EP3515785B1 - Procédé de fonctionnement d'un système ferroviaire et véhicule d'un système ferroviaire - Google Patents

Procédé de fonctionnement d'un système ferroviaire et véhicule d'un système ferroviaire Download PDF

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Publication number
EP3515785B1
EP3515785B1 EP17800401.6A EP17800401A EP3515785B1 EP 3515785 B1 EP3515785 B1 EP 3515785B1 EP 17800401 A EP17800401 A EP 17800401A EP 3515785 B1 EP3515785 B1 EP 3515785B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
vehicle
track
railway system
communication
cryptographic data
Prior art date
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Active
Application number
EP17800401.6A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP3515785C0 (fr
EP3515785A1 (fr
Inventor
Oliver Schulz
Matthias Seifert
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Siemens Mobility GmbH
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Siemens Mobility GmbH
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Publication of EP3515785A1 publication Critical patent/EP3515785A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP3515785B1 publication Critical patent/EP3515785B1/fr
Publication of EP3515785C0 publication Critical patent/EP3515785C0/fr
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Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L3/00—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal
    • B61L3/02—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control
    • B61L3/08—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically
    • B61L3/12—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using radio waves
    • B61L3/125—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using radio waves using short-range radio transmission
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
    • B61L15/0027—Radio-based, e.g. using GSM-R
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0072—On-board train data handling
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L23/00—Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/40—Handling position reports or trackside vehicle data
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/50—Trackside diagnosis or maintenance, e.g. software upgrades
    • B61L27/53—Trackside diagnosis or maintenance, e.g. software upgrades for trackside elements or systems, e.g. trackside supervision of trackside control system conditions
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/70—Details of trackside communication
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L2205/00—Communication or navigation systems for railway traffic

Definitions

  • an Ethernet network connection can be set up between the respective control components and the respective local signal box, for example, so that the relevant signal components can communicate with each other and ensure the safety of railway operations.
  • the keys and certificates used for communication should or must be exchanged from time to time.
  • this due to the lack of a communication connection to a central office or central facility of the railway system, this is difficult or is only possible, for example, if appropriate maintenance work is carried out by maintenance personnel on site.
  • this has the disadvantage that it involves considerable costs and effort.
  • a system for transporting wayside data in a rail vehicle.
  • the system includes a wayside device positioned adjacent to a rail on which the rail vehicle travels along the rail.
  • the system includes a transceiver coupled to the wayside device to send and receive data related to the operation of the wayside device.
  • the system includes a transceiver coupled to the rail vehicle in communication with the wayside device transceiver when the rail vehicle travels within a close distance of the wayside device.
  • the rail vehicle transceiver sends or receives the data based on communication with the wayside transceiver.
  • the rail vehicle transports the data between the wayside device and a secondary location along a pre-existing route of the rail vehicle.
  • a method for transporting wayside data in a rail vehicle is also provided.
  • EP 1 220 094 A1 describes a method for programming a redundant target system with security requirements, in particular for inserting data records into system target computers.
  • a data generation system is used to generate a target data record that is encrypted and sent to the target computers of the target system via a data transmission system.
  • the data signals are then decrypted, stored and/or processed.
  • the procedure in document EP 0 997 807 A2 involves providing public and secret keys to each subsystem.
  • the subsystem designates a certification authority to certify the key's ownership of the subsystem with a certificate.
  • Each subsystem receives a key certificate and a certificate from the certification authority.
  • Each person involved in the production and testing of product software signs the product software and forwards the current signature with the secret key along with their own key certificate.
  • the certification authority creates and signs a tester list for each user.
  • the target computer accepts and terminates the product software, the linked list of signatures and the list of participants' key certificates, and the tester list.
  • WO 2012/136525 A1 describes a method for distributing communication keys for the encryption of traffic control messages of a rail vehicle safety system.
  • the present invention is based on the object of specifying a method for operating a railway system which enables a secure connection of trackside facilities of the railway system in a low-effort manner even in the event of a lack of communication connection.
  • This object is achieved according to the invention by a method according to claim 1 for operating a railway system, wherein cryptographic data comprising at least one key and/or at least one digital certificate are stored in a storage device of a vehicle of the railway system and the cryptographic data are transmitted by the vehicle to the at least one trackside device of the railway system when the vehicle is within communication range of at least one trackside device during a journey.
  • cryptographic data which comprise at least one key and/or at least one digital certificate, are thus stored in a storage device of a vehicle of the railway system.
  • the storage device is preferably a storage device of the vehicle in such a way that it is an integral part of the vehicle, i.e., for example, it is assigned to a control device, for example in the form of an on-board computer, of the vehicle.
  • the storage device can be merely connected for communication purposes to a corresponding control device of the vehicle.
  • the storage device can be, for example, a mobile storage medium, for example in the form of a USB stick or a mobile communication terminal, which is or will be connected to the control system of the vehicle when the vehicle is in operation.
  • the vehicle transmits the cryptographic data to at least one trackside facility of the railway system when it is within communication range of at least one trackside facility during a journey.
  • the vehicle thus serves as a means of transport with regard to the cryptographic data in that it transports the cryptographic data or the storage device in which the cryptographic data is stored to a location that is within communication range of the at least one trackside facility in question.
  • the term "communication range” is therefore understood to mean that communication between the vehicle and the at least one trackside facility is possible at the relevant distance or in the relevant area. This means in particular that within communication range, the cryptographic data can be transmitted to the at least one trackside facility using the relevant communication means.
  • the cryptographic data is transmitted to the at least one trackside device of the railway system when the vehicle has reached the communication range of the at least one trackside device during its journey or is within the communication range.
  • the transmission of the cryptographic data from the vehicle to the at least one trackside device preferably takes place as part of a regular journey of the vehicle, which means that an additional journey is not necessary just for the transport of the storage device or the transmission of cryptographic data is avoided.
  • the method according to the invention is advantageous because it enables a low-effort and therefore cost-effective connection of trackside facilities of a railway system, even those located in remote locations, to a central facility of the same in that cryptographic data is transmitted from the central facility or control center to the respective trackside facility by means of a vehicle of the railway system.
  • the vehicle or its storage device can thus advantageously be used to transport the cryptographic data, whereby decentralized communication facilities with a comparatively small communication range can be used.
  • the storage device with the cryptographic data is transported from the vehicle to a location that is within the transmission range of the at least one trackside device. At this location or in a corresponding area, the cryptographic data is then transmitted from the vehicle to the at least one trackside device to ensure secure communication in the subsequent period.
  • a "vehicle-connected" or "train-connected” public key infrastructure in which communication between a central device, which can also be referred to as the central communication infrastructure, and decentralized signaling systems is implemented without connection to the central communication infrastructure using vehicles of the railway system.
  • the method according to the invention advantageously runs automatically in such a way that no manual actions or interventions are required to transmit the cryptographic data.
  • the vehicle can be any type of vehicle within the scope of the method according to the invention.
  • methods with multiple communication steps are implemented by means of at least one further journey of the vehicle or at least one further vehicle.
  • CMP Certificate Management Protocol
  • the cryptographic data are transmitted wirelessly, in particular radio-based, from the vehicle to the at least one trackside device.
  • wireless and “radio-based” are to be understood in such a way that at least a section of a communication connection between the vehicle and the at least one trackside device is implemented accordingly. As a rule, this will relate in particular to a section of a communication connection with the at least one trackside device that starts from the vehicle.
  • the wireless transmission of the cryptographic data from the vehicle to the at least one trackside device can also, for example, be a transmission using optical means.
  • the rails could also be used as a transport medium, in which case at least the section between the vehicle and the rails would be wireless. Due to their particular robustness and often already existing However, in terms of availability, radio-based transmission of cryptographic data will generally be preferred. It is sufficient if the radio system used allows transmission over short to medium distances, e.g. a few hundred meters. The only important thing here is that the transmission range is sufficiently dimensioned to ensure reliable transmission of cryptographic data from the vehicle to at least one trackside facility of the railway system.
  • the method according to the invention can advantageously also be designed in such a way that the cryptographic data is transmitted from a central device of a public key infrastructure of the railway system to the vehicle and is stored by the vehicle in the storage device.
  • a corresponding central device can be, for example, a component in the form of a certification authority or a registration authority.
  • the term "central" device is to be understood in contrast to the at least one trackside device in such a way that the central device of the public key infrastructure of the railway system is connected to a central communication infrastructure of the railway system, while this is not the case for the at least one trackside device.
  • the transmission of the cryptographic data from the device to the vehicle is also advantageously wireless, i.e. in particular radio-based. This also supports or ensures an automated, computer-controlled process with regard to the storage of the cryptographic data in the storage device.
  • the method according to the invention can also be further developed in such a way that additional information is provided to the vehicle, which comprises at least one of the following parameters: Identity of the at least one trackside Facility, communication address of the at least one trackside facility, location of the at least one trackside facility, size of the communication range, location of a respective route on or from which the cryptographic data is to be transmitted from the vehicle to the at least one trackside facility.
  • additional information is provided to the vehicle, which comprises at least one of the following parameters: Identity of the at least one trackside Facility, communication address of the at least one trackside facility, location of the at least one trackside facility, size of the communication range, location of a respective route on or from which the cryptographic data is to be transmitted from the vehicle to the at least one trackside facility.
  • the relevant parameters relate in particular to information which enables or facilitates the vehicle to establish a communication connection with the at least one trackside facility or informs the vehicle where the at least one trackside facility is located. This thus enables targeted communication between the vehicle and the at least one trackside facility.
  • the at least one trackside device to which the cryptographic data is transmitted is directly the component for which the cryptographic data is intended. In this case, no further distribution or forwarding of the cryptographic data is required on the trackside.
  • a local administration facility of the railway system is used as the trackside facility and the cryptographic data is distributed by the local administration facility to at least one other local component of the railway system.
  • the local management facility of the railway system can be, for example, a local registration authority or a local certification authority of a public key infrastructure, which manages one or more other local components of the railway system, for example with regard to the distribution of digital certificates.
  • the other local components can be designed, for example, as signaling security devices, ie, for example, as element controllers.
  • the cryptographic data can be transmitted from the vehicle to the at least one trackside device while it is at a standstill.
  • Such a procedure can be useful, for example, if the vehicle needs to stop or is stopped in the vicinity of the at least one trackside device anyway. This can be the case, for example, if the trackside device is located in the area of a siding and the vehicle has to stop at the relevant location anyway to let an oncoming vehicle pass.
  • the cryptographic data are transmitted from the vehicle to the at least one trackside device during the journey.
  • the cryptographic data are thus transmitted to the at least one trackside device while the vehicle is driving past it.
  • the corresponding transmission takes place while the vehicle and the at least one trackside device are within communication range of each other as the vehicle passes by, without the vehicle being braked or stopped for this purpose.
  • the method according to the invention can advantageously also be designed in such a way that the cryptographic data is transmitted from the vehicle to the at least one trackside device in an encrypted or otherwise secured manner. This ensures that the transmission of the cryptographic data as such also meets the usual security requirements and, in particular, that falsification of the cryptographic data is reliably excluded.
  • it can also be secured in another way, for example by embedding the cryptographic data in intrinsically secure containers.
  • the method according to the invention can advantageously also be designed in such a way that data is transmitted from the trackside device or at least one of the trackside devices to the vehicle or another vehicle that is within the communication range at the given time, the transmitted data is stored in the storage device of the vehicle in question and is forwarded by the vehicle in question outside the communication range of the at least one trackside device to a central device of the railway system.
  • the method according to the invention can therefore also be further developed in such a way that data is transmitted from the trackside device or at least one of the trackside devices to a central device of the railway system by means of the vehicle.
  • the relevant data is transmitted from the respective trackside device to the vehicle or to another vehicle that is within the communication range at the given time, and from there forwarded to the central device of the railway system outside the communication range of the at least one trackside device.
  • the transmission of the data from the respective trackside device to the vehicle can take place on the one hand in temporal connection with the transmission of the cryptographic data from the vehicle to the at least one trackside device. This means that the data can be transmitted simultaneously with the cryptographic data in the opposite direction or sequentially immediately after or even before the cryptographic data has been transmitted.
  • the data from the trackside device can be transmitted to the vehicle or the other vehicle that is in the reception area at the given time at a different time from the transmission of the cryptographic data.
  • the data can be data or information of any type. This includes further cryptographic data or data related to cryptographic procedures as well as recorded diagnostic data or notes or messages concerning security-relevant events.
  • the invention further relates to a vehicle of a railway system.
  • the present invention is based on the object of specifying a vehicle of a railway system which enables a secure connection of trackside facilities of the railway system in a low-cost manner even in the event of a lack of communication connection.
  • a vehicle according to claim 9 of a railway system with a storage device in which cryptographic data are stored, which comprise at least one key and/or at least one digital certificate, a control device for detecting that the vehicle is within communication range of at least one trackside device of the railway system during a journey, and a communication device for transmitting the cryptographic data to the at least one trackside device.
  • methods with multiple communication steps are implemented by means of at least one further journey of the vehicle.
  • CMP Chip Management Protocol
  • the vehicle according to the invention can be designed such that the communication device for wireless, in particular radio-based, transmission of the cryptographic data from the vehicle to the at least one trackside device.
  • the invention further comprises a railway system according to claim 11 with at least one vehicle according to the invention or at least one vehicle according to the preferred development of the vehicle according to the invention and with a central device which is designed to transmit the cryptographic data to the vehicle, wherein the vehicle is designed to store the cryptographic data in the storage device.
  • methods with multiple communication steps are implemented in the railway system by means of at least one further journey of the vehicle or at least one further vehicle.
  • CMP Chip Management Protocol
  • the railway system according to the invention can also be further developed in such a way that the railway system is designed to provide the vehicle with additional information which comprises at least one of the following parameters: Identity the at least one trackside device, communication address of the at least one trackside device, location of the at least one trackside device, size of the communication range, location of a respective route on or from which the cryptographic data are to be transmitted from the vehicle to the at least one trackside device.
  • the trackside device is a local management device of the railway system and the local management device is designed to distribute the cryptographic data to at least one further local component of the railway system.
  • FIG. 1 shows in a first schematic representation to explain an embodiment of the method according to the invention an embodiment of the railway system according to the invention with an embodiment of the vehicle according to the invention.
  • a railway system 10 is shown which, on the one hand, comprises a central facility 20, which can also be referred to as a central communications infrastructure or as a control center.
  • the central facility 20 comprises a central administration and/or control facility 21, which is used to manage and/or control the railway system 10.
  • a registration authority 22 in English, RA
  • a certification authority 23 in English, CA
  • the certificates issued within the public key infrastructure are used within the railway system 10 to secure computer-based communication.
  • the central device 20 of the railway system 10 further comprises a central communication device 24, which in the embodiment shown provides or enables radio-based communication.
  • the components 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the central device 20 of the railway system 10 are connected to one another directly or indirectly, wirelessly or by wire by means of communication technology.
  • Figure 1 An architecture is shown by way of example in which the registration authority 22 and the certification authority 23 are connected directly to one another and indirectly via the central communication device 24 to the central administration and/or control device 21.
  • the railway system 10 also comprises a decentralized device 30, which in the context of the described embodiment comprises components which, with respect to a track 50, i.e. a track or rails, control a passing place or a siding 51 or monitor it by signaling in such a way that encounters between vehicles on the track 50 are excluded or vehicles encountering each other on the track 50 in the form of the single-track section can pass each other at the passing place 51.
  • a decentralized device 30 which in the context of the described embodiment comprises components which, with respect to a track 50, i.e. a track or rails, control a passing place or a siding 51 or monitor it by signaling in such a way that encounters between vehicles on the track 50 are excluded or vehicles encountering each other on the track 50 in the form of the single-track section can pass each other at the passing place 51.
  • the decentralized device 30 in the embodiment shown comprises a signaling security device 31, which can be, for example, an element controller controlling a signal and/or a switch, and a local administration device 32, which can be designed, for example, as a local registration authority or as a local certification authority, ie also forms a component of the public key infrastructure.
  • a signaling security device 31 can be, for example, an element controller controlling a signal and/or a switch
  • a local administration device 32 which can be designed, for example, as a local registration authority or as a local certification authority, ie also forms a component of the public key infrastructure.
  • the local administration facility 32 is connected to a decentralized communication facility 33 in the form of a radio transmission facility and together with this forms a trackside facility 35.
  • the decentralized device 30, which can also be referred to as a signal box island, can have further components that are Figure 1 are not shown for reasons of clarity. This applies, for example, to a decentralized interlocking system and, if necessary, other signaling safety devices, which are preferably also connected to one another via communication technology.
  • the decentralized device 30 is located at a location that is far away from the central device 20 of the railway system 10 and to which there is no communication connection. This can, for example, apply to the case of mine railways that travel in large, isolated areas, the communication development of which for the purpose of connecting the decentralized device 30 to the central device 20 would incur disproportionately high costs or is not practical or possible for other reasons. Even if the decentralized device 30 can independently ensure signaling security in the area of the passing point 51, the problem with regard to the cryptosystem used is that, due to the lack of a communication connection, Connection to the central facility 20 means that updating or exchanging cryptographic data of the decentralized facility 30, in particular in the form of keys and/or certificates, is not easily possible. Although corresponding cryptographic data could be updated or exchanged by maintenance personnel as part of maintenance measures, this would require the maintenance personnel to travel to the relevant location and would therefore be comparatively expensive and complex.
  • a vehicle 40 of the railway system 10 can now advantageously be used as part of an automated process.
  • This has a vehicle-side control device 41, a vehicle-side storage device 42 and a vehicle-side communication device 43.
  • the communication device 43 is also designed for radio-based communication in such a way that radio-based data transmission is possible between the decentralized communication device 33 and the vehicle-side communication device 43.
  • the communication or transmission range resulting from the communication devices and communication protocols used and the type of data transmission is indicated in Figure 1 in the form of a reception area 34 of the decentralized communication device 32.
  • the decentralized communication device 32 only has a short or medium (transmission) range and therefore a communication connection between the vehicle-side communication device 43 and the decentralized communication device 33 can only be established within the circular reception area 34.
  • whose radius can be, for example, a hundred meters or a few hundred meters.
  • Cryptographic data comprising at least one key and/or at least one digital certificate are stored in the storage device 42 of the vehicle 40. If the vehicle 40, which is moving in a direction of travel 45, approaches the decentralized device 30 in such a way that it is within communication range of the decentralized communication device 33, so that communication between the decentralized communication device 33 and the vehicle-side communication device 43 is possible, the cryptographic data can be read from the storage device 42 and transmitted via the decentralized communication device 33 to the trackside device 35 or the local management device 32 of the same.
  • the control device 41 of the vehicle 40 is designed to detect that the vehicle 40 has sufficiently approached the trackside device during its journey.
  • control device 41 can preferably also use additional information stored in the storage device 42, which preferably includes as a characteristic at least the identity of the at least one trackside device, a communication address of the at least one trackside device, the location of the at least one trackside device, the size or amount of the communication range and/or the location of the route 50 on or from which the cryptographic data are to be transmitted from the vehicle 40 to the trackside device 35.
  • the vehicle 40 or its storage device 42 can thus advantageously be used to transport the cryptographic data, whereby a decentralized communication device 33 with a comparatively small communication range can advantageously be used, in particular by the decentralized device 30.
  • the cryptographic data can be transmitted, for example, by the registration office 22, the certification office 23 or the central administration and/or control device 21 of the central facility 20, to the vehicle 40, for example also by radio, and stored by the latter in the storage device 42 after receipt by the vehicle-side communication device 43 via the control device 41.
  • This step therefore takes place at a time which corresponds to the Figure 1 situation shown, ie at an earlier point in time when the vehicle 40 is even closer to the central facility 20, so that a corresponding radio-based transmission is possible.
  • the vehicle 40 has approached the trackside facility just enough for the cryptographic data to be transmitted from the vehicle 40 to the trackside facility 35.
  • the cryptographic data can then be distributed from the local management facility 32 to at least one other local component of the railway system 10 in the form of the signaling security device 31 and any other signaling security devices that may be present.
  • the transmission or communication of the cryptographic data from the vehicle 40 to the trackside facility 35 or the local management facility 32 of the same advantageously takes place while the vehicle 40 is traveling, so that it is not necessary to slow down or interrupt the travel of the vehicle 40. This means that the cryptographic data is transmitted without affecting the normal operation of the vehicle 40.
  • the transmission of the cryptographic data from the vehicle 40 to the at least one trackside facility is advantageously encrypted or otherwise secured, so that Attacks or falsification of the cryptographic data are excluded.
  • Figure 2 shows a second schematic representation for further explanation of the embodiment of the method according to the invention.
  • the representation of the Figure 2 corresponds to a flow chart, whereby on the left side the central device 20 of the railway system is shown, which according to the embodiment of the Figure 1 the central administration and/or control facility 21, the registration authority 22, the certification authority 23 and the central communication facility 24.
  • the decentralized device 30 which, according to the embodiment of the Figure 1 the trackside device 35 and the signalling safety device 31.
  • Figure 2 Further signalling safety devices 31a and 31b are indicated.
  • a transmission of cryptographic data from the central device 20 to the decentralized device 30 can now be carried out, for example, in such a way that the relevant cryptographic data is transmitted, for example, from the certification body 23 in a message 60 to the central communication device 24.
  • the cryptographic data is transmitted from the central communication device 24 in a message 61 via radio to the vehicle-side communication device 43 of the vehicle 40 and stored in the storage device 42 with the interposition of the control device 41.
  • the vehicle 40 then travels in the direction of travel 45 in the direction of the decentralized device 30 and at some point reaches the communication range of the trackside device 35. This is detected by the control device 41, whereupon the cryptographic data is transmitted in a message 62 via radio to the trackside device 35, which receives it as a message 63.
  • the cryptographic data or the parts of the data relevant to the respective component are transmitted from the trackside device 35 to the signaling security devices 31, 31a and 31b with the messages 64, 65 and 66. This subsequently enables them to continue to communicate with each other securely based on updated or exchanged keys and/or certificates, which in Figure 2 indicated by messages 67, 68 and 69.
  • Figure 3 shows a third schematic representation to explain a further embodiment of the method according to the invention.
  • the representation of the Figure 3 essentially corresponds to that of the Figure 2 , whereby a separate representation of the individual components has been omitted with regard to the central device 20. This is intended to indicate that these components as such can be designed differently.
  • a communication exchange takes place between the signalling safety device 31 and the other signalling safety devices 31a, 31b and the trackside device 35 (or the local administrative device 32 thereof) by means of messages 80, 81 and 82. These can be, for example, requests within the framework of procedures the public key infrastructure, which are answered by the trackside device 35 in the form of messages 83, 84 and 85. Subsequently, the signaling security devices 31, 31a and 31b exchange messages 86, 87, 88 and 89 with each other, which are secured using keys and digital certificates.
  • data or an information request 71 is now transmitted from the trackside device 35 to the vehicle 40.
  • this takes place in return for a transmission of cryptographic data from the vehicle 40 to the local management device 32, as previously described in connection with Figure 2 has been explained.
  • this can also be carried out at a time decoupled from the corresponding transmission of cryptographic data and the information request 71 can also be transmitted to another vehicle of the railway system 10.
  • the information request can relate to cryptographic methods or implement corresponding methods, ie, for example, request an update of certificates, or be detached from cryptographic methods, ie, for example, concern a transmission of diagnostic data.
  • the transmitted data are stored in the storage device 42 of the vehicle 40 and forwarded by the vehicle 40 outside the transmission range of the trackside device 35 to the central device 20 of the railway system 10.
  • This is indicated by messages 92 and 93.
  • the central device 20 exchanges communication in the form of messages 95 and 96, while at the same time the decentralized device 30 exchanges messages 97 and 98.
  • the central device 20 With a message 99, the central device 20 then transmits an information response 72 to another vehicle 40a, which is therefore not the Vehicle 40.
  • the additional vehicle 40a has, analogously to the vehicle 40, a further control device 41a, a further storage device 42a and a further communication device 43a and moves in a direction of travel 45a in the direction of the decentralized device 30.
  • the additional vehicle 41a transmits the information response 72 by means of messages 100/101 to the trackside device 35 or the local administration device thereof.
  • methods with several communication steps for example in the form of updating certificates or transmitting a certificate revocation list, can thus also be carried out by several journeys of vehicles 40, 40a. This also makes it possible to implement complex handshake procedures, for example.
  • the corresponding data transported with the vehicles 40, 40a is in turn secured, for example by using a transport key.
  • the vehicle according to the invention and the railway system according to the invention have the particular advantage that they enable a transmission of cryptographic data in particular from a central station to decentralized trackside facilities even in cases where these have no direct communication connection.
  • the corresponding data is automatically transported by vehicles or trains using storage devices installed in them.
  • the relevant data is then transmitted or downloaded at the respective remote location.
  • Data, so that a maintenance team on site is advantageously not required.
  • These processes can advantageously run completely automatically and do not require any maintenance. This also enables high-frequency key exchange, which can increase IT security without incurring additional costs.
  • feedback on the status of the local IT security at the remote location can continue to be provided to the head office.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Biomedical Technology (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Claims (13)

  1. Procédé pour faire fonctionner un système (10) ferroviaire, dans lequel
    - on met des données (70) cryptographiques, qui comprennent au moins une clé et/ou au moins un certificat numérique, dans un dispositif (42) de mémoire d'un véhicule (40) du système (10) ferroviaire, dans lequel on utilise le véhicule (40) avec son dispositif (42) de mémoire pour le transport des données cryptographiques, et
    - on transmet, pour assurer une communication sécurisée à l'avenir, par le véhicule (40), lorsque celui-ci s'arrête dans le cadre d'un voyage dans la portée de communication d'au moins un dispositif (35) sur la voie, les données (70) cryptographiques au au moins un dispositif (35) sur la voie du système (10) ferroviaire,
    - dans le procédé on réalise plusieurs stades de communication sous la forme d'une mise à jour de certificats ou d'une transmission d'une liste d'interdiction de certificat, au moyen d'au moins un autre voyage du véhicule (40) ou d'au moins un autre véhicule (40a).
  2. Procédé suivant la revendication 1,
    caractérisé en ce que l'
    on transmette les données cryptographiques (70) par le véhicule (40) sans fil, en particulier par radio, au au moins un dispositif (35) sur la voie.
  3. Procédé suivant la revendication 1 ou 2,
    caractérisé en ce que
    - on transmet les données (70) cryptographiques d'un dispositif (23) central d'une infrastructure à clé publique du système (10) ferroviaire au véhicule et
    - on les met par le véhicule dans le dispositif (42) de mémoire.
  4. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que l'
    on met à disposition du véhicule (40) des informations supplémentaires, qui comprennent au moins l'une des grandeurs caractéristiques suivantes :
    - identité du au moins un dispositif (35) sur la voie,
    - adresse de communication du au moins un dispositif (35) sur la voie,
    - emplacement du au moins un dispositif (35) sur la voie,
    - grandeur de la portée de communication,
    - emplacement d'un parcours, sur ou à partir duquel il faut transmettre les données cryptographiques du véhicule (40) au au moins un dispositif (35) sur la voie.
  5. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que l'
    - on utilise, comme dispositif (35) sur la voie, un dispositif local de gestion du système (10) ferroviaire et
    - on fait part des données (70) cryptographiques du dispositif local de gestion à au moins un autre composant (31) local du système (10) ferroviaire.
  6. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que l'
    on transmet des données (70) cryptographiques pendant le voyage du véhicule (40) au au moins un dispositif (35) sur la voie.
  7. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que l'
    on transmet les données (70) cryptographiques chiffrées ou sécurisées d'une autre façon du véhicule (40) au au moins un dispositif (35) sur la voie.
  8. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que l'
    - on transmet, du dispositif (35) sur la voie ou du moins de l'un des dispositifs sur la voie, des données (71) au véhicule (40) ou à un autre véhicule s'arrêtant à l'instant donné dans la portée de communication,
    - on met les données (71) transmises dans le dispositif (42) de mémoire du véhicule (40) concerné et
    - on les achemine du véhicule (40) concerné, à l'extérieur de la portée de communication du au moins un dispositif (35) sur la voie, à un dispositif central (par exemple 21) du système (10) ferroviaire.
  9. Véhicule (40) d'un système (10) ferroviaire, comprenant
    - un dispositif (42) de mémoire, dans lequel sont mises pour le transport des données (70) cryptographiques, qui comprennent au moins une clé et/ou au moins un certificat numérique,
    - un dispositif (41) de commande pour la détection que le véhicule (40) s'arrête dans le cadre d'un voyage dans la portée de communication d'au moins un dispositif (35) sur la voie du système (10) ferroviaire, et
    - un dispositif (43) de communication pour la transmission des données (70) cryptographiques au au moins un dispositif (35) sur la voie pour assurer une communication sécurisée à l'avenir, dans lequel le dispositif de communication est constitué, pour réaliser, au moyen d'un autre voyage du véhicule (40), plusieurs stades de communication, sous la forme d'une mise à jour de certificats ou d'une transmission d'une liste d'interdiction du certificat.
  10. Véhicule (40) suivant la revendication 9,
    caractérisé en ce que
    le dispositif (43) de communication est constitué pour la transmission sans fil, en particulier par radio, des données (70) cryptographiques du véhicule (40) au au moins un dispositif (35) sur la voie.
  11. Système (10) ferroviaire comprenant au moins un véhicule (40) suivant la revendication 9 ou 10 et un dispositif (20) central, qui est constitué pour transmettre les données (70) cryptographiques au véhicule (40), dans lequel le véhicule (40) est constitué pour mettre pour le transport les données (70) cryptographiques dans le dispositif (42) de mémoire,
    et dans lequel le système (19) ferroviaire est conçu pour réaliser, à l'avenir pour garantir une communication sécurisée, plusieurs stades de communication sous la forme d'une mise à jour de certificats ou d'une transmission d'une liste d'interdiction de certificat, au moyen d'au moins un autre voyage du véhicule (40) ou d'au moins un autre véhicule (40a).
  12. Système (10) ferroviaire suivant la revendication 11, caractérisé en ce que
    le système (10) ferroviaire est constitué pour mettre à disposition du véhicule (40) des informations supplémentaires, qui comprennent au moins l'une des grandeurs caractéristiques suivantes :
    - identité du au moins un dispositif (35) sur la voie,
    - adresse de communication du au moins un dispositif (35) sur la voie,
    - emplacement du au moins un dispositif (35) sur la voie,
    - grandeur de la portée de communication,
    - emplacement d'un parcours, sur ou à partir duquel il faut transmettre les données (70) cryptographiques du véhicule (40) au au moins un dispositif (35) sur la voie.
  13. Système (10) ferroviaire suivant l'une des revendications 11 à 12,
    caractérisé en ce que
    - le dispositif (35) sur la voie est un dispositif local de gestion du système (10) ferroviaire et
    - le dispositif local de gestion est constitué pour donner les données (70) cryptographiques à au moins un autre composant (31) local du système (10) ferroviaire.
EP17800401.6A 2016-11-25 2017-10-25 Procédé de fonctionnement d'un système ferroviaire et véhicule d'un système ferroviaire Active EP3515785B1 (fr)

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DE102016223481.1A DE102016223481A1 (de) 2016-11-25 2016-11-25 Verfahren zum Betreiben eines Eisenbahnsystems sowie Fahrzeug eines Eisenbahnsystems
PCT/EP2017/077280 WO2018095682A1 (fr) 2016-11-25 2017-10-25 Procédé de fonctionnement d'un système ferroviaire et véhicule d'un système ferroviaire

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CN110753320B (zh) * 2019-09-25 2022-11-01 株洲凯创技术有限公司 一种列车车载加密装置及列车车载加密机
CN113242235A (zh) * 2021-05-08 2021-08-10 卡斯柯信号有限公司 一种对铁路信号安全通信协议rssp-i加密认证的系统及其方法

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DE19851709A1 (de) 1998-10-30 2000-05-04 Siemens Ag Verfahren zum Online-Update sicherheitskritischer Software in der Eisenbahn-Signaltechnik
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DE102016223481A1 (de) 2018-05-30
US11958519B2 (en) 2024-04-16
CN110023170A (zh) 2019-07-16
EP3515785C0 (fr) 2024-08-21
WO2018095682A1 (fr) 2018-05-31
EP3515785A1 (fr) 2019-07-31
US20210114635A1 (en) 2021-04-22

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