EP0772164A2 - Dispositif et méthode pour le transfert de données protégés - Google Patents
Dispositif et méthode pour le transfert de données protégés Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP0772164A2 EP0772164A2 EP96116885A EP96116885A EP0772164A2 EP 0772164 A2 EP0772164 A2 EP 0772164A2 EP 96116885 A EP96116885 A EP 96116885A EP 96116885 A EP96116885 A EP 96116885A EP 0772164 A2 EP0772164 A2 EP 0772164A2
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- card
- data
- producer
- data record
- pin
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
Definitions
- the invention relates to a device and a method for protected data transmission, in particular for the protected data transmission of individual PIN values for payment cards.
- Payment cards such as credit cards or check cards, generally have a magnetic strip on which a verification code for a secret number, the so-called PIN ("personal identification number"), is stored, which is used to identify the cardholder and is entered by the cardholder at the ATM .
- PIN personal identification number
- the PIN protects the authorized cardholder against the misuse of his card in the event of card loss. To ensure this protection, it is necessary that nobody other than your cardholder (not even an employee of the credit card company or the card issuer) gets to know the PIN.
- the PIN of most common credit cards is generated in computer systems as random numbers and assigned to the credit cards to be produced.
- the PIN is usually transmitted to the cardholder by means of a so-called PIN letter.
- a PIN letter consists of a firmly glued envelope on which the card number of the associated credit card, as well (sometimes) the address of the cardholder is printed. Inside the PIN letter is a single sheet on which the PIN is printed.
- the PIN letter is physically designed in such a way that unauthorized reading of the PIN value is impossible without visible damage to the PIN letter.
- a special printing process ensures that even during the printing process, an employee involved in the PIN letter production can never gain knowledge of the PIN values.
- One way of avoiding the generation of random PIN values is to offer the credit card applicant the option of determining an individual PIN value of their choice.
- the applicant can take a numerical value that is easy to remember from their own private environment and define it as a PIN value for their credit card.
- the transmission of the desired PIN value from the card applicant to the card issuer poses a high security risk, which is why this method for generating individually determined PIN values is only used very rarely.
- Both the transport of the PIN value (post, fax, telephone) and the inevitable manual entry (by an employee of the card issuer) into the computer system of the card issuer is very risky.
- the object of the present invention is to provide a device and a method whereby a cardholder is able to determine the PIN values for his payment card himself without a security risk arising during the transmission of the PIN values.
- a first embodiment of the invention is based on the basic idea that knowing a "real" PIN value is worthless if the associated card number (or the card holder) cannot be assigned.
- the card issuer generates a secret assignment number for each card applicant - or for each card number to be issued.
- the generation can take place as a random number or by encrypting the card number with a secret key.
- the same measure of data protection measures as for the previous generation of random PIN values is to be applied when generating the assignment number, so that no one other than the card applicant can obtain knowledge of the assignment number.
- the generated assignment number is entered into a database together with the associated card number.
- the assignment number is communicated to the card applicant by means of a (correspondingly modified) "PIN letter".
- the card applicant then writes his desired PIN value together with his assignment number on a form and sends it back anonymously to the card issuer.
- the association number is entered together with the desired PIN value in a computer system which uses the association number (and the database) to establish the association between the entered desired PIN value and the actual card number. From this moment on, the normal process for personalizing payment cards can resume.
- the assignment number can be obtained, for example, by encrypting the card number with an internal key (only known to the card issuer's IT system). The result of the encryption serves as a secret assignment number.
- the card issuer's computer system decrypts the entered assignment number with the internal key and thus receives the card number of the card applicant.
- the transmitted PIN value can then be assigned to the credit card via the card number. Both for the process of encrypting the card number in the form of a secret assignment number, and for the The decoding of the entered assignment number does not require the use of a database.
- This embodiment offers a high level of security against the unauthorized assignment of the PIN value to the card number or card applicant and places only minor intellectual demands on the card applicant.
- the second embodiment is based on the basic idea that knowledge of the result of a mathematical operation between a PIN value and a second secret operand is worthless if the value of the second operand is unknown.
- the card issuer generates a secret numerical value (operands) for each card applicant - or for each card number to be issued.
- the card can be generated by encrypting the card number with an internal key (only known to the card issuer's IT system) or as a random number.
- the result of the encryption is then converted into a decimal number.
- the decimal number thus obtained serves as a secret operand.
- the secret operand is communicated to the card applicant by means of a (correspondingly modified) "PIN letter".
- the card applicant then carries out a given mathematical operation (e.g.
- the transmitted result is entered into a computer system together with the card number.
- This computer system calculates the value of the secret operand by performing the same procedure with the card number as when the secret operand was first generated.
- the mathematical reverse function for example subtraction
- the desired PIN value of the card applicant is obtained.
- This value is then assigned to the card to be produced as a PIN value. From this moment on, the normal process for personalizing payment cards can resume.
- the random number can be obtained, for example, by generating it from the card issuer's computer system.
- the operand generated in this way, together with the card number, is stored in a database.
- the result returned is then sent to the secret operand by means of an EDP system assigned via the database, the card number serving as an allocation index.
- the advantage of this embodiment is maximum security against unauthorized detection of the PIN value because the PIN value is never visible in plain text during the entire process.
- the invention is also suitable for defining individual PIN values for telephone banking accounts. All that is required is to use the account number instead of the card number.
- the invention Compared to the traditional PIN letter method (with random numbers), the invention has the advantage of increased data protection on the transport route. While in the traditional PIN letter process the plain text PIN value is mailed from the card issuer to the customer, with the two processes the total information is always divided into two letters (card issuer -> customer -> card issuer) so that the knowledge of a letter content is still known is not sufficient to obtain the PIN value.
Landscapes
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
- Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
- Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| DE19541081 | 1995-11-03 | ||
| DE19541081A DE19541081C2 (de) | 1995-11-03 | 1995-11-03 | Vorrichtung zur geschützten Datenübermittlung |
Publications (3)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| EP0772164A2 true EP0772164A2 (fr) | 1997-05-07 |
| EP0772164A3 EP0772164A3 (fr) | 1999-11-17 |
| EP0772164B1 EP0772164B1 (fr) | 2003-08-06 |
Family
ID=7776588
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP96116885A Revoked EP0772164B1 (fr) | 1995-11-03 | 1996-10-21 | Dispositif et méthode pour un transfert protégé de données |
Country Status (4)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| EP (1) | EP0772164B1 (fr) |
| AT (1) | ATE246829T1 (fr) |
| DE (2) | DE19541081C2 (fr) |
| ES (1) | ES2204984T3 (fr) |
Cited By (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FR2767406A1 (fr) * | 1997-08-13 | 1999-02-19 | France Telecom | Procede pour etablir une carte ou un moyen d'identification personnelle a code confidentiel |
| NL1008287C2 (nl) * | 1998-02-12 | 1999-08-13 | Rdc Datacentrum B V | Systeem voor het distribueren van PIN-codes. |
| EP1240571A4 (fr) * | 1999-11-22 | 2004-08-18 | Ascom Hasler Mailing Sys Inc | Creation et gestion de numeros d'identification personnels clients |
| EP2048632A1 (fr) * | 2007-10-12 | 2009-04-15 | Compagnie Industrielle et Financiere d'Ingenierie "Ingenico" | Procédé de transmission d'un code confidentiel, terminal lecteur de cartes, serveur de gestion et produits programme d'ordinateur correspondants |
| EP2187363A1 (fr) * | 2008-11-12 | 2010-05-19 | Oberthur Technologies Denmark A/S | Dispositif et procédé de distribution de numéros d'identification personnels |
| EP2704071A1 (fr) * | 2012-08-31 | 2014-03-05 | Gemalto SA | Système et procédé de personnalisation sécurisée d'un jeton personnel pendant une étape de personnalisation |
Family Cites Families (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPS5329542B2 (fr) * | 1974-07-08 | 1978-08-22 | ||
| US4616852A (en) * | 1984-11-26 | 1986-10-14 | The Talman Home Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Illinois | Money debit card application form and method of processing same |
| JPS6356785A (ja) * | 1986-08-28 | 1988-03-11 | Toshiba Corp | 携帯可能記憶媒体処理装置 |
| US4947027A (en) * | 1988-02-02 | 1990-08-07 | Golightly Cecelia K | System for identifying authorized use of credit cards |
| DE3927270C2 (de) * | 1989-08-18 | 1996-07-11 | Deutsche Telekom Ag | Verfahren zum Personalisieren von Chipkarten |
| US5477038A (en) * | 1993-10-25 | 1995-12-19 | Visa International | Method and apparatus for distributing currency |
-
1995
- 1995-11-03 DE DE19541081A patent/DE19541081C2/de not_active Revoked
-
1996
- 1996-10-21 ES ES96116885T patent/ES2204984T3/es not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1996-10-21 EP EP96116885A patent/EP0772164B1/fr not_active Revoked
- 1996-10-21 AT AT96116885T patent/ATE246829T1/de active
- 1996-10-21 DE DE59610645T patent/DE59610645D1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
Non-Patent Citations (1)
| Title |
|---|
| None |
Cited By (10)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FR2767406A1 (fr) * | 1997-08-13 | 1999-02-19 | France Telecom | Procede pour etablir une carte ou un moyen d'identification personnelle a code confidentiel |
| NL1008287C2 (nl) * | 1998-02-12 | 1999-08-13 | Rdc Datacentrum B V | Systeem voor het distribueren van PIN-codes. |
| EP1240571A4 (fr) * | 1999-11-22 | 2004-08-18 | Ascom Hasler Mailing Sys Inc | Creation et gestion de numeros d'identification personnels clients |
| US7716491B2 (en) | 1999-11-22 | 2010-05-11 | Neopost Technologies | Generation and management of customer pin's |
| EP2048632A1 (fr) * | 2007-10-12 | 2009-04-15 | Compagnie Industrielle et Financiere d'Ingenierie "Ingenico" | Procédé de transmission d'un code confidentiel, terminal lecteur de cartes, serveur de gestion et produits programme d'ordinateur correspondants |
| FR2922395A1 (fr) * | 2007-10-12 | 2009-04-17 | Ingenico Sa | Procede de transmission d'un code confidentiel, terminal lecteur de cartes, serveur de gestion et produits programme d'ordinateur correspondants |
| EP2187363A1 (fr) * | 2008-11-12 | 2010-05-19 | Oberthur Technologies Denmark A/S | Dispositif et procédé de distribution de numéros d'identification personnels |
| EP2461297A1 (fr) * | 2008-11-12 | 2012-06-06 | Oberthur Technologies Denmark A/S | Dispositif et procédé de distribution de numéros d'identification personnels |
| EP2704071A1 (fr) * | 2012-08-31 | 2014-03-05 | Gemalto SA | Système et procédé de personnalisation sécurisée d'un jeton personnel pendant une étape de personnalisation |
| WO2014033269A1 (fr) * | 2012-08-31 | 2014-03-06 | Gemalto Sa | Système et procédé pour la personnalisation sécurisée d'un jeton personnel durant une étape de personnalisation |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| DE19541081A1 (de) | 1997-05-07 |
| EP0772164A3 (fr) | 1999-11-17 |
| DE59610645D1 (de) | 2003-09-11 |
| ES2204984T3 (es) | 2004-05-01 |
| DE19541081C2 (de) | 1998-04-09 |
| ATE246829T1 (de) | 2003-08-15 |
| EP0772164B1 (fr) | 2003-08-06 |
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