EP1107190B1 - Procédé et machine à affranchir - Google Patents
Procédé et machine à affranchir Download PDFInfo
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- EP1107190B1 EP1107190B1 EP00118472A EP00118472A EP1107190B1 EP 1107190 B1 EP1107190 B1 EP 1107190B1 EP 00118472 A EP00118472 A EP 00118472A EP 00118472 A EP00118472 A EP 00118472A EP 1107190 B1 EP1107190 B1 EP 1107190B1
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- Prior art keywords
- postal
- electronic
- franking
- item
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- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 description 8
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 8
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- 238000011160 research Methods 0.000 description 2
- 241001295925 Gegenes Species 0.000 description 1
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
- G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
- G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
- G07B17/00435—Details specific to central, non-customer apparatus, e.g. servers at post office or vendor
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
- G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
- G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
- G07B17/00435—Details specific to central, non-customer apparatus, e.g. servers at post office or vendor
- G07B2017/00443—Verification of mailpieces, e.g. by checking databases
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
- G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
- G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
- G07B2017/00822—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system including unique details
- G07B2017/0083—Postal data, e.g. postage, address, sender, machine ID, vendor
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for automatic franking of mail and for checking the franking according to the preamble of claim 1.
- the invention also relates to a system for carrying out such a method according to the preamble of claim 14 and a franking machine for automatic franking of mail in accordance with the preamble of claim 18.
- EP 0 686 946 describes a method and system for postage payment for the generation of a plurality of individual encrypted data elements.
- Each of these encrypted data elements which may be a digital token, has a specific value.
- the generated plurality of individual encrypted data items are stored on a transportable medium.
- a prepayment value is also stored on the transportable medium.
- the stored plurality of individual encrypted data items is limited based on the prepayment value stored in the transportable medium.
- US 5,390,251 discloses a system for verifying the validity of the printing of franking marks on postal items by a possibly large number of users of franking machines, comprising a device arranged in each franking machine for generating a code and for printing the code on each mail piece.
- the code is an encrypted code representing the postage meter printing machine and other information that uniquely determines the legitimacy of the franking on the mail items.
- the keys for the code generating devices are changed at predetermined time intervals in each of the franking machines to change the code generation.
- a security center includes means for maintaining a security code database and tracking the keys for generating security codes corresponding to the changes in each generating device and the information printed by the postage meter on the mail to allow comparison with the code printed on the mail ,
- franking systems are used, with which postal charges can be downloaded via open networks such as the Internet from the postal service and which are not special Require hardware with regular inspection needs.
- open franking systems a conventional PC for downloading postage and a standard printer for printing a stamp on an envelope or label may be used.
- the US Postal Service has specified a system architecture for open and closed franking systems. Such a system is known for example from US 5,825,893.
- Each user has a physical security device that is as safe to break as possible, on which all user postage charges intended for franking are stored.
- PSD Postal Security Device
- In the security device is essentially a charge meter and a user-individual encryption module arranged with the fee stamp and another machine-readable data stamp, so-called "indicia" are generated.
- the security device For franking a piece of mail, the security device generates such an indication from the postage to be franked, an identification code of the security device, the sender address, the current meter count and possibly further data by means of a signature key. This indicia is then encoded into a two-dimensional barcode and printed on the mail so that it can be easily and reliably scanned and checked by a postal service testing facility. The internal postage meter of the franking machine is then reduced by the amount of postage used.
- the invention is therefore based on the object to provide a franking method, a franking system and a franking machine, which have a high security against fraud while having a low cost.
- the invention is based on the idea that a fraud by multiple use of postal fees and / or multiple use of data stamps can be prevented by the fact that the machine-readable data stamp applied to the mail during franking is coded and / or configured in such a way that it acquires clearly distinguishable from other used data stamps.
- the data stamp contains the impression and / or value of an electronic coin individualized for the present franking. While ordinary money, such as coins and banknotes are common means of payment, you can see them but not the purpose of payment.
- the franking for the present franking individualized money - hereinafter called electronic coin - generated - this electronic coin not only a monetary value - such as postage value - contains, but also the franking individualized data, so that a double generation of an electronic coin is excluded.
- the electronic coin is represented on the mail by a data stamp which, in addition to the postage value, also contains further information identifying the electronic coin, which are machine-readable.
- the postal service can check by means of a test facility whether a data stamp has already been used and has been cut by a fraudster, for example, and pasted on a new letter.
- the solution according to the invention has the advantages that in this case no additional hardware such as a described security device for storing and billing postage and for storing a user-individual Signature key is required and can be realized as a pure software solution on a conventional computer. Further, it is not mandatory that data about the user is included in the data stamp so that the user can not be deduced from the data stamp, thereby preserving the anonymity of the user. It is also not necessary that in addition to the user and the postal service a third person monitors as the monitoring process as in some known solutions the franking process and the billing of postage online, but a franking can be done at any time and without the involvement of such monitoring authority. Overall, the solution according to the invention achieves a similarly high security standard as with cryptographically secure electronic payment systems
- the check takes place by comparisons of the data stamp to be checked with used data stamps stored in a database.
- the comparison check of the data stamps to be checked is equivalent to the comparison check of generated electronic coins. Since an individual data stamp, that is to say an individual electronic coin which individualizes the mail piece, is generated for each piece of mail, this represents a simple realization of the check, wherein the database is stored in a suitable memory device in the checking device does not have unlimited storage space, the embodiment according to claim 3 is very advantageous.
- Each data stamp has an expiration date, ie a date from the date of creation of the data stamp in the future, to which the data stamp (or the electronic coin) is valid and up to which, for example, the mailpiece is transported.
- this period can be, for example, 14 days for all users and all data stamps (or electronic coins).
- storage space in the database can be made available again every day by deleting the data stamps or electronic coins with the oldest verification data.
- an individual coding of the postal fee units provided by the postal service with a secret key can also be found in the data stamp applied to the mail item, which can thus be used to identify a multiple use of postal fee units.
- the date of creation and creation time, the stamped postage and the addressee of the mail are contained in non-manipulable form in the data stamp.
- other and / or other data such as the sender, his or her address or a postage due date are included.
- not all frankings and date stamps are checked.
- the check is performed only on a random basis, that not all checked data stamps are stored in the database or that a data stamp to be checked is compared due to time constraints with only a portion of the data stamp stored in the database.
- further mail item data can be included in the data stamp in the development according to claim.
- the surface structure (surface fiber structure, roughness of the surface) of the packaging material or of the envelope or another measurable property individualizing the individual piece of mail item, such as the exact weight, can be used as the item data can be used, which are either entered by the user or measured automatically by a meter integrated in the franking machine at the franking.
- this item of mail data are artificially added in the form of label data located on a label the mail.
- a label may carry, for example, a hologram or a barcode whose data are integrated as mailing data into the data stamp.
- a data stamp must also belong to the postage stamped with it and can not be used for another mail item which has other mail item data. This can be ascertained during the checking of the data stamp, provided that the checking device is configured in a suitable manner for measuring the mail item data of the mail item to be checked and this measured postal data is then compared with the mail item data contained in the data stamp.
- the franking and mailing system shown in FIG. 1 comprises a postal service 1, a postage meter 2 and a mailing service 3.
- the postal service 1 essentially has a postal fee facility 11 for issuing and settling postal fee units and a checking device 13 for checking and validating frankings.
- the postage fee facility 11 which need not necessarily be located in a post office, but can also be located, for example, by a third party or on the Internet, provides postal fee units for franking postgates that can be purchased at any time by the user of a franking machine or downloaded electronically ,
- the postal fee units i.e., electronic coins
- billing and accounting are performed by means of an accounting facility 15.
- the franking machine 2 has a central unit 21 and a printing unit 22, which can be realized in an open franking system by a standard PC and a standard printer.
- the central unit 21 comprises a fee module 23 which downloads the postal fee units from the postal service 1, stores them and bills them internally at a franking.
- the storage of postal fees can be done for example on the hard disk of the PC, on a chip card or on another storage medium.
- the settlement of postal charges with the postal service is usually done when downloading postal fees from the postal service 1, while the internal billing is done when printing a franking.
- the settlement with the postal service can be done by means of a specially created billing account, by credit card, by electronic payment or by cash.
- a cryptographic module 24 is further provided.
- a pressure control module 25 is provided, which controls the printing device 22.
- the fee stamp and the data stamp can be printed either directly on the mail piece or a label to be stuck on the mail piece.
- the franked mail is then transported by a mail service 3, where it passes either there or in the postal service 1, for example, in a mail collection, a testing device 13, where the franking is checked and canceled.
- the Test device 13 to a memory device 14 are stored in the particular used data stamp, with which a data stamp to be tested is compared.
- the postage fee device 11 may also be a connection between the postage fee device 11 and the checking device 13 in order, for example, to keep a record of used and depreciated postal fee units and to ensure that the checking device 13 knows the coding of postal fee units which may change at regular intervals.
- the franking which in the present case has at least a stamp and a date stamp and is generally referred to as "indicium”, should have at least the stamped postage and an electronic signature to authorize that postage. Additionally, additional data may be provided to support specific functions of the mailing system. For example, the delivery address may be included in machine-readable form to enable automatic mail sorting. For reasons of anonymity, the identity of the sender can also be omitted.
- the machine-readable part of the franking can be printed, for example, in the form of a two-dimensional barcode. If a franking proves to be valid and sufficient, the mail will be delivered to the appropriate recipient.
- a franking system should also offer sufficient ease of use. After downloading postal charges in the value of x, the user should be able to generate any fee (maximum x).
- the process of purchasing postage units and generating franking should be independent of each other so that, unlike known systems for generating a postage, an online connection to a postage facility must first be made in order to download a postage directly into a postage is converted. The franking should also be offline and without intervention a third, the franking and the billing of the postage monitoring device be possible.
- the described safety requirements and the described ease of use can be achieved. Due to the individual design of the data stamp such that every day a different type of data stamps is required for each addressee, the double use of frankings can be largely excluded. A fraudster who has sent a mail to a particular recipient could use the used franking a second time only for a second shipment on the same day. Since it is further provided that in the test device, the data stamps are compared with those already stored in the database and used in data stamps, frankings used for the second time can be detected with high certainty. If the generation of the data stamp is designed such that information about the identity of the user is contained, it can also be determined in the event of fraud.
- the data stamp also contains a code from which the postal fee units used can be used to generate the franking, it can also be determined during this check whether the corresponding postage unit has previously been used to generate a franking and is therefore used up Also, at any time and regardless of the time of a postage to be acquired and downloaded and can be divided into smaller sub-units as well as can be combined into larger units, the required ease of operation is achieved.
- FIG. 2 shows a mail item 8, in the example an envelope, with a franking and addressing according to the invention.
- This comprises an address field 81 for addressing, an optional sender address sender field 82, a metering stamp 83, a data stamp 84 and a label 85.
- the label 85 is optional and serves as a kind of fingerprint for the mail item, for which label data contained on the label is also contained in the data stamp 84 in a non-manipulatable form. This is to prevent the fee stamp 83 and the data stamp 84 from being cut out or copied and pasted onto another mail item and illegally reused.
- the label 85 would also have to be reused, which, for example, can be designed such that it is destroyed when it is replaced and / or not Moreover, the data stamp 84 may be designed so that it is machine-readable, the address of the addressee is included and can be used for automatic sorting of the mail item. In this case, the franking could therefore also be used only for a mail addressed to the same addressee.
- the arrangement, size and configuration of the individual fields 81 to 85 can also be different than shown.
- families of groups G q which have efficient algorithms for multiplying group elements, uniformly randomly selecting group elements, and testing two group elements for equality. Furthermore, computing discrete logarithms is difficult, ie not possible in polynomial time in the bit length of q , Although the last property has not been proven for any family of groups to date, there are candidates to whom these attributes are attributed after several decades of intensive research. This is called the discrete logarithm assumption or discrete Representation assumption. Both are equivalent.
- a candidate is a large cyclic subgroup of multiplicative groups Z * p of finite fields of residues modulo a large prime p. Large means here that p is at least 1024 bit long.
- Other (but less well studied) candidates are families of certain elliptic curves, more specifically large subsets of elliptic curves. The elliptic curves should not be super-singular and of low sex. Specific recommendations are made, for example, by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [NIST99] (http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption).
- the current state of research is that calculating discrete logarithms in the former candidate at a module length of 1024 bits is about as heavy as calculating discrete logarithms in the latter candidate at a plot of about 160 bits.
- the multiplicative notation of G q is used. This notation can be easily translated into the additive notation common to elliptic curves by replacing multiplications in G q by addition and powers in G q by scalar velocities of points of a curve.
- a protocol declaration shown in the first line of the figure, consists of the formal output parameters, followed by an assignment arrow, followed by the protocol name and the formal input parameters in parentheses.
- all input and output parameters of a subscriber are enclosed in square brackets, with the abbreviation of the subscriber (S for user, P for postage fee facility) attached to the parenthesized bracket.
- Formal input parameters may be shared by a protocol participant alone or by all protocol participants. The former are called private inputs, the latter are called common inputs.
- a protocol definition is done in matrix notation, where the actions of each participant are written in columns and each column is overwritten with the participant name. Successive actions of a participant can be grouped into blocks.
- Log actions are written in the usual mathematical notation with some special symbols.
- the equally distributed random choice of a Elements of a set A and the assignment of this element to a variable a is denoted by a ⁇ R A.
- the evaluation of an expression E and subsequent assignment of the result to a is denoted by a ⁇ E.
- H denotes a pseudorandom hash function which returns a value of Z q after input of any binary string. It is allowed to write an H with any number of arguments. In this case, the input to H is the concatenation of the binary representations of all arguments.
- Arithmetic operations are written either in G q , ie multiplication mod p, or in Z q , ie addition and multiplication mod q .
- G q the unique subgroup of the multiplicative group of the body Z p having the order q.
- g 1 , g 2 , G , G 0 be four generators of G q which are chosen independently and equally distributed randomly at system startup.
- s ⁇ z q 3 an auxiliary value enabling the user to de-anonymise in the case of fraud
- the recipient scratches and d / t the creation date and the creation time of the indicium. Further data on the origin of the indicium can be added.
- FIG. 3 shows a part of the protocol that occurs when a premium account is opened.
- a protocol is shown which is traversed to download digital coins.
- Common entry is the account number 1 and the public key y of the postal fee facility.
- Private entry of the postal fee facility P is her private key x.
- Private input of the user S is his private digital identity ( u 1 , u 2 ).
- the user proves to have a discrete representation of 1 (block 51).
- the protocol is shown in FIG.
- the postage facility and the user take the common entry 1 and the user takes as his private input his private digital identity ( u 1 , u 2 ).
- the user randomly chooses two values w 1 , w 2 ⁇ Z q and calculates a ⁇ G 1 w 1 G 2 w 2 ,
- This value a is sent to the postage facility, which then randomly selects a value c and sends it to the user.
- the user equally randomly selects the values u, v according to block 52.
- the postage meter selects a value t and then calculates the components z, a, b according to block 53.
- the user calculates the value r ' and accepts the obtained digital coin ( A', B ', ( z', a ', b', r ' )) if valid (see equation (1) above) with respect to public key y of the postage facility (see block 56).
- the user stores the discrete representations ⁇ , ⁇ of A and B for the obtained digital coin.
- FIG. 7 shows a test impression of a data stamp with a data matrix of 40 ⁇ 40 elements, ie the smallest amount of data, of the options listed in Table 1.
- the printed data stamp is machine-readable and contains the electronic coin, its value and its expiry date, as well as other details that customize the franking.
- the data matrix 100 can also be formed from another element number of mx x n elements. To the left of the printed data matrix 100, a conventional advertising print is reproduced.
- the inventive concept can be used everywhere in electronic commerce (e-commerce, IE cash systems), for example, it is easily possible that by means of the invention in decentralized and open systems also services such as the issuing of cards and tickets ( Theater tickets, tickets etc.). For example, if a ticket is generated by the ticket user himself, the ticket contains all the data of the ticket-individual electronic coin. Since each ticket is individualized, a multiple use of the ticket is excluded.
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- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Devices For Checking Fares Or Tickets At Control Points (AREA)
- Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
Claims (19)
- Procédé d'affranchissement mécanique de courrier (8) et de contrôle de l'affranchissement, des frais de port étant mémorisés sous une forme électronique, en tant qu'unités de frais de port, dans une machine à affranchir, et un cachet de données codé, contenant un jeton électronique et exploitable par une machine, étant apposé sur le courrier (8), la machine à affranchir produisant pour chaque pièce de courrier un jeton électronique individuel, pouvant être différencié des jetons électriques produits pour d'autres pièces de courrier, et un contrôle étant effectué à l'aide du cachet de données (84) contenant le jeton électronique pour détecter si des jetons électroniques et/ou des cachets de données ont été utilisés plusieurs fois.
- Procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que le contrôle est effectué par comparaison du jeton électronique (84) à contrôler avec les jetons électroniques utilisés, mémorisés dans une base de données (14).
- Procédé selon la revendication 1 ou 2, caractérisé en ce que chaque cachet de données (84), respectivement le jeton électronique qu'il contient, comporte une date de fin de validité (individuelle).
- Procédé selon la revendication 3, caractérisé en ce que seuls les jetons électroniques déjà utilisés qui sont valables jusqu'à une date maximale de fin de validité sont enregistrés dans la base de données (14).
- Procédé selon une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que les frais de port payés par un client sont enregistrés en tant qu'unités de frais de port électroniques dans une machine à affranchir et en ce que l'unité de frais de port subit un codage individuel, en fonction du courrier, lors de la génération d'un jeton électronique pour un courrier (8), à l'aide d'informations spécifiques du courrier, de sorte que le cachet de données (84) sur un objet postal (8) permet de vérifier si un jeton électronique a été produit à partir d'une unité de frais de port qui a déjà servi précédemment à la génération d'un jeton électronique.
- Procédé selon la revendication 5, caractérisé en ce que différents jetons électroniques pour l'affranchissement d'un courrier (8) peuvent être combinés par des cachets de données séparés ou dans un même cachet de données.
- Procédé selon une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que le jeton électronique n'authentifie que des données concernant l'objet postal.
- Procédé selon une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que plusieurs jetons électroniques de même valeur totale peuvent être produits à partir d'une unité de frais de port et en ce que ces jetons électroniques peuvent être utilisés pour affranchir des objets postaux différents.
- Procédé selon une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que la génération des unités de frais de port est effectuée lors de leur achat auprès d'un dispositif de frais de port à l'aide d'un code secret connu de lui seul.
- Procédé selon une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que le jeton électronique généré contient sa date de création et son heure de création, les frais de port affranchis et/ou le destinataire du courrier (8), sous une forme non manipulable.
- Procédé selon une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que le jeton électronique généré contient des données caractérisant l'objet postal, notamment des données caractérisant des propriétés physiques de l'objet postal.
- Procédé selon la revendication 11, caractérisé en ce que l'on utilise comme données d'objet postal des données d'étiquette caractérisant de façon unique le type et/ou la structure de surface du matériau d'emballage de l'objet postal et/ou se trouvant sur une étiquette (85) supplémentaire appliquée sur le courrier.
- Procédé selon une des revendications 5 à 12, caractérisé en ce que, en cas d'utilisation multiple frauduleuse d'une unité de frais de port, l'utilisateur correspondant peut être déterminé à l'aide du cachet de données (84) sur un objet postal (8).
- Système pour la mise en oeuvre du procédé selon la revendication 1, comportant- une machine à affranchir (2) pour l'affranchissement mécanique de courrier (8), englobant une unité d'impression (22) et un module cryptographique (24) pour apposer sur le courrier (8) un cachet de données (84), exploitable par une machine et éventuellement codé, et une unité centrale (21) avec un module de frais de port (23) pour charger et mémoriser des frais de port, sous une forme électronique, en tant qu'unités de frais de port, et avec un module de commande d'impression (25) pour commander l'unité d'impression (22), et- un dispositif de frais de port (13) pour délivrer des unités de frais de port, et- un dispositif de contrôle (13) pour contrôler le cachet de données,
la machine à affranchir étant agencée pour produire des jetons électroniques individuels, en fonction du courrier, qui se différencient des jetons électroniques produits pour d'autres courriers, et le dispositif de contrôle (13) étant agencé pour contrôler le cachet de données (84) contenant le jeton électronique, aux fins de détecter une éventuelle utilisation multiple de jetons électroniques et/ou de cachets de données. - Système selon la revendication 14, caractérisé en ce que le cachet de données (84) contient les informations d'un jeton électronique et ce jeton électronique est individualisé pour chaque affranchissement, de sorte que les jetons électroniques de chaque affranchissement se différencient les uns des autres, même lorsque la même valeur de frais de port est imprimée sur le courrier.
- Système selon la revendication 14 ou 15, caractérisé en ce que le dispositif de contrôle (13) présente une mémoire (14) pour enregistrer des cachets de données utilisés ou des jetons électroniques utilisés.
- Système selon la revendication 16, caractérisé en ce que le dispositif de frais de port (11) présente un moyen de codage (12) (moyen cryptographique) pour coder (crypter) des unités de frais de port.
- Machine à affranchir (2) pour l'affranchissement mécanique de courrier (8), englobant une unité d'impression (22) et un module cryptographique (24) pour apposer un cachet de données exploitable par une machine, codé et contenant un jeton électronique, sur le courrier (8), une unité centrale (21) avec un module de frais de port (23) pour charger et mémoriser des frais de port, sous une forme électronique, en tant qu'unités de frais de port, et avec un module de commande d'impression (25) pour commander l'unité d'impression (22), un jeton électronique individuel, pouvant être différencié des jetons électroniques produits pour d'autres objets postaux, étant généré pour chaque objet postal de manière telle que le cachet de données (84) contenant le jeton électronique permette de contrôler s'il y a utilisation multiple de jetons électroniques et/ou de cachets de données.
- Machine à affranchir selon la revendication 18, caractérisée en ce que la machine à affranchir est réalisée par un ordinateur du commerce, équipé d'une imprimante.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| DE19958721A DE19958721A1 (de) | 1999-12-06 | 1999-12-06 | Frankierverfahren und -vorrichtung |
| DE19958721 | 1999-12-06 |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| EP1107190A1 EP1107190A1 (fr) | 2001-06-13 |
| EP1107190B1 true EP1107190B1 (fr) | 2006-02-15 |
Family
ID=7931574
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP00118472A Expired - Lifetime EP1107190B1 (fr) | 1999-12-06 | 2000-08-25 | Procédé et machine à affranchir |
Country Status (3)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US7496538B2 (fr) |
| EP (1) | EP1107190B1 (fr) |
| DE (2) | DE19958721A1 (fr) |
Families Citing this family (13)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE19958721A1 (de) * | 1999-12-06 | 2001-07-12 | Francotyp Postalia Gmbh | Frankierverfahren und -vorrichtung |
| US7162035B1 (en) | 2000-05-24 | 2007-01-09 | Tracer Detection Technology Corp. | Authentication method and system |
| US8171567B1 (en) | 2002-09-04 | 2012-05-01 | Tracer Detection Technology Corp. | Authentication method and system |
| DE10260406B4 (de) * | 2002-12-16 | 2007-03-08 | Francotyp-Postalia Gmbh | Verfahren und Anordnung zur unterschiedlichen Erzeugung kryptographischer Sicherungen von Mitteilungen in einem Hostgerät |
| US20040122776A1 (en) * | 2002-12-18 | 2004-06-24 | Pitney Bowes Incorporated | Method for obtaining refunds from a meter that produces a dual postal indicia |
| US20050138469A1 (en) * | 2003-09-19 | 2005-06-23 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Fraud detection in a postage system |
| US7353213B2 (en) * | 2003-09-19 | 2008-04-01 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | System and method for preventing duplicate printing in a web browser |
| US7937333B2 (en) * | 2003-09-19 | 2011-05-03 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | System and method for facilitating refunds of unused postage |
| DE102004037695A1 (de) * | 2004-08-02 | 2006-02-23 | Deutsche Post Ag | Verfahren und Vorrichtungsanordnung zur digitalen Freimachung von Postsendungen |
| DE102004046051A1 (de) * | 2004-09-21 | 2006-03-30 | Deutsche Post Ag | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Frankieren von Postsendungen |
| DE102007018394A1 (de) * | 2007-04-17 | 2008-10-23 | Deutsche Post Ag | Verfahren zur Frankierung einer Postsendung sowie Vorrichtung, Netzwerkknoten, Logistiksystem und Bearbeitungseinheit zur Durchführung des Verfahrens |
| US7995196B1 (en) | 2008-04-23 | 2011-08-09 | Tracer Detection Technology Corp. | Authentication method and system |
| US20160292788A1 (en) * | 2015-03-30 | 2016-10-06 | Domenick Gabriel Grasso | Currency and Financial Instrument Based Digital Assets |
Family Cites Families (14)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US4775246A (en) * | 1985-04-17 | 1988-10-04 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | System for detecting unaccounted for printing in a value printing system |
| FR2706655B1 (fr) * | 1993-06-17 | 1995-08-25 | Gemplus Card Int | Procédé de contrôle d'une imprimante pour obtenir des affranchissements postaux. |
| US5390251A (en) * | 1993-10-08 | 1995-02-14 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Mail processing system including data center verification for mailpieces |
| US5606507A (en) * | 1994-01-03 | 1997-02-25 | E-Stamp Corporation | System and method for storing, retrieving and automatically printing postage on mail |
| US5655023A (en) | 1994-05-13 | 1997-08-05 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Advanced postage payment system employing pre-computed digital tokens and with enhanced security |
| US5513563A (en) * | 1994-11-14 | 1996-05-07 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Indicia security via variable dot size |
| US5781438A (en) * | 1995-12-19 | 1998-07-14 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Token generation process in an open metering system |
| WO1997024699A1 (fr) * | 1995-12-29 | 1997-07-10 | S. E. Axis Limited | Authentification d'articles |
| US5768384A (en) * | 1996-03-28 | 1998-06-16 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | System for identifying authenticating and tracking manufactured articles |
| US5822739A (en) * | 1996-10-02 | 1998-10-13 | E-Stamp Corporation | System and method for remote postage metering |
| GB2321620A (en) * | 1997-01-29 | 1998-08-05 | Neopost Ltd | Method and apparatus for printing and prevention of copying of postage indicia |
| US6005945A (en) * | 1997-03-20 | 1999-12-21 | Psi Systems, Inc. | System and method for dispensing postage based on telephonic or web milli-transactions |
| DE19958721A1 (de) * | 1999-12-06 | 2001-07-12 | Francotyp Postalia Gmbh | Frankierverfahren und -vorrichtung |
| US6438530B1 (en) * | 1999-12-29 | 2002-08-20 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Software based stamp dispenser |
-
1999
- 1999-12-06 DE DE19958721A patent/DE19958721A1/de not_active Withdrawn
-
2000
- 2000-08-25 DE DE50012218T patent/DE50012218D1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2000-08-25 EP EP00118472A patent/EP1107190B1/fr not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2000-12-01 US US09/728,741 patent/US7496538B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| US7496538B2 (en) | 2009-02-24 |
| DE19958721A1 (de) | 2001-07-12 |
| EP1107190A1 (fr) | 2001-06-13 |
| DE50012218D1 (de) | 2006-04-20 |
| US20020035547A1 (en) | 2002-03-21 |
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