EP2952029A1 - Procédé d'accès à un service d'un serveur par l'intermédiaire d'une application d'un terminal - Google Patents
Procédé d'accès à un service d'un serveur par l'intermédiaire d'une application d'un terminalInfo
- Publication number
- EP2952029A1 EP2952029A1 EP14701919.4A EP14701919A EP2952029A1 EP 2952029 A1 EP2952029 A1 EP 2952029A1 EP 14701919 A EP14701919 A EP 14701919A EP 2952029 A1 EP2952029 A1 EP 2952029A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- service
- application
- security element
- terminal
- authentication token
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 60
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 28
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 24
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 10
- 230000001960 triggered effect Effects 0.000 claims description 5
- 230000000875 corresponding effect Effects 0.000 description 25
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 7
- 230000009471 action Effects 0.000 description 6
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 5
- 230000003993 interaction Effects 0.000 description 4
- 239000008186 active pharmaceutical agent Substances 0.000 description 3
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 description 3
- JOCBASBOOFNAJA-UHFFFAOYSA-N N-tris(hydroxymethyl)methyl-2-aminoethanesulfonic acid Chemical compound OCC(CO)(CO)NCCS(O)(=O)=O JOCBASBOOFNAJA-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 2
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000000969 carrier Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000001413 cellular effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008878 coupling Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010168 coupling process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005859 coupling reaction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000018109 developmental process Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000009434 installation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000010354 integration Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000007774 longterm Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010295 mobile communication Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
- H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
- H04L63/0838—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords using one-time-passwords
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/18—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security using different networks or channels, e.g. using out of band channels
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/12—Messaging; Mailboxes; Announcements
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
- H04W88/02—Terminal devices
- H04W88/06—Terminal devices adapted for operation in multiple networks or having at least two operational modes, e.g. multi-mode terminals
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for accessing a service of a server via an application of a terminal. Furthermore, the invention relates to a corresponding system for accessing a service.
- Authentication methods for accessing servers based on authentication tokens are known from the prior art. An application in possession of such an authentication token can gain access to a service or a resource via this token.
- Well-known token-based authentication methods are the protocols OAuth 1.0 and OAuth 2.0.
- the object of the invention is to provide a method for accessing a service of a server via an application, which is well protected against attacks by unauthorized third parties and requires few or possibly no user interaction for authentication. This object is achieved by the method according to claim 1 and the system according to claim 12. Further developments of the invention are defined in the dependent claims.
- the inventive method is used to access a service of a server via an application of a terminal, wherein the terminal is associated with a security element with which the terminal can communicate.
- the security element contains a subscriber identification of a mobile subscriber in a mobile network.
- the terminal has access to a mobile radio interface and may be a portable mobile device, such as a mobile phone, smart phone, tablet PC or a portable computer, depending on the configuration. Also, the terminal may also be a stationary device such as a desktop computer.
- the security element may also be a permanently installed in the terminal element (security module), in particular in the form of a so-called. Embedded UICC card or embedded SIM / USIM card, but also as an NFC module or TPM module. The assignment of the terminal to the security element can thus be achieved by inserting the security element in the terminal or by the fixed installation of the security element in the terminal.
- the terminal can also be ensured via another coupling between the terminal and the security element, for example by a mobile radio stick or another device containing the security element, wired (eg via USB) or wirelessly (eg via Bluetooth) is connected to the terminal.
- TLS Transport Layer Security
- the second channel is thus based on a transmission technology which is not based on the Internet Protocol.
- the verification of the corresponding identification can be done differently depending on the configuration, in case of unsuccessful identification of the method is aborted.
- one or more predetermined identifications are stored in the server, wherein in case the identification received via the first channel matches one of the predetermined identifications, the identification is successfully verified.
- the concept of the authentication token is here and in the As broadly understood, it may include any type of authentication data based on any data format.
- a step c) the application is provided automatically (i.e., without a user interaction) with the authentication token transmitted to the security element.
- the application accesses the service in a step d) by means of an encrypted communication via the first (IP-based) channel, wherein the application requests (which are transmitted in the context of the encrypted communication from the application to the service, automatically (ie without user interaction) with the provided authentication token.
- requests are processed by the service only upon successful verification of the authentication token.
- the verification of the authentication token takes place in particular in such a way that the authentication token is compared with the authentication token transmitted in step b) and still stored in the server, whereby the verification is successful only if the tokens match.
- the encrypted communication used in step d) is preferably based on the already mentioned TLS protocol.
- the inventive method has the advantage that the security against attacks by third parties is increased by the use of two channels for data transmission, namely a first channel for encrypted access to the service and a second channel for transmitting an authentication token.
- the number of required user inputs is reduced as part of an authentication.
- the authentication token is automatically generated by the application processed without having to enter authentication data manually.
- the identification transmitted in step a) is communicated in advance to a user of the terminal, whereby this message takes place in particular via the service which is to be accessed.
- the user enters the identification at the terminal via a user interface, whereupon the application transmits the input identification to the service via the first channel.
- the notification of the identification to the user may e.g. by sending an e-mail or text SMS.
- step a) the application reads out a call number stored in the security element, via which the mobile radio subscriber can be contacted, wherein the identification transmitted in step a) is the read out call number.
- the corresponding identification no longer has to be entered manually by a user.
- SMS Short Message Service
- the transmission of the authentication token to the security element in step b) with the interposition of a so-called.
- OTA server Over The Air
- the automatic provision of the authentication token in step c) takes place via a polling of the application for the authentication token on the security element.
- the term known per se for polling is understood as meaning a cyclical polling via which the application receives the information that a corresponding authentication token is available on the security element.
- the reception of the authentication token in the security element and the provision of this authentication token for the application are carried out with the aid of a program and in particular a Java applet on the security element.
- API application programming interface
- Such APIs are well known in the art (e.g., Open Mobile API or JSR177). These APIs allow for access protection mechanisms so that only an authorized application can read the authentication token from the security element.
- the transmission of queries in step d) can be triggered at least partially by a user via a user interface of the terminal.
- the execution of the application can be controlled in a suitable manner by a user.
- the authentication token is preferably valid only for a defined time for use with a service. The authentication token is thus accepted by the service for verification if it is used within the defined period of time. However, upon expiration of the time, the authentication token is no longer accepted by the service.
- the server can delete a transmitted (and stored for verification) authentication token after the defined time, for example, mark or expired.
- the transmitted (first) authentication token can also serve as a second identification (session ID) for a second communication with the service or another service, for which then - analogously to the procedure already described - a second authentication token is transmitted.
- the method of the invention can be used to access any types of services.
- one or more cryptographic keys or one or more certificates can be stored or renewed by the service on the terminal.
- a session ID is independent of the type of the first communication channel.
- the session ID can thus be used for different first communication channels between the application and the one service.
- the invention further relates to a system for accessing a service of a server via an application of a terminal, wherein the terminal is assigned a security element, with which the terminal can communicate, and the security element contains a subscriber identification of a mobile subscriber in a mobile network.
- the application, the security element and the service are designed such that the method according to the invention or one or more preferred variants of the method according to the invention can be carried out.
- the invention further relates to a server having a service stored thereon, wherein the service is set up for use in the method according to the invention or one or more preferred variants of the method according to the invention. That is to say, the service is set up to carry out the steps carried out by it according to claim 1 or corresponding dependent claims.
- the service is designed such that it corresponds to a service of the above-described system according to the invention.
- the invention further includes a terminal with an application and assigned security element deposited thereon, wherein the application and the security element are for use in the method according to the invention or one or more preferred variants of the invention
- Procedure are set up. That is, the application and the security element are set up to carry out the steps performed by them according to claim 1 or corresponding dependent claims.
- the application and the security element correspond to the application and the security element in the system according to the invention described above.
- Fig. 2 is a schematic representation of a second embodiment of the method according to the invention.
- a method for accessing an application AP which is an arbitrary consumer application, is shown on a service SR of a server SV.
- the application AP is stored on a mobile device MD of a user U.
- This mobile device allows communication in a mobile network.
- IMSI International Mobile Subscribe Identity
- the application AP can access the service SR via a suitable interface by means of an IP-based data transmission.
- This service is a so-called service provider application, via which the application AP can obtain data on the mobile device MD or perform actions.
- the service SR is thus offered by a service provider, this provider does not necessarily have to match the operator of the server SV.
- the application AP can, for example, access a service for providing keys, the keys being stored in the server SV.
- a certificate for the application AP to be issued. If, for example, a new key was generated by the application AP, it can request a certificate for the new key by accessing the service.
- Another example of a service is the renewal of an existing certificate for an application.
- the user U indicated schematically in FIG. 1 is a human person who operates the application AP on the mobile radio MD in order to access the service SR of the server SV. As a rule, this person is also the owner of the mobile device at the same time.
- the mobile device may be a mobile phone or a smartphone.
- the mobile device may also be a tablet computer, portable computer or laptop with security element inserted or integrated therein.
- the mobile device may be a stationary desktop computer or PC.
- the security element SE can be realized differently depending on the embodiment.
- it can be a replaceable SIM / USIM card, which is reversibly inserted into the mobile device (portable data carrier).
- the security element may be a so-called.
- Embedded SIM / USIM card which is firmly integrated in the mobile device (security module).
- the security element can also be used in a mobile radio stick to set up a mobile radio connection, wherein the stick is in turn connected to a terminal (eg via USB). The terminal together with the stick then represents the mobile device.
- the security element can be assigned to a terminal via another mobile device, which is connected via a corresponding interface and, in particular, to a wireless device. los (eg via Bluetooth) communicates with the terminal.
- the mobile device MD of FIG. 1 corresponds in this case to the combination of terminal and further mobile device.
- the application AP can access the security element SE in the context of the method according to the invention. In this case, known technologies can be used, for example, access via a so-called.
- Secure Element API Application Programming Interface
- Examples of such Secure Element APIs are Open Mobile API under the Android operating system or JSR177 for Blackberry phones.
- APDUs are typically used for data transfer between a security element and a terminal or mobile device.
- the communication between application and security element as well as the receipt of an authentication token described below is preferably controlled on the security element via a special Java applet.
- a step S1 the user U initially enters an identification in the form of a so-called session ID SID, whereby the user is provided with this identification in advance via a suitable transmission path (eg via text SMS or e-mail). Mail) was communicated.
- the corresponding message with the identification contained therein is transmitted in the embodiment described here by the server SV to the mobile device MD and can be displayed to the user U there.
- the application AP After entering the identification SID, this is transmitted by the application AP in a step S2 to the service SR.
- an IP-based data transmission over a corresponding first channel eg via a LAN or WLAN interface of the mobile device used.
- the Data transmission takes place with the interposition of the corresponding mobile radio interface of the mobile device.
- the transmission of the identification SID is encrypted to avoid manipulation, eg via the TLS protocol.
- a connection of the application AP to the server SV via the Internet is established via the IP-based first channel. This channel is also used in the further direct communication between application AP and service SR.
- the identification SID received by the service SR in step S2 is checked in step S3 by the service SR as to whether it is aware of the service. For this purpose, if appropriate, a database with corresponding permissible identifications can be stored in the server SV. If the identification SID in the server is known, in a next step S4 a so-called authentication token AT is generated, which contains corresponding authentication data and is used in a later stage of the method for authorizing the application AP with respect to the service SR. As part of a step S5, a status message is also sent to the application AP, with which it is informed whether the identification SID could be successfully identified or not. In the latter case, the method is stopped because the application AP has no authorization to access the service SR.
- this token is transmitted in step S6 to an OTA server OS.
- OTA server OS Such servers are known in the art and allow transmission of information over the air over a cellular network. Consequently, in a step S7, the OTA server OS transmits the token AT to the security element SE of the mobile radio MD based on a mobile radio transmission.
- the second channel used for this is not IP-based and thus uses a different transmission technology than the first channel.
- the transmission takes place by means of a text message based on an encrypted SMS, whereby preferably the standard GSM 03.48 is used.
- the telephone number used for the transmission of the SMS is known in the service SR and linked to the session identification SID.
- the application AP After sending the identification SID in step S2, the application AP carries out a so-called polling (i.e., a cyclical polling) via a secure element API, wherein in the course of the polling an authentication token AT which is transmitted to the security element SE is searched. As soon as the authentication token AT has been received by the security element SE, it is referred to by the application AP in step S8.
- This authentication token is then used to authenticate the application AP in the context of the subsequent communication with the service SR via the first IP-based channel.
- the subsequent communication takes place with the aid of so-called HTTP requests, which the application AP directs to the service SR in order to trigger corresponding actions.
- An HTTP request which is based on the known hypertext transfer protocol, is a concrete HTTP transfer command.
- data can be requested from an HTTP server using the "HTTP GET" command, whereas with the HTTP POST command, data can be transmitted from an HTTP server to an application, so that the server SV also has the functionality of a HTTP server.
- step S9 is via a user input to a user interface of the mobile device MD (or automated, in particular according to user default) a corresponding action for execution by the service SV triggered.
- an HTTP request RE is then directed to the service SR via the first channel in step S10.
- the authentication AP is automatically inserted into the HTTP request as an attribute by the application AP.
- the service SR then checks whether the received token corresponds to the token sent out in step S4. If so, the application AP is successfully authenticated or authorized so that the corresponding action requested via the HTTP command RE is performed in step S12. If no match of the tokens is found in step S12, the process is aborted.
- a response to the application AP is returned by the service SR in step S13.
- the result of the requested action eg a requested key or a requested certificate
- an abort message is transmitted to the application AP.
- step S9 ' the execution of a further action via corresponding steps S9 ', S10 1 , S13' is shown by way of example.
- steps S9 to S13 correspond to the steps S9 to S13 described above. That is, it is in turn via the step S9 'by the user (or automated) triggered an action that leads to the transmission of an HTTP request RE' containing the authentication token AT as an attribute.
- a check of the token is then carried out in step S11 'and, if authentication is successful, the action S12' is carried out, which in
- Step S13 'results in returning a response.
- the encrypted communication over the first channel is always based on the IP-based communication.
- the TLS protocol known per se is used in a particularly preferred embodiment. This protocol authenticates the server and encrypts the corresponding RE and RE 'requests and the responses based on them. This ensures that the authentication token can not be read by third parties by listening to the first channel.
- 2 shows a schematic representation of a modification of the embodiment of FIG. 1. The method of FIG. 2 largely corresponds to the method of FIG. 1. Thus, only the differences between the two methods are described. In contrast to FIG.
- no session ID SID is transmitted as identification in step S2, but instead the telephone number or telephone number TN of the mobile radio subscriber which is stored in the security element SE.
- the start of the application AP by the user U in step Sl takes place without the input of a session ID.
- the telephone number TN is then automatically read out of the security element SE by the application AP and encrypted (in particular with the TLS protocol) via the first IP-based channel to the service SR of the server SV.
- the service SR then verifies the telephone number, eg by comparing the telephone number with authorized telephone numbers from a user database. Upon successful verification, the method proceeds analogously as described in FIG.
- the embodiments of the invention described above have a number of advantages.
- two different transmission technologies are used via a first channel of an IP-based network and a second, different channel of a mobile network.
- the first channel is used, and the second channel is used to transmit the authentication key.
- attacks by unauthorized third parties are made more difficult because an attacker needs access to both networks to record and analyze corresponding log data to gain access to the service.
- the method according to the invention also ensures that the authentication token is always transmitted in encrypted form. It also ensures that the authentication token is transmitted only to authenticated communication partners. For this purpose, an encrypted SMS and the TSL protocol can be used in special embodiments. Moreover, typical access protection mechanisms of a secure element API (for example GP SE Access Control) during the communication between application and security element can ensure that only authorized applications can read the authentication token from the security element.
- a secure element API for example GP SE Access Control
- Another advantage of the method according to the invention is that the authentication of the application takes place automatically, which is achieved by the automatic provision of the authentication token and the automatic authentication. Integration of the authentication token is realized in corresponding requests to the service. Consequently, in the context of authentication, it is no longer necessary for inputs to be made manually by a user, as is often the case with conventional authentication protocols.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| DE102013001733.5A DE102013001733A1 (de) | 2013-01-31 | 2013-01-31 | Verfahren zum Zugriff auf einen Dienst eines Servers über eine Applikation eines Endgeräts |
| PCT/EP2014/000246 WO2014117939A1 (fr) | 2013-01-31 | 2014-01-29 | Procédé d'accès à un service d'un serveur par l'intermédiaire d'une application d'un terminal |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| EP2952029A1 true EP2952029A1 (fr) | 2015-12-09 |
Family
ID=50030243
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP14701919.4A Ceased EP2952029A1 (fr) | 2013-01-31 | 2014-01-29 | Procédé d'accès à un service d'un serveur par l'intermédiaire d'une application d'un terminal |
Country Status (3)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| EP (1) | EP2952029A1 (fr) |
| DE (1) | DE102013001733A1 (fr) |
| WO (1) | WO2014117939A1 (fr) |
Families Citing this family (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE102013111498A1 (de) * | 2013-10-18 | 2015-04-23 | Deutsche Telekom Ag | Verfahren zur automatischen Authentifizierung eines Benutzers gegenüber einem elektronischen Netzwerkdienst |
| CN108347784B (zh) * | 2017-01-23 | 2023-10-13 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种资源调度方法以及无线接入网设备和终端设备 |
| DE102017102336A1 (de) * | 2017-02-07 | 2018-08-09 | Deutsche Post Ag | Verfahren zum Erkennen von unberechtigten Kopien digitaler Sicherheits-Token |
Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE102009040419A1 (de) * | 2009-09-07 | 2011-04-28 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Verfahren zum Herstellen einer Datenkommunikationsverbindung |
| WO2012131659A1 (fr) * | 2011-04-01 | 2012-10-04 | Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri Anonim Sirketi | Système et procédé permettant une transmission sécurisée des sms |
Family Cites Families (7)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE19722424C5 (de) * | 1997-05-28 | 2006-09-14 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) | Verfahren zum Sichern eines Zugreifens auf ein fernab gelegenes System |
| DE10152572A1 (de) * | 2001-10-24 | 2003-05-15 | Siemens Ag | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum authentisierten Zugriff einer Station auf lokale Datennetze, insbesondere Funk-Datennetze |
| US6880079B2 (en) * | 2002-04-25 | 2005-04-12 | Vasco Data Security, Inc. | Methods and systems for secure transmission of information using a mobile device |
| US6968177B2 (en) * | 2002-11-19 | 2005-11-22 | Microsoft Corporation | Transport agnostic authentication of wireless devices |
| US20060002556A1 (en) * | 2004-06-30 | 2006-01-05 | Microsoft Corporation | Secure certificate enrollment of device over a cellular network |
| US8200854B2 (en) * | 2010-08-05 | 2012-06-12 | Verizon Patent And Licensing Inc. | Smart card driven device configuration changes |
| DE102012103106A1 (de) * | 2012-04-11 | 2013-10-17 | Vodafone Holding Gmbh | Verfahren zum Authentifizieren eines Nutzers an einem Dienst auf einem Diensteserver, Applikation und System |
-
2013
- 2013-01-31 DE DE102013001733.5A patent/DE102013001733A1/de active Pending
-
2014
- 2014-01-29 EP EP14701919.4A patent/EP2952029A1/fr not_active Ceased
- 2014-01-29 WO PCT/EP2014/000246 patent/WO2014117939A1/fr not_active Ceased
Patent Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE102009040419A1 (de) * | 2009-09-07 | 2011-04-28 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Verfahren zum Herstellen einer Datenkommunikationsverbindung |
| WO2012131659A1 (fr) * | 2011-04-01 | 2012-10-04 | Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri Anonim Sirketi | Système et procédé permettant une transmission sécurisée des sms |
Non-Patent Citations (2)
| Title |
|---|
| "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Security Mechanisms for the SIM application toolkit; Stage 2 (GSM 03.48 version 8.2.0 Release 99)", 3GPP STANDARD; GSM 03.48, 3RD GENERATION PARTNERSHIP PROJECT (3GPP), MOBILE COMPETENCE CENTRE ; 650, ROUTE DES LUCIOLES ; F-06921 SOPHIA-ANTIPOLIS CEDEX ; FRANCE, no. V8.2.0, 1 April 2000 (2000-04-01), pages 1 - 34, XP050357945 * |
| See also references of WO2014117939A1 * |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| DE102013001733A1 (de) | 2014-07-31 |
| WO2014117939A1 (fr) | 2014-08-07 |
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