EP2612207A2 - Procédé et plateforme permettant de mettre en uvre des systèmes critiques de sécurité - Google Patents

Procédé et plateforme permettant de mettre en uvre des systèmes critiques de sécurité

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Publication number
EP2612207A2
EP2612207A2 EP11767063.8A EP11767063A EP2612207A2 EP 2612207 A2 EP2612207 A2 EP 2612207A2 EP 11767063 A EP11767063 A EP 11767063A EP 2612207 A2 EP2612207 A2 EP 2612207A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
module
signals
logic
diagnostic
input
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
EP11767063.8A
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German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Ievgenii Bakhmach
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Individual
Original Assignee
Individual
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Publication of EP2612207A2 publication Critical patent/EP2612207A2/fr
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B23/00—Testing or monitoring of control systems or parts thereof
    • G05B23/02—Electric testing or monitoring
    • G05B23/0205—Electric testing or monitoring by means of a monitoring system capable of detecting and responding to faults
    • G05B23/0218—Electric testing or monitoring by means of a monitoring system capable of detecting and responding to faults characterised by the fault detection method dealing with either existing or incipient faults
    • G05B23/0224—Process history based detection method, e.g. whereby history implies the availability of large amounts of data
    • G05B23/0227—Qualitative history assessment, whereby the type of data acted upon, e.g. waveforms, images or patterns, is not relevant, e.g. rule based assessment; if-then decisions
    • G05B23/0237—Qualitative history assessment, whereby the type of data acted upon, e.g. waveforms, images or patterns, is not relevant, e.g. rule based assessment; if-then decisions based on parallel systems, e.g. comparing signals produced at the same time by same type systems and detect faulty ones by noticing differences among their responses
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B9/00—Safety arrangements
    • G05B9/02—Safety arrangements electric
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B2219/00—Program-control systems
    • G05B2219/20—Pc systems
    • G05B2219/21—Pc I-O input output
    • G05B2219/21109—Field programmable gate array, fpga as I-O module

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to automation devices. More particularly, the present invention is in the technical field of digital equipment of automated control systems of technological processes and safety control systems and methods relating thereto.
  • Safety critical systems are computer (digital), electronic or electromechanical systems whose failure may cause injury or death to human beings, environmental harm, loss or severe damage to equipment. For example chemicals plant or nuclear power stations control systems. Usually such safety critical systems measure a multitude of parameters related to the plant or facility (e.g. temperature, pressure, flow rates and neutron flux density), monitor various components (e.g. valves, pumps, generators and control devises) and perform control functions (e.g. send signals to actuators, initiate a reactor trip, or the like).
  • parameters related to the plant or facility e.g. temperature, pressure, flow rates and neutron flux density
  • monitor various components e.g. valves, pumps, generators and control devises
  • control functions e.g. send signals to actuators, initiate a reactor trip, or the like.
  • US 6484126 which relates to a system and method for interfacing with a nuclear power plant's digital plant protection system activates emergency response devices when necessary.
  • Two redundant bistable processors in each of four logic channels determine whether a particular parameter of the plant operation exceeds safety limits based on output from the plant protection system which monitors plant operations.
  • Two independent coincidence processors in each channel compare the output of each bistable processor with the complementary output of a bistable processor of another logic channel. The results are provided to a series of component control system processors for activating emergency response devices when necessary.
  • a fiber optic network interconnects the logic channels. Within each channel, a fiber optic network is provided between the component control system processors and a main control room so that a manual activation signal can be sent to the component control processors
  • US 5227121 teaches a control room complex for a nuclear power plant, including a discrete indicator and alarm for response to changes in plant parameters and a component control system which together provide a discrete monitoring and control capability at a panel in a control room .
  • a separate data processing system provides integrated and overview information to the control room and to each panel, through CRTs and a large, overhead integrated process status overview board .
  • the discrete indicator and alarm system and the data processing system receive inputs from common plant sensors and validate the sensor outputs to arrive at a representative value of the parameter for use by the operator during both normal and accident conditions, thereby avoiding the need to assimilate data from each sensor individually.
  • US 6292523 which relates to an interface between a Plant Protection System and Engineered Safety Features in a nuclear power plant for continuously monitoring the plant protection system initiation circuit for each remotely actuated Engineered Safety Feature system to effect remedial action in the event that the Plant Protection System generates a ' trip ' signal.
  • actuation inputs from the Plant Protection System and manual, operator implemented inputs, controls are provided for remote equipment components, such as solenoid valves, motor operated valves, pumps, fans and dampers.
  • US 7512917 shows a verification method for verifying a safety apparatus including a programmable logic device having a plurality of functional elements.
  • the verification method includes the steps of exhaustively verifying the plurality of functional elements on actual hardware, generating a functional element that is the same as one of the functional elements verified on the actual apparatus using a predetermined hardware description language, independently logic-synthesizing each generated functional element into a plurality of first net lists, generating a connection function between the functional elements using the predetermined hardware description language, logic-synthesizing the generated connection function into a second net list corresponding to the connection function, synthesizing the first net lists with the second net list to generate a third net list, writing a logic circuit into the programmable logic device on the basis of the third net list, and verifying the actual programmable logic device.
  • Still other systems are described in UA 2468 published 4/2004 , UA 22172 published in 4/2007 and UA 78477 published in 3/2007.
  • FPGA Field Programmable Gate Arrays
  • the functions that are provided by a module correspond with functions in a group. Therefore the number of groups of functions in a method is equal to the number of functional modules in platform.
  • the present invention also encompasses variants of safety critical systems configured according to the method with modules of platform. Represented Reactor Trip Systems and Engineering Safety Features Actuation Systems comprise modules of platform. The present invention is not limited by these systems, rather its main aim is implementation of different safety critical systems, based on the platform.
  • a primary object of this invention is to provide a method for implementing safety critical systems through configuring required system functionality out of the functions of platforms' modules.
  • thermocouples and resistive temperature detectors processing
  • Yet another aspect of this invention relates to a platform for monitoring and controlling plant operations, which receive input signals from sensors monitoring parameters of plant operation to generate output signals to actuators ;which includes the following set of functional modules: Analog Information Input Module ; Temperature Information Input Module; Neutron Flux Information Input Module; Discrete Information Input Module; Potential Signals Input Module; Logic Module that has an FPGA electronic design ; Analog Information Output Module; Discrete Information Output Module; Actuators Control Module; Diagnostic Module; Optic Communication Module.
  • a further aspect of this invention relates to a Reactor Trip System , which performs the following functions: storage of setpoints and conditions of reactor trip initiation; automatic monitoring of technological parameters and equipment states; forming of reactor trip signals in case of breaking of set points and conditions; data exchange with l&C systems of reactor; indication of technological parameters, reactor trip information and alarm signals at Main Control Room and Emergency Control Room; data archiving, registration and visualization; self-diagnostic and visualization of diagnostic data; has four or three tracks; and includes Signal Forming Cabinets (SFC) comprising the following platform modules (one or several of each type) namely : Analog Information Input Module; Temperature Information Input Module; Neutron Flux Information Input Module; Discrete Information Input Module; Potential Signals Input Module; Logic Module; Discrete Information Output Module; Diagnostic Module; Optic Communication Module; includes Cross Output Cabinet (COC) comprising the following platform modules (one or several of each type) : Logic Module; Analog Information Output Module; Discrete Information Output Module; Diagnostic Module;
  • Fig. 1 is a block diagram of redundant system with three tracks and voting logic "2-out-of-3".
  • Fig. 2 is a block diagram of redundant system with three tracks, three elements of voting logic "2-out-of-3” and logic element OR ("1-out-of-3” voting).
  • Fig. 3 is a block diagram of redundant system with four tracks and voting logic "2-out-of-4”.
  • Fig. 4 is a block diagram of redundant system with four tracks, four elements of voting logic "2-out-of-4" and logic element OR ("1-out-of-4" voting).
  • Fig. 5 is a block diagram of two-version redundant system with N tracks, voting logic "M-out-of-N" for outputs of tracks and logic OR ("1-out-of-2" voting) for outputs of channels. Versions are located in different cabinets.
  • Fig. 6 is a block diagram of two-version redundant system with N tracks, voting logic "M-out-of-N" for each track and logic OR for outputs. Versions are located in different cabinets.
  • Fig. 7 is a block diagram of two-version redundant system with N tracks, voting logic "M-out-of-N” for outputs of tracks and logic OR for outputs of channels. Versions (diverse tracks from different channels) are located in one cabinet.
  • Fig. 8 is a block diagram of two-version redundant system with N tracks, voting logic "M-out-of-N” for each track and logic OR for outputs. Versions (diverse tracks from different channels) are located in one cabinet.
  • Fig. 9 is a block diagram of N-version redundant system with N tracks and voting logic "M-out-of-N" for outputs.
  • Fig. 10 is a block diagram of N-version redundant system with N tracks, voting logic "M-out-of-N” for each track and logic OR ("1-out-of-N” voting) for outputs.
  • Fig. 11 is a block diagram of redundant system with N two-version tracks, voting logic OR ("1-out-of-2" voting) for versions in each track and logic "M- out-of-N” for outputs.
  • Fig. 12 is a block diagram of two-channel redundant system with two-version tracks in primary channel and one-version tracks in diverse channel.
  • Fig. 13 is a block diagram of two-channel redundant system with two-version tracks in both channels.
  • Fig. 14 is a block diagram of platform including eleven functional modules.
  • Fig. 15 is a simplified functional block diagram of Analog Information Input Module.
  • Fig. 16 is a simplified functional block diagram of Temperature Information Input Module.
  • Fig. 17 is a simplified functional block diagram of Neutron Flux Information Input Module.
  • Fig. 18 is a simplified functional block diagram of Discrete Information Input Module.
  • Fig. 19 is a simplified functional block diagram of Potential Signals Input Module.
  • Fig. 20 is a simplified functional block diagram of Logic Module.
  • Fig. 21 is a simplified functional block diagram of Analog Information Output Module.
  • Fig. 22 is a simplified functional block diagram of Discrete Information Output Module.
  • Fig. 23 is a simplified functional block diagram of Actuators Control Module.
  • Fig. 24 is a simplified functional block diagram of Diagnostic Module.
  • Fig. 25 is a simplified functional block diagram of Optic Communication Module.
  • Fig. 26 is a block diagram of Reactor Trip System with one three-track channel.
  • Fig. 27 is a block diagram of Reactor Trip System with one four-track channel.
  • Fig. 28 is a block diagram of Reactor Trip System with two three-track channels.
  • Fig. 29 is a block diagram of Reactor Trip System with two four-track channels.
  • Fig. 30 is a block diagram of Engineering Safety Features Actuation System with one three-track channel.
  • Fig. 31 is a block diagram of Engineering Safety Features Actuation System with one four-track
  • Safety critical systems designed to perform monitoring and control functions, have to provide receiving information on the controlled parameters of sensors and other instrumentation and control (l&C) systems, processing this information and sending control and informational signals to actuators and other l&C systems according to technological algorithms.
  • l&C instrumentation and control
  • Redundancy is used to improve reliability in safety critical systems. Examples of redundant systems with three tracks are shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show examples of four-track redundant systems.
  • Fig. 1 shows an input from a sensor, which could for example consist of a low voltage.
  • a sensor which could for example consist of a low voltage.
  • Each of the Tracks 1 ,2 and 3 or paths monitor the signals with a voting system as shown in Fig. 1 ie 2/3 .
  • the parameter being read by the sensor shows that the desired condition is operating as designed .
  • Each of the Track 1 , 2 and 3 include a Field Programmable Gate Array ( FPGA ) to be described herein .
  • FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
  • Fig. 2 shows another redundant system where every one of the Tracks 1 , 2, and 3 uses the majority principle as shown .
  • Fig. 3 and 4 illustrate 4 Track systems that are similar to those shown in Fig 1 and 2 respectively.
  • Fig. 5 shows a block diagram for two-version systems V-i and V 2 that consist of primary and diverse channels comprising N tracks (usually three or four) located in different cabinets with voting logic implemented in a separate cabinet.
  • voting logic "1 -out-of-2" (logic OR) is used.
  • the difference in diversity or versions Vi and V 2 can be as a result of different software for the FPGA's to be described herein , or different hardware in the circuits , or different people developing different channels . In other words the same results can be accomplished in different ways, so as to add to the redundancy of the system .
  • Fig. 6 shows a block diagram for two-version systems Vi and V 2 that consist of primary and diverse channels comprising N tracks (usually three or four) located in different cabinets with voting logic implemented for each track ( so long as M results out of N Tracks ) in the same cabinet. For outputs of channels the logic OR is used.
  • Fig. 7 shows a block diagram for two-version systems Vi and V 2 that consist of primary and diverse channels comprising N couples of tracks located in different cabinets with voting logic implemented in a separate cabinet. For outputs of channels the logic OR is used.
  • Fig. 8 shows a block diagram for two-version systems Vi and V 2 that consist of primary and diverse channels comprising N couples of tracks located in different cabinets with voting logic implemented for each track in the same cabinet. For outputs of channels the logic OR is used.
  • Each track can be implemented individually and system with N tracks comprises N diverse versions (Fig. 9 and Fig. 10).
  • Monitoring and control functions of safety critical system can be implemented by means of adjustable and scalable functions selected from the following groups:
  • thermocouples and resistive temperature detectors (RTD) processing thermocouples and resistive temperature detectors
  • FPGA Field Programmable Gates Arrays
  • Fig. 4 shows platform composition and connections between modules within a Track or version V N
  • the platform includes eleven functional modules shown in Figs, from 5 to 25.
  • Fig. 14 shows a plurality of Input Modules selected from the group of Analog Information Input Module , Temperature Information Input Module , Neutron Flux Information Module , Discrete Information Input Module and Potential Signals Input Module .
  • Figure 14 shows a plurality of Output Modules selected from the group of Analog Information Output Module , Discrete Information Output Module , and Actuators Control Module .
  • Each module V N has a Logic Module 100 and Diagnostic Module 102. All of the modules have an FPGA except the Potential Input Signals Module .
  • FIG. 15 shows an embodiment of an Analog Information Input Module comprising one or several Analog-Digital Conversion Units, two LVDS Transceivers, a Power Supply Unit, an Indication Board, and implemented in FPGA Logic 200, Diagnostic 202, and Communication and Indication 204 Units .
  • Fig. 16 shows an embodiment of a Temperature Information Input Module comprising one or several Analog-Digital Conversion Units, two Digital-Analog Conversion Units, two LVDS Transceivers, a Power Supply Unit, an Indication Board, and implemented in FPGA Logic 300, Diagnostic 302 , Communication and Indication 304 Units .
  • Fig. 17 shows an embodiment of a Neutron Flux Information Input Module comprising one or several Analog-Digital Conversion Units, two Digital-Analog Conversion Units, two LVDS Transceivers, a Power Supply Unit, an Indication Board, and implemented in FPGA Logic Unit 400, Diagnostic Unit 402, and Communication and Indication Unit 404.
  • Fig. 18 shows an embodiment of a Discrete Information Input Module comprising one or several Discrete Input Units, two LVDS Transceivers, a Power Supply Unit, an Indication Board, and implemented in FPGA Logic Unit 500, Diagnostic Unit 502 , Communication and Indication Unit 504.
  • Fig. 19 shows an embodiment of a Potential Signals Input Module comprising one or several Potential Signal Input Units, a Power Supply Unit and an Indication Board.
  • Fig. 20 shows an embodiment of a Logic Module 100 comprising several LVDS Transceivers, tree Optic Transceivers, a Location Unit, an Access Keys Unit, an Universal Time Unit, an Ethernet 100 FX Controller, a RS232 Interface Unit, a Dry Contacts Unit, a Power Supply Unit, an Indication Board, and implemented in FPGAs Time Input 103 , Logic 105 , Diagnostic 107, and Communication and indication 09 Units.
  • Fig. 21 shows an embodiment of an Analog Information Output Module comprising one or several Digital-Analog Conversion Units, two LVDS Transceivers, a Power Supply Unit, an Indication Board, and implemented in FPGA Logic 600, Diagnostic 602, Communication and Indication 604 Units.
  • Fig. 22 shows an embodiment of a Discrete Information Output Module comprising one or several Output Signals Forming Units, two LVDS Transceivers, a Power Supply Unit, an Indication Board, and implemented in FPGA Logic 700, Diagnostic 702, and Communication and Indication 704 Units.
  • Fig. 23 shows an embodiment of an Actuators Control Module comprising one or several Discrete Inputs Units, two Indicators Control Units, two Loading Control Units, a Dry Contacts Unit, two LVDS Transceivers, a Power Supply Unit, an Indication Board, and implemented in FPGA Logic 800, Diagnostic 802, and Communication and Indication 804 Units.
  • Actuators Control Module comprising one or several Discrete Inputs Units, two Indicators Control Units, two Loading Control Units, a Dry Contacts Unit, two LVDS Transceivers, a Power Supply Unit, an Indication Board, and implemented in FPGA Logic 800, Diagnostic 802, and Communication and Indication 804 Units.
  • Fig. 23 shows an embodiment of an Actuators Control Module comprising one or several Discrete Inputs Units, two Indicators Control Units, two Loading Control Units, a Dry Contacts Unit, two LVDS Transceivers, a Power Supply Unit, an Indication Board
  • a Diagnostic Module comprising two Discrete Inputs Units, a Fire Annunciator Discrete Inputs Unit, a Ethernet 100 FX Controller, a Location Unit, a Dry Contacts Unit, a Temperature Sensors Interface Unit, an Universal Time Unit, several LVDS Transceivers, a Power Supply Unit, an Indication Board, and implemented in FPGA Logic 104, Diagnostic 106, Time Input, Communication and Indication 108 Units.
  • Fig. 25 shows an embodiment of anOptic Communication Module comprising five Optic Transceivers, two LVDS Transceivers, a Power Supply Unit, an Indication Board, and implemented in FPGA Logic 900, Diagnostic 902, and Communication and Indication 904 Units.
  • these parameters comprise signals from sensors in the plant or field .
  • Fig. 26 shows a Reactor Trip System comprising three tracks according to block diagram in Fig. 2.
  • Fig. 27 shows a Reactor Trip System comprising four tracks according to block diagram in Fig. 3.
  • Fig. 28 shows a two-channel Reactor Trip System comprising three tracks in each channel according to block diagram in Fig. 5.
  • Fig. 29 shows a two-channel Reactor Trip System comprising four tracks in each channel according to block diagram in Fig. 5.
  • Fig. 30 shows Engineering Safety Features Actuation System comprising three tracks according to block diagram in Fig. 2.
  • Fig. 31 shows Engineering Safety Features Actuation System comprising four tracks according to block diagram in Fig. 4.
  • the invention described herein relates to a method to implement safety critical systems, to perform monitoring and control functions, which:
  • detectors processing by:
  • the invention as described herein also relates to a platform which includes the following set of functional modules:
  • Analog Information Input Module that provides the following functions:
  • Temperature Information Input Module that provides the following functions:
  • Neutron Flux Information Input Module that provides the following functions:
  • Discrete Information Input Module that provides the following functions:
  • each of those converters at the cabinet level can be powered from two different independent primary power sources;
  • module IP-address forming based on analysis of jumpers state on chassis motherboard where module is installed
  • Analog Information Output Module that provides the following functions:
  • Discrete Information Output Module that provides the following functions:
  • Actuators Control Module that provides the following functions:
  • Optic Communication Module that provides the following functions:
  • module state indication on the 4-character LED display (including upon the operator's request); providing module elements with stable power from two galvanically isolated power transducers 24VDC/3.3VDC, each of those at the cabinet level can be powered from two independent primary power sources.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
  • Testing And Monitoring For Control Systems (AREA)
  • Safety Devices In Control Systems (AREA)
  • Control By Computers (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé permettant de suivre et de contrôler le fonctionnement d'installations, qui reçoivent des signaux d'entrée en provenance de capteurs surveillant les paramètres de fonctionnement des installations afin de générer des signaux de sortie vers des actionneurs. Ledit procédé consiste à réduire les signaux d'entrée à un groupe sélectionné de fonctions d'entrée ; réduire les signaux de sortie à un groupe sélectionné de fonctions de sortie ; traiter les signaux d'entrée au moyen d'un FPGA pour générer les signaux de sortie. L'invention concerne également la plate-forme et le système mettant en œuvre ledit procédé.
EP11767063.8A 2010-06-14 2011-06-14 Procédé et plateforme permettant de mettre en uvre des systèmes critiques de sécurité Ceased EP2612207A2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CA 2707373 CA2707373A1 (fr) 2010-06-14 2010-06-14 Procede et plate-forme pour la mise en oeuvre de systemes critiques de securite
PCT/IB2011/001948 WO2011158120A2 (fr) 2010-06-14 2011-06-14 Procédé et plateforme permettant de mettre en œuvre des systèmes critiques de sécurité

Publications (1)

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EP2612207A2 true EP2612207A2 (fr) 2013-07-10

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Country Link
EP (1) EP2612207A2 (fr)
CA (1) CA2707373A1 (fr)
UA (1) UA102008C2 (fr)
WO (1) WO2011158120A2 (fr)

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DE102012010144B3 (de) * 2012-05-24 2013-11-14 Phoenix Contact Gmbh & Co. Kg Analogsignal-Ausgangsschaltung mit einer Anzahl von Analogsignal-Ausgabekanälen
DE102013100159A1 (de) * 2012-11-28 2014-05-28 Endress + Hauser Gmbh + Co. Kg Feldgerät zur Bestimmung oder Überwachung einer Prozessgröße in der Automatisierungstechnik
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CN106018429A (zh) * 2016-07-07 2016-10-12 福州觉感视觉软件科技有限公司 一种高速印刷品在线质量检测系统及其检测方法
CN105974903B (zh) * 2016-07-07 2018-09-28 福州觉感视觉软件科技有限公司 一种模块化可分布式运动控制系统
KR102873531B1 (ko) * 2016-12-30 2025-10-17 뉴스케일 파워, 엘엘씨 핵 반응기 보호 시스템 및 방법
CN108075824B (zh) * 2018-01-02 2024-07-26 中国商用飞机有限责任公司北京民用飞机技术研究中心 综合模块化航电系统
CN111624899B (zh) * 2020-06-30 2025-01-03 核工业理化工程研究院 可用于大型系统的多模式控制系统及其控制方法

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Publication number Publication date
CA2707373A1 (fr) 2011-12-14
WO2011158120A2 (fr) 2011-12-22
WO2011158120A3 (fr) 2012-03-01
UA102008C2 (ru) 2013-05-27

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