WO2024164349A1 - 侧链路通信方法及装置 - Google Patents
侧链路通信方法及装置 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2024164349A1 WO2024164349A1 PCT/CN2023/075543 CN2023075543W WO2024164349A1 WO 2024164349 A1 WO2024164349 A1 WO 2024164349A1 CN 2023075543 W CN2023075543 W CN 2023075543W WO 2024164349 A1 WO2024164349 A1 WO 2024164349A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
- H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/10—Integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/90—Services for handling of emergency or hazardous situations, e.g. earthquake and tsunami warning systems [ETWS]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W8/00—Network data management
- H04W8/005—Discovery of network devices, e.g. terminals
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W92/00—Interfaces specially adapted for wireless communication networks
- H04W92/16—Interfaces between hierarchically similar devices
- H04W92/18—Interfaces between hierarchically similar devices between terminal devices
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
- H04W12/037—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the control plane, e.g. signalling traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W76/00—Connection management
- H04W76/10—Connection setup
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W76/00—Connection management
- H04W76/10—Connection setup
- H04W76/14—Direct-mode setup
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W80/00—Wireless network protocols or protocol adaptations to wireless operation
- H04W80/02—Data link layer protocols
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
- H04W88/02—Terminal devices
- H04W88/04—Terminal devices adapted for relaying to or from another terminal or user
Definitions
- the present disclosure relates to the field of mobile communication technology, and in particular to a side link communication method and device.
- the remote user equipment In sidelink (SL) communication, the remote user equipment (UE) encrypts the information used for sidelink communication in the direct communication request (DCR) using the security parameters used in the discovery process, and then sends the direct communication request to the UE to the network relay device. After receiving the direct communication request, the relay device needs to use the corresponding security parameters to decrypt to obtain the information used for sidelink communication.
- DCR direct communication request
- the relay device After receiving the direct communication request, the relay device needs to use the corresponding security parameters to decrypt to obtain the information used for sidelink communication.
- the present disclosure proposes a side link communication method and device. After receiving a direct communication request, the UE can determine the security key used to decrypt the encrypted information in the direct communication request based on the destination layer 2 ID in the direct communication request, which helps to achieve secure side link communication.
- a first aspect embodiment of the present disclosure provides a side link communication method, which is executed by a UE, and the method includes: receiving a direct communication request (DCR), wherein the DCR includes a destination layer 2 identification (ID) and encryption information for side link communication; determining a security key for decrypting the encryption information based on the destination layer 2 ID; and decrypting the encryption information using the security key for side link communication.
- DCR direct communication request
- ID destination layer 2 identification
- determining the security key for decrypting the encrypted information based on the destination layer 2 ID includes: determining, based on the destination layer 2 ID, a security context that matches the destination layer 2 ID from one or more pre-stored security contexts; and determining the security key based on the matching security context.
- each security context includes a service code for identifying a service type for side link communication, a layer 2 ID corresponding to the service code, and a security key associated with the service code.
- the service code includes any one of the following: relay service code RSC; proximity service (ProSe) restriction code; ProSe query code; ProSe response code; ranging service code.
- each security context also includes any one or more of the following: a UE to network relay layer indicator; a control plane security indicator.
- the method further includes: creating and storing the security context based on the layer 2 ID, service code and security key determined during the discovery process.
- the creating and storing the security context includes any one of the following: creating and storing the security context when determining a layer 2 ID for the discovery process; creating and storing the security context after sending a discovery message for the discovery process; creating and storing the security context after completing the discovery process.
- the second aspect embodiment of the present disclosure provides a side link communication device for UE, the device comprising: a transceiver module for receiving a direct communication request DCR, wherein the DCR comprises a destination layer 2 ID and encryption information for side link communication; a processing module for determining a security key for decrypting the encryption information according to the destination layer 2 ID; and decrypting the encryption information using the security key for side link communication.
- the processing module is used to: determine, based on the destination layer 2 ID, a security context that matches the destination layer 2 ID from one or more pre-stored security contexts; and determine the security key based on the matching security context.
- each security context includes a service code for identifying a service type for side link communication, a layer 2 ID corresponding to the service code, and a security key associated with the service code.
- the service code includes any one of the following: relay service code RSC; proximity service (ProSe) restriction code; ProSe query code; ProSe response code; Ranging service code.
- each security context further includes any one or more of the following: a UE to network relay layer indicator; a control plane security indicator.
- the processing module is also used to create and store the security context based on the layer 2 ID, service code and security key determined during the discovery process.
- the processing module is used to perform any of the following steps: creating and storing the security context when determining the layer 2 ID for the discovery process; creating and storing the security context after sending the discovery message for the discovery process; creating and storing the security context after completing the discovery process.
- the third aspect embodiment of the present disclosure provides a communication device, including: a transceiver; a memory; a processor, which is connected to the transceiver and the memory respectively, and is configured to control the wireless signal reception and transmission of the transceiver by executing computer-executable instructions on the memory, and can implement the method described in the first aspect of the present disclosure.
- the fourth aspect embodiment of the present disclosure provides a computer storage medium, wherein the computer storage medium stores computer executable instructions; after the computer executable instructions are executed by a processor, the method described in the first aspect of the present disclosure can be implemented.
- the disclosed embodiment provides a sidelink communication method and apparatus, wherein a UE receives a DCR, wherein the DCR includes a destination layer 2 ID and encryption information for sidelink communication, determines a security key according to the destination layer 2 ID, and uses the security key to decrypt the encryption information for sidelink communication. This helps to achieve secure sidelink communication.
- FIG1 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a communication system provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG2 is a schematic diagram of a flow chart of a side link communication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure
- FIG3 is a schematic diagram of a flow chart of a side link communication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure
- FIG4 is a schematic diagram of a flow chart of a side link communication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure
- FIG5 is a schematic diagram of a process flow of a mode A discovery process according to an embodiment of the present disclosure
- FIG6 is a flow chart of a mode B discovery process according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG7 is a block diagram of a side link communication device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG8 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a chip provided in an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- first, second, third, etc. may be used to describe various information in the disclosed embodiments, these information should not be limited to these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish the same type of information from each other.
- first information may also be referred to as the second information, and similarly, the second information may also be referred to as the first information.
- the words "if” and “if” as used herein may be interpreted as “at” or "when” or "in response to determination”.
- LTE Long Term Evolution
- Side links can also be called side links or edge links. They are used for direct data transmission between UEs without going through network equipment.
- the design of the LTE sidelink can be applied to specific public safety matters (for example, emergency communications in disaster sites such as fires or earthquakes), or vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications.
- Vehicle-to-everything communications can include various services, such as basic safety communications, autonomous driving, platooning, sensor expansion, etc. Since the LTE sidelink only supports broadcast communications, it is mainly used for basic safety communications. Other advanced V2X services with strict quality of service (QoS) requirements in terms of latency, reliability, etc. will be supported through the new radio (NR) sidelink.
- QoS quality of service
- 5G ProSe refers to sidelink communication between device-to-device or between nearby mobile devices. Through UE-to-UE relay, 5G ProSe can further extend the range of sidelink communication.
- User Equipment to Network Relay (U2N Relay, UE to Network Relay)
- the U2N relay mode enables a UE to access the network by connecting to another relay UE regardless of whether the UE is within coverage.
- Ranging may be used to determine the distance and/or direction and/or relative position between two or more UEs.
- FIG1 is a block diagram of a wireless communication system applicable to the embodiments of the present disclosure.
- the wireless communication system includes a first user equipment (UE) 11, a second UE 12, and a network device 13.
- the link for communication between the network device and the UE is an uplink and a downlink, and the link between the first UE and the second UE is a side link.
- the wireless communication system shown in FIG1 is only for schematic illustration, and the wireless communication system may also include other network devices, such as core network devices, wireless relay devices, and wireless backhaul devices, which are not shown in FIG1.
- the embodiments of the present disclosure do not limit the number of network devices and terminals included in the wireless communication system.
- the wireless communication system of the embodiment of the present disclosure is a network that provides wireless communication functions.
- the wireless communication system can adopt different communication technologies, such as code division multiple access (code division multiple access, CDMA), wideband code division multiple access (wideband code division multiple access, WCDMA), time division multiple access (time division multiple access, TDMA), frequency division multiple access (frequency division multiple access, FDMA), orthogonal frequency division multiple access (orthogonal frequency-division multiple access, OFDMA), single carrier frequency division multiple access (single carrier FDMA, SC-FDMA), carrier sense multiple access/collision avoidance (Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance).
- code division multiple access code division multiple access
- CDMA code division multiple access
- wideband code division multiple access wideband code division multiple access
- WCDMA wideband code division multiple access
- time division multiple access time division multiple access
- FDMA frequency division multiple access
- OFDMA orthogonal frequency division multiple access
- single carrier frequency division multiple access single carrier frequency division multiple access
- the network can be divided into 2G (English: generation) network, 3G network, 4G network or future evolution network, such as 5G network, 5G network can also be called new wireless network (New Radio, NR).
- 2G International: generation
- 3G network 3G network
- 4G network 4G network
- future evolution network such as 5G network
- 5G network can also be called new wireless network (New Radio, NR).
- NR New Radio
- the present disclosure sometimes simply refers to a wireless communication network as a network.
- the network equipment involved in the present disclosure may also be referred to as a wireless access network equipment.
- the wireless access network equipment may be: a base station, an evolved node B (eNB), a home base station, an access point (AP) in a wireless fidelity (WIFI) system, a wireless relay node, a wireless backhaul node, a transmission point (TP) or a transmission and reception point (TRP), etc. It may also be a gNB in an NR system, or it may also be a component or a part of a device constituting a base station, etc. When it is a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication system, the network equipment may also be a vehicle-mounted device.
- V2X vehicle-to-everything
- the UE involved in the present disclosure may also be referred to as a terminal device, terminal, mobile station (MS), mobile terminal (MT), etc., which is a device that provides voice and/or data connectivity to users.
- the terminal may be a handheld device with wireless connection function, a vehicle-mounted device, etc.
- some examples of terminals are: smart phones (Mobile Phone), pocket computers (Pocket Personal Computer, PPC), PDAs, personal digital assistants (Personal Digital Assistant, PDA), laptops, tablet computers, wearable devices, or vehicle-mounted devices, etc.
- V2X vehicle-to-everything
- the terminal device may also be a vehicle-mounted device. It should be understood that the embodiments of the present disclosure do not limit the specific technology and specific device form adopted by the terminal.
- the communication system described in the embodiment of the present application is for more clearly illustrating the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application, and does not constitute a limitation on the technical solution provided in the embodiment of the present application.
- Ordinary technicians in this field can know that with the evolution of the system architecture and the emergence of new business scenarios, the technical solution provided in the embodiment of the present application is also applicable to similar technical problems.
- 5G ProSe remote UE uses the code for the discovery process to receive security parameters to encrypt information such as user plane Prose remote UE key ID (User Plane Prose Remote User Key, UP-PRUK ID)/control plane Prose remote UE key ID (Control Plane Prose Remote User Key, CP-PRUK ID) and service code (which identifies the service type of side link communication) in the direct communication request (DCR).
- DCR direct communication request
- the relay device from the 5G ProSe UE to the network uses the code for the discovery process to send security parameters to decrypt the encrypted information.
- the present application provides a side link communication method and device. After receiving the DCR, the UE can determine the security key used to decrypt the encrypted information in the DCR based on the layer 2 ID in the direct communication request, which helps to achieve secure side link communication.
- code sending security parameters, code receiving security parameters, and code security parameters mentioned in this disclosure include security keys for encryption and decryption.
- Fig. 2 shows a schematic flow chart of a side link communication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. As shown in Fig. 2, the method can be executed by a UE and can include the following steps.
- DCR direct communication request
- the DCR includes a destination layer 2 identification (ID) and encryption information for sidelink communication.
- ID destination layer 2 identification
- the remote UE sends a DCR to the relay UE to request the creation of a PC5 link for sidelink communication between the remote UE and the relay UE.
- the remote UE uses its own layer 2 ID as the source layer 2 ID and the relay UE's layer 2 ID as the destination layer 2 ID.
- Layer 2 ID DCR is sent to the relay UE.
- the DCR also includes encryption information for sidelink communication to ensure secure sidelink communication.
- the UE After receiving the DCR, the UE can determine the security key used to decrypt the encrypted information in the DCR based on the destination layer 2 ID included in the DCR.
- the UE may use the security key to decrypt the encrypted information in the DCR to obtain information for side link communication, thereby achieving side link communication.
- the UE receives a DCR, wherein the DCR includes a destination layer 2 ID and encryption information for sidelink communication, and the UE determines a security key according to the destination layer 2 ID and uses the security key to decrypt the encryption information for sidelink communication. This helps to achieve secure sidelink communication.
- Fig. 3 shows a schematic flow chart of a side link communication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. As shown in Fig. 3, the method can be executed by a UE and includes the following steps.
- the DCR includes the destination layer 2 ID and encryption information for sidelink communication.
- step S301 For a detailed description of the above step S301 and its related details, please refer to the description of step S201 and its related details, which will not be repeated here.
- the above step S302 may include the following steps.
- At least one security context is pre-stored in the UE. After receiving the DCR, the UE can select a security context that matches the destination layer 2 ID from the at least one security context according to the destination layer 2 ID in the DCR. It should be noted that the security context may also be referred to as a discovery security context or the like, which is not limited in the present disclosure.
- each security context includes a service code for identifying the service type of the side link communication, a layer 2 ID corresponding to the service code, and a security key associated with the service code.
- the UE may store a list of security contexts, which includes three security contexts, namely Context1, Context2 and Context3.
- Context1 includes service code 1, L2-ID1 (layer 2 ID corresponding to service code 1) and Key1 (security key associated with service code 1);
- Context2 includes service code 2, L2-ID2 (layer 2 ID corresponding to service code 2) and Key2 (security key associated with service code 2);
- Context3 includes service code 3, L2-ID3 (layer 2 ID corresponding to service code 3) and Key3 (security key associated with service code 3). If the destination layer 2 ID received by the UE in the DCR is L2-ID2, the UE can determine that the security context matching the destination layer 2 ID is Context2.
- a security key may be determined based on the matching security context.
- Context2 is determined to be a matching security context
- Key2 included in Context2 may be used as a security key.
- step S303 For a detailed description of the above step S303 and its related details, please refer to the description of step S203 and its related details, which will not be repeated here.
- the 5G ProSe U2N relay uses the code-sending security parameters including the security key to decrypt the UP-PRUK ID/CP-PRUK ID and RSC therein.
- the 5G ProSe U2N relay obtains the security key of the code-sending security parameters based on the security context, for example, by finding the security context including the layer 2 ID that matches the destination layer 2 ID in the DCR.
- the 5G ProSe U2N relay verifies whether the RSC matches the RSC sent in the discovery message. If it does not match, the 5G ProSe U2N relay abandons the PC5 direct link communication process.
- the UE receives a DCR, wherein the DCR includes a destination layer 2 ID and encryption information for sidelink communication, and the UE determines a security key according to the destination layer 2 ID and uses the security key to decrypt the encryption information for sidelink communication. This helps to achieve secure sidelink communication.
- the service code may include any one of the following: a replay service code (RSC), a ProSe restriction code, a ProSe query code, a ProSe response code, and a ranging service code.
- RSC replay service code
- ProSe restriction code a ProSe query code
- ProSe response code a ProSe response code
- each security context may further include one or more of the following: a UE-to-network relay layer indicator, a control plane security indicator.
- the UE to network relay layer indicator is used to indicate whether the associated service code provides 5G ProSe Layer 2 relay service or 5G ProSe Layer 3 relay service.
- a control plane security indicator is provided for a service code
- a control plane-based security procedure is performed for UE-to-network relay communications of the service code, otherwise a user plane-based security procedure is performed.
- Fig. 4 shows a schematic flow chart of a side link communication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. As shown in Fig. 4, the method can be executed by a UE and includes the following steps.
- S401 create and store a security context based on the layer 2 ID, service code, and security key determined during the discovery process.
- the UE may create a security context including the layer 2 ID, service code and security key according to the layer 2 ID, service code and security key determined in the discovery process, and store the security context.
- the security context may also be referred to as a discovery security context or the like, which is not limited in the present disclosure.
- the UE may create and store a security context when determining a Layer 2 ID to be used in the discovery process.
- the UE may create and store a security context after sending a discovery message for the discovery process.
- the UE may create and store a security context after completing the discovery process.
- Mode A Currently two modes are defined for the discovery process, Mode A and Mode B.
- FIG. 5 shows a schematic diagram of the discovery process in Mode A.
- Mode A two types of UEs participate in ProSe direct discovery, namely:
- -Announcement UE A UE that announces specific information, which can be used by nearby UEs with discovery rights.
- - Monitoring UE Listen to broadcast messages to discover nearby announcing UEs.
- the announcement UE broadcasts a discovery message, which may include the type of discovery message, a service code identifying the service type of the side link communication (such as a ProSe application code or a ProSe restriction code or a relay service code), and other metadata, etc.
- the application layer metadata may be used as metadata in the discovery message.
- the content in the discovery message is protected by a code discovery security parameter or a code security parameter.
- the UE declares that it selects the source layer 2 ID for the discovery process (such as 5G ProSe direct discovery/5G ProSe U2N discovery/ranging/SL positioning discovery process) by itself, and determines the destination layer 2 ID for the discovery process based on the network configuration information.
- the source layer 2 ID for the discovery process such as 5G ProSe direct discovery/5G ProSe U2N discovery/ranging/SL positioning discovery process
- the UE can create a security context including a self-selected source layer 2 ID, a service code, and a security key associated with the service code after broadcasting a discovery message, and store the security context.
- the UE can create a security context including a self-selected source layer 2 ID, a service code, and a security key associated with the service code, and store the security context.
- the UE may, after completing the discovery process, create a security context including a self-selected source layer 2 ID, a service code, and a security key associated with the service code, and store the security context.
- FIG. 6 shows a flow chart of the discovery process of Mode B.
- Mode B two types of UEs participate in ProSe direct discovery, namely:
- - Discoverer UE The UE that sends a request containing specific information about what it is interested in discovering.
- the UE that receives the request message may reply with some information related to the discoverer's request.
- the discoverer UE sends information about other UEs that hope to receive responses, for example, the information may be about the UE's identification information, the information may be about the ProSe query code, and the information may also be about the ProSe application identity corresponding to the group, and members of the group may respond.
- the information may be about the UE's identification information
- the information may be about the ProSe query code
- the information may also be about the ProSe application identity corresponding to the group, and members of the group may respond.
- the discoverer UE broadcasts a discovery message, which may include the type of discovery message, a service code identifying the service type of the side link communication (such as a ProSe query code or a relay service code), etc.
- the content in the discovery message is protected by code discovery security parameters or code security parameters.
- the discoverer UE selects the source layer 2 ID used for the discovery process (such as 5G ProSe direct discovery/5G ProSe U2N discovery/ranging/SL positioning discovery) by itself, and determines the destination layer 2 ID used for the discovery process based on the network configuration.
- the source layer 2 ID used for the discovery process such as 5G ProSe direct discovery/5G ProSe U2N discovery/ranging/SL positioning discovery
- the discoverer UE may create a security context including a self-selected source layer 2 ID, a service code, and a security key associated with the service code, and store the security context.
- the discoverer UE may create a security context including a self-selected source layer 2 ID, a service code, and a security key associated with the service code, and store the security context.
- the discoverer UE may, after completing the discovery process, create a security context including a self-selected source layer 2 ID, a service code, and a security key associated with the service code, and store the security context.
- the discoverer UE After receiving the discovery message, the discoverer UE that matches the discovery message can send a response message to the discoverer UE.
- the response message may include the type of discovery message, a service code (such as a ProSe response code or a relay service code) that identifies the service type of the side link communication, metadata, etc.
- the application layer metadata may be used as metadata in the discovery message.
- the content in the discovery message is protected by a code reception security parameter or a code security parameter.
- the discovered UE selects the source layer 2 ID for the discovery process (such as 5G ProSe direct discovery/5G ProSe U2N discovery/ranging/SL positioning discovery) by itself, and the source layer 2 ID of the received discovery message is set to the destination layer 2 ID.
- the source layer 2 ID for the discovery process such as 5G ProSe direct discovery/5G ProSe U2N discovery/ranging/SL positioning discovery
- the discoverer UE may, after sending a response message, create a security context including a self-selected source layer 2 ID, a service code, and a security key associated with the service code, and store the security context.
- the discoverer UE can create a security context including a self-selected source layer 2 ID, a service code, and a security key associated with the service code, and store the security context.
- the discoverer UE can create a security context including a self-selected source layer 2 ID, a service code, and a security key associated with the service code, and store the security context.
- the DCR includes the destination layer 2 ID and encryption information for sidelink communication.
- step S301 For a detailed description of the above step S301 and its related details, please refer to the description of step S201 and its related details, which will not be repeated here.
- the UE receives a DCR, wherein the DCR includes a destination layer 2 ID and encryption information for sidelink communication, and the UE determines a security key according to the destination layer 2 ID and uses the security key to decrypt the encryption information for sidelink communication. This helps to achieve secure sidelink communication.
- the service code may include any one of the following: replay service code (RSC), ProSe restriction code, ProSe query code, ProSe response code, and ranging service code.
- RSC replay service code
- ProSe restriction code ProSe query code
- ProSe response code ProSe response code
- each security context may further include one or more of the following: a UE-to-network relay layer indicator, a control plane security indicator.
- the method provided by the embodiment of the present application is introduced from the perspective of the user equipment.
- the user equipment may include a hardware structure and a software module, and implement the above functions in the form of a hardware structure, a software module, or a hardware structure plus a software module.
- a certain function of the above functions can be executed in the form of a hardware structure, a software module, or a hardware structure plus a software module.
- the present disclosure also provides a side link communication device. Since the side link communication device provided in the embodiment of the present disclosure corresponds to the side link communication methods provided in the above-mentioned embodiments, the implementation method of the side link communication method is also applicable to the side link communication device provided in this embodiment and will not be described in detail in this embodiment.
- FIG7 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a side link communication device 700 provided in an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- the side link communication device 700 can be used for a UE.
- the device 700 may include a transceiver module 701 .
- the transceiver module 701 is used to receive a direct communication request DCR, wherein the DCR includes a destination layer 2 ID and encryption information for side link communication.
- Processing module 702 is used to determine the security key used to decrypt the encrypted information based on the destination layer 2 ID; and use the security key to decrypt the encrypted information for side link communication.
- the UE receives the DCR, wherein the DCR includes the destination layer 2 ID and the encryption information for the sidelink communication, and the UE determines the security key according to the destination layer 2 ID and decrypts the encryption information using the security key for the sidelink communication.
- the UE determines the security key according to the destination layer 2 ID and decrypts the encryption information using the security key for the sidelink communication.
- the processing module 702 is used to: determine, based on the destination layer 2 ID, a security context that matches the destination layer 2 ID from one or more pre-stored security contexts; and determine the security key based on the matching security context.
- each security context includes a service code for identifying a service type of the sidelink communication, a layer 2 ID corresponding to the service code, and a security key associated with the service code.
- the service code includes any one of the following: a relay service code RSC; a proximity service (ProSe) restriction code; a ProSe query code; a ProSe response code; or a Ranging service code.
- RSC relay service code
- ProSe proximity service
- ProSe query code ProSe query code
- ProSe response code ProSe response code
- Ranging service code any one of the following: a relay service code RSC; a proximity service (ProSe) restriction code; a ProSe query code; a ProSe response code; or a Ranging service code.
- each security context further includes any one or more of the following: a UE-to-network relay layer indicator; a control plane security indicator.
- the processing module 702 is also used to: create and store the security context based on the layer 2 ID, service code and security key determined during the discovery process.
- the processing module 702 is used to perform any of the following steps: creating and storing the security context when determining the layer 2 ID for the discovery process; creating and storing the security context after sending the discovery message for the discovery process; creating and storing the security context after completing the discovery process.
- FIG 8 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device 800 provided in an embodiment of the present application.
- the communication device 800 can be a user device, or a chip, a chip system, or a processor that supports a network device to implement the above method, or a chip, a chip system, or a processor that supports a user device to implement the above method.
- the device can be used to implement the method described in the above method embodiment, and the details can be referred to the description in the above method embodiment.
- the communication device 800 may include one or more processors 801.
- the processor 801 may be a general-purpose processor or a dedicated processor, etc. For example, it may be a baseband processor or a central processing unit.
- the baseband processor may be used to process the communication protocol and communication data
- the central processing unit may be used to control the communication device (such as a base station, a baseband chip, a terminal device, a terminal device chip, a DU or a CU, etc.), execute a computer program, and process the data of the computer program.
- the communication device 800 may further include one or more memories 802, on which a computer program 804 may be stored, and the processor 801 executes the computer program 804 so that the communication device 800 performs the method described in the above method embodiment.
- data may also be stored in the memory 802.
- the communication device 800 and the memory 802 may be provided separately or integrated together.
- the communication device 800 may further include a transceiver 805 and an antenna 806.
- the transceiver 805 may be referred to as a transceiver unit, a transceiver, or a transceiver circuit, etc., and is used to implement a transceiver function.
- the transceiver 805 may include a receiver and a transmitter, the receiver may be referred to as a receiver or a receiving circuit, etc., and is used to implement a receiving function; the transmitter may be referred to as a transmitter or a transmitting circuit, etc., and is used to implement a transmitting function.
- the communication device 800 may further include one or more interface circuits 807.
- the interface circuit 807 is used to receive code instructions and transmit them to the processor 801.
- the processor 801 runs the code instructions to enable the communication device 800 to perform the method described in the above method embodiment.
- the processor 801 may include a transceiver for implementing receiving and sending functions.
- the transceiver may be a transceiver circuit, an interface, or an interface circuit.
- the transceiver circuit, interface, or interface circuit for implementing the receiving and sending functions may be separate or integrated.
- the above-mentioned transceiver circuit, interface, or interface circuit may be used for reading and writing code/data, or the above-mentioned transceiver circuit, interface, or interface circuit may be used for transmitting or delivering signals.
- the processor 801 may store a computer program 803, which runs on the processor 801 and enables the communication device 800 to perform the method described in the above method embodiment.
- the computer program 803 may be fixed in the processor 801, in which case the processor 801 may be implemented by hardware.
- the communication device 800 may include a circuit that can implement the functions of sending or receiving or communicating in the aforementioned method embodiment.
- the processor and transceiver described in the present application can be implemented in an integrated circuit (IC), an analog IC, a radio frequency integrated circuit RFIC, a mixed signal IC, an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a printed circuit board (PCB), an electronic device, etc.
- the processor and transceiver can also be manufactured using various IC process technologies, such as complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS), N-type metal oxide semiconductor (nMetal-oxide-semiconductor, NMOS), P-type metal oxide semiconductor (positive channel metal oxide semiconductor, PMOS), bipolar junction transistor (bipolar junction transistor, BJT), bipolar CMOS (BiCMOS), silicon germanium (SiGe), gallium arsenide (GaAs), etc.
- CMOS complementary metal oxide semiconductor
- N-type metal oxide semiconductor nMetal-oxide-semiconductor
- PMOS bipolar junction transistor
- BJT bipolar junction transistor
- BiCMOS bipolar CMOS
- SiGe silicon germanium
- GaAs gallium arsenide
- the communication device described in the above embodiment may be a user equipment, but the scope of the communication device described in the present application is not limited thereto, and the structure of the communication device may not be limited by FIG. 8.
- the communication device may be an independent device or may be part of a larger device.
- the communication device may be:
- the IC set may also include a storage component for storing data and computer programs;
- ASIC such as modem
- the communication device can be a chip or a chip system
- the communication device can be a chip or a chip system
- the schematic diagram of the chip structure shown in Figure 9 includes a processor 901 and an interface 902.
- the number of processors 901 can be one or more, and the number of interfaces 902 can be multiple.
- the chip further includes a memory 903, and the memory 903 is used to store necessary computer programs and data.
- the present application also provides a readable storage medium having instructions stored thereon, which implement the functions of any of the above method embodiments when executed by a computer.
- the present application also provides a computer program product, which implements the functions of any of the above method embodiments when executed by a computer.
- the computer program product includes one or more computer programs.
- the computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device.
- the computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium.
- the computer program can be transmitted from a website site, computer, server or data center by wired (e.g., coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line (digital subscriber line, DSL)) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) mode to another website site, computer, server or data center.
- the computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server or data center that includes one or more available media integrated.
- the available medium may be a magnetic medium (e.g., a floppy disk, a hard disk, a magnetic tape), an optical medium (e.g., a high-density digital video disc (DVD)), or a semiconductor medium (e.g., a solid state disk (SSD)), etc.
- a magnetic medium e.g., a floppy disk, a hard disk, a magnetic tape
- an optical medium e.g., a high-density digital video disc (DVD)
- DVD high-density digital video disc
- SSD solid state disk
- At least one in the present application can also be described as one or more, and a plurality can be two, three, four or more, which is not limited in the present application.
- the technical features in the technical feature are distinguished by “first”, “second”, “third”, “A”, “B”, “C” and “D”, etc., and there is no order of precedence or size between the technical features described by the "first”, “second”, “third”, “A”, “B”, “C” and “D”.
- machine-readable medium and “computer-readable medium” refer to any computer program product, apparatus, and/or device (e.g., disk, optical disk, memory, programmable logic device (PLD)) for providing machine instructions and/or data to a programmable processor, including a machine-readable medium that receives machine instructions as a machine-readable signal.
- machine-readable signal refers to any signal for providing machine instructions and/or data to a programmable processor.
- the systems and techniques described herein may be implemented in a computing system that includes back-end components (e.g., as a data server), or a computing system that includes middleware components (e.g., an application server), or a computing system that includes front-end components (e.g., a user computer with a graphical user interface or a web browser through which a user can interact with implementations of the systems and techniques described herein), or a computing system that includes any combination of such back-end components, middleware components, or front-end components.
- the components of the system may be interconnected by any form or medium of digital data communication (e.g., a communications network). Examples of communications networks include: a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), and the Internet.
- a computer system may include clients and servers.
- Clients and servers are generally remote from each other and usually interact through a communication network.
- the relationship of client and server is generated by computer programs running on respective computers and having a client-server relationship to each other.
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Abstract
Description
Claims (16)
- 一种侧链路通信方法,其特征在于,所述方法由用户设备UE执行,所述方法包括:接收直接通信请求DCR,其中所述DCR包括目的地层2标识ID以及用于侧链路通信的加密信息;根据所述目的地层2 ID,确定用于对所述加密信息进行解密的安全密钥;以及利用所述安全密钥对所述加密信息进行解密以便进行侧链路通信。
- 如权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述根据所述目的地层2 ID,确定用于对所述加密信息进行解密的安全密钥包括:根据所述目的地层2 ID,从预存储的一条或多条安全上下文中确定与所述目的地层2 ID匹配的安全上下文;根据所述匹配的安全上下文,确定所述安全密钥。
- 如权利要求2所述的方法,其特征在于,每条安全上下文包括用于标识侧链路通信的服务类型的服务代码、与所述服务代码对应的层2 ID、以及与所述服务代码相关联的安全密钥。
- 如权利要求3所述的方法,其特征在于,所述服务代码包括以下中任一个:中继服务代码RSC;邻近服务ProSe限制代码;ProSe查询代码;ProSe响应代码;测距Ranging服务代码。
- 如权利要求3或4所述的方法,其特征在于,每条安全上下文还包括以下中任一个或多个:UE到网络中继层指示符;控制面安全指示符。
- 如权利要求2-5中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,还包括:根据在发现过程中确定的层2 ID、服务代码和安全密钥,创建并存储所述安全上下文。
- 如权利要求6所述的方法,其特征在于,所述创建并存储所述安全上下文包括以下中任一种:在确定用于所述发现过程的层2 ID时,创建并存储所述安全上下文;在发送用于所述发现过程的发现消息后,创建并存储所述安全上下文;在完成所述发现过程后,创建并存储所述安全上下文。
- 一种侧链路通信装置,其特征在于,用于用户设备UE,所述装置包括:收发模块,用于接收直接通信请求DCR,其中所述DCR包括目的地层2标识ID以及用于侧链路通信的加密信息;处理模块,用于根据所述目的地层2 ID,确定用于对所述加密信息进行解密的安全密钥;以及利用所述安全密钥对所述加密信息进行解密以便进行侧链路通信。
- 如权利要求8所述的装置,其特征在于,所述处理模块用于:根据所述目的地层2 ID,从预存储的一条或多条安全上下文中确定与所述目的地层2 ID匹配的安全上下文;根据所述匹配的安全上下文,确定所述安全密钥。
- 如权利要求9所述的装置,其特征在于,每条安全上下文包括用于标识侧链路通信的服务类型的服务代码、与所述服务代码对应的层2 ID、以及与所述服务代码相关联的安全密钥。
- 如权利要求10所述的装置,其特征在于,所述服务代码包括以下中任一个:中继服务代码RSC;邻近服务ProSe限制代码;ProSe查询代码;ProSe响应代码;测距Ranging服务代码。
- 如权利要求10或11所述的装置,其特征在于,每条安全上下文还包括以下中任一个或多个:UE到网络中继层指示符;控制面安全指示符。
- 如权利要求8-12中任一项所述的装置,其特征在于,所述处理模块还用于:根据在发现过程中确定的层2 ID、服务代码和安全密钥,创建并存储所述安全上下文。
- 如权利要求13所述的装置,其特征在于,所述处理模块用于执行以下任一步:在确定用于所述发现过程的层2 ID时,创建并存储所述安全上下文;在发送用于所述发现过程的发现消息后,创建并存储所述安全上下文;在完成所述发现过程后,创建并存储所述安全上下文。
- 一种通信设备,其中,包括:收发器;存储器;处理器,分别与所述收发器及所述存储器连接,配置为通过执行所述存储器上的计算机可执行指令,控制所述收发器的无线信号收发,并能够实现权利要求1-7任一项所述的方法。
- 一种计算机存储介质,其中,所述计算机存储介质存储有计算机可执行指令;所述计算机可执行指令被处理器执行后,能够实现权利要求1-7任一项所述的方法。
Priority Applications (5)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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| JP2025546369A JP2026505584A (ja) | 2023-02-10 | 2023-02-10 | サイドリンク通信方法及び装置 |
| KR1020257030194A KR20250143846A (ko) | 2023-02-10 | 2023-02-10 | 사이드링크 통신 방법 및 장치 |
| PCT/CN2023/075543 WO2024164349A1 (zh) | 2023-02-10 | 2023-02-10 | 侧链路通信方法及装置 |
| CN202380008251.1A CN116830623A (zh) | 2023-02-10 | 2023-02-10 | 侧链路通信方法及装置 |
| EP23920556.0A EP4664954A4 (en) | 2023-02-10 | 2023-02-10 | METHOD AND DEVICE FOR LATERAL LINK COMMUNICATION |
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| PCT/CN2023/075543 WO2024164349A1 (zh) | 2023-02-10 | 2023-02-10 | 侧链路通信方法及装置 |
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| KR (1) | KR20250143846A (zh) |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN112491533A (zh) * | 2019-09-12 | 2021-03-12 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种密钥生成方法及装置 |
| WO2022038292A1 (en) * | 2020-08-21 | 2022-02-24 | Koninklijke Philips N.V. | Privacy of relay selection in cellular sliced networks |
| US20220303254A1 (en) * | 2020-07-23 | 2022-09-22 | Apple Inc. | Protection of communications through user equipment relay |
| CN115413413A (zh) * | 2020-05-01 | 2022-11-29 | 高通股份有限公司 | 用于安全链路建立的中继侧行链路通信 |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN111417092B (zh) * | 2019-01-04 | 2023-03-24 | 华硕电脑股份有限公司 | 支持单个一对一侧链路通信链路车联网服务的方法和设备 |
| US12587821B2 (en) * | 2021-05-07 | 2026-03-24 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Secure link establishment |
-
2023
- 2023-02-10 JP JP2025546369A patent/JP2026505584A/ja active Pending
- 2023-02-10 CN CN202380008251.1A patent/CN116830623A/zh active Pending
- 2023-02-10 WO PCT/CN2023/075543 patent/WO2024164349A1/zh not_active Ceased
- 2023-02-10 KR KR1020257030194A patent/KR20250143846A/ko active Pending
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN112491533A (zh) * | 2019-09-12 | 2021-03-12 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种密钥生成方法及装置 |
| CN115413413A (zh) * | 2020-05-01 | 2022-11-29 | 高通股份有限公司 | 用于安全链路建立的中继侧行链路通信 |
| US20220303254A1 (en) * | 2020-07-23 | 2022-09-22 | Apple Inc. | Protection of communications through user equipment relay |
| WO2022038292A1 (en) * | 2020-08-21 | 2022-02-24 | Koninklijke Philips N.V. | Privacy of relay selection in cellular sliced networks |
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| JP2026505584A (ja) | 2026-02-16 |
| EP4664954A4 (en) | 2026-02-18 |
| KR20250143846A (ko) | 2025-10-02 |
| CN116830623A (zh) | 2023-09-29 |
| EP4664954A1 (en) | 2025-12-17 |
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