WO2025001496A1 - 安全传输报文的方法及相关装置 - Google Patents
安全传输报文的方法及相关装置 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2025001496A1 WO2025001496A1 PCT/CN2024/091039 CN2024091039W WO2025001496A1 WO 2025001496 A1 WO2025001496 A1 WO 2025001496A1 CN 2024091039 W CN2024091039 W CN 2024091039W WO 2025001496 A1 WO2025001496 A1 WO 2025001496A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/46—Interconnection of networks
- H04L12/4641—Virtual LANs, VLANs, e.g. virtual private networks [VPN]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/46—Interconnection of networks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/46—Interconnection of networks
- H04L12/4633—Interconnection of networks using encapsulation techniques, e.g. tunneling
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L45/00—Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L45/00—Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks
- H04L45/34—Source routing
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L45/00—Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks
- H04L45/52—Multiprotocol routers
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L45/00—Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks
- H04L45/74—Address processing for routing
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L45/00—Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks
- H04L45/76—Routing in software-defined topologies, e.g. routing between virtual machines
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/40—Network security protocols
Definitions
- the present application relates to the field of wide area network message transmission, and in particular to a method for securely transmitting messages and a method for negotiating IPsec SA and related devices.
- an overlay network can be constructed by establishing tunnels between multiple network nodes.
- the overlay network decouples the service from the underlying network, enabling end-to-end rapid delivery of service messages.
- the tunnel since the tunnel is established based on the operator network, the network cannot guarantee the security of the service message. Therefore, the tunnel itself needs to have certain security capabilities to ensure the security of the service message.
- the currently commonly used method is that when establishing a tunnel on the control plane, the ingress node and the egress node of the tunnel use the border gateway protocol (BGP) to negotiate the key based on the transport network port (TNP) granularity, where the key is bound to the port of the ingress node and the port of the egress node of the tunnel.
- Border gateway protocol BGP
- TNP transport network port
- the ingress node After the tunnel is established, when the service message is transmitted in the tunnel, the ingress node encrypts the service message according to the key negotiated with the egress node, so that the service message is in an encrypted state when transmitted in the tunnel.
- the egress node decrypts the service message according to the negotiated key, thereby ensuring the security of the service message transmission.
- the above-mentioned method of encrypting and decrypting messages based on the TNP granularity of network nodes requires the negotiation of key information between the ingress node and the egress node for each tunnel segment.
- the service message When the service message is transmitted in the tunnel segment, it is encrypted in the negotiated manner at the ingress node of the tunnel segment and decrypted in the negotiated manner at the egress node.
- the keys between the tunnel segments are different. It is necessary to encrypt at the ingress node of each tunnel segment, decrypt at the egress node, encrypt again at the ingress node of the next tunnel segment, and decrypt again at the egress node...
- the encryption and decryption operations are cumbersome and consume a large amount of computing resources of the device, increasing the forwarding delay of the service message.
- This application provides a method for securely transmitting messages, a method for negotiating IPsec SA, and related devices. By using the methods described in this application, the message transmission efficiency can be improved and the transmission delay can be reduced.
- the present application provides a method for securely transmitting a message, which is described from the sending side of a data forwarding plane, and the method includes:
- the first site egress device edge in the wide area network receives the virtual private network VPN service message in the virtual routing forwarding VRF;
- the first site edge performs security protection on the VPN service message according to the Internet Protocol Security Association (IPsecSA) associated with the VRF negotiated with the second site edge to obtain a first message;
- IPsecSA Internet Protocol Security Association
- the first site edge encapsulates tunnel information of an upper layer overlay end-to-end tunnel established between the first site edge and the second site edge in an outer layer of the first message to obtain a second message, wherein the underlying underlay tunnel corresponding to the overlay end-to-end tunnel includes multiple tunnels, the tunnel information includes first information of a first point of presence POP, the first site edge is an inbound endpoint of the overlay end-to-end tunnel, the second site edge is an outbound endpoint of the overlay end-to-end tunnel, and the overlay end-to-end tunnel passes through the first POP;
- the first site edge sends the second message to the second site edge through the overlay end-to-end tunnel.
- the edge of the first site and the edge of the second site have pre-negotiated an IPsecSA associated with the VRF.
- the edge of the first site receives the VPN service message in the VRF
- the edge of the first site performs security protection on the VPN service message according to the IPsecSA associated with the VRF negotiated with the edge of the second site to obtain a first message
- the tunnel information of the upper-layer overlay end-to-end tunnel established between the edge of the first site and the edge of the second site is encapsulated in the outer layer of the first message to obtain a second message
- the edge of the first site transmits the second message to the edge of the second site through the upper-layer overlay end-to-end tunnel, wherein each POP through which the overlay end-to-end tunnel passes does not need to decrypt or encrypt the second message, but only needs to forward it according to the tunnel information.
- the present application provides a method for securely transmitting messages. This method only requires one security protection at the entry point of the overlay end-to-end tunnel established between the edges of the two sites.
- each POP does not need to encrypt or decrypt the message, which saves computing resources, reduces transmission delays, and improves message transmission efficiency.
- the security protection of the VPN service message includes: encrypting the VPN service message using the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol; and/or encapsulating the VPN service message with an Authentication Header.
- ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
- the tunnel information also includes second information of the second POP, the overlay end-to-end tunnel passes through the first POP and the second POP, the first site edge accesses the wide area network through the first POP, and the second site edge accesses the wide area network through the second POP.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a segment routing SRv6 tunnel of the sixth version of the Internet Protocol IPv6,
- the second message includes an IPv6 header and a segment routing header SRH, the destination address of the IPv6 header points to the first POP, and the SRH includes the first information and the second information.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel can be an SRv6 tunnel.
- the first site edge encapsulates the tunnel information of the SRv6 tunnel in the outer layer of the first message.
- the tunnel information of the SRv6 tunnel includes an IPv6 header and a segment routing header SRH.
- Each POP on the tunnel can forward the second message according to the IPv6 header and the segment routing header SRH.
- the first information is the first endpoint segment identifier END.SID of the first POP
- the operation associated with the first endpoint segment identifier END.SID includes: matching the upper layer overlay SRv6 Policy from the first POP to the second POP according to the next hop SID of the END.SID.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a segmented routing multi-protocol label switching traffic engineering policy SR-MPLS TE Policy
- the second message includes an MPLS label stack
- the MPLS label stack includes the first information and the second information.
- the first information is the first node SID of the first POP
- the operation associated with the first node SID includes: matching the upper layer overlay SR MPLS tunnel from the first POP to the second POP according to the next hop SID of the first node SID in the label stack.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a tunnel encapsulated based on the general network virtualization encapsulation GENEVE protocol, and the second message is encapsulated using SRv6 in GENEVE.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a tunnel encapsulated based on the Generic Routing Encapsulation GRE protocol, and the second message is encapsulated using SRv6 over GRE.
- the method before the first site edge receives the service message, the method further includes:
- the first site edge receives a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) route announced by the second site edge, wherein the BGP route includes a route type RT, the IPsec SA, an identifier of the second site edge, and an export route target ExportRT, wherein the route type RT indicates that the IPsec SA announced by the BGP route is used to perform end-to-end security protection on the VPN service message in the virtual routing forwarding VRF matching the Export RT; according to the route type RT and the Export RT, the first site edge associates the IPsec SA with the VRF.
- BGP Border Gateway Protocol
- a new route type has been added to BGP routing, which carries IPsec SA and Export RT.
- the newly added route type RT indicates that the IPsec SA announced by the BGP route is used to provide end-to-end security protection for VPN service messages in the VRF that matches the Export RT.
- the IPsecSA associated with the VRF is negotiated between the edge of the first site and the edge of the second site.
- the IPsecSA is used to provide security protection for the VPN service messages in the VRF, especially when multiple tunnels are spanned between the edge of the first site and the edge of the second site, which lays the foundation for the secure and fast transmission of VPN service messages.
- the implementation of the embodiment of the present application realizes the secure and fast transmission of VPN service messages, reduces transmission delays, and improves transmission efficiency.
- the BGP route is a BGP software defined wide area network SD-WAN route
- the sub-address family of the BGP SD-WAN route is the SD-WAN sub-address family
- the BGP route is a BGP Ethernet virtual private network EVPN route
- the sub-address family of the BGP EVPN route is the EVPN sub-address family.
- the identifier of the second site edge includes the site identifier site ID to which the second site edge belongs and/or the node identifier Node ID of the second site edge.
- the identifier of the second site edge may be the second site identifier site ID and the node identifier Node ID
- the second site edge may be determined by the second site identifier site ID and the node identifier Node ID, and the first site edge and the second site edge perform security protection and transmission on the service message based on the negotiated IPsec SA.
- the identifier of the second site edge may be the node identifier Node ID, and the node Node ID is globally unique in the wide area network, and the second site edge may be determined according to the Node ID.
- the identifier of the edge of the second site may be the second site identifier site ID.
- any edge in the first site receives a BGP route announced by any edge in the second site, wherein the BGP route carries the identifier of the second site and IPsec SA. This indicates that the key negotiated between the first site and the second site is IPsec SA, and service messages can be securely protected and transmitted between any edge in the first site and any edge in the second site through the negotiated IPsec SA.
- the BGP route includes network layer reachability information NLRI
- the NLRI includes the route type RT and an identifier of the second site edge.
- the BGP route includes a tunnel encapsulation attribute type length value Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV, and the Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV includes the IPsec SA.
- the BGP route includes an extended community attribute, and the extended community attribute is used to carry the Export RT.
- the first site edge and the second site edge are site edges in a software defined wide area network SD-WAN.
- the present application provides a method for securely transmitting a message, which is described from the receiving side of a data forwarding plane, and the method includes:
- a second site egress device edge in a wide area network receives a second message sent by a first site edge through an upper layer overlay end-to-end tunnel established between the first site edge and the second site edge, the second message including the first message and tunnel information of the overlay end-to-end tunnel encapsulated in an outer layer of the first message, the underlying underlay tunnel corresponding to the overlay end-to-end tunnel includes multiple tunnels, the tunnel information includes first information of a first point of presence POP, the first site edge is an entry point of the overlay end-to-end tunnel, the second site edge is an exit point of the overlay end-to-end tunnel, the overlay end-to-end tunnel passes through the first POP, and the first message is a message obtained by performing security protection on a virtual private network VPN service message through an Internet Protocol Security Alliance IPsec SA negotiated by the second site edge and the first site edge;
- IPsec SA Internet Protocol Security Alliance
- the second site edge decapsulates the second message to obtain the first message
- the second site edge processes the first message according to the IPsecSA to obtain the VPN service message.
- the second message After the second site edge receives the second message, the second message includes the first message and the tunnel information encapsulated in the outer layer of the first message.
- the second site edge decapsulates the second message to obtain the first message, and then processes the first message according to the IPsecSA negotiated with the first site edge to obtain the VPN service message.
- the second message does not need to be encrypted or decrypted by each POP on the overlay end-to-end tunnel, but only needs to be processed once at the second site edge, which improves transmission efficiency and reduces transmission delay.
- the processing of the first message includes: decrypting the first message according to the IPsecSA using the Encapsulated Security Payload ESP protocol; and/or authenticating the first message according to the IPsec SA and the authentication data carried in the authentication header Authentication Header of the first message.
- the tunnel information also includes second information of the second POP, the overlay end-to-end tunnel passes through the first POP and the second POP, the first site edge accesses the wide area network through the first POP, and the second site edge accesses the wide area network through the second POP.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a segment routing SRv6 tunnel of the sixth version of the Internet Protocol IPv6,
- the second message includes an IPv6 header and a segment routing header SRH, the destination address of the IPv6 header points to the first POP, and the SRH header includes the first information and the second information.
- the first information is the first endpoint segment identifier END.SID of the first POP
- the operation associated with the first endpoint segment identifier END.SID includes: matching the upper layer overlay SRv6 Policy from the first POP to the second POP according to the next hop SID of the END.SID.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a segmented routing multi-protocol label switching traffic engineering policy SR-MPLS TE Policy
- the second message includes an MPLS label stack
- the MPLS label stack includes the first information and the second information.
- the first information is a first node SID of the first POP
- the operation associated with the first node SID includes:
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a tunnel encapsulated based on the general network virtualization encapsulation GENEVE protocol, and the second message is encapsulated using SRv6 in GENEVE.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a tunnel encapsulated based on the Generic Routing Encapsulation GRE protocol, and the second message is encapsulated using SRv6 over GRE.
- the method before the second-site export device edge in the wide area network receives the second message sent by the first-site edge through the upper-layer overlay end-to-end tunnel, the method also includes: the second-site export device edge generates a Border Gateway Protocol BGP route, wherein the BGP route includes a route type RT, the IPsec SA, an identifier of the second-site edge, and an export route target ExportRT, wherein the route type RT indicates that the IPsec SA announced by the BGP route is used to perform end-to-end security protection on the VPN service message in the virtual routing forwarding VRF matching the Export RT; the second-site edge announces the BGP route to the first-site edge.
- the BGP route includes a route type RT, the IPsec SA, an identifier of the second-site edge, and an export route target ExportRT, wherein the route type RT indicates that the IPsec SA announced by the BGP route is used to perform end-to-end security protection on the VPN service message in the virtual routing forwarding VRF matching the Export RT
- the BGP route is a BGP software-defined wide area network SD-WAN route
- the sub-address family of the BGP SD-WAN route is the SD-WAN sub-address family
- the BGP route is a BGP Ethernet virtual private network EVPN route
- the sub-address family of the BGP EVPN route is the EVPN sub-address family.
- the identifier of the second site edge includes the site identifier site ID to which the second site edge belongs and/or the node identifier Node ID of the second site edge.
- the BGP route includes network layer reachability information NLRI
- the NLRI includes the route type RT and an identifier of the second site edge.
- the BGP route includes a tunnel encapsulation attribute type length value Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV, and the Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV includes the IPsec SA.
- the BGP route includes an extended community attribute, and the extended community attribute is used to carry the Export RT.
- the first site edge and the second site edge are site edges in a software defined wide area network SD-WAN.
- the present application provides a method for negotiating an Internet Protocol Security Alliance (IPsec) SA, described from the receiving side of the control plane, the method comprising:
- IPsec Internet Protocol Security Alliance
- the first site egress device edge in the wide area network receives a border gateway protocol BGP route announced by the second site edge, wherein the BGP route includes a route type RT, the IPsec SA, an identifier of the second site edge, and an export route target ExportRT, wherein the route type RT indicates that the IPsec SA announced by the BGP route is used to perform end-to-end security protection on a service message in a virtual routing forwarding VRF matching the Export RT;
- the first site edge associates the IPsec SA with the VRF.
- This application scheme adds a new route type RT to BGP routing.
- the BGP routing carries IPsec SA and export routing target ExportRT.
- the newly added route type RT is used to indicate that the IPsec SA announced by the BGP routing is used for end-to-end security protection of the service messages in the VRF matched by ExportRT.
- the end-to-end IPsec SA negotiation based on VRF granularity is realized between the edges of the two sites, so that the negotiated IPsec SA can be used to transmit VPN service messages in the future, laying the foundation for the transmission of VPN service messages.
- the BGP route is a BGP software-defined wide area network SD-WAN route
- the sub-address family of the BGP SD-WAN route is the SD-WAN sub-address family
- the BGP route is a BGP Ethernet virtual private network EVPN route
- the sub-address family of the BGP EVPN route is the EVPN sub-address family.
- the identifier of the second site edge includes the site identifier site ID to which the second site edge belongs and/or the node identifier Node ID of the second site edge.
- the identifier of the second site edge can be the second site identifier site ID and the node identifier Node ID.
- the second site edge can be determined by the second site identifier site ID and the node identifier Node ID, and the first site edge and the second site edge negotiate and agree on an IPsec SA.
- the identifier of the second site edge can be the node identifier Node ID, which is globally unique in the wide area network.
- the second site edge can be determined according to the Node ID, and the first site edge and the second site edge negotiate and agree on an IPsec SA.
- the identifier of the second site edge can be the second site identifier site ID.
- any edge in the first site receives a BGP route announced by any edge in the second site, wherein the BGP route carries the identifier and IPsec SA of the second site, indicating that the key negotiated between the first site and the second site is IPsec SA, and subsequently any edge in the first site and any edge in the second site can perform security protection and transmission on service messages through the negotiated key IPsec SA.
- the BGP route includes network layer reachability information NLRI
- the NLRI includes the route type RT and an identifier of the second site edge.
- the BGP route includes a tunnel encapsulation attribute type length value Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV, and the Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV includes the IPsec SA.
- the BGP route includes an extended community attribute, and the extended community attribute is used to carry the Export RT.
- the first site edge and the second site edge are site edges in a software-defined wide area network SD-WAN.
- the present application provides a method for negotiating an Internet Protocol Security Alliance (IPsec) SA, described from the sending side of the control plane, the method comprising:
- IPsec Internet Protocol Security Alliance
- the second site egress device edge in the wide area network generates a border gateway protocol BGP route, wherein the BGP route includes a route type RT, the IPsec SA, the identifier of the second site edge, and the export route target ExportRT, wherein the route type RT indicates that the IPsec SA of the BGP route announcement is used to perform end-to-end security protection on the service message in the virtual route forwarding VRF matching the Export RT;
- the second site edge announces the BGP route to the first site edge.
- This application scheme adds a new route type RT to BGP routing.
- the BGP routing carries IPsec SA and export routing target ExportRT.
- the newly added route type RT is used to indicate that the IPsec SA announced by the BGP routing is used for end-to-end security protection of the service messages in the VRF matched by ExportRT.
- the end-to-end IPsec SA negotiation based on VRF granularity is realized between the edges of the two sites, so that the negotiated IPsec SA can be used to transmit VPN service messages in the future, laying the foundation for the transmission of VPN service messages.
- the BGP route is a BGP software defined wide area network SD-WAN route
- the sub-address family of the BGP SD-WAN route is the SD-WAN sub-address family
- the BGP route is a BGP Ethernet virtual private network EVPN route
- the sub-address family of the BGP EVPN route is the EVPN sub-address family.
- the identifier of the second site edge includes the site identifier site ID to which the second site edge belongs and/or the node identifier Node ID of the second site edge.
- the identifier of the second site edge may be the second site identifier site ID and the node identifier Node ID, and the second site edge may be determined by the second site identifier site ID and the node identifier Node ID, and the first site edge and the second site edge negotiate and agree on an IPsec SA.
- the identifier of the second site edge may be the node identifier Node ID, and the node Node ID is globally unique in the wide area network, and the second site edge may be determined according to the Node ID, and the first site edge and the second site edge negotiate and agree on an IPsec SA.
- the identifier of the edge of the second site may be the second site identifier site ID. In this case, any edge in the first site receives a BGP route announced by any edge in the second site, wherein the BGP route carries the identifier of the second site and IPsec SA. This indicates that the key negotiated between the first site and the second site is IPsec SA. Subsequently, any edge in the first site and any edge in the second site may securely protect and transmit service messages through the negotiated key IPsec SA.
- the BGP route includes network layer reachability information NLRI
- the NLRI includes the route type RT and an identifier of the second site edge.
- the BGP route includes a tunnel encapsulation attribute type length value Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV, and the Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV includes the IPsec SA.
- the BGP route includes an extended community attribute, and the extended community attribute is used to carry the Export RT.
- the first site edge and the second site edge are site edges in a software-defined wide area network SD-WAN.
- the present application provides a device for securely transmitting a message, the device being applied to a first site egress device edge in a wide area network, the device comprising:
- a receiving module used for receiving a virtual private network VPN service message in a virtual routing forwarding VRF
- a processing module configured to perform security protection on the VPN service message according to an Internet Protocol Security Alliance (IPsecSA) associated with the VRF negotiated with the second site edge to obtain a first message;
- IPsecSA Internet Protocol Security Alliance
- the processing module is used to encapsulate tunnel information of an upper layer overlay end-to-end tunnel established between the first site edge and the second site edge in an outer layer of the first message to obtain a second message, wherein the underlying underlay tunnel corresponding to the overlay end-to-end tunnel includes multiple tunnels, the tunnel information includes first information of a first point of presence POP, the first site edge is an inbound end point of the overlay end-to-end tunnel, the second site edge is an outbound end point of the overlay end-to-end tunnel, and the overlay end-to-end tunnel passes through the first POP;
- a sending module is used to send the second message to the second site edge through the overlay end-to-end tunnel.
- the processing module is used to: perform Encapsulation Security Payload ESP protocol encryption on the VPN service message; and/or, encapsulate Authentication Header on the VPN service message.
- the tunnel information also includes second information of the second POP, the overlay end-to-end tunnel passes through the first POP and the second POP, the first site edge accesses the wide area network through the first POP, and the second site edge accesses the wide area network through the second POP.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a segment routing SRv6 tunnel of the sixth version of the Internet Protocol IPv6,
- the second message includes an IPv6 header and a segment routing header SRH, the destination address of the IPv6 header points to the first POP, and the SRH includes the first information and the second information.
- the first information is the first endpoint segment identifier END.SID of the first POP
- the operation associated with the first endpoint segment identifier END.SID includes: matching the upper layer overly SRv6 Policy from the first POP to the second POP according to the next hop SID of the END.SID.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a segmented routing multi-protocol label switching traffic engineering policy SR-MPLS TE Policy
- the second message includes an MPLS label stack
- the MPLS label stack includes the first information and the second information.
- the first information is the first node SID of the first POP
- the operation associated with the first node SID includes: matching the upper layer overly SR MPLS tunnel from the first POP to the second POP according to the next hop SID of the first node SID in the label stack.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a tunnel encapsulated based on the general network virtualization encapsulation GENEVE protocol, and the second message is encapsulated using SRv6 in GENEVE.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a tunnel encapsulated based on the Generic Routing Encapsulation GRE protocol, and the second message is encapsulated using SRv6 over GRE.
- the receiving module is also used to receive the Border Gateway Protocol BGP route announced by the second site edge, the BGP route including the route type RT, the IPsec SA, the identifier of the second site edge, and the export route target ExportRT, wherein the route type RT indicates that the IPsec SA announced by the BGP route is used to perform end-to-end security protection on the VPN service message in the virtual routing forwarding VRF matching the Export RT; the processing module is also used to associate the IPsec SA with the VRF according to the route type RT and the Export RT.
- the BGP route is a BGP software defined wide area network SD-WAN route
- the sub-address family of the BGP SD-WAN route is the SD-WAN sub-address family
- the BGP route is a BGP Ethernet virtual private network EVPN route
- the sub-address family of the BGP EVPN route is the EVPN sub-address family.
- the identifier of the second site edge includes the site identifier site ID to which the second site edge belongs and/or the node identifier Node ID of the second site edge.
- the BGP route includes network layer reachability information NLRI
- the NLRI includes the route type RT and an identifier of the second site edge.
- the BGP route includes a tunnel encapsulation attribute type length value Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV, and the Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV includes the IPsec SA.
- the BGP route includes an extended community attribute, and the extended community attribute is used to carry the Export RT.
- the first site edge and the second site edge are site edges in a software defined wide area network SD-WAN.
- Each functional module in the fifth aspect is used to implement the method described in the above-mentioned first aspect and any possible implementation method of the first aspect.
- the present application provides a device for securely transmitting a message, the device being applied to a second site edge in a wide area network, characterized in that the device comprises:
- a receiving module configured to receive a second message sent by a first site edge through an upper layer overlay end-to-end tunnel established between the first site edge and the second site edge, wherein the second message includes a first message and tunnel information of the overlay end-to-end tunnel encapsulated in an outer layer of the first message, the underlying underlay tunnel corresponding to the overlay end-to-end tunnel includes multiple tunnels, the tunnel information includes first information of a first point of presence POP, the first site edge is an entry point of the overlay end-to-end tunnel, the second site edge is an exit point of the overlay end-to-end tunnel, the overlay end-to-end tunnel passes through the first POP, and the first message is a message obtained by performing security protection on a virtual private network VPN service message through an Internet Protocol Security Alliance IPsec SA negotiated by the second site edge and the first site edge;
- IPsec SA Internet Protocol Security Alliance
- a processing module used for decapsulating the second message to obtain a first message
- the processing module is further configured to process the first message according to the IPsecSA to obtain the VPN service message.
- the processing module is used to: decrypt the first message using the Encapsulated Security Payload ESP protocol according to the IPsecSA; and/or authenticate the first message according to the IPsec SA and the authentication data carried in the authentication header Authentication Header of the first message.
- the tunnel information further includes second information of the second POP, the overlay end-to-end tunnel passes through the first POP and the second POP, the first site edge accesses the wide area network through the first POP, and the The second site edge accesses the wide area network through the second POP.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a segment routing SRv6 tunnel of the sixth version of the Internet Protocol IPv6,
- the second message includes an IPv6 header and a segment routing header SRH, the destination address of the IPv6 header points to the first POP, and the SRH header includes the first information and the second information.
- the first information is the first endpoint segment identifier END.SID of the first POP
- the operation associated with the first endpoint segment identifier END.SID includes: matching the upper layer overly SRv6 Policy from the first POP to the second POP according to the next hop SID of the END.SID.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a segmented routing multi-protocol label switching traffic engineering policy SR-MPLS TE Policy
- the second message includes an MPLS label stack
- the MPLS label stack includes the first information and the second information.
- the first information is the first node SID of the first POP
- the operation associated with the first node SID includes: matching the upper layer overly SR MPLS tunnel from the first POP to the second POP according to the next hop SID of the first node SID in the label stack.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a tunnel encapsulated based on the general network virtualization encapsulation GENEVE protocol, and the second message is encapsulated using SRv6 in GENEVE.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a tunnel encapsulated based on the Generic Routing Encapsulation GRE protocol, and the second message is encapsulated using SRv6 over GRE.
- the processing module is also used to generate a Border Gateway Protocol BGP route, wherein the BGP route includes a route type RT, the IPsec SA, an identifier of the second site edge, and an export route target ExportRT, wherein the route type RT indicates that the IPsec SA announced by the BGP route is used to perform end-to-end security protection on the VPN service message in the virtual route forwarding VRF matching the Export RT;
- a sending module is used to notify the BGP route to the first site edge.
- the BGP route is a BGP software defined wide area network SD-WAN route
- the sub-address family of the BGP SD-WAN route is the SD-WAN sub-address family
- the BGP route is a BGP Ethernet virtual private network EVPN route
- the sub-address family of the BGP EVPN route is the EVPN sub-address family.
- the identifier of the second site edge includes the site identifier site ID to which the second site edge belongs and/or the node identifier Node ID of the second site edge.
- the BGP route includes network layer reachability information NLRI
- the NLRI includes the route type RT and an identifier of the second site edge.
- the BGP route includes a tunnel encapsulation attribute type length value Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV, and the Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV includes the IPsec SA.
- the BGP route includes an extended community attribute, and the extended community attribute is used to carry the Export RT.
- the first site edge and the second site edge are site edges in a software-defined wide area network SD-WAN.
- Each functional module in the sixth aspect is used to implement the method described in the above-mentioned second aspect and any possible implementation method of the second aspect.
- the present application provides a device for negotiating an Internet Protocol Security Alliance (IPsec) SA, the device being applied to a first site edge in a wide area network, the device comprising:
- IPsec Internet Protocol Security Alliance
- a receiving module configured to receive a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) route announced by an edge of a second site, wherein the BGP route includes a route type RT, the IPsec SA, an identifier of the edge of the second site, and an export route target ExportRT, wherein the route type RT indicates that the IPsec SA announced by the BGP route is used to perform end-to-end security protection on a service message in a virtual routing forwarding VRF matching the Export RT;
- BGP Border Gateway Protocol
- a processing module is used to associate the IPsec SA with the VRF according to the routing type RT and the Export RT.
- the BGP route is a BGP software defined wide area network SD-WAN route
- the sub-address family of the BGP SD-WAN route is the SD-WAN sub-address family
- the BGP route is a BGP Ethernet virtual private network EVPN route
- the sub-address family of the BGP EVPN route is the EVPN sub-address family.
- the identifier of the second site edge includes a site to which the second site edge belongs. Identify the site ID and/or the node ID of the second site edge.
- the BGP route includes network layer reachability information NLRI
- the NLRI includes the route type RT and an identifier of the second site edge.
- the BGP route includes a tunnel encapsulation attribute type length value Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV, and the Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV includes the IPsec SA.
- the BGP route includes an extended community attribute, and the extended community attribute is used to carry the Export RT.
- the first site edge and the second site edge are site edges in a software-defined wide area network SD-WAN.
- Each functional module in the seventh aspect is used to implement the method described in the third aspect and any possible implementation method of the third aspect.
- the present application provides a device for negotiating an Internet Protocol Security Alliance (IPsec) SA, the device being applied to a second site edge in a wide area network, the device comprising:
- IPsec Internet Protocol Security Alliance
- a processing module configured to generate a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) route, wherein the BGP route includes a route type RT, the IPsec SA, an identifier of the second site edge, and an export route target ExportRT, wherein the route type RT indicates that the IPsec SA announced by the BGP route is used to perform end-to-end security protection on a service message in a virtual routing forwarding VRF matching the Export RT;
- BGP Border Gateway Protocol
- the sending module is used to notify the BGP route to the first site edge.
- the BGP route is a BGP software defined wide area network SD-WAN route
- the sub-address family of the BGP SD-WAN route is the SD-WAN sub-address family
- the BGP route is a BGP Ethernet virtual private network EVPN route
- the sub-address family of the BGP EVPN route is the EVPN sub-address family.
- the identifier of the second site edge includes the site identifier site ID to which the second site edge belongs and the node identifier Node ID of the second site edge.
- the BGP route includes network layer reachability information NLRI
- the NLRI includes the route type RT and/or an identifier of the second site edge.
- the BGP route includes a tunnel encapsulation attribute type length value Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV, and the Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV includes the IPsec SA.
- the BGP route includes an extended community attribute, and the extended community attribute is used to carry the Export RT.
- the first site edge and the second site edge are site edges in a software defined wide area network SD-WAN.
- the present application provides a network device, comprising a memory and a processor, the memory being used to store instructions, and the processor being used to execute the instructions stored in the memory to implement the method described in the first aspect and any possible implementation of the first aspect, or to implement the method described in the second aspect and any possible implementation of the second aspect, or to implement the method described in the third aspect and any possible implementation of the third aspect, or to implement the method described in the fourth aspect and any possible implementation of the fourth aspect.
- the present application provides a system, including a first site exit device edge and a second site edge, the first site edge is used to execute the method described in the first aspect and any possible implementation of the first aspect, and the second site edge is used to execute the method described in the second aspect and any possible implementation of the second aspect; or, the first site edge is used to execute the method described in the third aspect and any possible implementation of the third aspect, and the second site edge is used to execute the method described in the fourth aspect and any possible implementation of the fourth aspect.
- the present application provides a computer storage medium, characterized in that it includes program instructions, which, when executed on a processor, enable the processor to implement the method described in the first aspect and any possible implementation of the first aspect, or enable the processor to implement the method described in the second aspect and any possible implementation of the second aspect, or enable the processor to implement the method described in the third aspect and any possible implementation of the third aspect, or enable the processor to implement the method described in the fourth aspect and any possible implementation of the fourth aspect.
- the present application provides a computer program product comprising program instructions, which, when executed on a processor, enables the processor to implement the method described in the first aspect and any possible implementation of the first aspect, or enables the The processor implements the method described in the second aspect and any possible implementation of the second aspect, or enables the processor to implement the method described in the third aspect and any possible implementation of the third aspect, or enables the processor to implement the method described in the fourth aspect and any possible implementation of the fourth aspect.
- FIG1 is a schematic diagram of a scenario provided by the present application.
- FIG2 is a flowchart of a method for negotiating an IPsec SA provided by the present application
- FIG3 is a schematic diagram of a partial structure of a BGPSD-WAN routing message provided by the present application.
- FIG4 is a schematic diagram of a partial structure of a BGP EVPN routing message provided by the present application.
- FIG5 is a schematic diagram of a flow chart of a method for securely transmitting messages provided by the present application.
- FIG6A is a schematic diagram of the structure of a VPN service message provided by the present application.
- FIG6B is a schematic diagram of the structure of a first message provided by the present application.
- FIG6C is a schematic diagram of the structure of a second message provided by the present application.
- FIG7 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a second message provided by the present application.
- FIG8 is a schematic diagram of the structure of another second message provided by the present application.
- FIG9 is a schematic diagram of a flow chart of a method for securely transmitting messages provided by the present application.
- FIG10 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a device for securely transmitting messages provided by the present application.
- FIG11 is a schematic diagram of the structure of another device for securely transmitting messages provided by the present application.
- FIG12 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a network device provided in the present application.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a scenario provided by the present application.
- SD-WAN software-defined wide-area network
- POPs points of presence
- a tunnel 1 is established between customer premises equipment (CPE) 1 and edge point of presence (EPOP) 1
- a tunnel 2 is established between EPOP1 and backbone point of presence (BPOP) 1
- BPOP backbone point of presence
- a tunnel 3 is established between BPOP1 and BPOP2
- a tunnel 4 is established between BPOP2 and EPOP2
- a tunnel 5 is established between EPOP2 and CPE2, wherein CPE1 is located at site 1 and CPE2 is located at site 2.
- the ingress node and egress node of each tunnel are key negotiated based on the TNP granularity.
- the business flow (business message) needs to go from CPE1 to CPE2, that is, the business message needs to be transmitted from CPE1 to CPE2 across multiple tunnels.
- the CPE1 node encrypts the business message according to the key agreed upon between CPE1 and EPOP1 on tunnel 1.
- the EPOP1 node decrypts the message according to the agreed key;
- the business message reaches tunnel 2 the EPOP 1 node encrypts the business message according to the key agreed upon between EPOP1 and BPOP1 on tunnel 2.
- the BPOP1 node decrypts the business message according to the agreed key; ...
- the EPOP 2 node encrypts the business message according to the key agreed upon between EPOP2 and CPE2 on tunnel 5.
- the CPE2 node decrypts the business message according to the agreed key, parses the message, and obtains the data.
- IPsec SA Internet Protocol security
- IPsec SA is a security protocol used to provide confidentiality, integrity and authentication of data on an IP network.
- IPsec SA is a set of security parameters established between two network devices to protect the transmission of IP data packets. It includes encryption algorithms, authentication protocols, key lengths, key management and other security parameters. Before IPsec SA is established, the two devices must negotiate security parameters to ensure that they use the same security parameters. Once IPsec SA is established, data packets will be encrypted and authenticated using these security parameters to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the data.
- FIG 2 is a flow chart of a method for negotiating IPsec SA provided in this application, and the method includes but is not limited to the description of the following contents.
- the second site egress device edge in the wide area network generates a BGP route, where the BGP route includes a route type RT, an IPsec SA, an identifier of the second site edge, and an export route target ExportRT.
- BGP routes include Route Distinguisher (RD) and Export Route Target (RT).
- Route Distinguisher RD is used to identify the virtual routing forwarding (VRF) of the second site edge
- Export Route Target Export RT is used to match the VRF of the second site edge.
- the BGP route also includes the identifier of the edge of the second site.
- the identifier of the edge of the second site includes the site identifier site ID to which the edge of the second site belongs and the node identifier Node ID of the edge of the second site, that is, the edge can be determined by the site identifier and the node identifier.
- the node identifier in the wide area network has global uniqueness. In this case, the identifier of the edge of the second site can only include the node identifier, that is, the edge can be uniquely determined by the node identifier. In another implementation, the identifier of the edge of the second site can be the second site identifier site ID.
- any edge in the first site receives the BGP route announced by any edge in the second site, wherein the BGP route carries the identifier of the second site and the IPsec SA, indicating that the key negotiated between the first site and the second site is the IPsec SA, and subsequently any edge in the first site and any edge in the second site can perform security protection and transmission of service messages through the negotiated key IPsec SA.
- BGP routing also includes route type (Route Type, RT) and IPsec SA.
- Route type RT indicates that the IPsec SA announced by BGP routing is used to provide end-to-end security protection for service packets in the virtual routing forwarding VRF that matches the export routing target Export RT. For example, if the VRF that matches the export routing target Export RT is the VRF of the first site edge, then the route type RT indicates that the IPsec SA announced by BGP routing is used to provide end-to-end security protection for service packets between the second site edge and the first site edge.
- the BGP route may be a BGP SD-WAN route, the sub-address family of which is the SD-WAN sub-address family, or a BGP Ethernet virtual private network (EVPN) route, the sub-address family of which is the EVPN sub-address family.
- the BGP route may also be other routes, and its sub-address family may be other sub-address families, which is not limited in this application.
- BGP routing includes network layer reachability information (NLRI), wherein the routing type RT, routing distinguisher RD and the identifier of the second site edge are all located in the NLRI.
- NLRI network layer reachability information
- FIG3 is a partial structural diagram of a BGP SD-WAN routing provided by the present application, in FIG3, Route Type represents the routing type RT, and its length can be 2 bytes. In the SD-WAN sub-address family, the routing type can be defined as 2, Route Distinguisher represents the routing distinguisher RD, and its length can be 8 bytes. SD-WAN-Color is used to represent the site identifier, and its length can be 4 bytes.
- FIG4 is a partial structural diagram of a BGP EVPN routing provided by the present application, in FIG4, each field has the same meaning as each field in the schematic diagram of FIG3, except that in the EVPN sub-address family, the routing type RT is defined as 10. It should be noted that defining the route type RT as 2 here is only an example in the SD-WAN sub-address family. Other numerical values can be used in the SD-WAN address family to represent the newly added route types. Defining the route type RT as 10 is only an example of the EVPN sub-address family. Other numerical values can be used in the EVPN address family to represent the newly added route types. This application does not make specific limitations.
- BGP routes also include type-length-value (TLV for short).
- BGP routes include Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute (TEA) TLV, where TEA TLV includes IPsec SA, that is, IPsec SA is carried in the TEA TLV field of BGP routes.
- IPsec SA is carried in the sub-TLV of TEA TLV.
- BGP routes also include extended community attribute TLV, and the extended community attribute TLV includes export route target Export RT, that is, Export RT is carried in the extended community attribute TLV field of BGP routes.
- the positions of IPsec SA and Export RT here are just examples. IPsec SA and Export RT can also be carried in other TLV fields of BGP routes, and this application does not make specific limitations.
- the second site edge may be CPE1 or CPE2.
- the second site edge announces the BGP route to the first site edge.
- the second site edge announces the BGP route in the WAN.
- the second site edge is CPE1
- CPE1 after CPE1 generates the BGP route, it can reflect the BGP route to EPOP1 through the regional route reflector (RR)
- EPOP1 reflects the BGP route to BPOP1, BPOP2 and EPOP2 through the managed service provider (MSP) RR
- MSP managed service provider
- EPOP2 then reflects the BGP route to CPE2 through the regional RR, thereby realizing the announcement of the BGP route.
- the first site edge in the wide area network receives the BGP route announced by the second site edge.
- the first site edge may be CPE2; if the second site edge is CPE2, the first site edge may be CPE1.
- the first site edge associates the IPsec SA with the VRF.
- the first site edge receives the BGP route announced by the second site edge, and associates the IPsec SA with the VRF according to the route type RT and the export route target Export RT in the BGP route.
- Export RT is used to match the VRF of the second site edge
- the route type RT indicates that the IPsec SA announced by the BGP route is used to provide end-to-end security protection for the service packets in the VRF that matches the Export RT. Therefore, after receiving the BGP route, the first site edge first determines whether the VRF of its own site matches the Export RT, and then associates the IPsec SA with the VRF. In this case, the first site edge associates the IPsec SA with the VRF of the first site edge.
- the IPsec SA is also associated with the second site edge, it can be understood that the VRF of the first site edge and the VRF of the second site edge are both associated with the IPsec SA. In the case of mismatch, the first site edge is not associated with the IPsec SA.
- the matching strategy can be set as follows.
- Each edge in the wide area network can be set with an import route target and an export route target Export RT, wherein the import route target is stored locally on the edge, and the export route target is carried in the BGP route.
- the BGP route sent by the second site edge carries the export route target.
- the first site edge receives the BGP route sent by the second site, it compares the export route target in the BGP route with the import route target stored locally on the first site edge. If the two are consistent, the VRF of the first site edge matches the Export RT in the BGP route, and the first site edge associates the IPsec SA in the BGP route with the VRF of the first site edge.
- the VRF of the first site edge does not match the Export RT in the BGP route, and the IPsec SA is not associated with the VRF of the first site edge.
- the Export RT carried in the BGP route sent by the second site edge is 100
- the local import route target of the first site edge is 100.
- the first site edge compares the Export RT with the local import route target.
- the first site edge associates the IPsec SA carried in the BGP route with the VRF of the first site edge.
- the matching strategy can also be implemented in other ways, which is not limited in this application.
- the method described in this application can be applied to a wide area network, such as a software defined wide area network SD-WAN, where the first site edge and the second site edge can be site edges in the SD-WAN.
- the method described in this application can also be applied to other wide area networks, which is not limited in this application.
- the first site edge and the second site edge can be determined according to actual business needs and business flows, and the import routing target and export routing target of the first site edge, as well as the import routing target and export routing target of the second site edge can be set according to actual business needs.
- the VRF of the edge of the first site and the VRF of the edge of the second site are associated with the IPsec SA, that is, the IPsec SA used to transmit business messages has been negotiated between the edge of the first site and the edge of the second site.
- the business messages can be securely protected based on the negotiated IPsec SA, and the VPN business messages can be transmitted through the virtual routing forwarding VRF, thereby realizing end-to-end tunnel transmission between the edge of the first site and the edge of the second site, which only requires one security protection and one decapsulation process, thereby reducing transmission delay.
- this application provides a method for negotiating IPsec SA, adding a new route type in BGP routing, and carrying IPsec SA and export route targets in BGP routing.
- the newly added route type is used to indicate that the IPsec SA announced by the BGP route is used to provide end-to-end security protection for the service messages in the VRF that matches the export target route.
- the newly added route type implements IPsec SA negotiation based on VRF granularity.
- an IPsec SA method is negotiated between the edge of the first site and the edge of the second site, so that when the service messages are subsequently transmitted between the edge of the first site and the edge of the second site, the service messages can be securely protected based on the negotiated IPsec SA method, and the VPN service messages can be transmitted by means of virtual routing forwarding VRF.
- the present application also provides a method for securely transmitting messages. See Figure 5, which is a flow chart of a method for securely transmitting messages provided by the present application, the method is applied to a wide area network, and the method includes but is not limited to the following description.
- a first site egress device edge in a wide area network receives a virtual private network VPN service message in a virtual routing forwarding VRF.
- the first site egress device edge in the wide area network receives the VPN service message in the VRF, wherein the VPN service message may be sent to the first site edge by the controller, or may be sent to the first site edge by other network devices in the wide area network.
- the first site edge may be CPE1 or CPE2.
- the first site edge performs security protection on the VPN service message according to the Internet Protocol Security Alliance (IPsecSA) associated with the VRF negotiated with the second site edge to obtain a first message.
- IPsecSA Internet Protocol Security Alliance
- IPsecSA is negotiated between the edge of the first site and the edge of the second site, and the VRF of the edge of the first site and the VRF of the edge of the second site are associated with IPsecSA.
- IPsecSA is used to provide end-to-end protection for the service messages between the VRF of the edge of the first site and the VRF of the edge of the second site. Based on this, after the edge of the first site receives the VPN service message in the VRF, the edge of the first site performs security protection on the VPN service message according to the IPsecSA associated with the VRF negotiated with the edge of the second site, and obtains the first message.
- the security protection of VPN service messages includes encrypting the VPN service messages using the encapsulate security payload (ESP) protocol.
- the security protection of VPN service messages includes encapsulating the VPN service messages with an authentication header (AH).
- AH authentication header
- Full protection includes ESP protocol encryption of VPN service messages and VPN service message encapsulation of authentication header AH.
- Security protection of VPN service messages can also be achieved in other ways, which are not limited in this application.
- the first site edge encapsulates tunnel information of an upper layer overlay end-to-end tunnel established between the first site edge and the second site edge outside the first message to obtain a second message.
- the first site edge encapsulates the tunnel information of the upper layer overlay end-to-end tunnel established between the first site edge and the second site edge outside the first message to obtain a second message.
- the underlying underlay tunnel corresponding to the overlay end-to-end tunnel between the first site edge and the second site edge includes multiple tunnels.
- the underlying underlay tunnel corresponding to the overlay end-to-end tunnel between the first site edge and the second site edge includes tunnel 1 (CPE1 to EPOP1), tunnel 2 (EPOP1 to BPOP1), tunnel 3 (BPOP1 to BPOP2), tunnel 4 (BPOP2 to EPOP2) and tunnel 5 (EPOP2 to CPE2).
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel includes at least one entry point POP, and the tunnel information includes information about at least one entry point.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel includes a entry point POP, which is called the first entry point POP for ease of description, wherein the first site edge is the entry point of the overlay end-to-end tunnel, the second site edge is the exit point of the overlay end-to-end tunnel, and the overlay end-to-end tunnel passes through the first entry point POP, which can be either an EPOP or a BPOP, which is not limited in this application.
- the tunnel information of the overlay end-to-end tunnel includes first information about the first entry point.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel includes multiple access points POPs, and the multiple access points POPs include a first access point POP and a second access point POP, wherein the first site edge is the entry point of the overlay end-to-end tunnel, the second site edge is the exit point of the overlay end-to-end tunnel, the first site edge accesses the wide area network through the first POP, and the second site edge accesses the wide area network through the second POP.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel between the first site edge and the second site edge includes multiple access points, the first site edge accesses the wide area network through EPOP1, and the second site edge accesses the wide area network through EPOP2, then EPOP1 is the first POP, and EPOP2 is the second POP.
- the tunnel information of the overlay end-to-end tunnel includes first information of the first access point and second information of the second access point.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a segment routing SRv6 tunnel of the Internet Protocol version 6 (internet protocol version 6, IPv6)
- IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6
- the first site edge encapsulates the tunnel information of the SRv6 tunnel outside the first message to obtain a second message.
- the second message includes an IPv6 header and a segment routing header (segment routing header, SRH).
- segment routing header segment routing header
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel includes a first access point and a second access point
- the destination address of the IPv6 header points to the first access point
- the SRH includes the first information and the second information.
- Figures 6A to 6C are example diagrams provided by the present application.
- Figure 6A shows a VPN service message, including a message header Inner IP Hdr and a load Inner Payload.
- Figure 6B shows a first message, which is obtained after the VPN service message is encrypted by the ESP protocol.
- Figure 6C shows a second message, which is obtained after the tunnel information of the SRv6 tunnel between the first site edge and the second site edge is encapsulated outside the first message, wherein IPv6 Hdr (Src IP, Dst IP) represents the IPv6 message header, SRH (..., vpnsid) represents the segment routing header SRH, and the IPv6 message header and SRH constitute part of the tunnel information of the overlay end-to-end tunnel.
- IPv6 Hdr Src IP, Dst IP
- SRH ..., vpnsid
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram provided by the present application.
- IPv6 Hdr (cpe1, epop1-sid) is the IPv6 message header
- SRH (vpnsid, epop2-sid, bpop2-sid, bpop1-sid, epop1-sid,) is the segment routing header SRH, wherein epop1-sid represents the first endpoint segment identifier END.SID of CPE1, bpop1-sid represents the first endpoint segment identifier END.SID of BPOP1, bpop2-sid represents the first endpoint segment identifier END.SID of BPOP2, epop2-sid represents the first endpoint segment identifier END.SID of EPOP2, vpnsid is generated by CPE2 during BGP route announcement, and vpnsid is associated with the VRF of CPE2.
- EPOP1 is the first access point POP
- the first endpoint segment identifier epop1-sid of EPOP1 is the first information of the first access point POP
- EPOP2 is the second access point POP
- the first endpoint segment identifier epop2-sid of EPOP2 is the second information of the second access point POP
- the operation associated with the first endpoint segment identifier epop1-sid of EPOP1 includes: matching the upper layer overly SRv6 policy Policy from the first POP to the second POP according to the next hop SID of epop1-sid.
- the operation associated with the segment identifier END.SID can be seen from the messages at each POP point shown in Figure 7.
- the upper-layer overlay network is established on the basis of the underlying underlay network.
- the second message is transmitted through the overlay end-to-end tunnel, it is actually transmitted on the underlying underlay network.
- the upper-layer overlay network does not perceive how the message is transmitted on the underlying underlay network. Therefore, it is necessary to encapsulate the tunnel information of the underlay tunnel in the outer layer of the second message, and the message encapsulated with the tunnel information of the underlay tunnel is transmitted through the overlay end-to-end tunnel (the message actually encapsulated with the tunnel information of the underlay tunnel is transmitted on the underlying underlay tunnel.)
- the wide area network is an SD-WAN wide area network
- the message needs to pass through the operator network when it is transmitted.
- the devices in the operator network cannot recognize the upper-layer overlying IPv6 address. Therefore, an outer layer is encapsulated.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a segment routing multi-protocol label switching traffic engine (SR-MPLS TE) policy Policy
- the second message includes an MPLS label stack
- the MPLS label stack includes first information of the first POP and second information of the second POP.
- the first information is the first node SID of the first POP
- the operation of associating the first node SID includes: matching the upper layer overlay SR MPLS tunnel from the first POP to the second POP according to the next hop SID of the first node SID in the label stack.
- CPE1 is the edge of the first site
- CPE2 is the edge of the second site
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel between CPE1 and CPE2 is SR-MPLS TE Policy
- CPE1 encapsulates the SR-MPLS TE Policy information between CPE1 and CPE2 outside the first message to obtain a second message.
- FIG8 is a schematic diagram provided by the present application.
- epop1-sid, bpop1-sid, bpop2-sid, epop2-sid, cpe2-sid represents the tunnel information of the overlay end-to-end tunnel, that is, the MPLS label stack, wherein epop1-sid represents the first node SID of EPOP1, bpop1-sid represents the first node SID of BPOP1, bpop2-sid represents the first node SID of BPOP2, epop2-sid represents the first node SID of EPOP2, and cpe2-sid represents the first node SID of CPE2.
- EPOP1 is the first access point POP
- the first node segment identifier epop1-sid of EPOP1 is the first information of the first access point POP
- EPOP2 is the second access point POP
- the first node segment identifier epop2-sid of EPOP2 is the second information of the second access point POP.
- the operation associated with the first node SID includes: matching the upper layer overly SR MPLS tunnel between the first POP and the second POP according to the next hop SID of the first node SID in the label stack.
- the operation associated with the node segment identifier SID can be seen from the messages at each POP point shown in Figure 8.
- the underlay IP in the message of Figure 8 is the tunnel information of the underlay tunnel.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is an SRv6 tunnel
- the second message can be tunnel encapsulated based on the generic network virtualization encapsulation (GENEVE) protocol, and the second message is encapsulated using SRv6 in GENEVE.
- the second message includes: an outer IP header, a user datagram protocol (UDP) header, a GENEVE encapsulation, an SRH, an ESP, and a payload, wherein the payload includes the aforementioned VPN service message; the GENEVE encapsulation includes a VPN identifier of the VPN service carried by the VPN service message.
- a metadata field may also be included between the SRH and the ESP to carry service intent information.
- the second message can also use SRv6 over GENEVE encapsulation.
- the difference between SRv6 over GENEVE encapsulation and SRv6 in GENEVE encapsulation is that an IPv6 header is also included between the GENEVE encapsulation and the SRH.
- the encapsulation overhead of SRv6 over GENEVE encapsulation is larger than that of SRv6 in GENEVE encapsulation, but SRv6 over GENEVE encapsulation complies with the standard encapsulation format of SRv6.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a tunnel encapsulated based on the generic routing encapsulation (GRE) protocol
- the second message is encapsulated using SRv6 over GRE.
- the second message includes: an outer IP header, a UDP header, an outer GRE encapsulation, an IPv6 header, an SRH, an inner GRE encapsulation, an ESP, and a payload, wherein the payload includes the aforementioned VPN service message
- the inner GRE encapsulation includes a VPN identifier of the VPN service carried by the VPN service message. The VPN identifier is carried in the inner GRE encapsulation.
- the intermediate nodes through which the overlay end-to-end tunnel passes do not resolve the VPN identifier (VPN identifier, VNI), that is, the intermediate nodes are not aware of the VPN.
- VPN identifier VPN identifier
- a metadata field may also be included between the SRH and the inner GRE encapsulation to carry service intent information.
- the business intention information in the embodiment of the present application may include one or more information indicating the business intention.
- the business intention information may include a quality of service parameter, and the quality of service parameter is not limited to one or more parameters such as latency, packet loss, jitter, bandwidth utilization, and bit error rate.
- the business intention parameter may include gateway constraint information that needs to be satisfied by the end-to-end path from site edge1 to site edge2, and the gateway constraint information includes but is not limited to the gateways that need to be passed through and/or the gateways that need to be detoured.
- the first site edge sends a second message to the second site edge through the overlay end-to-end tunnel.
- the first site edge sends the second message to the second site edge through the overlay end-to-end tunnel.
- the first site edge sends the second message to the second site edge through the SRv6 tunnel or SR-MPLS TE Policy.
- each access point POP between the first site edge and the second site edge does not perceive the second message, does not decrypt the second message, and only forwards it according to the tunnel information of the overlay end-to-end tunnel until the second message reaches the second site edge. Therefore, during the transmission of the service message, only one security protection needs to be performed at the edge of the first site, and no decryption is required at other access points POP, which reduces the consumption of computing resources, improves forwarding efficiency, and reduces transmission delay.
- the method for securely transmitting messages provided in this embodiment can be applied to SD-WAN, and the first site edge and the second site edge are site edges in the SD-WAN.
- the method can also be applied to other wide area networks, which is not limited in this application.
- the present application scheme adds a new route type RT in BGP routing.
- the BGP routing carries IPsec SA and export routing target ExportRT.
- the newly added route type RT is used to indicate that the IPsec SA announced by the BGP routing is used for the business in the VRF matching ExportRT.
- End-to-end security protection for VPN service messages By announcing BGP routes in the WAN, end-to-end IPsec SA negotiation based on VRF granularity is achieved between the edges of the two sites, so that the negotiated IPsec SA can be used to transmit VPN service messages in the future, laying the foundation for the transmission of VPN service messages.
- each access point POP between the edge of the first site and the edge of the second site does not perceive the inner VPN service message.
- end-to-end encryption and decryption between the edges of the two sites the consumption of computing resources is reduced, the forwarding efficiency is improved, and the transmission delay is reduced.
- FIG9 is a flow chart of a secure message transmission method provided by the present application, and the method includes but is not limited to the following description.
- the second site edge in the wide area network receives a second message sent by the first site edge through an upper layer overlay end-to-end tunnel established between the first site edge and the second site edge.
- the second message includes the first message and tunnel information of the overlay end-to-end tunnel encapsulated in the outer layer of the first message.
- the method for securely transmitting messages can be applied in SD-WAN, the first site edge and the second site edge are site edges in SD-WAN, and the method can also be applied to other wide area networks, which is not limited in this application.
- the second site egress device edge receives the second message sent by the first site edge through the upper layer overlay end-to-end tunnel established between the first site edge and the second site edge.
- the underlying underlay tunnel corresponding to the upper layer overlay end-to-end tunnel established between the first site edge and the second site edge includes multiple tunnels.
- the first site edge may be CPE1
- the second site edge may be CPE2
- the first site edge may be CPE2
- the second site edge may be CPE1.
- the underlying underlay tunnel corresponding to the overlay end-to-end tunnel established between CPE1 and CPE2 includes multiple tunnels, specifically including: Tunnel 1 (CPE1 to EPOP1), Tunnel 2 (EPOP1 to BPOP1), Tunnel 3 (BPOP1 to BPOP2), Tunnel 4 (BPOP2 to EPOP2) and Tunnel 5 (EPOP2 to CPE2).
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel includes at least one access point POP, and the tunnel information includes information about at least one access point.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel includes a first access point POP, and the tunnel information includes first information about the first access point.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel includes multiple access points POPs, and the multiple access points POPs include a first access point POP and a second access point POP, and the tunnel information includes first information about the first access point and second information about the second access point.
- the first site edge is the entry point of the overlay end-to-end tunnel
- the second site edge is the exit point of the overlay end-to-end tunnel. The first site edge accesses the wide area network through the first POP, and the second site edge accesses the wide area network through the second POP.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is an SRv6 tunnel
- the second site edge receives the second message sent by the first site edge through the SRv6 tunnel
- the second message includes the first message and the tunnel information of the SRv6 tunnel encapsulated in the outer layer of the first message.
- the first message is a message obtained by performing security protection on the VPN service message through the IPsecSA negotiated by the second site edge and the first site edge
- the tunnel information of the SRv6 tunnel includes an IPv6 header and a segment routing header SRH
- the destination address of the IPv6 header points to the first POP
- the SRH header includes the first information and the second information.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is an SR-MPLS TE Policy
- the second message includes the first message and the SR-MPLS TE Policy information encapsulated in the outer layer of the first message.
- the SR-MPLS TE Policy information includes an MPLS label stack, and the MPLS label stack includes first information of the first POP and second information of the second POP.
- the format of the second message please refer to the description of the above method embodiment, and for the sake of brevity of the specification, it will not be repeated here.
- the second message may also include a message header of the underlying underlay tunnel.
- a message header underlay IP of the underlying underlay tunnel is encapsulated in the outer layer.
- the second site edge decapsulates the second message to obtain the first message.
- the second site edge decapsulates the second message to obtain the first message.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is an SRv6 tunnel
- the second message includes the first message and the tunnel information of the SRv6 tunnel.
- the second site edge decapsulates the second message, removes the tunnel information of the SRv6 tunnel, and obtains the first message.
- FIG6B A schematic diagram of the first message format is shown in FIG6B, which is not repeated here.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is SR-MPLS TE Policy
- the second message includes the first message and the SR-MPLS TE Policy information encapsulated in the outer layer of the first message.
- the second site edge decapsulates the second message, removes the tunnel information of the MPLS SR-TE tunnel, and obtains the first message.
- the schematic diagram of the first message format is shown in FIG6B, which is not repeated here.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a GENEVE protocol encapsulated tunnel
- the second message is encapsulated using SRv6 in GENEVE.
- the second site edge decapsulates the second message, removes the SRv6 in GENEVE encapsulated message header, and obtains the first message.
- FIG6B A schematic diagram of the first message format is shown in FIG6B , which will not be described in detail here.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a tunnel based on GRE protocol encapsulation
- the second message is encapsulated using SRv6 over GRE.
- the second site edge decapsulates the second message, removes the SRv6 over GRE encapsulated message header, and obtains the first message.
- FIG6B A schematic diagram of the first message format is shown in FIG6B , which is not described here.
- the second site edge processes the first message according to the IPsecSA to obtain a virtual private network VPN service message.
- the second site edge performs ESP protocol processing on the first message according to IPsecSA to obtain a VPN service message. In one implementation, the second site edge authenticates the first message according to IPsecSA and the authentication data carried in the authentication header AH of the first message to obtain a VPN service message. In one implementation, the second site edge performs ESP protocol decryption on the first message according to IPsecSA, and authenticates the first message according to the IPsecSA and the authentication data carried in the authentication header AH of the first message to obtain a VPN service message.
- the first site edge can generate a BGP route and notify the second site edge of the BGP route, or the second site edge can generate a BGP route and notify the BGP route to the first site edge. Both methods can achieve the association of the VRF of the first site edge and the VRF of the second site edge with the IPsec SA. After the VRF of the first site edge and the VRF of the second site edge are associated with the IPsec SA in either of the two methods, the first site edge can perform security protection and encapsulation on the VPN service message based on the negotiated IPsec SA, and then send it to the second site edge, which decapsulates and decrypts the VPN service message according to the negotiated IPsec SA to obtain the VPN service message.
- the present application provides a method for securely transmitting messages.
- the IPsec SA is negotiated between the edge of the first site and the edge of the second site, and the IPsec SA is associated with the VRF of the edge of the first site and the VRF of the edge of the second site.
- the implementation of the embodiment of the present application reduces the consumption of computing resources of network nodes, improves forwarding efficiency, and reduces transmission delay.
- FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a device 600 for securely transmitting a message according to an embodiment of the present application.
- the device 600 for securely transmitting a message may be configured as a first site edge in a wide area network.
- the device 600 includes:
- a receiving module 610 is used to receive a virtual private network VPN service message in a virtual routing forwarding VRF;
- the processing module 620 is used to perform security protection on the VPN service message according to the Internet Protocol Security Association (IPsecSA) associated with the VRF negotiated with the second site edge to obtain a first message;
- IPsecSA Internet Protocol Security Association
- the processing module 620 is further configured to encapsulate tunnel information of an upper layer overlay end-to-end tunnel established between the first site edge and the second site edge in an outer layer of the first message to obtain a second message, wherein the underlying underlay tunnel corresponding to the overlay end-to-end tunnel includes multiple tunnels, and the tunnel information includes first information of a first point of presence POP, the first site edge is an inbound end point of the overlay end-to-end tunnel, the second site edge is an outbound end point of the overlay end-to-end tunnel, and the overlay end-to-end tunnel passes through the first POP;
- the sending module 630 is used to send a second message to the second site edge through the overlay end-to-end tunnel.
- the processing module 620 is used to: encrypt the VPN service message using the Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) protocol; and/or encapsulate the VPN service message with an Authentication Header.
- ESP Encapsulation Security Payload
- the tunnel information also includes second information of the second POP, the overlay end-to-end tunnel passes through the first POP and the second POP, the first site edge accesses the WAN through the first POP, and the second site edge accesses the WAN through the second POP.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a segment routing SRv6 tunnel of the sixth version of the Internet Protocol IPv6,
- the second message includes an IPv6 header and a segment routing header SRH, the destination address of the IPv6 header points to the first POP, and the SRH includes first information and second information.
- the first information is the first endpoint segment identifier END.SID of the first POP
- the operations associated with the first endpoint segment identifier END.SID include: matching the upper-layer overlay SRv6 Policy from the first POP to the second POP according to the next-hop SID of END.SID.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is an SR-MPLS TE Policy
- the second message includes an MPLS label stack
- the MPLS label stack includes first information and second information.
- the first information is a first node SID of the first POP
- the operation associated with the first node SID includes: The next hop SID of the first node SID in the signature stack matches the upper layer overlay SR MPLS tunnel from the first POP to the second POP.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a tunnel encapsulated based on the general network virtualization encapsulation GENEVE protocol, and the second message is encapsulated using SRv6 in GENEVE.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a tunnel encapsulated based on the Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) protocol, and the second message is encapsulated using SRv6 over GRE.
- GRE Generic Routing Encapsulation
- the receiving module 610 is also used to receive the Border Gateway Protocol BGP route announced by the edge of the second site, the BGP route including the route type RT, IPsec SA, the identifier of the edge of the second site, and the export route target ExportRT, wherein the route type RT indicates that the IPsec SA announced by the BGP route is used to perform end-to-end security protection for the VPN service packets in the virtual routing forwarding VRF matching the Export RT; the processing module 620 is used to associate the IPsec SA with the VRF according to the route type RT and the Export RT.
- the BGP route is a BGP software defined wide area network (SD-WAN) route
- the sub-address family of the BGP SD-WAN route is the SD-WAN sub-address family
- the BGP route is a BGP Ethernet virtual private network (EVPN) route
- the sub-address family of the BGP EVPN route is the EVPN sub-address family.
- SD-WAN software defined wide area network
- EVPN BGP Ethernet virtual private network
- the identifier of the second site edge includes the site identifier site ID to which the second site edge belongs and/or the node identifier Node ID of the second site edge.
- the BGP route includes network layer reachability information NLRI
- the NLRI includes a route type RT and an identifier of the second site edge.
- a BGP route includes a Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute Type Length Value TLV, and the Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV includes an IPsec SA.
- BGP routes include an extended community attribute, which is used to carry the Export RT.
- the first site edge and the second site edge are site edges in a software-defined wide area network SD-WAN.
- the apparatus 600 for securely transmitting messages can be used to implement the method embodiment corresponding to FIG. 5, that is, the method embodiment corresponding to the sending side of the data forwarding plane, and can also be used to implement the method steps performed by the first site edge in the method embodiment of FIG. 2, that is, the method embodiment corresponding to the receiving side of the control plane.
- the apparatus 600 for securely transmitting messages can also be called a device for negotiating IPsec SA.
- each functional module and the corresponding execution steps of each functional module in Figure 10 are merely an example.
- the device 600 can also be divided into more or fewer functional modules according to specific execution steps.
- FIG. 11 is a schematic diagram of the structure of another apparatus 700 for securely transmitting a message provided in an embodiment of the present application.
- the apparatus 700 for securely transmitting a message may be configured as a second site edge in a wide area network.
- the apparatus 700 includes:
- the receiving module 710 is used to receive a second message sent by the first site edge through the upper layer overlay end-to-end tunnel established between the first site edge and the second site edge, the second message includes the first message and tunnel information of the overlay end-to-end tunnel encapsulated in the outer layer of the first message, the underlying underlay tunnel corresponding to the overlay end-to-end tunnel includes multiple tunnels, the tunnel information includes first information of the first point of presence POP, the first site edge is the ingress end point of the overlay end-to-end tunnel, the second site edge is the egress end point of the overlay end-to-end tunnel, the overlay end-to-end tunnel passes through the first POP, and the first message is a message obtained by performing security protection on a virtual private network VPN service message through an Internet Protocol Security Alliance IPsec SA negotiated by the second site edge and the first site edge;
- IPsec SA Internet Protocol Security Alliance
- the processing module 720 is used to decapsulate the second message to obtain the first message
- the processing module 720 is used to process the first message according to the IPsecSA to obtain a VPN service message.
- the processing module 720 is used to: decrypt the first message using the Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) protocol according to the IPsecSA; and/or authenticate the first message according to the IPsec SA and the authentication data carried in the Authentication Header of the first message.
- ESP Encapsulated Security Payload
- the tunnel information also includes second information of the second POP, the overlay end-to-end tunnel passes through the first POP and the second POP, the first site edge accesses the WAN through the first POP, and the second site edge accesses the WAN through the second POP.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a segment routing SRv6 tunnel of the sixth version of the Internet Protocol IPv6,
- the second message includes an IPv6 header and a segment routing header SRH, the destination address of the IPv6 header points to the first POP, and the SRH header includes first information and second information.
- the first information is the first endpoint segment identifier END.SID of the first POP
- the operations associated with the first endpoint segment identifier END.SID include: matching the upper-layer overlay SRv6 Policy from the first POP to the second POP according to the next-hop SID of END.SID.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a segment routing multi-protocol label switching traffic engineering policy SR-MPLS TE Policy
- the second message includes an MPLS label stack
- the MPLS label stack includes the first information and the second information.
- the first information is the first node SID of the first POP
- the operation associated with the first node SID includes: matching the upper layer overlay SR MPLS tunnel from the first POP to the second POP according to the next hop SID of the first node SID in the label stack.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a tunnel encapsulated based on the general network virtualization encapsulation GENEVE protocol, and the second message is encapsulated using SRv6 in GENEVE.
- the overlay end-to-end tunnel is a tunnel encapsulated based on the Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) protocol, and the second message is encapsulated using SRv6 over GRE.
- GRE Generic Routing Encapsulation
- the processing module 720 is used to generate a border gateway protocol BGP route, wherein the BGP route includes a route type RT, an IPsec SA, an identifier of the second site edge, and an export route target ExportRT, wherein the route type RT indicates that the IPsec SA announced by the BGP route is used to perform end-to-end security protection on VPN service messages in a virtual route forwarding VRF matching the Export RT;
- the sending module 730 is used for the second site edge to notify the BGP route to the first site edge.
- the BGP route is a BGP software defined wide area network (SD-WAN) route
- the sub-address family of the BGP SD-WAN route is the SD-WAN sub-address family
- the BGP route is a BGP Ethernet virtual private network (EVPN) route
- the sub-address family of the BGP EVPN route is the EVPN sub-address family.
- SD-WAN software defined wide area network
- EVPN BGP Ethernet virtual private network
- the identifier of the second site edge includes the site identifier site ID to which the second site edge belongs and/or the node identifier Node ID of the second site edge.
- the BGP route includes network layer reachability information NLRI
- the NLRI includes a route type RT and an identifier of the second site edge.
- a BGP route includes a Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute Type Length Value TLV, and the Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV includes an IPsec SA.
- BGP routes include an extended community attribute, which is used to carry the Export RT.
- the first site edge and the second site edge are site edges in a software-defined wide area network SD-WAN.
- the device 700 for securely transmitting messages can be used to implement the method embodiment corresponding to FIG. 9 , that is, the method embodiment corresponding to the data forwarding plane receiving side, and can also be used to implement the method steps performed by the second site edge in the method embodiment corresponding to FIG. 2 , that is, the method embodiment corresponding to the control plane sending side.
- the device 700 for securely transmitting messages can also be called a device for negotiating IPsec SA.
- each functional module in FIG. 11 and the corresponding execution steps of each functional module are merely an example.
- the device 700 may be further divided into more or fewer functional modules according to specific execution steps.
- Fig. 12 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a network device 800 provided by the present application, the network device 800 can be configured as a first site edge in a wide area network, or can be configured as a second site edge in a wide area network.
- the network device 800 can be implemented by a general bus architecture.
- the network device 800 includes at least one processor 801 , a memory 803 , and at least one communication interface 804 .
- Processor 801 may be a general-purpose CPU, NP, microprocessor, or may be one or more integrated circuits for implementing the solution of the present application. For example, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a programmable logic device (PLD), or a combination thereof.
- ASIC application-specific integrated circuit
- PLD programmable logic device
- PLD may be a complex programmable logic device (CPLD), a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), a generic array logic (GAL), or any combination thereof.
- CPLD complex programmable logic device
- FPGA field-programmable gate array
- GAL generic array logic
- the network device 800 may also include a communication bus 802 for transmitting information between various components.
- the communication bus 802 may be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc.
- FIG. 12 is represented by only one thick line, but does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.
- the memory 803 may be a read-only memory (ROM) or other types of static storage devices that can store static information and instructions, or a random access memory (RAM) or other types of dynamic storage devices that can store information and instructions, or an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), a compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM) or other optical disc storage, optical disc storage (including compressed optical disc, laser disc, optical disc, digital versatile disc, Blu-ray disc, etc.), a magnetic disk storage medium or other magnetic storage device, or any other medium that can be used to carry or store program codes in the form of instructions or data structures and can be accessed by a computer, but is not limited thereto.
- the memory 803 may exist independently and be connected to the processor 801 through the communication bus 802; the memory 803 may also be connected to the processor 801. Integrated together.
- the communication interface 804 is used to communicate with other devices or communication networks.
- the communication interface 804 may include a wired communication interface and may also include a wireless communication interface.
- the wired communication interface may be, for example, an Ethernet interface, and the Ethernet interface may be an optical interface, an electrical interface, or a combination thereof.
- the wireless communication interface may be a wireless local area network (WLAN) interface, a cellular network communication interface, or a combination thereof, etc.
- WLAN wireless local area network
- the processor 801 may include one or more CPUs, for example, CPU0 and CPU1 shown in FIG. 12 .
- the network device 800 may include multiple processors, such as the processor 801 and the processor 805 shown in Figure 12. Each of these processors may be a single-core processor (single-CPU) or a multi-core processor (multi-CPU).
- the processor here may refer to one or more devices, circuits, and/or processing cores for processing data (such as computer program instructions).
- the memory 803 is used to store the program code 810 of the present application solution
- the processor 801 is used to execute the program code 810 stored in the memory 803. That is, the network device 800 can implement the method provided by the method embodiment of Figure 2 or Figure 5 or Figure 9 through the processor 801 and the program code 810 in the memory 803.
- the network device 800 of the embodiment of the present application may correspond to the first site edge or the second site edge in the above-mentioned various method embodiments, and the processor 801, the communication interface 804, etc. in the network device 800 may implement the functions and/or various steps and methods implemented by the devices in the above-mentioned various method embodiments. For the sake of brevity, it will not be repeated here.
- the receiving module 610 and the sending module 630 in the device 600 for securely transmitting messages can be located in the communication interface 804 in the network device 800; the processing module 620 can be located in the processor 801 or the processor 805 in the network device 800.
- the receiving module 710 and the sending module 730 in the device 700 for securely transmitting messages can be located in the communication interface 804 in the network device 800; the processing module 720 can be located in the processor 801 or the processor 805 in the network device 800.
- the hardware, modules and other operations and/or functions in the network device 800 are respectively various steps and methods implemented by the device 600 for securely transmitting messages or the device 700 for securely transmitting messages.
- the specific details can be found in the above-mentioned method embodiments, and for the sake of brevity of the specification, they will not be repeated here.
- each step of Figure 2 or Figure 5 or Figure 9 above is completed by an integrated logic circuit of hardware in the processor of the network device 800 or an instruction in the form of software.
- the method and steps disclosed in conjunction with the embodiments of the present application can be directly embodied as a hardware processor for execution, or a combination of hardware and software modules (software units) in the processor for execution.
- the software module can be located in one or more storage media mature in the art such as random access memory, flash read-only memory, programmable read-only memory, electrically erasable programmable memory and registers.
- the storage medium is located in the memory, and the processor reads the information in the memory and executes the steps in the above method in conjunction with the hardware. For the simplicity of the specification, it is not described in detail here.
- An embodiment of the present application also provides a system, which includes a first site edge and a second site edge.
- the first site edge can be the above-mentioned device 600 or network device 800 for secure message transmission
- the second site edge can be the above-mentioned device 700 or network device 800 for secure message transmission.
- the first site edge can be used to implement the method embodiment described in Figures 2 or 5 above
- the second site edge can be used to implement the method embodiment described in Figures 2 or 9 above.
- An embodiment of the present application also provides a computer storage medium, including program instructions, which, when executed on a processor, enable the processor to implement each step in the method embodiment described in FIG. 2 or FIG. 5 or FIG. 9 above.
- An embodiment of the present application further provides a computer program product including program instructions.
- the program instructions When the program instructions are executed on a processor, the processor implements each step in the method embodiment described in FIG. 2 , FIG. 5 , or FIG. 9 .
- the disclosed systems, devices and methods may be implemented in other ways.
- the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative.
- the division of the unit is merely a logical function division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation.
- multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed.
- the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be an indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, or may be an electrical, mechanical or other form of connection.
- the unit described as a separate component may or may not be physically separated, and the component displayed as a unit may or may not be a physical unit, that is, it may be located in one place or distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the embodiment of the present application.
- each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.
- the above-mentioned integrated unit may be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional units.
- the integrated unit is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium.
- the technical solution of the present application is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including a number of instructions to enable a computer device (which can be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the method in each embodiment of the present application.
- the aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), disk or optical disk and other media that can store program code.
- the computer program product includes one or more computer program instructions.
- the computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device.
- the computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium.
- the computer program instructions can be transmitted from one website site, computer, server or data center to another website site, computer, server or data center by wired or wireless means.
- the computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server or data center that includes one or more available media integrated.
- the available medium can be a magnetic medium (such as a floppy disk, a hard disk, a tape), an optical medium (for example, a digital video disc (digital video disc, DVD), or a semiconductor medium (such as a solid state drive), etc.
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Abstract
Description
Claims (54)
- 一种安全传输报文的方法,其特征在于,所述方法包括:广域网中的第一站点出口设备edge接收虚拟路由转发VRF中的虚拟专用网络VPN业务报文;所述第一站点edge根据与第二站点edge协商的与所述VRF关联的因特网协议安全协议安全联盟IPsecSA对所述VPN业务报文进行安全保护,以得到第一报文;所述第一站点edge在所述第一报文外层封装所述第一站点edge与所述第二站点edge之间建立的上层overlay端到端隧道的隧道信息,以获得第二报文,其中,所述overlay端到端隧道对应的底层underlay隧道包括多段隧道,所述隧道信息包括第一入网点POP的第一信息,所述第一站点edge为所述overlay端到端隧道的入端点,所述第二站点edge为所述overlay端到端隧道的出端点,所述overlay端到端隧道经过所述第一POP;所述第一站点edge通过所述overlay端到端隧道,向所述第二站点edge发送所述第二报文。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述对所述VPN业务报文进行安全保护包括:对所述VPN业务报文进行封装安全载荷ESP协议加密;和/或,对所述VPN业务报文封装认证头Authentication Header。
- 根据权利要求1或2所述的方法,其特征在于,所述隧道信息还包括第二POP的第二信息,所述overlay端到端隧道经过所述第一POP和所述第二POP,所述第一站点edge通过所述第一POP接入所述广域网,所述第二站点edge通过所述第二POP接入所述广域网。
- 根据权利要求3所述的方法,其特征在于,所述overlay端到端隧道为互联网协议第六版本IPv6的段路由SRv6隧道,所述第二报文包括IPv6头和分段路由头SRH,所述IPv6头的目的地址指向所述第一POP,所述SRH包括所述第一信息和所述第二信息。
- 根据权利要求4所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一信息为所述第一POP的第一端点段标识END.SID,所述第一端点段标识END.SID关联的操作包括:根据所述END.SID的下一跳SID匹配从所述第一POP到所述第二POP之间的上层overlay SRv6 Policy。
- 根据权利要求3所述的方法,其特征在于,所述overlay端到端隧道为分段路由多协议标签交换流量工程策略SR-MPLS TE Policy,所述第二报文包括MPLS标签栈,所述MPLS标签栈包括所述第一信息和所述第二信息。
- 根据权利要求6所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一信息为所述第一POP的第一节点SID,所述第一节点SID关联的操作包括:根据所述标签栈中所述第一节点SID的下一跳SID匹配从所述第一POP到所述第二POP之间的上层overlay SR MPLS隧道。
- 根据权利要求3所述的方法,其特征在于,所述overlay端到端隧道为基于通用网络虚拟化封装GENEVE协议封装的隧道,所述第二报文采用SRv6 in GENEVE封装。
- 根据权利要求3所述的方法,其特征在于,所述overlay端到端隧道为基于通用路由封装GRE协议封装的隧道,所述第二报文采用SRv6 over GRE封装。
- 根据权利要求1至9任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,在所述第一站点edge接收所述业务报文之前,所述方法还包括:所述第一站点edge接收所述第二站点edge通告的边界网关协议BGP路由,所述BGP路由包括路由类型RT、所述IPsec SA、所述第二站点edge的标识、以及导出路由目标ExportRT,其中,所述路由类型RT指示所述BGP路由通告的所述IPsec SA用于对与所述Export RT匹配的所述虚拟路由转发VRF中的所述VPN业务报文进行端到端安全保护;根据所述路由类型RT和所述Export RT,所述第一站点edge将所述IPsec SA与所述VRF关联。
- 根据权利要求10所述的方法,其特征在于,所述BGP路由为BGP软件定义的广域网SD-WAN路由,所述BGPSD-WAN路由的子地址族为SD-WAN子地址族,或者,所述BGP路由为BGP以太网虚拟专用网络EVPN路由,所述BGP EVPN路由的子地址族为EVPN子地址族。
- 根据权利要求10或11所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第二站点edge的标识包括所述第二站点edge所属的站点标识site ID和所述第二站点edge的节点标识Node ID。
- 根据权利要求10-12任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述BGP路由包括网络层可达信息NLRI,所述NLRI包括所述路由类型RT和所述第二站点edge的标识。
- 根据权利要求10-13任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述BGP路由包括隧道封装属性类型长度值Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV,所述Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV包括所述IPsec SA。
- 根据权利要求10至14任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述BGP路由包括扩展团体属性,所述扩展团体属性用于携带所述Export RT。
- 根据权利要求10-15任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一站点edge和所述第二站点edge为软件定义的广域网SD-WAN中站点edge。
- 一种安全传输报文的方法,其特征在于,所述方法包括:广域网中的第二站点出口设备edge接收第一站点edge通过在所述第一站点edge和所述第二站点edge之间建立的上层overlay端到端隧道发送的第二报文,所述第二报文中包括第一报文以及在所述第一报文外层封装的所述overlay端到端隧道的隧道信息,所述overlay端到端隧道对应的底层underlay隧道包括多段隧道,所述隧道信息包括第一入网点POP的第一信息,所述第一站点edge为所述overlay端到端隧道的入端点,所述第二站点edge为所述overlay端到端隧道的出端点,所述overlay端到端隧道经过所述第一POP,所述第一报文为通过所述第二站点edge与所述第一站点edge协商的因特网协议安全协议安全联盟IPsec SA对虚拟专用网络VPN业务报文进行安全保护所得到的报文;所述第二站点edge对所述第二报文进行解封装,获得第一报文;所述第二站点edge根据所述IPsecSA对所述第一报文进行处理,以获得所述VPN业务报文。
- 根据权利要求17所述的方法,其特征在于,所述对所述第一报文进行处理包括:根据所述IPsecSA,对所述第一报文进行封装安全载荷ESP协议解密;和/或,根据所述IPsec SA和所述第一报文的认证头Authentication Header中携带的认证数据对所述第一报文进行认证。
- 根据权利要求17或18所述的方法,其特征在于,所述隧道信息还包括第二POP的第二信息,所述overlay端到端隧道经过所述第一POP和所述第二POP,所述第一站点edge通过所述第一POP接入所述广域网,所述第二站点edge通过所述第二POP接入所述广域网。
- 根据权利要求19所述的方法,其特征在于,所述overlay端到端隧道为互联网协议第六版本IPv6的段路由SRv6隧道,所述第二报文包括IPv6头和分段路由头SRH,所述IPv6头的目的地址指向所述第一POP,所述SRH头包括所述第一信息和所述第二信息。
- 根据权利要求20所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一信息为第一POP的第一端点段标识END.SID,所述第一端点段标识END.SID关联的操作包括:根据所述END.SID的下一跳SID匹配从所述第一POP到所述第二POP之间的上层overlay SRv6 Policy。
- 根据权利要求19所述的方法,其特征在于,所述overlay端到端隧道为分段路由多协议标签交换流量工程策略SR-MPLS TE Policy,所述第二报文包括MPLS标签栈,所述MPLS标签栈包括所述第一信息和所述第二信息。
- 根据权利要求22所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一信息为所述第一POP的第一节点SID,所述第一节点SID关联的操作包括:根据所述标签栈中所述第一节点SID的下一跳SID匹配从所述第一POP到所述第二POP之间的上层overlay SR MPLS隧道。
- 根据权利要求19所述的方法,其特征在于,所述overlay端到端隧道为基于通用网络虚拟化封装GENEVE协议封装的隧道,所述第二报文采用SRv6 in GENEVE封装。
- 根据权利要求19所述的方法,其特征在于,所述overlay端到端隧道为基于通用路由封装GRE协议封装的隧道,所述第二报文采用SRv6 over GRE封装。
- 根据权利要求17至25任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,在所述广域网中的第二站点出口设备edge接收第一站点edge通过上层overlay端到端隧道发送的第二报文之前,所述方法还包括:所述第二站点出口设备edge生成边界网关协议BGP路由,其中,所述BGP路由包括路由类型RT、所述IPsec SA、所述第二站点edge的标识、以及导出路由目标ExportRT,其中,所述路由类型RT指示所述BGP路由通告的所述IPsec SA用于对与所述Export RT匹配的虚拟路由转发VRF中的所述VPN业务报文进行端到端安全保护;所述第二站点edge向所述第一站点edge通告所述BGP路由。
- 根据权利要求26所述的方法,其特征在于,所述BGP路由为BGP软件定义的广域网SD-WAN路 由,所述BGPSD-WAN路由的子地址族为SD-WAN子地址族,或者,所述BGP路由为BGP以太网虚拟专用网络EVPN路由,所述BGP EVPN路由的子地址族为EVPN子地址族。
- 根据权利要求26或27所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第二站点edge的标识包括所述第二站点edge所属的站点标识site ID和所述第二站点edge的节点标识Node ID。
- 根据权利要求26至28任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述BGP路由包括网络层可达信息NLRI,所述NLRI包括所述路由类型RT和所述第二站点edge的标识。
- 根据权利要求26至29任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述BGP路由包括隧道封装属性类型长度值Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV,所述Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV包括所述IPsec SA。
- 根据权利要求26至30任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述BGP路由包括扩展团体属性,所述扩展团体属性用于携带所述Export RT。
- 根据权利要求26至31任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一站点edge和所述第二站点edge为软件定义的广域网SD-WAN中站点edge。
- 一种协商因特网协议安全协议安全联盟IPsec SA的方法,其特征在于,所述方法包括:广域网中的第一站点出口设备edge接收第二站点edge通告的边界网关协议BGP路由,所述BGP路由包括路由类型RT、所述IPsec SA、所述第二站点edge的标识、以及导出路由目标ExportRT,其中,所述路由类型RT指示所述BGP路由通告的所述IPsec SA用于对与所述Export RT匹配的虚拟路由转发VRF中的业务报文进行端到端安全保护;根据所述路由类型RT和所述Export RT,所述第一站点edge将所述IPsec SA与所述VRF关联。
- 根据权利要求33所述的方法,其特征在于,所述BGP路由为BGP软件定义的广域网SD-WAN路由,所述BGPSD-WAN路由的子地址族为SD-WAN子地址族,或者,所述BGP路由为BGP以太网虚拟专用网络EVPN路由,所述BGP EVPN路由的子地址族为EVPN子地址族。
- 根据权利要求33或34所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第二站点edge的标识包括所述第二站点edge所属的站点标识site ID和所述第二站点edge的节点标识Node ID。
- 根据权利要求33至35任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述BGP路由包括网络层可达信息NLRI,所述NLRI包括所述路由类型RT和所述第二站点edge的标识。
- 根据权利要求33至36任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述BGP路由包括隧道封装属性类型长度值Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV,所述Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV包括所述IPsec SA。
- 根据权利要求33至37任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述BGP路由包括扩展团体属性,所述扩展团体属性用于携带所述Export RT。
- 根据权利要求33至38任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一站点edge和所述第二站点edge为软件定义的广域网SD-WAN中站点edge。
- 一种协商因特网协议安全协议安全联盟IPsec SA的方法,其特征在于,所述方法包括:广域网中的第二站点出口设备edge生成边界网关协议BGP路由,其中,所述BGP路由包括路由类型RT、所述IPsec SA、所述第二站点edge的标识、以及导出路由目标ExportRT,其中,所述路由类型RT指示所述BGP路由通告的所述IPsec SA用于对与所述Export RT匹配的虚拟路由转发VRF中的业务报文进行端到端安全保护;所述第二站点edge向第一站点edge通告所述BGP路由。
- 根据权利要求40所述的方法,其特征在于,所述BGP路由为BGP软件定义的广域网SD-WAN路由,所述BGPSD-WAN路由的子地址族为SD-WAN子地址族,或者,所述BGP路由为BGP以太网虚拟专用网络EVPN路由,所述BGP EVPN路由的子地址族为EVPN子地址族。
- 根据权利要求40或41所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第二站点edge的标识包括所述第二站点edge所属的站点标识site ID和所述第二站点edge的节点标识Node ID。
- 根据权利要求40至42任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述BGP路由包括网络层可达信息NLRI,所述NLRI包括所述路由类型RT和所述第二站点edge的标识。
- 根据权利要求40至43任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述BGP路由包括隧道封装属性类型长度值Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV,所述Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV包括所述IPsec SA。
- 根据权利要求40至44任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述BGP路由包括扩展团体属性,所述 扩展团体属性用于携带所述Export RT。
- 根据权利要求40至45任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一站点edge和所述第二站点edge为软件定义的广域网SD-WAN中站点edge。
- 一种安全传输报文的装置,其特征在于,所述装置包括用于实现如权利要求1-16任一项所述方法的模块。
- 一种安全传输报文的装置,其特征在于,所述装置包括用于实现如权利要求17-32任一项所述方法的模块。
- 一种协商因特网协议安全协议安全联盟IPsec SA的装置,其特征在于,所述装置包括用于实现如权利要求33-39任一项所述方法的模块。
- 一种协商因特网协议安全协议安全联盟IPsec SA的装置,其特征在于,所述装置包括用于实现如权利要求40-46任一项所述方法的模块。
- 一种网络设备,其特征在于,包括存储器和处理器,所述存储器用于存储指令,所述处理器用于执行所述存储器中存储的所述指令,以实现如权利要求1至16任一项所述的方法,或者,以实现如权利要求17至32任一项所述的方法,或者,以实现如权利要求33至39任一项所述的方法,或者,以实现如权利要求40至46任一项所述的方法。
- 一种系统,其特征在于,包括第一站点出口设备edge和第二站点edge,所述第一站点edge用于执行如权利要求1至16任一项所述的方法,所述第二站点edge用于执行如权利要求17至32任一项所述的方法;或者,所述第一站点edge用于执行如权利要求33至39任一项所述的方法,所述第二站点edge用于执行如权利要求40至46任一项所述的方法。
- 一种计算机存储介质,其特征在于,包括程序指令,当所述程序指令在处理器上执行时,使得所述处理器实现如权利要求1至16任一项所述的方法,或者,使得所述处理器实现如权利要求17至32任一项所述的方法,或者,使得所述处理器实现如权利要求33至39任一项所述的方法,或者,使得所述处理器实现如权利要求40至46任一项所述的方法。
- 一种包括程序指令的计算机程序产品,其特征在于,当所述程序指令在处理器上执行时,使得所述处理器实现如权利要求1至16任一项所述的方法,或者,使得所述处理器实现如权利要求17至32任一项所述的方法,或者,使得所述处理器实现如权利要求33至39任一项所述的方法,或者,使得所述处理器实现如权利要求40至46任一项所述的方法。
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| CN113472622A (zh) * | 2020-03-30 | 2021-10-01 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种网络中传输业务的方法和设备 |
| CN114338116A (zh) * | 2021-12-21 | 2022-04-12 | 迈普通信技术股份有限公司 | 加密传输方法、装置及sd-wan网络系统 |
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| CN1323522C (zh) * | 2003-01-22 | 2007-06-27 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种确定客户边缘路由器与虚拟专用网络间关系的方法 |
| US7643488B2 (en) * | 2006-09-29 | 2010-01-05 | Nortel Networks Limited | Method and apparatus for supporting multiple customer provisioned IPSec VPNs |
| US20090106449A1 (en) * | 2007-10-19 | 2009-04-23 | Michael Satterlee | Method and apparatus for providing dynamic route advertisement |
| CN108574589B (zh) * | 2017-03-10 | 2021-09-14 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种互联网协议安全性隧道的维护方法、装置及系统 |
| CN113261248B (zh) * | 2018-10-19 | 2022-09-16 | 华为技术有限公司 | 安全sd-wan端口信息分发 |
| CN115606154A (zh) * | 2020-05-15 | 2023-01-13 | 华为技术有限公司(Cn) | 边界网关协议(BGP)控制的软件定义广域网(SD-WAN)中的互联网协议安全(IPsec)简化 |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20110023090A1 (en) * | 2009-07-22 | 2011-01-27 | Cisco Technology, Inc | Integrating service insertion architecture and virtual private network |
| CN113472622A (zh) * | 2020-03-30 | 2021-10-01 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种网络中传输业务的方法和设备 |
| CN114338116A (zh) * | 2021-12-21 | 2022-04-12 | 迈普通信技术股份有限公司 | 加密传输方法、装置及sd-wan网络系统 |
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| CN120074898A (zh) * | 2025-02-17 | 2025-05-30 | 新华三技术有限公司 | 通信方法及装置 |
Also Published As
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| CN119232523A (zh) | 2024-12-31 |
| EP4708784A4 (en) | 2026-05-06 |
| CN119232523B (zh) | 2025-12-02 |
| EP4708784A1 (en) | 2026-03-11 |
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