EP2252959A1 - Dispositif de protection et procédé pour empêcher le vol d'informations au niveau d'un appareil de lecture de carte - Google Patents

Dispositif de protection et procédé pour empêcher le vol d'informations au niveau d'un appareil de lecture de carte

Info

Publication number
EP2252959A1
EP2252959A1 EP09716398A EP09716398A EP2252959A1 EP 2252959 A1 EP2252959 A1 EP 2252959A1 EP 09716398 A EP09716398 A EP 09716398A EP 09716398 A EP09716398 A EP 09716398A EP 2252959 A1 EP2252959 A1 EP 2252959A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
data
protective
card reader
card
protective field
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
EP09716398A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Achim Müller
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Wincor Nixdorf International GmbH
Original Assignee
Wincor Nixdorf International GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Wincor Nixdorf International GmbH filed Critical Wincor Nixdorf International GmbH
Publication of EP2252959A1 publication Critical patent/EP2252959A1/fr
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K7/00—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns
    • G06K7/08—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by means detecting the change of an electrostatic or magnetic field, e.g. by detecting change of capacitance between electrodes
    • G06K7/082—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by means detecting the change of an electrostatic or magnetic field, e.g. by detecting change of capacitance between electrodes using inductive or magnetic sensors
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/06187—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with magnetically detectable marking
    • G06K19/06206—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with magnetically detectable marking the magnetic marking being emulated
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
    • G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
    • G07F19/205—Housing aspects of ATMs
    • G07F19/2055—Anti-skimming aspects at ATMs
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/0806—Details of the card
    • G07F7/0813—Specific details related to card security
    • G07F7/082—Features insuring the integrity of the data on or in the card
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/0873—Details of the card reader
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a protection device for a card reader according to the preamble of claim 1. Furthermore, the invention relates to a self-service terminal equipped with the protection device, in particular an ATM, a statement printer or an information terminal, and a method applied thereto for preventing the reading out of data from one
  • SB terminals Conventional self-service terminals, also called SB terminals for short, are frequently used in the function of an ATM or account statement tracker.
  • a bank card which usually corresponds to one of a card reader to read magnetic stripe card, are stored on the card data including the personal customer and account data.
  • self-service terminals are increasingly being manipulated by third parties to fraudulently access these map data. This is done at the respective
  • SB-terminal installed a special Ausspähvorraum inconspicuous as possible, which essentially contains a small foreign card reader, which is attached as close to the actual insertion slot of the self-service terminal or the actual card reader.
  • the third party the card data, in particular the customer and account data, procured and makes it possible, an illegal copy of the bank card manufacture.
  • the third party succeeds in addition, the bank card To spy out the appropriate secret code (the so-called PIN), he can easily withdraw money from the associated account with the counterfeit bank card and the spied PIN at ATMs.
  • Spying device is usually installed, namely immediately before the insertion slot of the "real" or actual card reader.
  • the protective field must be strong enough to ensure that the reading function of the spying device is effectively compromised or blocked, and that the data can no longer be skimmed by the magnetic stripe card.
  • Pre-detection head immediately behind the insertion slot which can be used to determine if the magnetic stripe card has been inserted correctly.
  • This magnetic track pre-recognition head is thus usually located near the area in which the protective field acts. Therefore, it may easily happen that the magnetic track pre-recognition head is deteriorated when read by the protective field.
  • read heads arranged further inside the card reader can also be inadvertently impaired or disturbed by the protective field. Therefore, in practice, it often turns out to be difficult to achieve a good balance between an optimal alignment and sufficient field strength of the protective field on the one hand and safe undisturbed operation of the card reader on the other hand.
  • DE 10 2005 043 317 B3 proposes a protective device which is advantageously used in a self-service terminal, in particular an ATM, statement printer and / or information terminal, can be used.
  • the protective device has a protective field generator and an inductor connected thereto for generating an electromagnetic protective field in the form of an alternating field, which is suitable for impairing the function of a skimming device, wherein the protective device of a
  • Control unit of the card reader for controlling a card transport device of the card reader is controlled so that the protective field is at least for the period of reading the magnetic stripe card in the actual card reader so reduced or turned off that the reading of the magnetic stripe card in the actual card reader is not affected by the protective field.
  • the protective field generator is deactivated only temporarily and precisely when or while the magnetic stripe card is being read by the actual and "real" card reader, as long as there is no card in the card reader, the protective field is switched on and acts with sufficient field strength against potential
  • the invention is therefore based on the object to provide an improved protective device of the type mentioned for generating an electromagnetic protective field.
  • a protective field is to be generated which can remain switched on as permanently as possible.
  • a self-service terminal equipped with such a protective device and a method for generating such a protective field are proposed.
  • the object is achieved by a protective device with the features of claim 1.
  • the object is further achieved by a self-service terminal and by a method having the features of the respective independent claim.
  • the protective device proposed here is characterized in that the
  • Protection device generated by means of a protective field generator, an electromagnetic protective field having a Schutzsigna] that simulates such a signal that occurs when reading magnetic stripe cards.
  • a special protection signals in a possibly existing Ausspähvorraum is induced via the protective field, there to emit the reading of a magnetic stripe card.
  • the skimming card reader reads a pseudo-magstripe card or at least when spying the real
  • the protection signal can correspond to at least one standardized for the reading of magnetic stripe card signal format.
  • the protection signal may contain pseudo-data, which in the demodulation with the actual
  • the protective field generator generates a pseudo-data-modulated protection signal which simulates data stored on magnetic stripe cards.
  • the protective field generator generates a pseudo-data-modulated protection signal which simulates data stored on magnetic stripe cards.
  • the protective field generator generates the pseudo-data-modulated protection signal with such a protection signal frequency, which is adapted to a data rate or data rate, which in a normal insertion and / or removal of the magnetic stripe card in or out Card reader occurs.
  • the pseudo-data can also have synchronization data, in particular in the form of leading zeros and / or start or end characters.
  • the pseudo-data represents a continuous data stream.
  • the protection device in particular the protective field generator, the modulated protection signal with pseudo-data in the form of at least two at least partially overlapping data streams generate.
  • the single FIGURE shows a schematic representation of the structure of a card reader 10, which is used for a self-service terminal, in the illustrated embodiment for a bank statement printer or an ATM.
  • the card reader 10 has a housing 12 with a front cover 14, which is preferably a plastic cover.
  • a front cover 14 which is preferably a plastic cover.
  • an insertion portion in the form of a slot 16 is formed, through which the magnetic stripe card, which here represents a bank card MSC, can be inserted into the card reader 10.
  • the transport device 18 Immediately behind the insertion slot 16, a transport device 18 connects.
  • the transport device 18 generally comprises rollers for
  • a reading device for reading the magnetic strip of Bank card of which in Fig. 1, a first magnetic read head 20 and a second magnetic read head 22 are shown.
  • the transport device 18 and the read heads 20 and 22 are connected to a control unit 24, which in turn is connected via an interface 25 to a computer or PC (not shown).
  • the protection device is integrated into the card reader, with this protection device an illegal reading of data from the bank card MSC by means of a third party immediately before the insertion slot 16 arranged spy SM (in the figure indicated by dashed lines) is effectively prevented.
  • the protective device comprises a protective field generator 26 connected to the control unit 24, to which a protective field inductance 28 is connected.
  • This inductor 28 is located near the lead-in area 16 and radiates that generated by the protected field generator 26 and modulated with it
  • Protective signal provided protective field 29 to the outside.
  • the electromagnetic protective field 29 is generated to have a pseudo-data PD modulated protection signal that simulates data used in reading magnetic stripe cards.
  • a reading sensor R of the spying device SM possibly mounted in the vicinity of the insertion slot 16 receives the protection signal therewith
  • Pseudo data PD which in turn the spy SM and in particular a demodulation stage provided therein (not shown) are affected.
  • the electromagnetic protective field 29 can be generated with a lower emission power, which is sufficient to influence the read sensor R of the spy SM.
  • an electromagnetic protective field 29 is generated by the protective field generator 26 and the associated inductance 28, which is particularly suitable for impairing the function of the spying device SM by the protective electromagnetic field 29 being a protective signal generated as a pseudo magnetic card signal contains, in particular pseudo-data PD, which simulate such data used in the reading of magnetic stripe cards.
  • the inductor 28 for generating and emitting the protective field 29 may be integrated, for example, in the cover 14 of the card reader, the cover preferably made of plastic.
  • the protective field 29 with the pseudo-data generated here represents an electromagnetic alternating field.
  • the protective field 29 can be generated permanently, in particular in the form of a continuous data stream.
  • the protective field 29 does not necessarily have to be permanently present, but can also be switched off temporarily. It can e.g. be provided that the electromagnetic protective field 29 only exists when there is no magnetic stripe card in the actual card reader 10. Thus, the protection mechanism is always activated only when required, i. when a user inserts his card MSC into the card slot 16.
  • the protection device shown here may also include a metal detector 30, which is also connected to the control unit 24 and to which a first inductance 32 and a second inductance 34 are connected.
  • the protective field inductor 28, the first inductor 32 and the second inductor 34 are preferably formed as coils and preferably poured into the plastic cover 14 of the card reader 10 and thus integrated into this. With the aid of the coils 32 and 34, the metal detector 30 can determine whether a foreign reading device, such as e.g. the illustrated Sldmming module SM, has been installed. The control unit 24 connected to the metal detector 30 can then, depending on the detected status, the protective field
  • the metal detector 30 generates a primary electromagnetic field in the region of the insertion slot 16 via the first inductance 32.
  • This primary electromagnetic field would interact with and generate eddy currents in metallic components necessarily contained in a foreign reading device or skimming module .
  • the interaction of the primary electromagnetic field with the metallic components of the foreign reading device generates a secondary electromagnetic field, which is detected by the metal detector 30 via the second inductance 34.
  • the front reading head 20 which is also referred to as a magnetic track pre-recognition head, whether the magnetic strip is in the correct position, i. whether the magnetic stripe card MSC has been inserted into the insertion slot 16 with the correct orientation.
  • the transport device 18 and the read heads 20 and 22 are controlled by the same control unit 24.
  • the protective field generator 26 is controlled by the same control unit 24, which also controls the transport device 18 and the reading heads 20 and 22 of the reading device, in such a way that the protective field 29 during reading of the bank card in the card reader 10 in its field strength reduced or completely is switched off and is restored after reading is finished.
  • Magnetic strip card by means of a spy (Sldmming module) to prevent.
  • a spy Simdmming module
  • an electromagnetic protective field is generated which is suitable for impairing the function of the spying device.
  • the protective field works against the
  • Skimming module as an interference field over which protection signals or interference signals are emitted, which essentially correspond to signals that are used in the recording or during
  • the waveform of the protection signals is preferably expressed similar to typical map data signals. These may e.g. contain f / 2f encoded data.
  • the signal frequency of the protection signal preferably corresponds to the data rate or Nutz Scheme für
  • the pseudo data or disturbance data can be generated in the form of a data stream with leading zeros and start or end characters. This instructs a skimming module upon receipt of this data stream to begin interpreting, recording, or transmitting to external listening devices and preferably synchronizing to the disturbance stream.
  • a synchronization to the data stream of the actual map data fails. At most, the real map data mixes with the pseudo-data to a non-usable amount of data. If the disturbance stream is generated continuously, the skimmer will not have the opportunity to read an undisturbed start condition. At best, it comes to a signal or data mixing of real map data and clutter.
  • the protective device 26, 28 according to the invention with the protective field generator 26 and the inductor 28 may alternatively be arranged independently of the latter at the SB terminal for integration into the card reader 10.
  • the protective device with its protective field generator 26 and the inductance 28 may be arranged on the back of a wall of the self-service terminal behind the insertion slot 16. Accordingly, it is also possible to arrange the metal detector 30 with its inductors 32, 34 in this area.
  • PC computer

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Vision & Pattern Recognition (AREA)
  • Artificial Intelligence (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Recording Or Reproducing By Magnetic Means (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Control Of Vending Devices And Auxiliary Devices For Vending Devices (AREA)
  • Telephone Function (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un dispositif de protection contre ce que l'on appelle des modules de skimming (vol d'informations), qui sont appliqués au niveau de terminaux en libre-service (par exemple des distributeurs d'argent) par manipulation frauduleuse, pour lire les données d'une carte à piste magnétique introduite dans l'appareil de lecture de carte (10). Pour y remédier, on recommande un dispositif de protection (26, 28) qui présente un générateur de champ de protection (26) et une inductivité associée (28) afin de produire un champ électromagnétique de protection (29), pour interférer avec la fonction du dispositif d'exploration (SM). Un signal de protection est produit, qui simule un signal apparaissant lors de la lecture de carte à piste magnétique. Ainsi, la lecture d'une carte à piste magnétique dans le module de vol d'informations éventuellement présent est imitée. Le signal de protection peut en particulier contenir des pseudo-données, qui se mélangent lors de la démodulation avec les données propres à la carte ou recouvre celles-ci complètement, de sorte que le tiers reçoit en définitif des données inutilisables.
EP09716398A 2008-03-03 2009-03-02 Dispositif de protection et procédé pour empêcher le vol d'informations au niveau d'un appareil de lecture de carte Ceased EP2252959A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102008012231A DE102008012231A1 (de) 2008-03-03 2008-03-03 Schutzvorrichtung, Selbstbedienungs-Terminal und Verfahren zum Verhindern von Skimming an einem Kartenlesegerät
PCT/EP2009/052446 WO2009109543A1 (fr) 2008-03-03 2009-03-02 Dispositif de protection et procédé pour empêcher le vol d'informations au niveau d'un appareil de lecture de carte

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2252959A1 true EP2252959A1 (fr) 2010-11-24

Family

ID=40564972

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP09716398A Ceased EP2252959A1 (fr) 2008-03-03 2009-03-02 Dispositif de protection et procédé pour empêcher le vol d'informations au niveau d'un appareil de lecture de carte

Country Status (5)

Country Link
US (1) US8397991B2 (fr)
EP (1) EP2252959A1 (fr)
CN (1) CN101971187B (fr)
DE (1) DE102008012231A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2009109543A1 (fr)

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CN101971187A (zh) 2011-02-09
WO2009109543A1 (fr) 2009-09-11
US20110006112A1 (en) 2011-01-13
CN101971187B (zh) 2015-02-25
US8397991B2 (en) 2013-03-19

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