Classifications

• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/06—Authentication
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
  • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
  • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
  • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
  • G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
  • G06Q20/322—Aspects of commerce using mobile devices [M-devices]
  • G06Q20/3229—Use of the SIM of a M-device as secure element
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
  • H04L63/205—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved

Definitions

• the present invention relates to a method presented in the preamble of Claim 1 for identification of a data transmission device in a data transmission system, where a connection is made for transmission of data between a first data transmission device and a second data transmission device.
• the invention relates also to a data transmission system presented in the preamble of Claim 5 and to a data transmission device presented in the preamble of Claim 8.
• the payer For preventing misuse, the payer must enter his or her user identification code and password at the beginning of the connection, wherein the data processing equipment of the bank checks if the given data correspond with the data recorded in the data processing equipment of the bank. If the data are identical, the data processing equipment of the bank will start receiving data and record the payments in its register and transfer the given sum of money on the due date from the account of the payer to the account of the recipient.
• the data transmission is usually made either by batch processing or in real time.
• batch processing the data of all the pay- ments to be made at a time are set in the memory of the data processing device, whereafter a data transmission connection is made with the payment server of the bank and the data is transmitted. After the transmission, the connection can be cut.
• connection time is es- sentially used only as long as is required for data transmission at the transmission rate available at the time.
• real-time transmission the connection is made as early as at the beginning of the session and the payment data are transmitted immediately to the payment server of the bank. After the payment instructions are entered and sent to the payment server of the bank, the connection is cut. This alternative requires a longer connection time than batch processing.
• So-called smart cards or processor cards are small cards manufactured usually in the size of a credit card and having a microprocessor and electronic circuits required for its operation laminated in plastic. Further, the surface of the card is usually provided with electric contacts for connecting supply voltages to the card and for transferring control and data signals between the card and its read/write device.
• systems have been developed for transferring the signals between the card and its read/write device as well as the supply voltages of the card in a wireless manner e.g. as high frequency electromagnetic signals. These methods involve the problem of transmitting a sufficiently high quantity of energy to the card so that the card can perform the necessary operations, such as checking of encryption and decryption, sufficiently quickly.
• Smart cards are used e.g. as charge cards in several different applications, such as with public telephones, as coin cards, as means of pay- ment at public transportation means, etc.
• a smart card is to be used as a charge card
• money can be stored on its so-called electronic purse for example at automatic cash dispenser points having the equipment for controlling the smart card and charging money on the card.
• FIG. 1 is a reduced block diagram illustrating the internal structure of a smart card 12, known as such.
• a central processing unit CPU controls the operation of the smart card 12 on the basis of a program code stored in the read-only memory ROM.
• Various user-specified data to be stored permanently in the memory can be stored in the electrically erasable programmable read-only memory EEPROM.
• the data memory RAM can be used as a temporary data storage.
• a bus adapter DATA-I/O adapts the smart card 12 to the inter- face lines of the card reading device (not shown) as well as to a control and data line 13.
• the properties and function of the smart cards can be set by storing application software according to the use in the program memory of the card advantageously at the manufacturing stage.
• enciphering or encryption systems have been developed for data transmission systems as well as identification systems for identification of the sender of the information e.g. in connection with making payments.
• the encryption methods are primarily based on the fact that each user has his or her own user code and an encryption key for confirming the identification of the user. This confirmation with the encryption key is also called digital signature, because this method is analogous to the situation in which the user pays for purchases e.g. with a credit card and confirms his or her identity with his or her own signature which the seller possibly compares with the signature on the I.D. card or the like of the payer.
• the purpose of the digital signature is thus to identify both the user and the transmitted message and to secure that the content of the message has not changed during the transmission.
• Using the digital signature enhances security of smart card systems and other systems and other systems based on electronic payment.
• the secret key system is also called symmetric encryption.
• One very well known encryption method using a secret key is the U.S. Federal Data Encryption Standard (DES).
• DES U.S. Federal Data Encryption Standard
• the encryption can involve either all the transmitted data or only some of the data, such as the user code.
• the encrypted information is known to the communication parties, or the encryption data is marked in the data to be transmitted e.g. by changing the value of an encryption bit.
• an encryption checking key identical to the encryption key is used for confirming that the received encrypted information is correct, i.e. the encryption key used at the transmitting stage was identical with the encryption checking key used at the receiving stage.
• the encryption can be deciphered by using the encryption checking key.
• a pair of two keys is used, the first being a secret key and the second a public key.
• the secret key is used for encrypting the data to be encrypted at the transmission stage, and the encryption is checked using the public key at the receiving stage.
• the public key can be used only for checking the encryption and for deciphering, but it is not possible to use the public key to find out which encryption key was used to encrypt the data.
• the system based on a public key is also called asymmetric encryption. In this system, the public key can be known to anybody, but the secret key is only known to the sender.
• the payment terminal must contain the encryption keys of all the persons having the right to use the payment terminal, wherein such a payment terminal must be made very reliable and crack-proof. In practice, this means that the apparatus becomes very expensive and it must be mounted on its ground in a stationary manner and possibly also equipped with a burglar alarm or the like.
• the public key system is more advantageous, because the payment terminal or the like does not need to contain secret keys but it is sufficient that the terminal has the public keys for checking the encryption made with different encryption keys. For each public key there can be several secret keys, wherein the number of keys to be stored is substantially smaller than in systems based on the secret key.
• the above-mentioned encryption methods have the disadvantage that the sender can- not make sure that the receiver is the intended recipient. There is thus the risk of an outsider to interfere with the data transmission e.g. by coupling on telephone lines and forging data transmission. Furthermore, this can be performed in a way that both the sender and the intended recipient see the situation as normal but in reality the communi- cation is made via a third party and the payment can be directed to a wrong account or confidential information is made known to outsiders.
• radio transmitters and receivers In mobile communication networks at least part of the data transmission is made in a wireless manner by using radio transmitters and receivers.
• the radio channel is a physically open resource which is available to anybody via suitable data transmission device. This involves security risks, for example eavesdropping or disclosure of the privacy of a location.
• digital mobile communication networks such as GSM networks
• digital data transmission is used which is difficult to eavesdrop.
• caller identification and encryption it is possible to use caller identification and encryption in data transmission.
• encryption methods have been developed for digital mobile communication networks, whereby the speech converted to digital form and the data signal are encrypted.
• the radio channel can be encrypted, such as the identification data of a mobile station (International Mobile Subscriber Identity, IMSI) and the identification data on the location (Location Area Identification, LAI).
• IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
• LAI Location Area Identification
• the encrypted signal is deciphered back to unencrypted speech and data.
• the encryption key and algorithm to be used in encryption is advantageously known only to the sending and receiving equipment in question, wherein the deciphering of the coded signal to intelligible speech and data as well as to processing signals of the bit stream in a violent or illegal manner without the correct encryption key and algorithm is very difficult, thanks to the efficient encryption algorithms currently in use.
• SIM module comprises typically a central processing unit (CPU), a read-only memory (ROM), an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), and a random access memory (RAM).
• CPU central processing unit
• ROM read-only memory
• EEPROM electrically erasable programmable read-only memory
• RAM random access memory
• a personal identity code stored on the SIM module must be given in connection with the use of the mobile station, usually upon switching on the mobile station.
• the data memory of the SIM module can also be used for storing other user-specified information, telephone numbers, messages, etc.
• the base station subsystem (BSS) of the mobile communication network comprises base transceiver stations (BTS) and base station controllers (BSC).
• BSS base transceiver stations
• BSC base station controllers
• the mobile station (MS) 3 is in a data transmission connection via the radio channel with a base station close to the respective location of the mobile station.
• the base station is in a data transmission connection with the base station controller.
• Data transmission between the base station and the base station controller is usually carried via a cable.
• Each base station controller operates with a group of several base stations.
• the base station controller is, in turn, in a data transmission connection with a mobile services switching center (MSC).
• MSC mobile services switching center
• the mobile services switching centers can, in turn, be in a data transmission connection with each other as well as with a landline communication network center (PSTN, ISDN).
• PSTN landline communication network center
• the information to be transmitted is usually divided into frames containing control information, speech converted to digital form, data, and error correction information.
• the frame structure can have several levels, wherein the frames of an upper level are formed by arranging frames of a lower level.
• Encryption can be directed both to the control information and the speech and data portions. Further, the encryption can be carried out also in a way that different encryption keys and algorithms are used at different frame levels.
• One example of digital communica- tion networks is the GSM network which has a standard defining the encryption methods and algorithms to be used.
• a mobile originated call is set up in a way that the GSM mobile station and the GSM system network send control and identification signals required for call set-up to each other.
• the GSM mobile station is assigned a channel for signalling, if this is possible within the capacity of the GSM system network.
• the GSM mobile station makes the GSM system network a request for speech or data services.
• this request is transmitted to the mobile services switching centre (MSC), in which the rights of the GSM subscriber in question are verified from the visitor location register (VLR).
• MSC mobile services switching centre
• the PABX of the telephone network Upon a mobile terminated call e.g. from a landline telephone network subscription, the PABX of the telephone network transmits inter alia the telephone number of the mobile station to the mobile services switching centre.
• the MSC verifies the rights of the GSM subscriber in question from the home location register (HLR) and the visitor location register (VLR). Following this, the GSM system network and the GSM mobile station send control and identification data required for call set-up.
• HLR home location register
• VLR visitor location register
• the visitor location register VLR can, via the mobile services switching centre, send the GSM mobile station a request for exchange of identification data and start of encryption.
• call set-up is possible also without exchange of identification data and encryption.
• the call is either encrypted or not encrypted according to the network parameters set by the operator of the GSM system network.
• encryption is made on the physical level as bit- specified encryption, i.e. the bit stream to be transmitted on the radio channel is formed by adding to the data the encryption bits that are generated by the A5 algorithm, known as such, using the encryption key Kc.
• the A5 algorithm encrypts on the physical level the data and signalling information to be transmitted on channels assigned for data transmission (traffic channel, TCH, or dedicated control channel, DCCH). Synchronization of the messages to be transmitted is secured by controlling the A5 algorithm with specific synchronization data (COUNT).
• COUNT specific synchronization data
• the synchronization data COUNT is formed on the basis of the TDMA frame number. Thus the content of each 114 bit block generated with the A5 algorithm depends only on the frame numbering and the encryption key Kc.
• the encryption key Kc is preferably set up at the stage when the com- munication on the assigned channel is not yet encrypted and the mobile communication network to be used has identified the mobile station MS.
• the mobile station is identified by using the international mobile subscriber identity (IMS! stored in the mobile station, or by using a temporary mobile subscriber identity (TMSI) formed on the basis of the subscriber identity.
• IMS international mobile subscriber identity
• TMSI temporary mobile subscriber identity
• Ki subscriber identification key stored in the mobile station. This subscriber identification key Ki is also known to the mobile communication network.
• the encryption key Kc is transmitted indirectly from the base station subsystem BSS to the mobile station MS.
• a random access number RAND is given by the base station subsystem BSS and sent to the mobile station MS.
• the encryption key Kc is generated by the algorithm A8 from the ran- dom access number RAND and the subscriber identification key Ki of the mobile station. The calculation and storing of the encryption key Kc is performed both in the mobile station MS and in the mobile communication network.
• the base station subsystem BSS sends the mobile station a certain command (unencrypted) which in this context is called "start cipher".
• start cipher a command (unencrypted) which in this context is called "start cipher”.
• the base station subsystem BSS starts encryption of messages to be sent to the mobile sta- tion after the base station subsystem has received an encrypted message sent by the mobile station and deciphered it correctly.
• the identification and encryption information is transmit- ted one-way, from the base station subsystem to the mobile station, wherein the base station subsystem does not confirm that the mobile station MS is the correct mobile station. Also, the mobile station MS does not necessarily know that the messages sent from the mobile station MS are transmitted to the correct base station subsystem. Thus there exists the possibility that efficient calculating devices and data transmission device can be used to intercept messages from the communication between the base station subsystem BSS and the mobile station MS.
• the present invention is based on the idea that the identification is carried out in the communication both ways advantageously so that both communicating parties identify each other.
• the method of the present invention is characterized in what will be presented in the characterizing part of the appended Claim 1.
• the system of the present invention is characterized in what will be presented in the characterizing part of the appended Claim 5.
• the device of the present invention is further characterized in what will be presented in the characterizing part of the appended Claim 8.
• the present invention gives significant advantages to the encryption methods and systems of prior art.
• double- checking is performed, wherein both parties to the communication session can make sure that the other party is exactly the intended one.
• Payment operations are made safer than by using methods and systems known at present.
• Checking can be done also during the data transmission connection, wherein attempts during the data transmission connection to interfere with the data to be transmitted can be found out and data can be prevented from falling into the hands of outsiders.
• Fig. 1 a shows a smart card
• Fig. 1 b is a reduced block diagram showing the functional structure of a smart card
• Fig. 2 is a reduced diagram showing a mobile communication network known as such
• Fig. 3 shows a communication system according to an advantageous embodiment of the invention
• Fig. 4 is an arrow diagram showing a payment operation according to the invention.
• Fig. 5 is a status chart showing identification according to the invention.
• the following example illustrates the use of the method according to the invention for making a order and payment of an article or service in the communication system shown in Fig. 3, such as the Internet data network.
• the invention can also be applied in other types of data systems and for transmitting other types of data.
• a first data transmission device 1 which in this advantageous embodiment of the invention comprises at least a first data processor 2, such as a portable computer (PC), a first telecommunication terminal 3, which is e.g. a mobile station MS, such as a GSM mobile station, and a SIM module 4.
• the first data processor 2 is in data transmission connection with the first telecommunication terminal 3.
• the SIM module 4 is also in a data transmission connection either with the first data processor 2, the first telecommunication terminal 3, or both.
• the SIM module 4 can also be part of the first telecommunication terminal 3, such as is known from GSM mobile stations.
• the first data processor 2 and the first telecommunication terminal 3 shown in Fig. 3 can be either separate devices or they can be integrated as for example in the Communicator manufactured by Nokia.
• the invention will be described using the SIM module 4 as an electronic purse, as shown in Fig. 3, but the electronic purse can also be a charge card or the like.
• the operations re- quired in the SIM module can be provided at least partly also in the charge card or the like.
• a second data transmission device 5 comprises advantageously a second data processor 6 which is e.g. a mainframe of the bank (payment server), a second telecommunication terminal 7, such as a modem, and a security access module (SAM) 8 for checking the user rights.
• the second data processor 6 and the second telecommunication terminal 7 are in data transmission connection with each other for transmitting messages between the second data processor 6 and a communication network 11.
• the SAM module 8 is coupled advantageously to the second data processor 6.
• the SIM module 4 makes the operations required for identification of the data transmission parties and also for encryption of data transmission in the data transmission device 1 , as well as deciphers the encrypted data received from the second data transmission device 5.
• the SAM module 8 makes the operations required for identification of the data transmission parties and also for encryption of data transmission in the second data transmission device 5, as well as deciphers the encrypted data received from the first data transmission device 1.
• Encryption of the data to be transmitted is made advantageously by selecting an encryption algorithm A1 , A2, A3, as shown in the status chart of Fig. 5.
• the encryption algorithms A1 , A2, A3 are stored preferably in the SIM module 4, and in the second data transmission device 5 advantageously in the SAM module 8.
• the encryption algorithm A1 , A2, A3 corresponding to the respective stage of identification according to the invention is searched in the application software of the SIM module 4 and the SAM module 8. This is shown by the indices A1 , A2, A3 in the respective blocks in Fig. 5.
• the encryption key K, Kc and the data to be transmitted are used as inputs of the selected encryption algorithm A1 , A2, A3, wherein the encryption algorithm A1 , A2, A3 generates an encrypted character string (a message), which is known as such.
• the encryption algorithm e.g. programmable logic circuits comprising a programmed encryption algorithm can be used, or the encryption algorithm and encryption can be implemented in the application software of the encryption device.
• also checking of the encrypted data and deciphering can be implemented on the hardware and/or software level. For verification of the encrypted data and deciphering, the same encryption key A1 , A2, A3 is used as for encryption.
• the encryption key K, Kc is either the same as the one used for encryption, or a public encryption key.
• the input of the algorithm comprises the encrypted data e.g. as a binary character string and the encryption key K, Kc.
• the result will be information on whether the checked data was encrypted with the correct encryption key K, Kc and encryption algorithm A1 , A2, A3.
• a payment operation is exemplified in an arrow chart shown in Fig. 4.
• the operations critical for safety are marked with points in the arrows.
• the user starts e.g. an Internet content browser with the first data processor 2 and finds the www page or the like of the supplier of the goods or services intended.
• the name and order are entered by the user with the first data processor 2 and transmitted to the content server (arrow 401).
• the content server checks the order and finds the price of the order from its service provider or the like (arrow 402), after which the price information is transmitted to the first data processor 2 (arrows 403, 404), in which ad- vantageously a paymaker shows the price information to the user and requests for a confirmation of order.
• the price and the information of the supplier of the goods or services are transmitted from the content server to a payment server of a bank (arrow 406).
• the payment operation is started advantageously by setting up a data transmission connection between the first data transmission device 1 and the second data transmission device 5 e.g. as a telephone connection in a situation in which the data transmission connection does not yet exist.
• the second data transmission device 5 is the payment server of the bank. Also other known data transmission methods can be used, while the basic idea of the invention remains the same.
• the second data transmission device 5 After the data transmission connection is formed between the data transmission devices 1 and 5, the second data transmission device 5 produces a first identification message R1 advantageously in the SAM module 8 and sends it to the first data transmission device 1 (arrow 407), in which advantageously a paymaker conveys the identifi- cation message to the SIM module 4 for processing (arrow 408).
• the first identification message R1 is advantageously a random character string, wherein it is different at each transmission session, which will further improve reliability of identification and security of data transmission.
• the first identification message R1 is sent advantageously in un- encrypted form.
• the SIM module 4 converts the first identification message R1 to a first check-up message C1s by using a first encryption algorithm A1 and a first encryption key K.
• the SIM module 4 produces a second identifi- cation message R2 and converts it to a temporary encryption key Kc by using a second encryption algorithm A2 and a first encryption key K.
• the first check-up message C1 s produced by the SIM module, the second identification message R2 and the identification ID of the SIM module are transmitted to the second data transmission device 5 (arrows 409, 410).
• the SIM module identification ID is transmitted in unencrypted form, wherein the second data transmission device 5 can select the correct encryption key K on the basis of the SIM module identification ID.
• the SIM module identification ID can be transmitted in unencrypted form, because outsiders cannot utilize the code without the correct encryption key K.
• the SAM module 8 of the second data transmission device 5 knows both the encryption key K and the first encryption algorithm A1.
• the SAM module 8 makes the corresponding operation to the first identification message R1 as the SIM module 4, i.e. converts the first identification message R1 into the first check-up message C1p by using the encryption key K and the first encryption algorithm A1.
• the result that is the first verification mes- sage Clp and the first check-up message C1s, should be identical, if the starting data was the same.
• the SAM module 8 compares the first check-up message C1s sent from the first data transmission device 1 with the first verification message C1 p formed by it. If the comparison shows that these are identical, the SAM module 8 knows that the sender was the first data transmission device 1 , or that the data transmission connection is all right in this respect.
• the SAM module 8 converts the second identification message R2 sent by the first data transmission device 1 into a second check-up message C2p by using the first encryption algorithm A1 and the encryption key K. Further, the SAM module 8 converts the second identification message R2 into a temporary encryption key Kc by using the second encryption algorithm A2 and the first encryption key K.
• the price information on the article or service ordered, and the address in- formation of the supplier of said article or service are transmitted to the first data transmission device 1 advantageously in encrypted form.
• the SAM module 8 uses a third encryption algorithm A3 and a temporary encryption key Kc formed by it.
• transmission device 5 sends then the price information and the address information in encrypted form as well as the second check-up message C2p to the first data transmission device 1 (arrows 411 , 412).
• the first data transmission device 1 uses the second identification message R2 produced by the SIM module 4 for producing the second verification message C2s by using the first encryption algorithm A1 and the encryption key K. Consequently, the SIM module 4 makes the corresponding operation to the second identification message R2 as the SAM module 8, wherein the result, i.e. the second check-up message C2p and the second verification message C2s, should be identical, if the starting data was the same.
• the SIM module 4 After receiving the second checkup message C2p sent by the second data transmission device 5, the SIM module 4 compares it with the second verification message C2s produced by it. If the result of the comparison is identical to the SIM module 4, the SIM module 4 knows that the transmitter was the second data transmission device 5. After this the SIM module deciphers the received price and address information by using the third encryption algorithm A3 and the temporary encryption key Kc. Now that both parties of the data transmission are identified, the order can be paid.
• the SIM module checks that the sum of money contained in the SIM module 4 is sufficient for making the payment. If there is not sufficiently money loaded in the SIM module 4, the payer can be given an error message for example on the display 9 of the first data transmission device or on the display 10 of the first data processor. If there is sufficiently money stored in the SIM module 4, the sum to be paid is reduced from the money account of the card.
• the SIM module 4 sends the payment and the identification pa- rameters, encrypted with the third encryption algorithm A3 and the temporary encryption key Kc, to the second data transmission device 5 (arrows 413, 414).
• the identification parameters used can be for example the payer identification and password for securing that the sent message and the message received by the second data transmission device 5 come from the correct SIM module and that the money is legal.
• the payment server of the bank transmits an acknowledgement for the payment to the first data transmission device 1 (arrow 415), in which the acknowledgement is transmitted to the SIM module 4 (arrow 416).
• the bank payment server sends information on the payment also to the content server (arrow 417).
• the content server sends the information on the order (e.g. the order number) to the user to the content browser for display of the information (arrow 418).
• the acknowledge- ment of receipt of the information by the user is transmitted to the content server (arrow 419) and to the payment server (arrow 420).
• the content server sends still an acknowledgement of the transmission of the order and payment data via the paymaker (arrow 421) to the SIM module (arrow 422).
• the payment server makes the payment in encrypted form to the bank account of the supplier of the article or services, as shown by arrow 423.
• An acknowledgement of the giro transfer is further sent to the payment server (arrow 424). The order is now received and the pay- ment made.
• the encryption key K is required which is linked to the SIM module identification ID.
• the second data transmission device 5 comprises a data file in which the identifications ID of the SIM modules connected with the system and the corresponding encryption keys K are stored, wherein the second data transmission device 5 is capable of finding out each encryption key K used on the basis of the received SIM module identification ID.
• the method according the invention uses advanta- geously three encryption algorithms A1 , A2, A3.
• the system implementing the method of the invention is very safe, because the encryption key K and the encryption algorithms A1 , A2, A3 are never transmitted via the data network but they are stored in the second data transmission device 5 as well as in the SIM module 4 for example in connection with manufacturing of the SIM module card.
• digital data transmission systems utilize binary digit strings, whose length is selected according to the use and the properties of the system, e.g. to be divisible by 8 or 16, which is known to an expert in the art.
• the invention was described above to secure payment operations, the invention can also be advantageously applied for securing communication, wherein the method works substantially in the manner described above.
• data is transmitted which is encrypted with the said encryption key Kc and encryption algorithm A3. Identification of the parties to the data transmission is conducted two ways with the encryption key K, the first encryption algorithm A1 and the two identification messages R1 and R2.
• the data are transmitted advantageously in packets, wherein in connection with the reception of each packet it can be verified that the packet was sent from the correct sender.

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  • 1997-12-17 WO PCT/FI1997/000793 patent/WO1998028877A1/en not_active Ceased
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