EP0846821B1 - Dispositif pour vérifier l'autorisation de contrôle d'accès - Google Patents

Dispositif pour vérifier l'autorisation de contrôle d'accès Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0846821B1
EP0846821B1 EP97121006A EP97121006A EP0846821B1 EP 0846821 B1 EP0846821 B1 EP 0846821B1 EP 97121006 A EP97121006 A EP 97121006A EP 97121006 A EP97121006 A EP 97121006A EP 0846821 B1 EP0846821 B1 EP 0846821B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
code
control device
storage area
secret
information
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP97121006A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP0846821A3 (fr
EP0846821A2 (fr
Inventor
Lutz Storjohann
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Delphi Automotive Systems Deutschland GmbH
Original Assignee
Delphi Automotive Systems Deutschland GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Delphi Automotive Systems Deutschland GmbH filed Critical Delphi Automotive Systems Deutschland GmbH
Publication of EP0846821A2 publication Critical patent/EP0846821A2/fr
Publication of EP0846821A3 publication Critical patent/EP0846821A3/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0846821B1 publication Critical patent/EP0846821B1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00857—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G07C2009/00793—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by Hertzian waves
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00857—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed
    • G07C2009/00873—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed by code input from the lock

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a device for testing the Use authorization for access control devices, in particular closing devices for vehicles, with an access-side control device with a Memory area for a secret code, one user-side key device having a Transponder with a memory area for storing a contains secret codes, and comparison means in the Control device for determining the release the access device required authorization, such that the information emitted by the transponder with a in the control by the secret Code specified specification information is compared and that only with a match a release of the Access is made, the transponder of the Key device a a vehicle-specific Release information of the key device for the Control device having further memory area contains, wherein the control means for Check if the key device has the permission has to be taught to the controller, having.
  • Such devices for testing the Use authorization for access control devices the from an access-side control device and a consist of user-side key device known practice.
  • Modern key facilities get as central Element a transponder coupled to a chip, which in electromagnetic excitation a User code information, for example in the form of a Number sequence, sends out.
  • control device In the control device is then compared, whether the from Transponder emitted in the key device User code information to an authorized user close or not. Only with identification of the authorized user gives the controller the Access to the downstream components of the vehicle free, while in the other case access to the operation of the Vehicle is blocked. To the owner of the respective Key device is to be designated as authorized in a so-called "learning process" of the key device a secret code transmitted by the controller. After teaching the complete vehicle key set, the user when taking over the vehicle has been passed, each key is thus characteristic for the authorized vehicle user.
  • each vehicle is equipped with a vehicle identification code.
  • spare keys and a transmitter within the vehicle encrypted codes are exchanged and stored in the spare key in a data matrix.
  • the replacement key has at least two memory locations in which the vehicle identification code and a decryption function can be stored.
  • the instruction code BC is read out and in the presence of a teach-in command with a Sharing routine continued.
  • a random number generator generates a random code.
  • the Random code is transmitted to the vehicle and there is the code C, which contains the VIN, overwritten. That means that of the workshop stored secret code C after learning in the Key is overwritten and no longer exists is.
  • US 5,369,706 relates to a method for releasing an access control device by means of rolling Codes.
  • rolling codes will look like Hash tables are taken from secret codes that are unique Activation of an access control device entitle. After that, that is after one-time Unlock, a new code is detected.
  • These rolling codes are both in the lock as well as stored in the key. Therefore, when in the Key the next code is detected, this one also in the Lock detected. Since the hash tables are not from the outside is therefore a secure access control possible.
  • the invention is based on the object Device of the type mentioned to that effect to develop an automatic learning of a or spare key by the user himself simultaneous protection against abuse.
  • the device according to the invention offers a large Safety when teaching new key devices a control unit, there by checking a vehicle-specific release information in the additional storage area of a new one Key device is ensured that a new Key device only from the controller of a certain vehicle can be taught by the one for which it has the release information. there the authorization for teaching is checked by the already existing in the control device Comparative means used by the key facility received release information with a required Compare release information.
  • the drawing gives an overview of the use of the invention provided additional Memory area in the key facility for the Storing a release information that is suitable for learning a new key device should be required.
  • a Key device B of the device according to the invention shown comprises a Transponder with a transponder coil T and a first Memory area SP1 for the secret code for a usual access authorization procedure is provided.
  • a second memory area SP2 available. In both memory areas SP1 and SP2 are no information stored at this time.
  • a device C of a spare parts center contains, among other things, a database or has access to such.
  • the database contains memory areas SC 1 -SC n , in which vehicle-specific information is stored by all vehicles for which this spare parts center is responsible.
  • vehicle-specific information is stored by all vehicles for which this spare parts center is responsible.
  • it is assumed that it is separate secret information.
  • also publicly accessible information such as the control unit identification numbers can be stored.
  • the spare part center device C also has means (not shown) for transmitting the stored secret data or, in the case of non-secret stored data, means for encrypting and transmitting the data.
  • the spare parts center receives from a customer the Request for another key device for a Vehicle.
  • the Device C of the spare parts center which stored Information about the vehicle belongs, for which a new one Key facility is requested.
  • the device C transmits this or one of them Generated release information M2 to a Key device B, the so far no vehicle is assigned and whose two memory areas SP1 and SP2 does not contain any data yet.
  • the key device B stores the received Release information M2 in its additional Memory area SP2.
  • the key device B which in the second representation (2) again with the Information M2 occupied memory area SP2 is shown can now from the parts center to the customer be handed over.
  • the third representation (3) turn the above described key device B shown. additionally is here indicated by a rectangle a vehicle FZ, at the control unit, the new key device B should be taught.
  • This control unit is in the Vehicle FZ marked and marked A.
  • the Control unit A has at least one Memory area SP3 in which the secret code for review the user authorization is stored. Furthermore it has a means of comparison V and not over recorded means for transferring data.
  • a second memory area SP4 provided in which another secret information is stored. Additionally or alternatively, a Memory area for storing a PIN number to be available.
  • the key device B the customer of the Spare parts center was handed out and now over has a secret release information M2 reads it Information from its additional memory area SP2 and transmits them, as indicated by an arrow, to the control unit A of the vehicle FZ.
  • the key device B stores the received secret code M1 in the first memory area SP1 of the Transponders as seen in illustration (5).
  • the key device B is now to the control unit A of the vehicle FZ taught and can by the user as proof of authorization to use the vehicle be used.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)

Claims (10)

  1. Dispositif pour vérifier l'autorisation d'utilisation pour des dispositifs de contrôle d'accès, notamment des dispositifs de fermeture pour véhicules automobiles, comportant
    un dispositif de commande (A) situé côté accès et comportant une troisième zone de mémoire (SP3) pour un code secret,
    un dispositif à clé (B) situé coté utilisateur et qui contient un transpondeur possédant une première zone de mémoire (SP2) pour mémoriser un code secret M1, et
    des moyens comparateurs (V) situés dans le dispositif de commande (A) pour déterminer l'autorisation nécessaire pour la libération du dispositif d'accès de telle sorte que l'information codée avec le code secret M1 et émise par le transpondeur est comparée à une information de prédétermination fixée dans le dispositif de commande (A) au moyen du code secret M1 et qu'une libération de l'accès s'effectue uniquement en cas de concordance,
    dans lequel le transpondeur du dispositif à clé (B) contient une autre zone de mémoire (SP2) comportant une information de libération (M2) spécifique au véhicule, du dispositif à clé (B) pour l'unité de commande (A),
    dans lequel le dispositif de commande (A) comporte des moyens pour vérifier si le dispositif à clé (B) possède l'autorisation d'être informé par le dispositif de commande (A),
    caractérisé en ce que le dispositif à clé (B) convient pour contrôler la légitimité d'un opérateur, qui veut introduire des données dans l'autre zone de mémoire (SP2).
  2. Dispositif selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que le dispositif de commande (A) comprend au moins une autre zone de mémoire (SP4/PIN).
  3. Dispositif selon la revendication 2, caractérisé en ce qu'un code d'utilisateur (PIN) et/ou un numéro d'identification de l'appareil de commande sont mémorisés dans l'autre zone de mémoire (SP4/PIN) du dispositif de commande (A).
  4. Dispositif selon l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que l'information de libération (M2) mémorisée dans la zone de mémoire (SP2) du dispositif à clé (B) contient des données spécifiques au véhicule.
  5. Dispositif selon la revendication 4, caractérisé en ce que les données spécifiques au véhicule, qui sont mémorisées dans l'autre zone de mémoire (SP2) du dispositif à clé (B), sont secrètes et non accessibles d'une manière générale ou sont mémorisées d'une manière chiffrée à l'aide d'un code secret.
  6. Dispositif selon la revendication 5, caractérisé en ce que pour les données du code PIN, spécifiques au véhicule, qui sont mémorisées dans l'autre zone de mémoire (SP2) du dispositif à clé (B), sont le numéro d'identification de l'appareil de commande ou le code secret (M1).
  7. Dispositif selon la revendication 5, caractérisé en ce qu'à l'aide des moyens de surveillance, on peut surveiller un code indépendant.
  8. Dispositif selon l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que le couplage entre le dispositif de commande (A) et le dispositif à clé (B) s'effectue par voie galvanique, notamment sous la forme d'une carte à puce.
  9. Dispositif selon l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que le couplage entre le dispositif de commande (A) et le dispositif à clé (B) s'effectue par voie capacitive et/ou inductive.
  10. Procédé pour l'information d'un dispositif à clé (B) d'un dispositif selon l'une des revendications précédentes, comportant les étapes suivantes:
    mémorisation d'une information secrète de libération (M2) au moyen d'un emplacement autorisé dans l'autre zone de mémoire (SP2) d'un dispositif à clé (B),
    transmission de l'information (M2) mémorisée dans la seconde zone de mémoire (SP2) du dispositif à clé (B) dans un dispositif de commande (A) côté accès,
    comparaison de l'information reçue de libération (M2) à une information prédéterminée, mémorisée par l'information mémorisée dans le dispositif de commande (A), dans ce dispositif de commande (A),
    transmission du code secret (M1) depuis le dispositif de commande (A) côté accès au dispositif à clé (B) lorsque la comparaison de l'information de libération reçue (M2) à l'information de prédétermination dans le dispositif de commande (A) a révélé une concordance, et
    mémorisation du code transmis (M1) dans la première de mémoire (SP1) du dispositif à clé (B),
    caractérisé en ce que dans le dispositif à clé (B), une légitimation d'un opérateur, qui veut introduire des données dans l'autre zone de mémoire (SP2), est contrôlée.
EP97121006A 1996-12-03 1997-11-29 Dispositif pour vérifier l'autorisation de contrôle d'accès Expired - Lifetime EP0846821B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19650020 1996-12-03
DE19650020 1996-12-03

Publications (3)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0846821A2 EP0846821A2 (fr) 1998-06-10
EP0846821A3 EP0846821A3 (fr) 2000-11-29
EP0846821B1 true EP0846821B1 (fr) 2005-01-19

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Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP97121006A Expired - Lifetime EP0846821B1 (fr) 1996-12-03 1997-11-29 Dispositif pour vérifier l'autorisation de contrôle d'accès

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EP (1) EP0846821B1 (fr)
DE (1) DE59712170D1 (fr)

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102008052239A1 (de) * 2008-10-17 2010-04-22 Volkswagen Ag Verfahren zum automatischen Anlernen mehrerer Schlüssel an eine Wegfahrsperre sowie entsprechende Wegfahrsperre und Fahrzeug
DE102011016889A1 (de) 2011-04-13 2012-10-18 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Elektrischer Antrieb und Wegfahrsperrsystem

Families Citing this family (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB9925275D0 (en) * 1999-10-27 1999-12-29 Rover Group A security system
DE102011002713A1 (de) 2011-01-14 2012-07-19 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Bereitstellen von kyptographischen Credentials für Steuergeräte eines Fahrzeugs
JP5866216B2 (ja) 2012-01-31 2016-02-17 株式会社東海理化電機製作所 電子キー登録システム
JP6194801B2 (ja) * 2014-01-20 2017-09-13 株式会社デンソー 携帯通信装置、車両制御装置、および車両制御システム

Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0525895A1 (fr) * 1991-08-01 1993-02-03 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Système de sécurité pour un appareil
US5369706A (en) * 1993-11-05 1994-11-29 United Technologies Automotive, Inc. Resynchronizing transmitters to receivers for secure vehicle entry using cryptography or rolling code

Family Cites Families (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE4317114C2 (de) * 1993-05-21 1997-03-20 Audi Ag Diebstahlschutzeinrichtung als Immobilisationseinrichtung an einem Kraftfahrzeug
DE4342641A1 (de) * 1993-12-14 1995-06-22 Siemens Ag Verfahren zur Authentifikation zwischen einem mobilen Datenträger und einer stationären Datenstation
US5734330A (en) * 1994-10-11 1998-03-31 Calsonic Corporation Anti-theft car protection device
DE4441415C2 (de) * 1994-11-22 2003-06-18 Audi Ag Verfahren für die Handhabung von Ersatzschlüsseln
DE19532067C1 (de) * 1995-08-31 1996-10-24 Daimler Benz Ag Verfahren und Einrichtung zur Einprogrammierung von Betriebsdaten in Fahrzeugbauteile

Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0525895A1 (fr) * 1991-08-01 1993-02-03 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Système de sécurité pour un appareil
US5369706A (en) * 1993-11-05 1994-11-29 United Technologies Automotive, Inc. Resynchronizing transmitters to receivers for secure vehicle entry using cryptography or rolling code

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102008052239A1 (de) * 2008-10-17 2010-04-22 Volkswagen Ag Verfahren zum automatischen Anlernen mehrerer Schlüssel an eine Wegfahrsperre sowie entsprechende Wegfahrsperre und Fahrzeug
DE102011016889A1 (de) 2011-04-13 2012-10-18 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Elektrischer Antrieb und Wegfahrsperrsystem

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE59712170D1 (de) 2005-02-24
EP0846821A3 (fr) 2000-11-29
EP0846821A2 (fr) 1998-06-10

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