Classifications

• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B61—RAILWAYS
  • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
  • B61L3/00—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal
  • B61L3/02—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control
  • B61L3/08—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically
  • B61L3/12—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using radio waves
  • B61L3/121—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using radio waves using magnetic induction
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B61—RAILWAYS
  • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
  • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
  • B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B61—RAILWAYS
  • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
  • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
  • B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
  • B61L2027/202—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation using European Train Control System [ETCS]

Definitions

• the present invention relates to a method and a system for checking a Acchariungsednheit for controlling a moving object, in particular a rail-bound vehicle.
• This information transmitted to the vehicle includes, for example, a signal term displayed on the next light signal in the direction of travel.
• a signal term displayed on the next light signal in the direction of travel can also result in compliance with predefined speed profiles, braking profiles or even emergency braking if the safety of this and / or other vehicle and the passengers and / or goods transported with it can not be guaranteed otherwise.
• the train control information in the ETCS level 1 is called via the air interface A according to punctiform fixed data and / or transparent data transmission units transmitted to the ETCS / ERTMS specification.
• the information transmitted with these balises is therefore of great importance in the As a result, module level security and data transfer procedures are generally subject to Level SIL 4 security levels (Security Integrity Level according to standards EN50159, EN50126 and EN50129 for secure connections).
• Level SIL 4 security levels Security Integrity Level according to standards EN50159, EN50126 and EN50129 for secure connections.
• Signal point also outputs the correct (associated) balise telegram to the air interface (A according to ETCS specification). For this purpose, it is currently necessary to block the route for reading out the configuration data provided for each signal concept and to manually pick up the transmitted balise telegram at the air interface with a programming and readout device on site.
• the tapped-off balise telegram is then sent by a checksum method, e.g. MD4 / MD5 or CRC32, processed and the corresponding determined code per
• the present invention is therefore based on the object, a method and a system for checking the correct function of a data transmission unit for controlling a moving object, in particular a rail vehicle, specify, with which a considerably simpler Procedure can be achieved as with the previous route inspection and the subsequent operational monitoring for the acceptance and function monitoring of (trackside) data transmission units.
• a method for checking the function of a data transmission unit which is used for wireless control of a moving object, in particular a rail vehicle, is provided, in which a) a to be transmitted to the vehicle and a signal path supplied information is radiated with the data transmission unit; b) a receiving device arranged in the data transmission unit is provided for receiving the information to be transmitted; c) the signals received by the receiving device are transmitted unchanged or evaluated by means of an analysis device in the form of a code to a logical control unit; d) the logical control unit compares the information to be radiated with the data transmission unit and the received signals or the code; and e) is determined on the basis of the comparison of the operating state of the data transmission unit and / or the signal path.
• this object is achieved by a system for checking the function of a data transmission unit for controlling a moving
• Object in particular a rail-bound vehicle, solved, comprising: a) an antenna associated with the data transmission unit, with which an information to be transmitted to the vehicle and brought up via a signal path can be emitted; b) one of the data transmission unit associated receiving device for receiving the information to be transmitted, - c) data transfer means with which the signals received by the receiving device unchanged or by means of an analysis device, in particular an encoder or decoder, evaluated in the form of a code to a logical control unit transferable are; d) the logical control unit is designed so that the radiated with the data transmission unit
• the method and system permit immediate feedback of the transmitted information to verify the information actually sent.
• the source of this readback channel is thus generated "onboard" in the communication unit by a receive antenna similar to the transmit antenna .
• the transmission at the data transmission unit can be made active or passive, for example because a reflection modulation would also be possible Coders (Bala Telegram Encoder) in the data transmission unit as backward information channel (MD4 / MD5, CRC32 etc.) can be realized a sufficiently good security of the readback channel
• Data transmission unit taking into account the required personal safety and efficiency and a qualitative improvement of the system availability and error disclosure can be achieved.
• the information to be transmitted from a signal box and / or a Control center be discontinued. Accordingly, the logical control unit can be assigned to the interlocking and / or the control center.
• a complete test of the signal path can be achieved with SIL 4 level, when the received signals or the code is passed over the signal path in the opposite direction to the direction of the information to be transmitted.
• the received signals or the code can be transmitted on a different from the information to be transmitted frequency.
• the data transmission unit is controlled by means of a control unit, wherein by means of the control unit
• Data transmission unit is converted and the received
• Signals preferably already on the data transmission unit, are converted into the code by means of a checksum method.
• Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a first system with a return path for the radiated from a balise Balisentelegramm;
• FIG 2 is a schematic representation of a second system with a return path for the radiated from a balise Balisentelegramm
• Figure 3 is a schematic representation of a layout for the balise and a MSTT controlling the balise;
• Figure 4 is a schematic representation of the frequency usage for the Balisentelegramm and the code return.
• FIG. 1 shows a schematic representation of a system for train control by means of a balise B and a signal S. Both the balise B and the signal S represent a data signal output by a signal box STW signal concept.
• LEU trackside control unit
• a telegram path TP (also called interface "C n ) for balise B transmits a balise telegram BT assigned to the signal term to the balise B, where it transparently to the air interface (as already mentioned as interface" A ")
• the balise B can receive this balise telegram BT output to the air interface A and send it back to the signal box STW via a return path RP in the form of a code obtained by a checksum method.
• a T element T associated with the LEU which is designed as a bandpass filter and bandpass lock, separates the returned code from the forward-oriented balise telegram BT, so that the code can be sent, for example, directly to the T element T or after transmission via a universal process signal.
• Interface for data and diagnosis UPS in the interlocking STW can be compared by a control unit KE with the originally transmitted signal term.
• the logical control unit KE is indicated here by the stick figure and a separate data cable.
• the control unit KE can be implemented fully automatically by software and automatically generate an error telegram if the retransmitted code (eg to MD4 / MD5, CRC32) does not match the signal concept originally issued by Stelltechnik STW.
• the retransmitted code eg to MD4 / MD5, CRC32
• FIG. 2 shows the case comparable to FIG. 1 of a control of the balise B via a modular control part MSTT.
• This modular control part MSTT works in a similar way to the LEU, but unlike the LEU it is also able to process the code sent via the return path itself and send it back to the STVJ interlocking.
• a schematic construction of an embodiment of the invention shows the balise B and the modular actuator MSTT.
• the components used are explained on the basis of the signal path.
• the modular control part MSTT receives a signaling term SB from the signal box STW via an ISDN connection.
• a processor CPU and a universal logic core ULK determines the modular control part MSTT associated with this signal term SB Beautysentelegramm BT and feeds this Balsentelegramm BT in the uplink direction via the balisen worne T-member T to a data transmitter DT, the Greysentelegramm BT by way of FSK (Frequency Shift Keying) modulation modulates to an analog amplifier AV passes.
• the analog amplifier AV then sends the modulated Beautysentegram BT 'via a loop antenna / current loop A to the air interface "A".
• This modulated Balisentegram BT is now by means of a second on the Balise B arranged antenna (loop), hereinafter called antenna sample AP, received and by means of a coder Coder in one after any Checksum method obtained code converted.
• This code is also modulated by means of the coder to an analog or digital carrier signal, the frequency of which clearly deviates from the frequency of the data signal of the balancing telegram BT (see FIG. 4), so that the T-element T has a retroactive effect of this code on the antenna A excludes.
• the code is then transmitted via the interface "C” and via another T-element T, which is arranged on the modular control part MSTT, back to the modular control part MSTT and transmitted from there again via the ISDN connection in the interlocking STW.
• the automatable check now takes place in the interlocking STW, as to whether the code transmitted back corresponds to the signal signal SB originally set off
• the T-link T can also be omitted in those applications in which the received signal of the beacon B is known and can be recovered by a mathematical correlation function, as is known, for example, from echo cancellation in telecommunications.
• FIG. 4 shows a schematic representation of the frequency usage in the above signal paths.
• the free frequency ranges are listed on which, for example, the code can be returned. Since the code, for example MD5 or CRC32, is only about 32 bits long, only low requirements are required of the transmission rate of the return path RP, which physically corresponds to the telegram path TP (unlike the telegram path on which the 1024 bit long ETCS - balancing telegram BT has to be transmitted).
• the signal for the power supply of the Balise B transmits on a frequency of 8.826 kHz.
• the data signal of the Beautysentelegramms C transmits in a range of 232 kHz to about 1.3 MHz. For the returned code therefore remain comfortable areas free frequency spectrum FS.
• the method and the system allow an immediate return of the sent Beautysentelegramms BT for checking in the interlocking STW.
• the source of this readback information channel (return path RP) thus becomes "onboard" in the balise B through one of the transmit antenna A.
• Reception antenna AP generated.
• a bitstream coder in the balise B as the backward information channel (MD4 / MD5, CRC32, etc.)
• the security of the return path RP can be realized.
• an automatable cost-effective acceptance of the Transparent Balise B can be achieved taking into account the required personal safety and efficiency as well as a qualitative improvement of the system availability and error disclosure in the Rolling Wheel operated network.
• any type of communication units can be checked for release and monitored for correct operation in current traffic.
• a route point for driving display cross sections on roads, in particular highways may be mentioned, in which not only the information controlling the traffic is displayed, but will also be transmitted to the vehicles in the future.

Landscapes

• Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
• Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
• Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
• Automatic Analysis And Handling Materials Therefor (AREA)
• Radar Systems Or Details Thereof (AREA)
• Detection And Prevention Of Errors In Transmission (AREA)

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Publications (2)

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• 2004
  • 2004-11-25 EP EP04027960A patent/EP1661784A1/fr not_active Withdrawn
• 2005
  • 2005-10-25 WO PCT/EP2005/011407 patent/WO2006056284A1/fr not_active Ceased
  • 2005-10-25 AT AT05796217T patent/ATE388072T1/de active
  • 2005-10-25 ES ES05796217T patent/ES2301065T3/es not_active Expired - Lifetime
  • 2005-10-25 EP EP05796217A patent/EP1824721B1/fr not_active Expired - Lifetime
  • 2005-10-25 DK DK05796217T patent/DK1824721T3/da active
  • 2005-10-25 AU AU2005309079A patent/AU2005309079B2/en not_active Ceased
  • 2005-10-25 CN CN2005800404606A patent/CN101065283B/zh not_active Expired - Fee Related
  • 2005-10-25 DE DE502005003148T patent/DE502005003148D1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime

Non-Patent Citations (1)

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