待指示信息进行指示的方式有很多种。待指示信息可以作为一个整体一起发送，也可以分成多个子信息分开发送，而且这些子信息的发送周期和/或发送时机可以相同，也可以不同。具体发送方法本申请不进行限定。其中，这些子信息的发送周期和/或发送时机可以是预先定义的，例如根据协议预先定义的，也可以是发射端设备通过向接收端设备发送配置信息来配置的。
第二，在本申请中示出的“至少一个”是指一个或者多个，“多个”是指两个或两个以上。另外，在本申请的实施例中，“第一”、“第二”以及各种数字编号(例如，“#1”、“#2”等)只是为了描述方便进行的区分，并不用来限制本申请实施例的范围。下文各过程的序号的大小并不意味着执行顺序的先后，各过程的执行顺序应以其功能和内在逻辑确定，而不应对本申请实施例的实施过程构成任何限定，应该理解这样描述的对象在适当情况下可以互换，以便能够描述本申请的实施例以外的方案。此外，在本申请实施例中，“510”、“520”等字样仅为了描述方便作出的标识，并不是对执行步骤的次序进行限定。
第三，在本申请中，“示例性的”或者“例如”等词用于表示作例子、例证或说明。本申请中被描述为“示例性的”或者“例如”的任何实施例或设计方案不应被解释为比其他实施例或设计方案更优选或更具优势。确切而言，使用“示例性的”或者“例如”等词旨在以具体方式呈现相关概念。
第四，本申请实施例中涉及的“保存”，可以是指的保存在一个或者多个存储器中。所述一个或者多个存储器，可以是单独的设置，也可以是集成在编码器或者译码器，处理器、或通信装置中。所述一个或者多个存储器，也可以是一部分单独设置，一部分集成在译码器、处理器、或通信装置中。存储器的类型可以是任意形式的存储介质，本申请并不对此限定。
第五，本申请实施例中涉及的“协议”可以是指通信领域的标准协议，例如可以包括LTE协议、NR协议以及应用于未来的通信系统中的相关协议，本申请对此不做限定。
第六，在本申请实施例中，“在…情况下”、“当…时”、“若…”有时可以混用，应当指出的是，在不强调其区别时，其所要表达的含义是一致的。
第七，在本申请实施例中，各术语及英文缩略语，如无线资源控制(RRC)等，均为方便描述而给出的示例性举例，不应对本申请构成任何限定。本申请并不排除在已有或未来的协议中定义其它能够实现相同或相似功能的术语的可能。
第八，本文中术语“和/或”，仅仅是一种描述关联对象的关联关系，表示可以存在三种关系，例如，A和/或B，可以表示：单独存在A，同时存在A和B，单独存在B这三种情况。另外，本文中字符“/”，一般表示前后关联对象是一种“或”的关系。
上文结合图1简单介绍了本申请实施例提供的通信方法能够应用的场景，以及介绍了本申请实施例中可能涉及到的基本概念，并在基本概念中介绍了初始信任的概念，一种NF和运营商CA建立初始信任的方案是：通过私有(Private)CA为NF颁发的初始证书，实现NF向运营商CA注册业务证书过程的安全保护，该方案使用由NF同一安全域(security domain)(或者说信任域(trust domain))中的Private CA颁发的初始证书。此Private CA充当初始注册中NF的初始信任锚。Private CA的根证书应配置为运营商PKI中CA中的信任锚点。具体地，该方案中建立NF与运营商CA之间的初始信任的前提条件是创建private CA并部署在5GC SBA中NF的同一网络安全(信任)域内，并且Private CA的根证书需要预配置在运营商PKI中CA中。
上述的建立NF与运营商CA之间的初始信任所需的NF的初始证书方案中，必须通过Private CA建立初始信任，因此无法在没有Private CA的场景中使用该方法。另外，通过Private CA建立初始信任的方案需要将Private CA的根证书需要预配置在运营商PKI中CA中，需要预配置过程。
本申请提供一种通信方法，可以应用在图2所示的CeEF和CeMF构成的证书管理框架中，由CeMF 给NF申请证书，并且在验证CeMF授权通过的时候CeEF会通过CeMF返回有效的NF证书给NF。可以无需通过Private CA建立初始信任。
应理解，本申请实施例提供的通信方法可以应用于5G系统中，例如，图1中所示的通信系统。
还应理解，下文示出的实施例并未对本申请实施例提供的方法的执行主体的具体结构特别限定，只要能够通过运行记录有本申请实施例的提供的方法的代码的程序，以根据本申请实施例提供的方法进行通信即可。例如，本申请实施例提供的方法的执行主体可以是网元，或者，是网元中能够调用程序并执行程序的功能模块。
图3是本申请提供的一种通信方法的示意性流程图。包括以下步骤：
S410，证书申请网元向证书颁发网元发送第一请求消息，或者说，证书颁发网元接收来自证书申请网元的第一请求消息。
该第一请求消息用于请求认证该证书申请网元是否为可信任的网元。可选地，证书申请网元向证书颁发网元发送第一请求消息可以理解为：证书申请网元请求建立初始信任，即证书申请网元通过第一请求消息请求证书颁发网元对证书申请网元进行验证，如果证书颁发网元验证证书申请网元为可信任的网元，说明证书颁发网元信任该证书申请网元可以同意该证书申请网元发送的证书申请。该实施例中第一请求消息也可以称为建立初始信任请求消息。
示例性地，证书申请网元可以是前文图2中所示的CeMF,证书颁发网元可以是前文图2中所示的CeEF。应理解，该实施例中对于证书申请网元的名称不做限定，能够用于为功能网元(如，NF)申请业务证书的网元均可以认为是该实施例中涉及的证书申请网元；同理，该实施例中对于证书颁发网元的名称不做限定，能够用于为功能网元(如，NF)颁发业务证书的网元均可以认为是该实施例中涉及的证书颁发网元。为了便于描述，下文中以证书申请网元为CeMF，证书颁发网元为CeEF为例进行说明。
具体地，该第一请求消息中包括该CeMF的标识(identify，ID)。
作为一种可能的实现方式，CeMF ID可以是CeMF的IP地址。
作为另一种可能的实现方式，CeMF ID可以是CeMF的实例(instance)ID。
应理解，上述CeMF的IP地址、CeMF的instance ID等只是举例说明CeMF ID可能的形式，对本申请的保护范围不构成任何的限定，CeMF ID还可以其他能够用于标识CeMF的信息，例如，可以是CeMF的类型信息；还例如，可以是CeMF的位置信息等，这里不再一一举例说明。
具体地，上述的第一请求消息中还可以包括第一信息，该第一信息用于对CeMF进行认证，该第一信息包括以下信息中的至少一项：网元标识列表(NF ID list)、域标识(Domain ID)、初始化证书列表。
其中，NF ID list是CeMF管理的一个或多个NF的名单，NF ID为NF的标识信息，包括但不限于NF的IP地址、NF的instance ID等用于标识NF的信息。CeMF和该NF ID list所指示的一个或多个NF由同一个厂商提供，CeMF可以为NF ID list所指示的NF提供代理服务(如，代为请求业务证书)。例如，CeMF和NF#1、NF#2以及NF#3由同一个厂商提供，NF#1、NF#2以及NF#3的标识分别为“#1”、“#2”和“#3”，CeMF可以为NF#1、NF#2和NF#3提供代理服务，则NF ID list信息为指示“#1”、“#2”和“#3”的信息。
Domain ID用于指示CeMF位于的域，如，CeMF位于某个信任域中Domain ID为该信任域标识。Domain ID可以是某个区域的ID，包括但不限于：虚拟局域网(Virtual Local Area Network，VLAN)ID；Domain ID可以是特定的设备商的ID，包括但不限于：供应商(Vendor)ID；Domain ID可以是运营商某个区域的标识，包括但不限于：陆上公用移动通信网(Public Land Mobile Network，PLMN)ID。
初始化证书列表是CeMF管理的NF对应的初始化证书。其中，初始化证书列表可以是预配置在CeMF中的，或者还可以是CeMF管理的NF发送给CeMF的(如，NF向CeMF发送请求消息#1，该请求消息#1用于请求获取业务证书，且该请求消息#1中携带NF的初始化证书)。上述的初始化证书列表信息可以是初始化证书列表中包括的初始化证书的标识信息。例如，CeMF管理的NF包括NF#1、NF#2和NF#3，且NF#1、NF#2和NF#3分别对应的初始化证书为初始化证书#1、初始化证书#2和初始化证书#3，则初始化证书列表信息为用于标识初始化证书#1、初始化证书#2和初始化证书#3的信息。
进一步地，该实施例中CeEF接收到CeMF发送的第一请求消息之后，可以向管理网元发送第二请求消息，该第二请求消息用于请求管理网元验证该CeMF发送的第一信息。需要说明的是，该实施例中CeEF接收到CeMF发送的第一请求消息之后可以不发送第二请求消息，而是由其他的网元向管理网元发送第二请求消息，请求管理网元验证第一信息，例如，CeEF通过其他网元发送第二请求消息；还例如， 其他设备获知第一信息，请求管理网元验证第一信息。也就是说该实施例中重点在于管理网元验证第一信息，对于如何触发管理网元验证第一信息不做限定，可以由CeEF触发，也可以由其他网元触发，为了便于描述，下面以CeEF触发管理网元验证第一信息为例进行说明。
图3所示的方法流程还包括：
S420，CeEF向管理网元发送第二请求消息，或者说管理网元接收来自CeEF的第二请求消息。
具体地，该实施例中管理网元为网管系统的统称，例如，管理网元可以是EMS、网络管理站(Network Management System，NMS)、MANO或者是OSS/BSS的一部分，或者一个或者几个。为了便于描述，下文中将管理网元称为MnF，需要说明的是，下文中管理网元称为MnF是不固定的，管理网元也可以称为OAM。
另外，需要说明的是，本申请中涉及的管理网元包括但不限于以下功能：网络设备(网元)初始化管理、网络配置管理、网络性能管理、网络故障管理、网络优化管理、或网络路由管理。例如，管理网元可以记录网元初始化信息。
可选地，CeEF向管理网元发送第二请求消息可以理解为CeEF请求管理网元对CeMF发送的信息进行验证，即CeEF通过第二请求消息请求管理网元验证CeMF发送的第一信息，该实施例中第二请求消息也可以称为验证请求消息。
第二请求消息中包括CeMF ID和CeEF ID，其中，CeMF ID用于标识CeMF，在上述步骤S410中关于第一请求消息中携带的CeMF ID已经对CeMF ID进行了说明，这里不再赘述；CeEF ID用于标识CeEF，CeEF ID包括但不限于CeEF的IP地址、CeEF的instance ID等用于标识CeEF的信息。
具体地，第二请求消息中还包括第一信息，如，包括以下信息中的至少一项：NF ID list、Domain ID、初始化证书列表。
其中，NF ID list、Domain ID、初始化证书列表等在上述步骤S410中关于第一请求消息中携带的信息部分已经进行了说明，这里不再赘述。
应理解，在第一请求消息中携带第一信息的情况下，第二请求消息中也携带该第一信息，第一信息可以是NF ID list信息、Domain ID信息、初始化证书列表信息中的至少一项。也就是说该实施例中CeEF可以将CeMF发送的第一信息透传给MnF，由MnF对CeMF发送的第一信息进行验证。
MnF接收到CeEF的第二请求消息之后，可以执行验证，图3所示的方法流程还包括：
S430，MnF执行验证。
需要说明的是，该实施例中MnF在NF初始化过程中，会记录并分配CeMF与NF的关系。具体地，MnF本地记录NF ID，可选地，如果该NF中预配置有初始化证书，则MnF本地记录NF的初始化证书。
作为一种可能的实现方式，NF的初始化证书为MnF预配置并在MnF中记录。例如NF初始化的时候，设备域的MANO配置了初始化证书到NF的实现层中(如，虚拟化网络功能(Virtualized Network Function，VNF)实例中)并记录在了MnF中。
作为另一种可能的实现方式，NF的初始化证书为设备商/运营商专属的Private CA通过私有接口颁发。
应理解，上述的两种实现方式，只是举例说明配置NF的初始化证书可能的方式，对本申请的保护范围不构成任何的限定，该实施例中对于是否配置NF的初始化证书不做限定，以及对于NF的初始化证书的配置方式也不做限定。
该实施例中MnF可以通过不同的验证方式对CeMF发送的信息进行验证，例如，包括但不限于：
作为一种可能的实现方式，当第二请求消息中携带Domain ID信息的情况下，MnF可以根据第二请求消息中携带的CeMF ID确定该CeMF初始化配置过程中所配置到的Domain的Domain ID#1，通过比较第二请求消息中携带的Domain ID和确定得到的Domain ID#1得到验证结果。
例如，当CeMF网元所属的设备层或者虚拟化层初始化(或者说启动、拉起等)，网管MnF会将CeMF初始化到哪个设备初始化信任域中做标识，即标识Domain ID与CeMF ID的关联关系。MnF可以根据第二请求消息中携带的CeMF ID确定该CeMF初始化配置过程中所配置到的Domain ID#1，若第二请求消息中携带Domain ID为Domain ID#1，则MnF确定CeMF发送的信息通过验证，否则确定CeMF发送的信息未通过验证。
作为另一种可能的实现方式，当第二请求消息中携带初始化证书列表信息的情况下，MnF可以根据第二请求消息中携带的CeMF ID确定该CeMF初始化配置过程中所配置的管理的NF对应的初始化证书列表#1，通过比较第二请求消息中携带的初始化证书列表和确定得到的初始化证书列表#1得到验证结果。
例如，MnF在当NF的设备层或者虚拟化层初始化时，会记录NF配置的初始化证书，初始化证书可以是设备商配置的或者是运营商配置的。相关的证书信息和NF ID的关联关系被预配置在MnF中。MnF可以根据第二请求消息中携带的CeMF ID确定该CeMF初始化配置过程中所配置的管理的NF对应的初始化证书列表#1，若第二请求消息中携带初始化证书列表为初始化证书列表#1，则MnF确定CeMF发送的信息通过验证，否则确定CeMF发送的信息未通过验证。
作为又一种可能的实现方式，当第二请求消息中携带初始化证书列表信息的情况下，MnF首先通过本地的配置文档确定CeMF ID对应的厂商(Vendor1)，然后MnF校验每个证书的签名，是否由Vendor1签名。并校验签名有效性，如果MnF判断90％的证书都是校验成功的，基于预配置值规则(校验成功率>85％)确定CeMF发送的信息通过验证。作为又一种可能的实现方式，当第二请求消息中携带NF ID list信息的情况下，MnF可以根据第二请求消息中携带的CeMF ID确定该CeMF初始化配置过程中所配置的管理的NF对应的NF ID list#1，通过比较第二请求消息中携带的NF ID list和确定得到的NF ID list#1得到验证结果。
例如，MnF在当NF层设备层或者虚拟化层初始化时，会记录NF ID。MnF可以根据第二请求消息中携带的CeMF ID确定该CeMF初始化配置过程中所配置的管理的NF对应NF ID list#1，若第二请求消息中携带NF ID list为NF ID list#1，则MnF确定CeMF发送的信息通过验证，
或者，若第二请求消息中携带NF ID list为NF ID list#2，且NF ID list#1和NF ID list#2中包括的部分NF ID不同，MnF确定验证结果为NF ID list#1和NF ID list#2中NF ID不同的个数。
作为又一种可能的实现方式，当第二请求消息中携带初始化证书列表信息的情况下，MnF查询Private CA的在线证书状态协议(Online Certificate Status Protocol，OCSP)服务器，查询初始化证书列表中所包括的初始化证书是否为吊销的初始化证书，若为吊销的初始化证书确定CeMF发送的信息为未通过验证。
应理解，上述的几种实现方式只是举例说明MnF验证的方式，对本申请的保护范围不构成任何的限定，还可以通过其他方式验证CeMF发送的信息，这里不再一一举例说明。
具体地，由上述的MnF执行验证过程可知，该实施例中利用MnF本地记录的信息(如，证书申请网元的初始化信息、证书申请网元的配置信息、或证书申请网元的管理信息等)协助对CeMF校验的过程，相比于前文介绍的Private CA建立初始信任的方案来说该实施例中不需要在执行预配置信息(如，Private CA的根证书预配置在运营商PKI中CA中)的流程，直接利用MnF记录的信息即可。
进一步地，MnF验证之后，可以通过第一指示信息通知CeEF，图3所示的方法流程还包括：
S440，MnF向CeEF发送第一指示信息，或者说CeEF接收来自MnF的第一指示信息。
该第一指示信息用于指示第二请求消息中携带的第一信息是否通过验证。
作为一种可能的实现方式，第一指示信息直接指示第一信息是否通过验证。
例如，第一指示信息为1比特，取值为“1”表示第一信息通过验证；取值为“0”表示第一信息未通过验证。
作为另一种可能的实现方式，第一指示信息间接指示第一信息是否通过验证。如，第一指示信息通过指示第二请求消息中携带的第一信息和MnF本地记录的第二信息是否相同，指示第一信息是否通过验证。若第一指示信息指示第一信息和第二信息不同，理解为第一信息未通过验证；或者，若第一指示信息指示第一信息和第二信息相同，理解为第一信息通过验证；或者，若第一指示信息指示第一信息和第二信息不同但是不相同的程度满足阈值要求，理解为第一信息通过验证。
在该实现方式下，若第二请求消息中携带的第一信息和MnF本地记录的第二信息不同，第一指示信息中还可以携带指示信息#1，指示信息#1用于指示第一信息和第二信息的不相同的程度。
例如，第二请求消息中携带的第一信息为Domain ID#1，MnF本地记录的CeMF所属的Domain的ID为Domain ID#1，则MnF通过第一指示信息指示第一信息通过验证。
还例如，第二请求消息中携带的第一信息为NF ID list#1，MnF本地记录的CeMF管理的一个或多个NF的ID为NF ID list#2，则MnF通过第一指示信息指示第一信息未通过验证。
可选地，该示例中MnF还可以通过在第一指示信息中携带指示信息#1，指示NF ID list#1和NF ID list#2区别。如，NF ID list#1中包括NF ID#1、NF ID#2和NF ID#3，而NF ID list#2中包括NF ID#1和NF ID#2，则指示信息#1可以指示NF ID list#1和NF ID list#2的区别为存在一个不同的NF ID。
又例如，第二请求消息中携带的第一信息为初始化证书列表，MnF对初始化证书列表中的初始化证 书进行校验，若校验结果为通过校验，则MnF通过第一指示信息指示第一信息通过验证。
可选地，第一指示信息中还可以携带MnF的签名。例如，当CeEF预配置了MnF的公钥，或者是证书，那么可以携带MnF的签名辅助CeEF校验第一指示信息是否可信。
应理解，该实施例中CeEF可以根据接收到第一指示信息确定CeMF是否为可信的，图3所示的方法流程还包括：
S450，CeEF确定CeMF是否可信。
作为一种可能的方式，在第一指示信息指示第一信息未通过验证的情况下，CeEF确定CeMF不可信。
作为另一种可能的方式，在第一指示信息指示第一信息通过验证的情况下，CeEF确定CeMF可信。
作为又一种可能的方式，在第一指示信息通过指示第一信息和第二信息是否相同指示第一信息是否通过验证的情况下，且第一指示信息指示第二请求消息中携带的一信息和MnF本地记录的第二信息不同，但是一信息和第二信息的不同程度小于预设阈值的情况下，CeEF确定CeMF可信。
可选地，该实施例中CeEF还可以通过如下方式确定管理网元发送的第一指示信息是否可信：
作为一种可能的方式，第一指示信息是通过安全连接(如SSL)传输的，CeEF确保第一指示信息可信。在该实现方式下，CeEF可以根据第一指示信息的类型(如，第一指示信息为Success_response)判断第一指示信息是否可信。
作为另一种可能的方式，CeEF和MnF之间没有直接的安全通道，可以在第一指示信息中携带MnF的签名，若CeEF预配置了MnF的公钥，或者是证书，那么CeEF可以通过第一指示信息中携带的MnF的签名校验第一指示信息是否可信。
应理解，上述的实现方式只是举例说明CeEF如何确定接收到的第一指示信息为可信的消息，对本申请的保护范围不构成任何的限定，CeEF还可以通过其他方式确定接收到的第一指示信息是否为可信的消息，例如，CeEF本地维护可信任设备列表，且确定MnF为可信任的设备。这里不再一一举例说明。
进一步地，CeEF确定CeMF是否可信任之后，可以通过第一响应消息通知CeMF，图3所示的方法流程还包括：
S460，CeEF向CeMF发送第一响应消息，或者说CeMF接收来自CeEF的第一响应消息。
具体地，第一响应消息中携带CeEF ID，第一响应消息用于指示CeEF是否信任CeMF。
作为一种可能的实现方式，该第一响应消息用于指示CeMF与CeEF之间成功建立初始信任，或者说第一响应消息指示CeEF信任CeMF。
作为另一种可能的实现方式，该第一响应消息用于指示CeMF与CeEF之间建立初始信任失败，或者说第一响应消息指示CeEF不信任CeMF。
上述的步骤S410至S460详细介绍了CeEF和CeMF之间建立初始信任的过程。
可选地，图3所示的方法流程还可以包括请求颁发业务证书的流程。具体地，图3所示的方法流程还可以包括：
S411，第一NF向CeMF发送业务证书请求消息，或者说CeMF接收来自第一NF的业务证书请求消息。
具体地，该业务证书请求消息用于请求获取业务证书。第一NF和CeMF为相同信任域中的网元，可以理解为：第一NF通过CeMF代为申请业务证书。
业务证书请求消息中携带第一NF ID，第一NF ID指的是第一NF申请业务证书时用的ID，可以是第一NF的instance ID可以是业务证书请求消息中的发送者身份字段(sender KID)或者任何用于标识第一NF的信息。
可选地，业务证书请求消息中还可以携带以下信息中的至少一项：公钥、私钥、初始化证书、或业务类型等。
其中，公钥、私钥为第一NF在请求业务证书时生成的，由第一NF在业务证书请求消息中携带。例如，第一NF在请求业务证书时，生成了公钥和私钥(或者称为公私钥对pk/sk)对，则第一NF可以在请求业务证书的业务证书请求消息中携带该第一NF对应的公钥和私钥；或者，还例如，第一NF在请求业务证书时，生成了公钥，则第一NF可以在请求业务证书的业务证书请求消息中携带该第一NF对应的公钥。
初始化证书是第一NF中预配置的证书，若第一NF在初始化过程中被配置有初始化证书，则第一NF在业务证书请求消息中可以携带该初始化证书。例如，第一NF的初始化证书为初始化过程中MnF预 配置在第一NF中的；还例如，第一NF的初始化证书为设备商/运营商专属的Private CA通过私有接口颁发。
业务类型显性或者隐式指示了请求的业务证书的类型，CeMF或者CeEF可以根据业务类型判断申请的业务证书的类型。应理解，业务证书请求消息中未携带业务类型的情况下，CeMF或者CeEF可以根据其他信息(如，历史请求信息等)确定业务证书的类型，这里不再赘述。
作为一种可能的实现方式，步骤S411可以是在步骤S410之前执行的，可以理解为CeMF在接收到第一NF的业务证书请求之后才发起初始信任建立请求。
作为另一种可能的实现方式，步骤S411可以是在步骤S410之后执行的，如可以是在步骤S460之后执行的，可以理解为CeMF和CeEF之间完成初始信任建立之后，第一NF才发起业务证书请求。
应理解，上述两种实现方式只是举例说明第一NF发起业务证书请求的时机，对本申请的保护范围不构成任何的限定，该实施例中第一NF可以在任何时机发起业务证书请求，这里不再一一举例说明。
进一步地，CeMF在接收到第一NF的业务证书请求消息之后，可以根据规则判断是否响应所述第一网元申请业务证书的请求，图3所示的方法流程还可以包括：
S412，CeMF确定是否响应第一NF申请业务证书的请求。
具体地，CeMF可以根据预配置的规则，对第一NF申请业务证书的请求做判断，确定是否响应第一NF申请业务证书的请求。
示例性地，第一NF申请的业务证书的类型为第一类型，CeMF根据预配置的规则验证第一NF是否可以申请第一类型的业务证书。
例如，第一NF不可以申请第一类型的业务证书，如果业务证书请求消息请求申请第一类型的业务证书，则CeMF确定拒绝第一NF的业务证书申请。
示例性地，第一NF的类型为第二类型，CeMF根据预配置的规则验证第一NF是否可以申请业务证书。
例如，第一NF为SMF时，可以具有IPSec证书，如果第一NF ID或者初始化证书指示第一NF不是SMF，则CeMF确定拒绝第一NF的业务证书申请。
还例如，如果第一NF ID或者初始化证书指示第一NF是SMF，则CeMF确定代第一NF申请业务证书。
应理解，上述CeMF根据预配置的规则对第一NF申请业务证书的请求做判断包括但不限于：
CeMF直接根据预配置的规则对第一NF申请业务证书的请求做判断，确定是否响应第一NF申请业务证书的请求；或者，
在CeMF根据预配置的规则无法对第一NF申请业务证书的请求做判断时，CeMF也可以根据预配置的规则通过其他网元或网管辅助校验第一NF的证书申请请求是否有效。例如，CeMF可以请求CeEF辅助校验第一NF的证书申请请求是否有效，具体地流程可参考S410-S440步骤(如，将第一请求消息的功能定义为校验第一NF的证书申请请求是否有效即可)，这里不再赘述。
作为一种可能的实现方式，CeMF确定拒绝第一NF的业务证书申请(如，CeMF确定第一NF证书请求无效或不合理的情况下)，CeMF向第一NF发送失败指示，该失败指示用于指示所述第一NF申请业务证书的请求无效。
可选地，失败指示还可以指示请求业务证书失败的原因，如，失败指示中携带原因值，该原因值指示第一NF申请的业务证书不可使用或原因值指示业务证书类型与第一NF类型不匹配。
作为另一种可能的实现方式，在CeMF确定同意第一NF的业务证书申请的情况下，CeMF可以根据请求的业务证书类型确定一个CeEF给第一NF颁发业务证书。因为CeMF可能与多个CeEF建立关联关系，而每个CeEF可能只会颁发特定的证书。
下面主要介绍CeMF确定同意第一NF申请业务证书的情况，图3所示的方法流程还可以包括：
S413，CeMF向CeEF发送业务证书申请消息，或者说CeEF接收来自CeMF的业务证书申请消息。
具体地，该证书申请请求中携带CeMF ID。
可选地，证书申请请求中还包括以下信息中的至少一项：
公钥、私钥、第一NF ID、初始化证书、CeMF签名。
其中，第一NF ID或初始化证书用于防止重复申请业务证书，或者防止利用多个CeMF重复申请业务证书。
CeMF签名用于防止第三方篡改业务证书申请。应理解，当CeEF预置了CeMF的公钥或者证书时可以不携带CeMF签名，或者当CeMF与CeEF之间有安全连接时可以不携带CeMF签名。
公钥和私钥对是业务证书申请时的参数，可以是第一NF在业务证书请求消息中携带的，也可以是CeMF代第一NF生成的。例如，如果业务证书请求消息中没有携带公钥，CeMF也可以代第一NF生成第一NF对应的公钥和/或私钥，用于证书申请，本申请对此不作限定。
进一步地，CeEF接收到CeMF的业务证书申请消息之后，由于该实施例中步骤S410至S460所示的流程中CeEF和CeMF之间建立了初始信任(建立失败的情况这里不进行说明)，CeEF可以响应CeMF的请求，图3所示的方法流程还包括：
S414，CeEF向第一NF颁发业务证书。
具体地，CeEF响应CeMF的业务证书申请请求给第一NF颁发业务证书。
作为一种可能的实现方式，CeEF可以直接给第一NF发送业务证书。
作为另一种可能的实现方式，CeEF可以间接给第一NF发送业务证书。例如，通过其他设备将业务证书转发给第一NF。
可选地，携带业务证书的消息中还可以携带CeMF ID。
图3所示的方法流程中，在颁发证书之前CeEF与CeMF建立初始信任，通过MnF进行辅助校验，可以在没有Private CA的场景下完成业务证书颁发。
本申请还提供了一种通信方法，CeEF可以检验MnF或预置MnF证书的情况下，可以实现离线校验CeMF，为了便于理解，下面结合图4详细介绍该通信方法。
图4是本申请提供的另一种通信方法的示意性流程图。包括以下步骤：
S510，第一NF向CeMF发送业务证书请求消息，或者说CeMF接收来自第一NF的业务证书请求消息。
参考图3中的步骤S411的描述，这里不再赘述。
进一步地，该实施例中，CeMF在接收到NF的业务证书请求消息之后，可以请求MnF对业务证书请求进行验证。图4所示的方法流程还包括：
S520，CeMF向MnF发送第三请求消息，或者说MnF接收来自CeMF的第三请求消息。
该第三请求消息用于请求MnF对第一NF发起业务证书请求进行验证。第三请求消息可以理解为验证请求消息。
具体地，第三请求消息中包括CeMF ID和第一NF ID。
可选地，第三请求消息中还包括Domain ID和/或第一NF对应的初始化证书。
应理解，图4所示的实施例中CeMF向MnF发送第三请求消息中携带的信息相比于图3所示的实施例中CeMF向CeEF发送的第一请求消息中携带的信息不同点在于：携带是请求业务证书的NF的NF ID，而不是NF ID list；同理，第三请求消息中携带的是请求业务证书的第一NF对应的初始化证书，而不是初始化证书list。原因在于，图4所示的实施例中CeMF是根据NF的业务证书请求触发请求MnF做辅助校验。也就是说图4所示的实施例中CeMF请求MnF做校验针对的是某个NF发起的，而不是针对CeMF进行校验的，如果针对CeMF进行校验，该CeMF可能管理一个或者多个NF，所以携带的是NF ID list或初始化证书list。
还应理解，图4所示的实施例中涉及的MnF和图3所示的实施例中涉及的MnF相同，可以记录NF初始化过程中相关的配置信息。具体描述可以参考图3中步骤S430中关于MnF的描述，这里不再赘述。
作为一种可能的实现方式，该实施例中CeMF向MnF发送第三请求消息之前，CeEF与CeMF之间可以执行交互。
例如，CeMF接收到NF发送的业务证书请求消息之后，直接向CeEF发送业务证书申请消息，CeEF接收到CeMF发送的业务证书申请消息之后，CeEF会通过请求消息#1请求CeMF做校验辅助，请求消息#1中包括MnF ID。可选地，该请求消息#1中还可以包括新鲜值，该新鲜值用于保证传达信息的实时性。
进一步地，MnF接收到第三请求消息之后，执行验证，图4所示的方法流程还包括：
S530，MnF执行验证。
MnF执行验证的过程可以参考图3中步骤S430中关于MnF执行验证的描述，不同点在于该实施例中MnF执行验证的过程基于的是第三请求消息中携带的初始化证书或第一NF ID，而不是初始化证书列表或NF ID list。
例如，第三请求消息中携带的初始化证书为初始化证书#1，MnF可以根据第三请求消息中携带的第一NF的第一NF ID确定该第一NF初始化过程中被配置的初始化证书#2，若是初始化证书#1和初始化证书#2为同一个初始化证书，MnF确定CeMF可以代第一NF申请业务证书。
还例如，第三请求消息中携带的第一NF ID为NF ID#1，MnF可以根据第三请求消息中携带的CeMF ID确定该CeMF管理的一个或者多个NF分别对应的ID，若NF ID#1属于该一个或者多个NF分别对应的ID，MnF确定CeMF发送的信息可以代第一NF申请业务证书。
又例如，第三请求消息中携带的初始化证书为初始化证书#1，MnF查询Private CA的OCSP服务器，查询初始化证书#1是否为吊销的初始化证书，若为吊销的初始化证书确定CeMF不可以代第一NF申请业务证书。
进一步地，MnF执行验证之后，可以通过第二指示信息通知CeMF该验证结果，图4所示的方法流程还包括：
S540，MnF向CeMF发送第二指示信息，或者说CeMF接收来自MnF的第二指示信息。
作为一种可能的实现方式，MnF确定CeMF发送的信息不可以代第一NF申请业务证书，第二指示信息用于通知验证失败。
作为另一种可能的实现方式，MnF确定CeMF可以代第一NF申请业务证书，可以理解为验证成功，MnF通过第二指示信息给CeMF返回验证可信凭据为MnF的签名，同时指示验证成功。
具体地，在该实现方式下，第二指示信息中包括CeMF ID、MnF签名和事件ID。
可选地，MnF可以在MnF本地缓存该验证事件，有利于CeEF进行后续校验。
进一步地，CeMF接收到MnF的第二指示信息之后，可以向CeEF发送业务证书申请消息，图4所示的方法流程还包括：
S550，CeMF向CeEF发送业务证书申请消息，或者说CeEF接收来自CeMF的业务证书申请消息。
具体地，业务证书申请消息中携带指示验证可信凭据，若CeMF向MnF发送第三请求行消息之后已经和CeEF完成交互，CeMF接收到MnF的第二指示信息之后将验证可信凭据发送给CeEF即可。
业务证书申请消息携带CeMF ID，pk/sk，MnF签名(事件ID)。
具体地，CeEF接收到业务证书申请消息之后可以响应并颁发业务证书，图4所示的方法流程还包括：
S560，CeEF向第一NF颁发业务证书。
可以参考图3中步骤S414的描述，这里不再赘述。
另外，在该实施例中，CeEF可以请求MnF验证是否可以向第一NF颁发业务证书。
图4所示的方法流程还可以包括：
S570，CeEF向MnF发送查询消息，或者说MnF接收来自CeEF的查询消息。
该查询消息用于请求MnF验证CeMF能否代第一NF申请业务证书。
S580，MnF向CeEF发送查询响应消息，或者说CeEF接收来自MnF的查询响应消息。
该查询响应消息用于指示验证通过或失败。
例如，CeEF在接收到业务证书请求消息之后向MnF发送查询消息，该查询消息中携带事件ID和CeMF ID，用于查询CeMF ID所指示的CeMF是否可以执行事件ID所指示的事件。如，CeMF ID所指示的CeMF代第一NF申请业务证书，MnF本地缓存的验证事件指示为CeMF可以代第一NF申请业务证书，则通过查询响应通知CeEF该事件可执行，则CeEF可以向第一NF颁发业务证书。
该实施例中由于MnF验证某个事件是在CeEF确定是否颁发业务证书之前，所以改实施例中CeEF可以针对多个事件请求MnF验证是否可以向多个NF分别颁发业务证书。
例如，CeEF在接收到请求向NF#1颁发业务证书的业务证书请求消息#1和请求向NF#2颁发业务证书的业务证书请求消息#2之后，向MnF发送查询消息，该查询消息中携带事件ID#1、CeMF ID#1、事件ID#2、CeMF ID#2，其中，事件ID#1和CeMF ID#1表示CeMF ID#1所指示的CeMF#1请求向NF#1颁发业务证书，事件ID#2和CeMF ID#2表示CeMF ID#2所指示的CeMF#2请求向NF#2颁发业务证书。若MnF根据本地缓存的验证事件指示为CeMF#1可以为NF#1申请业务证书，则通过查询响应消息通知CeEF该事件ID#1所指示的事件#1可执行，CeEF可以向NF#1颁发业务证书；若MnF根据本地缓存的验证事件指示为CeMF#2不可以为NF#2申请业务证书，则通过查询响应消息通知CeEF该事件ID#2所指示的事件#2不可执行，CeEF可以不向NF#2颁发业务证书。
本申请还提供了一种通信方法，可以通过在CeMF中预配置相关信息实现校验CeMF，为了便于理解， 下面结合图5详细介绍该通信方法。
图5是本申请提供的又一种通信方法的示意性流程图。包括以下步骤：
S610，MnF向CeEF发送第一消息。
该第一消息中包括CeMF ID和CeMF ID对应的信息，具体地，CeMF ID对应的信息包括以下信息中的至少一项：
NF ID list、初始化证书list、domain ID或NF type。
该实施例中CeEF接收并存储MnF发送第一消息。也就是说在CeEF预配置CeMF和NF所在的信任域映射信息。
例如，CeEF本地维护CeMF和NF所在的信任域映射信息如下表2所示：
S620，第一NF向CeMF发送业务证书请求消息，或者说CeMF接收来自第一NF的业务证书请求消息。
参考图3中的步骤S411的描述，这里不再赘述。
S630，CeMF向CeEF发送业务证书申请消息，或者说CeEF接收来自CeMF的业务证书申请消息。
S640，CeEF进行信息匹配。
CeEF接收到CeMF的业务证书申请消息之后，匹配表格中的信息，与CeMF发送的业务证书申请消息中携带的信息是否为一致，如果一致则颁发业务证书。
例如，业务证书申请消息中携带的CeMF ID指示请求颁发业务证书的CeMF为CeMF1，且业务证书申请消息中携带NF ID为1000001。CeEF根据本地缓存的映射关系(如，表2所示)确定NF ID为1000001的NF属于CeMF1管理，则给第一NF颁发业务证书。
应理解，该实施例中CeEF本地配置的信息可以配置NF Type，表明CeEF可以根据type判断该第一NF是否具备申请该证书的条件。
例如，CeMF在步骤S630中发送的业务证书申请消息中携带了NF ID，并要请求IPSec证书，但是CeEF根据本地表格，判断该NF ID对应的Type为AMF，而根据预配置的规则，该Type不需要IPSec证书，这种情况下，可以发送失败响应，指示第一NF证书申请请求申请了错误的证书。
示例性地，在CeEF进行信息匹配成功确定可以给第一NF颁发业务证书的情况下，图5所示的方法流程还包括：
S650，CeEF向第一NF颁发业务证书。
可以参考图3中步骤S414的描述，这里不再赘述。
应理解，上述各过程的序号的大小并不意味着执行顺序的先后，各过程的执行顺序应以其功能和内在逻辑确定，而不应对本申请实施例的实施过程构成任何限定。
还应理解，在本申请的各个实施例中，如果没有特殊说明以及逻辑冲突，不同的实施例之间的术语和/或描述具有一致性、且可以相互引用，不同的实施例中的技术特征根据其内在的逻辑关系可以组合形成新的实施例。
还应理解，在上述一些实施例中，主要以现有的网络架构中的设备为例进行了示例性说明(如NF，MnF等)，应理解，对于设备的具体形式本申请实施例不作限定。例如，在未来可以实现同样功能的设备都适用于本申请实施例。
可以理解的是，上述各个方法实施例中，由设备(如NF，MnF)实现的方法和操作，也可以由设备 的部件(例如芯片或者电路)实现。
以上，结合图3至图5详细说明了本申请实施例提供的通信方法。上述通信方法主要从终端设备各个协议层之间交互的角度进行了介绍。可以理解的是，终端设备为了实现上述功能，其包含了执行各个功能相应的硬件结构和/或软件模块。
本领域技术人员应该可以意识到，结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的单元及算法步骤，本申请能够以硬件或硬件和计算机软件的结合形式来实现。某个功能究竟以硬件还是计算机软件驱动硬件的方式来执行，取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能，但是这种实现不应认为超出本申请的范围。
以下结合图6至图8详细说明本申请提供的通信装置。应理解，装置实施例的描述与方法实施例的描述相互对应。因此，未详细描述的内容可以参见上文方法实施例，为了简洁，部分内容不再赘述。
本申请实施例可以根据上述方法示例对发射端设备或者接收端设备进行功能模块的划分，例如，可以对应各个功能划分各个功能模块，也可以将两个或两个以上的功能集成在一个处理模块中。上述集成的模块既可以采用硬件的形式实现，也可以采用软件功能模块的形式实现。需要说明的是，本申请实施例中对模块的划分是示意性的，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式。下面以采用对应各个功能划分各个功能模块为例进行说明。
图6是本申请实施例提供的通信装置10的示意性框图。该装置10包括收发模块11和处理模块12。收发模块11可以实现相应的通信功能，处理模块12用于进行数据处理，或者说该收发模块11用于执行接收和发送相关的操作，该处理模块12用于执行除了接收和发送以外的其他操作。收发模块11还可以称为通信接口或通信单元。
可选地，该装置10还可以包括存储模块13，该存储模块13可以用于存储指令和/或数据，处理模块12可以读取存储模块中的指令和/或数据，以使得装置实现前述各个方法实施例中设备的动作。
在一种设计中，该装置10可对应于上文方法实施例中的CeEF，或者是CeEF的组成部件(如芯片)。
该装置10可实现对应于上文方法实施例中的CeEF执行的步骤或者流程，其中，收发模块11可用于执行上文方法实施例中CeEF的收发相关的操作，处理模块12可用于执行上文方法实施例中CeEF的处理相关的操作。
在一种可能的实现方式，收发模块11，用于接收来自证书申请网元的第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息用于请求认证所述证书申请网元，所述第一请求消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和第一信息，所述第一信息用于对所述证书申请网元进行认证；所述收发模块11，还用于向管理网元发送第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息用于请求验证所述第一信息，所述第二请求消息中包括所述第一信息；所述收发模块11，还用于接收来自所述管理网元的第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第一信息是否通过验证；处理模块12，用于根据所述第一指示信息确定所述证书申请网元是否为可信的网元。
在另一种可能的实现方式，收发模块11，用于接收来自证书申请网元的业务证书申请消息，所述业务证书申请消息用于请求所述通信装置颁发业务证书，所述业务证书申请消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和管理网元的签名；所述收发模块11，还用于向第一网元颁发业务证书；其中，所述管理网元的签名为基于事件标识的签名，所述事件标识用于标识所述证书申请网元请求为所述第一网元申请业务证书。
在又一种可能的实现方式，收发模块11，用于接收来自管理网元的第一消息，所述第一消息中包括所述管理网元本地记录的至少一个证书申请网元相关的信息；所述收发模块11，还用于接收来自证书申请网元的业务证书申请消息，所述业务证书申请消息用于请求所述通信装置颁发业务证书；所述处理模块12，用于根据所述第一消息确定是否颁发业务证书。
其中，当该装置10用于执行图3中的方法时，收发模块11可用于执行方法中的收发信息的步骤，如步骤S410、S420、S460、S413和S414；处理模块12可用于执行方法中的处理步骤，如步骤S450。
当该装置10用于执行图4中的方法时，收发模块11可用于执行方法中的收发信息的步骤，如步骤S550、S560、S570和S580；处理模块12可用于执行方法中的处理步骤。
当该装置10用于执行图5中的方法时，收发模块11可用于执行方法中的收发信息的步骤，如步骤S610和S630；处理模块12可用于执行方法中的处理步骤，如步骤S640。
应理解，各单元执行上述相应步骤的具体过程在上述方法实施例中已经详细说明，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
在另一种设计中，该装置10可对应于上文方法实施例中的CeMF，或者是CeMF的组成部件(如芯片)。
该装置10可实现对应于上文方法实施例中的CeMF执行的步骤或者流程，其中，收发模块11可用于执行上文方法实施例中CeMF的收发相关的操作，处理模块12可用于执行上文方法实施例中CeMF的处理相关的操作。
在一种可能的实现方式，收发模块11，用于向证书颁发网元发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息用于请求认证所述通信装置，所述第一请求消息中包括所述通信装置的标识和第一信息，所述第一信息用于对所述通信装置进行认证；所述收发模块11，还用于接收来自所述证书颁发网元的第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息用于指示所述通信装置是否为可信的网元，其中，所述证书颁发网元是基于第一指示信息确定所述通信装置是否为可信的网元的，且所述第一指示信息是所述证书颁发网元请求管理网元对第一信息进行校验的反馈信息。
在另一种可能的实现方式，收发模块11，用于接收来自第一网元的业务证书请求消息，所述业务证书请求消息用于请求通信装置代所述第一网元申请业务证书；所述收发模块11，还用于向管理网元发送第三请求消息，所述第三请求消息用于请求所述管理网元验证所述通信装置能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书；所述收发模块11，还用于接收来自所述管理网元的第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述通信装置能否待所述第一网元申请业务证书，所述第二指示信息中包括所述管理网元的签名和事件标识，其中，所述管理网元的签名为基于事件标识的签名，所述事件标识用于标识所述通信装置请求代所述第一网元申请业务证书。
其中，当该装置10用于执行图3中的方法时，收发模块11可用于执行方法中的收发信息的步骤，如步骤S410、S460、S411、S413和S414；处理模块12可用于执行方法中的处理步骤，如步骤S412。
当该装置10用于执行图4中的方法时，收发模块11可用于执行方法中的收发信息的步骤，如步骤S510、S520、S540和S550；处理模块12可用于执行方法中的处理步骤。
当该装置10用于执行图5中的方法时，收发模块11可用于执行方法中的收发信息的步骤，如步骤S620和S630；处理模块12可用于执行方法中的处理步骤。
应理解，各单元执行上述相应步骤的具体过程在上述方法实施例中已经详细说明，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
在又一种设计中，该装置10可对应于上文方法实施例中的MnF，或者是MnF的组成部件(如芯片)。
该装置10可实现对应于上文方法实施例中的MnF执行的步骤或者流程，其中，收发模块11可用于执行上文方法实施例中MnF的收发相关的操作，处理模块12可用于执行上文方法实施例中MnF的处理相关的操作。
在一种可能的实现方式，收发模块11，用于接收来自证书颁发网元的第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息用于请求验证所述第一信息，所述第二请求消息中包括所述第一信息；处理模块12，用于根据所述通信装置本地记录的第二信息对所述第一信息进行验证，所述第二信息为所述证书申请网元相关的信息；所述收发模块11，还用于向所述证书颁发网元发送第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第一信息是否通过验证。
在另一种可能的实现方式，收发模块11，用于接收来自证书申请网元的第三请求消息，所述第三请求消息用于请求所述通信装置验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书；处理模块12，用于根据所述管理网元本地记录的第二信息，验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，所述第二信息为所述证书申请网元相关的信息；所述收发模块11，还用于向所述证书颁发网元发送第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述证书申请网元能否待所述第一网元申请业务证书，所述第二指示信息中包括所述通信装置的签名和事件标识，其中，所述通信装置的签名为基于事件标识的签名，所述事件标识用于标识所述证书申请网元请求代所述第一网元申请业务证书。
其中，当该装置10用于执行图3中的方法时，收发模块11可用于执行方法中的收发信息的步骤，如步骤S420和S440；处理模块12可用于执行方法中的处理步骤，如步骤S430。
当该装置10用于执行图4中的方法时，收发模块11可用于执行方法中的收发信息的步骤，如步骤S520、S540、S570和S580；处理模块12可用于执行方法中的处理步骤，如步骤S530。
当该装置10用于执行图5中的方法时，收发模块11可用于执行方法中的收发信息的步骤，如步骤 S610；处理模块12可用于执行方法中的处理步骤。
应理解，各单元执行上述相应步骤的具体过程在上述方法实施例中已经详细说明，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
还应理解，这里的装置10以功能模块的形式体现。这里的术语“模块”可以指应用特有集成电路(application specific integrated circuit，ASIC)、电子电路、用于执行一个或多个软件或固件程序的处理器(例如共享处理器、专有处理器或组处理器等)和存储器、合并逻辑电路和/或其它支持所描述的功能的合适组件。在一个可选例子中，本领域技术人员可以理解，装置10可以具体为上述实施例中的移动管理网元，可以用于执行上述各方法实施例中与移动管理网元对应的各个流程和/或步骤；或者，装置10可以具体为上述实施例中的终端设备，可以用于执行上述各方法实施例中与终端设备对应的各个流程和/或步骤，为避免重复，在此不再赘述。
上述各个方案的装置10具有实现上述方法中的设备(如终端设备、网络设备)所执行的相应步骤的功能。该功能可以通过硬件实现，也可以通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块；例如收发模块可以由收发机替代(例如，收发模块中的发送单元可以由发送机替代，收发模块中的接收单元可以由接收机替代)，其它单元，如处理模块等可以由处理器替代，分别执行各个方法实施例中的收发操作以及相关的处理操作。
此外，上述收发模块11还可以是收发电路(例如可以包括接收电路和发送电路)，处理模块可以是处理电路。
图7是本申请实施例提供另一种通信装置20的示意图。该装置20包括处理器21，处理器21用于执行存储器22存储的计算机程序或指令，或读取存储器22存储的数据/信令，以执行上文各方法实施例中的方法。可选地，处理器21为一个或多个。
可选地，如图7所示，该装置20还包括存储器22，存储器22用于存储计算机程序或指令和/或数据。该存储器22可以与处理器21集成在一起，或者也可以分离设置。可选地，存储器22为一个或多个。
可选地，如图7所示，该装置20还包括收发器23，收发器23用于信号的接收和/或发送。例如，处理器21用于控制收发器23进行信号的接收和/或发送。
作为一种方案，该装置20用于实现上文各个方法实施例中由CeEF执行的操作。
作为另一种方案，该装置20用于实现上文各个方法实施例中由CeMF执行的操作。
作为又一种方案，该装置20用于实现上文各个方法实施例中由MnF执行的操作。
应理解，本申请实施例中提及的处理器可以是中央处理单元(central processing unit，CPU)，还可以是其他通用处理器、数字信号处理器(digital signal processor，DSP)、专用集成电路(application specific integrated circuit，ASIC)、现成可编程门阵列(field programmable gate array，FPGA)或者其他可编程逻辑器件、分立门或者晶体管逻辑器件、分立硬件组件等。通用处理器可以是微处理器或者该处理器也可以是任何常规的处理器等。
还应理解，本申请实施例中提及的存储器可以是易失性存储器和/或非易失性存储器。其中，非易失性存储器可以是只读存储器(read-only memory，ROM)、可编程只读存储器(programmable ROM，PROM)、可擦除可编程只读存储器(erasable PROM，EPROM)、电可擦除可编程只读存储器(electrically EPROM，EEPROM)或闪存。易失性存储器可以是随机存取存储器(random access memory，RAM)。例如，RAM可以用作外部高速缓存。作为示例而非限定，RAM包括如下多种形式：静态随机存取存储器(static RAM，SRAM)、动态随机存取存储器(dynamic RAM，DRAM)、同步动态随机存取存储器(synchronous DRAM，SDRAM)、双倍数据速率同步动态随机存取存储器(double data rate SDRAM，DDR SDRAM)、增强型同步动态随机存取存储器(enhanced SDRAM，ESDRAM)、同步连接动态随机存取存储器(synchlink DRAM，SLDRAM)和直接内存总线随机存取存储器(direct rambus RAM，DR RAM)。
需要说明的是，当处理器为通用处理器、DSP、ASIC、FPGA或者其他可编程逻辑器件、分立门或者晶体管逻辑器件、分立硬件组件时，存储器(存储模块)可以集成在处理器中。
还需要说明的是，本文描述的存储器旨在包括但不限于这些和任意其它适合类型的存储器。
图8是本申请实施例提供一种芯片系统30的示意图。该芯片系统30(或者也可以称为处理系统)包括逻辑电路31以及输入/输出接口(input/output interface)32。
其中，逻辑电路31可以为芯片系统30中的处理电路。逻辑电路31可以耦合连接存储单元，调用存 储单元中的指令，使得芯片系统30可以实现本申请各实施例的方法和功能。输入/输出接口32，可以为芯片系统30中的输入输出电路，将芯片系统30处理好的信息输出，或将待处理的数据或信令信息输入芯片系统30进行处理。
作为一种方案，该芯片系统30用于实现上文各个方法实施例中由CeEF、CeMF、或MnF执行的操作。
例如，逻辑电路31用于实现上文方法实施例中由CeEF、CeMF、或MnF执行的处理相关的操作；输入/输出接口32用于实现上文方法实施例中由CeEF、CeMF、或MnF执行的发送和/或接收相关的操作。
本申请实施例还提供一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有用于实现上述各方法实施例中由CeEF、CeMF、或MnF执行的方法的计算机指令。
例如，该计算机程序被计算机执行时，使得该计算机可以实现上述方法各实施例中由CeEF、CeMF、或MnF执行的方法。
本申请实施例还提供一种计算机程序产品，包含指令，该指令被计算机执行时以实现上述各方法实施例中由CeEF、CeMF、或MnF执行的方法。
本申请实施例还提供了一种通信系统，包括前述的CeEF、CeMF和MnF。
上述提供的任一种装置中相关内容的解释及有益效果均可参考上文提供的对应的方法实施例，此处不再赘述。
在本申请所提供的几个实施例中，应该理解到，所揭露的装置和方法，可以通过其它的方式实现。例如，以上所描述的装置实施例仅是示意性的，例如，所述单元的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，例如多个单元或组件可以结合或者可以集成到另一个系统，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。此外，所显示或讨论的相互之间的耦合或直接耦合或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，装置或单元的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性，机械或其它的形式。
在上述实施例中，可以全部或部分地通过软件、硬件、固件或者其任意组合来实现。当使用软件实现时，可以全部或部分地以计算机程序产品的形式实现。所述计算机程序产品包括一个或多个计算机指令。在计算机上加载和执行所述计算机程序指令时，全部或部分地产生按照本申请实施例所述的流程或功能。所述计算机可以是通用计算机、专用计算机、计算机网络、或者其他可编程装置。例如，所述计算机可以是个人计算机，服务器，或者网络设备等。所述计算机指令可以存储在计算机可读存储介质中，或者从一个计算机可读存储介质向另一个计算机可读存储介质传输，例如，所述计算机指令可以从一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心通过有线(例如同轴电缆、光纤、数字用户线(DSL))或无线(例如红外、无线、微波等)方式向另一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心进行传输。所述计算机可读存储介质可以是计算机能够存取的任何可用介质或者是包含一个或多个可用介质集成的服务器、数据中心等数据存储设备。所述可用介质可以是磁性介质(例如，软盘、硬盘、磁带)、光介质(例如，DVD)、或者半导体介质(例如固态硬盘(solid state disk，SSD)等。例如，前述的可用介质包括但不限于：U盘、移动硬盘、只读存储器(read-only memory，ROM)、随机存取存储器(random access memory，RAM)、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
以上所述，仅为本申请的具体实施方式，但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此，任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本申请揭露的技术范围内，可轻易想到变化或替换，都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。因此，本申请的保护范围应以所述权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims (46)

  1. 一种通信方法，其特征在于，包括：
    证书申请网元向证书颁发网元发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息用于请求认证所述证书申请网元，所述第一请求消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和第一信息，所述第一信息用于对所述证书申请网元进行认证；
    所述证书颁发网元向管理网元发送第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息用于请求验证所述第一信息，所述第二请求消息中包括所述第一信息；
    所述管理网元根据所述管理网元本地记录的第二信息对所述第一信息进行验证，所述第二信息为所述证书申请网元相关的信息；
    所述管理网元向所述证书颁发网元发送第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第一信息是否通过验证；
    所述证书颁发网元根据所述第一指示信息确定所述证书申请网元是否为可信的网元。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一信息包括以下信息中的至少一项：
    网元标识列表、域标识、或初始化证书列表，所述网元标识列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元，所述域标识用于指示所述证书申请网元所位于的域，所述初始化证书列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元被配置的至少一个初始化证书。
  3. 根据权利要求1或2所述的方法，其特征在于，所述证书颁发网元根据所述第一指示信息确定所述证书申请网元是否为可信的网元，包括：
    在所述第一指示信息指示所述第一信息通过验证的情况下，所述证书颁发网元确定所述证书申请网元为可信的网元；或者，
    在所述第一指示信息指示所述第一信息未通过验证的情况下，所述证书颁发网元确定所述证书申请网元为不可信的网元。
  4. 根据权利要求1至3中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一指示信息中还包括管理网元的签名，所述管理网元的签名用于验证所述第一指示信息是否可信。
  5. 根据权利要求1至4中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述证书颁发网元向所述证书申请网元发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息用于指示所述证书申请网元是否为可信的网元。
  6. 根据权利要求1至5中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    第一网元向所述证书申请网元发送业务证书请求消息，所述业务证书请求消息用于请求所述证书申请网元代所述第一网元申请业务证书；
    所述证书申请网元根据规则判断是否响应所述第一网元申请业务证书的请求。
  7. 根据权利要求6所述的方法，其特征在于，所述业务证书请求消息中包括所述第一网元的标识和以下信息中的至少一项：
    所述第一网元对应的公钥、所述第一网元对应的私钥、所述第一网元被配置的初始化证书、或业务类型指示信息。
  8. 根据权利要求6或7所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述业务证书请求消息请求的业务证书的类型为第一类型的情况下，所述证书申请网元根据规则判断是否响应所述第一网元申请业务证书的请求包括：
    所述证书申请网元根据规则验证所述第一网元是否可以申请第一类型的业务证书；
    在验证失败时，所述方法还包括：
    所述证书申请网元向所述第一网元发送失败指示，所述失败指示用于指示所述第一网元申请业务证书的请求无效。
  9. 根据权利要求1至8中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述第一信息为所述网元标识列表，且所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元的标识构成所述网元标识列表时，所述管理网元确定所述第一信息通过验证；或者，
    在所述第一信息为所述初始化证书列表，且所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元对应的初始化证书构成所述初始化证书列表，所述初始化证书列表中的初始化证书均有效时，所述管理网元确定所述第一信息通过验证；或者，
    在所述第一信息为所述域标识，且所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元所属的域的标识为所述域标识时，所述管理网元确定所述第一信息通过验证。
  10. 根据权利要求1至9中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第二信息包括以下信息中的至少一种：
    所述证书申请网元的初始化信息、所述证书申请网元的配置信息、或所述证书申请网元的管理信息。
  11. 一种通信方法，其特征在于，包括：
    证书颁发网元接收来自证书申请网元的第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息用于请求认证所述证书申请网元，所述第一请求消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和第一信息，所述第一信息用于对所述证书申请网元进行认证；
    所述证书颁发网元向管理网元发送第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息用于请求验证所述第一信息，所述第二请求消息中包括所述第一信息；
    所述证书颁发网元接收来自所述管理网元的第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第一信息是否通过验证；
    所述证书颁发网元根据所述第一指示信息确定所述证书申请网元是否为可信的网元。
  12. 根据权利要求11所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一信息包括以下信息中的至少一项：
    网元标识列表、域标识、或初始化证书列表，所述网元标识列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元，所述域标识用于指示所述证书申请网元所位于的域，所述初始化证书列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元被配置的至少一个初始化证书。
  13. 根据权利要求11或12所述的方法，其特征在于，所述证书颁发网元根据所述第一指示信息确定所述证书申请网元是否为可信的网元，包括：
    在所述第一指示信息指示所述第一信息通过验证的情况下，所述证书颁发网元确定所述证书申请网元为可信的网元；或者，
    在所述第一指示信息指示所述第一信息未通过验证的情况下，所述证书颁发网元确定所述证书申请网元为不可信的网元。
  14. 根据权利要求11至13中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一指示信息中还包括管理网元的签名，所述管理网元的签名用于验证所述第一指示信息是否可信。
  15. 根据权利要求11至14中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述证书颁发网元向所述证书申请网元发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息用于指示所述证书申请网元是否为所述证书颁发网元可信的网元。
  16. 一种通信系统，包括证书申请网元、证书颁发网元和管理网元，其特征在于：
    所述证书申请网元用于向证书颁发网元发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息用于请求认证所述证书申请网元，所述第一请求消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和第一信息，所述第一信息用于对所述证书申请网元进行认证；
    所述证书颁发网元用于向管理网元发送第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息用于请求验证所述第一信息，所述第二请求消息中包括所述第一信息；
    所述管理网元用于根据所述管理网元本地记录的第二信息对所述第一信息进行验证，所述第二信息为所述证书申请网元相关的信息；
    所述管理网元还用于向所述证书颁发网元发送第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第一信息是否通过验证；
    所述证书颁发网元还用于根据所述第一指示信息确定所述证书申请网元是否为可信的网元。
  17. 根据权利要求16所述的通信系统，其特征在于，所述证书颁发网元用于根据所述第一指示信息确定所述证书申请网元是否为可信的网元，包括：
    在所述第一指示信息指示所述第一信息通过验证的情况下，所述证书颁发网元确定所述证书申请网元为可信的网元；或者，
    在所述第一指示信息指示所述第一信息未通过验证的情况下，所述证书颁发网元确定所述证书申请网元为不可信的网元。
  18. 根据权利要求16或17所述的通信系统，其特征在于，所述证书颁发网元还用于向所述证书申请网元发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息用于指示所述证书申请网元是否为所述证书颁发网元可信 的网元。
  19. 根据权利要求16至18中任一项所述的通信系统，其特征在于，所述通信系统还包括第一网元：
    所述第一网元用于向所述证书申请网元发送业务证书请求消息，所述业务证书请求消息用于请求所述证书申请网元代所述第一网元申请业务证书；
    所述证书申请网元还用于根据规则判断是否响应所述第一网元申请业务证书的请求。
  20. 根据权利要求19所述的通信系统，其特征在于，在所述业务证书请求消息请求的业务证书的类型为第一类型的情况下，所述证书申请网元用于根据规则判断是否响应所述第一网元申请业务证书的请求包括：
    所述证书申请网元用于根据规则验证所述第一网元是否可以申请第一类型的业务证书；
    在验证失败时，所述证书申请网元还用于向所述第一网元发送失败指示，所述失败指示用于指示所述第一网元申请业务证书的请求无效。
  21. 根据权利要求16至20中任一项所述的通信系统，其特征在于，在所述第一信息为所述网元标识列表，且所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元的标识构成所述网元标识列表时，所述管理网元确定所述第一信息通过验证；或者，
    在所述第一信息为所述初始化证书列表，且所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元对应的初始化证书构成所述初始化证书列表，所述初始化证书列表中的初始化证书均有效时，所述管理网元确定所述第一信息通过验证；或者，
    在所述第一信息为所述域标识，且所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元所属的域的标识为所述域标识时，所述管理网元确定所述第一信息通过验证。
  22. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，所述装置包括：用于执行如权利要求1至10中任一项所述的方法的模块，或者用于执行如权利要求11至15中任一项所述的方法的模块。
  23. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括：
    处理器，用于执行存储器中存储的计算机程序，以使得所述装置执行如权利要求1至10中任一项所述的方法，或者以使得所述装置执行如权利要求11至15中任一项所述的方法。
  24. 一种计算机程序产品，其特征在于，所述计算机程序产品包括用于执行如权利要求1至10中任一项所述的方法的指令，或者，所述计算机程序产品包括用于执行如权利要求11至15中任一项所述的方法的指令。
  25. 一种计算机可读存储介质，其特征在于，包括：所述计算机可读存储介质存储有计算机程序；所述计算机程序在计算机上运行时，使得所述计算机执行如权利要求1至10中任一项所述的方法，或者使得所述计算机执行如权利要求11至15中任一项所述的方法。
  26. 一种通信方法，其特征在于，包括：
    管理网元接收来自证书颁发网元的第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息用于请求验证所述第一信息，所述第二请求消息中包括所述第一信息；所述管理网元根据所述管理网元本地记录的第二信息对所述第一信息进行验证，所述第二信息为所述证书申请网元相关的信息；所述管理网元向所述证书颁发网元发送第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第一信息是否通过验证。
  27. 根据权利要求26所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一信息包括以下信息中的至少一项：网元标识列表、域标识、或初始化证书列表，所述网元标识列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元，所述域标识用于指示所述证书申请网元所位于的域，所述初始化证书列表用于指示所述证书申请网元管理的至少一个网元被配置的至少一个初始化证书。
  28. 根据权利要求26或27所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述第一信息为所述网元标识列表，且所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元的标识构成所述网元标识列表时，所述管理网元确定所述第一信息通过验证；或者，在所述第一信息为所述初始化证书列表，且所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元对应的初始化证书构成所述初始化证书列表，所述初始化证书列表中的初始化证书均有效时，所述管理网元确定所述第一信息通过验证；或者，在所述第一信息为所述域标识，且所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元所属的域的标识为所述域标识时，所述管理网元确定所述第一信息通过验证。
  29. 根据权利要求26至28中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一指示信息中还包括管理网元的签名，所述管理网元的签名用于验证所述第一指示信息是否可信。
  30. 一种通信方法，其特征在于，包括：
    证书申请网元接收来自第一网元的业务证书请求消息，所述业务证书请求消息用于请求证书申请网元代所述第一网元申请业务证书；
    所述证书申请网元向管理网元发送第三请求消息，所述第三请求消息用于请求所述管理网元验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书；
    所述管理网元根据所述管理网元本地记录的第二信息，验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，所述第二信息为所述证书申请网元相关的信息；
    所述管理网元向所述证书申请网元发送第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，所述第二指示信息中包括所述管理网元的签名和事件标识，其中，所述管理网元的签名为基于事件标识的签名，所述事件标识用于标识所述证书申请网元代所述第一网元申请业务证书。
  31. 根据权利要求30所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述证书申请网元向证书颁发网元发送业务证书申请消息，所述业务证书申请消息用于请求所述证书颁发网元为所述第一网元颁发业务证书，所述业务证书申请消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和所述管理网元的签名。
  32. 根据权利要求30或31所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述证书颁发网元向所述管理网元发送查询消息，所述查询消息用于查询所述证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请业务证书，所述查询消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和所述事件标识；
    所述证书颁发网元接收来自所述管理网元发送查询响应消息，所述查询响应消息用于指示所述证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请业务证书。
  33. 根据权利要求30至32中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述第三请求消息包括所述第一网元的标识的情况下，所述管理网元验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，包括：
    所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元的标识包括所述第一网元的标识时，所述管理网元确定所述证书申请网元能代所述第一网元申请业务证书；或者，
    在所述第二请求消息包括所述第一网元对应的初始化证书的情况下，所述管理网元验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，包括：所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元对应的初始化证书包括所述第一网元的对应的初始化证书时，所述管理网元确定所述证书申请网元能代所述第一网元申请业务证书。
  34. 一种通信方法，其特征在于，包括：
    证书颁发网元接收来自证书申请网元的业务证书申请消息，所述业务证书申请消息用于请求所述证书颁发网元颁发业务证书，所述业务证书申请消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和管理网元的签名；所述证书颁发网元向第一网元颁发业务证书；其中，所述管理网元的签名为基于事件标识的签名，所述事件标识用于标识所述证书申请网元请求为所述第一网元申请业务证书。
  35. 根据权利要求34所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：所述证书颁发网元向所述管理网元发送查询消息，所述查询消息用于查询所述证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请业务证书，所述查询消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和所述事件标识；所述证书颁发网元接收来自所述管理网元发送查询响应消息，所述查询响应消息用于指示所述证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请业务证书。
  36. 一种通信方法，其特征在于，包括：
    证书申请网元接收来自第一网元的业务证书请求消息，所述业务证书请求消息用于请求证书申请网元代所述第一网元申请业务证书；
    所述证书申请网元向管理网元发送第三请求消息，所述第三请求消息用于请求所述管理网元验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书；
    所述证书申请网元接收来自所述管理网元的第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述证书申请网元能否待所述第一网元申请业务证书，所述第二指示信息中包括所述管理网元的签名和事件标识，其中，所述管理网元的签名为基于事件标识的签名，所述事件标识用于标识所述证书申请网元请求代所述第一网元申请业务证书。
  37. 根据权利要求36所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述证书申请网元向证书颁发网元发送业务证书申请消息，所述业务证书申请消息用于请求所述证 书颁发网元为所述第一网元颁发业务证书，所述业务证书申请消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和所述管理网元的签名。
  38. 一种通信方法，其特征在于，包括：
    管理网元接收来自证书申请网元的第三请求消息，所述第三请求消息用于请求所述管理网元验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书；
    所述管理网元根据所述管理网元本地记录的第二信息，验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，所述第二信息为所述证书申请网元相关的信息；
    所述管理网元向所述证书颁发网元发送第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述证书申请网元能否待所述第一网元申请业务证书，所述第二指示信息中包括所述管理网元的签名和事件标识，其中，所述管理网元的签名为基于事件标识的签名，所述事件标识用于标识所述证书申请网元请求代所述第一网元申请业务证书。
  39. 根据权利要求38所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述第三请求消息包括所述第一网元的标识的情况下，所述管理网元验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，包括：
    所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元的标识包括所述第一网元的标识时，所述管理网元确定所述证书申请网元能代所述第一网元申请业务证书；或者，
    在所述第二请求消息包括所述第一网元对应的初始化证书的情况下，所述管理网元验证所述证书申请网元能否代所述第一网元申请业务证书，包括：所述管理网元本地记录的所述证书申请网元管理的一个或多个网元对应的初始化证书包括所述第一网元的对应的初始化证书时，所述管理网元确定所述证书申请网元能代所述第一网元申请业务证书。
  40. 根据权利要求38或39所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：所述管理网元接收来自证书颁发网元的查询消息，所述查询消息用于查询所述证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请颁发业务证书，所述查询消息中包括所述证书申请网元的标识和所述事件标识；所述管理网元向所述证书颁发网元发送查询响应消息，所述查询响应消息用于指示所述证书申请网元能否代第一网元申请颁发业务证书。
  41. 一种通信方法，其特征在于，包括：
    证书颁发网元接收来自管理网元的第一消息，所述第一消息中包括所述管理网元本地记录的至少一个证书申请网元相关的信息；所述证书颁发网元接收来自证书申请网元的业务证书申请消息，所述业务证书申请消息用于请求所述证书颁发网元颁发业务证书；所述证书颁发网元根据所述第一消息确定是否颁发业务证书。
  42. 根据权利要求41所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一消息中包括证书申请网元的标识和以下至少一种信息的对应关系：网元的标识、域标识、初始化证书标识、或网元类型。
  43. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，所述装置包括：用于执行如权利要求26至29中任一项所述的方法的模块，或者用于执行如权利要求34或35所述的方法的模块，或者用于执行如权利要求36或37所述的方法的模块，或者用于执行如权利要求38至40中任一项所述的方法的模块，或者用于执行如权利要求41或42所述的方法的模块。
  44. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括：
    处理器，用于执行存储器中存储的计算机程序，以使得所述装置执行如权利要求26至29中任一项所述的方法，或者以使得所述装置执行如权利要求34或35所述的方法，或者以使得所述装置执行如权利要求36或37所述的方法，或者以使得所述装置执行如权利要求38至40中任一项所述的方法，或者以使得所述装置执行如权利要求41或42所述的方法。
  45. 一种计算机程序产品，其特征在于，所述计算机程序产品包括用于执行如权利要求26至29中任一项所述的方法的指令，或者，所述计算机程序产品包括用于执行如权利要求34或35所述的方法的指令，或者，所述计算机程序产品包括用于执行如权利要求36或37所述的方法的指令，或者，所述计算机程序产品包括用于执行如权利要求38至40中任一项所述的方法的指令，或者，所述计算机程序产品包括用于执行如权利要求41或42所述的方法的指令。
  46. 一种计算机可读存储介质，其特征在于，包括：所述计算机可读存储介质存储有计算机程序；所述计算机程序在计算机上运行时，使得所述计算机执行如权利要求26至29中任一项所述的方法，或者使得所述计算机执行如权利要求34或35所述的方法，或者使得所述计算机执行如权利要求36或37所述的方法，或者使得所述计算机执行如权利要求38至40中任一项所述的方法，或者使得所述计算机执 行如权利要求41或42所述的方法。
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