EP1101005B1 - Systeme de securite - Google Patents

Systeme de securite Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1101005B1
EP1101005B1 EP99928063A EP99928063A EP1101005B1 EP 1101005 B1 EP1101005 B1 EP 1101005B1 EP 99928063 A EP99928063 A EP 99928063A EP 99928063 A EP99928063 A EP 99928063A EP 1101005 B1 EP1101005 B1 EP 1101005B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
frequency
signal
security
signal component
unit
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP99928063A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP1101005A1 (fr
Inventor
Kevin Trevor Talbot
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG
Original Assignee
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Bayerische Motoren Werke AG filed Critical Bayerische Motoren Werke AG
Publication of EP1101005A1 publication Critical patent/EP1101005A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1101005B1 publication Critical patent/EP1101005B1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00555—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks comprising means to detect or avoid relay attacks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G07C2009/00793—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by Hertzian waves
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C2209/00—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00 - G07C9/38
    • G07C2209/60—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00174 - G07C9/00944
    • G07C2209/61—Signal comprising different frequencies, e.g. frequency hopping

Definitions

  • This invention relates to security systems and in particular to a security system for a vehicle.
  • a relay unit can be used by a thief to capture the interrogation signal and relay it to the remote transponder and thereafter to relay the response signal back to the vehicle.
  • GB-A-2 288 261 Another solution is known from GB-A-2 288 261, wherein a security system is disclosed, by which a security signal is transmitted comprising first and second signal components, which are sequentially transmitted at different frequencies.
  • this system cannot be protected from eavesdropping of the access code or of the second frequency.
  • a security system comprising a security control unit and a remote transponder unit arranged in use to communicate with each other using a coded security signal, wherein the security signal comprises first and second signal components which are transmitted at different frequencies and the frequency of transmission of the second signal component is encoded in the first signal component.
  • the unit which is arranged in use to receive the security signal may be arranged to decode the frequency of the second signal component from the first signal component. Thus, no eavesdropping of the access code or of the second frequency is possible.
  • the frequency of the second signal component may be generated in a variable manner by the unit arranged to transmit the security signal.
  • the variability of the generation of the frequency of transmission of the second signal component may be achieved by a substantially random selection, from within a predetermined range of frequencies, by the unit arranged to transmit the security signal.
  • the unit arranged to receive the security signal may be arranged to tune itself to receive the second signal component after it has decoded the frequency thereof from the first signal component.
  • the range of frequencies of transmission from which the frequency of transmission of the second signal component may be selected is such that the difference frequency between the frequency of the second signal component and the frequency of the first signal component is substantially the same as the frequency of the second signal component.
  • the unit arranged to receive the security signal may be arranged to determine the difference frequency as well as the frequency of transmission of the first and second signal components and thereby to determine whether or not a relay unit has been used to relay the security signal between the units.
  • the frequency of the first signal component may be in the order of 120 kHz.
  • the frequency of the second signal component may be in the order of 40 kHz to 80 kHz.
  • the difference frequency may be in the order of 40 kHz to 80 kHz.
  • the security system may comprise a security system of a vehicle.
  • the invention also provides a method of controlling a security system, the security system comprising a security control unit and a remote transponder unit arranged in use to communicate with each other using a coded security signal, the method including:
  • the method may include decoding, in the unit which is arranged in use to receive the security signal, the frequency of the second signal component from the first signal component.
  • the method may include generating the frequency of the second signal component in a variable manner and may include achieving that variability by a substantially random selection from within a predetermined range of frequencies.
  • the method may include tuning the unit arranged to receive the security signal such that it receives the second signal component after it has decoded the frequency thereof from the first signal component.
  • the method may include selecting the frequency of transmission of the second signal component such that the difference frequency between the frequency of the second signal component and the frequency of the first signal component is substantially the same as the frequency of the second signal component.
  • the method may include determining the difference frequency as well as the frequency of transmission of the first and second signal components and thereby determining whether or not a relay unit has been used to relay the security signal between the units.
  • the method may include transmitting the first signal component at a frequency in the order of 120 kHz and/or may include transmitting the second signal at a frequency in the order of 40 kHz to 80 kHz.
  • the method may include transmitting the signal components at a difference frequency in the order of 40 kHz to 80 kHz.
  • the security system of the present invention is a passive entry system and a general example of a known arrangement of this type is disclosed in EP 0218251.
  • a security control unit detects the approach of a user to the vehicle and transmits a coded command signal to a remote transponder which is carried by the user and which identifies itself by returning a response signal to the security control unit on receipt of the command signal.
  • the security control unit opens the vehicle on receipt of a valid response signal.
  • a vehicle 10 includes a security system comprising a security control unit 12 fitted to the vehicle 10 and a portable/remote transponder unit 14 carried by a user.
  • the units 12, 14 are arranged in use to communicate with each other by passing coded security signals.
  • the security control unit 12 On detecting the approach towards the vehicle 10 of a remote transponder unit 14, the security control unit 12 transmits a coded security signal.
  • This coded security signal is transmitted in the form of two signal components, comprising a first coded signal component S1 at a first frequency F1 and a second coded signal component S2 at a second frequency F2.
  • the frequency F2 of transmission of the second signal component S2 is encoded in the information conveyed by the first signal component S1.
  • the remote transponder unit 14 is capable of tuning itself to receive the range of frequencies sent by the security control unit 12.
  • the remote transponder unit 14 is arranged to de-code the frequency F2 of the second signal component S2 from the first signal component S1 and is then arranged to tune itself to also receive the second signal component S2 at its respective frequency F2.
  • the frequency F2 of the second signal component S2 is generated internally by the security control unit 12 and is selected by the security control unit 12 such that its difference frequency with respect to the frequency F1 of the first signal component S1 is substantially the same as its generated frequency F2.
  • the frequency F2 of the second signal component S2 may instead be selected substantially randomly from a number of second frequencies F2 which could be stored in the security control unit 12 and all of which would conform to the requirements laid out above for the difference frequency.
  • the remote transponder unit 14 is arranged to determine the difference frequency as well as the first frequency F1 and the second frequency F2. When the remote transponder unit 14 has de-coded the first signal component S1 and from that the second signal component S2, it transmits a response signal S3 back to the security control unit 12 at a fixed frequency F3 and upon receipt of the response of signal S3 the security control unit 12 disarms the alarm and opens the vehicle 10.
  • the frequency of the first signal component S1 is set to a nominal 120 kHz.
  • the frequency F2 of the second signal component S2 is selected variably or randomly in the range of 40 kHz to 80 kHz such that it results in a difference frequency also in the order of 40 kHz to 80 kHz.
  • the frequency of the response signal S3 is conveniently preset in the region of 433 MHz.
  • the vehicle 10 of Figure 1 is shown in a position in which the remote transponder unit 14 is out of range of the vehicle 10 and a pair of relay units 16, 18 are interposed between them 10, 14.
  • the relay units 16, 18 are of the code grabber type known to car thieves. One of the relay units 16 is positioned close to the vehicle 10 and the second relay unit 18 is positioned close to the remote transponder unit 14. Such relay units 16, 18 commonly operate with a large bandwidth and are used to try to trigger and capture the coded security signal from the security unit 12 and then to modulate it onto a higher frequency carrier wave F4, of for example 27 MHz, after which it is transmitted to the distant relay unit 18 as a captured signal S4.
  • a higher frequency carrier wave F4 of for example 27 MHz
  • the relay unit 18, which is in the vicinity of the remote transponder unit 14, demodulates this higher frequency signal S4 and generates sum and difference frequencies.
  • the relay unit 18 then re-transmits the signal it has received from the first relay unit 16 to the remote transponder unit 14 at its original frequency F1 of 120 kHz as a relayed signal S5. This is done in an attempt to cause the remote transponder unit 14 to transmit its response signal S3, which would then be captured by the relay unit 18 and transmitted back to the relay unit 16 at, for example, 418 MHz. If this can be achieyed, the relay unit 16 can re-transmit the response signal S3 at its frequency of 433 MHz to the security control unit 12 and thereby defeat the security system.
  • the frequency F2 of the second signal component S2 is in the range of 40 kHz to 80 kHz and the difference frequency is also in the range of 40 kHz to 80 kHz, however, it is significantly more difficult to reject the difference signal without also rejecting what may be the genuine second frequency F2. This means that the relay units 16, 18 have great difficulty in relaying the second signal component S2 to the remote transponder 14.
  • the remote transponder 14 can, during normal communication with the security controller 12, receive the first signal component S1 and from that decode the frequency F2 of the second signal component S2 and determine the difference frequency.
  • the remote transponder unit 14 cannot determine the frequency F2 of the second signal component S2 from the relayed signal S5. The remote transponder 14 cannot then receive the second signal component S2 and therefore does not transmit its response signal S3.
  • the security system of this invention determines whether or not a relay transmitter arrangement 16, 18 has been used and for it then to take defensive action, i.e. by not transmitting its response signal S3. In this manner, it is made more difficult to make an effective code grabber 16, 18 without incurring high cost and therefore the security of the vehicle 10 is improved.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Selective Calling Equipment (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)

Claims (10)

  1. Système de sécurité comprenant un bloc de contrôle de sécurité (12) et un bloc de transpondeur éloigné (14) disposés, en cours d'utilisation, pour communiquer l'un avec l'autre en utilisant un signal de sécurité codé, dans lequel le signal de sécurité comprend une première composante de signal et une seconde composante de signal (S1, S2) qui sont émises à des fréquences différentes (F1, F2),
    caractérisé en ce que
    la fréquence d'émission (F2) de la seconde composante de signal (S2) est codée dans la première composante de signal (S1).
  2. Système de sécurité selon la revendication 1,
    dans lequel
    le bloc qui est disposé, en cours d'utilisation, pour revoir le signal de sécurité, est disposé pour décoder la fréquence (F2) de la seconde composante de signal (S2) à partir de la première composante de signal (S1).
  3. Système de sécurité selon la revendication 1 ou 2,
    dans lequel
    la fréquence (F2) de la seconde composante de signal (S2) est générée d'une manière variable par le bloc (12) disposé pour émettre le signal de sécurité.
  4. Système de sécurité selon la revendication 3,
    dans lequel
    la variabilité de la génération de la fréquence d'émission de la seconde composante de signal, est obtenue par une sélection essentiellement aléatoire, à partir de l'intérieur d'une plage de fréquences prédéterminée, par le bloc disposé pour émettre le signal de sécurité.
  5. Système de sécurité selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes,
    dans lequel
    le bloc (14) prévu pour recevoir le signal de sécurité est disposé pour s'accorder de lui-même de manière à recevoir la seconde composante de signal (S2) après avoir décodé sa fréquence (F2) à partir de la première composante de signal (S1).
  6. Système de sécurité selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes,
    dans lequel
    la plage de fréquences d'émission dans laquelle on sélectionne la fréquence d'émission de la seconde composante de signal, est telle que la fréquence de différence entre la fréquence de la seconde composante de signal et la fréquence de la première composante de fréquence, est essentiellement la même que la fréquence (F2) de la seconde composante de signal.
  7. Système de sécurité selon la revendication 6,
    dans lequel
    le bloc prévu pour recevoir le signal de sécurité est disposé pour déterminer la fréquence de différence ainsi que la fréquence d'émission des première et seconde composantes de signal, pour déterminer de cette manière si un bloc de retransmission a été utilisé ou non pour retransmettre le signal de sécurité entre les blocs.
  8. Système de sécurité selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes,
    dans lequel
    la fréquence de la première composante de signal est de l'ordre de 120 kHz.
  9. Système de sécurité selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes,
    dans lequel
    la fréquence de la seconde composante de signal est de l'ordre de 40 kHz à 80 kHz.
  10. Système de sécurité selon l'une quelconque des revendications 7 à 9,
    dans lequel
    la fréquence de différence est de l'ordre de 40 kHz à 80kHz.
EP99928063A 1998-07-29 1999-06-17 Systeme de securite Expired - Lifetime EP1101005B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB9816409 1998-07-29
GBGB9816409.8A GB9816409D0 (en) 1998-07-29 1998-07-29 A security system
PCT/GB1999/001943 WO2000006858A1 (fr) 1998-07-29 1999-06-17 Systeme de securite

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1101005A1 EP1101005A1 (fr) 2001-05-23
EP1101005B1 true EP1101005B1 (fr) 2004-09-15

Family

ID=10836300

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP99928063A Expired - Lifetime EP1101005B1 (fr) 1998-07-29 1999-06-17 Systeme de securite

Country Status (5)

Country Link
EP (1) EP1101005B1 (fr)
AU (1) AU4519099A (fr)
DE (1) DE69920233T2 (fr)
GB (1) GB9816409D0 (fr)
WO (1) WO2000006858A1 (fr)

Families Citing this family (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN1248542C (zh) 1999-02-15 2006-03-29 新型转换器有限公司 扬声器
DE10201580A1 (de) * 2002-01-17 2003-08-07 Philips Intellectual Property Verfahren zum Betreiben eines Zugangssicherungssystemes
FR3044100B1 (fr) * 2015-10-19 2018-01-05 Valeo Comfort And Driving Assistance Procede d'estimation d'une distance et unite electronique pour vehicule

Family Cites Families (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE3536377A1 (de) 1985-10-11 1987-04-16 Bayerische Motoren Werke Ag Sicherheitseinrichtung fuer kraftfahrzeuge
DE4003280C5 (de) 1990-02-03 2007-06-28 Bayerische Motoren Werke Ag Sicherheitseinrichtung für Kraftfahrzeuge
US5319797A (en) * 1992-09-17 1994-06-07 Rockwell International Corporation Remote vehicle access featuring high security
DE4409167C1 (de) * 1994-03-17 1995-06-29 Siemens Ag Schlüssellose Zugangskontrolleinrichtung
GB9406754D0 (en) * 1994-04-06 1994-05-25 Doxas Michael Remote control radio key with ultimate protectin against decoding and accessing of codes by any method including scanners, grabbers and radio receivers
GB2310300B (en) * 1996-02-17 2000-04-19 Rover Group A vehicle security system

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE69920233D1 (de) 2004-10-21
AU4519099A (en) 2000-02-21
GB9816409D0 (en) 1998-09-23
WO2000006858A1 (fr) 2000-02-10
DE69920233T2 (de) 2005-11-24
EP1101005A1 (fr) 2001-05-23

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