EP0729252B1 - Verwaltung kryptographischer Schlüssel - Google Patents

Verwaltung kryptographischer Schlüssel Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0729252B1
EP0729252B1 EP96300116A EP96300116A EP0729252B1 EP 0729252 B1 EP0729252 B1 EP 0729252B1 EP 96300116 A EP96300116 A EP 96300116A EP 96300116 A EP96300116 A EP 96300116A EP 0729252 B1 EP0729252 B1 EP 0729252B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
cryptographic
key
keys
cryptographic key
csf
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP96300116A
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English (en)
French (fr)
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EP0729252A3 (de
EP0729252A2 (de
Inventor
James Press
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Fujitsu Services Ltd
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Fujitsu Services Ltd
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Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Fujitsu Services Ltd filed Critical Fujitsu Services Ltd
Publication of EP0729252A2 publication Critical patent/EP0729252A2/de
Publication of EP0729252A3 publication Critical patent/EP0729252A3/de
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0729252B1 publication Critical patent/EP0729252B1/de
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/088—Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms

Definitions

  • This invention relates to cryptographic key management in data processing systems. More specifically, the invention is concerned with a mechanism for enforcing cryptographic control policies.
  • policies specifying which cryptographic controls are to be applied can be defined in a file issued by the system supplier and tied into a specific customer (e.g. by hashing the file using a one-way function using the licence key and customer identity as initialisation vectors).
  • Such controls could include:
  • the key tags may be used to control:
  • the object of the present invention is to provide an extension of the key tagging concept, in order to support the control of the application of cryptographic control policies.
  • this shows a distributed data processing system 10, including a number of applications 11,12. It is assumed that one of these applications 11 (referred to as the client) wishes to set up a secure communication with another application 12, referred to as the server.
  • the system also includes a key distribution service (KDS) 13, whose purpose is to distribute cryptographic keys to the applications.
  • KDS key distribution service
  • Each of the applications 11,12 and the KDS 13 has a respective cryptographic support facility (CSF) 14,15,16 associated with it.
  • Each application 11,12 has its own key encrypting key (KEK), which is held securely in its own CSF.
  • the KDS has a key database 17 which holds the KEKs of all the applications, encrypted under a master key MK, known only to the KDS's CSF 16.
  • FIG. 2 shows one of the CSFs 14,15,16 in more detail.
  • the CSF is a trusted secure module, and includes a key store 21 in which it securely holds keys. Each key held in the store is identified by a handle, which allows the key to be referenced by the associated application or KDS without allowing direct access to the key itself.
  • Each CSF also includes a key management function 22, a key generation function 23 and a cryptographic operation function 24.
  • the key management function 22 is used for checking key tags, and enforcing any restrictions imposed by those tags.
  • the key generation function 23 is used for generating and deriving keys.
  • the cryptographic operation function 24 is used for encryption, decryption and integrity protection.
  • the cryptographic keys may for example be DES keys, as described in FIPS Pub 40, Data Encryption Standard, National Bureau of Standard (now National Institute of Standards and Technology), U.S. Department of Commerce, 1977.
  • Bit 7 denotes the most significant bit, and bit 0 denotes the least significant.
  • Bit Meaninq if set ( 1) 7 key can be used to protect data 6 key can be used to protect keys 5 key can be used to encipher 4 key can be used to decipher 3 key can be used for integrity seal generation 2 key can be used for integrity seal verification 1 reserved 0 continued in next byte
  • a key can be tagged as being able to protect both data and keys. This is in order to support protocols where a single session key may be used to protect requests for keys and also to protect keys returned from the KDS.
  • tag byte 1 will be the last (and only) tag byte; otherwise tag byte 2 will follow tag byte 1.
  • the keys and their associated tags are encrypted together whenever they are sent outside the trusted CSF. Hence, users or user processes will be unable to modify the settings of the key tags. Whenever the CSF is invoked to use a key, it will take into account the key tags appended to that key, e.g. to determine whether it is permissible to use the key to derive other keys and whether to apply cryptographic control policies before the key is used.
  • this shows the operation of the client 11 when it wishes to set up a secure communication with the server 12.
  • the server when the server receives this secure association request message, it similarly imports the encrypted basic key BK into its CSF and uses it and the accompanying dialog key packages to derive the same dialog keys as the client. The client and server may then use the dialog keys to send messages to each other in a secure manner.
  • the client and server may derive as many dialog keys for use between themselves as required, without further recourse to the KDS.
  • this shows the operation of the KDS when it receives a request from a client for a basic key for use with a named server.
  • this shows the operation of a CSF when it receives a call requesting it to generate a dialog key.
  • the call includes the handle of the basic key BK, and also includes a seed value to be used in key generation.
  • the client and server applications may call their respective CSFs to use this key for enciphering, deciphering, integrity seal generation, and integrity seal verification.
  • FIG 7 shows the operation of a CSF when called by an application to encipher data.
  • the call includes the data to be enciphered, along with the handle of the dialog key to be used.
  • the above description has discussed how the CSFs enforce the application of cryptographic control policies to dialog keys which are derived by two peers from basic keys generated by the key distribution service (KDS).
  • KDS key distribution service
  • the CSFs are also able to enforce the application of cryptographic control policies to keys which are generated directly (i.e. generated by applications rather than by the KDS), as will now be described.
  • the default action of a CSF is to apply cryptographic control policies to all keys that are generated or derived unless overridden by the KDS.
  • derived keys the tagging of the basic key (generated by the KDS) controls whether the derived dialog keys will be subject to cryptographic control policies.
  • keys generated by applications these will be subject to cryptographic control policies.
  • direct key generation facilities are not available to applications thus making key derivation the only option.
  • a derived key is tagged so that it cannot be used itself in order to derive other keys.
  • keys can only be derived from basic key generated by the KDS.
  • the KDS will have a special version of the direct key generation interface to the CSF which allows the KDS to direct the settings of the key tags for:
  • KDS will allow the KDS to generate keys that are not subject to cryptographic control policies for use by the security infrastructure. It will also allow the KDS to generate untagged keys for use with external systems, such as Kerberos, DCE and SESAME, that do not support tagged keys and thus would misinterpret the key tags as part of the key value.
  • external systems such as Kerberos, DCE and SESAME
  • the KDS could still request that the CSF apply cryptographic control policies on a generated session key in order to weaken the privacy of user data communicated between a Kerberos or DCE client and server (as these are using the KDS of an export controlled product). This cannot be done for SESAME, as a basic key is generated from which dialog keys are derived external to the export controlled product.
  • the KDS would thus need a mapping of target application to security system type in order to know whether the target application would understand tagged keys.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Computer And Data Communications (AREA)

Claims (5)

  1. Kryptographische Unterstützungseinrichtung zur Verwendung in einem Datenverarbeitungssystem, die eine Vorrichtung (21 - 24) zum sicheren Managen von kryptographischen Schlüsseln aufweist, von denen jedem eine Kennung zugeordnet ist,
    dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass
    a) die kryptographische Unterstützungseinrichtung Zugang zu einer Steuerungsmethoden-Datei hat, die eine oder mehrere kryptographische Steuerungen definiert, die kryptographischen Schlüsseln aufgeschaltet werden,
    b) jede der Kennungen anzeigt, ob der zugeordnete kryptographische Schlüssel einer Steuerungsmethode ausgesetzt sein soll, und
    c) die kryptographische Unterstützungseinrichtung eine Vorrichtung besitzt, die prüft, ob die einem kryptographischen Schlüssel zugeordnete Kennung anzeigt, dass der kryptographische Schlüssel einer Steuerungsmethode unterliegt, und die, wenn dies der Fall ist, einen Zugriff zu der Steuerungmethoden-Datei vornimmt und die kryptographischen Steuerungen aufschaltet, die durch die Steuerungsmethoden-Datei für den kryptographischen Schlüssel vor der Nutzung dieses kryptographischen Schlüssels oder beliebiger neuer, aus dem kryptographischen Schlüssel generierter kryptographischer Schlüssel festgelegt sind.
  2. Kryptographische Unterstützungseinrichtung nach Anspruch 1, bei der
    a) jede der Kennungen auch anzeigt, ob der zugeordnete kryptographische Schlüssel berechtigt ist, als Basis zum Generieren neuer kryptographischer Schlüssel verwendet zu werden, und
    b) die kryptographische Unterstützungseinrichtung ferner eine Vorrichtung aufweist, die auf eine Anfrage zum Generieren eines neuen kryptographischen Schlüssels aus einem bereits vorhandenen kryptographischen Schlüssel anspricht, indem sie die dem vorhandenen kryptographischen Schlüssel zugeordnete Kennung überprüft, und in dem Fall, dass die Kennung anzeigt, dass der vorhandene kryptographische Schlüssel nicht berechtigt ist, als Basis für die Herleitung neuer kryptographischer Schlüssel verwendet zu werden, die Anfrage zurückweist.
  3. Kryptographische Unterstützungseinrichtung nach Anspruch 1 oder 2, gekennzeichnet durch eine Vorrichtung, die auf eine Anfrage anspricht, um einen der kryptographischen Schlüssel durch Kodieren dieses Schlüssels zusammen mit der zugeordneten Kennung bereit zu stellen, und die den kodierten Schlüssel und die Kennung zurückführt.
  4. Verfahren zum Betreiben eines Datenverarbeitungssystems, mit einer kryptographischen Unterstützungseinrichtung, die eine Vorrichtung (21 - 24) zum sicheren Managen von kryptographischen Schlüsseln aufweist, deren jeder eine mit ihm verbundene Kennung besitzt, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass
    a) die kryptographische Unterstützungseinrichtung Zugriff zu einer Steuerungsmethoden-Datei hat, die festlegt, daß eine oder mehrere kryptographische Steuerungen kryptographischen Schlüsseln aufgeschaltet werden,
    b) jede der Kennungen anzeigt, ob der zugeordnete kryptographische Schlüssel einer Steuerungsmethode ausgesetzt sein soll, und
    c) die kryptographische Unterstützungseinrichtung prüft, ob die einem kryptographischen Schlüssel zugeordnete Kennung anzeigt, dass der kryptographische Schlüssel einer Steuerungsmethode ausgesetzt werden soll, und, wenn dies der Fall ist, einen Zugriff zu der Steuerungsmethoden-Datei vornimmt und die kryptographischen Steuerungen, die durch die Steuerungsmethoden-Datei definiert sind, dem kryptographischem Schlüssel aufschaltet bevor der kryptographische Schlüssel oder ein neuer kryptographischer Schlüssel, der aus diesem kryptographischem Schlüssel generiert wird, benutzt wird.
  5. Verfahren nach Anspruch 4, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass
    a) jede der Kennungen ferner anzeigt, ob der zugeordnete kryptographische Schlüssel berechtigt ist, als Basis für das Generieren neuer kryptographischer Schlüssel zu dienen, und
    b) die kryptographische Unterstützungseinrichtung auf eine Anfrage zum Generieren eines neuen kryptographischen Schlüssels aus einem vorhandenen kryptographischen Schlüssel antwortet, indem die Kennung, die einem vorhandenen kryptographischen Schlüssel zugeordnet ist, geprüft wird, und in dem Fall, dass die Kennung anzeigt, dass der vorhandene kryptographische Schlüssel nicht zur Verwendung als Basis für die Herleitung neuer kryptographischer Schlüssel berechtigt ist, die Anfrage zurückweist.
EP96300116A 1995-02-24 1996-01-05 Verwaltung kryptographischer Schlüssel Expired - Lifetime EP0729252B1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB9503738 1995-02-24
GBGB9503738.8A GB9503738D0 (en) 1995-02-24 1995-02-24 Cryptographic key management

Publications (3)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0729252A2 EP0729252A2 (de) 1996-08-28
EP0729252A3 EP0729252A3 (de) 1998-05-13
EP0729252B1 true EP0729252B1 (de) 2003-09-03

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EP96300116A Expired - Lifetime EP0729252B1 (de) 1995-02-24 1996-01-05 Verwaltung kryptographischer Schlüssel

Country Status (4)

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US (1) US5745572A (de)
EP (1) EP0729252B1 (de)
DE (1) DE69629738T2 (de)
GB (1) GB9503738D0 (de)

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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
US5745572A (en) 1998-04-28
EP0729252A3 (de) 1998-05-13
DE69629738T2 (de) 2004-07-08
EP0729252A2 (de) 1996-08-28
GB9503738D0 (en) 1995-04-19
DE69629738D1 (de) 2003-10-09

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