EP3448737B1 - Procédé de sécurisation pour passage à niveau - Google Patents

Procédé de sécurisation pour passage à niveau

Info

Publication number
EP3448737B1
EP3448737B1 EP17728154.0A EP17728154A EP3448737B1 EP 3448737 B1 EP3448737 B1 EP 3448737B1 EP 17728154 A EP17728154 A EP 17728154A EP 3448737 B1 EP3448737 B1 EP 3448737B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
level crossing
control device
securing
point
stationary control
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active
Application number
EP17728154.0A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP3448737C0 (fr
EP3448737A1 (fr
EP3448737B8 (fr
Inventor
Jens-Harro Oechsner
Thomas Schmidt
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens Mobility GmbH
Original Assignee
Siemens Mobility GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens Mobility GmbH filed Critical Siemens Mobility GmbH
Publication of EP3448737A1 publication Critical patent/EP3448737A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP3448737C0 publication Critical patent/EP3448737C0/fr
Publication of EP3448737B1 publication Critical patent/EP3448737B1/fr
Publication of EP3448737B8 publication Critical patent/EP3448737B8/fr
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
    • B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or trains
    • B61L25/021—Measuring and recording of train speed
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L29/00—Safety means for rail/road crossing traffic
    • B61L29/08—Operation of gates; Combined operation of gates and signals
    • B61L29/18—Operation by approaching rail vehicle or train
    • B61L29/22—Operation by approaching rail vehicle or train electrically
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L29/00—Safety means for rail/road crossing traffic
    • B61L29/24—Means for warning road traffic that a gate is closed or closing, or that rail traffic is approaching, e.g. for visible or audible warning
    • B61L29/28—Means for warning road traffic that a gate is closed or closing, or that rail traffic is approaching, e.g. for visible or audible warning electrically operated
    • B61L29/32—Timing, e.g. advance warning of approaching train
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
    • B61L2027/202—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation using European Train Control System [ETCS]

Definitions

  • level crossing closing times is of great importance in practice when operating track-bound vehicles, which can be, for example, rail vehicles, track-guided vehicles with rubber tyres or magnetic levitation trains.
  • track-bound vehicles which can be, for example, rail vehicles, track-guided vehicles with rubber tyres or magnetic levitation trains.
  • track-bound vehicles which can be, for example, rail vehicles, track-guided vehicles with rubber tyres or magnetic levitation trains.
  • Appropriate security of the level crossing can be achieved, for example, by means of one or more barriers. Furthermore, it is also possible, for example, for the level crossing to be secured solely by a corresponding signal indicating a prohibition of entry. Such a signal could, for example, be a light signal. Furthermore, other devices and methods for securing level crossings are also known, which can also be combined with one another if necessary. For example, it is possible for a level crossing to be secured by barriers and, at the same time or especially before the barriers are lowered, for approaching traffic to be warned by a corresponding light signal and/or a warning tone.
  • document JP 2011 105117 A describes an on-board device that transmits the position and length of a train via radio.
  • a wireless alarm control device is configured to calculate a train speed from a change in the train position and estimates the earliest arrival time using the train speed, the maximum acceleration of the train, and the maximum speed in the section.
  • An alarm control means is provided for issuing an alarm.
  • A1 relates to a device and a method for train control at a level crossing.
  • a rail vehicle has an ETCS on-board system.
  • Level crossing safety devices in particular railway barriers, controlled by track-side switch-on contacts, are provided.
  • An evaluation device monitoring the level crossing safety devices is connected to a track-side switch balise located behind the switch-on contact and at least within the braking distance of the level crossing, which interacts with the ETCS on-board system.
  • document DE 102 27 046 C1 Describes a method for speed control for hazardous track sections. It includes a central control system for the track section so that when a vehicle approaches a hazardous area, the vehicle brakes are applied. The vehicle's speed is limited to the hazardous area speed. The vehicle braking point for a given speed is compared with the optimal braking point for that speed.
  • a trackside device such as an axle counter can be used as the activation point for a level crossing, detecting the passage of a train approaching the level crossing. The signal from the trackside device is then used to trigger the level crossing.
  • the present invention is based on the object of providing a method for securing a level crossing that allows for timely securing of the respective level crossing and is at the same time particularly efficient and reliable. This object is achieved according to the invention by a method
  • vehicle data comprising at least the current position and the current speed of the rail-bound vehicle are received by a stationary control device of a train control system from a rail-bound vehicle approaching the level crossing, a switch-on point is determined taking into account the received vehicle data and route data comprising at least the location of the level crossing, and securing of the level crossing is initiated when the switch-on point is reached.
  • the method according to the invention for securing a level crossing is characterized by the fact that its method steps are carried out by a stationary control device of a train control system.
  • the term "stationary" expresses that the control device in question is located at a fixed location outside the track-bound vehicle.
  • the stationary control device of the train control system can be located trackside, i.e., in the area or near the route of the track-bound vehicles, or at any distance from the respective route.
  • the stationary control device of the train control system receives vehicle data from a rail-bound vehicle approaching the level crossing, which data include at least the current position and the current speed of the rail-bound vehicle.
  • the respective rail-bound vehicle can receive the respective current
  • the position and the respective current speed can be determined, for example, using existing odometric systems, such as radar-based or a position sensor, satellite-based, and/or by taking into account "reference points," such as beacons.
  • the vehicle data can also contain further information or data. This could include, for example, information on the type of rail-bound vehicle, its braking capacity, and/or its weight.
  • the transmission of vehicle data from the track-bound vehicle to the stationary control device can, in principle, be carried out in any known manner.
  • the transmission of vehicle data from the track-bound vehicle to the stationary control device is preferably wireless, i.e., radio-based, for example, over at least part of the communication path.
  • a switch-on point is determined by the stationary control device, taking into account the received vehicle data and route data including at least the location of the level crossing. It should be noted at this point that not all data transmitted from the respective rail-bound vehicle to the stationary control device are necessarily taken into account when determining the switch-on point.
  • the vehicle data within the scope of the present invention are characterized in that they include at least the current position and the current speed of the rail-bound vehicle, as well as, if necessary, other variables that are taken into account by the stationary control device when determining the switch-on point. If the stationary control device receives further data from the rail-bound vehicle for another purpose, but these are not taken into account when determining the switch-on point, this is Therefore, these additional data do not constitute vehicle data within the meaning of the present invention.
  • the stationary control device When determining the activation point, the stationary control device considers not only the received vehicle data but also route data, which includes at least the location of the level crossing. Furthermore, the route data considered may include other parameters, such as information on the gradient, i.e., the uphill or downhill gradient, of the route.
  • the stationary control device when the activation point is reached, the stationary control device initiates securing of the level crossing.
  • the stationary control device directly or indirectly acts on at least one component intended to secure the level crossing, initiating or carrying out the securing of the level crossing.
  • securing can be achieved, for example, by switching on one or more signal lamps, closing level crossing barriers, or initiating another action to secure the level crossing.
  • the method according to the invention is characterized by the fact that it incorporates the stationary control device of the train control system into the safeguarding of the level crossing beyond the usual system boundaries. This advantageously makes it possible to use a communication channel that is already used by these components for communication to transmit the vehicle data from the track-bound vehicle to the stationary control device of the train control system. Furthermore, in the event of a problem or error in safeguarding the level crossing, the stationary control device of the train control system is advantageously able to influence the track-bound vehicle in such a way that it can still comes to a stop before the level crossing or at least reaches the level crossing at a (significantly) reduced speed.
  • the method according to the invention is further particularly powerful in that it allows dynamic determination of the activation point, taking into account at least the current position and the current speed of the rail-bound vehicle. This means that, for example, if the rail-bound vehicle approaches the level crossing comparatively slowly, securing of the level crossing is only initiated at a later point in time than if the rail-bound vehicle approaches the level crossing at a comparatively high speed. Consequently, securing of the level crossing is not initiated either upon reaching a fixed location or at a fixed time.
  • the activation point is calculated dynamically and is not determined by a component arranged at a fixed location on the route, such as a sensor device, the activation point can also be referred to as a "virtual" activation point.
  • the method according to the invention thus enables a level crossing to be secured in a timely manner in a particularly reliable manner, whereby, depending on the respective conditions, a closing time of the level crossing can be achieved which is largely constant regardless of the speed of the respective track-bound vehicle.
  • the stationary control device determines a switch-on point in the form of a route point and initiates securing of the level crossing, provided that the track-bound vehicle has reached the relevant route point according to the received vehicle data.
  • This is advantageous because it allows the stationary control device to determine the current position based on the received vehicle data. of the rail-bound vehicle, it is possible in a simple manner to compare the position of the rail-bound vehicle with the determined route point and, in the event that the rail-bound vehicle has reached the relevant route point, to arrange for the level crossing to be secured.
  • the method according to the invention can also be further developed such that a switch-on point in the form of a time is determined by the stationary control device and the securing of the level crossing is initiated at the relevant time. Based on a switch-on point in the form of a time, it is also advantageously possible to decide whether or not the level crossing needs to be secured.
  • the time itself can be specified absolutely, i.e., for example, by specifying a time, preferably at least accurate to the second, or indirectly by specifying a period of time after which the securing of the level crossing is initiated.
  • the securing of the level crossing is initiated by the stationary control device transmitting a request to secure the level crossing to a signal box that is connected to the level crossing by means of communication.
  • the signal box then transmits a safety signal to a local control component of the level crossing, and the local control component, upon receipt of the safety signal, initiates the securing of the level crossing.
  • Local control components of level crossings e.g. level crossing controls
  • the corresponding interlocking system is already connected to the stationary control unit of the train control system via communication technology. This provides a communication channel that allows the stationary control unit to initiate the level crossing security via the interlocking system and the local control component of the level crossing.
  • a confirmation signal is transmitted from the local control component to the interlocking system, and the interlocking system then transmits a confirmation related to the successful securing of the level crossing to the stationary control device.
  • the method according to the invention can further be configured such that, upon receipt of the confirmation, the stationary control device determines a driving authorization extending beyond the level crossing and transmits it to the rail-bound vehicle as a replacement for a previous driving authorization ending before the level crossing.
  • a driving authorization is also referred to as a "movement authority" and, in this specific case, results in the rail-bound vehicle not coming to a standstill before the level crossing in accordance with the previous driving authorization, but being able to pass the level crossing without stopping.
  • the activation point is determined by the stationary control device, additionally taking into account a possible speed profile for the rail-bound vehicle's further approach to the level crossing. This is advantageous because timely securing of the level crossing must be ensured even in the event of acceleration of the rail-bound vehicle. In this case, this is achieved by additionally taking into account the possible speed profile for the rail-bound vehicle's further approach to the level crossing when determining the activation point.
  • the method according to the invention can also be configured such that the possible speed profile for the further approach of the rail-bound vehicle to the level crossing is determined by the stationary control device based on acceleration curves that take into account the received vehicle data.
  • the acceleration curves used take into account, in particular, the current location and the current speed of the rail-bound vehicle.
  • the activation point is determined by the stationary control device, taking into account a delay time in securing the level crossing.
  • the considered delay time preferably includes all delays that may occur during the implementation of the level crossing security. This includes, for example, a barrier runtime, a pre-lighting/clearance time, and/or required communication and activation times.
  • the reception of the vehicle data and the determination of the activation point are carried out continuously.
  • the stationary control device receives the vehicle data at preferably regular time intervals, which, depending on the respective requirements, are preferably in the range of fractions of a second or a few seconds, and a new determination of the activation point is made in each case, taking into account the vehicle data and the route data. This advantageously makes it possible to react promptly to any changes in the speed profile of the rail-bound vehicle and to provide an earlier or later activation point accordingly.
  • any communication channel or communication path can be used to transmit the vehicle data received by the stationary control device from the track-bound vehicle.
  • the term "communication channel” refers to a transmission path or transmission medium, without this actually having to correspond to a "channel” in radio terms.
  • a communication channel of the train control system is used to transmit the vehicle data received by the stationary control device from the track-bound vehicle. Transmitting the vehicle data via the communication channel of the train control system offers the advantage that an already existing and simultaneously reliable communication channel can be used for transmitting the vehicle data. This avoids, in particular, additional effort for providing an alternative communication channel and allows existing resources and communication channels to be used in a practical and efficient manner.
  • the method according to the invention can also be designed such that the activation point is checked for plausibility by the stationary control device based on sensor data acquired by at least one trackside sensor device.
  • Such plausibility checks can further increase the safety and reliability of the method if necessary.
  • the trackside sensor device can be a wheel sensor, for example, in which case the acquired sensor data can indicate, for example, the speed of the rail-bound vehicle and simultaneously indicate that the rail-bound vehicle is currently located at the location of the relevant trackside sensor device.
  • Figure 1 shows in a first schematic sketch to explain a first embodiment of the method according to the invention a first embodiment of an arrangement 100 according to the invention.
  • a level crossing 10 which is approached from the left by a rail-bound vehicle 20.
  • the distance between the rail-bound vehicle 20 and the level crossing 10 at the time shown is d.
  • a stationary control device 30 of a train control system can be seen.
  • the stationary control device 30 is a track control center in the form of a Radio Block Center (RBC) of a train control system according to the standard or norm ETCS (European Train Control System) Level 2.
  • RBC Radio Block Center
  • ETCS European Train Control System
  • the representation of the Figure 1 a signal box 40 and a local control component 50 of the level crossing 10 are indicated.
  • the signal box 40 is, on the one hand, connected to the stationary control device 30 via a bidirectional communication link 41.
  • the signal box 40 is also connected to the local control component 50 of the level crossing 10 via a bidirectional communication link 51.
  • This bidirectional communication connection which can also be referred to as a communication channel, is in the embodiment of the Figure 1 as a wireless, mobile communication connection and, in the context of the described embodiment, is to be carried out via the railway-specific mobile radio network GSM-R (Global System for Mobile Communications - railway).
  • GSM-R Global System for Mobile Communications - railway
  • the indicated mobile radio network designated by reference numeral 70, has a base station 60, via which, by means of partial routes or partial communication connections 61 and 62, bidirectional communication is established between the track-bound vehicle 20 and the stationary control device 30 is possible.
  • the stationary control device 30 is connected to the mobile radio network 70 or its base station 60 by wires, i.e., via a copper or fiber optic cable, for example.
  • the Figure 1 The arrangement shown can now be used, for example, to secure the level crossing 10 in such a way that the stationary control device 30 of the train control system receives vehicle data from the rail-bound vehicle 20 approaching the level crossing 10, which data comprise at least the current position and the current speed of the rail-bound vehicle 20. Taking into account the received vehicle data and route data comprising at least the location of the level crossing 10, the stationary control device 30 is then able to determine a switch-on point. In the context of the described exemplary embodiment, it is assumed that the switch-on point is a route point P. Alternatively, or possibly additionally, a point in time could also be used as the switch-on point.
  • the described method runs continuously or permanently, so that the vehicle data are received by the stationary control device 30 at short intervals.
  • the stationary control device 30 determines or recalculates the switch-on point in the form of the route point P in a correspondingly continuous manner.
  • the stationary control device 30 initiates the securing of the level crossing 10.
  • the stationary control device 30 A request to secure the level crossing 10 is transmitted to the signal box 40, which is connected to the level crossing 10 by communication technology, and the signal box 40 then transmits a safety signal to the local control component 50 of the level crossing 10.
  • the local control component 50 triggers the securing of the level crossing 10. This can be achieved, for example, by first emitting a visual and/or acoustic warning signal and then closing one or more barriers of the level crossing 10.
  • the local control component 50 transmits a confirmation signal to the interlocking system 40. This, in turn, then transmits a confirmation relating to the successful securing of the level crossing 10 to the stationary control device 30 of the train control system. This provides the stationary control device 30 with reliable feedback indicating that the securing of the level crossing 10 initiated by it has been successful.
  • the stationary control device 30 determines a driving authorization extending beyond the level crossing 10 and transmits this to the rail-bound vehicle 20 as a replacement for a previous driving authorization ending before the level crossing 10. This is again done via the bidirectional communication connection 61, 62 with the interposition of the base station 60 of the mobile network 70.
  • a correspondingly upgraded driving authorization which is also referred to as "movement authority”
  • the communication link 61, 62 between the stationary control device 30 and the rail-bound vehicle 20 is continuously monitored.
  • the rail-bound vehicle 20 assumes a safe state in that it automatically brakes, for example, if the communication link 61, 62 with the stationary control device 30 is interrupted or if no driving authorization is received within an expected period.
  • the described method utilizes the existing safety structure between the interlocking system 40 and the level crossing 10, or rather, the local control component 50 of the latter.
  • the stationary control device 30 communicates with the interlocking system 40 to ensure the shortest possible closing time of the level crossing 10 in the sense of a "constant warning time" while simultaneously excluding potential hazards.
  • the activation point, in the form of route point P is determined by the stationary control device 30, preferably taking into account a (maximum) delay time occurring when securing the level crossing 10, which, for example, takes into account a barrier runtime, a pre-lighting/clearance time, the times required for communication between the components involved, and the activation times.
  • the stationary control device 30 usually determines driving permissions based on dynamic and static track-related data. Should the track-bound vehicle 20 have to change its driving profile due to track conditions, e.g., weather, technical problems, or track-related problems such as obstacles or people in the track area, this is done by the continuous Communication from the stationary control device 30 is recorded and, if necessary, an updated driving authorization is then generated by the stationary control device 30 and transmitted to the rail-bound vehicle 20.
  • track conditions e.g., weather, technical problems, or track-related problems such as obstacles or people in the track area
  • the method for optimizing the security of the level crossing 10 thus advantageously utilizes data that is at least partially already used in the train control system in connection with the determination of "movement authorities" and thus ensures the best possible optimization of the closing time of the level crossing 10 for almost all train travel cases.
  • the activation point P is calculated dynamically; this is thus a "virtual" activation point that is not fixed in a fixed location but is adapted to the respective conditions. This virtual activation point is therefore the route point P, upon reaching which the security, activation, or closing of the level crossing 10 is initiated for the respective rail-bound vehicle 20.
  • the driving information received by the stationary control device 30 is used to precisely determine the distance of the rail-bound vehicle to the level crossing 10 or the time remaining until reaching the level crossing 10 at any time, taking into account the current speed profile of the rail-bound vehicle 20 and the speed profile possible for onward travel, and based on this, the time for initiating the securing of the level crossing 10.
  • the activation point in the form of the route point P or in the form of the time is determined by the stationary control device 30, additionally taking into account a speed profile possible for a further approach of the rail-bound vehicle 20 to the level crossing 10.
  • the speed profile possible for the further approach of the rail-bound vehicle to the level crossing 10 can be determined by the stationary control device 30 based on acceleration curves that take the received vehicle data into account.
  • Figure 2 shows a second embodiment of an arrangement 110 according to the invention in a second schematic sketch to explain a second embodiment of the method according to the invention.
  • FIG. 2 The representation of the Figure 2 essentially corresponds to that of the Figure 1 .
  • a trackside sensor device 80 can be seen, which in the illustrated embodiment is a radio proximity detector arranged at a distance s in front of the level crossing 10.
  • the trackside sensor device 80 comprises a wheel sensor 81 and a radio module 82, via which the trackside sensor device 80 can establish a communication connection 83 with the stationary control device 30 via the mobile radio network 70 or the base station 60 of the same (or another base station of the mobile radio network 70) and can transmit data to the stationary control device 30.
  • the communication connection 83 is designed as a unidirectional connection; alternatively, it could of course also be a bidirectional communication connection.
  • the trackside sensor device 80 in the form of the radio proximity detector or the wheel sensor 81 thereof determines the speed of the rail-bound vehicle 20 and transmits this together with the information that the rail-bound vehicle 20 (or generally a rail-bound vehicle) has been detected and is thus currently located at the location of the radio proximity detector 80, to the stationary control device 30.
  • the stationary control device 30 advantageously has the option of initiating a braking operation of the rail-bound vehicle 20, for example by transmitting a correspondingly restricted driving authorization.
  • the trackside sensor device 80 in the form of the radio proximity detector can advantageously also be used for those rail-bound vehicles that are not capable of bidirectional communication with the stationary control device 30 of the train control system. In this way, a type of "mixed operation" is also possible between such rail-bound vehicles 20, which, for example, have a corresponding ETCS on-board unit, and other vehicles, such as maintenance vehicles.
  • the stationary control device according to the invention and the arrangement according to the invention, these have the particular advantage of enabling the level crossing 10 to be secured in a particularly efficient and reliable manner.
  • the current position and the current speed of the rail-bound vehicle 20 an unnecessarily long closing time of the level crossing 10 can be avoided and a largely uniform closing time can be achieved.
  • potential risks due to a too late securing of the level crossing 10 or a disruption during the same are reliably excluded, in particular through the continuous communication between the stationary control device 30 and the rail-bound vehicle 20.
  • a communication channel of the train control system is advantageously used, which the system already has and which enables continuous communication between the rail-bound vehicle 20 and the stationary control device 30.
  • the described procedure is therefore particularly suitable in connection with the train control systems ETCS Level 2 and 3, CTCS Level 3 and 4 and PTC advantageous.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)

Claims (10)

  1. Procédé de sécurisation d'un passage à niveau (10), dans lequel par un dispositif (30) stationnaire de commande d'un système d'arrêt automatique des trains
    - on reçoit d'un véhicule (20) guidé sur rail s'approchant du passage à niveau (10) des données de véhicule créées sur le véhicule,
    qui comprennent au moins la position instantanée ainsi que la vitesse instantanée du véhicule (20) guidé sur rail,
    - en tenant compte des données du véhicule reçues ainsi que de données de voie comprenant au moins le lieu du passage à niveau (10), on détermine un point de déclenchement, non fixé par un composant disposé en un lieu fixe de la voie de circulation, et ainsi virtuel et
    lorsque le point de déclenchement est atteint, on provoque une sécurisation du passage à niveau (10),
    dans lequel
    - on provoque la sécurisation du passage à niveau (10), par le fait qu'il est transmis à un poste (40) d'aiguillage, rattaché au passage à niveau (10) en technique de communication, du dispositif (30) stationnaire de commande, une invitation à sécuriser le passage à niveau (10),
    - on transmet après quoi du poste (40) d'aiguillage un signal de sécurisation à un composant (50) local de commande du passage à niveau (10) et
    - on déclenche par le composant (50) local de commande à la réception du signal de sécurisation la sécurisation du passage à niveau (10),
    caractérisé en ce que,
    après une sécurisation couronnée de succès du passage à niveau (10),
    - on transmet un signal de confirmation du composant (50) local de commande au poste (40) d'aiguillage et
    - après quoi on transmet du poste (40) d'aiguillage au dispositif (30) stationnaire de commande, une confirmation se rapportant à la sécurisation couronnée de succès du passage à niveau (10).
  2. Procédé suivant la revendication 1,
    caractérisé en ce que
    par le dispositif (30) stationnaire de commande
    - on détermine un point de déclenchement sous la forme d'un point (P) sur la voie et
    - on provoque la sécurisation du passage (10) à niveau dès que le véhicule (20) guidé sur rail a, suivant les données de véhicule reçues, atteint le point (P) concerné sur la voie.
  3. Procédé suivant la revendication 1 ou 2,
    caractérisé en ce que
    par le dispositif (30) stationnaire de commande
    - on détermine un point de déclenchement sous la forme d'un instant et
    - on provoque la sécurisation du passage à niveau (10) à l'instant concerné.
  4. Procédé suivant la revendication 3,
    caractérisé en ce que l'
    on détermine, par le dispositif (30) stationnaire de commande, après la réception de la confirmation, une autorisation de conducteur allant au-delà du passage à niveau (10) et on la transmet au véhicule (20) guidé sur rail comme remplacement d'une autorisation de conducteur précédente se terminant avant le passage à niveau (10).
  5. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications précédentes,
    caractérisé en ce que l'
    on détermine le point de déclenchement par le dispositif (30) stationnaire de commande, en tenant compte en outre d'une courbe de vitesse possible pour un autre rapprochement du véhicule (20) guidé sur rail du passage à niveau (10).
  6. Procédé suivant la revendication 5,
    caractérisé en ce que, pour l'autre rapprochement du véhicule (20) guidé sur rail du passage à niveau, on détermine une courbe de vitesse possible par le dispositif (30) stationnaire de commande sur la base de courbes d'accélération, qui prennent en compte les données du véhicule reçues.
  7. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications précédentes,
    caractérisé en ce que l'
    on détermine, lors de la sécurisation du passage à niveau (10), le point de déclenchement par le dispositif (30) stationnaire de commande, en tenant compte d'un temps de retard.
  8. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications précédentes,
    caractérisé en ce que l'
    on effectue en continu la réception des données du véhicule et la détermination du point de déclenchement.
  9. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications précédentes,
    caractérisé en ce que,
    pour la transmission des données du véhicule reçues du véhicule (20) guidé sur rail par le dispositif (30) stationnaire de commande, on utilise un canal (61, 62) de communication du système d'arrêt automatique des trains.
  10. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications précédentes,
    caractérisé en ce que l'
    on rend vraisemblable le point de déclenchement du côté du dispositif (30) stationnaire de commande, sur la base de données de capteur détectées par au moins un dispositif (80) capteur sur la voie.
EP17728154.0A 2016-06-27 2017-06-01 Procédé de sécurisation pour passage à niveau Active EP3448737B8 (fr)

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DE102016211481.6A DE102016211481A1 (de) 2016-06-27 2016-06-27 Verfahren zum Sichern eines Bahnübergangs sowie stationäre Steuereinrichtung für ein Zugbeeinflussungssystem
PCT/EP2017/063262 WO2018001673A1 (fr) 2016-06-27 2017-06-01 Procédé de commande d'un passage à niveau, ainsi qu'équipement de commande fixe pour un système de contrôle de la marche des trains

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DE102016211481A1 (de) * 2016-06-27 2017-12-28 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zum Sichern eines Bahnübergangs sowie stationäre Steuereinrichtung für ein Zugbeeinflussungssystem
DE102017209926A1 (de) * 2017-06-13 2018-12-13 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zum Betreiben eines spurgebundenen Verkehrssystems
US10773742B2 (en) * 2017-09-13 2020-09-15 Siemens Industry, Inc. Advanced preemption using the wayside inspector and wireless magnetometer sensors
DE102018212768A1 (de) * 2018-07-31 2020-02-06 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zum Erzeugen einer Bewegungsinformation
DE102019207809A1 (de) * 2019-05-28 2020-12-03 Siemens Mobility GmbH Steueranlage und Verfahren zum Betreiben einer Steueranlage
CN112429045B (zh) * 2020-10-28 2022-08-26 卡斯柯信号有限公司 用于轨道交通列车运行控制的车地联锁方法及系统
US12143896B2 (en) * 2022-04-20 2024-11-12 Ford Global Technologies, Llc Systems and methods for providing a vehicle-and drone-based tracking system
CN116161089B (zh) * 2023-03-03 2023-09-01 北京全路通信信号研究设计院集团有限公司 一种道口控制方法、装置、电子设备和存储介质
JP2025003041A (ja) * 2023-06-23 2025-01-09 株式会社京三製作所 省電力型運行管理システム

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US11124213B2 (en) 2021-09-21
US20190144024A1 (en) 2019-05-16
WO2018001673A1 (fr) 2018-01-04
EP3448737C0 (fr) 2025-09-03
EP3448737A1 (fr) 2019-03-06
EP3448737B8 (fr) 2025-10-15
DE102016211481A1 (de) 2017-12-28

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