EP1222100B1 - Procede et dispositif de securisation d'une section de voie a double sens de circulation - Google Patents

Procede et dispositif de securisation d'une section de voie a double sens de circulation Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1222100B1
EP1222100B1 EP00971107A EP00971107A EP1222100B1 EP 1222100 B1 EP1222100 B1 EP 1222100B1 EP 00971107 A EP00971107 A EP 00971107A EP 00971107 A EP00971107 A EP 00971107A EP 1222100 B1 EP1222100 B1 EP 1222100B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
train
control means
track section
running control
wheel sensor
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP00971107A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP1222100A1 (fr
Inventor
Dieter Tod
Franz Bacher
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens AG Oesterreich
Original Assignee
Siemens SGP Verkehrstechnik GmbH
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Publication date
Application filed by Siemens SGP Verkehrstechnik GmbH filed Critical Siemens SGP Verkehrstechnik GmbH
Priority to AT00971107T priority Critical patent/ATE258516T1/de
Publication of EP1222100A1 publication Critical patent/EP1222100A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1222100B1 publication Critical patent/EP1222100B1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L23/00—Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains
    • B61L23/22—Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains for controlling traffic in two directions over the same pair of rails

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method and a device for securing in both directions used track section, at the ends of each a siding via a switch is connected to which in a train corresponding at least to the protective path of a train a train control means is arranged at the first predetermined distance in front of the switch.
  • the Indusi system works with track magnets that are attached to the track and an electrical one Form suction circuit, which acts on a control provided on the locomotive, the again the train automatically comes to a standstill when entering a blocked track section brings.
  • Permanent magnets arranged on the track are used for the magnetic driving lock.
  • the track magnets are not demagnetized if the train runs over them irregularly subsequently trigger the train in question to brake.
  • the patent holder has also created the so-called support relay, which consists of two on top of each other arranged signal relays, which are mounted on a common base plate.
  • the two Relays are mutually interlocked with the help of support plates that are rigidly connected to the armature are and mutually fix, so that the support relay as an electromechanical Flip-flop can be called.
  • the term support relay has also been used in the Expert input found (see e.g. support relay K 50, Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, Railway Signal Technology, Braunschweig, 1983, Order No. F 526/103, Christian Hager, railway security systems in Austria, Vol. 2: Signals, 1st ed. 1994, pages 150 ff., Verlag Peter Pospischil, Vienna and Das Haus Siemens und die Eisenbahn-Signaltechnik, Braunschweig, 1972).
  • DE 26 23 108 describes a system for the transmission of signals from a track-fixed device on a passing rail vehicle become known.
  • the light signal “Drive not free” by illuminating a high-frequency alternating field and that Light signal “drive free” modulated by broadcasting the same alternating field with a tone frequency transfer.
  • the aim of the invention is to create a method and a device for train protection, that work automatically and with increased safety without the cooperation of people. Furthermore, the train protection device should have no central control center and be independent of route signals function.
  • Train influencing means automatically detects the passing of a train on the siding is that on the track section on either side of the two switches on a second or third
  • the passage of a train is automatically recorded at the point of the track section, wherein when a train is detected in front of the train influencing means at one end of the track section and simultaneous non-detection of a train in front of the train control means at the other end of the track section, the first-mentioned train control means into a passive one Operating condition is controlled or left and the other train control in one active operating state is controlled or left when detecting a train on the second Place the adjacent train control device in at one end of the track section an active operating state is controlled and on detection of a train at the third position the other end of the track section, the train control means in the initial state be transferred.
  • each Train control means and each wheel sensor is electrically connected to a control logic which is set up to respond to the first wheel sensor at one end of the track section as well as non-response of the first wheel sensor at the other end of the Track section, the neighboring train control means in a passive operating state to control or leave the other train control device in an active operating state to control or leave when the first wheel sensor responds at one end of the track section adjacent to the second wheel sensor, the adjacent train control means to control in an active operating state and when the third wheel sensor responds to the to put the control logic in the initial state at the other end of the track section.
  • protective path used in the generic term is in the operating regulations of The respective railway operator defines and means that a train within this path to the Bring to a standstill.
  • the invention provides a train protection device that without the cooperation of People automatically and with increased compared to the prior art, practically complete Security works. Furthermore, the train protection device is independent and from a central one Control center and independent of route signals. Since there is no connection between the control center and the train protection device does not fail. Because the train protection device works independently of route signals, has their possible disregard by the driver no negative effects. The device according to the invention makes route signals unnecessary. Human misinterpretation or disregard driving bans are excluded.
  • the train influencing means can be magnetic Driving lock can be formed with an electrically demagnetizable permanent magnet.
  • the train control means can be continuously operated by means of the control logic be, which ensures security even in the event of a power failure or missing control logic supply is guaranteed.
  • control logic can advantageously be constructed with electromechanical relay circuits be those that have proven themselves very well in practice and / or for setting up the control logic are readily available.
  • a support relay which is off, is connected upstream of the train influencing means there are two mutually mechanically interlocked relays (electromechanical flip-flop). Consequently ensures that the respective state of the relay is locked and not inadvertently can change.
  • control means is controlled or blocked in operation by means of the control logic. On this is also the more unlikely event that prevents two trains from entering at the same time retract the track section.
  • Each wheel sensor can advantageously consist of a pair of sensors arranged in the track direction each with a dampable magnetic circuit, because this automatically changes the direction of the train can be determined.
  • each switch can be set in a predetermined direction, whereby the entire Simplifies setup.
  • FIG. 1 shows a basic illustration of the invention
  • 2a and 2b a circuit diagram of the device according to the invention
  • Fig. 3 is a flow chart the control logic.
  • the train protection device is primarily for one in both Direction track section GLA provided the stations BH1 and BH2 combines.
  • a switch WE1 or WE2 Siding AG1 or AG2 connected, on which the protective path (as defined above) a first predetermined distance B corresponding to a train in front of the switch WE1 or WE2 a train control means ZM1 or ZM2 is arranged.
  • a second predetermined Distance A in front of each train control device ZM1 or ZM2 is on the siding AG1 or AG2 a first wheel sensor R01 or R02 is provided for detecting a train.
  • the track section GLA has a second wheel sensor on each side of the two turnouts WE1 and WE2 R11 or R21 or a third one, located next to the siding AG1 or AG2 Wheel sensor AB2 or AB1 arranged to detect a train that is from the switch WE1, WE2 has a third predetermined distance C.
  • the distance C results from the respective safety-related or operational requirements for a border-free entry of a train, i.e. on the other hand, to enable an exit via points WE1, WE2.
  • Each train control device ZM1 or ZM2 and each wheel sensor R01, R02, R11, R21, AB1, AB2 is electrically connected to a control logic STL, which is set up to when the first wheel sensor R01 responds at one end of the track section GLA and simultaneous non-response of the first wheel sensor R02 at the other end of the track section GLA to control the adjacent train control device ZM1 or to leave and to control or keep the other train control device ZM2 in operation.
  • the control logic STL controls the adjacent train control means in the adjacent second wheel sensor R11 ZM1 in operation and when the third wheel sensor AB1 responds to the the other end of the track section GLA in the initial state.
  • Each train control ZM1, ZM2 is as a magnetic driving lock with an electric demagnetizable permanent magnets.
  • every train control device is ZM1, ZM2 continuously controlled in operation by means of the control logic STL. This means that at Power failure the train control devices ZM1, ZM2 cannot be put out of operation. Furthermore, the control logic STL is set up in such a way that when the two respond simultaneously first wheel sensors R01, R02 each train control means ZM1, ZM2 controlled in operation or is blocked.
  • Each switch WE1, WE2 is simply designed as a dropout switch, i. H. with the help of Hydraulic cylinders always set in a predetermined direction. u. between towards the right held so that a train is always directed to the continuous track, from the siding However, AG1 or AG2 can enter the secured track section GLA, provided that that the entrance is clear.
  • the wheel sensors R01, R02, R11 and R21 consist of one arranged in the track direction Pair of sensors, each with a dampable magnetic circuit, so that the direction of travel of a train can be determined.
  • 2a and 2b show the electrical circuit diagram of the control logic STL, which has been tried and tested in practice Electromechanical relay circuits is built, but also with others, e.g. B. electronic circuits can be realized.
  • 2a is the station BH1, the circuit of Fig. 2b assigned to the station BH2.
  • the two circuits are over one Multi-wire connection L15, L16, L17, L25, L26, L27 connected, the individual wires L15, L16, L17, L25, L26, L27 are connected to each other via terminals e, f, g, h, i and k.
  • An arrow ⁇ up or an arrow ⁇ down next to a relay indicates.
  • the index I or E at a reference number for a relay means that the relay is from another relay (Mother or master relay) is dependent. Otherwise, the same reference numerals are used below as used in Fig. 1.
  • the wheel sensors R01, R11 and AB2 are each connected via a normally closed contact r01, r11 or a02 connected to an ANS supply.
  • a relay F01 to which a make contact is connected, is connected to the ANS supply via a line L11 r01 of the first wheel sensor R01 and a self-holding contact f01 of the relay in series F01 are connected upstream.
  • the two contacts r01, f01 is the series connection of a normally closed contact a 1E of the third wheel sensor AB1 at the other end of the track section GLA and one Normally closed contact b01 of a block lock relay BS1 connected in parallel, the normally closed contact a1E a normally closed contact a02 of the third wheel sensor AB2 at this end of the track section GLA is connected in parallel.
  • the block lock relay BS1 is also in a line L14 between positive pole and negative pole in Row with one of its working contacts b01 and a working contact r11 of the second wheel sensor R11 connected. These two contacts b01, r11 are connected in series of the following contacts connected in parallel: a normally closed contact a1E of a relay A1E, a normally open contact f01 of relay F01, a normally open contact f1I of relay F1I and a normally closed contact b01 of the block lock relay BS1, the first-mentioned break contact a1E a break contact a02 of the third Wheel sensor AB2 is connected in parallel.
  • Relay F1I, relay F2E and relay A1E are connected to the negative pole each through a line L15, L16 or L17 with the switching of the control logic STL on the other End of the track section GLA are connected, in the drawing in the right area is shown.
  • Relay A1E is delayed by means of a parallel-connected RC element.
  • the lines L15, L16, L17 are used to transmit feedback signals from the other End of track section GLA (station BH2).
  • a line contact f1E is in line L15 Relay F1E, a line contact f02 of relay F02 in line L16 and a line 17 in line 17 Normally open contact a01 of the third wheel sensor AB1 switched on.
  • the wheel sensors R02, R21 and AB2 are each connected via an associated break contact r01, r11 or a02 connected in parallel to the ANS supply.
  • the control logic shows at the other end of the track section GLA or at station BH2 STL similar circuit design (Fig. 2b).
  • the circuits at the stations BH1, BH2 are connected to one another via the above-mentioned multi-wire line, which in addition to the lines L15, L16, L17, L25, L26 and L27 also have connections between terminals a, b, c and d, whereby a common feed is created.
  • a relay F02 is connected to the ANS supply via a line L21 r02 of the first wheel sensor R02 and a self-holding contact f02 of the relay in series F02 are connected upstream.
  • the two contacts r02, f02 is the series connection of a normally closed contact a2E of the third wheel sensor AB2 at the other end of the track section GLA and one Normally open contact b02 of a block lock relay BS2 connected in parallel, the normally closed contact a2E a normally closed contact a02 of the third wheel sensor AB2 at this end of the track section GLA is connected in parallel.
  • the block lock relay BS2 is also in a line L24 between positive pole and negative pole in Row with one of its working contacts b02 and one working contact r21 of the second wheel sensor R21 connected. These two contacts b02, r21 are connected in series of the following contacts connected in parallel: a normally closed contact a2E of a relay A2E, a normally open contact f02 of relay F02, a normally open contact f2I of relay F02 and a normally closed contact b02 of the block lock relay BS2, the first-mentioned break contact a2E a break contact a01 of the third Wheel sensor AB1 is connected in parallel at the other station BH1.
  • Relay F2I, relay F1E and relay A2E are connected to the negative pole each through a line L25, L26 or L27 with the switching of the control logic STL on the other End of the track section GLA are connected, shown in the drawing in the left area is.
  • the relay A2E is delayed by means of a parallel connected RC element.
  • the Lines L24, L25, L26 are used to transmit feedback signals.
  • line L25 is a normally closed contact f2E of relay F2E
  • in line L26 a normally open contact f01 of relay F01 and a normally closed contact a02 of the third wheel sensor AB2 is switched on in line L27.
  • the wheel sensors R02, R21 and AB1 are each connected to a normally closed contact r02, r21 or a01 connected in parallel to the ANS supply.
  • FIG 3 shows the flow diagram of the control logic STL.
  • the second wheel sensor R11 After passing the switch WE1 at station BH1, the second wheel sensor R11 responds the normally open contact r11 in line L14 is opened and this in line L14 block lock relay BS1 drops, which in turn by means of its closing normally closed contact bs1 and relay M12 in line L13 support relay M11, M12 for switching controls, whereby the train control means ZM1 controlled again in the active operating state becomes.
  • the support relay M11, M12 is locked in its position because that Relay F01 in line L11 has dropped out and therefore its normally closed contact f01 in line L12 is open.
  • the train protection device works without human To do automatically, but also independently of a central control center and independently of Link signals. If the ANS supply fails, the GLA section of the track is inaccessible secured from each of the stations BH1, BH2. At this point the track section A train traveling on GLA can leave it without any problems due to the preset points WE1, WE2.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)

Claims (9)

  1. Procédé de sécurisation d'une section de voie à double sens de circulation, aux extrémités de laquelle est respectivement raccordée, par l'intermédiaire d'un aiguillage une voie d'évitement, sur laquelle est disposé un moyen de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains à une première distance prédéterminée par rapport à l'aiguillage correspondant au moins à la distance réglementaire de protection d'un train,
       caractérisé en ce qu'à un premier endroit, à une deuxième distance prédéterminée avant chaque moyen de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains, le passage d'un train est détecté automatiquement sur la voie d'évitement, en ce que sur la section de voie, aux deux côtés des deux aiguillages, à un deuxième ou troisième endroit de la section de voie, le passage d'un train est respectivement détecté automatiquement, lors de la détection d'un train devant le moyen de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains à l'une extrémité de la section de voie ainsi que lors de la non-détection simultanée d'un train devant le moyen de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains à l'autre extrémité de la section de voie, le moyen de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains cité le premier étant commandé ou laissé dans un état de fonctionnement passif et l'autre moyen de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains étant commandé ou laissé dans un état de fonctionnement actif, lors de la détection d'un train au deuxième endroit à une extrémité de la section de voie, le moyen de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains voisin étant commandé dans un état de fonctionnement actif et, lors de la détection d'un train au troisième endroit à l'autre extrémité de la section de voie les moyens de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains, étant remis dans l'état initial.
  2. Dispositif de protection des trains pour la mise en oeuvre du procédé selon la revendication 1, destiné à une section de voie à double sens de circulation, aux extrémités de laquelle est respectivement raccordée, par l'intermédiaire d'un aiguillage, une voie d'évitement, sur laquelle est disposé un moyen de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains à une première distance prédéterminée par rapport à l'aiguillage et correspondant au moins à la distance réglementaire de protection d'un train,
       caractérisé en ce qu'à une deuxième distance prédéterminée (A) avant chaque moyen de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains (ZM1, ZM2) un premier capteur de roue (R01, R02) est disposé sur la voie d'évitement (AG1, AG2) pour détecter un train, en ce que sur la section de voie (GLA), aux deux côtés des deux aiguillages (WE1, WE2), à une troisième distance (C) prédéterminée de ceux-ci, respectivement un deuxième ou un troisième capteur de roue (R11, R21 ou AB2, AB1) est disposé à côté de la voie d'évitement (AG1, AG2) pour détecter un train, et en ce que chaque moyen de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains (ZM1, ZM2) et chaque capteur de roue (R01 à AB2) sont reliés électriquement à une logique de commande (STL), qui est prévue, lors de la réaction du premier capteur de roue (R01, R02) à l'une extrémité de la section de voie (GLA) ainsi que lors de la non-réaction simultanée du premier capteur de roue (R02, R01) à l'autre extrémité de la section de voie (GLA), pour commander ou laisser le moyen de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains (ZM1, ZM2) voisin dans un état de fonctionnement passif, et de commander ou laisser l'autre moyen de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains (ZM2, ZM1) dans un état de fonctionnement actif, lors de la réaction du deuxième capteur de roue (R11, R21) voisin du premier capteur de roue (R01, R02) à l'une extrémité de la section de voie (GLA) , pour commander le moyen de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains (ZM1, ZM2) dans un état de fonctionnement actif, et lors de la réaction du troisième capteur de roue (AB1, AB2) à l'autre extrémité de la section de voie (GLA), pour remettre la logique de commande (STL) dans l'état initial.
  3. Dispositif selon la revendication 2, caractérisé en ce que le moyen de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains (ZM1, ZM2) est conçu comme un blocage de marche magnétique avec un aimant permanent électriquement démagnétisable.
  4. Dispositif selon la revendication 2 ou 3, caractérisé en ce que le moyen de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains (ZM1, ZM2) est commandé en fonctionnement permanent à l'aide de la logique de commande (STL).
  5. Dispositif selon l'une des revendications 2 à 4, caractérisé en ce que la logique de commande (STL) est montée avec des circuits à relais électromécaniques.
  6. Dispositif selon la revendication 5, caractérisé en ce qu'un relais à verrouillage est monté en amont du moyen de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains (ZM1, ZM2), qui consiste en deux relais (M11, M12 ; M21, M22) mécaniquement verrouillés l'un avec l'autre (flip-flap électromécanique).
  7. Dispositif selon l'une des revendications 2 à 6, caractérisé en ce que lors d'une réaction simultanée des deux capteurs de roue (R01, R02), chaque moyen de commande automatique intermittente de la marche des trains (ZM1, ZM2) est commandé ou bloqué en fonctionnement à l'aide de la logique de commande (STL).
  8. Dispositif selon l'une des revendications 2 à 7, caractérisé en ce que chaque capteur de roue (R01 à AB2) consiste en une paire de capteurs de roue disposée dans le sens de la voie et comprenant chacune un circuit magnétique amortissable.
  9. Dispositif selon l'une des revendications 2 à 8, caractérisé en ce que chaque aiguillage (WE1, WE2) est ajustée dans une direction prédéterminée.
EP00971107A 1999-10-21 2000-10-16 Procede et dispositif de securisation d'une section de voie a double sens de circulation Expired - Lifetime EP1222100B1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AT00971107T ATE258516T1 (de) 1999-10-21 2000-10-16 Verfahren und einrichtung zur sicherung eines in beiden richtungen befahrenen gleisabschnittes

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AT177899 1999-10-21
AT177899 1999-10-21
PCT/AT2000/000268 WO2001028839A1 (fr) 1999-10-21 2000-10-16 Procede et dispositif de securisation d'une section de voie a double sens de circulation

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EP1222100A1 EP1222100A1 (fr) 2002-07-17
EP1222100B1 true EP1222100B1 (fr) 2004-01-28

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CN116923493B (zh) * 2022-03-29 2026-02-10 比亚迪股份有限公司 轨道列车的位置检测系统及方法、轨道系统存储介质

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FR2386439A1 (fr) * 1977-04-05 1978-11-03 Guyon Gerard Block automatique simplifie pour voie unique

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DE50005156D1 (de) 2004-03-04
WO2001028839A1 (fr) 2001-04-26

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