JPH10285153A - Communication system, ic card issue registration system, key code generator and recording medium - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a communication system which prevents the leakage of a key file that is used in utilizing a virtual dedicated line to a third person. SOLUTION: When a user loads an IC and 30 that stores his own key file into a card reader/writer 75, a communication terminal 2a detects IC card loading and expands the key file in memory 73 when user authentication is performed with a password. When a user ID is preliminarily registered in an IC card issue registration system 1, authentication check is performed with member service, and when it is valid, a VPN server that constructs a virtual dedicated line is started and constructs a virtual dedicated line VT between the terminal 2a and a DB server (target server) and communication is available. When the card 30 is unloaded or when the communication is over, the key file is eliminated from the memory 73 and leakage to a third person is prevented.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to a technology for keeping information confidential, such as electric commerce or business information of a company using a communication technology, and more particularly to a technology for communicating with a communication partner device connected to a public network. The present invention relates to a technique for increasing the confidentiality of a key file used when starting a communication mechanism for constructing a virtual private line.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art It is well known that data interception and data tampering by a third party can easily occur in data communication using a public network. Therefore, for example, electronic cash used in the field of electric commerce,
When transmitting highly confidential data using a communication medium, the public network is unsuitable, and a separate dedicated line has to be laid. However, in data communication using a dedicated line, not only the communication cost cannot be reduced, but also a communication mode in which individual communication terminals or networks are directly connected, that is, only a one-to-one communication mode can be realized. , 1: n (n is a natural number, the same applies hereinafter), or n: n
Communication form cannot be taken. Therefore, for example, in a company, it is not possible to implement a dedicated line for a service for performing a mutual communication between the head office and a plurality of branch offices or a communication setting between a head office or a branch office and a plurality of employees having a portable mobile terminal. It was difficult.

[0003] Therefore, recently, by applying data encryption technology, authentication technology, encapsulation technology for concealing target data, or the like, a network line or individual line virtually closed on a public network (hereinafter, a virtual private line). Attempts have also been made to construct data communication using this virtual private line.

FIG. 14 is a conceptual diagram showing an example of a communication system for establishing a virtual private line in a public network and performing data communication. This communication system is, for example, a communication server 80
And a fixed communication terminal 81 and one or a plurality of mobile communication terminals 84 and 85 used in a remote environment.

The communication server 80 and the fixed communication terminal 81 are provided with a VPN (virtual leased line network) server 82 or a VPN for establishing a virtual leased line VT with a communication partner connected to the public network LP, respectively. Device 83
Is connected. Each of the mobile communication terminals 84 and 85 has a VPN constructing unit 841 or 851 for constructing the virtual private line VT between its own terminal and a communication partner device by software. Note that the VPN server 8
2, the VPN device 83 and the VPN construction units 841 and 851
The basic functions are substantially the same.

In this communication system, for example, when transmitting target data from the fixed communication terminal 81 to the communication server 80, the VPN device 83 first receives a packet (including a terminal address) from the communication terminal 81, and then receives the packet. The encryption is performed using the public key of the server 82, and a header is added to the encrypted packet. The header contains
It contains its own address and the address of the VPN device 83 that is the communication partner. The VPN device 83 also performs route control based on the header, and transmits this packet to the communication server 80.
Send to the side. When the public network LP is the Internet,
Route control based on the header (IP header) is performed by a router installed at a predetermined point.

[0007] After removing the header from the received packet, the VPN server 82 decrypts the packet using its own secret key, and sends the target data reproduced thereby to the communication server 80. As a result, it is possible to perform highly confidential data mutual communication that can eliminate data interception or the like from a third party while using the public network LP having a low communication cost. According to the above communication system, 1: n or n: n
This facilitates the realization of this communication mode, and makes it possible to construct various information transmission systems for transmitting confidential information to a communication partner online.

[0008] For example, a company information management mechanism for disseminating business information unique to a company to employees of the company is provided by the communication server 8.
0, and an employee who operates each of the communication terminals 81, 84, 85 accesses the enterprise information management mechanism via the virtual private line VT and the communication server 80. In this case, the business information manager of the company issues a key file storing employee's personal information such as a password and a key used for encryption and decryption for each employee, and transmits the key file to a security device such as an IC card. Store it on a highly confidential recording medium and distribute it to multiple employees. Each employee stores the above IC in the memory area of the communication terminal operated by himself / herself.
A key file distributed through a card is stored, and authentication processing is performed in the communication terminal during operation. In other words, the communication terminal prompts the operator to enter a password, and compares the password set in the key file with the entered password, so that the communication terminal can identify that the operator is a regular employee. It can be so. If it is determined that the employee is a regular employee, the corresponding communication terminal establishes a call with the communication server 80 so that the sales information can be obtained. In this manner, one-to-n information transmission of confidential information with high security is enabled.

[0009]

By the way, in the information transmission system as described above, for example, the authority to create a key file for each employee should be originally limited to only the sales information manager. However, in practice, as is well known, the communication server 80
Anyone who has authority as a system administrator (supervisor) can create the key file.
Therefore, if the identification information (ID) or password of the system administrator is stolen by a malicious third party, it becomes possible to newly issue an unauthorized key file, delete or falsify registered information.

If the key file is stolen by a malicious third party at the time of distribution of the key file, there is a risk that the password is easily searched out and an illegal act is performed. Therefore, even when a communication system capable of constructing a virtual private line is used, there is a limit in transmitting and receiving confidential information, and improvement has been desired.

Accordingly, an object of the present invention is to provide a communication-related technique capable of preventing a key file from leaking to a third party during communication. Another object of the present invention is to improve the security of the authority to create a key file used when using a virtual leased line and make it difficult for a malicious third party to leak the key file. To provide technology.

[0012]

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION In order to solve the above-mentioned problems, the present invention provides a communication mechanism for establishing a virtual private line with a communication partner device connected to a public network, and at least authority to use the communication mechanism. An IC card in which a key file containing information and user identification information is confidentially stored;
Provided is a communication system having a mechanism for detachably mounting a C card and a communication device having a memory referred to during operation. In this communication system, the communication device decrypts the key file stored in the IC card upon loading of the IC card and expands the key file in the storage unit, and based on the expanded key file, the communication mechanism. To establish a virtual private line with the communication partner device, and delete the key file from the storage unit after the operation of the communication mechanism ends. Further, when it is detected that the IC card is removed during the operation of the communication mechanism, the operation of the communication mechanism is stopped and the key file is deleted from the storage means.

As a preferred mode, the communication device is provided with a visualization restricting means for restricting visualization of the contents of the key file. An authentication unit for performing user authentication based on a key file stored in the IC card;
Lock means for locking the key file when the number of misrecognitions by the authentication means reaches a certain number is provided.

According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided an IC card issuance / registration system for issuing the IC card used in the communication system. This IC card issuance / registration system is a card issuance apparatus that keeps secret information of an administrator's encryption code unique to an issuance manager who supervises the issuance of the IC card and a person's encryption code unique to an issuer in charge of issuing the IC card. And a key management device for creating and registering the key file, which are connected in a bidirectional manner so that the key management device can register the supervisory code acquired based on a predetermined authority. The issuer registration request is authenticated by the challenge-response method based on the already-executed supervisor encryption code, and when the authentication result is valid, the supervisor encryption code encrypted with the supervisor encryption code is issued to the card. Means for acquiring from the device, and means for decrypting and registering the acquired person's encryption code with the registered supervisor's encryption code. Characterized in that it is configured after authentication based on user cryptographic code to perform creation of the key file.

[0015] The present invention also relates to a system for issuing the IC card used in the communication system, wherein at least the secret code of a person in charge of issuing the IC card is kept secret. An issuing device and a key management device for creating and registering the key file are connected so as to be capable of two-way communication, and the key management device registers the person-in-charge code acquired based on predetermined authority. And a key file creation request is authenticated by a challenge-response method based on the registered person's encryption code, and a predetermined confidentiality session key passed when the authentication result is valid is sent from the card issuing device. Acquisition of file basic information and transmission of the key file created based on the file basic information to a card issuing device And means for performing, wherein the card issuing apparatus also provides an IC card issuing registration system characterized by being configured to store confidential to a subject IC card the created key file.

The person in charge code is confidentially stored, for example, in an IC card dedicated to the person in charge attached to the card issuing device, and the above processing can be performed only while the IC card is attached. To do. The key file unique to the issuer may be confidentially stored in the IC card dedicated to the issuer.

The present invention also provides a key code generation device used in the IC card issuance / registration system. This device includes a storage unit that stores at least basic information that is a basis for creating the supervisor encryption code and the person-in-charge code, a random number generation unit that generates a random number that is a basis for the session key, and a storage unit that stores the random number. Encryption means for encrypting the generated basic information and the random number output from the random number generation means based on predetermined authority information, wherein the input of the authority information triggers the manager encryption code, It is configured to generate either an encryption code or a session key. In this device, it is effective to increase the confidentiality if the storage means is constituted by a volatile memory and the basic information is erased by unauthorized reading or interruption of power supply.

According to the present invention, a key file including use right information and user identification information for using a communication mechanism for establishing a virtual private line with a communication partner device connected to a public network is confidential. When a predetermined authentication process is completed after the IC card is mounted on a computer device having a mechanism for detachably mounting the IC card that is stored in a removable manner and a storage unit, the IC card is stored in the IC card. The key file is expanded in the storage means, and the communication mechanism is activated based on the expanded key file to establish a virtual private line with the communication partner device. A form in which the computer device can read a computer program for deleting the key file from the memory when the operation of the communication mechanism ends. Providing a recording medium comprising recording.

[0019]

Embodiments of the present invention will be described below in detail with reference to the drawings. FIG. 1 is a configuration diagram of a main part of an IC card issuance / registration system of the present invention. This IC card issuance / registration system 1 issues an IC card 30 storing a key file including use authority information of a communication mechanism for establishing a virtual private line on a public network and identification information of a user. It comprises a key management device 10 and a card issuing device 20 to be realized, and key code generation devices (SCDs) 40 and 41. The IC card 30 used in this embodiment has a PIN (personal identification information: sometimes used as a password) storage unit and an authentication processing unit for performing authentication using the PIN. Key code generator (SCD) 4
Numerals 0 and 41 have the same function, but output different key codes as described later.

The key management device 10 includes a card issuing device 20
A communication control unit 11 for performing communication control between the server and an authentication processing unit 12 for performing authentication by a challenge-response method
And an encryption processing unit 13 for encrypting information transmitted to the card issuing device 20 and decrypting information received from the card issuing device 20, and a key for creating a key file used when constructing a virtual private line A file creation unit 14,
It comprises an issuance supervisor, an issuance person in charge, and an ID registration unit 15 for registering key information such as a user ID and a password. In the figure, ITT is an issue terminal management table, IPT is an issuer management table, and TKT is a virtual private line key management table.

On the other hand, the card issuing apparatus 20 includes a communication control section 21 for controlling communication with the key management apparatus 10, an authentication processing section 22 for authenticating an operator, and transmitting information transmitted to the key management apparatus 10. An encryption processing unit 23 for encrypting and decrypting information received from the key management device 10; a card input / output interface unit 24 serving as an interface for reading information from the IC card 30 and writing information to the IC card 30; , A card reader / writer 25 for removably mounting the IC card 30, a detachable detector 26 for detecting insertion and removal of the IC card 30, and a data input device 27 including a keyboard and the like.

FIG. 2 is an external view of a key code generator (SCD) used by being connected to the key management device 10, for example. The key code generation device 40 generates a key code requiring high confidentiality, for example, a supervisor encryption code or the like, or generates a challenge code or a session key to be described later, via an interface such as RS-232C. Connected to the key management device 10. In the key code generator 40, the security of use is ensured from both hardware and software. Hardware security is realized by inserting the physical keys A and B (42a, 42b) into the corresponding key insertion holes 41a, 41b, respectively. On the other hand, software security is realized by authentication processing using a logical key such as a password. The key code generation device 40 also has control means for generating various key codes using a master key, an ID, a password, and the like used for encrypting plaintext information.

FIG. 3 is a functional block diagram of the control means. The control means includes an I / O interface unit 51 serving as an information input / output interface with the key management device 10 when a CPU (microprocessor) (not shown) reads and executes a predetermined program.
A start control unit 52 that detects insertion of a physical key and determines whether or not to start, a master key 541 serving as basic information for creating various key codes, and a supervisor password 54
2, a memory 54 having a storage area for a person-in-charge ID and password, and other key information related to the user; a memory control unit 53 for controlling writing of information to the memory 54 and reading of information from the memory 54; Authentication processing unit 55
, A random number generator 56, an encryption processor 57, and a key code generator 58.

The memory 54 is a volatile memory. When the computer device to which the key code generator 40 is connected instructs to stop using the device, or when the device is forcibly disassembled, the memory 54 is used as a memory. The control unit 53 is notified and the information in the memory 54 is deleted.

The authentication processing section 55 authenticates the generation of various key codes based on the input password from the key management device 10 and the insertion states (authority information) of the physical keys 42a and 42b. The encryption processing unit 57 uses the master key recorded in the memory 54 and a predetermined encryption algorithm to encrypt the random number generated by the random number generation unit 56, the password for the supervisor, the ID for the issuer, and the password. It is to make. As the encryption algorithm in this case, for example, “SXAL / MBAL” (IS) in which a block-based encryption algorithm called SXAL and a multi-block encryption algorithm called MBAL are combined.
O / IEC9979-0012) can be used. The key code generation unit 58 generates a key code according to the request using the encryption processing unit 57 and sends the key code to the key management device 10 and the like via the I / O interface unit 51. The key code generator 41 connected to the card issuing device 20 has the same configuration.

Next, the operation of the IC card issuance / registration system 1 will be specifically described. In the present embodiment, the issuing supervisor registration phase, the issuing person registration phase, and the IC card issuing phase are executed in this order. IC card 3
If 0 is issued, the process proceeds to the user operation phase (operation mode of the communication system). Hereinafter, each phase will be described.

(1) Issuance Supervisor Registration Phase First, the registration procedure of the issuance supervisor will be described with reference to the sequence chart of FIG. The issuing terminal management table ITT is created in the key management device 10, and the supervisor ID used when the issuing supervisor logs in, for example, “TORIGAI” is directly registered (k11, k12). Next, the user logs in from the card issuing device 20 with the supervisor ID “TORIGAI” (c11). The key management device 10 compares this supervisor ID with the supervisor ID registered in the ITT, and sends a good notification to the card issuing device 20 if they match (k13). The card issuance device 20 has a manager encryption code (encrypted random numbers: X, X,... X).
Is generated and transferred to the key management device 10 (c1
2). The supervisor encryption code is obtained by inserting the physical key B into the key code generator 41 and inputting a supervisor key or the like. The key management device 10
This supervisor encryption code is encrypted with its own encryption key (X ′, X ′,... X ′) and recorded in the issuing terminal management table ITT.
FIG. 5 shows an example of the recorded contents of the issuing terminal management table ITT at this time.

(2) Issuer Registration Phase Next, the procedure for registering the issuer will be described with reference to the sequence chart of FIG. Registration of the person in charge of issuance is performed by the issuance supervisor. In other words, the card issuing device 20 has an issuer, for example, an issuer IC having an identification ID of “FUJII”.
The card is attached (c21), and the issuing supervisor has the supervisor ID.
Login with “TORIGAI” (c22). The key management device 10 compares the supervisor ID sent from the card issuing device 20 with the supervisor ID recorded on the issuing terminal management table ITT (k21), and when they match, a challenge code composed of a random number. Is generated and sent to the card issuing device 20 (k22). Also, this challenge code is encrypted with the supervisor code on the issuing terminal management table ITT (k2
3), this is stored as a reference response. The card issuing device 20 encrypts the challenge code with the supervisor encryption code, and sends this to the key management device 10 as a response code (c23). The key management device 10 compares the response code with the reference response,
If they match, the issuing terminal is notified of the permission of the issuer registration (k24). The card issuing device 20 reads the ID of the issuing person, the IC authentication code, and the like from the issuing person's IC card (c24), encrypts these, and transfers it to the key management device 10 (c25). Key management device 10
Decrypts the IC authentication code and the like with the supervisor encryption code recorded in the issuing terminal management table ITT (k25), and records it in the issuing person management table IPT (k26). However, the IC authentication code is re-encrypted with the encryption key managed by the key management device 10, and this is used as the person-in-charge encryption code.
Record on PT. FIG. 7 shows an example of the contents of the issuer management table IPT thus recorded.

(3) Issuance phase of user's IC card The issuance of a user's IC card is performed by a registered issuer. 8 and 9 are sequence charts showing the registration procedure in this case. In FIG. 8, when the issuer IC card is inserted and authentication with a correct password is performed (c31), the card issuing device 20 automatically sends the ID of the issuer to the key management device 10 (c3).
1). In other words, communication with the key management device 10 is established without the issuer himself being aware of the contents of the IC card 30. The key management device 10 includes a card issuing device 20
Is compared with the identification ID on the issuer management table IPT (k31), and when they match, the challenge code (random number 1) is obtained using the key code generation device 40.
Is generated and transmitted to the card issuing device 20 (k3
2). Further, this challenge code is encrypted with an IC authentication code on the issuer management table IPT (k33), and this is stored as a reference response. The card issuing device 20 encrypts the challenge code with an IC authentication code (person-in-charge code) and sends it to the key management device 10 as a response code (c32). The key management device 10 compares the response code with the reference response (k34), and when they match, notifies that the key file generation is permitted. The key management device 10 also includes an SCD
The session key (random number 2) generated in 40 is encrypted and transmitted to the card issuing device 20 (k35).

Referring to FIG. 9, the card issuing device 20 decrypts the encrypted session key with the IC authentication code of the IC card for the issuing person (c33), and also provides file basic information necessary for key file generation. (User ID,
The key information) is encrypted with the session key and transferred to the key management device 10 (c34). The key management device 10 decrypts the information sent from the card issuing device 20 with the session key (k36), creates a key file, and records this in the virtual private line key management table TKT (k37). The created key file is encrypted with the session key and transferred to the card issuing device 20 (k38). The card issuing device 20 decrypts the encrypted key file with the session key (c35), and stores this in the IC card 30 confidentially (c36). FIG. 10 shows an example of the contents of the virtual private line key management table TKT thus created.

(4) User Operation Next, a communication system using the IC card 30 created as described above will be described. In this embodiment, as shown in FIG. 11, a known fireall (F
W) 61, VPN comprising the key management device 10 described above
Server 62, DB server 63, card issuing device 2 described above
0 via a local network LL1 and a public network LP
An example of the communication system 2 for performing inter-member communication via the virtual leased line VT between the communication terminals 2a and 2b connected to the local network LL2 will be described.

The VPN server 62 is a communication mechanism for constructing a virtual private line (VT) in the public network LP, and the fireall 61 is for preventing intrusion from a non-member communication device into its own network as is well known. is there. The DB server 63 stores information to be provided to members, and in this example, serves as a target server for the communication terminal 2a. The communication terminals 2a and 2b are member communication devices and have the same function.
Will be described only.

As shown in FIG. 12, the communication terminal 2a includes a communication control unit 71 for controlling communication with the virtual private line VT, an application unit (AP) 72,
A memory 73 such as a disk, a memory control unit 74 for controlling writing of information to the memory 73 and reading of information from the memory 73, a card reader / writer 75 for detachably mounting the IC card 30; It comprises a card information expanding section 76 for expanding the stored information, and a detachment detecting section 77 for detecting insertion and removal of an IC card. I
The C card 30 is the IC card issuance / registration system 1 described above.
Although the key file is stored confidentially, a password authentication function using a PIN (personal identification information), which is a basic function of the IC card, is locked if unauthorized input continues a predetermined number of times as a result of this authentication. It has both functions.

The above functional blocks 71 to 74 and 76 to 77 in the communication terminal 2a are realized by cooperation of a computer such as a personal computer and a predetermined program. This program is usually integrated with the computer device, but is recorded on a computer-readable recording medium, for example, a CD-ROM or a flexible disk in a form separated from the computer device, and is appropriately installed in the computer device and used. May be performed.

The AP 72 has a function of defining communication contents to be performed with the communication apparatus 70 of the other party and encrypting or decrypting the communication contents by a hybrid method of a public key method and a common key method. In addition, a function of restricting the display of the record information in the memory 73 obtained through the memory control unit 74, particularly the key file, a function of monitoring the state of the attachment / detachment detection unit 78 and performing communication when the IC card 30 is removed. It also has a function to interrupt. That is, communication is enabled only when the IC card 30 is mounted.

The communication procedure using this communication terminal 2a is as shown in FIG. That is, when the user operating the communication terminal 2a inserts his / her own IC card 30 into the card reader / writer 75, the communication terminal 2a
In step S101, the IC card is detected (step S101: Ye).
s) When the user authentication with the password is performed (Step S102: Yes), the key file stored in the IC card 30 is developed in the memory 73 through the memory control unit 74 (Step S103). Thereafter, the user ID is transmitted to the key management device 10 in the VPN server 62 through the communication control unit 71. If the password is incorrectly entered six times, the IC card 30 is locked and cannot be used.

The key management device 10 in the VPN server 62 checks whether the user ID sent from the communication terminal 2a is recorded in the virtual private line management table TKT of the key management device 10 and records it. In this case, an authentication check by the member service is performed using the key information.
If the authentication is valid, the access permission is notified to the communication terminal 2a (step S104).

Thus, the AP 72 of the communication terminal 2a
A call is established with the target DB server 63 via the virtual leased line VT indicated by the broken line in FIG. 11, and encrypted communication using a hybrid method of the public key method and the common key method is started (step S105). The communication terminal 2a detects that the IC card 30 has been removed during the communication (Step S106: No, Step S107: Yes) or ends the communication (Step S106: Yes).
Deletes the key file from the memory 73 (step S108). In this manner, communication using the virtual private line VT can be performed while ensuring security during communication.

[0039]

As is clear from the above description, according to the IC card issuance / registration system of the present invention, only the issuing supervisor can specify the issuing person, and only the issuing person can enter the key file. I for users who have secretly stored
Since the C card can be issued, the security of the authority to create the key file is enhanced, and the key file is less likely to be leaked to a malicious third party. In addition, since the key file is stored by being encrypted with information unique to the IC card, it is impossible to copy the key file to another IC card and restore the key file correctly.

According to the communication system of the present invention, communication using the virtual private line is enabled only when an IC card storing a key file is mounted.
Since the key file is deleted when the C card is removed or at the end of communication, there is an effect that the security of the key file at the time of communication is enhanced. Also, at the time of authentication at the start of communication, the IC card is locked when an unauthorized password is entered a predetermined number of times, so that it is impossible for a third party to know the contents of the password and the like. Therefore, security can be improved.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a configuration diagram of a main part of an IC card issuance / registration system of the present invention.

FIG. 2 shows a key code generator (SC) used in the present embodiment.
D) Exterior view.

FIG. 3 is a functional block configuration diagram of a key code generator (SCD) of the embodiment.

FIG. 4 is a sequence chart showing a registration procedure of an issuing supervisor.

FIG. 5 is an explanatory view of the contents of an issuing terminal management table formed by the procedure of FIG. 4;

FIG. 6 is a sequence chart showing a procedure for registering a person in charge of issuance;

FIG. 7 is an explanatory view of the contents of an issuer management table formed by the procedure of FIG. 6;

FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing a registration procedure of a user terminal.

FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing a user terminal registration procedure (continued).

FIG. 10 is an explanatory diagram of the contents of a user terminal management table formed by the procedures of FIGS. 8 and 9;

FIG. 11 is a configuration diagram of a communication system to which the present invention is applied.

FIG. 12 is a block configuration diagram of a communication terminal included in the communication system of FIG. 11;

FIG. 13 is an explanatory diagram of a communication procedure in the communication system 2 of FIG. 11;

FIG. 14 is a schematic configuration diagram of a conventional communication system.

[Explanation of symbols]

 DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 IC card issue registration system 2 Communication system 2a, 2b Communication terminal 10 Key management device 12, 22, 55 Authentication processing unit 13, 23, 57 Encryption processing unit 14 Key file creation unit 15 ID registration unit 20 Card issuing device 24 Card insertion Output interface unit 25, 75 Card reader / writer 26, 77 Removal / attachment detection unit 30 IC card 40, 41 Key code generator 52 Activation control unit 53, 74 Memory control unit 54, 73 Memory 57 Key code generation unit 62 VPN server 63 DB server 72 Application part (AP) 76 Card information development part LL1, LL2 Local network LP Public network VT Virtual private line

 ────────────────────────────────────────────────── ─── Continued on the front page (72) Inventor Mikio Fujii 1-14-14 Azamino, Aoba-ku, Yokohama-shi, Kanagawa Prefecture 5 Inside Laurel Intelligent Systems Co., Ltd. (72) Inventor Seiichi Nakahara 3-488, Narabashi, Higashiyamato-shi, Tokyo Address No. 3 (72) Inventor Atsushi Osawa 1-29, Nakamachi 6-chome, Hoya-shi, Tokyo

Claims (11)

[Claims] 1. A communication mechanism for establishing a virtual private line with a communication partner device connected to a public network, and a key file including at least usage authority information and user identification information of the communication mechanism is confidentially protected. The stored IC card and this I
A communication device having a mechanism for detachably mounting the C card and storage means referred to at the time of operation. The communication device is stored in the IC card when the IC card is mounted. The key file is decrypted and developed in the storage means, the communication mechanism is activated based on the developed key file, a virtual private line is established with the communication partner device, and the operation of the communication mechanism is terminated. After that, the communication system is configured to delete the key file from the storage unit. 2. The communication device, when detecting that the IC card has been removed during operation of the communication mechanism,
2. The communication system according to claim 1, wherein the operation of the communication mechanism is stopped, and the key file is deleted from the storage unit. 3. The communication system according to claim 1, wherein the communication device includes a visualization restricting unit that restricts visualization of the contents of the key file. 4. An authentication means for performing user authentication based on the stored key file;
4. The communication system according to claim 1, further comprising: a lock unit configured to lock the key file when the number of misrecognitions by the authentication unit reaches a predetermined number. 5. A system for issuing the IC card used in the communication system according to claim 1, wherein a supervisor encryption unique to an issue supervisor who supervises the issuance of the IC card. A card issuing device that keeps a secret code of a code and a person-in-charge code unique to a person in charge of issuance of the IC card, and a key management device that creates and registers the key file connected so as to be capable of two-way communication. The key management device comprises: means for registering a supervisory code acquired based on a predetermined authority; and authentication of an issuer registration request by a challenge-response method based on the registered supervisory code. Means for acquiring, from the card issuing device, the person-in-charge code encrypted by the supervisor code when the result is valid; Means for decrypting and registering the responsible person's encryption code with the registered supervisor's encrypted code, wherein the key file is created after authentication based on the registered responsible person's encryption code. IC card issue registration system. 6. A system for issuing the IC card used in the communication system according to claim 1, wherein at least a person in charge of issuance of the IC card is assigned. A card issuing device that keeps the encryption code confidential and a key management device that creates and registers the key file are connected so as to enable two-way communication, and the key management device acquires the charge in accordance with a predetermined authority. The key file creation request is authenticated by the challenge-response method based on the means for registering the user encryption code and the registered person encryption code,
Using the predetermined confidentiality session key passed when the authentication result is valid, obtaining the file basic information from the card issuing device, and transmitting the key file created based on the file basic information to the card issuing device. Means for performing transmission, wherein the card issuing device is configured to store the created key file confidentially in a target IC card. 7. The clerk's code is secretly stored in an IC card dedicated to a clerk in charge attached to the card issuing device.
IC card issuance registration system as described. 8. The IC card issuance / registration system according to claim 7, wherein the key file unique to the issuer is confidentially stored in the IC card dedicated to the issuer. 9. An apparatus used in the IC card issuance / registration system according to any one of claims 5 to 8, wherein at least basic information which is a basis for creating the supervisory code and the responsible person's code is provided. The stored storage means, a random number generation means for generating a random number serving as a basis of the session key, and a basic information stored in the storage means and a random number output from the random number generation means are encrypted based on predetermined authority information. Encryption means for encrypting, and the input of the authority information triggers the supervisory encryption code, the person in charge encryption code,
And a key code generation device configured to generate one of a session key and a session key. 10. The storage means is a volatile memory,
10. The key code generation device according to claim 9, wherein the basic information is erased by unauthorized reading or interruption of energization. 11. A key file containing use right information and user identification information for using a communication mechanism for constructing a virtual private line with a communication partner device connected to a public network is confidentially stored. When a predetermined authentication process is completed after the IC card is mounted on a computer device having a mechanism for detachably mounting the IC card and a storage unit, the key file stored in the IC card is deleted. Developed in the storage means, activates the communication mechanism based on the developed key file, establishes a virtual private line with the communication partner device, and furthermore, when the IC card is removed or the communication mechanism is disconnected. A computer program for deleting the key file from the storage means at the end of the operation is recorded in a form readable by the computer device. Recording medium.