EP3311342A1 - Procédé de délégation et de vérification de droits sur un tutoré entre un tuteur et un tiers. - Google Patents
Procédé de délégation et de vérification de droits sur un tutoré entre un tuteur et un tiers.Info
- Publication number
- EP3311342A1 EP3311342A1 EP16739234.9A EP16739234A EP3311342A1 EP 3311342 A1 EP3311342 A1 EP 3311342A1 EP 16739234 A EP16739234 A EP 16739234A EP 3311342 A1 EP3311342 A1 EP 3311342A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- delegation
- tutored
- certificate
- party
- guardian
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q50/00—Information and communication technology [ICT] specially adapted for implementation of business processes of specific business sectors, e.g. utilities or tourism
- G06Q50/10—Services
- G06Q50/20—Education
- G06Q50/205—Education administration or guidance
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q50/00—Information and communication technology [ICT] specially adapted for implementation of business processes of specific business sectors, e.g. utilities or tourism
- G06Q50/10—Services
- G06Q50/26—Government or public services
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/088—Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
- H04L9/3231—Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
- H04L9/3268—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q2220/00—Business processing using cryptography
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the definition and implementation of relationships that may exist between a tutor, a tutored and at least one third, and securely. More particularly, the present invention relates to the delegation, by a guardian, of rights on a tutored to a third party.
- a tutored person means, in the present, a person who can not carry out only a formality.
- the realization of such a formality requires the control of a guardian.
- a guardian means, in the present, a person holding rights for the tutored and able to carry out a formality on behalf of the tutored or authorize the tutored to carry out a formality.
- the present invention overcomes these disadvantages and proposes to carry out a delegation to transfer the rights of the guardian to a third party, so that the latter is able to replace the guardian.
- the corresponding verification method is also proposed.
- the subject of the invention is a method of delegation, by a tutor, of rights to a tutored person to a third party, comprising the following steps: creation of a delegation certificate comprising: a third party authorization including the rights delegated to the third party on the tutored by the tutor, storage of the certificate of delegation, storage, if it is not already present, of a certificate of affiliation materializing a tutoring relationship, between a tutor and a tutor, including a tutor authorization including rights allocated to the tutor on the tutored.
- the method comprises the next step is the production of an electronic guarantee of the integrity and authenticity of the delegation certificate.
- the electronic guarantee is a delegation seal produced by electronic signature of the delegation certificate by means of a cryptographic material guardian associated with the tutor, and the method still includes the following step: storage of the delegation seal .
- the guardian cryptographic material includes a guardian public key and a guardian private key
- the portion of the guardian cryptographic material used to produce the delegation seal includes the guardian private key
- the delegation certificate also includes a guardian attribute and / or a tutored attribute and / or a third attribute.
- the tutor is associated with a guardian cryptographic material, and the tutor attribute comprises at least part of the tutoring cryptographic material, and / or the tutor is associated with a tutored cryptographic material, and the tutored attribute comprises least part of the tutored cryptographic material, and / or the third party is associated with third-party cryptographic material, and the third-party attribute comprises at least a portion of the third-party cryptographic material.
- the guardian cryptographic material includes a guardian public key and a guardian private key
- the portion of the guardian cryptographic material used to produce the delegation seal includes the guardian private key
- the cryptographic material tutor includes a public key tutor and a private key tutor
- the part of the cryptographic material guardian included in the guardian attribute includes the public key tutor
- / or the cryptographic material tutored includes a public key tutored and a private key tutored
- part of the material cryptographic tutelage included in the tutored attribute includes the tutored public key
- / or the third party cryptographic material includes a third party public key and a third party private key
- the portion of the third party cryptographic material included in the third party attribute includes the third party public key .
- the electronic signature step is conditioned on the provision of a guardian document and on the authentication of the bearer of the guardian document, by means of a PIN code associated with the guardian document, and / or an identification biometric, and / or proving that the holder knows a guardian attribute included in the certificate of affiliation or in the certificate of delegation.
- the storage step (s) is (are) carried out: on a tutor document associated with the tutor, on a tutored document associated with the tutor, on a third party document associated with the third party, on a mass storage medium, on a network storage medium, or distributed over several of the previous media.
- the tutor document, the tutored document and the third document are electronic documents, produced by an authority, the electronic tutor document storing the cryptographic material tutor, the tutored electronic document storing the cryptographic material tutored, and the electronic document third party stores the third party cryptographic material.
- the invention also relates to a method of delegation, by a third party who has been delegated by such a delegation process, rights to a tutored, to a secondary third, including the following steps: creation of a delegation certificate comprising: a secondary third party authorization including the rights delegated to the third party on the tutored by the third party, storage of the delegation certificate, storage, if it is not already present, of an affiliation certificate embodying a tutoring relationship, between a tutor and a tutor, including a tutor authorization including the rights allocated to the tutor on the tutor, storage, if they are not already present, attestations of delegation materializing the successive delegations, between the tutor and the third party.
- the invention also relates to a method of emancipation by a third party who has been delegated by such a delegation process, a tutored, comprising the following steps: - creation of an emancipation certificate comprising: a tutored authorization comprising the emancipated rights to the tutored by the third party, storage of the certificate of emancipation, storage, if it is not already present, of a certificate of affiliation materializing a tutoring relationship between a tutor and a tutor with a license tutor including the rights allocated to the tutor on the tutored, storage, if they are not already present, attestations of delegation materializing the successive delegations, between the guardian and the third party.
- the subject of the invention is also a method for verifying a delegation, carried out by the delegation method, comprising the following steps: reading the affiliation certificate, possibly checking the origin and the integrity of the Affiliation certificate by control of the associated electronic guarantee, reading of the certificate of delegation, possible control of the origin and integrity of the delegation certificate by checking the associated electronic guarantee, exploitation of the third party authorization.
- control of the origin and the integrity of the affiliation certificate also comprises the following steps: reading of the seal of affiliation, checking of the seal of affiliation by means of at least a part authoritative cryptographic material, and the control of the origin and integrity of the delegation certificate also includes the following steps: reading at least part of the cryptographic material tutor, reading the delegation certificate, reading the delegation seal, control of the delegation seal by means of at least a portion of the cryptographic material guardian.
- the material cryptographic authority includes a public key authority and a private key authority
- the portion of the authoritative cryptographic material used to control the affiliation seal includes the public key authority
- the cryptographic material guardian includes a public key guardian and a private key guardian
- the portion of the cryptographic material guardian used to control the delegation seal includes the public key guardian.
- the method also comprises at least one of the following steps: if a tutored attribute is included in the certificate of affiliation or in the delegation certificate, possible control of the authenticity of the tutored person by proving that it knows the said tutored attribute, if a third party attribute is included in the certificate of affiliation or in the delegation certificate, a possible control of the authenticity of the third party by proving that he knows the said third attribute.
- the method also comprises at least one of the following steps: if a part of the tutored cryptographic material is included in the affiliation certificate or in the delegation certificate, possible control of the authenticity of the document tutored in proving that he or she holds at least some of the tutored cryptographic material, if any part of the third party cryptographic material is included in the affiliation certificate or in the delegation certificate, any verification of the authenticity of the third party document proving that it owns at least some of the third party cryptographic material.
- the method also comprises at least one of the following steps: if the tutored cryptographic material comprises a tutored public key and a tutored private key and if said tutored public key is included in the affiliation certificate or in the attestation of delegation, possible control of the authenticity of the tutored electronic document by proving that it holds the tutored private key, by means of a defi-response with said tutored public key, if the hardware cryptographic third party includes a third party public key and a third party private key and if said third party public key is included in the certificate of affiliation or in the delegation certificate, verification of the authenticity of the third party electronic document proving that it holds the third party private key, by means of a challenge-response with said third party public key.
- the invention also relates to an electronic document comprising an affiliation certificate and / or an associated electronic guarantee, and / or a certificate of delegation and / or an associated electronic guarantee.
- the electronic document comprises a guardian attribute, respectively a tutored attribute, respectively a third party attribute, in order to form an electronic tutor document, respectively a tutored electronic document, respectively a third electronic document.
- FIG. 1 illustrates an affiliation between an electronic tutor document and a tutored electronic document
- FIG. 2 illustrates a delegation of rights to a tutor, performed by a tutor for the benefit of a third party
- FIG. 3 illustrates an emancipation benefiting a tutored by a third delegate
- FIG. 4 illustrates a delegation of rights on a tutored by a third delegated to the benefit of a secondary third.
- the tutored person is a person, whose prerogatives are limited, in that it can not carry out certain formalities alone, but can perform them under the supervision of a tutor.
- the tutored person is, for example, a person presenting limited legal capacity. It may be a minor, a person under guardianship or a person under guardianship.
- the tutor is, for example, a subordinate, whose access / permissions / rights on a system are defined under the control of a superior.
- tutored means in the present indifferently for all these terms.
- tutored is used in this to describe elements attached to the tutored person. This is the case of a tutored document, a tutored electronic document, a tutored cryptographic material, a tutored cryptographic pair, or a tutored public / private key.
- the tutor is a person, having authority over the tutored, to allow the tutored to achieve, under the supervision of the tutor, operations that the tutored could not achieve alone.
- the guardian is, for example, a person with the capacity to represent the tutel, in the legal sense. It may be a parent or guardian in the case of a minor, a tutor in the case of a person under guardianship or a curator in the case of a person under guardianship.
- the tutor is, for example, a superior.
- guardian means in the present indifferently for all these terms.
- guardian is used in the present to qualify elements attached to the guardian person. This is the case of a tutor document, an electronic tutor document, a cryptographic tutor material, a cryptographic guardian pair, or a public / private key tutor.
- the third is a person. He is able to receive a delegation from a guardian or another third party. He is able to replace the tutor in his prerogatives. Also some conditions may apply to third parties, such as majority or capacity.
- third party is used herein to describe elements attached to the third party. This is the case of a third document, an electronic document third, third-party cryptographic hardware, third-party cryptographic pair, or third-party public / private key.
- a document is a medium capable of recording information. It can be a sheet, a cardboard, a booklet, a plastic card, a badge, a magnetic tape, able to receive a written inscription, drawn, printed, engraved, embossed, visible or hidden, a barcode, a QR code, etc ....
- a document is advantageously issued by an authority.
- a document advantageously comprises an authentication and / or security device: a buffer, an ampliation, a hologram, or any means of signature emanating from the authorization authority. issue in order to offer a guarantee of origin and integrity.
- An electronic document 11, 21, 31, 31 ' is an information storage means, such as a memory, secured by a microcircuit or chip. Its shape can be variable and includes a microcircuit card, such as a credit card or a SIM card, a USB key, a memory card, such as an SD card, an RFID tag, etc.
- An electronic document thus comprises a storage area accessible only by means of a dialogue with the microcircuit, which makes it possible to apply any type of access control to the stored data.
- An electronic document 11, 21, 31, 31 ' is thus able to store cryptographic material 12, 22, 32, 32'.
- the microcircuit gives the electronic document a processing capacity, making it possible to carry out calculations, comparisons and thus tests of coherence, authentication or encryption or an electronic signature.
- identity document such as an electronic identity card
- travel document such as an ePassport.
- Such an electronic document is most often attached to a person or carrier, and he allows to transport personal data in a secure manner, typically by cryptographic and / or biometric material. These data and materials may allow the holder of the electronic document to state his rights.
- an identity document enables a person to prove his identity by giving a certain indication of his marital status.
- a social insurance card may contain a person's medical file as well as the state of his rights to care.
- a credit card allows a person to perform transactions, transfer, withdrawal, etc. on his bank account (s).
- a travel document allows a person to prove his identity and allows him to travel by allowing him to carry out a formality of control at the crossing of a border.
- a cryptographic pair 12, 22, 32, 32 ', 42 comprising for example a cryptographic pair 12, 22, 32, 32', 42.
- This cryptographic pair is personal and attached to a speaker (authority, tutor, tutored, third party, ...) and is stored securely, for example in an electronic document attached to the speaker.
- Such a cryptographic pair 12, 22, 32, 32 ', 42 may, for example, be of the RSA type, two-key on elliptic curves, ECC or equivalent.
- Such a cryptographic pair 12, 22, 32, 32 ', 42 allows several treatments.
- a basic property is that a signature by means of the private key PrKxx can be verified by means of the associated public key PuKxx, without however revealing or making it possible to deduce the private key PrKxx.
- the public key PuKxx can be broadcast to the recipients, who are then able to check, using the public key PuKxx, a signature made with the private key PrKxx, but without being able to achieve a signature.
- An electronic document advantageously makes it possible to store a private key PrKxx, and to make a signature by means of this private key, without disclosing or externalizing said private key PrKxx, which remains specific to its holder and under its exclusive control.
- a controller in possession of a person's PuKxx public key, challenges a suitor by submitting a random test data to him. The suitor signs the test data by means of its private key PrKxx and returns the signed data to the controller. The controller verifies the signed data returned by means of the public key PuKxx. If the signature received and the initial test data match, in that the signature received can be correctly verified from the test data by means of the associated public key, the suitor does indeed have the private key PrKxx and can reasonably be considered to be the nobody. This makes it possible to authenticate a person.
- a delegation process allowing a tutor to delegate at least part of his rights on a tutored to a third party.
- a delegation requires a prior affiliation to materialize a tutoring relationship between a tutor and a tutor.
- the delegation process is further associated with a verification method.
- the first need relates to the definition of the tutoring relationship, linking a tutor 10, and a tutored 20, and associated rights, to materialize said tutoring.
- an affiliation between a tutor 10 and a tutored 20, by means of an affiliation process.
- Such affiliation is materialized by a certificate of affiliation 51 which includes at least one guardian authorization 13 including the list of rights allocated to tutor 10 on tutoré 20.
- Such affiliation certificate 51 may include any medium or means of registration. sustainable.
- Such an affiliation certificate 51 is, after its creation, registered or stored so that it can be subsequently consulted for use and allow a tutor or a tuteman to assert at least one of his rights.
- an affiliation certificate is advantageously digital in order to be stored and processed by computer.
- an affiliation certificate 51 it is advantageously produced a guarantee of integrity and authenticity.
- a guarantee is advantageously affixed to or associated with the affiliation certificate 51 in that it incorporates at least one element of the affiliation certificate 51 in order to be linked thereto.
- Such a guarantee is advantageously difficult to reproduce and resistant to any modification in order to constitute a secure guarantee.
- the guarantee is advantageously provided by the authority 40 which issues the affiliation certificate 51 in order to authenticate the origin of the affiliation certificate 51 and its integrity.
- a guarantee can take various forms, from the simplest to the most complex, depending on the desired security.
- a guarantee may be a right of access to writing, held by the authority 40, on the medium or part of the medium in which the affiliation certificate is stored.
- a sharing of access rights with an organization performing the verification may help to guarantee the authenticity and integrity of the affiliation certificate 51.
- a guarantee may still be any security device capable of being controlled by a verifier .
- An electronic guarantee of integrity can still, for example, be a checksum.
- Other embodiments of such a guarantee and the associated methods of verification are possible and only limited by the imagination of those skilled in the art.
- the guarantee is electronic.
- the electronic guarantee is an affiliation seal 44 produced by electronic signature of the affiliation certificate 51 by means of an authoritative cryptographic material 42 associated with an authority 40.
- This authority 40 may be a trusted third party and in a particular case, the authority 40 issuing the certificate of affiliation 51.
- this affiliation seal 44 is advantageously stored. It may be stored anywhere, together or separately from the affiliation certificate 51. It may, according to a particular embodiment, be incorporated in the affiliation certificate 51. The only constraint is that the seal of affiliation Affiliation 44 may be re-read if necessary, for example to carry out an audit of the affiliation certificate 51.
- the affiliation certificate 51 also includes an attribute of the tutor and / or an attribute of the tutor.
- An attribute here refers to an element, record, datum, possession, etc. relative or associated with the respective person of the guardian and / or tutored, and allowing to establish a link with the person. For example, this may include the person's name, social security number, photo ID, preferred color, PIN code, biometric data, cryptographic means, etc.
- the tutor 10 is associated with a tutoring cryptographic material 12.
- the tutor attribute may be composed of at least a portion of the tutoring cryptographic material 12.
- the tutor may be associated with tutored cryptographic material 22.
- the tutored attribute comprises at least a portion of the tutored cryptographic material 22.
- both the affiliation certificate 51, and a possible affiliation seal 44 could be stored.
- This storage can be performed on any medium, as long as it can be read for future use.
- this storage can be performed on a tutorial document 11 associated with the tutor 10, on a tutored document 21 associated with the tutored tutorial 20, but more generally on any mass storage medium, such as a local hard disk, a memory card, a USB key , a microcircuit card, a phone, etc. or on such a mass storage medium accessible via a communication network, and which is designated network storage medium.
- Each of the stored elements can be in extenso on only one of these supports or still to be divided into several parts, each part being stored on a storage medium, among the previous supports.
- the tutor 10 is associated with an electronic document tutor 11 and the tutor 20 is associated with a tutored electronic document 21.
- an affiliation is performed, electronically, between the tutor 10 represented by the electronic tutor document. 11 and the tutored 20 represented by the tutored electronic document 21, by means of an affiliation method.
- the cryptographic tutor material comprises a guardian cryptographic pair 12 comprising a public key tutor PuKTu and a private key tutor PrKTu.
- the tutored cryptographic material comprises a tutored cryptographic pair 22 comprising a tutored public key PuKTe and a tutored private key PrKTe.
- the cryptographic guardian pair 12, respectively tutored 22, is typically stored on the tutorial electronic document 11, respectively tutored 21.
- the electronic tutor 11 and tutored 21 documents are produced by an authority 40.
- This authority 40 has an authoritative cryptographic material 42 comprising an authoritative cryptographic pair 42 comprising an authoritative public key PuKAu and a private key authority PrKAu.
- This authoritative cryptographic pair 42 is typically stored in a very secure "super" electronic document 41, also called a hardware security module MMS (or hardware security module HSM) serving as a cryptographic safe. All the security of the system according to the invention is based on the preservation of the secrecy of the authoritative cryptographic material and particularly of the private key authority PrkAu.
- Authority 40 refers here to the body in charge of issuing electronic documents 11, 21.
- a travel document it is typically a government, or in the practice of a certifying industrialist document (document sign or DS in English) working for the account and under the control of the government and to which the government technically subcontracts the manufacture of electronic documents.
- the affiliation process comprises a first step of creating an affiliation certificate 51.
- This affiliation certificate which materializes the tutoring relationship, includes a guardian authorization 13. It can still include a guardian attribute, for example in the form of the public key tutor PuKTu.
- the tutor authorization 13 is a file including the rights of the tutor 10, the tutor 20.
- This tutor authorization 13 defines the tutor (s), the tutor (s), and the tutor's rights on the tutor: what the tutor can do for and / or instead of the tutored, what the tutor can allow the tutored with or without the presence of the tutor, what the tutor can possibly delegate to a third party, the possible conditions of exercise of these rights and the possible limits, both in space and time, of these rights.
- the rights may include the areas of the base accessible or not to the tutored, the modalities: read only, write, delete, and the possible modifications of these zones and modalities that the tutor can realize.
- the rights of the parent are defined by law and may be modified by court order.
- the whole, via at least one part or condensate from each of the constituents, of the content of the affiliation certificate 51 is the subject of an electronic signature by means of the authoritative private key PrKAu.
- attestation Affiliation 51 and Affiliation Seal 44 are stored, together or separately, for example, in the tutorial electronic document 11, in the tutored electronic document 21, or in both.
- the affiliation certificate 51 and the affiliation seal 44 it is still possible to store the affiliation certificate 51 and the affiliation seal 44 partly in the electronic tutor document 11 and partly in the electronic tutored document 21.
- the recovery of the two elements, for example for verification requires the electronic tutor document 11 and the tutored electronic document 21.
- This is applicable in cases where a formality, requiring the affiliation certificate 51 and the affiliation seal 44, requires the presence conjoint of the tutor electronic document 11 and the tutored electronic document 21.
- the affiliation certificate 51 and / or the affiliation seal 44 may still be stored, if necessary partially, in at least one other medium.
- said support can be present or at least accessible remotely to allow said reading.
- FIG. 1 illustrates an embodiment of the affiliation method.
- An affiliation certificate 51 is created including a guardian authorization 13 containing the rights of the guardian 10.
- the electronic guardian document 11 provides (indicated by a thin arrow) systematically (indicated by a solid line) the public guardian key PuKTu.
- the tutored electronic document 21 provides (indicated by a thin arrow) optionally (indicated by a dotted line) the tutored public key PuKTe.
- the electronic safe authority 41 signs (indicated by a thick arrow) the certificate of affiliation 51 by means of the private key authority PrKAu and produces an affiliation seal 44.
- the affiliation certificate signed 51 and the seal of affiliation affiliation 44 are stored (indicated by a large white arrow), for example, in the tutored electronic document 21 and / or in the electronic document tutor 11.
- the public key tutor PuKTu is useful, as described later, for verification operations.
- the public key guardian PuKTu is included in the certificate of affiliation 51.
- the tutored electronic document 21, respectively of the electronic tutor document 11 it may be useful to have the tutored public key PuKTe, respectively of the public key tutor PuKTu.
- the affiliation certificate 51 may further include the PuKTe tutored public key.
- Attestation of Affiliation 51 is the highest level certificate, which most other operations will depend on. It is signed by the authority 40, can only be produced by the authority and requires the presence of the electronic document (s) 11,21 or medium (s) on which the certificate (s) affiliate 51 is stored.
- an affiliation can be verified, typically prior to the completion of a formality.
- a verification process depends on the form and content of the affiliation.
- an affiliation with no associated guarantee can only be difficult to verify, except to achieve an aspect control.
- An affiliation including a guarantee, electronic or not, can be verified.
- the verification mode is dependent on the form of the guarantee.
- An affiliation verification method performed by the previously described method comprises the following steps.
- a first step is to read the affiliation certificate 51 from the medium where it is stored. Then a check is made by checking the associated guarantee.
- another step consists in reading the affiliation seal 44 from the support (s) on which it has been stored.
- a second step the origin and integrity of the affiliation certificate 51 are verified by means of the affiliation seal 44. This verification is carried out at means of authoritative cryptographic material 42.
- the affiliation certificate 51 is deemed to be authentic and intact, and its contents, including the guardian authorization 13, can be used safely.
- the affiliation method and the affiliation verification method under the control of the authoritative cryptographic pair 42, ensure that the affiliation certificate 51 has a high level of legitimacy, since it is guaranteed by the authority 40.
- control may change form.
- the authenticity of the guardian 10 can be controlled by offering the guardian the possibility, for example by means of a dialogue via a man-machine interface, to prove that he knows the guardian attribute. included in the certificate of affiliation 51.
- This proof can be done in different ways and this knowledge must be understood in a very broad way.
- This knowledge can be by knowledge proper or by possession. It can be direct or indirect. It can still be partial or complete.
- Direct knowledge refers to a knowledge that the holder directly holds. So a wearer knows his name or date of birth directly. He is a natural bearer of his facial image comparable to a photo ID or a biometric print of which he can give or give back a sample or an image. Direct knowledge is still a password or a PIN.
- An indirect knowledge or possession / possession is understood by means of a visual, magnetic, storage medium, which can then be presented during the inspection. This is the case of a barcode, a photo or graphic representation, a password, a cryptographic material.
- control is then validated if the carrier claiming to be the tutor 10 is able to respond to the request for guardian attribute evidence made to him by presenting directly or indirectly a satisfactory answer in terms of expected guardian attribute.
- guardian attribute consists of a part of the cryptographic material guardian 12 included in the affiliation certificate 51
- control of the authenticity of the guardian document 11 can be done by proving that the guardian document 11 holds at least a part of the material cryptographic tutor 12.
- the cryptographic material guardian 12 includes a public key guardian PuKTu and a private key tutor PrKTu
- the verification of the authenticity of the electronic document guardian 11 is performed by proving that it holds the private key tutor PrKTu. This is typically done by challenge-response, as previously described, with the public key tutor PuKTu, if said public key tutor PuKTu is available, for example included, in the certificate of affiliation 51.
- the tutor 10, and with him his electronic tutor document 11, is thus able to prove that he holds the private key tutor PrKTu corresponding to the public key tutor PuKTu extracted from the certificate of affiliation 51 and so s' authenticate.
- the control can change form.
- the authenticity of the tutored can be controlled by offering the tutored the possibility, for example by a dialogue by means of a man-machine interface, to prove that he knows the tutored attribute. included in the certificate of affiliation 51.
- the control is then validated if the bearer who claims to be the tutored one is able to respond to the tutored attribute proof request made to him by directly or indirectly presenting a satisfactory answer in terms of the expected tutored attribute. If the tutored attribute consists of a part of the tutored cryptographic material 22 included in the affiliation certificate 51, the control of the authenticity of the tutored document 21 can be done by proving that the tutored document 21 holds at least a part of the material cryptographic tutored 22.
- the tutored cryptographic material 22 comprises a tutored public key PuKTe and a private key tutored PrKTe
- the verification of the authenticity of the tutored electronic document 21 is achieved by proving that it holds the tutored private key PrKTe. This is typically done by challenge-response, as previously described, with the public tutored PuKTe key, if said tutored public key PuKTe is available, for example included, in the affiliation certificate 51.
- the tutored 20, and with him his tutored electronic document 21, is thus able to prove that he holds the private key tutored PrKTe corresponding to the tutored public key PuKTe extracted from the certificate of affiliation 51 and so s' authenticate.
- Affiliation is the first brick, essential, of the building. It can be used for different operations: emancipation and delegation.
- a delegation to a third party 30 allows a tutor 10 to delegate at least one right to a tutor 20 by transferring this right to a third party 30, in order to allow the third party 30 to replace the tutor 10, in that it can allow the tutored to perform a formality, normally only feasible in the presence of the tutor 10, in the presence of the third party 30, including in the absence of the tutor 10.
- the necessary effective presence of the guardian 10 is replaced by the presence of the third party 30 and by a certificate of delegation 71 indicating what rights the guardian authorizes the third party to exercise for him and within what limits of time and space.
- a delegation process includes a step of creating a delegation certificate 71.
- Such a delegation certificate 71 includes a third party authorization 33 comprising the rights emancipated to the third party 30 by the tutor 10.
- the delegation certificate 71 is advantageously stored, so that it can be later found to be controlled and operated.
- the delegation certificate 71 in order to be exploited and / or controlled, requires a certificate of affiliation 51 in order to define the link between the tutor 10 and the tutor 20. It is supposed that such a certificate of affiliation 51 pre-exists and is already stored. Otherwise, it can be created on the occasion of the delegation, and / or be stored.
- a guarantee of integrity and authenticity may be produced associated with the delegation certificate 71.
- This guarantee may be electronic.
- the electronic guarantee is a delegation seal 17 produced by electronic signature of the delegation certificate 71 by means of a cryptographic material tutor 12 associated with the tutor 10.
- this delegation seal 17 is advantageously stored. It may be stored anywhere, together or separately from the delegation certificate 71. It may, according to a particular embodiment, be incorporated in the delegation certificate 71. The only constraint is that said delegation seal 17 may be be re-read when necessary, for example to carry out a verification process of the delegation certificate 71.
- the delegation certificate 71 also includes an attribute of the tutor and / or an attribute of the tutor and / or an attribute of the third party.
- An attribute here refers to an element, record, datum, possession, etc. relative or associated with the respective person of the tutor and / or tutored and / or third party, and to establish a link with the person.
- the tutor 10 is associated with a tutoring cryptographic material 12.
- the tutor attribute may be composed of at least a portion of the tutoring cryptographic material 12.
- the tutor may be associated with
- the tutored attribute comprises at least a portion of the tutored cryptographic material 22.
- the third party 30 may be associated with third-party cryptographic material 32.
- the third-party attribute includes at least some of the third party cryptographic material 32.
- both the delegation certificate 71, and a possible delegation seal 17, could be stored.
- This storage can be performed on any medium, as long as it can be read for future use.
- this storage can be performed on a tutorial document 11 associated with the tutor 10, on a tutored document 21 associated with the tutored 20, or on a third document 31 associated with the third party 30, but more generally on any mass storage medium or on such a mass storage medium accessible via a communication network, and which is designated network storage medium.
- Each of the stored items can be in extenso on only one of these supports or be divided into several parts, each part being stored on a storage medium, among the previous supports.
- the tutor 10 is associated with an electronic tutor document 11
- the tutor 20 is associated with a tutored electronic document 21
- the third party 30 is associated with a third electronic document 31.
- a delegation operation is performed and implemented electronically by a delegation method.
- the delegation method comprises a first step of creating a delegation certificate 71 which includes a third party authorization 33.
- the third party authorization 33 is, like the authorization guardian 13, a file comprising the rights delegated to the third party
- the third party authorization 33 still includes the possible conditions of exercise of these rights and the possible limits, both in space and time, of these rights.
- the rights thus delegated to the third party 30 can not go beyond the rights actually available to the tutor 10.
- the third party authorization 33 is advantageously a subset of the guardian authorization 13. This necessary relationship can be verified at the time of the creation of the third party authorization 33 during the delegation process. Alternatively, this relationship can be verified at any time by one of the verification methods, for example prior to the exercise of one of the rights.
- At least a part or condensate of the content of the delegation certificate 71 is the subject of an electronic signature by means of the private key tutor PrKTu. This produces a delegation seal 17, guaranteeing the origin (guardian 10) and the integrity of the delegation certificate 61.
- the delegation certificate 71 and the delegation seal 17 are stored, together or separately, advantageously in the tutored electronic document 21, in the third electronic document.
- the affiliation certificate 51 and the affiliation seal 44 are advantageously stored in the tutored electronic document 21, in the third electronic document 31 or in both.
- the affiliation certificate 51 and the affiliation seal 44 respectively the delegation certificate 71 and the delegation seal 17, partly in the tutored electronic document 21 and in part in the third electronic document 31.
- the recovery for example for a verification, requires the tutored electronic document 21 and the third electronic document 31.
- the formality requiring the certificate of affiliation 51 and the affiliation seal 44, respectively the delegation certificate 71 and the delegation seal 17 requires the joint presence of the tutored 20 and the third party 30 and therefore the joint presence of the tutored electronic document 21 and the third electronic document 31.
- any alternative storage medium is here possible to the extent that it is accessible when needed.
- the tutored electronic document 21, in that it usually accompanies the tutored 20, is a support advantageously available and present.
- the third electronic document 31, in that it generally accompanies the third party 30, is a support advantageously available and present.
- FIG. 2 illustrates an embodiment of the delegation method.
- a delegation certificate 71 is created comprising a third party authorization 33 containing the rights delegated to the third party 30.
- the tutored electronic document 21 provides (indicated by a thin arrow) optionally (indicated by a dotted line) the tutored public key PuKTe.
- the third electronic document 31 provides (indicated by a thin arrow) optionally (indicated by a dash dotted) PuKTi third party public key.
- the electronic document guardian 11 signs (indicated by a thick arrow) the delegation certificate 71 by means of the private key tutor PrKTu and produces a delegation seal 17.
- the signed delegation certificate 71 + 17 is stored (indicated by a large white arrow) in the tutored electronic document 21, in the third electronic document 31 or in both.
- the affiliation certificate signed 51 + 44, made during the affiliation process, is still stored in the tutored electronic document 21, in the third electronic document 31 or in both.
- the tutor 10 via his electronic tutor document 11, acts, during the delegation process, as an authority. However, its level of security and its legitimacy are conferred on it by the authority 40. Also the presence of the certificate of affiliation 51, in addition to the delegation certificate 71 is required. It is thus in the presence of a stack of attestations 51, 71, which complement each other and confer security coming from the highest level: authority 40.
- the delegation uses a signature by the tutor 10.
- the creation of a delegation certificate 71 requires the electronic document guardian 11 for the signature step by means of the private key tutor PrKTu. It still requires the tutored electronic document 21 and / or the third electronic document 31 for the step of storing the delegation certificate 71 and the delegation seal 17 and, if necessary, for the step of copying / storing the document. certificate of affiliation 51 and affiliation seal 44.
- these electronic documents 11, 21, 31 are portable and autonomous.
- the electronic document tutor 11 can autonomously perform the signature step.
- the delegation process can be achieved by means of a very light infrastructure.
- a person equipped with an electronic document reader can achieve, for example from home, the delegation process if it has the electronic document tutor 11 and the electronic document tutored 21 and / or third electronic document 31. There is thus no need for a connection to a secure network, neither through a trusted third party nor from a body authorized by the authority 40.
- the delegation certificate 71 can still include the public key tutored PuKTe. Similarly, optionally, the delegation certificate 71 may further include the third party public key PuKTi.
- the signature by the tutor 10 becomes an important step in the delegation process and makes it possible to transmit rights vested in the tutor 10 by the authority 40 itself. Therefore, it should be ensured that the signature step is well performed, preferably in the presence, but at least with the agreement, of the tutor 10 and not only in the presence of the tutor electronic document 11, which could be accessible by example tutored 20.
- the electronic signature step of the delegation process is conditioned to an authentication of the holder of the electronic document guardian 11. This authentication is intended to ensure the presence, but especially the consent of the tutor 10 to the delegation, in principle and in its content.
- This authentication of the document holder Electronic tutor 11 can be performed by any means. Thus, for example, the entry of a secret code, type PIN code associated with the electronic document tutor 11, may be required.
- a biometric identification check may alternatively or additionally authenticate the guardian.
- the collection of the consent of the tutored 20, is a priori required for a delegation.
- the tutored 20 is not necessarily able to give such consent.
- a step of collecting such consent can easily be included in a delegation process, for example by means of a tutored authentication step 20, by verification of a PIN code and / or by a biometric test. .
- the collection of the consent of the third party 30, to receive the delegation can easily be included in a delegation process, for example by means of a step of authentication of the third party, by verification of a PIN code and / or by a biometric test .
- a delegation may be verified, typically prior to the completion of a formality requiring a right exercised by the third party 30. Before any use of a delegated right, it is preferable to check the delegation.
- a method of verifying a delegation depends on the form and content of the delegation.
- a delegation including a guarantee, electronic or not, can be verified.
- the verification mode is dependent on the form of the guarantee.
- a method of verifying a delegation performed by the previously described delegation method comprises the following steps.
- a first step is to read the affiliation certificate 51 from the medium on which it was stored.
- the origin and integrity of the affiliation certificate 51 are verified by means of a check of the associated electronic guarantee.
- a third step is to read the delegation certificate 71 from the medium on which it was stored.
- the origin and the integrity of the delegation certificate 71 are verified by means of a check of the associated electronic guarantee.
- affiliation guarantee is an affiliation seal 44
- another step is to read the affiliation seal 44 from the medium (s) on which it has been stored.
- the origin and integrity of the affiliation certificate 51 are verified by means of the affiliation seal 44. This verification is carried out by means of the material authority cryptographic 42.
- the delegation guarantee is a delegation seal 17
- another step consists in reading the delegation seal 17 from the medium (s) on which it has been stored.
- the origin and the integrity of the delegation certificate 71 are verified by means of the delegation seal 17. This verification is carried out using the cryptographic material 12.
- the delegation certificate 71 is deemed to be genuine and integrity, and its content, including the third party authorization 33, can be used safely to apply the rights delegated to the third party.
- the authoritative cryptographic material 42 comprises an authoritative public key PuKAu and a private key authority PrKAu, and the affiliation seal 44 has been realized by means of the private key authority PrKAu.
- the public key authority PuKAu corresponding to the private key authority PrKAu used for the signature of the affiliation certificate 51, is necessary and makes it possible to verify the seal of affiliation 44.
- These first two stages substantially repeat the steps of the verification process of the affiliation because the legitimacy of the delegation is certified by the certificate of affiliation 51. This step still makes it possible to extract the public key tutor PuKTu from the certificate of affiliation 51 with an assurance on its origin and its integrity.
- the cryptographic material tutor 12 includes a public key tutor PuKTu and private key tutor PrKTu, and the delegation seal 17 was realized by means of private key tutor PrKTu. Also, the origin and the integrity of the delegation certificate 71 is verified by means of the delegation seal 17. For this, the public key guardian PuKTu, corresponding to the private key tutor PrKTu used for the signature of the attestation of delegation 71, is necessary and allows verification of the delegation seal 17.
- the verification of the delegation seal 17 by means of the public key tutor PuKTu makes it possible to ascertain the origin of the delegation certificate 71, which has been created under the supervision of the tutor 10, and that its content is integrates, unchanged since its broadcast.
- the content of the delegation certificate 71 and in particular the contents of the third party authorization 33 can thus be trusted, which can then be exploited to apply the rights delegated to the third party.
- the delegation process and the delegation verification method under the control of the guardian cryptographic pair 12, assures the delegation attestation 71 a high-level legitimacy, since guaranteed by the guardian 10, the legitimacy of the tutor 10 being the same. -the same guarantee, via the affiliation, under the control of the authoritative cryptographic pair 42, by the authority 40.
- guardian attribute for example a tutoring cryptographic material 12, such as for example the public key tutor PuKTu
- the purpose of the delegation may be to allow the tutor 10 to be absent.
- control may change form.
- the authenticity of the guardian 10 can be controlled by offering the guardian the possibility, for example by means of a dialogue via a man-machine interface, to prove that he knows the guardian attribute. included in the certificate of affiliation 51.
- control is then validated if the carrier claiming to be the guardian 10 is able to respond to the request for guardian attribute evidence made to him by presenting directly or indirectly a satisfactory response in terms of expected guardian attribute.
- the guardian attribute consists of a portion of the guardian cryptographic material 12
- the authenticity check of the guardian 10 and the guardian document 11 can be done by proving that the guardian document 11 holds at least a part of the guardian cryptographic material 12.
- the cryptographic material guardian 12 includes a public key guardian PuKTu and a private key tutor PrKTu
- the verification of the authenticity of the tutor 10 and the electronic tutor document 11 is performed by proving that he holds the private key tutor PrKTu. This is typically done by challenge-response, as previously described, with the public key tutor PuKTu, if said public key tutor PuKTu is available, for example included, in the certificate of affiliation 51 or in the certificate of emancipation 61 .
- the tutor 10, and with him his electronic tutor document 11, is thus able to prove that he holds the private key tutor PrKTu corresponding to the public key tutor PuKTu extracted from the certificate of affiliation 51 and so s' authenticate.
- a tutored attribute such as for example a tutored cryptographic material 22, such as for example the tutored public key PuKTe is available, in that it is, for example, included in the certificate of affiliation 51 and / or in the delegation certificate 71 and / or on any medium accessible during the verification, it is possible to proceed, in a similar way, to the control of the authenticity of the tutored 20 and thus, if necessary, the tutored electronic document 21.
- control may change form.
- the authenticity of the tutored can be controlled by offering the tutored the possibility, for example by a dialogue by means of a man-machine interface, to prove that he knows the tutored attribute. .
- control is then validated if the bearer who claims to be the tutored one is able to respond to the tutored attribute proof request made to him by directly or indirectly presenting a satisfactory answer in terms of the expected tutored attribute.
- the verification of the authenticity of the tutored 20 and the tutored document 21 can be done by proving that the tutored document 21 holds at least a part of the tutored cryptographic material 22.
- the tutored cryptographic material 22 comprises a tutored public key PuKTe and a tutored private key PrKTe
- the verification of the authenticity of the tutored 20 and the tutored electronic document 21 is achieved by proving that it holds the tutored private key PrKTe. This is typically done by challenge-response, as previously described, with the PuKTe tutored public key, if said tutored public key PuKTe is available, for example included, in the affiliation certificate 51 or in the delegation certificate 71.
- the tutored 20, and with him his tutored electronic document 21, is thus able to prove that he holds the tutored private key PrKTe corresponding to the tutored public key PuKTe extracted from the certificate of affiliation 51 or the attestation of delegation 71 and thus to authenticate.
- a third attribute such as for example a third-party cryptographic material 32, such as for example the third-party public key PuKTi is available, in that it is, for example, included in the certificate 51 and / or in the certificate of delegation 71 and / or on any medium accessible during the verification, it is possible to proceed, in a similar way, to the control of the authenticity of the third party 30 and thus the where applicable, third party electronic document 31.
- control may change form.
- the authenticity of the third party 30 can be controlled by offering the third party the possibility, for example by a dialogue through a human machine interface, to prove that he knows the third-party attribute. .
- control is then validated if the carrier claiming to be the third party 30 is able to respond to the third party attribute proof request made to him by directly or indirectly presenting a satisfactory response in terms of the expected third attribute.
- the third party and third party document authenticity control 31 may be done by proving that the third party document 31 holds at least a portion of the third party cryptographic material 32.
- the verification of the authenticity of the third party 30 and the third electronic document 31 is performed by proving that it holds the private third party key PrKTi. This is typically done by challenge-response, as previously described, with the third-party public key PuKTi, if said third-party public key PuKTi is available, for example included, in the affiliation certificate 51 or in the delegation certificate 71.
- the third party 30, and with it his third electronic document 31, is thus able to prove that he holds the third party private key PrKTi corresponding to the third party public key PuKTi extracted from the certificate of affiliation 51 or the certificate delegation 71 and thus to authenticate.
- An illustrative example with a travel document system depicts a minor child (tutored 20) authorized to cross a border only in the company of one of his parents (guardian 10) and a third party 30 who receives by delegation at least a party rights of a parent.
- a certificate of affiliation 51 indicates a parent.
- a delegation certificate 71 is used, which indicates that the third party 30 is authorized to replace the parent 10 of the tutored 20, for example for the formality of crossing the border. Border control of the electronic document 21 of the child alone would indicate that he can not cross the border.
- the third party authorization 33 establishes the right of the third party 30 to replace the parent (guardian 10) for the accompaniment of the child (tutored 20) at the crossing of the border.
- the certificate of delegation 71 read by the controller to the electronic document 21 of the child 20 and / or the electronic document 31 of the third party 30, makes it possible to determine that a relative 10 has made a delegation to the third party 30, and the Attestation of affiliation 51 proves that this parent 10 is himself authorized by the authority 40 to delegate this right.
- a delegation allows, in a first mode, to make a third party 30 proctor of the guardian 10.
- the presence of the third party 30 can then replace the presence of the tutor 10.
- the third party 30 is authorized to act as if he were the tutor 10 affiliated and can by its mere presence, allow the tutored 20 to perform a formality requiring the presence of a guardian 10.
- the third party 30 can in turn realize an emancipation from the 20. Everything is happening substantially as for a "direct" emancipation performed by a tutor 10, the third 30 replacing the tutor 10. Such emancipation is more particularly described in another application of the applicant.
- a delegation certificate 71 previously produced and defining, by means of a third party authorization 33, the rights that the guardian 10 delegate to the third party 30. If these rights include the right to emancipate the tutored 20, the third party 30, may issue a certificate of emancipation 81.
- the emancipation certificate 81 includes a tutored authorization 23 defining the rights that the third party 30 emancipates from the tutored 20.
- the third party 30, by means of its third electronic document 31 signs the emancipation certificate 81 by means of the private third party key PrKTi to produce an emancipation seal 38.
- L Emancipation certificate 81 and the emancipation seal 38 are stored, for example, on the tutored electronic document 21.
- the signature step by the third party 30 is advantageously subject to authentication (PIN, biometrics, etc.) of the third party 30.
- the certificate of delegation 71 and the seal 17 are also stored, for example, on the tutored electronic document 21.
- the affiliation certificate 51 and the seal of affiliation 44 are also stored, for example, on the tutored electronic document 21.
- the tutored electronic document 21 is thus depository of a stack of attestations making it possible to go back to the authority 40 and making it possible to guarantee the content of the rights emancipated to the tutor. , so that the tutored 20 can make use of it.
- the verification of a right during a formality then includes the cascading verification of all these certificates stacked.
- the third party 30 can in turn perform a delegation to a secondary third 30 '. Everything happens substantially as for the "direct" delegation of the tutor 10 to the third party 30 and illustrated in Figure 2, the third 30 replacing the guardian 10 and the secondary third 30 'substituting for the third 30.
- a delegation certificate 71 previously produced and defining, by means of a third party authorization 33, the rights that the guardian 10 delegates to the third party 30. If these rights include the right to delegate again to another third party 30 'that is called third party 30', the third party 30, where appropriate by means of his third electronic document 31, can issue a delegation certificate 91.
- the delegation certificate 91 includes a secondary third authorization 33 'defining the rights that the third party 30 delegates to the secondary third party 30'.
- it may further comprise the public key tutored PuKTe and the secondary public third key PuKti '.
- the delegation certificate 91 and the delegation seal 38 are stored, for example, on the tutored electronic document 21 and / or the secondary third electronic document 31 'and / or on any medium.
- the signature step by the third party 30 is advantageously subject to authentication (PIN, biometrics, etc.) of the third party 30.
- the certificate of delegation 71 and the delegation seal 17 are also stored, for example, on the tutored electronic document 21 and / or the secondary third electronic document 31 'and / or on any medium.
- the affiliation certificate 51 and the affiliation seal 44 are also stored, for example, on the electronic document. tutored 21 and / or the secondary electronic document secondary 31 'and / or on any support.
- the tutored electronic document 21 and / or the secondary third electronic document 31 'and / or the other medium is thus depository of a stack of attestations allowing to go back to the authority 40 and making it possible to guarantee the content of the rights delegated to secondary third 30 ', so that the tutored 20 can make use of it.
- the verification of a right during a formality then includes the cascading verification of all these certificates stacked.
- the rights transferred can not exceed the rights actually available to the transferor.
- any transferred authorization is advantageously a subset of the transferring authorization. This necessary relation can be verified at the moment of the creation of the authorization transferred during the creation process: emancipation or delegation. Alternatively, this relationship can be verified at any time by one of the verification methods, for example prior to the exercise of one of the rights.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Tourism & Hospitality (AREA)
- Educational Administration (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Educational Technology (AREA)
- Economics (AREA)
- Marketing (AREA)
- Primary Health Care (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Human Resources & Organizations (AREA)
- Development Economics (AREA)
- Biomedical Technology (AREA)
- Biodiversity & Conservation Biology (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Life Sciences & Earth Sciences (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| FR1555720A FR3037700A1 (fr) | 2015-06-22 | 2015-06-22 | Procede de delegation et de verification de droits sur un tutore entre un tuteur et un tiers. |
| PCT/FR2016/051514 WO2016207538A1 (fr) | 2015-06-22 | 2016-06-21 | Procédé de délégation et de vérification de droits sur un tutoré entre un tuteur et un tiers. |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| EP3311342A1 true EP3311342A1 (fr) | 2018-04-25 |
Family
ID=55542726
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP16739234.9A Withdrawn EP3311342A1 (fr) | 2015-06-22 | 2016-06-21 | Procédé de délégation et de vérification de droits sur un tutoré entre un tuteur et un tiers. |
Country Status (4)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US20190156446A1 (fr) |
| EP (1) | EP3311342A1 (fr) |
| FR (1) | FR3037700A1 (fr) |
| WO (1) | WO2016207538A1 (fr) |
Family Cites Families (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US8887297B2 (en) * | 2007-07-13 | 2014-11-11 | Microsoft Corporation | Creating and validating cryptographically secured documents |
-
2015
- 2015-06-22 FR FR1555720A patent/FR3037700A1/fr not_active Withdrawn
-
2016
- 2016-06-21 WO PCT/FR2016/051514 patent/WO2016207538A1/fr not_active Ceased
- 2016-06-21 EP EP16739234.9A patent/EP3311342A1/fr not_active Withdrawn
- 2016-06-21 US US15/738,566 patent/US20190156446A1/en not_active Abandoned
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| WO2016207538A1 (fr) | 2016-12-29 |
| US20190156446A1 (en) | 2019-05-23 |
| FR3037700A1 (fr) | 2016-12-23 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| JP6756817B2 (ja) | 非集中型のタイトル記録および認証のためのシステムならびに方法 | |
| EP2071798B1 (fr) | Procédé et serveur de coffres-forts électroniques avec mutualisation d'informations | |
| CN113472521B (zh) | 基于区块链的实名数字身份管理方法、签名设备和验证设备 | |
| KR20210024992A (ko) | 블록체인 내에서 코드와 이미지를 사용하는 시스템과 방법 | |
| WO2007077324A1 (fr) | Procede de certification et d'authentification ulterieure de documents originaux papier ou numeriques pour constitution de preuves | |
| FR2703800A1 (fr) | Procédé de signature d'un fichier informatique, et dispositif pour la mise en Óoeuvre. | |
| US12432195B2 (en) | Using globally-unique numbers for all secure unique transactions, authentications, verifications, and messaging identities | |
| EP3701462A1 (fr) | Méthode et système d'inscription sécurisé de clés cryptographiques sur un support physique pour clés cryptographiques, et support physique produit | |
| US12494907B2 (en) | Delivering random number keys securely for one-time pad symmetric key encryption | |
| TW202312058A (zh) | 去中心化零信任身份核實認證系統與方法 | |
| US20250028790A1 (en) | Systems and Methods for Token Use and Protection Using Blockchain | |
| WO2010100064A1 (fr) | Procédé d'établissement sécurisé d'un contrat multipartite virtuel matérialisable | |
| RS60498B1 (sr) | Postupak i sistem zaštite od neovlašćenog kopiranja (protiv kloniranja) | |
| EP3488390B1 (fr) | Procédé de communication rfid sécurisée | |
| Syed | Power to the people: How blockchain based digital identity can empower disadvantaged individuals | |
| WO2010007479A2 (fr) | Appareil et procédé de génération d'un titre sécurisé à partir d'un titre officiel | |
| JPH10503037A (ja) | 真偽性確認技術 | |
| WO2016207536A1 (fr) | Procédés d'affiliation, d'émancipation, et de vérification entre un tuteur et un tutoré. | |
| EP3311342A1 (fr) | Procédé de délégation et de vérification de droits sur un tutoré entre un tuteur et un tiers. | |
| BE1015988A6 (fr) | Carte plastique produites en 3 couches format carte de credit, individualise par deux pistes memoire non reproductible sur la partie optique digitale, integration d'une antenne et puce et d'un procede de paiement et d'authentification remplacant la certification sur internet, le serveur d'authentification et la methode de realisation. | |
| FR2697361A1 (fr) | Procédé et système d'inscription d'une information sur un support permettant de certifier ultérieurement l'originalité de cette information. | |
| EP3032450B1 (fr) | Procédé de contrôle d'une authenticité d'un terminal de paiement et terminal ainsi sécurisé | |
| EP4193283A1 (fr) | Procede pour generer un document numerique securise stocke sur un terminal mobile et associe a une identite numerique | |
| Lang | Investigating the Use of the South African National ID Card for Electronic Transaction Processing | |
| WO2022122821A1 (fr) | Dispositif et procédé d'authentification de produits |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATION HAS BEEN MADE |
|
| PUAI | Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012 |
|
| STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: REQUEST FOR EXAMINATION WAS MADE |
|
| 17P | Request for examination filed |
Effective date: 20180118 |
|
| AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR |
|
| AX | Request for extension of the european patent |
Extension state: BA ME |
|
| DAV | Request for validation of the european patent (deleted) | ||
| DAX | Request for extension of the european patent (deleted) | ||
| STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: EXAMINATION IS IN PROGRESS |
|
| 17Q | First examination report despatched |
Effective date: 20190903 |
|
| STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: THE APPLICATION IS DEEMED TO BE WITHDRAWN |
|
| 18D | Application deemed to be withdrawn |
Effective date: 20200314 |