EP2018632B1 - Speicherträger, autorisierungsverfahren, leser, netzwerk und zugangskontrollsystem - Google Patents

Speicherträger, autorisierungsverfahren, leser, netzwerk und zugangskontrollsystem Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2018632B1
EP2018632B1 EP07729015A EP07729015A EP2018632B1 EP 2018632 B1 EP2018632 B1 EP 2018632B1 EP 07729015 A EP07729015 A EP 07729015A EP 07729015 A EP07729015 A EP 07729015A EP 2018632 B1 EP2018632 B1 EP 2018632B1
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Prior art keywords
record
memory carrier
code
memory
security
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French (fr)
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EP2018632A1 (de
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Francis Duyck
Maurizio Locatelli
Jean Claeys
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SERVIPARK INTERNATIONAL
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SERVIPARK INTERNATIONAL
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    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07CTIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/29Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass the pass containing active electronic elements, e.g. smartcards

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the technical field of memory carriers for access control systems.
  • Such memory carriers comprising a unique, read-only serial code and a plurality of records, comprising a memory carrier identification record and at least one contract identification record, for access control.
  • contactless cards such as CALYPSO® or MIFARE® have already been proposed as a versatile means of providing both logical and physical access control to a variety of facilities, such as public transportation, telecommunications or monetary transaction facilities.
  • a single such card can contain information about a plurality of contracts, thus providing access to several different facilities.
  • such cards already usually comprise in-built security features, they do not, by themselves, provide comprehensive security, as the structure of the contract information and the method of reading it may leave loopholes and backdoors allowing potential abuse.
  • the authentication code of the memory carrier identification record should ensure that copying the records from a valid memory carrier to a blank will not produce another valid memory carrier, since it is linked to both the memory carrier identification record, and the unique, read-only serial code of each memory carrier through an opaque encryption.
  • the authentication code of the at least one contract identification record ensures that copying the contract identification records of one valid memory carrier to another valid memory carrier will not produce valid contract identification records in the second memory carrier, since this other authentication code is linked to both the memory carrier serial code and identification record, and to the specific contract identification record.
  • the authentication code of the at least one contract identification record also ensures that no authorisation to proceed with operations related to a given contract can be given by a reader not having access to the specific product key associated with that contract.
  • the memory carrier of the invention comprises a record allocation table pointing to the memory addresses of at least some of the plurality of records.
  • the record allocation table is dynamic, so that each record can be stored in the first available memory address, and said record allocation table comprises a record allocation table authentication code, so as to allow a data integrity check of said record allocation table.
  • a dynamic record allocation table enables a much faster authorisation process, a critical aspect in applications such as car parking access cards.
  • the record allocation table authentication code ensures that this does not affect the security of the card and that the pointers to the memory addresses of the records can not be tampered with.
  • the potential application of this secure dynamic record table is not limited to the memory carrier of the invention, and could also be applied to other memory carriers.
  • the plurality of records also comprises other records, such as a life cycle record.
  • other records such as a life cycle record. This has the advantage of allowing further security measures against, for instance, the used of expired or stolen memory carriers.
  • the invention also provides a method for using said memory carrier for the authorisation of operations associated with one of the at least one contact identification record of said memory carrier, said method comprising the steps of:
  • this method when using a memory carrier comprising a record allocation table pointing to the memory addresses of at least some of the plurality of records, this method also comprises the step of finding in the record allocation table the memory addresses of each memory carrier record to be read. Still more preferably, when using a memory carrier comprising a dynamic record allocation table with a record allocation table authentication code, this method also comprises the step of performing said data integrity check on said dynamic record allocation table.
  • this method when using a memory carrier comprising a life cycle record, also comprises the step of reading said life cycle record.
  • this method when using a memory carrier comprising at least one record other than the memory carrier identification record and the at least one contract identification record, wherein said other record comprises a record authentication code, this method also comprises the steps of:
  • a product table contains a plurality of potential product keys, each one of them individually identified by a product identification code, said one of the at least one contract identification record contains a particular product identification code, and the step of obtaining the product key involves reading a product identification code contained in said contract identification record and extracting from said product table the product key identified by said particular product identification code.
  • the operations associated with the at least one contract identification record comprise logical access to an information system.
  • the operations associated with the at least one contract identification record comprise physical access to an enclosed space, comprising, for example, a secure building or at least one car parking space.
  • the operations associated with the at least one contract identification record comprise monetary transactions.
  • the operations associated with the at least one contract identification record comprise access to services comprising, for example, transportation or telecommunication services.
  • the invention also provides a reader for performing said method for using said memory carrier for the authorisation of operations associated with one of the at least one contract identification record of said memory carrier, wherein the reader preferably comprises local memory storage means for containing at least part of one of said security and/or product keys.
  • the invention also provides a network comprising at least one such reader connected to at least one other such reader and/or a remote memory storage means for containing at least part of one of said security and/or product keys.
  • the invention also provides an access control system comprising at least one such memory carrier and one such reader and/or network.
  • a memory carrier 1 that contains a serial code 2, a record allocation table 3, comprising a record allocation table authentication code 3a, a memory carrier identification record 4, comprising a memory carrier identification record authentication code 4a, a life cycle record 5, comprising a life cycle record authentication code 5a, and at least one contract identification record 6, comprising a corresponding contract identification record authentication code 6a and a product key 6b.
  • serial code 2 is unique to each memory carrier 1 and read-only, meaning that it can not be altered, erased or overwritten without destroying the memory carrier 1.
  • the record allocation table 3 contains the memory address of each individual record in the memory carrier 1. So, for reading and/or writing in a given record, the record allocation table 3 needs to be consulted first in order to ascertain the memory address, that is, the actual position within the memory carrier, of that particular record.
  • the record allocation table 3 is dynamic, that is, it can reassign a given record to a different memory address than its original one. This accelerates the read/write process, which is very advantageous in time-critical applications, such as car parking access cards. To ensure, however, that this capability is not misused to tamper with its content, the record allocation table 3 also comprises a record allocation table authentication code 3a, which can be used to perform a data integrity check of the record allocation table 3 every time that it is to be consulted.
  • the memory carrier identification record 4 serves to identify each individual memory carrier 1.
  • the memory carrier identification record authentication code 4a ensures that a given memory carrier 1 cannot be falsified by copying it straight onto another, blank, memory carrier.
  • the life cycle record 5 contains information regarding the life cycle of each individual memory carrier 1, that is for instance, when it was produced, when it was activated, whether it has been previously locked or cancelled, whether it has been unlocked or reactivated, the expiration date, etc.
  • the life cycle record 5 also contains an authentication code 5a to ensure, for instance, that a stolen memory carrier 1 is not illegitimately reactivated.
  • Each contract identification record 6 contains information identifying a contract related to certain operations which the memory carrier 1 can authorize to perform. These operations may comprise logical access to an information system, physical access to an enclosed space, monetary transactions or access to services. In this way, a single memory carrier 1 can be used, for instance, to get entrance to a parking near an entertainment arena, to access the public transportation system so as to go from the parking to the arena, to get entrance to the arena, to pay for goods bought within the arena, etc. each one of these operations being actually related to a different contract with a different contractor.
  • Each contract identification record 6 also comprises a contract identification record authentication code 6a and a product identification code 6b, to ensure not only that spurious contract identification records cannot be added to a memory carrier 1, but also that a given contractor can only perform those operations related to its corresponding contract identification record, that is for instance, in the example given above, that the memory card reader of the arena access system cannot illegitimately charge the electronic wallet within the same memory carrier 1.
  • the memory carrier 1 could be a card and could also comprise data processing means and/or a contactless interface.
  • Contactless smart cards are particularly advantageous for realising the memory carrier 1, because of their capabilities, ease of use and practicality.
  • other types of memory carriers such as telephone SIM cards, should not be excluded.
  • the first step 10 of the method consists in reading the serial code 2 of the memory carrier 1.
  • the memory carrier identification record 4 is read.
  • the memory carrier identification record authentication code 4a is contained, for example, as a two-digit trailer, in the Memory carrier identification record.
  • This memory carrier identification record authentication step 50 in turn comprises several smaller steps, illustrated in Fig. 3 :
  • step 60 at least part of the serial code 2 and at least part of the memory carrier identification record 4 are combined by, for example, concatenating them.
  • a key offset code is then calculated in step 70 using the result of this combination, by, for example, adding all digits.
  • a security key is extracted from a security key table containing a plurality of potential security keys, each one identified by one key offset code.
  • step 90 Using this security key in a predefined encryption algorithm, it is then possible in step 90 to encrypt the above mentioned combination of at least part of the memory carrier identification record 4 and at least part of the serial code 2 to obtain a memory carrier security code.
  • step 100 the authentication code 4a of the memory carrier identification record 4 is verified by means of a check, in this case a redundancy check, in which this authentication code 4a is compared with the result of a predetermined calculation on the memory carrier security code. If that result does not match the authentication code 4a, the process of reading the memory carrier can be interrupted.
  • a check in this case a redundancy check, in which this authentication code 4a is compared with the result of a predetermined calculation on the memory carrier security code. If that result does not match the authentication code 4a, the process of reading the memory carrier can be interrupted.
  • the next step 170 will be to read a contract identification record 6, followed by the step 180 of authenticating said contract identification record 6.
  • the contract identification record authentication step 180 in turn comprises several smaller steps, illustrated in Fig. 5 :
  • the product key can be used in step 210 to encrypt the result of step 190 with yet another encryption algorithm to produce a business security code.
  • this business security code will then be compared in yet another check 220, in the form of a redundancy check, using yet another predefined calculation, with the authentication code 6a of said contract identification record 6. If this check 220 failed, the process could also be interrupted, but if the contract identification record 6 is authenticated, then the operations related to said contract could be authorised.
  • An access control system 11 comprises several memory carriers 1 as illustrated in Fig. 1 , in this case in the form of contactless smart cards.
  • the access control system 11 also comprises several readers 12, each one of them capable of performing the method illustrated in Figs. 2-5 using the memory carriers 1.
  • Some of these readers 12 can be autonomous and contain the security key and product tables in local memory storage means, whereas some other of these readers 12 can be integrated in a network 13 connecting them to each other and to a remote memory storage means 14, and the security key and product key tables can be contained in the remote memory storage means 14 or distributed throughout the network 13.
  • the network 13 can be a local network in turn connected to a remote network (not illustrated) connected to several such local networks.
  • Each reader 12 can have access to product tables containing different selections of product keys, therefore enabling them to authorise operations related to different selections of contracts. So, some readers 12 can be associated, for example, to a parking access, other readers 12 to a payment system, whereas other readers 12 may be associated to public transportation services.
  • a reader 12 could either read all the contract information records 6 present in a memory carrier 1, or a selection thereof, such as only those contract information records 6 for which it has access to the corresponding product keys.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Communication Control (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)

Claims (20)

  1. Speicherträger (1) für Zugangskontrolle, umfassend:
    - einen eindeutigen Nurlese-Speicherträger-Seriencode (2);
    - mehrere Speicherträger-Datensätze, umfassend einen Speicherträger-Identifikationsdatensatz (4) und wenigstens einen Vertrags-Identifikationsdatensatz (6); wobei
    - jeder von dem Speicherträger-Identifikationsdatensatz (4) und dem wenigstens einen Vertrags-Identifikationsdatensatz (6) einen Authentifizierungscode (4a, 6a) umfasst;
    - der Authentifizierungscode (4a) des Speicherträger-Identifikationsdatensatzes (4) in einer ersten Prüfung mit einem Speicherträger-Sicherheitscode übereinstimmt, welcher aus Verschlüsseln, mit einem Sicherheitsschlüssel, einer Kombination wenigstens eines Teils des eindeutigen Nurlese-Speicherträger-Seriencodes (2) und wenigstens eines Teils des Speicherträger-Identifikationsdatensatzes (4) resultiert; und
    dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass
    - der Authentifizierungscode (6a) eines jeden des wenigstens einen Vertrags-Identifikationsdatensatzes (6) in einer zweiten Prüfung mit einem Geschäftssicherheitscode übereinstimmt, welcher aus Verschlüsseln, mit einem Produktschlüssel, einer Kombination wenigstens eines Teils des Speicherträger-Sicherheitscodes und wenigstens eines Teils des Vertrags-Identifikationsdatensatzes (6) resultiert.
  2. Speicherträger (1) nach Anspruch 1, ferner umfassend eine Datensatz-Zuordnungstabelle (3), welche auf die Speicheradressen wenigstens einiger der mehreren Speicherträger-Datensätze zeigt.
  3. Speicherträger (1) nach Anspruch 2, wobei die Datensatz-Zuordnungstabelle (3) dynamisch ist, derart, dass jeder Speicherträger-Datensatz in der ersten verfügbaren Speicheradresse gespeichert werden kann, und die Datensatz-Zuordnungstabelle (3) einen Datensatz-Zuordnungstabellen-Authentifizierungscode (3a) umfasst, um so eine Datenintegritätsprüfung der Datensatz-Zuordnungstabelle (3) zu erlauben.
  4. Speicherträger (1) nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche, wobei die mehreren Speicherträger-Datensätze ferner wenigstens einen Datensatz (5) umfassen, anders als der Speicherträger-Identifikationsdatensatz (4) und der wenigstens eine Vertrags-Identifikationsdatensatz (6), wie etwa einen Lebenszyklus-Datensatz.
  5. Speicherträger (1) nach Anspruch 4, wobei der wenigstens eine andere Datensatz (5) einen Datensatz-Authentifizierungscode (5a) umfasst, welcher in einer zusätzlichen Prüfung mit einem Datensatz-Sicherheitscode übereinstimmt, welcher aus Verschlüsseln, mit dem Sicherheitsschlüssel, einer Kombination wenigstens eines Teils eines Codes, der Information aus dem Speicherträger-Seriencode (2) enthält, wie etwa des Speicherträger-Sicherheitscodes, und wenigstens eines Teils des anderen Datensatzes (5) resultiert.
  6. Verfahren zum Verwenden eines Speicherträgers (1) nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 5 zur Autorisierung von Operationen, welche einem des wenigstens einen Vertrags-Identifikationsdatensatzes (6) des Speicherträgers (1) zugeordnet sind, wobei das Verfahren die Schritte umfasst:
    - Lesen (10) des eindeutigen Nurlese-Speicherträger-Seriencodes (2);
    - Lesen (40) des Speicherträger-Identifikationsdatensatzes;
    - Erhalten (60, 70, 80) des Sicherheitsschlüssels, wenigstens teilweise aus einer Quelle außerhalb des Speicherträgers (1);
    - Verschlüsseln (90), mit dem Sicherheitsschlüssel, einer Kombination wenigstens eines Teils des Speicherträger-Seriencodes (2) und wenigstens eines Teils des Speicherträger-Identifikationsdatensatzes (4), um so den Speicherträger-Sicherheitscode zu erhalten;
    - Durchführen der ersten Prüfung (100) durch Vergleichen des Authentifizierungscodes (4a) des Speicherträger-Identifikationsdatensatzes (4) mit dem Ergebnis des Durchführens einer ersten vorbestimmten Rechnung an dem Speicherträger-Sicherheitscode;
    - Lesen (170) des einen des wenigstens einen Vertrags-Identifikationsdatensatzes (6);
    - Erhalten (200) des entsprechenden Produktschlüssels wenigstens teilweise aus einer Quelle außerhalb des Speicherträgers (1);
    - Verschlüsseln (210), mit dem Produktschlüssel, einer Kombination wenigstens eines Teils des Speicherträger-Sicherheitscodes und wenigstens eines Teils des einen des wenigstens einen Vertrags-Identifikationsdatensatzes (6), um so einen Geschäftssicherheitscode zu erhalten; und
    - Durchführen der zweiten Prüfung (220) durch Vergleichen des Authentifizierungscodes (6a) des einen des wenigstens einen Vertrags-Identifikationsdatensatzes (6) mit dem Ergebnis des Durchführens einer zweiten vorbestimmten Rechnung an dem Geschäftssicherheitscode.
  7. Verfahren nach Anspruch 6 zum Verwenden eines Speicherträgers nach Anspruch 2 oder 3, ferner umfassend den Schritt des Auffindens (20) in der Datensatz-Zuordnungstabelle (3) der Speicheradressen jedes Speicherträger-Datensatzes (4, 5, 6), der zu lesen ist.
  8. Verfahren nach Anspruch 7 zum Verwenden eines Speicherträgers nach Anspruch 3, ferner umfassend den Schritt des Durchführens einer Datenintegritätsprüfung (30) an der Datensatz-Zuordnungstabelle (3).
  9. Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 6 bis 8 zum Verwenden eines Speicherträgers nach Anspruch 4, ferner umfassend den Schritt des Lesens (110) des anderen Datensatzes (5).
  10. Verfahren nach Anspruch 9 zum Verwenden eines Speicherträgers nach Anspruch 4, und wobei der wenigstens eine andere Datensatz (5) ein Lebenszyklus-Datensatz ist, wobei das Verfahren ferner den Schritt des Prüfens (160) in dem Lebenszyklus-Datensatz (5) umfasst, ob der Speicherträger (1) aktuell aktiv ist.
  11. Verfahren nach Anspruch 9 oder 10 zum Verwenden eines Speicherträgers nach Anspruch 5, ferner umfassend die Schritte:
    - Verschlüsseln (140), mit dem Sicherheitsschlüssel, einer Kombination wenigstens eines Teils eines Codes, der Information aus dem Speicherträger-Seriencode (2) enthält, wie etwa des Speicherträger-Sicherheitscodes, und wenigstens eines Teils des anderen Datensatzes (5), um so einen Datensatz-Sicherheitscode zu erhalten; und
    - Durchführen der zusätzlichen Redundanzprüfung (150) durch Vergleichen des Ergebnisses des Durchführens einer zusätzlichen vorbestimmten Rechnung an dem Datensatz-Sicherheitscode mit dem Authentifizierungscode (5a) des anderen Datensatzes (5).
  12. Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 6 bis 11, wobei eine Sicherheitsschlüsseltabelle mehrere potentielle Sicherheitsschlüssel enthält, von denen jeder einzeln durch einen Schlüsseloffsetcode identifiziert ist, und der Schritt des Erhaltens des Sicherheitsschlüssels die Schritte umfasst:
    - Durchführen (70) einer weiteren zusätzlichen vorbestimmten Rechnung, welche wenigstens einen Teil des Speicherträger-Seriencodes (2) und wenigstens einen Teil des Speicherträger-Identifikationsdatensatzes (4) beinhaltet, um einen konkreten Schlüsseloffsetcode zu erhalten; und
    - Extrahieren (80), aus der Sicherheitsschlüsseltabelle, des Sicherheitsschlüssels, welcher durch den konkreten Schlüsseloffsetcode identifiziert ist.
  13. Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 6 bis 12, wobei der eine des wenigstens einen Vertrags-Identifikationsdatensatzes (6) einen konkreten Produktidentifikationscode enthält, und der Schritt des Erhaltens des Produktschlüssels die Schritte umfasst:
    - Lesen eines Produktidentifikationscodes, welcher in dem Vertrags-Identifikationsdatensatz (6) enthalten ist; und
    - Extrahieren (210) aus einer Produkttabelle, welche mehrere potentielle Produktschlüssel enthält, von denen jeder einzeln durch einen unterschiedlichen Produktidentifikationscode identifiziert ist, des Produktschlüssels, welcher durch den Produktidentifikationscode, der in dem Vertrags-Identifikationsdatensatz (6) enthalten ist, identifiziert ist.
  14. Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 6 bis 13, wobei die Operationen, welche dem wenigstens einen Vertrags-Identifikationsdatensatz (6) zugeordnet sind, logischen Zugang zu einem Informationssystem umfassen.
  15. Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 6 bis 14, wobei die Operationen, welche dem wenigstens einen Vertrags-Identifikationsdatensatz (6) zugeordnet sind, physischen Zugang zu einem geschlossenen Bereich, umfassend, zum Beispiel, ein sicheres Gebäude, ein Entertainment Venue oder wenigstens einen Autoparkbereich, umfassen.
  16. Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 6 bis 15, wobei die Operationen, welche dem wenigstens einen Vertrags-Identifikationsdatensatz (6) zugeordnet sind, Geldtransaktionen umfassen.
  17. Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 6 bis 16, wobei die Operationen, welche dem wenigstens einen Vertrags-Identifikationsdatensatz (6) zugeordnet sind, Zugang zu Diensten, umfassend, zum Beispiel, Transport- oder Telekommunikationsdienste, umfassen.
  18. Leser (12), angepasst zum Durchführen des Autorisierungsverfahrens nach wenigstens einem der Ansprüche 6 bis 17, vorzugsweise umfassend lokale Speichermittel zum Enthalten wenigstens eines Teils von einem von den Sicherheits- und/oder den Produktschlüsseln.
  19. Netzwerk (13) umfassend wenigstens einen Leser (12) nach Anspruch 18 und, verbunden mit dem wenigstens einen Leser (12), wenigstens einen weiteren Leser (12) nach Anspruch 18 und/oder wenigstens ein entferntes Speichermittel (14) zum Enthalten wenigstens eines Teils von einem von den Sicherheits- und/oder den Produktschlüsseln.
  20. Zugangskontrollsystem (11), umfassend wenigstens einen Speicherträger (1) nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 5 und wenigstens einen Leser (12) nach Anspruch 18 und/oder ein Netzwerk (13) nach Anspruch 19.
EP07729015A 2006-05-12 2007-05-11 Speicherträger, autorisierungsverfahren, leser, netzwerk und zugangskontrollsystem Active EP2018632B1 (de)

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EP07729015A EP2018632B1 (de) 2006-05-12 2007-05-11 Speicherträger, autorisierungsverfahren, leser, netzwerk und zugangskontrollsystem

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Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP06113897A EP1855254A1 (de) 2006-05-12 2006-05-12 Speicherträger, Autorisierungsverfahren, Lesegerät, Netzwerk und Zugangssteuerungssystem
EP07729015A EP2018632B1 (de) 2006-05-12 2007-05-11 Speicherträger, autorisierungsverfahren, leser, netzwerk und zugangskontrollsystem
PCT/EP2007/054563 WO2007131952A1 (en) 2006-05-12 2007-05-11 Memory carrier, authorisation method, reader, network and access control system

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EP2018632A1 EP2018632A1 (de) 2009-01-28
EP2018632B1 true EP2018632B1 (de) 2009-09-16

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EP07729015A Active EP2018632B1 (de) 2006-05-12 2007-05-11 Speicherträger, autorisierungsverfahren, leser, netzwerk und zugangskontrollsystem

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EP (2) EP1855254A1 (de)
AT (1) ATE443305T1 (de)
DE (1) DE602007002495D1 (de)
ES (1) ES2332022T3 (de)
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FR2722596A1 (fr) * 1994-07-13 1996-01-19 France Telecom Systeme de controle d'acces limites a des places horaires autorisees et renouvables au moyen d'un support de memorisation portable
US5721781A (en) * 1995-09-13 1998-02-24 Microsoft Corporation Authentication system and method for smart card transactions
US6871278B1 (en) * 2000-07-06 2005-03-22 Lasercard Corporation Secure transactions with passive storage media

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WO2007131952A1 (en) 2007-11-22
ATE443305T1 (de) 2009-10-15
EP1855254A1 (de) 2007-11-14
DE602007002495D1 (de) 2009-10-29
ES2332022T3 (es) 2010-01-22
EP2018632A1 (de) 2009-01-28
EP1855254A8 (de) 2008-04-02

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