EP1900172A1 - Système anti-pirate de type pot de miel - Google Patents

Système anti-pirate de type pot de miel

Info

Publication number
EP1900172A1
EP1900172A1 EP06742459A EP06742459A EP1900172A1 EP 1900172 A1 EP1900172 A1 EP 1900172A1 EP 06742459 A EP06742459 A EP 06742459A EP 06742459 A EP06742459 A EP 06742459A EP 1900172 A1 EP1900172 A1 EP 1900172A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
hacker
honey pot
attack
ports
firewall
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP06742459A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Rene Thomassen
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Gatesweeper solutions Inc
Original Assignee
Gatesweeper solutions Inc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Gatesweeper solutions Inc filed Critical Gatesweeper solutions Inc
Publication of EP1900172A1 publication Critical patent/EP1900172A1/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1491—Countermeasures against malicious traffic using deception as countermeasure, e.g. honeypots, honeynets, decoys or entrapment

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to an anti-hacker system for counteracting a hacker attack on a computer system, wherein the anti-hacker system comprises a computer sys- tem with a firewall configured upon a recognised attack on the computer system to forward the attack into a honey pot system without a for the hacker noticeable change of IP address.
  • Firewalls are a form of security software and hardware that attempt to provide protection to computer systems by disallowing traffic from the internet or from another computer on a network when it does not confirm to a specific set of guidelines or filters. They protect from intentional hostile intrusion that might compromise sensitive data or result in a corruption of data or denial of service.
  • Firewalls are an essential first line of defense for protecting computer systems.
  • An essential first line of defense for protecting computer systems An essential first line of defense for protecting computer systems.
  • An important firewall protection An essential first line of defense for protecting computer systems.
  • An important firewall protection An essential first line of defense for protecting computer systems.
  • An important firewall protection An essential first line of defense for protecting computer systems.
  • An important firewall protection An essential first line of defense for protecting computer systems.
  • An important firewall protection is an essential first line of defense for protecting computer systems.
  • firewalls are created equal. Up until now, the typical firewalls on the market have acted as barriers between computers on a network, whether that is a business network or the World Wide Web. Without firewalls, intruders on a network would be able to destroy, tamper with or gain access to the files on many computers.
  • a computer system is disclosed in European patent application EP 1 218 822 by Roesch et al., where the disclosed computer system comprises a real network and a virtual network.
  • An attempt of use of the virtual network is regarded as a hacker attack and information about the hacker is gathered in order to update the firewall of the real network in order to prevent attack in this network
  • FIG. 1 hi order to otherwise reduce the damage of hacker attack on a computer system, there has been provided systems, as illustrated in FIG. 1, where the hacker 2 attack is redirected 10 into a second system 6, which has the purpose to give the hacker 1 the impression to have entered the computer system 3 through a firewall 4, but which in reality is a simulated system where damage is of no concern.
  • honey pot Such a system is called a "honey pot" due to the association with baits used to catch insects.
  • the honey pot is used to catch and keep the hacker in an environment, which the hacker experiences as desired goal.
  • the hacker may in some instances be traced in order to find the address from which the sending occurs.
  • the described system has the disadvantage that the IP address of the honey pot is different than the IP address towards which the attack was directed. The experienced and alert hacker would immediately recognize this and terminate the attack or try a new attack in a different way.
  • an anti-hacker system for counteracting a hacker attack on a computer system
  • the anti-hacker system comprises a computer system with a firewall configured upon an attempted attack on the computer system to forward the attack into a honey pot without a for the hacker noticeable change of IP address, and wherein the honey pot is located outside the computer system with the firewall.
  • the system comprises a public digital data network, for example the Internet, a computer system connected to the public network, and a honey pot system connected to the public network for communication between the computer system and the honey pot system only through the public network system.
  • the honey pot may be part of a commercial system to which customers with personal computers or other computer systems may subscribe.
  • the honey pot maybe available for a large number of users independent of geographical distance.
  • a good solution at low cost is a firewall that is implemented as a software program in the computer system. Such software programs are easily distributed in large numbers, for example via the Internet for download on computer systems, such as a personal computer.
  • a practical embodiment is achieved by configuring the system with one or more dedicated computer ports through which entry is possible through the firewall, but only with a subsequent redirection into a honey pot.
  • the system is configured such that the hacker experiences an apparent entry into the system without noticeable change of IP address.
  • the redirection is achieved through a unique built-in, rule based bouncer software program.
  • the unique bouncers work similarly to a transparent proxy server behind the apparently open port, which makes any IP address change invisible to the hacker.
  • the rule based aspect of the bouncer allows and easy configuration.
  • honey pot port is used for a port that leads into a Honey- Pot.
  • true port is used for ports in the computer system that lead into the true computer system, which means not into a honey pot.
  • trusted system is used for the computer system into which no access is desired by hackers.
  • ports may be used for leading the hacker attack.
  • ports number 20 FTP Data
  • 21 FTP
  • 22 SSH
  • 23 TELNET
  • 25 STP
  • 80 HTTP
  • web server HTTP
  • 110 POP3, mail account. Due to the fact that these ports are typically the only ports that are open for public access because of their dedicated functions, such ports have a high likelihood to be object for attacks.
  • a hacker scans a number of IP addresses for open ports. The scanning is typically performed systematically on all subsequent ports. If the hacker normally finds an open, dedicated port, it indicates the type of server, the attack is directed towards. For example, if the open port is port number 25, the hacker has an indication that the attacked server is a mail server with the corresponding security system typical for mail serers. The hacker may in this case use certain developed tools for entering the computer through the mail server security system, for example the creation of a buffer overflow causing the execution of computer commands during emptying of the buffer.
  • the invention simulates a vulnerable computer system, by apparently having the following 7 ports open; 20 (FTP Data), 21 (FTP), 22 (SSH), 23 (TELNET), 25 (SMTP, mail server), 80 (HTTP, web server), 110 (POP3, mail account).
  • 20 FTP Data
  • 21 FTP
  • 22 SSH
  • 23 TELNET
  • 25 STP
  • 80 HTTP
  • web server HTTP
  • 110 POP3, mail account
  • the honey pot may optionally be configured to gather information about the attack.
  • the information is forwarded to a central server in order to keep track of attacks in general and of specific types of attacks.
  • the information is used to upgrade the firewall software.
  • information about the attack can be used to trace the hacker address for with help by the police to prevent further actions from the hacker.
  • the open ports may be blocked by the firewall for a certain time for these specific IP addresses, hi connection with a web port or an e-mail port, the firewall may be configured to let the port be open to any IP address in general but to check the entering IP addresses, whether the entering address is equal to one of those that have been associated with a hacker attack.
  • honey pot ports may be made easy to enter in order for the port to attract most hackers, as most hackers choose the easiest ways into the true system.
  • open ports into the true system may be secured by the typical security system for this type of ports.
  • some ports are only open to certain IP addresses.
  • the honey pot ports may be camouflaged by covering the entry with an apparent - but not true - security system.
  • This security system is configured to give the hacker a certain resistance, such that the hacker believes that this is an entrance to the true computer system and not just another easy access to a honey pot.
  • these ports lead to a honey pot after apparent victory of the hacker attack over this apparent security system.
  • the probability for trapping of hackers in honey pots is increased, because in this case, the likelihood for being trapped in a honey pot is high not only for inexperienced hackers that go for easy entrance but also for experienced hackers that aim to enter the system only if there is a certain resistance.
  • a simple method in a honey pot to keep the hacker busy is to repeatedly answer attacks with standard phrases that increase the effort of the hacker to get further into the system, such as a standard phrase expressing that the submitted commend is not understood by the system or a phrase expressing that an entrance is accepted. Meanwhile the honey pot may collect information about the hacker attack.
  • the security system according to the invention may be additionally secured in a further embodiment.
  • the computer system analyses the request for entering the ports.
  • certain ports namely the access ports to the true system, may be closed for this specific IP address or closed in general for a short while in order to prevent the hacker to enter through these specific ports.
  • the computer system according to the invention may be configured to check for attempts from hackers to create buffer overflows by a large number of requests within short time spans. Also in this case, true access ports may be closed for a certain time for the specific IP address or in general in order to keep the system safe from hacker attacks that would destabilize the system.
  • the information that is collected in the honey pots may, as mentioned above, be used later for additional security. For example, it may occur that certain hacker attacks use certain programmed attack codes in order to enter computer systems. Such code blocks may be distributed to various associated computer systems using a safety system according to the invention, where the safety system is configured to generally check access requests, whether the requests do contain such blocks of code. If a re- quest can be recognized as containing this kind of code blocks, certain true ports may be closed for a certain while in order to protect the system against hacker attacks.
  • the security system according to the invention has an increased performance if it is installed on an increasingly number of computer systems. This is so, because each computer with the invention installed becomes an advanced honey pot.
  • the honey pot system is able to record both known methods of hacking as well as unknown methods of hacking. Once recorded by the honey pot, an update of all firewall software programs can be performed to achieve more effective guard against future hacker attempts.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates the prior art principle of a redirection of a hacker attack into a honey pot
  • FIG. 2 illustrates the principle of the invention
  • FIG. 3 shows a flow diagram of the principle
  • FIG. 4 illustrates the system according to the invention in greater detail
  • FIG. 5 illustrates the Rules menu of the toolbox
  • FIG. 6 illustrates the LogMonitor menu of the toolbox
  • FIG. 7 illustrates the InformationCenter menu of the toolbox
  • FIG. 8 illustrates the HoneySet menu of the toolbox
  • FIG. 9 illustrates the Statistics menu of the toolbox.
  • FIG. 2a and b illustrates the principle of the invention.
  • a hacker/intruder 1 may attack 2 a computer system 3 in order to enter through the firewall 4.
  • the firewall may be a hardware firewall but, preferably, is a software program implementet in the computer system 3.
  • the firewall 4 is programmed to register the attack 2, which initiates a number of computer routines.
  • the attack is not redirected, which would imply a new IP address, but is forwarded 10 instead into a honey pot 6 outside the computer system 3 with the firewall 4, for example by a transparent proxy server implemented in the firewall 4, such that the hacker would not experience any redirection to a different IP address.
  • the hacker may use his efforts in a system, namely the honey pot, where damage is of no concern to the rest of the network.
  • the attack may reach the computer system 3 through a public network system 100, for example the Internet.
  • the attack may then be forwarded to a honey pot 6.
  • the honey pot 6 may serve several computer systems with firewalls, all connected to the public network, where the communication to the honey pot 6 from the computer systems 3 with the firewalls 4 only through the public network.
  • the attack 2 from the hacker 1 may be allowed to enter through one of the ports 5 of the firewall, which is illustrated in more detail in FIG. 4, but the attack is not allowed to enter the system 3 as such, where damage may occur.
  • the attack 2 is forwarded 10 into a honey pot 6 located outside the computer system 3 with the firewall 4, for example at another place on the internet 100.
  • This can be achieved by the unique "Bouncer" software programs 7 behind the firewall, hi any case, response 8 from the honey pot is received and forwarded 9 to the hacker from the IP address associated with the attacked firewall 4.
  • the security system with the firewall 4 acts as a transparent proxy server 7 during the attack such that the hacker does not experience any indication of the fact that the attack has been redirected into a honey pot 6.
  • routines from known software programs may be utilized. This serves as example only and is not limiting for the principle of the invention, hi connection with the firewall, routines from winsock.dll, such as Hooking, Send(), receive(), and connect() are used, where data packages are parsed/redirected before entering the stack where overflow may occur. If the packages are not allowed, they typically are rejected. However, in connection with the honey pot, the packages may be forwarded in a bounced connection to a different IP without change of the packages and without noticeable change of IP due to the transparent proxy behind the firewall. This way, the traffic is forwarded to a different server (honey pot), where all technical evidence is accumulated.
  • winsock.dll such as Hooking, Send(), receive(), and connect()
  • the traffic may run the protocol TCPIP TCP and UDP supported by the firewall, or tsl/ssl may be used in the case of encryption.
  • the forwarding/redirection happens be- fore the traffic gets access to the tcp/udb stack of the computer system such that it is not possible for the hacker at achieve a stack overflow which would destabilize the system for access thereto.
  • FIG. 3 is a flow diagram of the principle of how the rules in the invention work.
  • part of the user interface of the system according to the invention is illus- trated.
  • the program implementing the invention is for simplicity called GateSweeper and comprises a user interface with a Toolbox having different tools.
  • One of the tool menus namely the Rules Menu 11 governs setting of the rules for the security system.
  • certain IP addresses may be set for allowance or denial of requests from computers with those IP numbers.
  • the allowance or denial through certain pre-chosen ports of the system is set in the second column 13.
  • the port type may be pre-selected (for example TCP/UDP, FTP, SSH, Mail, etc.) in the third column 14 and the degree of permission in column four 15.
  • certain programs may be selected in the Application path column 16 with corresponding settings (generally al- lowed or generally denied) in the Permission column 17. Changes to these settings/rules to the IP Add column 12 or the Application Path column 16 can be made by adding or deleting rules, which is initiated by activating the corresponding buttons 18, 19 in the bottom part.
  • pre-set rules handling requests for entrance to the system in the lower right part 20 of the Rules Menu where the term OPEN refers to the fact that the system is open.
  • OPEN refers to the fact that the system is open.
  • STANDARD refers to the setting, where allow rules and deny rules are obeyed and the system uses the predefined rules.
  • PARANOID is used as a pre-setting, where the system is generally closed for traffic.
  • FIG. 6 a second part of the user interface is illustrated, namely the Log Monitor. The Log Monitor shows any traffic into and out of the computer.
  • the Information Center menu of the system is illustrated. It contains information about attack attempts that have been redirected into the honey pot.
  • the infor- mation from the honey pot and from the Information Center is forwarded to a central server, where statistics are performed concerning the attacks, and where studies are made concerning the methods used by different hackers.
  • the central server system also is responsible for the evaluation of the technical evidence concerning the attack as gathered in the honey pot and responsible for the update and reconfiguration of fire- walls in order to prevent further successful attempts for intrusion.
  • FIG. 9 a server status is illustrated, showing the number of hacker attacks in different countries. The number of attacks illustrated depends on the actual attack frequency and on the number of computers that are using the system according to the invention.
  • the invention may in a further embodiment be used as a sniffing system for attack methods for an immediate updating of firewalls.
  • information is collected about the attack, for example: How the attack is performed? Which are the points of attack? Where are weaknesses expected?
  • This information may be collected in a central database, for example in a world-wide anti-hacker system, and be used to upgrade the firewalls associated with this anti-hacker system.
  • a scenario as the following may occur: A hacker tries to enter a computer system through a firewall and the attack is forwarded into a honey pot. Information is collected in the honey pot and via a computer network, for example the Internet, transmitted to a central server.
  • the central server initiates an immediate update of the firewalls of all users/subscribers of the system.
  • the update may be performed soon after the hacker has been using his efforts in the honey pot. Once the hacker exits the honey pot, the same method of attack or the same IP address would after a few minutes be useless on all the firewalls associated with this central server system.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)

Abstract

Système anti-pirate pour contrecarrer l’attaque d’un système informatique, le système anti-pirate comprenant un système informatique pourvu d’un pare-feu configuré pour que, sur détection d’une attaque du système informatique, l’attaque soit transmise à un système pot de miel, sans changement d’adresse IP que le pirate puisse remarquer. Le système pot de miel est situé à l’extérieur du système informatique comportant le pare-feu. Le système peut comprendre un certain nombre de ports ouverts à une attaque de pirate, ports qui sont protégés par un certain nombre de “ videurs ” intégrés fonctionnant en tant que serveurs de proximité transparents, configurés pour transmettre l’attaque au pot de miel.
EP06742459A 2005-06-10 2006-06-09 Système anti-pirate de type pot de miel Withdrawn EP1900172A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DKPA200500856 2005-06-10
DKPA200501495 2005-10-28
PCT/DK2006/000327 WO2006131124A1 (fr) 2005-06-10 2006-06-09 Système anti-pirate de type “ pot de miel ”

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1900172A1 true EP1900172A1 (fr) 2008-03-19

Family

ID=36992762

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP06742459A Withdrawn EP1900172A1 (fr) 2005-06-10 2006-06-09 Système anti-pirate de type pot de miel

Country Status (2)

Country Link
EP (1) EP1900172A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2006131124A1 (fr)

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