EP0138320B1 - System zum Verteilen von kryptografischen Schlüsseln - Google Patents

System zum Verteilen von kryptografischen Schlüsseln Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0138320B1
EP0138320B1 EP19840305480 EP84305480A EP0138320B1 EP 0138320 B1 EP0138320 B1 EP 0138320B1 EP 19840305480 EP19840305480 EP 19840305480 EP 84305480 A EP84305480 A EP 84305480A EP 0138320 B1 EP0138320 B1 EP 0138320B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
card
terminal
information
encrypted
personal identification
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Expired
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EP19840305480
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English (en)
French (fr)
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EP0138320A3 (en
EP0138320A2 (de
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Carl Merritt Campbell
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Visa USA Inc
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Visa USA Inc
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Publication of EP0138320A3 publication Critical patent/EP0138320A3/en
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
    • G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
    • G07F19/206—Software aspects at ATMs
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for distributing cryptographic keys in a system having a plurality of issuing institutions and a plurality of transaction terminals and a central host, said method allowing the off-line verification of the authenticity of a financial transaction card at a terminal on the basis of authorisation information placed on the card by the issuing institution, said authorisation information being encrypted using an encrypting key.
  • Financial transaction cards are commonly used as a replacement for cash. These cards, which can either be credit cards or debit cards, can be used instead of cash to purchase goods or services from a merchant. Many cards can also be utilized to obtain cash or traveller's checks from financial institutions or merchants, including through the use of automatic teller machines (ATM's).
  • ATM's automatic teller machines
  • transaction card fraud There are many types of transaction card fraud. For example, criminals have used lost or stolen cards to purchase goods or services. criminals have also duplicated or counterfeited cards using valid account numbers.
  • Another approach which overcomes many of the shortcomings of card lists, includes on-line authorization terminals.
  • merchants are provided with electronic terminals that are connected to the issuer of the cards, possibly through a central processor.
  • information encoded on the card is read into the terminal.
  • the terminal communicates this information over transmission lines to a host computer having information on the card holder. If the card is valid and the transaction does not exceed a specified limit, the host computer will return an approval to the merchant.
  • One method which the applicant has developed, includes placing a secret, encrypted code on the card to guard against counterfeiting.
  • anticounterfeiting check digits are derived by encrypting the personal account number (PAN) associated with the card.
  • PAN personal account number
  • These cryptographic check digits are encoded onto the magnetic stripe of the card.
  • the central processor receives the information on the magnetic stripe, which includes the PAN and the check digits.
  • the transmitted PAN is encrypted in a manner similar to the generation of the cryptographic check digits. If the two results compare favorably, the card can be authorized.
  • the counterfeiter merely having a valid personal account number, could not generate valid check digits.
  • PIN personal identification numbers
  • a particular PIN is assigned to each card holder.
  • the PIN may be either selected by the card holder or issued by the financial institution. This approach is utilized today in many banks having automatic teller machines.
  • the central host compares the transmitted PIN with the associated PIN stored at the central location. If these numbers match, the card holder is identified as the authorized user of the card.
  • the latter approach is effective to reduce the unauthorized use of lost or stolen credit cards.
  • One example includes the comparison of at least a portion of a cardholder's PIN, at the terminal.
  • a portion of the PIN is encrypted and encoded onto the magnetic stripe of the card.
  • the key which is used to encrypt the partial PIN values is supplied to the transaction terminals.
  • the encrypted information is read from the magnetic stripe and compared with the PIN entered by the card holder, utilizing the secret key stored at the terminal.
  • the partial PIN check can be used to authorize low value transactions. If a higher level transaction needs to be authorized, the remainder of the PIN can be verified through the communication network in an on-line manner.
  • the offline approach can also be adapted for use with the anticounterfeiting scheme outlined above.
  • each of the institutions could be provided with their own encrypting key.
  • the rest of the institutions in the system could still operate.
  • the latter approach would require that each terminal be provided with the encrypting keys of each and every institution. Because of the number of institutions, this approach is deemed unfeasible as a long term solution. Therefore, it would be desirable to provide a key management system which would overcome the shortcomings described above.
  • An alternative, compromise approach would include supplying the terminals with a portion of the encrypting keys used by the card issuers. In this manner, some of the transactions could be approved in an off-line manner.
  • Such a system is disclosed in EP-A- 0 003 756.
  • authorisation information is encoded on each card by the card issuer.
  • the authorisation information is enciphered under a key used by that issuer.
  • Each of the remote terminals is provided with a partial list of the keys used by the various issuers.
  • the user initiates a transaction request by inserting his card into the terminal.
  • the issuer identification number is read from the card and used to search the table in the terminal for the proper encryption key data. If the encryption key data is found, the card can be authorised off-line. If the data is not found in the table, the card data is sent to the central host which accesses the key data from a master table. This information is communicated back to the terminal.
  • This system has some obvious drawbacks. First, it is necessary to distribute keys from each of the issuers to the remote terminals. This process is very inefficient and requires significant storage capabilities at the local terminal. Moreover, since only a fraction of the keys are distributed, many transactions still must be authorised in an on-line manner, that, is by connection to the host which has the master table of key data.
  • the present invention overcomes these disadvantages by allowing the terminal to derive the encrypting key from information found on the card. This result is achieved by having the central host supply key data to the various issuers which is related to a system master key. Only the system master key is stored in the local terminals. The system master key is used by the terminals to derive the encrypting key permitting full off-line authentication.
  • the invention also provides a corresponding system which is defined in claim 11 hereinafter.
  • the issuing institutions are connected by communication lines to the host, and the terminals are also connected by communication lines to the host.
  • some transactions may be authorized in a typical on-line manner utilizing the communication lines.
  • the system also permits security and fraud analysis to take place in an off-line manner.
  • the terminals are designed such that if someone tampers with the terminal, the master key is erased or destroyed.
  • Each issuing institution will typically have some form of identification number (i.e. Bank Identification Number, BIN).
  • BIN Bank Identification Number
  • the encryption key sent to the institution is derived by encrypting the BIN, associated with the bank, under the master key.
  • BIN Bank Identification Number
  • the institution's identification number (BIN) The institution also places the authorisation information on the card and, as discussed more fully hereinbelow, this authorisation information can include anticounter f eiting data, personal identification numbers or even dynamic signature information. In any case the authorisation information is placed on the card in encrypted form. Furthermore, the authorisation information is encrypted under the secondary key associated with the institution.
  • the secondary key When a card holder initiates a transaction, the information from the card is read by the terminal. In order to authorise the transaction, the secondary key must be derived by the terminal. The secondary key is derived by utilizing the master key stored in the terminal to encrypt, in this example, the BIN placed on the card. Once the secondary key has been derived, it can be used to permit the analysis of the encrypted authorisation information placed on the card.
  • the above approach solves the shortcomings found in the prior art. More specifically, it permits off-line authorisation of transaction cards at a terminal. Furthermore, since each individual issuing institution is provided with unique encrypting keys, the compromise of any single issuer's secondary key will not affect the security of the entire system. From a commerical standpoint, it is necessary to have each individual institution responsible for its own security. This result is achieved with the key management approach of the invention. In addition, while each individual bank is given its own unique key, there is no requirement for each terminal to be provided with all of the keys. Rather, the terminal derives the necessary secondary key utilizing the master key supplied by the central host and the bank identification number. Thus, the terminal does not require large storage capacity but only needs to be provided with one secure master key.
  • a central host 20 which acts as a network switch, routing information between a plurality of transaction terminals 22 and issuing institutions 24.
  • the issuing institutions can be banks or other service organizations which distribute transaction cards, such as credit cards or debit cards. These cards may be used at various merchants or institutions to purchase goods or services or to obtain cash.
  • a terminal typically includes a reader for receiving information encoded on the magnetic stripe of the card.
  • the terminal may include a PIN pad to permit a customer to enter their personal identification number (PIN).
  • the terminal will also include an encryption apparatus which may be provided in the main portion of the terminal or separately in the PIN pad. The location of the encryption apparatus will depend on the particular technique being selected.
  • Each of the terminals is connected to the host along communication lines 30.
  • the host is also connected to the issuers along communications lines 32.
  • information about the card holder and the purchase are transmitted from the terminal, along communication lines 30, to the host.
  • the central host will make the approval or denial decision.
  • the information is routed along lines 32, to the institution which issued the card.
  • the authorization decision made by the institution is retransmitted to the merchant along the same communication lines.
  • off-line is defined to mean operations which can be performed at the terminal without any communication to the host.
  • FIG 2 the general key management system of the subject invention is illustrated. This approach can be utilized to provide both an off-line anticounterfeit check and PIN verification.
  • the flow chart is broken into three segments where Figure 2A shows the operations performed at the central host, Figure 2B shows the operations performed by the issuer and Figure 2C shows the actions taken at the terminal.
  • the central host or control 20 initially generates a system master key 40.
  • This master key is supplied to all of the terminals 42. Since the security of the master key is of utmost importance, this distribution should be handled in a highly secure manner.
  • the terminals are physically connected to the host permitting initial loading of the master key. After this time, the terminals are kept under high security until they are installed at merchant locations.
  • a key loading device is connected to the host and has the master key loaded therein. The key loading device is then brought to each terminal and physically connected to load the key.
  • the terminal should be designed such that any tampering will erase or otherwise destroy the master key, such that it can never be extracted from the terminal.
  • the host then generates a plurality of secondary keys 44. These secondary keys are derived utilizing the bank identification number (BIN). As pointed out above, each institution is generally associated with an unique identification number. This identification number is encrypted using the master key. The resulting secondary keys are then distributed to the associated issuers. Again, a number of methods can be used to distribute the keys. Typically, secure encrypted communication lines are already established between the issuers and the host and therefore it is possible to transmit these keys over communication lines. The key may also be physically delivered using a key loading device as discussed above.
  • BIN bank identification number
  • the issuer is now capable of generating transaction cards. Initially, the issuer will place its BIN number on each card 50. Typically, this information is placed on the card by encoding the information on a magnetic stripe. While this approach is fairly common, there many other ways of encoding data on the cards, all of which are within the scope of the subject invention.
  • the issuer will then generate authorizaton information 52. As discussed below, this authorization information can be anticounterfeiting digits, PIN information or any other suitable identifier.
  • the authorization information is then encrypted, using the secondary key supplied by the host 54.
  • the encrypted authorization information is then placed on the card 56 in the manner described above.
  • the card can now be authorized in an off-line manner at the terminals.
  • the card is initially read by the terminal at 60.
  • the terminal will typically have a card reader capable of deciphering the encoded information on the magnetic stripe.
  • the terminal should have compatible reading equipment.
  • the information which is read includes the BIN number of the institution, as well as the encrypted authorization information.
  • the terminal will then derive the secondary key, utilizing the master key stored at the terminal to encrypt the BIN number of the institution 62. Once the secondary key has been derived, it can be used to analyze encrypted authorization information on the card 64.
  • the analysis can be handled in a number of ways. The particular approach will depend on the system design and a few examples will be discussed in detail hereinbelow.
  • the transaction can be authorized. If the information does not match, the transaction can be denied.
  • Figure 3 a more specific approach is shown for use in an anticounterfeiting scheme.
  • Figure 3A illustrates the actions taken at the issuer, while Figure 3B describes the events at the terminal.
  • Figures 3 through 6 the activities of the central host are identical with those described in Figure 2 and will not be further discussed.
  • the issuer will again place the BIN number on the card 70.
  • the issuer will also generate a personal account number (PAN) which is unique for each card.
  • PAN personal account number
  • This account number or (PAN) is placed on the card 72.
  • the issuer will then encrypt the PAN with the secondary key 74.
  • the result of this encryption is placed on the card 76. While the above discussion is limited to the use of a PAN, this number may be combined with any other information normally on the card, such as the card expiration date. Further, the entire encrypted information need not be placed on the card but only a subset thereof. By choosing only a specific subset, the information which must fit on the card can be economized.
  • the card will be read at the terminal 80.
  • both the BIN number and the encrypted PAN information will be received.
  • the terminal will then derive the secondary key, utilizing the master key to encrypt the BIN 82.
  • the secondary key is then used to encrypt the account number placed on the card at 84.
  • the result of this encryption (or at least a portion thereof) can then be compared with the encrypted account information on the card. If these match, the transaction can be authorized.
  • the issuer will again place the BIN on the card 90.
  • the PAN is also placed on the card 92.
  • the secure card property such as the Watermark is placed on the card. Because of the manufacturing sophistication necessary to implant a secure property, this step will typically be initially handled by an entity other than the issuer. The cards with the secured property placed thereon will then be supplied to the issuer. Thus, it is not intended that the order of the placement of the information on the card restrict the scope of the subject invention.
  • the secure property which would provide some form of numeric information, is then combined with the account number and encrypted, using a secondary key 96. The result of this encryption is then encoded on the card 98.
  • the information on the card including the secure property, is read by the terminal 100.
  • the secondary key is derived, utilizing the master key to encrypt the BIN 102.
  • the PAN and secure property are combined and are encrypted using the secondary key 104.
  • the result of this encryption is then compared with the encrypted information encoded on the card 106. As in the previous cases, if the information matches, the transaction can be approved. However, if the information does not match, the transaction can be denied.
  • the use of the key management system is illustrated for use with information particularly associated with the card holder, such as a PIN.
  • the identical system can be used for any other information associated with a specific card holder, such as dynamic signature analysis information.
  • the handwriting analysis information unique to the cardholder, would be encoded in numeric form and encrypted, using the proper key.
  • the remainder of discussion of Figures 5 and 6 will be restricted to the use of PINs.
  • the issuer will once again place its BIN number on the card 110.
  • a PIN will then be generated to be associated with the customer.
  • the bank generates this PIN.
  • the PIN may also be supplied to the issuer by the cardholder.
  • the particular approach taken can be left to the discretion of the issuing institution as there are various advantages and disadvantages with both techniques. The benefits of each technique is discussed in detail in a bulletin by the American National Standards Committee (ANSI) publication on Pin Management and Security, ANSI-X9.8 (1982). If the PIN has been generated by the institution, it must be supplied to the cardholder.
  • ANSI American National Standards Committee
  • the PIN which has been selected is then encrypted using the secondary key 114.
  • the result of this encryption is then placed on the card 116.
  • this system is probably best utilized using only a partial PIN value. For example, where four digits constitute the PIN, only two digits are encrypted and placed on the card. The remaining two digits are utilized for higher value, on-line authorization.
  • the partial PIN digits may also be derived using the full PIN. All or only a portion of these derived digits may be placed on the card. The details of implementing a partial PIN system are known in the prior art and need not be discussed in detail.
  • the card to be used is read by the terminal 120.
  • the secondary key is derived by encrypting the BIN utilizing the master key stored at the terminal 122.
  • the card holder will then enter his PIN.
  • the PIN may be entered through the PIN pad of the terminal 124.
  • the secondary key is then utilized to compare the encrypted PIN information on the card with the PIN entered by the card holder 126. This comparison may be carried out either by encrypting the PIN entered by the card holder or by decrypting the encrypted PIN on the card such that both PINS are in clear text.
  • the issuer places the BIN number on the card 130.
  • the PAN is placed on the card 132.
  • a PIN is generated 134 in a manner described above.
  • the PAN is encrypted 136.
  • the resulting encryption is then combined with the PIN to define a coded value 138.
  • the card is read at the terminal 150.
  • the PIN is received from the cardholder 152.
  • the secondary key is then derived utilizing the master key to encrypt the BIN 154.
  • the PAN is then encrypted under the secondary key 156.
  • the encrypted PAN is then compared with the information placed on the card. This can conveniently be done in two ways, as shown at 158 and 160. More specifically, the encrypted PAN (or a portion thereof) is combined with the coded value and then compared with the PIN entered by the card holder. Where the original combination at 138 was by addition, the encrypted PAN is subtracted from the coded value, which should yield the PIN.
  • Another alternative (160) is to combine the newly encrypted PAN (or a portion thereof) with the PIN entered by the card holder. This result should generate the coded value which has been placed on the card. In either case, if the comparison matches, the transaction can be authorized.
  • a new and improved key management system for use in an EFT environment, which permits off-line authorization of a transaction card.
  • a central host generates a master key which is then supplied to all the terminals in the system.
  • the host then derives a secondary key for each issuing institution by encrypting the BIN number of the issuing institution under the master key.
  • the secondary keys are then supplied to the issuing institution.
  • the institution When the institution issues a card, it places its BIN number on the card.
  • authorization information is placed on the card in encrypted form. This information is encrypted under the secondary key associated with the institution. This information may include anticounterfeiting digits or PIN information.
  • the information on the card is read.
  • the terminal then derives the secondary key, utilizing the master key stored at the terminal to encrypt the BIN of the institution.
  • the secondary key is then used to permit analysis of the encrypted authorization information which has been placed on the card.
  • off-line authorization can be carried out to enhance the security of the transaction card network.
  • each of the issuing institutions is given a different cryptographic key, thereby further enhancing overall system security.
  • the disclosure has included a description of a number of different security approaches which can utilize the subject key management system. These techniques can be used alone or in combination. If used in combination, it could be beneficial to have the issuing institutions use a different secondary key for each technique. This could be accomplished in a number of ways. For example, a different master key could be generated for each technique, or the BIN could be modified in a set way before it is encrypted.

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Claims (17)

1. Verfahren zum Verteilen von Cryptographieschlüsseln in einem System mit einer Vielzahl von Ausgabestellen (24) und einer Vielzahl von Transaktions-Endgeräten (22) und einem zentralen Wirt (20), das off-line die Verifizierung der Authentizität einer Finanztransaktionskarte an einem Endgerät (22) auf der Basis von durch die Ausgabestelle (24) auf die Karte plazierter Autorisationsinformation ermöglicht, wobei die Autorisationsinformation unter Verwendung eines Verschlüsselungs-Schlüssels verschlüsselt ist, gekennzeichnet durch folgende Schritte:
Erzeugen eines System-Hauptschlüssels am zentralen Wirt (20);
Liefern des Hauptschlüssels an jedes Endgeräte (22);
Ableiten eines Sekundärschlüssels für jede Ausgabestelle im zentralen Wirt (20) durch Verschlüsseln von Daten, die die Ausgabestelle identifizieren, unter Verwendung des Hauptschlüssels;
Liefern der Sekundärschlüssel an die angeschlossenen Ausgabestellen (24).
Plazieren der die Ausgabestelle identifizierenden Daten auf die Karten und
Plazieren von Autorisationsinformation auf jede Karte durch die Ausgabestelle (24), wobei die Autorisationsinformation unter Verwendung des Sekundärschlüssels, der mit der Ausgabestelle assoziiert ist, verschlüsselt ist, so daß eine Karte off-line an jedem Endgerät (22) dadurch autorisiert werden kann, daß der Sekundärschlüssel abgeleitet wird, wobei der am Endgerät gespeicherte Hauptschlüssel dazu verwendet wird, die auf die Karte plazierte Information, die die Ausgabestelle identifiziert, zu verschlüsseln, womit eine Analyse der auf die Karte plazierten verschlüsselten Autorisationsinformation möglich ist.
2. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, gekennzeichnet durch folgende Schritte:
An jeder der Ausgabestellen (24):
Plazieren eindeutiger Kontoinformation auf jede von dieser Stelle ausgegebene Karte, wobei die auf die Karte plazierte Autorisationsinformation durch Verschlüsseln der Kontoinformation abgeleitet wird; und
an jedem Endgerät (22) Vergleichen der verschlüsselten Autorisationsinformation und der auf die vorgelegte Karte plazierten Kontoinformation.
3. Verfahren nach Anspruch 2, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der Vergleich durch Verwendung des Sekundärschlüssels durchgeführt wird, der am Endgerät (22) abgeleitet wird, um die Kontoinformation zu verschlüsseln, die auf die vorgelegte Karte plaziert ist, und Vergleichen des verschlüsselten Resulates mit der verschlüsselten Autorisationsinformation, die auf die vorgelegte Karte plaziert ist.
4. Verfahren nach Anspruch 2, gekennzeichnet durch den Schritt, daß eine Sicherheits-Karteneigenart auf jede ausgegebene Karte plaziert wird, und daß der Schritt der Ableitung von Autorisationsinformation eine Verschlüsselung der Sicherheits-Karteneigenart in Kombination mit der Kontoinformation einschließt.
5. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Endgeräte (22) fähig sind, vom Kartenhalter eingegebene persönliche Identifikations-Information zu akzeptieren, und durch folgende Schritte:
Verschlüsseln in jeder Ausgabestelle (24) die persönliche Identifikations-Information des betreffenden Kartenhalters unter Verwendung des Sekundärschlüssels, der mit der Ausgabestelle assoziiert ist, und Plazieren wenigstens eines Teils der verschlüsselten persönlichen Identifikations-information auf die assoziierte Karte; und
Vergleichen, an jedem Endgerät (22), der verschlüsselten persönlichen Identifikations-Information auf der vorgelegten Karte mit der persönlichen Identifikations-Information, die vom Kartenhalter in das Endgerät eingegeben ist.
6. Verfahren nach Anspruch 5, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der Vergleich dadurch durchgeführt wird, daß der am Endgerät (22) abgeleitete Sekundärschlüssel dazu verwendet wird, die persönliche Identifikations-Information, die auf die vorgelegte Karte plaziert ist, zu entschlüsseln, und Vergleichen des Resultates mit der persönlichen Identifikations-Information, die vom Kartenhalter in das Endgerät (22) eingegeben ist.
7. Verfahren nach Anspruch 5, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der Vergleich dadurch durchgeführt wird, daß der am Endgerät (22) abgeleitete Sekundärschlüssel dazu verwendet wird, die persönliche Identifikations-Information, die vom Kartenhalter in das Endgerät (22) eingegeben ist, zu verschlüsseln, und Vergleichen des Resultates mit der persönlichen Identifikations-Information, die auf die vorgelegte Karte plaziert ist.
8. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Endgeräte (22) fähig sind, vom Kartenhalter eingegebene persönliche Identifikations-Information zu akzeptieren, und durch folgende Schritte:
An jeder der Ausgabestellen (24):
Erzeugen und Plazieren eindeutiger Kontoinformation auf jeder von dieser Stelle ausgegebene Karte;
Erzeugen der Autorisationsinformation in Form einer kodierten Nachricht, wobei die kodierte Nachrichtdurch eine Anzahl von Schritten abgeleitet wird, die die Kombination der assoziierten Kontoinformation und der assoziierten persönlichen Identifikations-Information und wenigstens einen Verschlüsselungsschritt unter Verwendung des Sekundärschlüssels einschließen;
Plazieren der kodierten Nachricht auf der Karte; und
am Endgerät (22):
Vergleichen der Information auf der vorgelegten Karte und der Persönlichen Identifikations-Information, die vom Kartenhalter in das Endgerät (22) eingegeben ist.
9. Verfahren nach Anspruch 8, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der Vergleich dadurch durchgeführt wird, daß der am Endgerät (22) abgeleitete Sekundärschlüssel dazu verwendet wird, die Kontoinformation, die auf die vorgelegte Karte plaziert ist, zu verschlüsseln, und Kombinieren wenigstens eines Teils des Resultates mit der kodierten Nachricht, die auf die vorgelegte Karte plaziert ist, um einen Vergleich mit der persönlichen Identifikations- Information, die vom Kartenhalter in das Endgerät (22) eingegeben ist, zu ermöglichen.
10. Verfahren nach Anspurch 8, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der Vergleich dadurch durchgeführtwird, daß der am Endgerät (22) abgeleitete Sekundärschlüssel dazu verwendet wird, die Kontoinformation, die auf die vorgelegte Karte plaziert ist, zu verschlüsseln, und Kombinieren wenigstens eines Teils des Resultates mit der persönlichen Identifikations-Information, die vom Kartenhalter in das Endgerät (22) eingegeben ist, um einen Vergleich mit der kodierten Nachricht, die auf die vorgelegte Karte plaziert ist, zu ermöglichen.
11. System zum Verteilen von Cryptographieschlüsseln mit einer Vielzahl von Ausgabestellen (24) und einer Vielzahl von Transaktionsendgeräten (22) und einem zentralen Wirt (22), das die offlin-Verifizierung der Authentizität einer Finanz-Transaktions-Karte an einem Endgerät (22) auf der Basis von von der Ausgabestelle (24) auf die Karte plazierter Autorisationsinformation erlaubt, wobei die Autorisationsinformation unter Verwendung eines Cryptographieschlüssels verschlüsselt ist, gekennzeichnet durch
Kontrollmittel am zentralen Wirt (20) zum Erzeugen und Liefern eines System-Hauptschlüssels an jedes der Endgeräte, und zum Ableiten eines Sekundärschlüssels für jede Ausgabestelle durch Verschlüsseln von die Ausgabestelle identifizierenden Daten unter dem Hauptschlüssel und Liefern der Sekundärschlüssel an die assoziierten Ausgabestellen;
Mitteln an den Ausgabestellen zur Ausgabe von Karten, die in der Lage sind, die Ausgabestelle identifizierende Daten auf jede von dieser Stelle ausgegebene Karte zu plazieren, und zum Erzeugen von Autorisationsinformation und Verschlüsseln dieser Autorisationsinformation mit dem Sekundärschlüssel, der von den Kontrollmitteln geliefert ist, und Plazieren der verschlüsselten Autorisationsinformation auf die Karte;
Mitteln (22a) an jedem Endgerät (22) zum Lesen der auf eine vorgelegte Karte plazierten Information; und
Mitteln (22a) an jedem Endgerät (22) zum Ableiten des Sekundärschlüssels unter Verwendung des im Endgerät (22) gespeicherten Hauptschlüssels, um die die Ausgabestelle identifizierenden Daten zu verschlüsseln, um den Sekundärschlüssel abzuleiten, um eine off-line-Analyse der auf die vorgelegte Karte plazierten Autorisationsinformation zu erlauben.
12. System nach Anspruch 11, gekennzeichnet durch
Mitteln an jeder Ausgabestelle (24) zum Erzeugen von eindeutiger Kontoinformation für jede ausgegebene Karte und Plazieren der Kontoinformation auf die assoziierte Karte und Mitteln zum Verschlüsseln der Kontoinformation unter dem Sekundärschlüssel und Plazieren wenigstens eines Teils der verschlüsselten Kontoinformation als verschlüsselte Autorisationsinformation auf die auszugebene Karte; und
Mitteln an jedem Endgerät (22) zum Vergleich der verschlüsselten Autorisationsinformation und der auf die vorgelegte Karte plazierten Kontoinformation.
13. System nach Anspruch 12, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß das Verschlüsselungsmittel an jedem Endgerät (22) den Sekundärschlüssel verwendet, der am Endgerät (22) abgeleitet ist, um die Kontoinformation zu verschlüsseln, die auf die vorgelegte Karte plaziert ist, und wenigstens einen Teil des verschlüsselten Resultats mit der verschlüsselten Autorisationsinformation vergleicht, die auf die vorgelegte Karte plaziert ist.
14. System nach Anspruch 12, gekennzeichnet durch ein Mittel zum plazieren einer Sicherheits-Karteneigenart auf die auszugebende Karte, sowie dadurch, daß das Verschlüsselungsmittel an jeder Ausgabestelle (24) eine Kombination der Sicherheits-Karteneigenart und der Kontoinformation verschlüsselt und wenigstens einen Teil des Resultates auf die auszugebende Karte plaziert, und daß jedes Endgerät (22) ein Mittel zum Lesen der Sicherheits-Karteneigenart aufweist.
15. System nach Anspruch 12, gekennzeichnet durch
Mittel an jeder AusgabesteHe (24) zum Erzeugen von persönlicher Identifikationsinformation für jede Karte und Mittel zum Erzeugen der Autorisationsinformation in Form einer kodierten Nachricht, wobei die kodierte Nachricht durch eine Anzahl von Schritten abgeleitet wird, einschließlich Kombination der Kontoinformation und der persönlichen Identifikationsinformation und wenigstens einen Verschlüsselungsschritt unter Verwendung des Sekundärschlüssels;
Mittel (22a) an jedem Endgerät (22) zum Empfang von persönlicher Identifikationsinformation, die vom Kartenhalter eingegeben wird; und
Mitteln an jedem Endgerät (22) zum Vergleich der Information auf einer vorgelegten Karte und der persönlichen Identifikationsinformation, die vom Kartenhalter in das Endgerät (22) eingegeben ist.
16. System nach Anspruch 15, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß das Verschlüsselungsmittel an jedem Endgerät (22) den Sekundärschlüssel verwendet, der am Endgerät (22) abgeleitet ist, um die Kontoinformation zu verschlüsseln, die auf die vorgelegte Karte plaziert ist, und wenigstens einen Teil des Resultates mit der kodierten Nachricht kombiniert, die auf die vorgelegte Karte plaziert ist, um einen Vergleich mit der persönlichen Identifikationsinformation zu erlauben, die vom Kartenhalter in das Endgerät (22) eingegeben ist.
17. System nach Anspruch 15, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß das Verschlüsselungsmittel an jedem Endgerät (22) den am Endgerät (22) abgeleiteten Sekundärschlüssel dazu benutzt, die Kontoinformation zu verschlüsseln, die auf die vorgelegte Karte plaziert ist, und wenigstens einen Teil des Resultates mit der persönlichen Identifikationsinformation kombiniert, die vom Kartenhalter in das Endgerät (22) eingegeben ist, um einen Vergleich mit der kodierten Nachrcht auf der vorgelegten Karte zu erlauben.
EP19840305480 1983-09-02 1984-08-10 System zum Verteilen von kryptografischen Schlüsseln Expired EP0138320B1 (de)

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JPS6061863A (ja) 1985-04-09
DE3477331D1 (en) 1989-04-20
EP0138320A3 (en) 1986-02-19
EP0138320A2 (de) 1985-04-24

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