EP2039583A1 - Système de radiocommande ferroviaire - Google Patents

Système de radiocommande ferroviaire Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2039583A1
EP2039583A1 EP08252720A EP08252720A EP2039583A1 EP 2039583 A1 EP2039583 A1 EP 2039583A1 EP 08252720 A EP08252720 A EP 08252720A EP 08252720 A EP08252720 A EP 08252720A EP 2039583 A1 EP2039583 A1 EP 2039583A1
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EP
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Prior art keywords
train
radio communication
radio
control unit
authentication process
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP08252720A
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German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP2039583B1 (fr
Inventor
Tsuyoshi Yorishige
Yoshihide c/o Hitachi Ltd.Intell Prop. Group Nagatsugu
Kenichi c/o Hitachi Ltd.Intell.Prop.Group Sakai
Hiroshi c/o Hitachi Ltd. Intell.Prop.group Taoka
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Hitachi Ltd
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Hitachi Ltd
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Publication date
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Publication of EP2039583A1 publication Critical patent/EP2039583A1/fr
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Publication of EP2039583B1 publication Critical patent/EP2039583B1/fr
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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
    • B61L15/0027—Radio-based, e.g. using GSM-R
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
    • B61L15/0036—Conductor-based, e.g. using CAN-Bus, train-line or optical fibres
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/70—Details of trackside communication

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the art of realizing a stable data communication by establishing a plurality of radio communication channels between a train and a communication base station, the art of train control performed via radio and the art of a safe and stable data communication system using a plurality of radio communications that adopt a data encryption system of data transmitted on radio communication channels and a security authentication technique required for entering the radio-controlled zone.
  • Communication systems are utilized to perform train control via a "blocking system" in which only a single train is accepted to travel within a single section.
  • ERTMS/ETCS utilizes GSM-R (GSM-Railway) using a GSM network as the radio communication system.
  • the data is encrypted before radio transmission so as to ensure the confidentiality of data, and the received data is decrypted, thereby protecting the data information from the exterior.
  • Patent document 1 discloses a method for controlling the train by transmitting the control information for operating the train safely on a railroad via wire to the train.
  • the disclosure realizes a train control system having a high security extent by providing a radio control unit, a data encryption system and a radio transmitter malfunction detection system for utilizing radio communication for train control.
  • Japanese patent application laid-open publication 2006-129432 discloses a train authentication technique of a train control system using radio communication.
  • the key used for encrypting and decrypting data on the communication channels is determined per each train, which is notified from a ground train control unit through the authentication process of the train.
  • the authentication process is performed at the ground train control unit in response to an authentication request sent from an on-train control unit via an on-train radio control unit.
  • the authentication process is performed with the aim to prevent impersonation access to the whole system. Further, the authentication process is performed at the start up of the train, the entry of the train to the control section and periodically during traveling of the train to update the encryption key, so as to change the encryption pattern of data of the train and to prevent the data from being read from the exterior.
  • the arrangement of establishing a plurality of radio communication channels between the on-train control unit of a single train and the ground train control unit is aimed at realizing a stable and continuous data communication between the on-train control unit and the ground train control unit by realizing redundant radio communication channels.
  • This art realizes a highly reliable data communication by providing redundant multiple radio communication channels using multiple CHs, multiple antennas and radio control units under the following radio communication environments: (1) preventing interference bymultipath fading of radio waves withinbuildings in the urban area or within tunnels; (2) preventing interference by noise from other radio communication systems; and (3) change in radio status caused by the movement of the train.
  • the control system When the ground train control unit recognizes start up or system entry of the train, the control system must perform an authentication process to notify information such as acceptance to enter system or an encryption key allocated uniquely to each train. If this authentication process must be performed with all the plurality of radio communication channels of a single train, the ground train supervising system must perform a large number of processes determined by the number of trains times the number of radio communication channels, by which the process load becomes excessive.
  • the above-mentioned system also has another drawback in that the encryption rules determinedbetween the on-train control unit and the ground train control unit by the authentication process must be set to correspond to the number of radio communication channels per a single train, and the processing load related to data communication becomes excessive.
  • the object of providing redundant radio communication channels is as mentioned earlier. According to the present system configuration in which the defection of data is prevented since other radio communication channels are connected even if one radio communication channel is disconnected, some radio communication channels may not be able to perform the authentication process at the time of initial start up of the train according for example to the position of the train, the environment of the radio or the apparatus status of the radio control unit. Such radio communication channel may recover its connection by the movement of the train.
  • the radio communication channel for performing data communication for train control and a radio communication channel for performing authentication process, and since the processing mode of the ground train control unit differs for each of the radio communication channels for a single train, the process performed by the ground train control unit becomes too complex.
  • the object of the present invention is to provide a train control system having redundant data communication channels using a plurality of radio communication channels using difference channels (CH) between the on-train control unit and the ground train control unit so as to prevent disconnection of communication of control data in the bidirectional radio communication between the on-train control unit and the ground train control unit in a train control system, wherein each of the radio communication channels are made effective as safe and stable data communication channels.
  • CH difference channels
  • the present invention provides a train control system establishing radio communication between a plurality of on-train radio control apparatuses moving on a predetermined track and a plurality of ground train radio control units disposed along a predetermined track, so as to establish parallel simultaneous radio communications on a plurality of radio communication channels of various communication frequencies between the plurality of on-train radio communication apparatuses and the plurality of ground train radio control units, characterized in that one radio communication channel is selected out of the plurality of radio communication channels to perform an authentication request and an authentication process, wherein an encryption key obtained by the authentication process is used as a common encryption key shared by the plurality of on-train radio control units to encrypt data communication between the plurality of on-train radio control units and the plurality of ground train radio control units.
  • the present invention also characterizes in that the authentication request and the authentication process required at the time of entry of the on-train radio control unit to the train control system or at the initial start up of the on-train radio control unit are performed by switching the selected radio communication channels.
  • the present invention also characterizes in that a supervising system of the on-train radio control unit for selecting a single radio communication channel and performing the authentication request generates a random number for the authentication process, and hands over the random number to only the radio communication channel for performing the authentication request and the authentication process.
  • the present invention further characterizes in that the data on the plurality of radio communication channels are encrypted using an encryption key generated by a ground train supervising system and notified via the ground train radio control unit to the on-train radio control unit, wherein the encryption key is notified from the ground train radio control unit while performing authentication of a single radio communication channel, and the supervising system of the ground train radio control unit shares the encryption key with other on-train radio control units to be used for encrypting data sent via other radio communication channels that have not performed authentication, so that the data sent on all the plurality of radio communication channels established between the on-train radio control units and the ground train radio control units can be encrypted.
  • the present invention also characterizes in that the supervising system of the on-train radio control unit observes the status of radio waves of a plurality of radio communication channels and the status of apparatuses of the on-train radio control units, so as to determine a single radio communication channel for performing the authentication process and to start the authentication process.
  • the present invention further characterizes in that the train control system is equipped with an authentication retry function in which if the authentication process is not completed within a certain period of time or if radio communication is disconnected during the authentication process, the authentication process is discontinued and terminated, then the supervising system selects another radio communication channel to restart the authentication process, so as to switch the radio communication channel to retry the authentication request and the authentication process.
  • the present invention also characterizes in that when the authentication is completed via a single radio communication channel, data communication of the on-train radio control unit within the train control system is accepted, and the supervising system of the on-train radio control apparatus shares the authentication completion information and the encryption key with other radio communication channels, so that the data communication on the remaining radio communication channels are also accepted and started, by which the data communication of the train control system is activated.
  • data is communicated via a plurality of radio communication channels between the on-train control unit of a single train and the ground train control unit so as to ensure the redundancy of data communication, and a secure and appropriate authentication is performed by executing a security authentication between the on-train and ground train control units using one of the plurality of radio communication channels. Further, by sharing the encryption key obtained by the authentication process with other radio communication channels to start data communication, the security of data sent via the redundant radio communication channels can be guaranteed effectively.
  • the authentication process is performed via only one radio communication channel, so that compared to the system in which all the radio communication channels must perform the authenticationprocess, the loadof authenticating a single train is very small. This is also effective from the viewpoint of reducing load of the ground train control unit that controls the plurality of trains traveling on one railroad track.
  • the authentication request and the authentication process required during initial start up of the on-train radio control unit or the entry of the on-train radio control unit to the train control system is performed by switching the selected radio communication channels, so that even if the radio communication status or the status of the radio transmitter or the antenna is not good, the authentication process can be performed by switching to another radio communication channel, so that the plurality of radio communication channels can be performed effectively under a condition in which the authentication process is required.
  • the supervising system of the on-train radio control unit for selecting a single radio communication channel and executing the authentication request generates random numbers for the authentication process, and hands over the random number only to the radio communication channel that performs the authentication request and the authentication process, so that the authentication request and the authentication process can be performed effectively only by the supervising system and the radio communication channel performing the authentication process.
  • the data on the plurality of radio communication channels is encrypted using an encryption key generated by the ground train supervising system and notified via the round-based radio control unit to the on-train radio control unit.
  • the encryption key is notified from the ground train radio control unit upon performing authentication on a single radio communication channel, and the supervising system of the ground train radio control unit demands the on-train radio control unit to share the encryption key for encrypting data with other radio communication channels that have not performed authentication.
  • the data on all the plurality of radio communication channels between the on-train radio control unit and the ground train radio control unit can be encrypted, so that compared to the system where all the radio communication channels must perform the authentication process, the authentication process is restricted to a single radio communication channel, the load for performing the authentication process of a single train can be reduced, and the load applied to the ground train control unit that controls the plurality of trains traveling on one railroad track can be reduced.
  • the radio wave status of the plurality of radio communication channels and the apparatus status of the on-train radio control unit is monitored by the supervising system of the on-train radio control unit, and by determining the single radio communication channel for performing the authentication process and starting the authentication process, the radio wave status of the plurality of radio communication channels and the apparatus status of the on-train radio control unit can be monitored efficiently, and the authentication process can be started efficiently, compared to the system in which a plurality of on-train radio control units monitor the status respectively.
  • the present invention can further be equipped with an authentication retry function that disconnects and terminates the authentication process if the authentication process is not completed within a certain period of time or if the radio communication is disconnected during the authentication process, and selects another radio communication channel to retry the authentication process by the supervising system so as to switch the radio communication channel for retrying the authentication request and the authentication process.
  • an authentication retry function that disconnects and terminates the authentication process if the authentication process is not completed within a certain period of time or if the radio communication is disconnected during the authentication process, and selects another radio communication channel to retry the authentication process by the supervising system so as to switch the radio communication channel for retrying the authentication request and the authentication process.
  • the authentication process when the authentication process is completed via a single radio communication channel, data communication of the on-train radio control unit in the train control system is accepted, and the supervising system of the on-train radio control unit shares the authentication completion information and the encryption key with other radio communication channels, so that data communication via the remaining radio communication channels is also accepted and started, and the data communication of the train control system can be started.
  • the security of data encryption of the radio communication channels not having performed the authentication process is also ensured.
  • the data sent on the radio communication channels are encrypted for confidentiality.
  • the plurality of radio communication channels formed between a single train and a ground train control unit use the same encryption key to encrypt the same control data, so that identical information are transmitted via the respective radio communication channels.
  • An authentication process is performed to prevent impersonation access from the exterior of the system to the radio transmission channels.
  • the encryption key generated by the ground train control unit is notified to the on-train control unit.
  • the authentication process is performed between the train and the ground train control unit.
  • the authentication process recognizes the authentication request from the train via the radio communication path, and determines whether or not to accept access of the train to the system. When access is accepted, an encryption key used for encrypting the data on the radio communication channel is notified to the train. If authentication requests are sent via each of the plurality of radio communication channels between the ground train control unit and a single train, the ground train control unit must receive a large number of authentication requests corresponding to the number of radio communication channels to authenticate only a single train, so that when it is necessary to authenticate multiple trains, the process to be performed at the ground train control unit will become too complex and the load will become excessive. By restricting the number of radio communication channels subjected to authenticationprocesstoone, and having only one authentication request for a single radio communication channel to be output per a single train, the process load of the ground train control unit can be reduced.
  • the present system corresponds to such data communication malfunction by establishing a plurality of radio communication channels.
  • the authentication process is performed on a single radio communication channel, if the above-mentioned problems causing defective data communication occurs and the radio communication control unit cannot perform the authentication process, switching among the plurality of radio communication channels is performed for example by the following processes:
  • data communication is performed via a plurality of radio communication channels established between the on-train control unit of a single train and the ground train control unit, so as to ensure the redundancy of data communication. Further, by executing a security authentication between the on-train and ground train control units using a single radio communication channel out of the plurality of radio communication channels, it becomes possible to perform a secure and appropriate authentication effectively, and by sharing the encryption key obtained in the security authentication process with other radio communication channels when data communication is started, security of data can be guaranteed in the redundant radio communication channels.
  • the authentication process performed when starting up the train, when entering the system and when updating the encryption key is performed by selecting one of the plurality of radio communication paths, so that even if the radio communication status or the statuses of the radio transmitter or the antenna is not good, the authentication process can be performed by switching to another radio communication channel, so that the plurality of radio transmission channels can be used effectively in such a state where authentication process is necessary.
  • the present system restricts the authentication process to be performed by only a single radio communication channel, so that the load of the authentication process is very small. Therefore, the load on the ground train control unit that controls the large number of trains on a single track can be effectively reduced.
  • the channels When an authentication process is performed for all the plurality of radio communication channels, the channels will have various different encryption keys, and the load of the decryption process by the ground train control unit becomes excessive.
  • the encryption key obtained via the authentication process by the on-train control unit is distributed and shared with other on-train control units, so that the data encryption of the radio communication channels that did not perform authentication process will also be security-ensured.
  • all the data communicated on the plurality of radio communication channels between the ground train control unit and a single train are protected by the same encryption key as that used in the authentication process.
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram showing the on-train and ground train control units according to embodiment 1 of the present invention.
  • the ground-based facilities include a ground train control unit 10 that generates information to a train 90 accompanying the bidirectional data communication with the train 90, and a ground train radio communication apparatus AP 111 for realizing radio communication (hereinafter referred to as ground train radio control apparatus: AP).
  • a supervising system AP master 14 of the plurality of ground train radio control units that exist along the railroad tracks is arranged between the ground train control unit 10 and the AP 111.
  • an on-train control unit 12 functioning as the supervising system of the train 90 and an on-train radio control unit STA 131 for performing radio communication (hereinafter referred to as on-train radio control unit: STA) are provided as the train-based facilities.
  • STA on-train radio control unit
  • four STAs, STA 131, STA 132, STA 133 and STA 134 are disposed on a train 90, with four radio communication channels formed between the on-train control unit 12 and the ground train control unit 10.
  • each STA has established radio communication channels with the AP 111, AP 112, AP 113 and AP 114.
  • the respective radio communication channels use different channels (CH), and when the on-train radio control units STA 131, STA 132, STA 133 and STA 134 each having an antenna 8 communicate with the base-stations AP 111, AP 112, AP 113 and AP 114 having different installationenvironments and each having an antenna 8, the environments of the radio communication channels are set to be varied, so that when the radio transmission path is disconnected due to radio wave environment or the status of operation of the on-train radio communication system STA, the data from another on-train radio communication system STA is used for processing data of the on-train control unit 12.
  • CH channel
  • FIG. 2 is a data communication flow chart of the radio communication channel according to embodiment 1 of the present invention.
  • the train 90 communicates data with the ground-based facility.
  • the information that the ground train control unit 10 wishes to send to a single train is at first transmitted to the AP master 14.
  • the information having been subjected to encryption process in the AP master 14 is then send to each of the APs 111 through 114.
  • Each AP 111 through 114 transmits the encrypted train control information to each STA 131 through 134 having established radio communication, respectively, and each STA 131 through 134 having received the data sends the decrypted data to the on-train control unit 12.
  • each STA 131 through 13 encrypts the data and sends the data to each AP 111 through 114 having established radio communication channels.
  • the AP 111 through 114 notifies the received data to the AP master 14, and the AP master 14 decrypts the data.
  • the decrypted data from the on-train control unit 12 is notified from the AP master 14 to the ground train control unit 10.
  • the on-train control unit 12 usually uses data from a single STA for control, but if data reception error such as the missing of data or missing of data update occurs, or if data disconnection of the radio communication channel occurs, the data received by other STA are used for control. This redundancy of radio communication channels enables to prevent data from the ground train control unit 10 from being discontinued.
  • the radio communication channels are open networks, so that the data must be encrypted to ensure confidentiality of the data.
  • the encryption key required for the encryption is generated by the ground train control unit 10 per each train 90, and during the authentication process performed during start up of the train or the system entry of the train, the key is handed over from the ground train control unit 10 to the on-train control unit 12.
  • FIG. 3 is a flowchart showing the authentication process performed among the various apparatuses according to embodiment 1 of the present invention.
  • the on-train control unit 12 generates a random number.
  • the on-train control unit 12 selects an STA 13 for performing authentication, and outputs an authentication request by handing over the generated random number.
  • the STA 13 transmits the random number to the AP master 14 via a radio communication channel.
  • the AP master 14 encrypts the random number using an authentication key shared in advance by the STA 13 and the AP master 14.
  • the data is sent to the STA 13, and the STA 13 decrypts the same.
  • the STA 13 receives the random number again from the on-train control unit 12 that had been received previously, and compares the same with the random number that had been encrypted and decrypted using the authentication key so as to confirm that they match.
  • the ground train control unit 10 generates a random number.
  • the ground train control unit 10 hands over the generated random number to the AP master 14.
  • the AP master 14 transmits the random number to the STA 13 using AP 11 having a secured radio communication channel that is performing authentication process.
  • the STA 13 encrypts the random number using an authentication key shared in advance by the STA 13 and the AP master 14.
  • the data is sent to the AP master 14, and the AP master 14 decrypts the same.
  • theAPmaster 14 receives the random number again from the ground train control unit 10 that had been received previously, and compares the same with the random number that had been encrypted and decrypted using the authentication key, so as to confirm that they match.
  • the ground train control unit 10 encrypts the encryption key determined uniquely for each train, which is notified to the on-train control unit 12 via the radio communication channel established between the AP master 14 and the STA 13.
  • the on-train control unit 12 subjects the encryption key received at the time of completion of authentication to a sharing process to share the same with other STAs not subjected to the authentication process, and then notifies that the authentication has completed. Thereby, radio communication using all four STAs is started.
  • FIG. 4 is a data communication flow chart illustrating the authentication process performed using radio communication channels according to embodiment 1 of the present invention.
  • STA 131 is performing the authentication process.
  • the authentication process is performed using a single radio communication channel 41 via the process shown in FIG. 3 .
  • the on-train control unit 12 performs an discontinuation-termination process of the authentication process, and outputs an authentication process request to STA 132 so as to switch the STA performing the authentication process.
  • This arrangement constitutes an authentication retry function.
  • the encryption key notified from the ground train control unit 10 through the authentication process is shared via the on-train control unit 12 with other STAs 132, 133 and 134.
  • all the radio communication channels have completed the authentication process and are able to communicate data using the distributed encryption key, so that the data communication of all four radio communication channels are protected from interception from the exterior.
  • the authentication is performed using a single wire communication channel and single STA. If the authentication is not completed within a certain period of time and the authentication key is not notified to the on-train control unit 12, the system is equipped with a retry function to perform an authentication discontinuation-termination process so as to switch the authentication request to another STA to retry the authentication.
  • the authentication process can be performed by switching the STA used for authentication.
  • the authentication process must be performed for four times per a single train, and the process load of the AP master 14 and the ground train control unit 10 becomes excessive.
  • the on-train control unit 12 must perform an authentication process corresponding to the radio communication status in addition to performing the train control based on the communicated data, and the performance load of the system becomes excessive.
  • the train control unit according to embodiment 1 of the present invention By applying the train control unit according to embodiment 1 of the present invention to perform the authentication process using an STA administering a single radio communication channel and share the encryption key obtained through the authentication process with other STAs administering other radio communication channels, the STAs not having performed the authentication process can also share the encryption key to perform encryption anddecryptionofdata. Thus, even in STAs not having established radio communication during the authentication process can share the encryption key after the authentication of a single STA has completed, so that when radio communication has been established while the train is moving, encrypted data can be communicated immediately.
  • the present invention is applicable to signaling systems for moving vehicles such as railway cars, monorails and light rail transits (LRT).
  • the present invention is applicable not only to railway cars, but also to systems aimed at performing highly reliable transmission on an open network by adopting redundant data communication using a plurality of radio communication channels.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
EP08252720A 2007-09-18 2008-08-15 Système de radiocommande ferroviaire Not-in-force EP2039583B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP2007240874A JP4471996B2 (ja) 2007-09-18 2007-09-18 列車制御システム

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2039583A1 true EP2039583A1 (fr) 2009-03-25
EP2039583B1 EP2039583B1 (fr) 2011-08-03

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EP08252720A Not-in-force EP2039583B1 (fr) 2007-09-18 2008-08-15 Système de radiocommande ferroviaire

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EP (1) EP2039583B1 (fr)
JP (1) JP4471996B2 (fr)
CN (1) CN101391616B (fr)
AT (1) ATE518718T1 (fr)

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JP6241067B2 (ja) * 2013-05-16 2017-12-06 三菱電機株式会社 無線装置
DE102014204146A1 (de) * 2014-03-06 2015-09-10 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zum Steuern eines mit einem CBTC-System verbundenen Schienenfahrzeugs und CBTC-System mit mindestens einem Schienenfahrzeug
CN104768151B (zh) * 2015-04-16 2018-04-20 北京交通大学 基于车地无线通信系统的接入密钥修改方法
CN105142137B (zh) * 2015-07-27 2018-10-12 北京交通大学 城市轨道交通系统车地无线通信认证密钥配置系统及方法
CN105025479B (zh) * 2015-07-27 2019-03-05 北京交通大学 城市轨道交通系统车地无线通信认证密钥配置系统及方法
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CN102209366B (zh) * 2010-03-31 2013-09-18 中兴智能交通（无锡）有限公司 一种车载通信方法和系统
CN102209366A (zh) * 2010-03-31 2011-10-05 中兴智能交通（无锡）有限公司 一种车载通信方法和系统
RU2444455C2 (ru) * 2010-06-03 2012-03-10 Открытое Акционерное Общество "Российские Железные Дороги" Система передачи данных для обеспечения управления движением поезда в тоннеле
WO2012136525A1 (fr) * 2011-04-05 2012-10-11 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Système et procédé de gestion de clés d'un système de protection des trains
DE102011084344A1 (de) * 2011-10-12 2013-04-18 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zur Laufzeitoptimierung bei paketorientierter Mobilfunkübertragung von Datentelegrammen
DE102011118076A1 (de) * 2011-11-04 2013-05-08 Airbus Operations Gmbh Verfahren zur deutlichen Steigerung der Verfügbarkeit drahtloser Verbindungen
DE102011118076B4 (de) * 2011-11-04 2024-04-18 Airbus Operations Gmbh Verfahren zur deutlichen Steigerung der Verfügbarkeit drahtloser Verbindungen
US10624026B2 (en) 2011-11-04 2020-04-14 Airbus Operations Gmbh Method for considerably enhancing the availability of wireless connections
US9950719B2 (en) 2012-10-04 2018-04-24 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Operator control system for operator control of functional units for a rail vehicle
EP2874860B1 (fr) 2012-10-04 2016-11-02 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Système de commande pour commander des unités fonctionnelles dans un véhicule ferroviaire
EP2939901A4 (fr) * 2012-12-28 2016-09-21 Toshiba Kk Système et procédé de commande de train
US9128815B2 (en) 2013-01-14 2015-09-08 Thales Canada Inc Control system for vehicle in a guideway network
DE102014226902A1 (de) * 2014-12-23 2016-01-14 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Einrichtung einer sicheren Datenübertragungsverbindungim Schienenverkehr
EP3495233A4 (fr) * 2016-08-04 2019-11-06 Mitsubishi Electric Corporation Système de commande de train sans fil et procédé de commande de train sans fil
US11117601B2 (en) 2016-08-04 2021-09-14 Mitsubishi Electric Corporation Radio train control system and radio train control method
US11420662B2 (en) 2016-11-17 2022-08-23 Hitachi Rail Sts S.P.A. Device and method for the safe management of vital communications in the railway environment
WO2019076032A1 (fr) * 2017-10-20 2019-04-25 北京全路通信信号研究设计院集团有限公司 Procédé et système de mémorisation classifiée de clés
WO2019242967A1 (fr) * 2018-06-19 2019-12-26 Siemens Mobility GmbH Procédé de transmission de données à l'intérieur d'un véhicule ferroviaire et/ou entre le véhicule ferroviaire et au moins une unité externe, système de communication, véhicule ferroviaire et système

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CN101391616A (zh) 2009-03-25
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JP4471996B2 (ja) 2010-06-02
JP2009067357A (ja) 2009-04-02
CN101391616B (zh) 2011-04-06

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