JPH03185585A - Method and device for deciding validity of id card - Google Patents

Abstract

PURPOSE:To decide the forgery of an ID card including personal data and a photograph by checking the density change of picture points of a photographic data part in the main scanning direction or subscanning direction, and when the period does not coincide with the resolution of a printer used for printing out the photographic data, deciding the ID card as a false one. CONSTITUTION:The device is provided with a means for reading out personal data and a means for reading out data recorded in a photographic part. Whether the relation of these data coincides with a rule or not is checked to check the validity of the ID card. Namely, the read personal data, a part of the data, or data obtained by converting the personal data based upon a fixed conversion expression are compared with data read out from the photographic part. When both the contents coincide with each other, the ID card is decided as a correct one, and if any difference is included between both the contents, the ID card is decided as a forged one. Consequently, the forgery of the ID card including the personal data and the photograph can simply be decided.

Description

Detailed Description of the Invention [Objective of the Invention] (Industrial Application Field) This invention provides an ID card in which transcribed personal data and a face photograph of the person are recorded. The present invention relates to an ID card authenticity determination method and authenticity determination device for determining whether or not the person is the person indicated by the ID card.

(Prior Art) Conventionally, an ID card has been formed by placing a photograph of one's face on paper or plastic on which personal data is printed, and then laminating the two together. ID card is employee ID card.

It is used as a credit card, CD card, or a card to prove your identity. The ID card contains the person's name as personal data.

Date of birth 9 Personal number (if you have an employee ID card, employee number, etc.)
) Furthermore, the issue number of the ID card, etc. is recorded. Some of this personal data is visualized, but in some cases, it may be recorded in an invisible state such as on a magnetic card.

In the past, the usage of ID cards was not very large, but
Recently, ID cards have come into use in various fields. However, at the same time, unauthorized use of these cards is also becoming more common. For example, people are trying to find out card passwords, pin numbers, etc. and illegally using other people's cards.

(Problems to be Solved by the Invention) In addition to personal data recorded on the ID card, the ID card also records the person's true face.

Therefore, by comparing the card with the person, it can be confirmed that the person is using his or her own ID card. (In all cases from now on, we will proceed on the assumption that the recorded personal data is correct. Therefore, if the photo affixed to the ID card matches the person's face, (Assume that the personal data recorded on the ID card also belongs to the person in question.) When using such an ID card, use another person's ID card and forge it by replacing only the face photo with your own. For example, by cutting out the facial photograph shown in FIG. 10(a) and inserting another person's photograph as shown in FIG. 10(b), it becomes possible to misuse the personal data of another person. For example, if there is a company that uses this ID card for its attendance/attendance system, it is possible to infiltrate into other companies with this forged ID card and take out important confidential information. Regarding counterfeiting of personal data, since personal data consists of numbers, alphabets, etc., special conversions are applied to these numbers and letters to create check codes, etc., and these are stored in the personal data. , difficult to counterfeit. However, facial photographs can be easily forged by replacing them with other people's photographs, pasting other people's facial photographs on them, or taking photos of ID cards. An object of the present invention is to show a method for determining whether the personal data of an ID card and the photograph of the person's face recorded therein are correct.

[Structure of the Invention] (Means for Solving the Problems) In order to solve the above-mentioned problems, the ID card reading method of the present invention includes a means for reading personal data and a means for reading personal data, which is also recorded in the photo section. It is characterized by having means for reading and taking data, and it is a method to check whether the relationship between these data is as specified and to check the authenticity of the ID card.

(Function) Because of this configuration, the personal data that has been read, or a part of this data, or this personal data can be combined with data obtained based on a certain conversion formula, etc. from the photo department. By comparing the read data, if they match, it is determined that the ID card is the correct card, and if they do not match, it can be determined that it is a counterfeit ID card.

(Embodiments) O First Embodiment Several embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings. First, in the ID card used in the present invention, it is assumed that all data that differs from person to person, such as personal data and facial photograph data, is recorded by a printer. The other common parts may be recorded in advance by printing, or may be recorded at the same time by a printer when personal data is recorded.

FIG. 10(a) shows a typical example of an ID card. This ID
The card consists of personal data and a facial photo. The simplest method of forgery is to cut out a portion of the face photo, or paste another person's face photo on top of it and take the photo again (Figure 1O (b)). Even if you use a normal checker, it will only check the personal data section, so it will be judged as genuine.The following is a method to prevent this.

First, the most basic method of checking is to simultaneously check the face photo area to at least check that this face part is not a composite photo that was inserted later. In this method, a sensor in the checker reads the face photo section and determines whether it was recorded by a printer or a photo was inserted. Fortunately, this ID card was recorded using a printer with a constant resolution, so each pixel can be clearly recognized when enlarged. In other words, the resolution of the printer is about 8 dots/l to 16 dots/city, so it is about 125 μm.
You should be able to see a pixel with a size of about m to 62.5 μm (first
As shown in figure (a)). On the other hand, when a facial photograph is recorded as a photograph, the silver particles in the photograph are small particles of 1 μm or less. Therefore, when checking the face photo area with a sensor, if you cannot see the pixel corresponding to the printer's resolution and the density is changing continuously (as shown in Figure 1 (b)) It is believed that the card used a photo, and it can be considered that it is a counterfeit ID card.

In addition, there are cases where fake ID cards are made by pasting another person's face photo on an ID card and taking a photo of the whole thing, so not only the face photo but also other personal data can be scanned with a sensor to ensure compliance with regulations. It becomes possible to determine whether the entire ID card has been forged using a photograph, depending on whether or not pixels with a resolution of .

O Second Embodiment A second embodiment is shown in which the ID card is determined to be a counterfeit card when the face photo of the ID card is replaced with another person's face photo.

Because gradation is important in facial photographs, thermal recording devices that use sublimation color ink are often used. It is assumed that the ID card used in the present invention has a facial photograph recorded with a color printer using heat-sublimable ink. Figure 2 shows the reflectance of magenta ink. Heat-sublimable inks are mostly transparent to near-infrared light. Dye is used in sublimation ink,
This is because it is transparent to near-infrared light. Therefore, even if a portion of a facial photograph is scanned with near-infrared light, the reflected light will be almost uniform at the sensor. Note that since the ink containing the personal data is mainly composed of pigments, it has sufficient absorption of near-infrared light, so that the personal data can be read. On the other hand, a forged ID card with a photo inserted into the face, etc.
Since the silver in the photo area has sufficient reflective properties for near-infrared light, signals can be detected by scanning the photo area with infrared light. In other words, the reflectance when exposed to near-infrared light is completely different when a photo is used for the face photo and when heat sublimation ink is used.
The authenticity of the ID card can be determined.

O Third Embodiment In the second embodiment, a method for determining the authenticity of an ID card is introduced by taking into consideration the difference between the characteristics of the ink in the facial photograph part and the ink used to record the personal data part. As shown, this embodiment is also similar to this embodiment. For example, there is a method of recording a facial photograph and then printing a more special pattern using fluorescent printing, which emits visible light when exposed to ultraviolet light. FIG. 3 illustrates fluorescent ink. The horizontal axis represents wavelength and the vertical axis represents absorption or emission intensity. Some fluorescent inks absorb ultraviolet light and emit visible light as fluorescent light, as shown in Figure 3.

Note that, as shown by the broken line in the figure, some inks emit fluorescence in the infrared region. When such ink is used, it is possible to make the ink completely invisible in the visible light range. An ID card checker uses ultraviolet light to read the fluorescent pattern of visible light, for example, and confirms that a specified pattern is recorded at a specified position.
You can check the authenticity of the card. Furthermore, in this case as well, the authenticity of the ID card can be fully confirmed by using it together with the first embodiment and checking that this fluorescent pattern was also recorded by a printer with a certain resolution. It becomes possible to do so.

Note that when fluorescence recording is performed, it is possible to make a certain determination by viewing under ultraviolet light without using a special machine. In other words, if you can see a special fluorescence pattern, there is a high possibility that it is real. However, there is a possibility that the image was forged by fluorescent printing, so it is necessary to use a checker to confirm whether or not pixels with the specified resolution are formed.

O Fourth Example In the methods described in the previous examples, a photo is used to make a forgery, but since the ID card is also created with a printer, it goes without saying that a printer cannot be used. It is not inconceivable that something could be forged. In such a case, one way to make counterfeiting difficult is to change the resolutions of the printer that records the personal data section and the printer that records the face photo. Naturally, the ID card was forged using a printer, so even if you try to confirm the forgery using the method shown in the first example, the dots recorded by the printer will be visible, so it will naturally be determined that it is a water item. .

Therefore, for example, by changing the resolution of the personal data section printer and the resolution of the facial photo recording printer,
In the second embodiment of the present invention, authenticity is determined based on the difference in size of a pixel that occurs when each portion is read by a sensor of an ID card checker. For example, if the personal data section is recorded using a printer with a resolution of 10 dots/+im as shown in FIG. 4, a pixel size of about 100 μm can be recorded, and a facial photograph can be recorded at 12 dots/+im. If the image is recorded by a No. 111 printer, pixels of approximately 82.5μ will be recorded. Therefore, if the resolution of the printer for recording the personal data section and facial photo section is changed in this way, when the personal data section and the facial photo section are checked with a sensor, they will be recorded with pixels of the same size. If so, it can be determined that the ID card is a counterfeit ID card.

In this example, two printers with different resolutions are used, one for the personal data section and one for recording facial photographs, but in order to further prevent counterfeiting, a larger number and types of printers are used. By using printers and changing the resolution of each printer, the effect of preventing forgery can be increased.

O Fifth Example All of the above examples assume that a printer with exactly the same resolution as the ID card making machine, ink with the same characteristics, etc. cannot be prepared, or that these are not available. If possible, it should be possible to configure an ID card issuer that is basically the same as the real one. In such cases, the method of determining the authenticity of the ID card, that is, the method of determining whether the personal data matches the person in the face photo, is basically to check whether the personal data or the person in the face photo matches. It is necessary that data created from personal data is recorded.

One example is a method of recording data created from personal data in photo data, as shown in FIG. 5(a). Of course, the way this data is generated is
Created from personal data as shown in Figure 5(b),
Since no one other than the creator of the D card knows about it, it is impossible to set it to an arbitrary number.

In other words, by comparing the personal data with the characters in the photo, it is possible to determine whether the ID card is genuine or not. However, of course, there is also a method of forging someone else's photo by using current photography and printing technology and recording the same characters in the photo. If it is created using photographic technology, it can be determined that it is a fake by using the first embodiment, but if it is recorded using an actual printer, it is quite difficult to determine that it is a fake.

In such a case, the following measures can be considered.

For example, it is assumed that the four pixels at the top right of the photo area of the ID card in FIG. 5(a) are special pixels and have weights as shown in FIG. 5(C), for example.

For example, if there are pixel points at positions 2° and 23 as shown in FIG. 5(C), this represents 9.

Therefore, when calculating the verification data in Figure 5(b), there is also a number hidden in the image (9 in this case).
You just have to calculate it according to -. In other words, a machine that checks ID cards reads personal data and numbers (letters) hidden in images, and checks the authenticity of the ID card based on whether the calculated results match the verification data. In other words, it is quite difficult to closely examine a photographic image and find a check pattern from it, making it extremely difficult to forge an ID card.

Additionally, a sophisticated printer that can faithfully reproduce every pixel is required.

Note that when using the method shown in FIG. 5(C), the numbers hidden in the image as shown in FIG. 5(d) are sufficient as the data used for calculation.

In extreme cases, the data may be output as confirmation data without much conversion. Also, the confirmation data is
It may also be displayed in a manner as shown in Figure (C).

Sixth Embodiment If a clearly visible pattern is recorded in a photograph, it will be forged by using a printer. , In order to prevent forgery, characters recorded in photographic images cannot be directly read by humans under normal light conditions.

■ It is recorded in an encrypted state, making it impossible for others to determine where and in what state it is recorded.

■ By combining ■ and ■ and using a special beam of light, the encrypted characters are read out from within the photo section.

Possible methods include:

The simplest method is to record a character string obtained by a special calculation formula from characters or numbers in personal data using ink that is normally invisible (see Figure 3). For example, it is conceivable to use a fluorescent ink that emits visible light when exposed to ultraviolet light. In addition, with devices that generate visible light like this,
In some cases, it may become clear that the information is being recorded. Therefore, especially when strict confidentiality is desired, it is desirable to use a fluorescent ink that emits infrared fluorescence when exposed to ultraviolet light. Under normal conditions, it is almost impossible to recognize the characters written on the photo section. In other words, it is possible to determine the authenticity of an ID card by using an ID card reading device that includes a device that generates ultraviolet light and a device that recognizes infrared light in one housing.

In this case as well, the numbers or characters recorded in the photo section are not numbers or characters themselves, but ASCn, etc., or a specially created character code.

It would be better if it was a barcode or something similar. Encoding characters is also a type of encryption, but it would be ideal to perform encryption more actively.

Seventh Embodiment An example of a method for encrypting personal data and recording it in a facial photograph will be shown. Sublimation printers are used for facial photographs on ID cards because gradation and resolution are important. Therefore, each pixel is subjected to pulse width control of, for example, about 128 gradations, and one pixel is controlled to 128 gradations.

Therefore, as a method to encrypt a part of the photo,
One possible method is to replace (encrypt) and record the string of characters and numbers obtained from personal data with the density of each pixel. However, considering that the ink changes over time and the density difference between each gradation is too small, this method is too reckless and far-fetched to be used, and it is hard to imagine that they have put any thought into it. It's a situation.

For encryption, it is optimal to use binary information indicating whether there is a pixel or not. In other words, this is a method of encrypting and recording personal data, a portion thereof, or characters and numbers created from personal data in a binary pattern in a portion of a photograph. For example, Fig. 6 (a
) shows one of the examples. This data is recorded on a diagonal part of the photograph as shown in the figure. The reason why this data is recorded diagonally in a part of the photo is to prevent the data from being replaced while leaving only this data section if it is placed at the outer edge of the photo image. It's for a reason.

A method for encrypting personal data and recording it in the shaded area of the photo area will be described. FIG. 6(b) is an example. The four pixel points in this figure are given four weights of 2° + 21 + 22 + 2" according to their respective positions. Record these patterns in the shaded area of the ID card photo. .

For example, if only the position 21.23 is recorded at an appropriate density, 23 X1 + 22 XO + 2' × 1 + 2
It represents °X0-10.

It is also assumed that the shaded area in FIG. 6(b) is a dummy bit and is recorded at an appropriate density. Also, since the data recording start position is predetermined,
All you have to do is start reading the data from the predetermined position of this shaded area. Alternatively, a start code indicating the start of data writing may be recorded, and confirmation data may be written from there. By doing as described above, the personal data of the ID card, a part thereof, or data generated from the personal data can be written in a part of the photo area.

The photographic area will be recorded with sublimation ink in three colors Y, M, and C or with black added thereto.

Data written in a photograph as shown in FIG. 6 can be recorded using one of these inks. By dispersing the other inks completely randomly, the sixth
A line with diagonal confirmation data written as shown in the figure is recorded. Decide in advance what color of ink to use to record the confirmation data, or write data on what color of data is the confirmation data in this data, or write it for every 4 pixels. By recording the verification data and using a method such as changing the color of the ink, it is possible to read the verification data recorded on the photographic section.

By comparing the result of reading the personal data section, it is possible to determine whether the ID card is genuine or not.

Eighth Embodiment As another embodiment of the seventh embodiment, there is a method in which the identification data for the ID card is recorded with heat-melting color ink using ordinary pigments.

For example, data for confirming an ID card is recorded with M pigment heat-melting ink (FIG. 7(a)). Then, on top of this, the entire surface is painted with diagonal lines using the same dye-based heat sublimation ink of M, as shown in FIG. 7'(b), for example. In other words, by doing this, only the magenta diagonal line can be seen with the naked eye. When an ID card reader uses infrared light, infrared light is transparent to dye ink (see Figure 2), so the pigment ink is recorded and hidden under the diagonal lines. Only the ID card and confirmation data can be read.

So far, several methods for determining the authenticity of ID cards have been described. All of these methods require a reading device, and the size and configuration of the reading device vary greatly depending on the stage of the check or the importance of the purpose of use. When entering the most important places or places where VIP-level people gather, you must not only carry out all of the methods for determining authenticity shown here, but also conduct thorough visual checks.

However, normally such strict checks are not necessary.
A simple check is sufficient. For example, the most common form of forgery involves creating a fake ID card by inserting one's own photo in the photo section. In such a case, checks 1 and 2 of this embodiment are sufficient to perform the check function.

FIG. 8 shows the simplest ID card authenticity determination device.

This device consists of at least an infrared LED array (4) and an infrared CCD array (5). ID card (
7> moves in the direction of arrow A, for example, and the infrared light emitted from the infrared LED array (4) is reflected on the ID card (1) and then enters the infrared CCD array (5). Character part (
3) is recorded with pigment ink, so infrared light is sufficiently absorbed, so the infrared CCD (5) can record the character part (3).
The character pattern recorded in is input. At this time, if the resolution of the infrared CCD array (5) is made sufficiently small, the resolution of the printer that recorded the character section (3) can be determined by a circuit (not shown) within the apparatus. If the resolution of this character printer is not as specified, this ID
The card is determined to be fake. The ID card (L) whose text portion is determined to be genuine is further moved in the direction of arrow A, and the photo portion (2) is placed below the infrared LED (4). In the case of a genuine ID card recorded with sublimation ink, when the photo area (2) is scanned, infrared light is almost uniformly reflected back to the CCD array sensor (5). Therefore, in this case, it can be determined that it is a genuine ID card (1). If the photo section (2) is replaced with another person's photo, it will be immediately obvious that it is a fake ID card because the pattern will change depending on the output photo pattern from the CCD array (5). FIG. 9 shows a flowchart of a method for determining authenticity of an ID card using this method. If there is room, calculate the personal data of the read text section (3) and hide this calculated value in advance in the photo section (2) using the method shown in Example 8. If these data are read and checked again, the authenticity of the ID card can be determined with a fairly high degree of accuracy.

〔Effect of the invention〕

By using this invention, it is difficult to forge ID cards with personal data and photos, and if a forged ID card is
Even if a D card is created, it is possible to configure an ID card determination device that can easily determine that it is a fake ID card.

[Brief explanation of drawings]

Fig. 1 is a diagram for explaining an ID card and the first embodiment of the present invention, Fig. 2 is a diagram for explaining the reflection characteristics of dye ink and pigment ink, and Fig. 3 is a diagram for explaining the reflection characteristics of dye ink and pigment ink. Figure 4 is a diagram explaining the absorption and emission of light when ink is used.
Figure 5 is a diagram for explaining a method for determining the authenticity of an ID card by recording the ID card using printers with two different resolutions and determining whether or not the resolution is a specified size depending on the location. The data obtained from calculations using personal data is recorded in the photo section, and the ID is determined depending on whether the value calculated from the personal data by reading the ID card matches the data recorded in the photo section.
Figure 6 is a diagram showing a method for determining the authenticity of a D card; Figure 6 is a diagram showing another method of recording confirmation data in the photo section; Figure 7 is a diagram showing another method of recording verification data in the photo section; Furthermore, a diagram showing a method of making this data invisible to the naked eye using heat-sublimable ink, which is a dye, FIG. 8 is a diagram showing the simplest example of the ID card authenticity determination device of the present invention, and FIG. 9 The figure is a flowchart of this ID card authenticity determination device, and FIG. 10 is a diagram showing an example of a counterfeit ID card (b) in which only the ID card (a) and its photographic part are replaced.

Claims (5)

[Claims] (1) Personal data and photo data are recorded with a dot printer, and changes in the density of pixels in the main scanning direction or sub-scanning direction are checked at least in the photo data area of the ID card to be created. An ID card authenticity determination method that determines that if the period matches the resolution of a printer that records photographic data, it is a real ID card, and if it does not match, it is a fake ID card. (2) The method for determining the authenticity of an ID card according to claim 1, further comprising a photodetector having a resolution capable of finer resolution than the minimum resolution of the printer that produced the ID card. ID card authenticity determination device used. (3) At least the photographic data uses sublimable dye;
In the case of ID cards formed by so-called thermal sublimation recording, the reflected light at the photo data area is almost uniform due to the combination of near-infrared light and a photodetector that generates an output in response to the near-infrared light. If the ID card is not, the ID card is determined to be a fake ID card. (4) Record various parts of the ID card using several printers with different resolutions, check whether each part matches the resolution of each printer when reading the ID card, and check whether each part matches the resolution of each printer, and An ID card authenticity determination method that determines that there is a possibility that the ID card is not a fake if a match is obtained from the above. (5) Personal data is converted based on a special conversion formula, and the result based on this conversion is recorded in the photo data section, so that when the personal data of the ID card is read, the conversion formula is known in advance. A method for determining the authenticity of an ID card, in which the data is converted based on the data and the data read from the photo section match, and then the card is determined to be a genuine ID card.