EP4309332A1 - Procédé mis en oeuvre par ordinateur pour fournir des clés cryptographiques pour signer des données, module de signature, procédé de signature de données et procédé de communication authentifiée - Google Patents

Procédé mis en oeuvre par ordinateur pour fournir des clés cryptographiques pour signer des données, module de signature, procédé de signature de données et procédé de communication authentifiée

Info

Publication number
EP4309332A1
EP4309332A1 EP22725763.1A EP22725763A EP4309332A1 EP 4309332 A1 EP4309332 A1 EP 4309332A1 EP 22725763 A EP22725763 A EP 22725763A EP 4309332 A1 EP4309332 A1 EP 4309332A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
keys
hash tree
signature
tree structure
hash
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP22725763.1A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Hans Aschauer
Fabrizio De Santis
Rainer Falk
Andreas Furch
Daniel Schneider
Thomas Zeschg
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens AG
Siemens Corp
Original Assignee
Siemens AG
Siemens Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens AG, Siemens Corp filed Critical Siemens AG
Publication of EP4309332A1 publication Critical patent/EP4309332A1/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a computer-implemented method for providing cryptographic keys for data signature, a signature module, a method for data signature and a method for authenticated communication.
  • asymmetric cryptographic methods in particular signature methods, is regularly based on the difficulty of solving a specific type of mathematical problem.
  • these are trapdoor functions, i.e. functions that are easy to calculate in one direction but difficult in the other direction if you do not have certain additional information.
  • Mathematical problems of this kind include the factorization problem or the discrete logarithm problem or the discrete logarithm problem of elliptic curves. In the future, these methods will be vulnerable to powerful quantum computers. Therefore, new cryptographic methods are currently being developed which - from today's point of view - are secure against attacks with future quantum computers. Such cryptographic methods are also referred to as post-quantum cryptographic methods.
  • a currently pursued approach for signature methods in post-quantum cryptography is hash-based cryptography, which can be used to create digital signatures.
  • the XMSS method uses a modified Winternitz signature method as the signature method, i.e. a one-time signature method, and links this signature method with hash trees.
  • the hash trees consist of so-called L -Trees ("L Trees”) and a Merkle tree ("Merkle Tree”), whereby multiple one-time signatures can be verified with a public key, since all public keys are contained in the Merkle tree The root of the Merkle tree then represents the combined public key.
  • Hash-based methods such as the XMSS method and the LMS method are based on an efficient combination of a specified number of one-time signature keys.
  • the number of signatures that can be created using the above-mentioned method corresponds to the number specified above.
  • This maximum number of signatures is set before the key is generated. If the maximum number of signatures is chosen to be quite large, the duration of key generation scales linearly with the number of signatures. The length of the signatures increases with the logarithm of the number of signatures.
  • Multi-tree variants of XMSS and LMS were developed to accelerate key generation for keys with a large number of signatures.
  • These multi-tree methods do not use a single Merkle tree, but a tree of Merkle trees, ie a tree whose nodes and leaves each contain an XMSS tree; Such a tree is also referred to below as a subtree, since here the keys are generated as part of the signature generation and in particular occur after the root generation can, large numbers of keys can also be generated with this method.
  • the maximum number of signatures when generating the key must also be specified for the multi-tree method.
  • the object of the invention specifies an improved computer-implemented method for providing cryptographic keys for data signatures, in which the computing effort can easily be kept low. Furthermore, the object of the invention is to specify an improved signature module and an improved method for data signatures and an improved method for authenticated communication, which can be carried out using the improved method for providing cryptographic keys to the data signature.
  • This object of the invention is achieved with a method for providing cryptographic keys for data signatures with the features specified in claim 1 and with a signature module with the features specified in claim 12 and with a method for data signatures with the features specified in claim 13
  • a method for authenticated communication with the specified in claim 14 features.
  • the method according to the invention for providing cryptographic keys for data signatures is computer implemented.
  • a requirement criterion for a requirement for additional keys is used and evaluated, and when it is determined that the requirement criterion is met, a number of additional keys is generated.
  • the additionally generated keys are kept ready as leaves of at least one further hash tree, with the at least one further hash tree being integrated into the hash tree structure in such a way that the root of at least one further hash tree has a key of a leaf of the hash tree structure is signed.
  • a key of a leaf means a key that forms this leaf.
  • hash trees of a predetermined number, height and structure it is therefore not necessary to use hash trees of a predetermined number, height and structure, but instead hash tree structures can grow as required if a need for new keys is foreseeable.
  • a new hash tree in the sense of a subtree as described above is only formed when the provision of new keys appears necessary.
  • the number of keys required is not predetermined, ie predetermined, by a predetermined hash tree structure with a predetermined number of hash trees.
  • the number of cryptographic keys that can be provided is basically unlimited according to the invention, so that the method according to the invention can advantageously also be used in applications with high availability requirements and, associated therewith, with a high and ongoing need for new cryptographic keys.
  • the hash tree structure does not have to be designed in advance for a specific number of keys. Consequently, in the method according to the invention, a number of signatures is not specified beforehand, but rather the hash tree structure grows as a function of a requirement criterion that is currently being evaluated. Since the number of signatures and the depth of the hash tree structure does not have to be unnecessarily high in advance, the signatures do not have to be unnecessarily long and the computational effort for generating and using the signatures increases at most to the extent that this increased computational effort is caused by a need for new keys to be provided is required at all.
  • the method steps of the first claim are preferably repeated.
  • the hash tree structure is a multi-tree structure and preferably the first hash tree and ideally the further hash tree are XMSS hash trees.
  • Established hash tree structures of known cryptographic signature methods can be used in this development of the method according to the invention. In this way, existing cryptographic systems can easily be updated and adapted and expanded to use the solution according to the invention.
  • the keys in the method according to the invention are suitably one-time keys or so-called “few-time signatures”, also referred to in German as “pair keys”.
  • one-time keys or pairs of keys can be designed and used securely against quantum computer-assisted attacks, preferably by means of hash-based cryptographic methods known per se.
  • the keys are particularly preferably hash-based keys. According to current knowledge, finding original images of a hash function is sufficiently difficult even for quantum computers, so that the method according to the invention can also be used in future applications. availability of powerful quantum computers remains reliably practicable.
  • the keys are preferably public keys for each of an asymmetric key pair.
  • the keys are private keys for each of an asymmetric key pair.
  • the keys are preferably each Winternitz signature key, ie keys that are designed for signature using the Winternitz signature method.
  • the keys are each Lamport signature keys, ie keys which are formed out for signature according to the Lamport signature method.
  • the keys in the method according to the invention are each HORST signature keys, ie keys that are designed for signature using the HORST signature method, a paired signature method.
  • the three aforementioned signature methods are known to be quantum computer-resistant, so that the method according to the invention is particularly future-proof in this development.
  • the requirement criterion preferably depends on a number of keys of the hash tree structure that have already been used for the signature.
  • the need for additional keys can be predicted on the basis of progress in the use of the keys provided and the hash structure can be extended in a foresighted manner to include a need to be expected in the future.
  • the requirement criterion depends on a number of keys and/or keys that are still intended for use depends on an age of the hash tree structure or the first hash tree.
  • the signature module is designed to execute a computer-implemented method for providing cryptographic keys as described above, and the signature module has a memory for this purpose, storing a hash tree structure, a first hash tree with a plurality of keys as leaves of the hash tree structure and with one not previously specified number of hash trees, and includes an evaluation unit for evaluating whether a requirement criterion is met and a key generation module which, depending on whether the requirement criterion is met, is set up to generate additional keys as leaves of at least one additional hash tree and which is set up to integrate the at least one further hash tree is set up in the hash tree structure by means of a signature for each root of the at least one further hash tree with a key of a leaf of the hash tree structure.
  • At least one additional cryptographic key is provided using a previously described method according to the invention for providing cryptographic keys in the event that additional cryptographic keys are required, and at least one file is signed using the at least one additional cryptographic key, preferably using a signature module according to the invention as described above.
  • the communication takes place using at least one signed file, the at least one signed file being encrypted using a method for data signatures as described above.
  • FIG. 2 shows a hash tree structure in a memory of a signature module according to the invention at a first point in time when executing a method according to the invention for providing cryptographic keys, schematically in a basic sketch,
  • FIG. 3 shows the hash tree structure according to FIG.
  • FIGS. 2 and 3 shows the hash tree structure according to FIGS. 2 and 3 at a third point in time following the second point in time, schematically in a basic sketch.
  • the hash tree structure 10 shown in FIG. 1 is used in a manner known per se from the prior art for the digital signature of data.
  • the hash tree structure 10 provides digital signature keys 20 (uniformly denoted by the reference number 20 in the drawing; it goes without saying that the signature keys 20 are different from one another and are not identical).
  • the hash tree structure 10 has a first XMSS tree 30, which is formed with a Merkle tree and L-trees.
  • the XMSS tree 30 comprises one-time keys 40 as leaves, by means of which user data can be digitally signed.
  • these one-time keys 40 are not used for the direct signature of user data, but are roots by means of the one-time keys 40 other, similarly structured, XMSS trees 50 signed.
  • XMSS trees 60 are in turn signed with leaves of these XMSS trees 50 , the leaves of which now form the signature key 20 .
  • Keys of the hash tree structure 10 are available by means of these signature keys 20, by means of which user data, for example electronic documents (not explicitly shown in FIG. 1), can be digitally signed.
  • the public key is formed with the root of the first XMSS tree 30, shown here as the tip of the triangle symbolizing the first XMSS tree 30.
  • the digital signatures which are generated using a signature key 20, contain the complete signature chain of the XMSS trees 60, the XMSS trees 50 of the higher level of the hash tree structure 10 and the first XMSS tree 30.
  • the depth of the hash tree structure 10 and the selection of the XMSS trees 50, 60 that are linked to the first XMSS tree 30 are already specified when the key is generated.
  • a depth of the hash tree structure 10 is to be understood as the number of roots of XMSS trees 50, 60, 30 linked to one another by means of one-time signatures 40, by means of which the signature keys 20 are linked to the root of the first XMSS tree 30.
  • the depth of the hash tree structure 10 as a whole means the maximum number of linked roots that can occur with the signature key 20 .
  • the depth of the hash tree structure is therefore 10 and the number of possible signature keys 20 at the time of key generation of the public key, here the root of the first XMSS tree 30, already fixed:
  • each individual XMSS tree 60, 30, or 60 four signatures are performed. This number is in the illustrated embodiment for purposes of illustration cke elected.
  • per XMSS tree 602 5 ie 32, signatures, 2 10 signatures or 2 20 signatures are provided.
  • the number of signature keys 200 and in particular the number of XMSS trees of the hash tree structure 100 is not fixed from the outset, in contrast to the prior art.
  • a hash tree structure 100 is formed by starting with a first XMSS tree 30 as shown in FIG. However, the depth of the hash tree structure 100 is determined dynamically:
  • a required value is defined, when it is reached the depth of the hash tree structure 100 increases.
  • the required value is defined as the consumption of 50 percent of the one-time keys 40 that have been available up to now. If a proportion of 50 percent of the available leaves of the first XMSS tree 30 has already been used, then the remaining one-time keys 40 are not themselves used as signature keys 200, but rather the remaining one-time keys 40 of the first XMSS tree 30 are used to sign roots of other XMSS trees 500. These further XMSS trees 500 are created when the required value is reached and integrated into the previous hash tree structure 100 by means of signing with the one-time keys 40 . In the representation of FIG. 3, 8 additional one-time keys 40 are now available, which can basically be used as signature keys 200.
  • This method can be repeated any number of times, so that in principle any number of signatures can be generated using the signature key 200 .
  • the signature of a message or a document with a signature key 200 is thus always made by means of a one-time key of an XMSS tree 30, 500, 600 on the locally lowest level of the hash tree structure 100 in the method according to the invention, i. H. by means of a one-time key 40, by means of which no root of another XMSS tree has been signed.
  • the depth of the hash tree structure 100 increases.
  • the signature keys 200 that are generated become longer and longer.
  • the length of the signature key 200 generated according to the invention remains comparable to signature keys 20 that are generated using the prior art method.
  • a suitable compromise can be selected in further exemplary embodiments, which results in a suitable required value:
  • the fraction of signature keys 200 that must be used before a new XMSS tree 600 is integrated into the hash tree structure 100 can be suitable to get voted.
  • the integration of new XMSS trees 500, 600 does not have to take place when a specific, fixed proportion of used signature keys 200 is reached. Rather, a required value can also be selected which depends on the current depth of the hash tree structure 100, where the required value can optionally also include additional circumstances, such as an age of the hash tree structure 100 or a number of the previously used signature keys 200 per time unit.
  • the XMSS trees 500, 600 integrated into the hash tree structure 100 need not necessarily have the same size, but XMSS trees with 2 5 one-time keys 40 can be integrated first, for example, and then when a requirement change frequency per time unit increases, XMSS trees with 2 20 one-time keys 40 are integrated, which are then potentially available as signature keys 200 .
  • the required value can also specify the location at which an XMSS tree 500, 600 and the size of it should be added in order to meet the need for new signature keys 200. Because when new XMSS trees 500, 600 are inserted into an already existing level of hash tree structure 100, i. That is, if newly integrated XMSS trees 500, 600 do not increase the depth of the hash tree structure 100, then the signature length remains the same. The signature keys only get longer with the local depth of the hash tree structure 100, i.e. H. with the depth of the hash tree structure 100 with the signature key 200.
  • the point at which an XMSS tree is integrated into the hash tree structure 100 is also stored in the method.
  • This information is stored internally or externally with integrity protection. In exemplary embodiments that are not shown specifically, this information is calculated from the number of signature keys 200 used up to now.
  • the complete signature chain is not provided, but only a part of the signature from that specific XMSS tree 500, 600, 30, in which the signature key 200 is contained, since the other signatures are already ge have been checked and stored in an integrity-protected manner.
  • the length of the signature key 200 does not have to match the depth of the hash tree structure 100 in the signa- door key 200 grow with you.
  • This variant can advantageously be used whenever a party signing using the signature key 200 knows which signature key 200 all conceivable recipients of the signed file who want to verify this file with the signature key 200 have already received. This can be the case in particular when all signature keys 200 are published and can be queried at any time, for example in a blockchain context.
  • the method according to the invention is carried out using a signature module according to the invention.
  • the signature module is set up to keep the required value ready and to integrate new XMSS trees 500, 600 into the hash tree structure 100 according to the required value.
  • the signature module has a memory that stores the hash tree structure 100 and also has an evaluation unit for evaluating the required value and a key generation module, which is set up to generate additional keys as leaves of at least one further XMSS tree 500, 600 and which is set up for integrating the at least one further XMSS tree 500, 600 into the hash tree structure 100 by signing the root of the at least one further XMSS tree 500, 600 with a one-time key.
  • the signature keys 200 are used, as before according to the method according to the invention for data signatures, to digitally sign data, in particular documents.
  • Communication data is signed using the data signature method and the signed communication data is exchanged. In this way, a method according to the invention for authenticated communication is carried out.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

Dans le procédé mis en œuvre par ordinateur pour fournir des clés cryptographiques (200) pour signer des données, une pluralité de clés (200) sont fournies en tant que feuilles d'une structure d'arbre de hachage (100) ayant au moins un premier arbre de hachage (30), le nombre d'arbres de hachage (30, 500, 600) de la structure d'arbre de hachage (100) n'est pas prédéterminée, un critère d'exigence pour une exigence pour des clés supplémentaires (200) est utilisé et évalué et, s'il est établi que le critère d'exigence est satisfait, un certain nombre de clés supplémentaires (200) sont générés, qui sont conservées prêtes à fonctionner en tant que feuilles d'au moins un arbre de hachage supplémentaire (500, 600), le ou les arbres de hachage supplémentaires (500, 600) étant intégrés dans la structure d'arbre de hachage (100) de telle sorte que la racine de chaque un arbre de hachage supplémentaire (500, 600) est signée avec une clé (40) d'une feuille de la structure d'arbre de hachage (100).
EP22725763.1A 2021-04-30 2022-04-26 Procédé mis en oeuvre par ordinateur pour fournir des clés cryptographiques pour signer des données, module de signature, procédé de signature de données et procédé de communication authentifiée Withdrawn EP4309332A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102021204340.2A DE102021204340A1 (de) 2021-04-30 2021-04-30 Computerimplementiertes Verfahren zur Bereitstellung von kryptographischen Schlüsseln zur Datensignatur, Signaturmodul, Verfahren zur Datensignatur und Verfahren zur authentifizierten Kommunikation
PCT/EP2022/061012 WO2022229161A1 (fr) 2021-04-30 2022-04-26 Procédé mis en oeuvre par ordinateur pour fournir des clés cryptographiques pour signer des données, module de signature, procédé de signature de données et procédé de communication authentifiée

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP4309332A1 true EP4309332A1 (fr) 2024-01-24

Family

ID=78085461

Family Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP21200279.4A Withdrawn EP4084399A1 (fr) 2021-04-30 2021-09-30 Procédé mis en uvre par ordinateur destiné à la fourniture de clés cryptographiques pour la signature de données, module de signature, procédé de signature de données et procédé de communication authentifiée
EP22725763.1A Withdrawn EP4309332A1 (fr) 2021-04-30 2022-04-26 Procédé mis en oeuvre par ordinateur pour fournir des clés cryptographiques pour signer des données, module de signature, procédé de signature de données et procédé de communication authentifiée

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Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP21200279.4A Withdrawn EP4084399A1 (fr) 2021-04-30 2021-09-30 Procédé mis en uvre par ordinateur destiné à la fourniture de clés cryptographiques pour la signature de données, module de signature, procédé de signature de données et procédé de communication authentifiée

Country Status (5)

Country Link
US (1) US20240223389A1 (fr)
EP (2) EP4084399A1 (fr)
CN (1) CN117256123A (fr)
DE (1) DE102021204340A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2022229161A1 (fr)

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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US10608824B1 (en) * 2017-01-09 2020-03-31 Amazon Technologies, Inc. Merkle signature scheme tree expansion
US11233483B2 (en) * 2017-02-02 2022-01-25 Macom Technology Solutions Holdings, Inc. 90-degree lumped and distributed Doherty impedance inverter
US11711204B2 (en) * 2020-01-29 2023-07-25 EMC IP Holding Company LLC Using sparse merkle trees for smart synchronization of S3

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN117256123A (zh) 2023-12-19
DE102021204340A1 (de) 2022-11-03
WO2022229161A1 (fr) 2022-11-03
EP4084399A1 (fr) 2022-11-02
US20240223389A1 (en) 2024-07-04

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