EP3245586A1 - Procédé d'établissement d'une liaison codée entre deux appareils de communication après échange préalable du code sur une liaison de courte distance - Google Patents
Procédé d'établissement d'une liaison codée entre deux appareils de communication après échange préalable du code sur une liaison de courte distanceInfo
- Publication number
- EP3245586A1 EP3245586A1 EP12826617.8A EP12826617A EP3245586A1 EP 3245586 A1 EP3245586 A1 EP 3245586A1 EP 12826617 A EP12826617 A EP 12826617A EP 3245586 A1 EP3245586 A1 EP 3245586A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- connection
- mobile devices
- identification step
- encrypted
- exchanged
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
- G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
- G06F9/44—Arrangements for executing specific programs
- G06F9/445—Program loading or initiating
- G06F9/44505—Configuring for program initiating, e.g. using registry, configuration files
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0492—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload by using a location-limited connection, e.g. near-field communication or limited proximity of entities
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/10—Integrity
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W76/00—Connection management
- H04W76/10—Connection setup
- H04W76/14—Direct-mode setup
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/18—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security using different networks or channels, e.g. using out of band channels
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/63—Location-dependent; Proximity-dependent
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
- H04W12/77—Graphical identity
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/18—Self-organising networks, e.g. ad-hoc networks or sensor networks
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method for establishing an encrypted communication connection between two mobile devices.
- the basic principle of any encryption is to process a message in such a way that, in contrast to a plaintext transmission, it remains unreadable for the recipient without suitable decryption means.
- Encryption methods as such have been known for a very long time, and first encryption methods have already been attributed to Julius Caesar. This encrypted military news by carrying out a shift of the individual letters in the alphabet, which the receiver carried out in the opposite direction to get back to plain text. Since in this case the question of how many letters a displacement had taken was not the focus of attention, since a repetition of the method had the clear text at most after the 25th attempt, the actual protection of the message was to keep the procedure secret , Only because of the fact that unwanted receivers knew nothing about the encryption, it could work.
- the present invention is based on the object to provide a method for establishing an encrypted communication connection between two mobile devices, which opens the possibility to ensure the most secure encryption of a peer-to-peer connection and at the same time map the problem of key exchange to a procedure that is as easy to handle as possible.
- a direct data exchange to take place between the two mobile devices communicating with one another in a unique identification step, which can be carried out, for example, during a one-time meeting of the users of these mobile devices.
- a common key is exchanged so that the realization of a symmetric encryption method is enabled.
- an unencrypted communication connection is then first set up, with which the call participants can be identified. After an identification of the respective mobile device communicating with the other party has taken place and it has been determined that a unique identification step has taken place with this mobile device, a second communication connection is set up and the data part of the subsequently transmitted messages is encrypted with the shared key exchanged in the one-time identification step ,
- the key code is known only to these two mobile devices, after a mutual identification it is thus possible to switch immediately to an encrypted communication connection, while the unencrypted communication connection which was used to establish the communication can then be ended again , It is also possible for peer-to-peer connections to enable secure communication, since a transmission of the key code at the beginning of the communication neither directly nor indirectly takes place.
- the one-time identification step can take place via a wired transmission, near-field communication or via a short-range radio link.
- the near field communication can be configured such that a mobile device generates a key code, for example in a random process, codes this key code into a two-dimensional barcode and displays it on its display, while subsequently the second mobile device scans the display of the first mobile device with its optical sensor, thus capturing the two-dimensional barcode and also obtaining the key code by decrypting the two-dimensional barcode.
- device-related information such as unique hardware addresses and the like, can be exchanged in this identification, so that the communication possibilities are not only linked to the ownership of the key code but also to a specific mobile device.
- it may be provided to process the two hardware addresses of the mobile devices in the common key code.
- an unencrypted communication connection in particular a telephone connection can be established by simply calling the second mobile device, an unscrambled data connection through the Internet at an already known Internet address, or an Internet connection with the intermediary of a mediating server. In the latter case, the registration with the respective server may be required prior to establishing the appropriate connection.
- the unencrypted communication connection is a telephone connection, it is necessary to exchange the required Internet addresses of the mobile devices for the peer-to-peer connection to be subsequently set up, so that addressing of the messages can usefully also take place.
- the address data is either the mobile devices known directly or were passed on to the server at logon and are then provided by the server.
- the security can be increased by the fact that one of the mobile devices forms a central node of a star-shaped communication network as the central device, while the other mobile device is connected as a peripheral device.
- the central device can execute a program product as a native application which, after identification in the one-time identification step, generates an Internet application and makes it available for execution on the peripheral device on an Internet server.
- this Internet application in this case already the access information and the hardware information of the second mobile device, which is used by the execution of the Internet application as a peripheral node in the star-shaped communication network, so that the Internet application can only be executed by the associated mobile device.
- the central node can in turn be used as a switching node between a plurality of peripheral nodes in order to improve the possibilities of communication within the communication network.
- it is intended to superpose several star-shaped communication networks in such a way that virtually every participating mobile device acts as a central device in its own star-shaped communication network.
- FIG. 1 shows two mobile devices during a one-time identification step in a schematic representation, two mobile devices during an unencrypted communication connection in three alternative ways in a schematic representation,
- Figure 3 shows two mobile devices during the finally encrypted communication connection in a schematic representation, as well
- Figure 4 is a schematic representation of a coded, encrypted
- FIG. 1 shows a first mobile device 1 and a second mobile device 2, which establish a near-field communication 3 for carrying out a first, one-time identification step for setting up an encrypted communication connection.
- the objective of this approach is ultimately the construction of later, encrypted direct connections between the two mobile devices 1 and 2, in particular via an Internet connection, be.
- this first one-time identification step between the mobile devices 1 and 2 access codes for mutual identification and a common key codes for establishing a symmetric encryption are exchanged, wherein the exchange can take place via a wired direct connection.
- FIG. 2 shows the structure of the encrypted communication connection, with the conventional structure of an unencrypted communication connection initially being at the beginning of such an encrypted communication connection.
- a connection can be established either as a server connection 4, as an unencrypted direct connection 5 or as a telephone connection 6.
- server connection 4 both the first mobile device 1 and the second mobile device 2 will log on to a server, whereupon the server in each case forwards the address data of the mobile devices 1 and 2 to the respective other subscriber, so that subsequently the desired encrypted direct connection 7 is established can be.
- the address location is already clear, since such a direct connection 5 can be established only at known addresses.
- the third possibility which is to be referred to here, consists in the establishment of a telephone connection 6, for example in the form of a GSM or UMTS connection, via which the Internet addresses of the mobile devices 1 and 2 are subsequently also exchanged.
- this first handshake access information is exchanged, which allow mutual identification of the mobile devices 1 and 2.
- FIG. 3 shows the two mobile devices 1 and 2 after the construction of the finally desired, encrypted direct connection 7, which takes place after a mutual identification with the previously exchanged access data and using the initially exchanged key code 8.
- Such an encrypted direct connection 7 can be used as a data connection for the transmission of files, but it is also easily possible to use such an encrypted direct connection 7 for voice-over-IP connections, for example.
- Figure 4 shows a possible example of the coding of a message used in the invention 9.
- Such a message 9 consists of a header 10, a pointer 1 1 and a data part with encrypted data 12, wherein the data by superimposing the key code 8, which has been changed in the one-time identification step have been changed.
- the pointer 1 1 points to a location of the key code 8, for example, by the pointer 1 1 is a two-digit number, which points to the location of the key code 8. Beginning with this point, a number of the key code 8 is successively superimposed on the encrypted data 12 in each position, starting again from the beginning when the end of the key code 8 is reached. Due to the knowledge of the key code 8 on both sides and the transmission of the pointer 1 1, the message 9 can be decrypted again on the opposite side and thus accessed on the unencrypted messages.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)
Abstract
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/EP2011/006560 WO2013091672A1 (fr) | 2011-12-23 | 2011-12-23 | Procédé permettant de générer un code exécutable |
| DE102012111834 | 2012-12-05 | ||
| PCT/DE2012/100398 WO2013110253A1 (fr) | 2011-12-23 | 2012-12-21 | Procédé d'établissement d'une liaison codée entre deux appareils de communication après échange préalable du code sur une liaison de courte distance |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| EP3245586A1 true EP3245586A1 (fr) | 2017-11-22 |
Family
ID=47749590
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP12826617.8A Ceased EP3245586A1 (fr) | 2011-12-23 | 2012-12-21 | Procédé d'établissement d'une liaison codée entre deux appareils de communication après échange préalable du code sur une liaison de courte distance |
Country Status (3)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US20150052361A1 (fr) |
| EP (1) | EP3245586A1 (fr) |
| WO (1) | WO2013110253A1 (fr) |
Families Citing this family (13)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2014159662A1 (fr) | 2013-03-13 | 2014-10-02 | University Of Miami | Procédé pour isoler et purifier les microvésicules de surnageants de culture cellulaire et fluides biologiques |
| US9363259B2 (en) * | 2013-05-23 | 2016-06-07 | Symantec Corporation | Performing client authentication using onetime values recovered from barcode graphics |
| WO2015005256A1 (fr) * | 2013-07-09 | 2015-01-15 | 京セラ株式会社 | Système de communication mobile et terminal d'utilisateur |
| EP3031121A4 (fr) | 2013-08-06 | 2017-02-15 | Bedrock Automation Platforms Inc. | Système électrique intelligent |
| US20150156207A1 (en) * | 2013-12-02 | 2015-06-04 | Institute For Information Industry | Network service system and network service utilizing method thereof |
| CN104252870B (zh) * | 2014-02-10 | 2016-10-26 | 宋少鹏 | 一种体感控制播放器的方法及播放器 |
| CN105025471A (zh) * | 2014-04-21 | 2015-11-04 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | 被叫终端、主叫终端、语音通信方法及系统 |
| US20160087949A1 (en) * | 2014-09-24 | 2016-03-24 | Intel Corporation | Establishing secure digital relationship using symbology |
| EP3001597B1 (fr) * | 2014-09-29 | 2020-01-22 | Appbyyou GmbH | Procédé destiné au codage de données |
| US9772863B2 (en) * | 2014-10-15 | 2017-09-26 | Dell Products, L.P. | Methods for copying information handling system configuration settings |
| GB2564430C (en) * | 2017-07-07 | 2021-02-17 | Gurulogic Microsystems Oy | Data communication system and method |
| US10686844B2 (en) | 2018-01-17 | 2020-06-16 | International Business Machines Corporation | Trusted group identification code |
| US11658820B2 (en) * | 2020-10-05 | 2023-05-23 | Vmware, Inc. | Workflow for enabling data-in-transit in a distributed system |
Family Cites Families (8)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US7065070B1 (en) * | 2000-07-21 | 2006-06-20 | Chang Ifay F | Method and system for establishing a voice communication service for business transactions and commerce applications |
| JP2003018148A (ja) * | 2001-07-05 | 2003-01-17 | Toshiba Corp | 無線データ通信装置及びそのデータ通信方法 |
| EP1473899A1 (fr) * | 2003-04-28 | 2004-11-03 | Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (publ) | Sécurité dans un reseau |
| US8688986B2 (en) * | 2006-12-27 | 2014-04-01 | Intel Corporation | Method for exchanging strong encryption keys between devices using alternate input methods in wireless personal area networks (WPAN) |
| CN101868954A (zh) * | 2007-11-21 | 2010-10-20 | Nxp股份有限公司 | 使用音频换能器进行近场通信的设备和方法 |
| ATE524897T1 (de) * | 2008-09-17 | 2011-09-15 | Gmv Soluciones Globales Internet S A | Verfahren und system zur authentifizierung eines benutzers mit hilfe eines mobilfunkgeräts |
| EP2306692B1 (fr) * | 2009-10-02 | 2014-05-21 | BlackBerry Limited | Procédés et dispositifs pour faciliter l'appariement Bluetooth à l'aide d'une caméra en tant que lecteur de codes à barres |
| US8751794B2 (en) * | 2011-12-28 | 2014-06-10 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | System and method for secure nework login |
-
2012
- 2012-12-21 EP EP12826617.8A patent/EP3245586A1/fr not_active Ceased
- 2012-12-21 WO PCT/DE2012/100398 patent/WO2013110253A1/fr not_active Ceased
- 2012-12-21 US US14/367,384 patent/US20150052361A1/en not_active Abandoned
Non-Patent Citations (2)
| Title |
|---|
| None * |
| See also references of WO2013110253A1 * |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| US20150052361A1 (en) | 2015-02-19 |
| WO2013110253A1 (fr) | 2013-08-01 |
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