Classifications

• • G—PHYSICS
  • G08—SIGNALLING
  • G08B—SIGNALLING SYSTEMS, e.g. PERSONAL CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
  • G08B29/00—Checking or monitoring of signalling or alarm systems; Prevention or correction of operating errors, e.g. preventing unauthorised operation
  • G08B29/16—Security signalling or alarm systems, e.g. redundant systems
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G08—SIGNALLING
  • G08B—SIGNALLING SYSTEMS, e.g. PERSONAL CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
  • G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
  • G08B13/02—Mechanical actuation
  • G08B13/12—Mechanical actuation by the breaking or disturbance of stretched cords or wires
  • G08B13/126—Mechanical actuation by the breaking or disturbance of stretched cords or wires for a housing, e.g. a box, a safe, or a room

Definitions

• Tamper-evident techniques are used in the process of product packaging and labelling, especially in cases where it is vital to know whether or not a product has been altered, damaged, or tampered with.
• the problem of tamper detection has been solved in many ways. For example, jars of food are packed with bubble-top lids that pop out when the jar is opened. Unfortunately, such tamper-resistant jars can be resealed with seals apparently intact if closed under elevated pressure. The removal of plastic wrap around all or a portion of a container is often used to detect opening and possible tampering. Break-away components of seals or lids that cannot be reattached are also in common use to detect the opening of containers.
• More complex tamper evident technologies include security tapes, security labels, and RFID tags. Multiple layers or redundant indicators are often used because it is more difficult to defeat multiple tamper evident indicators. Radio-controlled incendiary dye pack device are used by banks to permanently mark money and bank robbers with dye after robberies. Most security products can be defeated by a knowledgeable person with sufficient time and access to specialized tools and materials. Existing methods do not adequately detect small punctures and other forms of tampering that are difficult to see.
• tamper evident methods do not provide information on a time at which tampering occurs, where on a package tampering has occurred, or where during transport tampering has occurred nor do they provide means for detecting multiple tampering events at different times on the same package. It is also desirable for a tamper evident system to have a form of redundancy to solve problems arising from the failure of an essential component leading to complete failure of the system and/or undetected failure of the system.
• the present invention overcomes the limitations and solves problems associated with existing tamper-evident products and methods by providing for a microprocessor-controlled tamper detection system and method for detection of tampering or damage to a package, container, or anything that needs to remain secure. Additionally or alternatively, the system and method may initiate countermeasures in response to the detection of possible tampering.
• a microprocessor controlled system for monitoring a package or container to detect unwanted tampering, record one or more parameters related to tampering, and optionally initiate one or more countermeasures in response to tampering.
• the system comprises a layered composite material comprising two isolated conducting layers and two or more microprocessors connected to the conducting layers and programmed for tamper detection and monitoring.
• the inclusion of two or more microprocessors provides for detects evidence of tampering by sensing a measured change in an electrical property, such as impedance, between the two isolated conducting layers.
• a potential may be provided across the two isolated conducting layers by a dedicated power supply or by a power supply of one or more microprocessors.
• a tamper detection method provides for detection of tampering and/or its prevention, and optionally one or more countermeasures.
• a potential is applied between the two conducting layers and one or more of the microprocessors connected to the conducting layers arm the system and a clock function begins.
• Microprocessor serial numbers and sealing time are recorded and stored. If the package is punctured, cut, or otherwise damaged in route, a change in an impedance or other electrical property measured between the two conductive layers is measured and recorded by the microprocessor in an event log as a possible tampering event and a reset function is activated for the next potential event.
• a user may interrogate the package and download the available event log upon receipt of the package and/or en route. Knowledge of the package transit route provides for comparison with elapsed time and calculation of the location of any tampering or damage.
• the system comprises a layered composite material comprising first and second flexible conductive layers separated by a flexible inner non- conductive layer.
• the first and second conductive layers and inner non-conductive layer are contained within two outer non-conductive layers.
• Each of the respective inner and outer non- conductive layers may be embodied as a thin polyester film so that the layered composite material provides flexibility for enclosure and containment of one or more items.
• a first thin film microprocessor is positioned within a portion of the layered composite material and is electrically coupled to the first conductive layer..
• a second thin film microprocessor is positioned within a portion of the layered composite material and is electrically coupled to the second conductive layer.
• the first and second microprocessors are electrically coupled to each other to form an electrical circuit that is complete except for a break between the first and second conductive layers.
• One or more programs for execution by the first and/or second microprocessor are configured to arm the system upon the one or more items being sealed within the layered composite material and, upon detection of a change in the electrical properties of the circuit, to record a detected event for evidence of tampering in an event log.
• the event log preferably includes the time of the event and may include other available data such as the location on the composite material of the tampering and/or GPS coordinates at the time of tampering.
• the system may be reset for possible detection of a future event and may additionally or alternatively initiate a countermeasure in response to detected tampering.
• each non-conductive layer comprises biaxially-oriented polyethylene terephthalate (BoPET).
• BoPET biaxially-oriented polyethylene terephthalate
• only one of the non-conductive layers comprises BoPET.
• two of the non-conductive layers comprises BoPET.
• One or both flexible conductive layers may be a metal foil.
• the metal foil may comprise, for example gold, aluminium, an aluminium alloy, indium tin oxide or combinations of these.
• One or both of the flexible conductive layers may be embodied as a thin film metalized layer deposited onto a surface of a non-conducting flexible layer.
• One or both of the flexible conductive layers may be embodied as a metalized layer that has been sprayed onto a surface of a non-conducting flexible layer.
• the non-conductive layers may comprise or consist of BoPET.
• FIG. 1 is an illustration of a tamper detection system according to the present invention
• FIGs. 2A-C are circuit schematic illustrations of various embodiments of a tamper detection system
• FIG. 3 is an illustration of a tamper detection system comprising an additional sensor as part of the circuit
• FIGs. 4A-D are illustrations of various embodiments of a tamper detection system
• FIG. 5-A is an illustration of a shipping box that includes the tamper detection system
• FIG. 5-B is an illustration of an alternate embodiment of a shipping box that is a tamper detection system
• FIG. 6 is an illustration of a magazine cabinet for currency that makes use of the tamper detection system
• FIG. 7 is an illustration of a pallet of boxes partially wrapped by tamper detection system packaging
• FIG. 8 is a flowchart that illustrates arming and monitoring of a tamper detection system for use with a package.
• FIG. 9 is a flowchart that further illustrates arming and monitoring a tamper detection system that includes an additional sensor for use with a package.
• a microprocessor-controlled system for monitoring a package, container, or other material wrapped in film-type packaging, for detecting unwanted tampering, recording parameters related to the tampering, and optionally for initiating countermeasures in response to the tampering.
• the tamper detection system provides for detection of tampering more-so than its prevention, although countermeasures against, or in response to, tampering are provided for some embodiments.
• Countermeasures may include radio frequency alert for a tracking signal, or destruction or marking of package contents.
• Such countermeasures may include, for example, dye bombs to mark a currency with ink for ease of future detection and/or tracking of the currency and/or the purveyors of the tampering or theft of the currency.
• FIG. 1 is an illustration of a microprocessor-controlled tamper detection system 100 for monitoring and detection of unwanted tampering with the contents of a shipping package or any other container for which there is a desire for protection of the contents from unwanted tampering.
• the tamper detection system 100 comprises a layered composite material 110 electrically coupled to microprocessors 140a, 140b via lead attachments 120 and 130 and terminals 122 and 132, respectively, within the layered composite material 110.
• One or both of the microprocessors 140a, 140b may communicate an output signal 150 via any number of standard wired and/or wireless communication means and protocols, such as BlueTooth,, ZigBee, NFC, RFID WiFi, USB, RS232 port and/or RJ45 port connections.
• the presence of multiple microprocessors allows for redundancy of function between microprocessors and/or separation of functions between microprocessors.
• An electrical potential is provided between terminals 122 and 132, for example by one or more batteries within the the layered composite material 110 and connected to the electrical circuit that is broken only by the middle nonconducting layer 114b.
• the system may comprise“printed batteries” and ultra thin microprocessors in a film of silicone ribbon to make the power supply and the microprocessors 140a, 140b hard to detect by simple feel or touch. Additionally or alternatively, the battery systems within the tamper detection system 100 may have a duty life proportional to use. Envelopes and packages intended for short- or near-term delivery have typical service duration on the order of weeks. Larger and/or long-term shipping or storage containers are provided with capability to last for months or years according to the desired use.
• Each microprocessor is uniquely identified with an embedded serial number identifier as a countermeasure against replacement by a seemingly identical system 100. Unwrapping an object sealed via the tamper detection system 100 and then resealing in a new seemingly identical package will reveal, on receipt and interrogation of the package, that a swap has occurred because the serial number of one or both of the microprocessors will not match that of the original(s). Ether or both of the microprocessors may additionally be programmed to record an event that damages either one of the microprocessors. Either or both of the microprocessors 140a and 140b may comprise the functionality for communication via data transmission to 150 a user.
• the microprocessor-controlled tamper detection system 100 detects if and when a secured package or container has been compromised by tampering by detecting a measured change in an impedance in a circuit comprising two conducting layers of the composite material.
• the tamper detection system 100 is made from lightweight composite materials to provide security for the package.
• the tamper detection system 100 optionally provides for capture of data via one or both of the microprocessors 140a, 140b that records the exact location of the breach, as well as other information, and may additionally or alternatively trigger a specified predetermined action in response.
• the layered composite material 110 is made from two conductive layers 112a and 112b separated by an insulating or nonconductive layer 114b and sandwiched between insulating or nonconductive layers 114a and 114c.
• the conductive layers 112a and 112b are formed from a metal foil.
• the conductive layers 112 and 112b can be formed from any metallic material having sufficient conductivity and, in this embodiment, that can be made suitably flexible while maintaining its conductivity. Examples of such materials include gold, aluminum, aluminum alloys, and indium tin oxide.
• at least one non-conductive layer is embodied as a metalized layer deposited onto a surface of biaxially-oriented polyethylene terephthalate (BoPET).
• a first conductive layer 112a is compressed between a first nonconductive layer 114a and a second nonconductive layer 114b.
• a second conductive layer 112b is compressed between the second nonconductive layer 114b and a third nonconductive layer 114c.
• the first conductive layer 112a is electrically connected to a first microprocessor 140a via terminal 132 and lead 130.
• the second conductive layer 112b is electrically connected to a second microprocessor 140b via terminal 122 and lead 120.
• One or more batteries may be incorporated into the microprocessors to provide power for the processor and also an electrical potential between the two terminals.
• one or more batteries may be located elsewhere and connected to the microprocessors 140a, 140b to provide power to the microprocessor on the same or a separate circuit as used to produce a potential between the terminals 122 and 132.
• tampering such as puncturing, tearing, or the application of other forces acting on the nonconducting layer 114b will damage the nonconducting layer 114b and change the impedance measured between the conductive layers 112a and 112b and cause one or both of the microprocessors 140a, 140b to note and record a tamper event.
• FIG. 2-B illustrates an alternative embodiment 100-B of the microprocessor- controlled tamper detection system in which the composite material 110 includes layers that are tiered so that the nonconductive layers 114a, 114b, and 114c along with the conductive layers 112a and 112b all exposed near the same point for ease in connecting the leads 120 and 130 to terminals 122’ and 132’.
• the nonconductive layers 114a, 114b, and 114c are polyester films manufactured and stretched to provide a high tensile strength.
• One commonly available form of such a material is biaxially-oriented polyethylene terephthalate (BoPET), which is a polyester film made from stretched polyethylene terephthalate (PET).
• PET provides high tensile strength, chemical and dimensional stability, transparency, reflectivity, gas and aroma barrier properties, in addition to the desired electrical insulation capabilities.
• PET provides high tensile strength, chemical and dimensional stability, transparency, reflectivity, gas and aroma barrier properties, in addition to the desired electrical insulation capabilities.
• BoPET is Mylar®.
• BoPET may be metalized by depositing a thin film of evaporated gold, aluminum, or another metal onto the BoPET surface by a vapor deposition technique to create a conductive layer 112a or 112b on one of the nonconducting BoPET layers.
• Conductive indium tin oxide or other coatings can also be applied via sputter deposition or spray coating, for example.
• Conductive layers 112a and 112b can be formed from any metallic material having sufficient conductivity, and that can be made suitably flexible while maintaining its conductivity.
• the term“aluminized BoPET” is used for an exemplary thin film material coated on one side with aluminum.
• a sometimes common equivalent and comparable term is aluminized Mylar®.
• other flexible synthetic films may be coated on one-side with a conductor and on the opposite side with an insulator to produce conducting and nonconducting layers in the composite layer material 110.
• the five functional layers 114a, 112a, 114b, 112b, 114c may be embodied as various combinations comprising a conducting layer and a nonconducting layer embodied as a unitary structural layer.
• a complete BoPET laminate having five layers
• an embodiment of the tamper detection system 100 can also be made from a complete laminate having three layers.
• a three layer BoPET laminate may comprise an exterior nonconductive outer layer 114a upon which a conductive inner face is deposited, an interior nonconductive layer 114b, and an exterior nonconductive layer upon which a conductive inner face has been deposited.
• a plain metal foil is utilized and includes four layers of material rather than three.
• the four layers may comprise one layer of aluminized BoPET to form a structurally unitary layer comprising 114a and 112a, for example, a nonconductive layer 114b, a conducting layer 112b, and a nonconducting layer outer layer 114c.
• the three nonconductive layers 114a, 114b, and 114c are provided by BoPET film layers that separate the conductive layers 112 and 112b from each other. Together, the nonconductive layers 114a, 114b, and 114c and the conductive layers 112 and 112b form the layered composite material 110 or packaging.
• the tamper detection system 100 can be constructed from any number of layers so long as those layers include insulating or nonconductive layers 114a, 114b, and 114c to separate the conductive layers 112 and 112b.
• Such layers can be constructed from five individual layers, or from a group of multi-sided materials having, for example, insulating material on one side and conductive material on the other side, or any other such arrangement to construct the arrangement described above.
• the layers can be constructed and/or assembled from any type material that can be utilized to form the respective conductive or insulating layer.
• the respective layers are formed from a spray-on type material that is utilized to apply the respective layer, as noted above.
• a conductive layer is applied via spraying the conductive material to a BoPET material.
• Another BoPET material layer is applied adjacent the spray-on conductive layer. The process is repeatable to provide the desired number of conductive and non-conductive layers necessary for the particular situation.
• a non-conductive or insulating layer is applied via spraying the material in the desired location, then a conductive layer is applied via spraying over the insulating layer. Additional layers of non-conductive, conductive, and then non-conductive materials are sprayed respectively until the desired number of layers are applied.
• Fig. 2-C discloses an embodiment 100-C of a tamper evident system similar to that shown in Fig. 2-A except that the first and second microprocessors 140a and 140b are electrically coupled to a third microprocessor 140c.
• Programming for detecting, reporting, and storing data associated with a tamper event may be present in any one, two or three of the microprocessors 140a-c.
• the microprocessors may be configured to provide a double or triple redundancy for any single or combination of functions performed by the system.
• One or more of the microprocessors may additionally be programmed to record an event that damages one or both of the other microprocessors. Any single microprocessor or combination of two or three of the microprocessors may be programmed to provide communication via data transmission to 150 a user.
• FIG. 3 is an illustration of a tamper detection system comprising a sensor 160 included as part of the circuit.
• the sensor 160 may be located anywhere within the layered composite material 110 or it may be attached thereto.
• the sensor may be electrically coupled to the microprocessor 140 and its power supply or the sensor 160 may have its own power supply and communicate wirelessly with the microprocessor 140.
• the sensor 160 may be incorporated into and integral with the layered composite material 110 such that the sensor 160 is undetectable by a visual inspection of the tamper detection system.
• One or more additional sensors 160 may be included in various embodiments of tamper detection systems 100A-C to provide additional monitoring and or detection capabilities and associated data recording.
• the microprocessor 140 may, for example, record one or more of sensor information on temperature, barometric pressure, altitude, moisture, acceleration, and crush force provided by one or more sensors 160. Utilizing this collected information, the microprocessors 140a, 140b can issue or relay a command to take various type defensive or offensive actions.
• the microprocessor- controlled tamper detection systems 100-100C and additional embodiments comprising various disclosed combinations of features comprise an inexpensive, disposable, composite material.
• the tamper detection systems disclosed herein may be incorporated into common items such as envelopes, boxes, and bags and, if incorporated on the inside of a box, envelope or other container, may be completely invisible from the outside. Piercing, cutting, tearing or otherwise damaging the composite material causes the microprocessor(s) to quietly record the time and date of the tampering, and optionally to illuminate a telltale LED light, or to trigger a countermeasure action, i.e. dye bomb, radio signal, etc., if so programmed.
• a countermeasure action i.e. dye bomb, radio signal, etc.
• any of the disclose embodiments of the tamper detection system may provide specialized applications that detect temperature changes, pressure changes, crushing force, and or acceleration experienced by the package.
• the various described embodiments are particularly useful for shipping pharmaceuticals, legal evidence, confidential documents, and other items that require greater than normal security and accountability.
• the tamper detection systems 100A-C can provide tamper and damage detection security even for large objects such as motor vehicles, space craft, airplanes, boxcars, tankers, buildings, doors, hatches, body bags, evidence lockers, and crates.
• the tamper detection system 100 provides tamper and damage detection for anything that can be sealed and remain secure in the knowledge that there has been no tampering. An entire object need not be sealed within the layered composite material 110.
• the layered composite material 110 can be used to detect tampering with or opening of a door to a locker, a hatch on a ship or submarine or the canopy of an airplane, for example.
• the system 100 is preferably configured to measure an impedance between the two conducting layers 112a and 112b and arm when the door, hatch or canopy is closed.
• the layered composite material 110 may be attached to the inner hull of a ship or submarine or to the fuselage of an aircraft so that the system 100 detects any piercing of the hull or fuselage.
• the layered composite material 110 may be attached to helmets, flight suits or space suits to detect minute piercings.
• Conducting and nonconducting layers may be sprayed onto interior and/or internal surfaces of vessels such as spacecraft, aircraft, watercraft, or submarines to provide for detection of penetration through a hull, fuselage, containment wall, or other internal or external barrier.
• the tamper detection system 100 operates effectively as a switch, triggered by altering an electrical property, such as impedance, in a flexible packaging wrap.
• an electrical property such as impedance
• One or both of the microprocessors 140a, 140b monitor the composite material 110.
• the electrical alteration can be a dead short in the packaging (bridging between two conductive layers as in a penetration through at least a portion of the packaging), a capacitive discharge from an electrical layer to ground (scraping away the outside insulating layer), or tampering with sensors that changes conductivity or other electrical properties.
• the tamper detection system 100A-C may be a sealed, monitored, sensor system in which a change beyond a specified allowable parameter is measured by the microprocessor and an action is taken as a result. For example, a penetration of the exterior insulating layer and cutting or applying pressure to just one conductive layer with a metallic or nonmetallic tool can cause such a change.
• Temperature, interior and exterior atmospheric pressures, and interior crush sensors may also be monitored by one or both of the microprocessor 140a, 140b.
• the triggering methods chosen are based on use and cost considerations.
• the composite packaging material 110 and the microprocessor units are disposable and represent effective but very low cost security. It should be appreciated that the use of additional sensors provide for multiple configurations and variations depending on the particular requirements.
• the tamper detection system provides for detection of tampering more-so than its prevention, although countermeasures against, or in response to, tampering are provided for some embodiments.
• the system comprises a radio transmitter controlled by one or more microprocessors to send a radio frequency alert as a tracking signal, or even destroy or mark the package contents
• a dye bomb is activated to mark a currency with ink for ease in future detection and/or tracking of the currency and/or the purveyors of the tampering or theft of the currency.
• an alert is transmitted via available communication channels, such as WiFi, WAN, LAN, or available cellular and other communication methods.
• the alert can be as simple as a text message to a prescribed number or location, an email communication to one or more parties, or as complex as a telemetry data dump to a designated recipient or recipients.
• the tamper detection system 100A-D may provide for triggering a specified predetermined action in response to a breach detected by one or more sensors 160, such as recording information provided by a sensor 160 and relay a command for defensive or offensive actions.
• microprocessors 140a, 140b may provide total redundancy or either of the first and second microprocessors 140a and 140b may be programmed to provide partial or no redundancy of function with the other of the first and second microprocessors.
• the second microprocessor may be programmed to detect damage to, or tampering with, the first microprocessor.
• the second microprocessor may additionally monitor for a change in impedance and/or other electrical property in the system.
• the second microprocessor may be configured for communications to users reporting on the operation of the first microprocessor and may optionally be located remotely from the first microprocessor to reduce the risk of damage to both microprocessor simultaneously.
• FIG. 4-A is an illustration of a tamper detection system applied to the interior of a shipping envelope 402.
• the tamper detection system is located inside a paper or paper type mailing envelope 402 that includes an interior interleaving of insulating and conductive layers that form the composite material 110.
• a double-flap peel-destructive flap 410, 420 is utilized to activate one or both of the interior microprocessors 140a, 140b upon sealing of the envelope 402.
• the interior microprocessor(s) may additionally or alternatively be activated in any manner that is customarily utilized for activating or applying power to a microprocessor, such as a switch, or a wireless signal.
• the tamper detection system applied in Fig. 4-A may be, for example, any of embodiments 100-100C with any combination of the microprocessors being activated by the double-flap peel-destructive flap 410.
• a LED external to the package may be functionally (physically and/or wirelessly) connected to two or more microprocessors in the system to provide a visible indication of tampering or damage.
• Other embodiments may additionally or alternatively include audible, olfactory, and/or other visual methodologies for signaling that tampering has taken place.
• FIG. 4-B is an illustration of an alternate embodiment of a tamper detection system that is embodied as a shipping envelope 404 that comprises an interleaving of insulating and conductive layers that is formed into an envelope 404. That is, the envelope 404 is made from the composite material 110’ itself. At least one of the insulating and/or conductive layers also provides the rigidity necessary for the particular envelope design. Embodiments comprising two, three, or more microprocessors may be configured in this way. Any of the nonconducting layers may be made to have the structure or rigidity necessary for the envelope 404.
• FIG. 4-C is an illustration of an embodiment of a tamper detection system that is also a pouch container 430 with a typical shipping type pouch configuration often used for the shipping of sensitive materials or products for which it is desired that the product be unopened.
• materials might include printed circuit boards, hard drives, USB devices, electronic products, compact discs, DVDs, evidence, medical products and devices, prescription drugs, pharmaceuticals, and many other products.
• the particular products that are often shipped in such pouches are many and varied.
• the composite layer may have any of the configurations described herein with respect to 100-100c.
• the pouch container 430 includes a seal 432 at the open-able end which may be re-sealable or non re-sealable.
• the pouch container 430 is made from an interleaving of the insulating and conductive layers of the composite material 110. That is, the pouch container 430 is made from the composite material 110.
• a specialized double-flap peel-destructive flap is utilized to seal the contents within and to trigger the interior microprocessor(s) 140a, 140b, and/or 140c for monitoring upon sealing of the pouch container 430.
• the interior microprocessors may be activated in any manner that is customarily utilized for activating or applying power to a microprocessor, such as a switch, a wireless signal, or completing a circuit in some other manner.
• the pouch container 430 can be constructed from any number of layers so long as those layers include three insulating or nonconductive layers to separate two conductive layers electrically coupled to one or more processors as described herein. In some embodiments, at least one of the layers provides any additional structure necessary for the pouch and its desired contents.
• the invention is not limited to the pouch shaped explicitly described herein and could include any variety of geometric shapes so long as the contents are sealed within and at least one of the interior microprocessors is activated for monitoring.
• a specialized double-flap peel-destructive flap may be used to seal the contents and activate the interior microprocessor(s) 140a, 140b need not extend across an entire end of the pouch container 430.
• a balloon type pouch container 430 may comprise a narrow spout with a relatively smaller size than the end of the pouch for activating and sealing.
• FIG. 4-D is an illustration of tamper detection system embodied as a pouch 430 placed within a shipping envelope 402. Once the contents requiring tamper detection monitoring are sealed within the pouch 430, the pouch 430 is placed within a shipping envelope 402 for delivery. Multiple pouches may be placed within a shipping envelope 402 or any other type shipping package as space and any other desired shipping constraints allow.
• FIG. 5-A is an illustration of a tamper detection system embodied as a liner applied to the interior of a shipping box 502.
• the cardboard shipping box 502 encloses an interior interleaving of insulating and conductive layers that form the composite material 110.
• a double flap peel-destructive flap 510, 520 triggers the interior microprocessor(s) 140a, 140b, 140c upon sealing of the shipping box 502.
• One or more of the interior microprocessor(s)140-140c may be activated in any manner that is customarily utilized for activating or applying power to a microprocessor, such as a switch, a wireless signal, or completing a circuit in some other manner.
• a LED external to the package may be electrically coupled to one or more microprocessors and lit as a visual indication of tampering or damage.
• one embodiment provides for a single external LED external to the shipping box that is lit by one or more of the microprocessors as an indication of shipping or damage.
• This and other embodiments may additionally or alternatively include audible, olfactory, and/or other visual methodologies for signaling that tampering has taken place.
• FIG. 5-B is an illustration of a tamper detection system embodied as a shipping box 504.
• the tamper detection system is made by interleaving insulating and conductive layers into a rigid composite layered material 110’ that forms the shipping box 504. That is, the shipping box 504 is made from the composite material 110’ itself. At least one of the insulating and/or conductive layers also provides the rigidity necessary for the particular shipping box design. This is an example of a tamper detection system for which the conducting and nonconducting layers need not be flexible and are preferably rigid.
• FIG. 6 illustrates a tamper detection system applied to a magazine cabinet 602 for containing and/or dispensing currency in an ATM machine or currency exchange machine.
• the magazine cabinet 602 includes a base 620, a main cabinet 630, and a top plate or lid 640.
• Two layered composite materials 610a, 610b are attached to the inside of the main cabinet 630.
• the front 612a and back 612b of each layered composite material are attached to the front and back (narrow ends visually in the orientation of the illustrated example) respectively of the main cabinet 630.
• the left sides 611 a, 611 b wrap along one edge of the main cabinet 630, and the right sides 613a, 613b wrap along the opposing edge of the main cabinet 630.
• Each of the layered composite material 610a, 610b includes a base fold 614, 615 respectively.
• the base fold 615 of the back layered composite material 610b includes an opening for an ink spray mechanism, for example, as part of a dye bomb. Additional or alternative action mechanisms such as audible, visible, or wireless signals can be provided. Closing the lid 640, completes the circuit to arm the processor(s).
• Combination crush and thermal sensors may be adhered at the top, middle, and bottom of the interior walls of the magazine cabinet 602.
• the sensors are made from a material that will fragment and break the thin, brittle wires embedded inside. Breaking the wires signals the microprocessor(s) 140-140c that severe impacts and/or crushing forces are being applied to the magazine.
• thermocouple connections may be included with the crush sensors and provide for temperature measurement and detection of changes in temperature within the magazine cabinet 602. Such measurements can be recorded by one or more microprocessors 140-140c to track the mean magazine cabinet temperature.
• the layered composite materials 610a, 610b cover the inside of the magazine cabinet. Any piercing or cutting causes the two inner conducting layers of metal foil to contact each other and completes the electrical circuit that triggers, for example, an ink jet spray system, or other desired action. The circuit is completed when physical contact occurs between the normally insulated metal foil layers.
• the tamper detection system may provide for reporting a penetration in a specific area of a package or panel using a grid detection technique.
• Sector detection may be provided for individual aircraft or spacecraft doors, as well as fuselage or hull sections.
• Each piece or desired protection section may be equipped with a dedicated tamper detection system with each of the tamper detection systems 100-100C wired to a common microprocessor bus.
• Grids can be provided in large sheets or panels having square yard or square foot grids, for example.
• the material may be constructed of many smaller, individually sized tamper detection systems, with each wired to a common microprocessor bus.
• Square inch detection may be achieved by printing a complex grid pattern in the conductive layers of the sensors using nonmetallic conductive ink.
• the two conductive layers are adhered in a specific overlapping manner so that there is no unprotected area.
• Each square inch section of the grid has an individual reporting circuit, half in one conductive layer, the other half in the other conductive layer.
• the circuits connect to collector buses that report to one or more of the microprocessors.
• the sensor material can be used in spaced parallel sheets to detect and calculate the trajectory of incoming small arms fire, for example.
• targeted structures and other areas subject to hostile fire are provided with the capability to record forensic data of the time and angle of fire.
• a return fire azimuth may be calculated by the system.
• Such an embodiment comprises a variation of the square inch grid-locating configuration described above, with two- inch squares on the outer panel, and one-inch squares on the inner panel. Arranged in parallel, and spaced four to six inches apart, two panels allow precise trajectory calculations as a projectile passes through them.
• FIG. 7 illustrates a pallet of boxes 700 partially wrapped by a microprocessor-controlled tamper detection system, e.g. any of 100-100C, comprising a layered composite material 110.
• a microprocessor-controlled tamper detection system e.g. any of 100-100C
• Two layers of the layered composite material 110 are wrapped around a portion of the stack of boxes.
• One layer of composite material 110 is completely wrapped, while a second layer is mostly wrapped but not yet closed around the boxes.
• the layered composite material 110 of the microprocessor-controlled tamper detection system can also be wrapped over the top and/or the bottom of the stack of boxes 720, before or after wrapping around the sides.
• FIG. 8 is a flowchart illustrating logic for arming and monitoring of a tamper detection system 100-100D for use with a package or other container.
• the initiation process for arming the package begins at step 810.
• the microprocessor(s) 140a and/or 140b begins monitoring the electrical properties, such as impedance, of a circuit comprising conducting layers 112a and 112b for an event indicative of tampering. If no tamper event is detected at step 830, the microprocessors maintain a loop beginning at step 820 to continue monitoring for a tamper event.
• the processor records the time and location of the tamper event.
• One or more of the microprocessors 140a, 140b then resets at step 850 for the next tamper event, and then proceeds back into the loop beginning at step 820 to monitor for new tamper events.
• FIG. 9 is a flowchart illustrating logic for arming and monitoring a tamper detection system that includes one or more sensors 160. Once contents are placed into the container and the package is sealed, the initiation process for arming the package begins at step 910. At step 920, one or more of microprocessors 140a, 140b begins monitoring for input from the sensor(s) 160. If no sensor detected event is detected at step 930, the microprocessor maintains a loop beginning at step 920 to continue monitoring for a tamper event or other sensor notification.
• one or more of the microprocessors 140a, 140b determines the event type at step 940. Determination of the event type is dependent on the type(s) of sensor(s) in the system. Examples of events include sudden acceleration, temperature change, change in humidity, and exposure to a form of radiation. Any actions required by the particular event type are initiated at step 950. The data related to the tamper and/or other event are recorded along with the time and location at step 960. The microprocessors 140a, 140b then reset at step 970 for the next tamper event, and then proceeds back into the loop beginning at step 920 to monitor for new events. For embodiments of the system three or more microprocessors, the functions performed by a single processor in this example may be distributed between the microprocessors and/or be performed redundantly by the microprocessors.

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• 2018
  • 2018-10-22 WO PCT/US2018/056819 patent/WO2019139658A1/en not_active Ceased
  • 2018-10-22 EP EP18811100.9A patent/EP3740942A1/de not_active Withdrawn

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