JPH01101042A - Authentication device - Google Patents
Authentication deviceInfo
- Publication number
- JPH01101042A JPH01101042A JP62259023A JP25902387A JPH01101042A JP H01101042 A JPH01101042 A JP H01101042A JP 62259023 A JP62259023 A JP 62259023A JP 25902387 A JP25902387 A JP 25902387A JP H01101042 A JPH01101042 A JP H01101042A
- Authority
- JP
- Japan
- Prior art keywords
- integer
- authentication code
- user
- time
- generating
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 claims abstract 2
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims description 10
- 238000006243 chemical reaction Methods 0.000 claims 1
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 description 5
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012790 confirmation Methods 0.000 description 1
Abstract
Description
【発明の詳細な説明】
(産業上の利用分野)
本発明はネットワークにおいて、通信相手ユーザあるい
はメツセージの認証さらには通信の略号化に関する。DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION (Field of Industrial Application) The present invention relates to the authentication of communicating users or messages as well as the abbreviation of communications in networks.
(従来の技術)
認証方式として
ニー・シャミア(A、Shamir>がクリプト84
(Crypto’[+4>で提案した方式は、各ユーザ
の氏名などのID情報を用いた実用的方式として評価が
高い。(Prior art) Nee Shamir (A, Shamir) uses Crypto84 as an authentication method.
(The method proposed in Crypto'[+4> is highly evaluated as a practical method that uses ID information such as each user's name.
(発明が解決しようとする問題点) シャミアの方式には次の2つの欠点がある。(Problem to be solved by the invention) Shamir's method has two drawbacks:
1つは、正当なユーザから別の正当なユーザへの送信文
を第3者が録音しておき、後にそれを再生送信すると受
信者がその不正を検出できないことである。さらにもう
1つは暗号通信と組合せようとすると、その鍵を送るた
めの情報帯域が新たに必要となる。One is that if a third party records a message sent from a legitimate user to another legitimate user and later plays and transmits it, the receiver cannot detect the fraud. Furthermore, if you try to combine it with encrypted communication, you will need a new information band to send the key.
(問題点を解決するための手段)
本発明によれば、認証子を作成する認証装置において、
ランダムな整数rを生成する乱数生成手段と、あらかじ
め定められた4つの整数n、α、e、sを記憶する記憶
手段と、少なくとも時刻と前記乱数とに依存した整数C
を生成するハツシュ化手段と、前記の整数n、α、e、
s、c、rから2つの整数a ”(sod n)とS
・a ”(sod n)から成る認証子を生成する認証
子生成手段と、から成ることを特徴とする認証装置が得
られる。(Means for solving the problem) According to the present invention, in an authentication device that creates an authentication code,
Random number generation means for generating a random integer r, storage means for storing four predetermined integers n, α, e, and s, and an integer C that depends on at least time and the random number.
and hashing means for generating the integers n, α, e,
Two integers a'' (sod n) and S from s, c, r
An authentication device is obtained, comprising: an authentication code generating means for generating an authentication code consisting of a ” (sod n).
また、本発明によれば、あらかじめ定められた4つの整
数n、α、e、sとランダムに選んだ整数rと少なくと
も時刻に依存した整数Cから作成した2つの整数a ”
(sod n)とS ・a ”(sod n)から成る
認証子(x、y)を送り側から受取り、認証を行なう認
証装置において、少なくとも時刻と前記認証子に依存し
た整数C1を生成するハツシュ手段と、前記整数nとe
を記憶する記憶手段と、前記整数n、e、x、y、c1
に対してye/ x”(sod n)が送り側の識別情
報になっているか否かを判定する判定手段と、から成る
こと番特徴とする認証装置が得られる。Further, according to the present invention, two integers a are created from four predetermined integers n, α, e, and s, a randomly selected integer r, and an integer C that depends on at least time.
(sod n) and S a '' (sod n) from the sender, and an authentication device that performs authentication generates an integer C1 that depends on at least the time and the authenticator. means and said integers n and e
a storage means for storing the integers n, e, x, y, c1;
According to the present invention, there is obtained an authentication device which is characterized in that it comprises a determination means for determining whether or not ye/x” (sod n) is the identification information of the sender.
さらに本発明によれば、通信相手に送るべき認証子を作
成し、鍵を生成する認証装置において、ランダムな整数
rを生成する乱数生成手段と、あらかじめ定められた4
つの整数n、α、e、sを記゛憶する記憶手段と、少な
くとも時刻と前記乱数に依存した整数Cを生成するハツ
シュ化手段と、前記の整数n、α、e、s、c、rから
2つの整数a ”(sod n)とS・a’″″(ma
d n)から成る認証子を生成する認証子生成手段と、
通信相手から送られた認証子が正しければそれと前記整
数rを用いて鍵を生成する鍵手段とから成ることを特徴
とする認証装置が得られる。Further, according to the present invention, in an authentication device that creates an authentication code to be sent to a communication partner and generates a key, a random number generation means that generates a random integer r, and a predetermined
storage means for storing integers n, α, e, s; hashing means for generating an integer C depending on at least time and the random number; , two integers a ”(sod n) and S・a′″″(ma
d n) authenticator generation means for generating an authenticator consisting of;
If the authentication code sent from the communication partner is correct, an authentication device is obtained which is characterized by comprising a key means for generating a key using the authentication code and the integer r.
(作用)
第1図は本発明の作用・原理を示すごく大まかな流れ図
である。以下、認証子を作成する側を証明側、認証子を
検証する側を認証側とよぶことにする。証明側は、認証
側が検証を行えるような認証子を作成して他の必要なデ
ータと共に送る。これが第1図(a)である。一方、認
証側では送られた認証子の正否を判断する。これが第1
図(b)である。さらに、受信側では暗号用の鍵を該認
証子を用いて秘密に作成することができ、これが第1図
(c)である。暗号通信の相手側も同じ略号用の鍵を持
たなくてはならないが、これは受信側が(a)の証明側
となって認証子を送信側に送り、該送信側が認証側とな
って(c)を実行すればよい。(Operation) FIG. 1 is a very rough flowchart showing the operation and principle of the present invention. Hereinafter, the side that creates the authenticator will be referred to as the proving side, and the side that verifies the authenticator will be referred to as the authenticating side. The proving side creates an authenticator that can be verified by the authenticating side and sends it along with other necessary data. This is shown in FIG. 1(a). On the other hand, the authentication side determines whether the sent authentication code is correct or not. This is the first
It is figure (b). Furthermore, on the receiving side, an encryption key can be secretly created using the authenticator, as shown in FIG. 1(c). The other side of the encrypted communication must also have the same abbreviation key, but this is because the receiving side acts as the proving side in (a) and sends the authenticator to the sending side, and the sending side acts as the authenticating side and sends the authenticator (c). ).
(実施例)
第2図は本発明の一実施例を示す構成図である。ネット
ワークを介して接続されている端末の1つを送信ユーザ
が利用し、別の1つを受信ユーザが利用するものとする
。各端末にはカードリーダが設置され、端末には認証の
ためのソフトあるいはハードが組込まれ、第1図を実行
する。各ユーザには512ビット程度の整数n、α、e
3、Siが書込まれたカードがカード発行者(又はセン
ター)から配布される。ここでSlのみがユーザ毎に異
なる秘密の整数で他は各ユーザに共通である。ユーザi
のID情報をIDIとすると、Siは
St” (mod n)=ID。(Embodiment) FIG. 2 is a configuration diagram showing an embodiment of the present invention. It is assumed that one of the terminals connected via the network is used by a sending user, and another one is used by a receiving user. A card reader is installed in each terminal, and software or hardware for authentication is installed in the terminal to execute the process shown in FIG. Each user has an integer of about 512 bits n, α, e.
3. Cards with Si written on them are distributed by the card issuer (or center). Here, only Sl is a secret integer that differs for each user, and the others are common to each user. user i
If the ID information of is IDI, then Si is St” (mod n)=ID.
を満たすように作られている。このようにできることは
、コミュニケーション・オブ・ザ・ニーシーエム(Co
mmunication of the ACM)第2
1巻2号120頁〜126頁に示されている。It is made to satisfy. What you can do in this way is the Communication of the NCM (Co.
communication of the ACM) 2nd
It is shown in Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 120-126.
端末がなすべき作業は第1図に示しであるが、その中の
認証子作成、認証子検証、鍵生成の実施例を各々第3.
4.5図に示す。The operations to be performed by the terminal are shown in FIG. 1, and examples of authentication code creation, authentication code verification, and key generation are shown in Section 3.
Shown in Figure 4.5.
認証子作成では乱数rを生成し、ユーザの力・−・ドか
ら読出したe、α、nからx = a ”(sod n
、)を計算する。次々に送るべきデータDataと時刻
Timeと前記整数Xのハツシュ関数値、C=h a
s h (Time、x、Data)を計算する。ここ
でハツシュ関数hashは例えばアイイーイーイー(I
EEE)ノ確認コンピュータ(COMPUTER)誌1
983年2同号55頁〜62頁に記載されている関数で
ある。Dataは謂ゆるメツセージ以外にも送信者のI
D情報やその他のデータを含めてもよい。このとき、認
証子(x、y)は上記Xと
y=Si−d”(mod n)
で与えられる。Siもユーザのカードから読み出した整
数である。When creating an authenticator, a random number r is generated and x = a'' (sod n
, ). Data to be sent one after another, time, and hash function value of the integer X, C=h a
Calculate s h (Time, x, Data). Here, the hash function hash is, for example, Ieeeeee (I
EEE) Confirmation Computer (COMPUTER) Magazine 1
This is a function described in 983/2 same issue, pages 55 to 62. Data includes the sender's I in addition to the so-called message.
D information and other data may also be included. At this time, the authenticator (x, y) is given by the above X and y=Si-d'' (mod n).Si is also an integer read from the user's card.
第4図の認証子検証では前記ハツシュ関数により同様に
c = h a s h (Time、x、Data)
を計算する。ここでDataは送信側から送られたデー
タであり、Timeは送信側が認証子作成の際に用いた
時刻情報であり、受信側で正しくわからない場合にはT
imeを送ってもらう必要がある。Xは送られた認証子
の一部である。次に送られて認証子(x、y)と受信側
ユーザのカードからのe、n、 x、ら
y”/x’ (mod n)
が送信側ユーザのID情報I D +に等しいか否かを
判定する。もし等しくなければ不正データとみなす。送
信側ユーザが送った(x、y)を用いれば、x、yの定
義から、nを法として
y@/x’ =Si” a”e/aer” =ID+ど
なる。In the authenticator verification in Figure 4, c = h a sh (Time, x, Data) using the hash function.
Calculate. Here, Data is the data sent from the sending side, Time is the time information used by the sending side when creating the authentication code, and if the receiving side does not know it correctly, T
I need you to send me an ime. X is part of the authenticator sent. Next, determine whether the authenticator (x, y) sent and e, n, x, y''/x' (mod n) from the receiving user's card are equal to the sending user's ID information ID If they are not equal, it is considered invalid data. If we use (x, y) sent by the sending user, from the definition of x, y, y@/x' = Si"a" modulo n. e/aer” = ID + roar.
第5図の鍵生成では、乱数Rを用いて、WK=XR(m
od n)
により作成する。ここでXは認証側から送られたもので
あり、乱数Rは認証子作成に用いた乱数である。即ち、
受信側でも鍵生成の場合には(作用)の項で述べたよう
に認証子作成を行なうが、その時に用いた乱数Rである
。送信側でも認証子作成に用いた乱数rを鍵生成に用い
る。いずれの側でもWKはα”R(locjn)に等し
くなる。In the key generation shown in FIG. 5, a random number R is used and WK=XR(m
od n). Here, X is the one sent from the authentication side, and the random number R is the random number used to create the authentication code. That is,
On the receiving side, when generating a key, an authenticator is created as described in the (effect) section, and this is the random number R used at that time. The transmitting side also uses the random number r used for creating the authentication code for key generation. On either side WK will be equal to α''R(locjn).
以上の実施例において、中乗剰除z=ab(sodn)
の計算は端末のソフトで行なうことも、プロセッサで行
なうこともできる。また、時刻情報Tのならよい。In the above embodiment, the middle power remainder division z=ab(sodn)
The calculation can be done by the terminal's software or by the processor. Also, time information T is fine.
(発明の効果)
以上、詳細に説明したように、本発明を用いれば第3者
による不正再送を防ぎ、あるいは暗号用の鍵生成も行な
えるという機能付きの認証が実行できるのでネットワー
ク通信などに有用である。(Effects of the Invention) As explained above in detail, the present invention enables authentication with functions such as preventing unauthorized retransmission by a third party and generating encryption keys, which is useful for network communication, etc. Useful.
第1図は本発明の作用・原理を示す流れ図、第2図は本
発明の実施例を示す構成図、第3.4.5図は第1図の
認証子作成、認証子検証、鍵生成の各実施例を示す図で
ある。図において、101は認証子作成機能、102は
認証子送信機能を、111.121は認証子受信状態を
、112.122は認証子検証機能を、123は鍵生成
機能を各々を示す。Figure 1 is a flowchart showing the operation and principle of the present invention, Figure 2 is a configuration diagram showing an embodiment of the present invention, and Figures 3.4.5 are authentication code creation, authentication code verification, and key generation in Figure 1. It is a figure which shows each Example. In the figure, 101 indicates an authentication code generation function, 102 indicates an authentication code transmission function, 111.121 indicates an authentication code reception state, 112.122 indicates an authentication code verification function, and 123 indicates a key generation function.
Claims (1)
数rを生成する乱数生成手段と、あらかじめ定められた
複数の整数を記憶する記憶手段と、少なくとも時刻と前
記乱数とに依存した整数cを生成するハッシュ化手段と
、前記の複数の整数とc、rから認証子を生成する認証
子生成手段と、から成ることを特徴とする認証装置。 2、あらかじめ定められた複数の整数とランダムに選ん
だ整数rと少なくとも時刻と該乱数に依存した整数cか
ら作成した認証子を送り側から受取り、認証を行なう認
証装置において、少なくとも時刻と前記認証子に依存し
た整数c_1を生成するハッシュ化手段と、前もって定
められた複数の整数を記憶する記憶手段と、該整数と認
証子とc_1からあらかじめ定められた変換を施した結
果が送り側の識別情報になっているか否かを判定する判
定手段と、から成ることを特徴とする認証装置。 3、通信相手に送るべき認証子を作成し、鍵を作成する
認証装置において、ランダムな整数rを生成する乱数手
段と、あらかじめ定められた複数の整数を記憶する記憶
手段と、少なくとも時刻と前記乱数とに依存した整数c
を生成するハッシュ化手段と、前記複数の整数とc、r
から認証子を生成する認証子生成手段と、通信相手から
送られた認証子が正しければそれと前記rを用いて鍵を
生成する鍵生成手段と、から成ることを特徴とする認証
装置。[Claims] 1. An authentication device that creates an authentication code, comprising a random number generation means for generating a random integer r, a storage means for storing a plurality of predetermined integers, and at least a time and the random number. An authentication device comprising: hashing means for generating a dependent integer c; and authentication code generation means for generating an authentication code from the plurality of integers, c and r. 2. An authentication device that receives from a sender an authentication code created from a plurality of predetermined integers, a randomly selected integer r, at least a time, and an integer c that depends on the random number, and performs authentication, at least the time and the authentication code. a hashing means for generating an integer c_1 depending on the child; a storage means for storing a plurality of predetermined integers; and a predetermined conversion from the integer, the authenticator, and c_1, and the result is the identification of the sender. An authentication device comprising: determination means for determining whether or not information is obtained. 3. In an authentication device that creates an authentication code to be sent to a communication partner and creates a key, it includes a random number means for generating a random integer r, a storage means for storing a plurality of predetermined integers, and at least a time and the above. random number and integer c depending on
hashing means for generating the plurality of integers and c, r.
An authentication device comprising: an authentication code generation means for generating an authentication code from a communication partner; and a key generation means for generating a key using the authentication code sent from a communicating party and the r when the authentication code is correct.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP62259023A JPH0618368B2 (en) | 1987-10-13 | 1987-10-13 | Authentication device |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP62259023A JPH0618368B2 (en) | 1987-10-13 | 1987-10-13 | Authentication device |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| JPH01101042A true JPH01101042A (en) | 1989-04-19 |
| JPH0618368B2 JPH0618368B2 (en) | 1994-03-09 |
Family
ID=17328274
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP62259023A Expired - Lifetime JPH0618368B2 (en) | 1987-10-13 | 1987-10-13 | Authentication device |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| JP (1) | JPH0618368B2 (en) |
Cited By (9)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPH04271462A (en) * | 1991-02-27 | 1992-09-28 | Canon Inc | System for deciding document |
| JPH06195024A (en) * | 1991-09-13 | 1994-07-15 | American Teleph & Telegr Co <Att> | Communication channel opening method and customer device |
| US6144745A (en) * | 1997-04-07 | 2000-11-07 | Fujitsu Limited | Method of and apparatus for retaining and verifying of data on recording medium |
| JP2001075868A (en) * | 1999-03-26 | 2001-03-23 | Sony Corp | Reproduction device and reproduction method |
| EP1335365A3 (en) * | 2002-01-31 | 2003-10-08 | Fujitsu Limited | Data storage apparatus and method |
| WO2005057525A1 (en) * | 2003-12-11 | 2005-06-23 | Buffalo Inc. | Encryption/decryption system, device, and method |
| JP2007504756A (en) * | 2003-09-02 | 2007-03-01 | クゥアルコム・インコーポレイテッド | Method and apparatus for providing authenticated challenge for broadcast / multicast communication in a communication system |
| JP2007529959A (en) * | 2004-03-15 | 2007-10-25 | カーディアック・ペースメーカーズ・インコーポレーテッド | Cryptographic authentication for telemetry of implantable medical devices |
| US8098818B2 (en) | 2003-07-07 | 2012-01-17 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Secure registration for a multicast-broadcast-multimedia system (MBMS) |
-
1987
- 1987-10-13 JP JP62259023A patent/JPH0618368B2/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
Cited By (10)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPH04271462A (en) * | 1991-02-27 | 1992-09-28 | Canon Inc | System for deciding document |
| JPH06195024A (en) * | 1991-09-13 | 1994-07-15 | American Teleph & Telegr Co <Att> | Communication channel opening method and customer device |
| US6144745A (en) * | 1997-04-07 | 2000-11-07 | Fujitsu Limited | Method of and apparatus for retaining and verifying of data on recording medium |
| JP2001075868A (en) * | 1999-03-26 | 2001-03-23 | Sony Corp | Reproduction device and reproduction method |
| EP1335365A3 (en) * | 2002-01-31 | 2003-10-08 | Fujitsu Limited | Data storage apparatus and method |
| US8098818B2 (en) | 2003-07-07 | 2012-01-17 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Secure registration for a multicast-broadcast-multimedia system (MBMS) |
| JP2007504756A (en) * | 2003-09-02 | 2007-03-01 | クゥアルコム・インコーポレイテッド | Method and apparatus for providing authenticated challenge for broadcast / multicast communication in a communication system |
| WO2005057525A1 (en) * | 2003-12-11 | 2005-06-23 | Buffalo Inc. | Encryption/decryption system, device, and method |
| JP2005173197A (en) * | 2003-12-11 | 2005-06-30 | Buffalo Inc | Encryption / decryption processing system and encryption / decryption processing apparatus |
| JP2007529959A (en) * | 2004-03-15 | 2007-10-25 | カーディアック・ペースメーカーズ・インコーポレーテッド | Cryptographic authentication for telemetry of implantable medical devices |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| JPH0618368B2 (en) | 1994-03-09 |
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