JPH11110464A - Processing system and method for issuing, transferring, certifying and erasing electronic securities - Google Patents

Abstract

(57) [Summary] [PROBLEMS] To provide a processing system and a processing method for guaranteeing the legitimacy of each procedure in various procedures for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities. SOLUTION: A processing device of an issuer o, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral institution T, a processing device of the neutral institution T generates a digital certificate C in an electronic securities issuance procedure. and, processor issuer o is said digital certificate C and rights and obligations ECN right portion S ₀ containing encrypted data description D relationship, to generate a blind signature data B that concealed certificate number, The processing unit of the neutral institution T digitally signs the data B for blind signature to generate blind-signed data B ′, and the processing unit of the issuer o performs unblind processing on the blind-signed data to obtain a digitally signed security. A number is obtained, and the electronic securities identification unit including the number and the electronic securities identification unit are combined to complete the electronic securities issuing procedure.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to a processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities of a type in which rights and obligations can be freely described and a number of electronic securities having the same rights and obligations are issued. It relates to the processing method.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art With the recent development of computers and their communication networks, trading of goods and exchange of digital data as money have been performed on the communication networks. This digital data exchanged as money is what is called electronic money, has the advantage that it can be moved instantly anywhere in the world, and does not require the cost and time of payment to remote places, so it will be increasingly in the future The demand for usage is increasing. On the other hand, electronic money itself is digital data, and therefore cannot be physically restricted from being transferred, and has characteristics of being easily copied. For this reason, a technique for verifying that one electronic money is unique, that is, that it is not used twice, and that it is legitimate data that the bank recognizes as money, is required.

At present, in order to verify the validity of electronic money data, a method of partially using hardware such as an IC card and a method of exchanging pure digital data on software are adopted. The method of using hardware such as an IC card makes continuous improvements to the IC card to make it difficult for data to be tampered or leaked, and stores the electronic money as data using the IC card as if it were a wallet. In this method, the balance is reduced from the IC card in response. British National Wes
t The Monex system being promoted by Minster Bank and Midland Bank is an example. In this case, prevention of unauthorized tampering / copying of electronic money largely depends on hardware reliability.

[0004] On the other hand, the method of exchanging pure digital data on software presupposes the existence of a computer network, and exchanges electronic money, which is digital data, between personal computers connected to the computer network for settlement. It is a method to perform. The Digi Cash system being promoted by Digi Cash is an example. This method has the advantage that it can be easily deployed worldwide using an existing computer network, as compared with the method using a part of the IC card.・ The prevention of copying must be based on data verification technology.

[0005] The electronic securities of the present invention is a system for exchanging digital data on the above-mentioned software. It implements various procedures such as erasure. for that reason,
Verification of digital data by software Digi
Related to Cash method. Hereinafter, the Digi Cash method will be described.

FIG. 7 shows a flow from the issue of electronic money to the settlement by the Digi Cash method. The numbers in the figure indicate the order of processing.

In FIG. 7, a consumer who first has an account in a bank sends the amount of money to be withdrawn from the account and a proof of identity (such as an ID card) to the bank. In order to maintain the electronic money data blindly without knowing the contents of each electronic money. After the blind signature, the electronic money is given to the consumer.

The technique of blind signature is disclosed in US Pat.
The technique disclosed in No. 9,063 is used. The purpose of the blind signature is to guarantee the electronic money issued by the bank without being able to later confirm to which consumer the electronic money was issued. This makes it impossible to trace information such as which consumer purchased which product and so on, thereby maintaining the privacy of individual transactions.

Next, it is assumed that the electronic money has been paid by the consumer to a store having an account at the same bank. The store that has received the electronic money requests the bank to inspect the electronic money before delivering the product.

[0010] The bank verifies that the electronic money is indeed issued by itself and that it is not used twice. As a result, when the electronic money is legitimate, the amount of the electronic money is transferred to the store account, and the store is notified that the electronic money is legitimate.

[0011] Upon notification from the bank, the store delivers the product to the consumer.

The flow of distribution and processing of electronic money has been described above. Since element technologies such as blind signature and verification of validity of electronic money are also used in the present invention, an embodiment of the present invention will be described. I will explain at the point.

[0013]

However, the above Di
GiCash-based electronic money could not function as an electronic security that issued, transferred, certified, and erased. The specific problems are as follows.

The issue of electronic money has been limited to banks. With regard to electronic money, banks have only issued the amount requested by the user or several types of predetermined face value electronic money. Electronic securities, on the other hand, describe the rights and obligations of the property.They can be issued by multiple issuers, and each issuer can freely describe their rights and obligations with relatively complicated content. There must be.
In other words, in electronic securities, the rights of the person holding the electronic securities (mostly the right to request money) and the obligations that the issuer should fulfill to the person holding the electronic securities (often payment of money) Obligations) must be made available to a large number of issuers in the context of commercial transactions.
The issuer's free rights and obligations could not be stated.

[0015] Electronic money could not be claimed to be a legitimate owner. In securities, it is necessary to prove that the user is a legitimate owner, as in the case of stock securities, for example, and to request the issuer to pay a dividend. Electronic securities must also be able to prove that the person who owns the data of the electronic securities is the legitimate owner.

On the other hand, in the conventional electronic money, it is possible to show that the owner is the owner only by the transfer procedure, and to prove that he / she is the only valid owner without any transfer action. I couldn't do that.

Therefore, an object of the present invention is to provide a processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities and a processing method for realizing various procedures for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing securities. It is to provide.

[0018]

A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities according to claim 1 of the present application comprises a processing unit of an issuer, a processing unit of a user, and a processing unit of a neutral organization. Issuance, transfer, certification,
A processing system for erasure, wherein in a procedure for issuing electronic securities, the processing device of the neutral institution generates a digital certificate that can be digitally signed only by the neutral institution, and the processing device of the issuer includes: Only the digital certificate that can be digitally signed and the electronic securities right part including the encrypted data of the description of the rights and obligations relationship are generated, while the security number is generated, and the blind signature data that conceals the security number is generated. The processing device of the neutral institution inputs the digital certificate and the blind signature data, and digitally signs the blind signature data with the same private key as the digital signature of the digital certificate. Generating blind-signed data that can be digitally signed only by a neutral institution, and wherein the processing device of the issuer generates the blind-signed data. And inputting a digitally signed security number that can be digitally signed only by the neutral institution by performing an unblind process, generating an electronic securities identification unit including the digitally signed security number by the neutral institution, The electronic securities issuing section is completed by combining the electronic securities identification section and the electronic securities identification section.

The processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities according to claim 2 of the present invention is the processing system according to claim 1, wherein the security number generated by the issuer's device has the following relationship: Is calculated using three random numbers a, b, and c satisfying the following and the issuer's specific number id.

X = f (y, z) y = f (a, b) z = f (id, c) where x: security number f (): f (x, y) = f (x ′, y ') x ≠
A one-way hash function in which it is difficult to find x ', y ≠ y'. A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities according to claim 3 of the present invention comprises a processing device of an issuer and a user. A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, comprising a processing device of (i) and a processing device of a neutral institution. key n _T of RSA system for each electronic securities on _{demand, e T, p T, q} T, generates the d _T, digital certificates and digital signatures n _T of the public key, the e _T by the secret key d _T A letter C is generated, where C = <n _T , e _T , h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp mod n _p ><> is a set of data n _T and e _T inside the right and obligation contents. The corresponding security-specific public keys d _p and n _p are the private key and the public key h (n _T | e _T ) is a hash function using n _T and e _T as variables h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp is data obtained by digitally signing h (n _T | e _T ) with a secret key d _p mod n _p is n _p law said issuer processing device indicating that a (modulus) inputs the description D that describes the rights and obligations of the digital certificate C and the electronic securities, and outputs a right portion S ₀ of the electronic securities, where _{in, S 0 = <C, D} , h (C | D) do mod n o> d o is the issuer of the secret key n _o is the issuer's public key h (C | D) is a variable C and D hash function h to (C | D) ^do the h | processing device data (C D) a digitally signed by the private key _{d o} mod n _o is the NSO indicating that the _{n o} modulo (modulus) is inputs and said digital certificate C and ECN right portion S _0, the digital in electronic securities issuing record database Search for Le certificates C, and the electronic securities issuing record database right portion S ₀ of the digital certificate C and the electronic securities on condition that the digital certificate C is not used in other electronic securities as a set And the issuer's processing device registers the security number random numbers a, b, c (0 <
a, b, c < ^2t , t is a predetermined number of binary digits) and a blind coefficient r (0 <r < ^2t , t is a predetermined number of binary digits) are randomly generated and issued. The security number x is calculated using the specific number id of the third party, and then the blind signature data B in which the security number x is concealed by the blind coefficient r is calculated, where x = f (y, z) y = F (a, b) z = f (id, c) f () is x ≠ such that f (x, y) = f (x ′, y ′)
x ', y ≠ y' indicates the hard one-way hash function to find ^{a, B = r eT h (x} ) modn T h (x) is a hash function mod n _T to variable x to the n _T The processing unit of the neutral organization inputs the blind signature data B and the digital certificate C, and uses the secret key d _T used for the digital signature of the digital certificate C. Blind signed data B ′ is generated by digitally signing the blind signature data B, where B ′ = (r ^eT ) ^dTh (x) ^dT mod n _T = r · h (x) ^dT mod n _T h (x) ^dT data the issuer processing devices that digitally signed h (x) is the private key d _T inputs the blind signed data B ', which was divided by the blind coefficient r electronic Identification of securities S calculated ₁ (x), _{wherein, S 1 (x) = <} x, h (x) dT mod n T> Subsequently, the electronic securities right portion _{S 0} and ECN identification unit S
₁ (x) to generate electronic securities S (x) S (x) = <S ₀ , S ₁ (x)>, thereby completing the electronic securities issuance procedure.

A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities according to claim 4 of the present application is an electronic security system comprising an issuer's processing device, a user's processing device, and a neutral organization's processing device. Is a processing system for the issuance, transfer, certification, and erasure of electronic securities. In the electronic securities transfer procedure, the processing device of the transferee uses electronic securities from the transferor and the security number before transfer, which only the transferor can know. A new security number dedicated to the transferred user, generates blind signature data concealing the new security number, and the processing unit of the neutral organization The digital signature identification unit consisting of the blind signature data from the sender, the security number before transfer and the digitally signed security number that can be digitally signed only by the neutral authority, and the security number before transfer that only the transferor can know Random number A part and a digital certificate included in the electronic securities right section of the electronic security are input, and the electronic certificate identification section and the electronic securities right section before transfer are one-to-one through the digital certificate. Perform the verification calculation of the correspondence, the electronic securities identification unit before the transfer using the part of the random number of the security number before the transfer and the security number of the security number identification unit before the transfer, the transfer user of the transfer user A verification calculation is performed to confirm that the transfer has been given to the transferred user under the agreement, and it is confirmed by the electronic securities transfer record database that the electronic securities identification unit before the transfer has not been transferred. By registering the electronic securities identification section of the transferee as a transferred electronic securities identification section on the condition, and digitally signing the blind signature data with the same private key that digitally signed the digital certificate. Blind-signed data that can only be digitally signed by a neutral institution is generated, and the processing device of the transferee unblinds the blind-signed data to generate a new digitally signed security that can be digitally signed only by a neutral institution. Get the number,
An electronic securities identification unit including the new security number and the digitally signed security number is generated, and the electronic securities right unit and the new electronic security identification unit are combined to complete an electronic securities transfer procedure. It is assumed that.

A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities according to claim 5 of the present invention is an electronic security system comprising an issuer processing device, a user processing device, and a neutral institution processing device. Is a processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing the electronic securities. In the transfer procedure of the electronic securities, the processing device of the transferred user β transmits the electronic securities S from the transfer user α.
(X _α ) and the random numbers a _α , b of the security number x _α of the transfer user α
_alpha, it acquires the z _alpha, random a _beta of transferee user beta dedicated new policy number of, b _beta, and c _beta, blind coefficient r _beta (0
<R _β <2 ^t , where t is a predetermined number of binary digits).
Using a specific number idβ the transferee user beta calculates the new certificate number x _beta dedicated transferee user beta, followed by the policy number x _beta blind signature data B that concealed by the blind coefficient r _{beta β} is calculated, where S (x _α ) = <S ₀ , S ₁ (x _α )><<> is a set of data S ₀ = <C, D, h (C | D) ^do mod n _o> C is the description of the digital certificate D is right and obligations d _o is the secret key of the issuer, _{n o} public key h of the issuer (C | D) is a hash function as a variable C and D h ( C | D) ^do the h (C | D) a _{d o} data mod n _o which was digitally signed by indicates modulo _{n o C = <n T,} e T, h (n T | e T) the secret of ^{_{dp mod n p> n T,}} e T securities-specific public key d _p corresponding to the rights and obligations content, n _p is a neutral institution And the public key h (n _T | e _T) is n _T and e _T a hash function to the variable _{h (n T | e T)} dT is h (n _T | e _T) digitally signed by a d _p data mod n _p indicates that n _p is a modulus S ₁ (x _α ) = <x _α , h (x _α ) ^dT mod n ^T > x _α is the security number h (x _α ) is a hash function h (x _alpha to variable x _alpha) ^dT is h (x _alpha) of d _T by the digital signature data _{x α = f (y α,} z α) y α = f (a α, b _α ) z _α = f (id _α , c _α ) a _α , b _α , c _α are 0 <a _α , b _α , c _α <2 ^t id _α is the specific number of the transfer user α f () is f X ≠ such that (x, y) = f (x ′, y ′)
x ', y ≠ y' difficult to find a one-way hash function _{x β = f (y β,} z β) y β = f (a β, b β) z β = f (id β, c β X _β is a new security number dedicated to the transferred user β a _β , b _β , c _β is 0 <a _β , b _β , c _β <2 ^t id _β is the specific number of the transferred user β B _β = processing apparatus of ^{_{r β eT h (x β)}} modn T h (x β) hash and variable _x β function e _T is public key the neutral institution corresponding to the private key d _T of neutral institutions, transferee From the user β, the blind signature data _Bβ , the electronic security identification unit S ₁ ( _xα ) before transfer, and the security number random numbers _aα , _bα , z
and _alpha, the inputs the digital certificate C contained in the electronic security rights section S ₀ of the electronic securities S (x _α), wherein the front transfer certificate number x _alpha from the hash function h a (x _alpha) The hash function h (x
_α ) ^dT is decrypted by the public key e _T paired with the secret key d _T used in the digital certificate C to calculate h (x _α ) ^{dT · eT} , and the two are compared to obtain the electronic security identification. It is verified that the section S ₁ (x _α ) has a one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities right section S _0, and then the security number x _α is x _α =
_{f (f (a α, b} α), z α) by verifying that satisfies the relationship, the electronic securities identification section S _{1 (x α)} is to be moved to under the transfer user alpha agreement user β, and by searching the electronic securities transfer record database for the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ ( _xα ), it is confirmed that the electronic securities have not been transferred. The electronic security identification unit S ₁ ( _xα ) is registered as the transferred electronic security identification unit, and the blind signature data B is obtained using the secret key d _T used for the digital signature of the digital certificate C.
The _beta and digital signature 'generated, where, B _beta' blind signed data ^{_{B β = (r β eT)}} dT h (x β) dT mod n T = r β · h (x β) dT mod n _T h (x _β) ^dT is h (x _β) a processor of the data the transferee user beta was digitally signed by d _T inputs the blind signed data B _beta ', the blind factor this r
by dividing by _β digital signed policy number h (x _β)
^dT mod n _T is obtained, and the identification part S ₁ (x
_β ), where S ₁ (x _β ) = <x _β , h (x _β ) ^dT mod n _T > Then, the electronic securities right part S ₀ and the electronic securities identification part S ₁ (x
_β ) to generate electronic securities S ( _xβ ) S ( _xβ ) = <S ₀ , S ₁ ( _xβ )> to complete the transfer procedure of the electronic securities. .

A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities according to claim 6 of the present application is an electronic security system comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral organization. Is a processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities. In the certification procedure of the electronic securities, the processing device of the issuer knows only the electronic securities from the user who owns the electronic securities and the user. A part of the obtained security number random number, an electronic security identification part consisting of the security number of the electronic security and a digitally signed security number obtained by digital signature only by a neutral organization, and an electronic security right part of the electronic security The digital certificate contained in the, and a part of the security number random number is sent to the processing unit of the neutral institution to request proof of ownership, the processing unit of the neutral institution, via the digital certificate The electronic certificate The identification unit performs a verification calculation that the electronic securities right unit is in one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities right unit, and the random number of the security number identifies the electronic security using a part of the security number random number and the security number of the security number identification unit. Performing a calculation of verification that only the owning user can know, searching the electronic securities identification unit in the electronic securities certification record database, and returning the search and verification results to the processing device of the issuer. Is what you do.

A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities according to claim 7 of the present application is an electronic security system comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral organization. issuing, transferring, certification, a processing system for erasing, in the proof procedure of the electronic securities processing apparatus of the issuer o includes an electronic securities from the user a who owns the electronic securities S (x _a) some of the random number of the user a only knows obtained policy number y _a, id _a, acquires the c _a, the electronic securities identification section _S 1 of the electronic securities S (x _a) and (x _a), wherein ECN S (x _a) and a digital certificate C contained in the electronic security rights section S ₀ of a portion y _a of the policy number random number,
id _A and c _A are sent to the processing unit of the neutral organization T to request proof of possession, where S (x _A ) = <S ₀ , S ₁ (x _A )><> is the data inside set _{S 0 = <C, D,} h (C | D) do mod n o> of C digital certificate D description of the rights and obligations d _o secret key of the issuer n _o the public of the issuer key h (C | D) is a hash function h to the variable C and D indicate that the data | | (D C) was digitally signed by _{d o} mod n _o is modulo _{n o} (C D) ^do the h C = <n _T , e _T , h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp mod n _p > n _T , e _T is a public key unique to the security corresponding to the rights and obligations d _p , n _p is a private key of a neutral organization And the public key h (n _T | e _T ) is a hash function h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp with n _T and e _T as variables, and the digital ^signature of h (n _T | e _T ) with d _p The named data mod n _p indicates that n _p is a modulus S ₁ (x _A ) = <x _A , h (x _A ) ^dT mod n _T > x _A is the user who owns the electronic securities The security numbers d _T and n _T assigned by A are the secret key and public key of the neutral institution, respectively. H (x _A ) is a hash function using x _A as a variable, and h (x _A ) ^dT is h (x ^A ). d _T data digitally signed by _{x A = f (y A,} z A) y A = f (a A, b A) z A = f (id A, c A) a A, b A, c A securities The random number of the number 0 <a _A , b _A , c _A <2 ^tt is a predetermined number of binary digits id _A is the specific number of the user A f () is f (x, y) = f (x ′, y ') x ≠
One-way hash function in which it is difficult to find x ′, y ≠ y ′. The processing device of the neutral institution T includes the identification unit S ₁ (x _A )
The hash function h from the policy number x _A, which is included in the
(X _A ) is calculated, and a hash function h (x _A ) ^dT of the digitally signed security number included in the electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x _A ) is used as a secret key d used in the digital certificate C. _T
And decrypted by the public key e _T paired with h (x _A )
By calculating ^{dT · eT} and comparing the two, it is verified that the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _A ) has a one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities rights unit S _0, and then the security number x _A is obtained. x _A =
_{f (y A, f (id} A, c A)) by calculating satisfy a relationship of a portion of the policy number random number y _A, i
Verify that d _A and c _A are known only to the user who owns the electronic security, search the electronic security certificate record database, and return the search and verification results to the processing device of the issuer o. It is characterized by the following.

A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying and erasing electronic securities according to claim 8 of the present invention is an electronic security system comprising an issuer's processor, a user's processor, and a neutral institution's processor. Is a processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying and erasing electronic securities, and in the process of erasing electronic securities, the processing unit of the neutral institution only has the security number of the electronic security that is required to be erased and a digital signature of only the neutral institution. Only the digital certificate identification section consisting of the digitally signed security number obtained, the digital certificate included in the digital certificate right section of the digital certificate, and the issuer or user requesting erasure of the digital certificate. Enter a part of the random number of the security number to obtain,
Performing a verification calculation that the electronic securities identification unit is in one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities right unit via the digital certificate,
Using a part of the security number random number and the security number of the security number identification unit, a verification calculation is performed to verify that only the issuer or user seeking the erasure of the electronic security can be known. Searching for the electronic securities identification section in the electronic securities erasure record database, and registering the electronic security identification section as an erased electronic security identification section on the condition of non-erasure, thereby completing the erasure procedure of the electronic security. It is a feature.

A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying and erasing electronic securities according to claim 9 of the present application is an electronic security system comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral organization. Is a processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities. In the erasure procedure of electronic securities, the processing unit of the neutral institution is required to be erased by the issuer or user B requesting erasure of the electronic securities. The electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _B ) of the electronic security, the digital certificate C included in the electronic securities rights unit S ₀ of the electronic security, and the issuer or user requesting erasure of the electronic security A part of security number random numbers a _B , b _B , and z _B that only B can know is obtained, where S (x _B ) = <S ₀ , S ₁ (x _B )><> The data set S ₀ is the electronic securities rights department S ₁ (x _B ) Policy number S ₀ = electronic securities electronic securities identification unit x _B, which are required to erase <C, D, h (C | D) do mod n o> C is the description of the digital certificate D is the rights and obligations relationship d _o is the issuer of the secret key n _o is the issuer's public key h (C | D) is C and the hash function h to the variable D by | | (D C) a _{d o} (C _{D) d o} is h digital signature data mod n _o is _{n o} law (modulus) indicate that the _{C = <n T, e T} , h (n T | e T) dp mod n p> n T, e T the right content The public key d _p and n _p corresponding to the security are a secret key and a public key of a neutral institution, and h (n _T | e _T ) is a hash function h (n _T | e _T ) using n _T and e _T as variables. ^dp is h (n _T | e _T) data was digitally signed by d _p mod n _p is S ₁ indicating that the n _p modulo (modulus) (x _{B) <X B, h (x B} ) dT mod n T> d T and n _T is the secret key of each of the neutral institution and the public key h (x _B) is a hash function to the variable x _B, h (x _B) ^dT is h (x _B) data was digitally signed by _{d T x B = f (y} B, z B) y B = f (a B, b B) z B = f (id B, c B) a B , b _B, c _B is a random number of policy number _{0 <a B, b B,} c B <2 t t is a predetermined number of digits of the binary numbers id _B issuer seeking erase specific number f of the user B ( ) Is x ′ ≠ such that f (x, y) = f (x ′, y ′).
A one-way hash function in which it is difficult to find x ′, y ≠ y ′. Subsequently, the processing unit of the neutral organization calculates a hash function h (x _B ) from the security number x _B and obtains the electronic security identification. The hash function h (x _B ) ^dT of the digitally signed security number included in the part S ₁ (x _B ) is decrypted by the public key e _T paired with the secret key d _T used in the digital certificate C. By calculating h (x _B ) ^{dT · eT} and comparing them, it is verified that the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _B ) has a one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities rights unit S _0, and ID x _B is _{x B = f (f (a} B, b B), z B) by verifying that satisfies the relationship), part a _B of the policy number random number, b _B, is z _B electron Verify that only the issuer or user B seeking erasure of the security can know, Identifying portion S ₁ a _{(x B)} searching in an electronic securities erase record database, the electronic securities identifying unit S non erased condition
By registering _{1 (x B)} as an electron securities identification of erased, issues an electronic certificate, characterized in that to complete the erasing procedure of the electronic securities, transfer, certification, processing system for erasing.

[0027] A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities according to claim 10 of the present application is an electronic securities system comprising an issuer processing apparatus, a user processing apparatus, and a neutral institution processing apparatus. Is a processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing, wherein in a procedure for issuing electronic securities, the processing device of the neutral organization generates a digital certificate that can be digitally signed only by the neutral organization, The processing device generates an electronic securities rights section including the digital certificate that can only be digitally signed by the issuer and encrypted data of the description of the rights and obligations relationship, while generating a security number and concealing the security number. The blind signature data is generated, and the processing unit of the neutral institution inputs the digital certificate and the blind signature data, and has the same secret as when the digital certificate is digitally signed. Digitally signing the blind signature data with a key generates blind signed data that can be digitally signed only by a neutral organization, and the processing unit of the issuer inputs the blind signed data and performs unblind processing. To obtain a digitally signed security number that only a neutral institution can digitally sign, generate an electronic securities identification unit including the digitally signed security number by this neutral institution, and combine the electronic securities rights unit and the electronic securities identification unit with each other. In combination, the electronic securities issuance procedure is completed.

[0028] The processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying and erasing electronic securities according to claim 11 of the present application is the processing method according to claim 10, wherein the security number generated by the issuer's device is It is characterized by being calculated by three random numbers a, b, c satisfying the relationship and the issuer's specific number id. x = f (y, z) y = f (a, b) z = f (id, c) where x: security number f (): f (x, y) = f (x ′, y ′) X
A one-way hash function that is difficult to find x ', y {y}

A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities according to claim 12 of the present application is an electronic security system comprising an issuer processing device, a user processing device, and a neutral organization processing device. Is a processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities. In the electronic securities issuance procedure, the processing unit of the neutral institution processes R for each electronic security in response to a request from the issuer.
SA system key _{n T, e T, p T} , q T, generates the d _T, and generates the n _T, e _T a digital certificate C was digitally signed by the private key d _T of the public key, wherein , C = <n _T , e _T , h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp mod n _p >><> is a set of data inside n _t , e _T is a security-specific public key d _p corresponding to the rights , N _p are the secret and public keys of a neutral institution h (n _T | e _T ) is a hash function h (n _T | e _T ) with n _T and e _T as variables ^dp is h (n _T | e _T ) the issuer of the processor data mod n _p which is digitally signed by the private key d _p to indicate that the n _p modulo (modulus) of the description describes the rights and obligations of the digital certificate C and the electronic securities D enter the door, and outputs the right portion _{S 0} of electronic securities, _{here, S 0 = <C, D} , h (C | D) do mod n o> d o is the issuer Of the secret key n _o is the issuer's public key h (C | D) is a hash function h to the variable C and D was digitally signed by the | | (D C) of the secret key _{d o} (C _D) ^do is h processor data mod n _o is the NSO indicating that the n _o modulo (modulus) inputs and said digital certificate C and ECN right portion S _0, the digital in electronic securities issuing record database Find the certificate C, registered in the electronic securities issuing record database right portion S ₀ of the digital certificate C and the electronic securities on condition that the digital certificate C is not used in other electronic securities as a set The issuer's processing device then checks the security number random numbers a, b, c (0 <
a, b, c < ^2t , t is a predetermined number of binary digits) and a blind coefficient r (0 <r < ^2t , t is a predetermined number of binary digits) are randomly generated and issued. The security number x is calculated using the specific number id of the third party, and then the blind signature data B in which the security number x is concealed by the blind coefficient r is calculated, where x = f (y, z) y = F (a, b) z = f (id, c) f () is x ≠ such that f (x, y) = f (x ′, y ′)
x ', y ≠ y' indicates the hard one-way hash function to find ^{a, B = r eT h (x} ) mod n T h (x) is a hash function mod n _T of the variables x n _T Is a modulus. The processing unit of the neutral organization inputs the blind signature data B and the digital certificate C, and uses the secret key d _T used for the digital signature of the digital certificate C. said blind signature data B 'to generate where, B' blind signed data B digitally signed by ^{= (r eT) dT h (} x) dT mod n T = r · h (x) dT mod n _T h (x) ^dT is h (x) processor of the data the issuer digitally signed by the private key d _T a, enter the blind signed data B ', which was divided by the blind coefficient r Identification of electronic securities S calculated ₁ (x), _{wherein, S 1 (x) = <} x, h (x) dT mod n T> Subsequently, the electronic securities right portion _{S 0} and ECN identification unit S
₁ (x) to generate electronic securities S (x) S (x) = <S ₀ , S ₁ (x)>, thereby completing the electronic securities issuance procedure.

[0030] A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities according to claim 13 of the present application is an electronic security system comprising an issuer processing device, a user processing device, and a neutral institution processing device. Is a processing method for the issuance, transfer, certification, and erasure of electronic securities. In the electronic securities transfer procedure, the processing device of the transferee uses the electronic securities from the transferor and the security number before transfer that only the transferor can know. A new security number dedicated to the transferred user, generates blind signature data concealing the new security number, and the processing unit of the neutral organization Electronic signature identification unit consisting of the blind signature data from the sender, the security number before transfer and the digitally signed security number that could only be digitally signed by a neutral organization, and the security number before transfer that only the transferor can know Part of the random number of A digital certificate included in the electronic securities right section of the electronic security, and the electronic securities identification section and the electronic securities right section before the transfer are in one-to-one correspondence via the digital certificate. The electronic securities identification unit before transfer uses the part of the random number of the security number before transfer and the security number of the security number identification unit before transfer under the agreement of the transfer user. In the electronic securities transfer record database, it is confirmed that the electronic securities identification unit before the transfer has not been transferred. Registering the electronic securities identification unit of the person as a transferred electronic securities identification unit, and digitally signing the blind signature data with the same private key as the digital signature of the digital certificate, thereby achieving a neutrality. Only the Seki generates blind-signed data that can be digitally signed, and the transferee's processing device unblinds the blind-signed data so that only a neutral authority can digitally sign a new digitally signed security number. To generate an electronic securities identification unit including the new security number and the digitally signed security number, and complete the electronic securities transfer procedure by combining the electronic securities right unit and the new electronic security identification unit. It is characterized by doing.

A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities according to claim 14 of the present application is an electronic security system comprising an issuer processing device, a user processing device, and a neutral institution processing device. Is a processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing the electronic securities. In the transfer procedure of the electronic securities, the processing device of the transferred user β transmits the electronic securities S ( _xα ) from the transferring user _α .
And random numbers a _α , b _α , z _α of the security number xα of the transfer user _α
And the random numbers a _β , b _β , and c _β of the new security number dedicated to the transferred user _β and the blind coefficient r _β (0 <r _β <
2 ^t , t is a predetermined number of binary digits) and a new security number x _β dedicated to the transferred user _β is calculated using the specific number id _β of the transferred user β, and then The security number x _β
Was calculated blind signature data B _beta was concealed by the blind coefficient r _{beta, where, S (x α) = <} S 0, S 1 (x α)><> is set S ₀ data inside = <C, D, h ( C | D) do mod n o> C digital certificate D description of the rights and obligations d _o is the issuer of the secret key n _o is the issuer's public key h (C | D ) is the hash function h (C whose variable C and D | indicates that a D) data mod n _o which was digitally signed by a _{d o} is _{n o} law (modulus) | is D) _{d o} h (C C = <n _T , e _T , h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp mod n _p > n _T , e _T is a public key unique to the security corresponding to the rights and obligations d _p , n _p is a private key of a neutral organization And public key h (n _T | e _T ) is a hash function h (n _T | e _T ) with n _T and e _T as variables, and ^dp is h (n _T | e _T) ) Is digitally signed with d _p , indicating that mod n _p is a modulus of n _p S ₁ (x _α ) = <x _α , h (x _α ) ^dT mod n _T > x _α user alpha policy number h (x _α) is a hash function h (x _alpha) of the variables x _alpha ^dT is h (x _alpha) data was digitally signed by _{d T x α = f (y} α, z α ) Y _α = f (a _α , b _α ) z _α = f (id _α , c _α ) a _α , b _α , c _α is 0 <a _α , b _α , c _α < ^2t id _α is used for transfer The specific number f () of the person α is x ≠ such that f (x, y) = f (x ′, y ′)
x ', y ≠ y' hard one-way hash function to find the _{x β = f (y β,} z β) y β = f (a β, b β) z β = f (id β, c β X _β is a new security number dedicated to the transferred user β a _β , b _β , c _β is 0 <a _β , b _β , c _β <2 ^t id _β is the specific number of the transferred user β B _{β ^{= r β eT h (x β}} ) mod n T h (x β) the processing unit of the hash function e _T is the public key the NSO corresponding to the private key d _T of NSO to variable x _beta is to be From the transfer user β, the blind signature data B _β , the electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x _α ) before the transfer, and the security number random numbers a _α , b _α , z
and _alpha, the inputs the digital certificate C contained in the electronic security rights section S ₀ of the electronic securities S (x _α), wherein the front transfer certificate number x _alpha from the hash function h a (x _alpha) The hash function h (x
_α ) ^dT is decrypted by the public key e _T paired with the secret key d _T used in the digital certificate C to calculate h (x _α ) ^{dT · eT} , and the two are compared to obtain the electronic security identification. It is verified that the section S ₁ (x _α ) has a one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities right section S _0, and then the security number x _α is x _α =
_{f (f (a α, b} α), z α) by verifying that satisfies the relationship, the electronic securities identification section S _{1 (x α)} is to be moved to under the transfer user alpha agreement user β, and by searching the electronic securities transfer record database for the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ ( _xα ), it is confirmed that the electronic securities have not been transferred. The electronic security identification unit S ₁ ( _xα ) is registered as the transferred electronic security identification unit, and the blind signature data B is obtained using the secret key d _T used for the digital signature of the digital certificate C.
The _beta and digital signature 'generated, where, B _beta' blind signed data ^{_{B β = (r β eT)}} dT h (x β) dT mod n T = r β · h (x β) dT mod n _T h (x _β) ^dT is h (x _β) a processor of the data the transferee user beta was digitally signed by d _T inputs the blind signed data B _beta ', the blind factor this r
by dividing by _β digital signed policy number h (x _β)
^dT mod n _T is obtained, and the identification part S ₁ (x
_β ), where S ₁ (x _β ) = <x _β , h (x _β ) ^dT mod n _T > Then, the electronic securities right part S ₀ and the electronic securities identification part S ₁ (x
_β ) to generate electronic securities S ( _xβ ) S ( _xβ ) = <S ₀ , S ₁ ( _xβ )> to complete the transfer procedure of the electronic securities. .

Claim 15 The processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing an electronic security is to issue an electronic security comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral organization. , Transfer, certification, erasure, in the certification procedure of the electronic securities, the processing unit of the issuer, the electronic securities from the user who owns the electronic securities, and securities that only the user can know Get a part of the number random number,
An electronic securities identification unit composed of the security number of the electronic security and a digitally signed security number obtained by digital signature only by a neutral organization; a digital certificate included in the electronic security right section of the electronic security; A part of the number random number is sent to the processing unit of the neutral institution to request proof of ownership, and the processing unit of the neutral institution has the electronic securities identification unit and the electronic securities right unit through the digital certificate. Performs a verification calculation of one-to-one correspondence, and uses only a part of the security number random number and the security number of the security number identification unit so that only the user who owns the electronic security can know the random number of the security number. The electronic securities identification unit is searched in the electronic securities certificate record database, and the result of the search and verification is returned to the processing device of the issuer.

A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities according to claim 16 of the present application is an electronic security system comprising an issuer processing device, a user processing device, and a neutral institution processing device. Is a processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing the electronic securities, in the certification procedure of the electronic securities, the issuer o
Obtains the electronic security S (x _A ) from the user A who owns the electronic security, and the random numbers y _A , id _A , and c _{A of the} security numbers that only the user A can know, The electronic securities S
An electronic securities identification section S ₁ of the _{(x A) (x A)} , wherein the digital certificate C contained in the electronic security rights section S ₀ of the electronic securities S (x _A), a part of the policy number random number y _A, id _A, c
_A is sent to the processing unit of the neutral organization T to request proof of ownership, where S (x _A ) = <S ₀ , S ₁ (x _A )><<> is the set of data S ₀ inside = <C, D, h ( C | D) do mod n o> C digital certificate D description of the rights and obligations d _o is the issuer of the secret key n _o is the issuer's public key h (C | D ) is the hash function h (C to variable C and D | is D) ^do h (C | shows that to D) data was digitally signed by _{d o} modn _o is modulo _{n o} (modulus) C = <N _T , e _T , h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp mod n _p > n _T , e _T are the public keys d _p , n _p specific to the securities corresponding to the rights and obligations, and the private key and the public of the neutral institution digitally signed by the | (e _T n _T) the d _p key _{h (n T | | e T} ) is a hash function h as a variable n _T and _{e T (n T e T)} dp is h Data mod n _p is S ₁ indicating that the n _p modulo _{(modulus) (x A) =} <x A, h (x A) dT mod n T> x A is the user A who owns the electronic securities The security numbers d _T and n _T assigned to the public and private keys of the neutral institution are respectively h (x _A ), a hash function using x _A as a variable, h (x _A ) ^dT is h (x _A ) data digitally signed by _{T x A = f (y A} , z A) y A = f (a A, b A) z A = f (id A, c A) a A, b A, c A is policy number 0 <a _A , b _A , c _A <2 ^tt is a predetermined number of binary digits id _A is a specific number of user A f () is f (x, y) = f (x ′, y ') Becomes x ≠
One-way hash function in which it is difficult to find x ′, y ≠ y ′. The processing device of the neutral organization T includes the identification unit S ₁ (x _A )
The hash function h from the policy number x _A, which is included in the
(X _A ) is calculated, and a hash function h (x _A ) ^dT of the digitally signed security number included in the electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x _A ) is used as a secret key d used in the digital certificate C. _T
And decrypted by the public key e _T paired with h (x _A )
By calculating ^{dT · eT} and comparing the two, it is verified that the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _A ) has a one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities right unit S _0, and then the security number xA is x _A
= F (y _A , f (id _A , c _A )) to calculate a part of the security number random number y _A , i
Verify that d _A and c _A are known only to the user who owns the electronic security, search the electronic security certificate record database, and return the search and verification results to the processing device of the issuer o. It is characterized by the following.

A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities according to claim 17 of the present application is an electronic security system comprising an issuer processing device, a user processing device, and a neutral institution processing device. Is a processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing an electronic security. In the erasure procedure of the electronic securities, the processing device of the neutral institution only has a digital signature of the security number of the electronic security required to be erased and the neutral institution. Only the electronic securities identification unit consisting of the digitally signed security number obtained, the digital certificate included in the electronic securities rights department of the electronic security, and the issuer or user requesting erasure of the electronic security A part of the random number of the security number to be obtained is input, and a verification calculation is performed to confirm that the electronic security identification unit is in one-to-one correspondence with the electronic security right unit via the digital certificate. part Using the security number of the security number identification unit, a calculation is performed to verify that the security number random number can be known only to the issuer or user who is requesting the erasure of the electronic security, and the electronic security identification unit performs The electronic securities erasure procedure is completed by searching the erasure record database and registering the electronic securities identification section as an erased electronic securities identification section on the condition of non-erasure.

A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities according to claim 18 of the present application is an electronic security system comprising an issuer processing device, a user processing device, and a neutral institution processing device. Is a processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, wherein in the electronic securities erasure procedure, the processing unit of the neutral organization is requested to erase by the issuer or user B requesting the erasure of the electronic securities. The electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _B ) of the electronic security, the digital certificate C included in the electronic securities rights unit S ₀ of the electronic security, and the issuer or user requesting erasure of the electronic security A part of security number random numbers a _B , b _B , and z _B that only B can know is obtained, where S (x _B ) = <S ₀ , S ₁ (x _B )><> Data set S ₀ is the electronic securities rights department S ₁ (x _B ) is the electronic certificate Ticket identification unit x _B securities number S of electronic securities are required to erase ^{_{0 = <C, D, h}} (C | D) do mod n o> C is described d _o of the digital certificate D rights and obligations digitally signed by the | (D C) a _{d o} is the public key h of the secret key n _o of the issuer the issuer (C | | D) is C and the hash function to the variable D h (C D) ^do is h data mod n _o is _{n o} law (modulus) indicate that the _{C = <n T, e T} , h (n T | e T) dp mod n p> n T, e T in the rights and obligations content The corresponding security-specific public keys d _p and n _p are the secret key and public key of the neutral institution h (n _T | e _T ), and the hash function h (n _T | e _T ) d with n _T and e _T as variables _p is _{h | S 1 (n T e} T) data mod n _p which is digitally signed by the d _p is shown that the n _p modulo (modulus) (x _B) = _{x B, h (x B)} dT mod n T> d T and n _T is the secret key of each of the neutral institution and the public key h (x _B) is a hash function to the variable _{x B, h (x B)} dT data _{x B = f (y B,} z B) of h a (x _B) digitally signed by d _T is _{y B = f (a B,} b B) z B = f (id B, c B) a B, b _B, c _B is a random number of policy number _{0 <a B, b B,} c B <2 t t is a predetermined number of digits id _B binary issuer seeking erase specific number f of the user B () Is x ≠ such that f (x, y) = f (x ′, y ′)
A one-way hash function in which it is difficult to find x ′, y ≠ y ′. Subsequently, the processing unit of the neutral organization calculates a hash function h (x _B ) from the security number x _B and obtains the electronic security identification. The hash function h (x _B ) ^dT of the digitally signed security number included in the part S ₁ (x _B ) is decrypted by the public key e _T paired with the secret key d _T used in the digital certificate C. By calculating h (x _B ) ^{dT · eT} and comparing them, it is verified that the electronic securities identification unit S 1 (x _B ) has a one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities rights unit S _0, and the security number x _B is _{x B = f (f (a} B, b B), z B) by verifying that satisfies the relationship, a portion of the policy number random number a
It verifies that _B , b _B , and z _B can be known only to the issuer or user B who wants to erase the electronic security, and searches the electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x _B ) in the electronic security erasure record database. , On the condition that it has not been erased, the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x
By registering _B ) as the erased electronic securities identification unit, the electronic securities erasure procedure is completed.

[0036]

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS An embodiment of a "processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying and erasing electronic securities and a processing method thereof" according to the present invention will be described below.

First, the configuration of an electronic security to be processed by the present invention, the configuration of a processing system for processing the issuance of the electronic security, and various procedures for issuance, transfer, certification, and erasure of the electronic security will be briefly described. I do.

FIG. 1 conceptually shows the structure of an electronic security to be processed in the present invention. The electronic security S (x) to be processed in the present invention is, in substance, a group of digital data, but conceptually, as shown in FIG. The rights section S ₀ describing the obligation (hereinafter referred to as the electronic securities rights section S ₀ ) and the identification section S describing the security number identifying the electronic security
₁ (x) (hereinafter referred to as electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x)). x represents the security number of the electronic security.

Each of the electronic securities right section S ₀ and the electronic securities identification section S ₁ (x) includes a plaintext (which means unencrypted data) that can be read by anyone and a specific section. And a part that can only be encrypted by a third party. Here, "the part that only a specific person can encrypt" means that only a specific person can encrypt, and any third party confirms the person who was able to encrypt from the encrypted part The part that can be done. It should be noted that an encryption process in which a third party can confirm such an encrypted person is called “digital signature”.

The electronic securities handled in the present invention include a statement of rights and obligations that can be read by anyone, a security number, and a digital signature by those specific persons.

[0041] Specifically, the electronic securities right portion S ₀ is a description D plaintext describing the holder of the rights and obligations associated with electronic issuers, digital certificates only predetermined neutral institution may digitally sign C And encrypted data h (C | D) ^do mo by the issuer of digital certificate C and description D of rights and obligations relationship
consisting of a d n _o.

The digital certificate C is provided by a neutral authority to the public key n _T , e _T and the private key p _T , in response to a request for issuance of electronic securities.
q _T and d _T are generated, and the public keys n _T and e _T are digitally signed with a secret key d _p unique to a neutral organization.
h (C | D) is a hash function using C and D as variables, that is, a data compression function, and h (C | D) ^do is h (C |
D) the issuer is one that has been digitally signed by the secret key d ₀ of the issuer. It should be noted, mod _{n o} are h (C | D)
^do is an indication that the public key _{n o} of the issuer with the law (modulus). A public key, a secret key, a method of confirming a person who has digitally signed, and the like will be described later.

The electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x) includes a plaintext electronic security number x and encrypted data h (x) ^dT mod n _{T of the} security number x that can be digitally signed only by a neutral organization.

Here, the arbitrary third
A mechanism by which a person can confirm that "only a neutral organization can digitally sign ..." or "only an issuer can digitally sign ..." will be outlined.

Two large (for example, about 512 bits) prime numbers p and q are selected, and the product is n = p · q. On the other hand, Euler number φ (n) of n = (p−1)) (q−1)
And a number e that is a mutual element, and a number d that satisfies the relationship of the following equation (1) can be uniquely determined.

[0046]

(Equation 1) Here, e and n are public keys of a person who performs digital signature, d and
Assuming that p and q are private keys of a person who performs digital signature, an arbitrary third party can confirm a person who has performed digital signature as follows.

The public key is a number that is publicly disclosed by a person who performs digital signature, and that an arbitrary third party knows that the public key belongs to a person who performs digital signature. The secret key is a number known only to the person signing the digital signature. Deriving a private key from a public key is generally computationally infeasible. That is, unless the person signing the digital signature gives his / her private key to another person, the third party cannot know the secret key of the person signing the digital signature.

Now, assuming that the data digitally signed by the secret key d is Z and the plaintext data before the digital signature is X, the digitally signed data Z is given by the following equation (7).

Z = X ^d mod n (7) In order for a third party to confirm a person who has digitally signed the encrypted data Z, the encrypted data Z can be identified using the public key e of the digitally signed person. May be raised to the power of e. Equations (6) and (7)
From the relationship,

(Equation 2) Thus, plaintext X can be obtained from the encrypted data Z. In addition, the only private key corresponding to the public key e is d, and the private key d can be known only by the person who has digitally signed the digital key. You can be sure that there is. It should be noted that the digital signer is not limited to a third party, and that the digital signer himself uses his / her own public key e to confirm that the encrypted data Z is indeed the digital signature. be able to.

When the digital signature and the method of confirming the digital signer are applied to the electronic securities right section S ₀ , an arbitrary third party describes the electronic securities right section S ₀ as the issuer, and It can be confirmed that the digital certificate C is digitally signed by a neutral organization.

That is, an arbitrary third party uses the issuer's public key _eo to obtain h (C | D) d _{o of the} electronic securities right unit S _0.
Is raised to the power ^eo , h (C | D) = h (C | D) ^{do · eo,} and h (C | D) can be obtained. This h
And | (C D), the plain text electronic securities right portion S ₀ C, by comparing to that D hashing (applying a hash function h), indeed issued ECN right portion S ₀ if they match It can be confirmed that the digital signature has been obtained by a person.

[0052] In addition, in the same manner, the electronic securities right part digital certificate is certainly a neutral institution that is included in the S ₀ can be sure they are granted to the electronic securities S (x) .

If the method of confirming the digital signature and the digital signer is applied to the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x),
It can be confirmed that the electronic security number x is digitally signed by a neutral organization. That is, the third party ^raises h (x) ^dT of the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x) to the power of e _T using the public key e _T of the neutral institution, so that h (x) = h (x) ^{dT -It} becomes ^eT and h (x) can be obtained. This h (x)
And the hashed version of the plaintext x of the electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x), it can be confirmed that the electronic security number x is indeed a digital signature by a neutral organization. It is.

In the electronic security according to the present invention, each time the owner is changed, the electronic security number x is changed to the actual owner's only dedicated electronic security number. By being able to verify that this electronic security number can only be generated by the real owner,
It is possible to confirm that the person is a valid owner of the electronic securities. In addition, since it is possible to confirm that the electronic securities number and the electronic securities right section S ₀ have been digitally signed with the secret key d _T of the same neutral organization, the electronic securities right section S ₀ and the electronic securities identification section S ₁ ( x) is guaranteed one-to-one. This is the principle by which the electronic securities according to the present invention can be used. A specific processing method will be described later in detail.

[0055] The electronic securities right part _{S 0} and the electronic securities identification unit _S 1 (x) can be used in isolation. This allows the real owner to have a unique electronic securities number.

FIG. 2 shows the configuration of a processing system for processing issuance of electronic securities according to the present invention and the flow of main processing of various procedures for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities.

As shown in FIG. 2, the processing system for electronic securities according to the present invention includes a processing device of the issuer o, a processing device of the user (α, β, A, B,...) And a processing device of the neutral organization T. And a processing device. The issuer o is a person who issues electronic securities and has a predetermined obligation to a person who owns the electronic securities.
In terms of stock certificates, companies are the equivalent. A user is a person who transfers, exercises, or deletes electronic securities. In some cases, the issuer also includes the issuer because the issuer may transfer, certify, or delete the electronic securities. The neutral institution T is a third party for guaranteeing the legitimacy of electronic securities when issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities. Issuer o's processing device, user (α, β,
A, B,...), And the processing unit of the neutral institution T preferably comprise a publisher o, a user (α, β, A, B,...), And a computer owned by the neutral institution T. It is assumed that they are connected so as to be able to communicate with each other. These processing devices are associated with each other in various procedures for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities. Note that FIG.
, The broken arrow indicates the progress from the generation of electronic securities to their disappearance. Reference numerals (T, o, A, B,...) With parentheses at the end of the processing steps of various procedures such as issuance, transfer, certification, and erasure indicate the processing apparatus.

Hereinafter, various procedures for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities will be described.

The issuance procedure is a procedure for issuing an electronic security. The issuer of the electronic securities states the issuer's obligations to the owner of the electronic securities, or conversely, the content of the rights of the owner of the electronic securities (in this specification, these are collectively referred to as a statement of rights and obligations). Described and issued. The electronic securities issuance procedure of the present invention is performed by the processing device of the issuer o and the
Is processed by the associated processing of the processing device. In the issuance procedure, a digital certificate indicating that the electronic security to be issued has been issued under the approval of the neutral institution T is given by the processing device of the neutral institution T. On the other hand, an electronic securities number is created by the issuer o, and a digital signature is given to the electronic security number by a neutral organization while keeping the contents of the electronic security number confidential (this processing is called a blind signature). The blindly signed electronic security number is restored to the digitally signed electronic security number by the processing device of the issuer o (this processing is referred to as unblind processing). Finally, the digital certificate, the blindly signed electronic security number, and the description of the rights and obligations of the electronic security are combined, and the electronic security is issued.

It should be noted that the above issuance procedure is based on the fact that the neutral institution has a one-to-one correspondence between the electronic securities right section S ₀ and the electronic securities number (in a broad sense, the electronic securities identification section S ₁ (x)). The point is that the content of the electronic securities number is guaranteed without knowing it, and that a third party can confirm that the neutral organization guarantees the above-mentioned one-to-one correspondence.

The transfer procedure is a procedure for changing the ownership of electronic securities. Electronic securities have the property value of their own because they have the right to make certain requests to the issuer,
It is transferred and transferred between multiple persons. The transfer procedure must be a procedure to change the right holder while ensuring that the electronic security has not been transferred twice. The transfer procedure according to the present invention includes a processing device for a person β to be transferred (referred to as a transferred user β), a processing device for a person α to be transferred (referred to as a transferred user α), and a processing device for a neutral organization T. Processed between.

The transferee β obtains the electronic security data and a part of the random number for calculating the electronic security number before the transfer from the transfer user α, and generates a new electronic security number after the transfer. . Further, the processing device of the transferred user β generates blind signature data in which the contents of the new electronic security number are concealed, and the blind signature data, the electronic security identification unit before the transfer, The digital certificate included in the section and a part of the random number for calculating the electronic security number before transfer are sent to the neutral organization T. The processing device of the neutral institution T confirms that the electronic securities right part and the electronic securities identification part of the electronic securities transferred by the digital certificate have a one-to-one correspondence. In addition, the processing device of the neutral institution T verifies that the transfer is performed under the agreement of the transfer user α by using a part of the random number of the electronic security number before the transfer. In addition, it verifies that the electronic securities to be transferred do not make double transfers. As a result, if the entire transfer of the electronic security is valid, the processing device of the neutral institution T blind-signs the new electronic security number created by the transferred user β. As a result, a new electronic security number digitally signed by a neutral organization is given to the electronic security, and the electronic security identification unit having the electronic security number before transfer is recorded as the transferred electronic security identification unit.

It should be noted that the above-mentioned transfer procedure is performed in such a manner that a neutral institution has a one-to-one correspondence between the electronic securities right section and the electronic securities identification section of the electronic securities to be transferred, and that the electronic securities to be transferred are duplicated. Guaranteeing that the transfer has not been made and that the transfer has been made under the agreement of the transfer user without knowing the contents of the new electronic security number after the transfer. Thus, even a neutral institution does not know what number of electronic securities was transferred as electronic securities. That is, the privacy of the transaction is maintained without knowing the transfer route of the electronic securities, and the way of using the electronic securities as property is widely secured.

The certification procedure is a procedure in which the owner of the electronic security has a third party prove that he / she is a valid owner of the electronic security. For example, as in the case of a stock certificate, the owner may claim that he / she is the owner of the stock certificate and ask the issuer for a dividend. In such a case, the certification procedure
This is a procedure to have a third party prove that the person seeking the dividend is the legitimate owner of the stock.

In the certifying procedure of the present invention, a user (owner of electronic securities) who intends to certify the ownership sends a certification request and predetermined data to the processing device of the issuer o, and The processing is performed by requesting the neutral institution T to have the proof that the owner of the electronic securities is a valid owner.

In this case, the processing unit of the neutral institution has a digital certificate identification section of the digital certificate to be certified, a digital certificate C, and a random number for calculating the certificate number of the digital certificate which can be known only by the holder of the digital certificate. And confirm that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the electronic securities right unit and the electronic securities identification unit of the electronic security whose ownership is to be proofed using the private key used for the digital signature of the digital certificate C. . In addition, the processing device of the neutral institution, from a part of the random number to calculate the security number of the electronic security, that the security number of the electronic security is indeed constituted by a hidden number that only the owner of the electronic security can know, That is, it confirms that the owner of the electronic security is a valid owner. Further, the processing device of the neutral institution searches the history of the transfer procedure of the electronic security and confirms that it does not request a certificate of ownership for the transferred security. As a result, if the entire procedure for certifying ownership of the electronic security is valid, the processing device of the neutral institution T sends the result to the processing device of the issuer o.

The notable point of the above certification procedure is to verify that the owner of the electronic security is a valid owner by using a part of the random number for calculating the electronic security number provided by the owner of the electronic security. And that a person who has obtained a part of the random number for calculating the electronic securities number cannot perform another procedure by misusing the random number. This mechanism will be further described later.

The erasure procedure is a procedure in which the owner of the electronic securities erases the electronic securities to prevent the third party from exercising the rights thereafter.

In the erasure procedure of the present invention, a user requesting erasure (including the issuer of the electronic security) sends an erasure request and predetermined data to a processing unit of the neutral institution T, and the neutral institution T
Is processed by confirming that the user requesting the erasure is the legitimate owner of the electronic security and instead erasing the electronic security without requesting the issuance of a new security number.

In this case, the processing unit of the neutral institution T sends, from the user who requests the erasure, the electronic certificate identification part of the electronic security to be erased and the digital certificate included in the electronic security right part of the electronic security. C and a part of the random number for calculating the security number which can be known only by the authorized owner of the electronic security, and the electronic security to be erased by the secret key used for the digital signature of the digital certificate C. It is confirmed that the electronic securities right section and the electronic securities identification section have a one-to-one correspondence. In addition, the processing unit of the neutral institution confirms that only the owner of the electronic security can know the security number of the electronic security from a part of the random number for calculating the security number of the electronic security, that is, the erasure of the electronic security. Make sure the person you are looking for is a legitimate electronic securities owner. Further, the processing unit of the neutral institution searches the transfer record of the electronic security to confirm that the electronic security does not request the erasure corresponding to the transferred security. As a result, if the entire erasure procedure of the electronic security is valid, the processing device of the neutral institution T registers the electronic security identification unit of the electronic security as an erased electronic security identification unit, and thereafter, the subsequent processing of the electronic security is performed. Prevent the use of.

The point of note in the above erasure procedure is that a part of the random number for calculating the electronic security number provided by the person requesting the erasure of the electronic security verifies that the individual is a valid owner of the electronic security. And that a person who has obtained a part of the random number for calculating the electronic security number cannot perform another procedure by misusing the random number. This mechanism will be further described later.

The above is a brief description of the electronic securities according to the present invention, the configuration of the electronic securities processing system, and various procedures for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing the electronic securities. The detailed data processing of the transfer, certification, and erasure procedures will be described in detail.

FIG. 3 shows the flow of processing for issuing an electronic security by the processing system of the present invention.

In the issuing procedure of the electronic securities by the processing system of the present embodiment, the processing device of the issuer o who first wants to issue the electronic securities transmits a request for the issuance of the electronic securities to the processing device of the neutral institution T (step). S100). In response to the request from the processing device of the issuer o, the processing device of the neutral institution T transmits the RSA key n _T ,
Generate e _T , p _T , q _T , and d _T. Here, n _T and e _T are public keys unique to the security corresponding to the rights and obligations, and p _T , q _T and d.
_T is the same secret key, and satisfies the relations of equations (1) to (8) described above. These RSA keys n _T ,
After generating e _T , p _T , q _T , and d _T , the processing unit of the neutral authority T generates a digital certificate C in which the public keys n _T and e _T are digitally signed with a secret key d _T unique to the neutral authority. (Step S1
10) Return to the processing device of issuer o.

Here, C = <n _T , e _T , h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp mod n _p ><> is a set of data n _T , e _T inside it is a security corresponding to the rights and obligations The unique public key d ^p , n _p is a secret key and a public key of a neutral organization h (n _T | e _T ) is a hash function h (n _T | e _T ) ^d _p is a variable with n _T and e _T as variables (n _T | e _T) data mod n _T which is digitally signed by the private key d _p indicates that the n _T modulo (modulus).

The hash function h () is a data compression function, and it is easy to generate compressed data from uncompressed data, but it is difficult to recover uncompressed data from compressed data. Function.

Next, the processing device of the issuer o inputs the digital certificate C and a description D of the rights and obligations of the digital certificate.
By integrating preparative generates electronic securities right portion _{S 0} (step S120).

[0078] In this _{case, S 0 = <C, D} , h (C | D) do mod no> d o is the secret key n _o of the issuer is the issuer of the public key h (C | D) is C and D A hash function with
"|" H indicating the concatenation (C | D) ^do the h (C | D) data mod digitally signed by the private key _{d o} n _o is the electronic securities indicating that the _{n o} modulo (modulus) right portion _{S 0} is, any third party to later h (C
| D) _{d o} a using the public key _{e o h (C | D)} d o a e
_o ride to h | give a (C D), h (C | D) do · eo = h (C | D) ... (10) On the other hand, C, which is included in the electronic securities right portion _{S 0,} and D H (C | D) can be calculated using the hash function h ().

[0079] C, D, h () → h (C | D) ... (11) If the above formula (10) and the result of the expression (11) is a match, the public key _{e o} and the private key _{d o} is one-to-one is a relationship, and, since only the private key d _o is the issuer o may know, this electronic securities right portion S ₀ is intended only certainly the issuer o can be created, and, the electronic securities right part It can be confirmed that S ₀ has a one-to-one relationship with the digital certificate C.

Next, the processing device of the issuer o checks the random numbers a, b, c (0 <a, b, c <2 ^t , t is a predetermined number of binary digits) of the security number, and the blind coefficient r ( 0 <r <2 ^t , where t is a predetermined number of binary digits), the security number x is calculated using the specific number id of the issuer o, and the security number x is concealed by the blind coefficient r. and it was calculated blind signature data B, and transmits the blind signature data B and the electronic certificate C and ECN right portion S ₀ to the processing apparatus of NSO T (step S130).

Here, the security number x and its random numbers a, b, c
Satisfies the following relationship.

X = f (y, z) y = f (a, b) z = f (id, c) x is 0 <x <2 ^t , t is a predetermined number of binary digits, f ()
Represents a hash function, also blind signature data B ^{is, B = r eT h (x} ) modn T h (x) is a hash function mod n _T to variable x to the n _T modulo (modulus) processing apparatus NSO T indicating that the electronic certificate C and ECN right portion S ₀ which is transmitted from the processing apparatus issuer o searched electronic securities issuing record database 10, an electronic certificate C is another on condition that it is not used in the electronic securities right unit, it registers the electronic securities issuing record database 10 the electronic certificate C and ECN right section S ₀ as a set (step S14
0).

Further, the processing unit of the neutral organization T uses the blind signature data B and the digital certificate C transmitted from the processing unit of the issuer o, and uses the private key used for digital signature of the digital certificate C. Digitally sign the blind signature data B with d _T to generate blind signed data B ′ and send it to the processing device of issuer o (step S150).

[0084] Here, B '= ^{(r eT)} digital by ^{dT h (x) dT mod n} T = r · h (x) dT mod n T h (x) dT is h (x) the secret key d _T signed data Note that when the NSO T to digitally sign the blind signature data B is, B = r ^eT so has a h (x) modn _T, policy number x itself blind coefficient r on which hashed , The contents of the neutral institution T securities number x cannot be known. That is, the neutral institution T digitally signs the blind signature data B with the secret key d _T of the electronic certificate C without knowing the contents of the security number x.

The blind-signed data B 'is sent to the processing device of the issuer o, and subjected to unblind processing by the processing device of the issuer o. Specifically, the blind signed data B ′ may be divided by the blind coefficient r. That is, By the above unblind processing, the processing device of the issuer o acquires the security number x blind-signed by the neutral institution T. Using the security number x blind-signed by the neutral institution T, the processing device of the issuer o generates an electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x) (step S160).

Here, S ₁ (x) = <x, h (x) ^dT mod n _T > This electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x) is used by an arbitrary third party, including a neutral institution T, to obtain h ( x) ^dT is the public key e _{T of the} neutral institution _T
H (x) ^dT is raised to the power of e _T to obtain h (x). H (x) ^{dT · eT} = h (x) (12) On the other hand, the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x) H (x) can be calculated using x and the hash function h ().

X, h () → h (x) (13) If the results of the above equations (12) and (13) match, the public key e _T and the secret key d _T have a one-to-one relationship. In addition, since the private key d _T can be known only by the neutral institution T, this electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x) can be digitally signed only by the neutral institution T, and the private key d _T Through this, it can be confirmed that there is a one-to-one relationship with the digital certificate C using the secret key d _T and the electronic securities right section S ₀ .

[0088] Finally, the issuer o of the processing device, the electronic securities right part S ₀ and the electronic securities identification unit S that has already been generated
₁ (x) to generate electronic securities S (x) S (x) = <S ₀ , S ₁ (x)> (step S160).

The above is the processing in the electronic securities issuance procedure by the processing system of the present embodiment. The electronic securities issued in this manner are transmitted to the electronic certificate C via the same secret key d _T of the electronic certificate C. Stock right part S ₀ and the electronic securities identification unit S
₁ (x) is guaranteed to have a one-to-one correspondence. Further, the neutral institution T does not know the electronic security number x assigned to each electronic security by the issuer o, and no one except the issuer o knows the random numbers a, b, and c of the electronic security number x. Become.
The nature of these securities will play a very important role in the following electronic securities transfer, certification and erasure procedures.

The electronic securities issued in the present invention are electronic securities of a type issued in large numbers with the same description of rights and obligations, such as stock certificates. Therefore, the policy number is generated number for the same electronic securities right portion S _0. This is a condition that the transfer route of the electronic securities of the present invention is kept confidential. The confidentiality of this transfer path will be further described later.

Next, the processing in the transfer procedure of the electronic securities by the processing system of this embodiment will be described.

FIG. 4 shows the flow of processing in the electronic securities transfer procedure by the processing system of this embodiment. In the electronic securities transfer procedure of the present embodiment, the transfer user α receives the data of the electronic security S (x _α ) related to the transfer and the partial random numbers a _α , b _α , and z _α of the corresponding security number x _α. It is transmitted to the processing device of the transfer user β (step S200).

Here, the electronic securities S (x _α ) related to the transfer
S ( _xα ) = <S ₀ , S ₁ (x _α )><<> is a set of data inside S ₀ is an electronic securities right section S ₁ ( _xα ) is an electronic securities identification section Electronic securities right section S ₀ consists of the following data.

[0094] _{S 0 = <C, D,} h (C | D) do mod n o> C is described d _o of the digital certificate D is the rights and obligations related issuer secret key, _{n o} the public of the issuer key h (C | D) is C and the hash function h to the variable D (C | D) ^do the h | data mod n _o which was digitally signed by a (C D) _{d o} is the modulo _{n o} C = <n _T , e _T , h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp mod n _p > n _T , e _T is the security-specific public key d _p , n _p corresponding to the content of rights and obligations The secret key and the public key h (n _T | e _T ) are hash functions h (n _T | e _T ) using n _T and e _T as variables, and ^dT is a digital signature of h (n _T | e _T ) by d _p . The data mod n _p indicates that n _p is a modulus, while the electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x _α ) includes the following data.

S ₁ (x _α ) = <x _α , h (x _α ) ^dT mod n _T > x _α is the security number h (x _α ) of the transfer user _α , and the hash function h (x _α ) is a variable of x _α x _alpha) ^dT is also data digitally signed h a (x _alpha) by d _T, a part of the x _alpha is the random number of the electronic certificate number a _alpha,
It has the following relationship with b _α and z _α .

[0096] _{x α = f (y α,} z α) y α = f (a α, b α) z α = f (id α, c α) a α, b α, c α is the electronic security number xα Random numbers 0 <a _α , b _α , c _α <2 ^t id _α is a specific number of the transfer user α f () is a hash function The processing device of the transfer user β is a new security dedicated to the transfer user β A random number a _β , b _β , c _β of a number is generated, and a new security number x _β dedicated to the transferred user _β is calculated using these random numbers and the specific number id _{β of the} transferred user β. New policy number x _beta and the random number _{a β, b β, c β} , is as following relationship specific number id _beta of the transfer user beta.

[0097] _{x β = f (y β,} z β) y β = f (a β, b β) z β = f (id β, c β) x β is a new policy number of dedicated transferee user β a _β , b _β , c _β are 0 <a _β , b _β , c _β <2 ^t id _β is the specific number of the transferred user β, and the processing device of the transferred user β is a blind coefficient r _{β
(0 <r β <2 t} , t is a predetermined number of digits of the binary numbers) to generate a calculated blind signature data B _beta which concealed the certificate number x _beta by blind coefficient r _beta.

[0098] In this ^{_{case, B β = r β eT h}} (x β) modn T h (x β) is a hash function e _T for the variable _x β public key the preparation corresponding to the private key d _T of neutral institutions after, the processor of the transfer user beta, and blind signature data B _beta of the new policy number x _beta, relocation before the electronic securities identification section S ₁ and _{(x alpha),} partial random number a
_alpha, b _alpha, and z _alpha, it transmits the electronic certificate C contained in the electronic security rights section _{S 0} to the processing apparatus of NSO T (step S210).

The processing unit of the neutral institution T that has received the data performs the following three verifications in order to guarantee the validity of the transfer.

[0100] processing apparatus of the first to neutral institutions T, the electronic securities right portion S ₀ of the electronic securities in accordance with the transfer and electronic securities identification section S ₁
Verify that (x) is one-to-one correspondence (step S
220). This is because to prevent predetermined electronic securities rights describing the right section S ₀ ECN identification and any securities number assigned to another security unit S _{1 (x)} are combined to move .

The verification of the one-to-one correspondence between the electronic securities right part S ₀ and the electronic securities identification part S ₁ (x) is verified through the secret key d _T of the electronic certificate C. That is, the processor of NSO T uses the certificate number x _alpha before transfer to calculate the hash function h (x _α), whereas, the hash function h (x _α) ^dT digitally signed certificate number The secret key d _T used in the digital certificate C is decrypted with the public key e _T paired with the secret key d _T to calculate h (x _α ) ^{dT · eT} , and the two are collated.
If the two match, the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _α ) and the electronic securities rights unit S ₀ use the same secret key d _T , so the electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x _α) and the electronic securities right portion S ₀ is guaranteed to be one-to-one correspondence.

Next, the processing device of the neutral institution T verifies that the transfer has been given to the transferred user β under the agreement of the transferred user α (step S230). This verification is based on random numbers a _α , b _α ,
This is done using z _α . The processor of NSO T Specifically, policy number xα and the random number a _α, b _α, z _α is x _alpha = f
_{(F (a α, b α} ), z α) confirms that satisfies the relationship. The security number x _α and the random numbers a _α , b _α , and z _α are x _α = f
_{(F (a α, b α} ), z α) satisfy _the, a α, b α,
Since z _α can only be known by the transferring user α, these data are given by the transferring user α to the transferred user β, that is, this transfer is performed under the agreement of the transferring user α. Is guaranteed.

Since the random number of the security number given by the transfer user α is partial, the neutral institution T that has learned the random number of the security number or a person who has learned the random number from the neutral institution T knows them. The random number of the security number cannot be misused. That is, by _{z α = f (id α,} c α),
Since it is difficult to know the _id α and _c α from z _α, is the third party is not able to perform the procedure of certification of electronic securities that require the data of the _id α and c _α. In other words, the random number of the security number given in the transfer is only used to prove the transfer agreement in the transfer and cannot be used for any other purpose.

Next, the processing unit of the neutral institution T verifies that the electronic securities related to the transfer are not those transferred twice (step S240). More specifically, the processing device of the neutral institution T uses the electronic securities transfer record database 20 in which the electronic securities already transferred are registered in the electronic securities identification unit S.
By searching for ₁ ( _xα ), the electronic securities identification unit S ₁
Check that (x _α ) is not registered, ie not a double transfer. If the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _α ) has not been transferred in the past, the processing device of the neutral institution T will execute the electronic securities identification unit S ₁
( _Xα ) is registered as the transferred electronic securities identification unit, and subsequent double transfer is prevented.

After completing the above verification, the processing device of the neutral institution T converts the blind signature data Bβ input from the processing device of the transferred user _β into the public keys n _T and e _T of the digital certificate C. Secret key d _T used for the digital signature corresponding to
Digitally sign by As a result, blind signed data B _β ′ is generated, and the processing unit of the neutral organization T
The blind signed data _Bβ ′ is transmitted to the processing device of the transferred user β (step S250).

[0106] In this _{case, B β '= (r β} eT) dT h (x β) dT mod n T = r β · h (x β) dT mod n T h (x β) dT is h (x _β) data Note digitally signed by the d _T, while when the processing apparatus NSO T to digitally sign the blind signature data B _beta is NSO T does not know a new security number transferee user beta-generated since the digital signature, the new policy number attached to the electronic securities right part S ₀ according to the transfer becomes a place where only the transfer user β know.

The processing device of the transferred user β inputs the blind-signed data B _β ′, and
by dividing by _β digital signed policy number h (x _β)
Obtain ^dT mod n _T, and identify the electronic securities S
₁ ( _xβ ) is calculated (step S260).

Here, S ₁ (x _β ) = <x _β , h (x _β ) ^dT mod n _T > Next, the processing device of the transferred user β is the same as the electronic securities right unit S ₀ already obtained and Combined with the identification unit S ₁ (x _β ) of the electronic security to generate S (x _β ), S (x _β ) = <S ₀ , S ₁ (x _β )> exclusive to the transferred user β (step). S270).

In the above electronic securities transfer procedure, a neutral institution T
The process of step S220～S240, ECN right portion _{S 0} of the electronic securities transfer and electronic securities identification unit S
₁ ( _xα ) is one-to-one correspondence, that the electronic securities S ( _xα ) to be transferred is not a double transfer, and that the transfer is performed under the agreement of the transfer user α. Guarantee without knowing the contents of the new electronic securities number later. That NSO T does not know the new contents of the electronic securities number after transfer is equal to that one of a number of electronic securities having the same electronic securities right portion S ₀ can not know whether the transfer. As a result, the transfer path of the electronic securities related to the transfer cannot be followed by the neutral institution T, the privacy of the transactions of the electronic securities is maintained, and the way of using the electronic securities as property is widely secured.

Next, a description will be given of processing in a certification procedure for electronic securities by the processing system of the present embodiment.

FIG. 5 shows the flow of processing in the electronic securities certification procedure by the processing system of this embodiment. In the electronic securities certifying procedure of the present embodiment, if the user who claims ownership of the electronic security is A, this user A (the processing device of the user A) together with the assertion that he owns the electronic security , Electronic securities S (x _A ) and a part y of a random number of security number x _A
A , c _A and the specific number id _A of the user A are transmitted to the processing device of the issuer o of the electronic security (step S300).

Here, S (x _A ) = <S ₀ , S ₁ (x _A )><> is a set of data inside S ₀ is an electronic securities right unit S ₁ (x _A ) is an electronic securities identification unit electronic securities right portion S ₀ is as described, the data shown below.

[0113] _{S 0 = <C, D,} h (C | D) do mod n o> C is described d _o of the digital certificate D is the rights and obligations related issuer secret key, _{n o} the public of the issuer key h (C | D) is C and the hash function h to the variable D (C | D) ^do the h | data mod n _o which was digitally signed by a (C D) _{d o} is the modulo _{n o} are shown also, the electronic certificate C contained in the electronic security rights section S ₀ is as described, a data shown below.

C = <n _T , e _T , h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp mod n _p > n _T , e _T is a security-specific public key d _p , n _p corresponding to the content of right and obligation is a neutral institution H (n _T | e _T ) is a hash function with n _T and e _T as variables, and h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp is h (n _T | e _T ). data mod n _T a digitally signed by d _p electronic securities identification section _S 1 indicating that the n _T modulo (modulus) (x _a) comprises the following data.

S ₁ (x _A ) = <x _A , h (x _A ) ^dT mod n _T > x _A is the security number d _T and n _T assigned by the user A who owns the electronic security, and each of them is a neutral institution. H (x _A ) is a hash function using x _A as a variable, h (x _A ) ^dT is data obtained by digitally signing h (x _A ) with d _{T The} random number for calculating the security number x _A is The following relationship is satisfied.

[0116] _{x A = f (y A,} z A) y A = f (a A, b A) z A = f (id A, c A) a A, b A, random number c _A is policy number 0 < _{A A} , b _A , c _A <2 ^tt is a predetermined number of binary digits id _A is a specific number of the user A f () is a hash function When the processor of the issuer o receives the data, Electronic securities identification section S ₁ (x _A ), electronic certificate C, user A
Sends the partial security number random numbers y _A , id _A , and c _A to the processing unit of the neutral institution T, and confirms that the user A is indeed the owner of the electronic security S (x _A ). The proof is requested from the neutral organization T (step S310).

[0117] processor of the issuer o NSO requested ownership certificate of the electronic securities from T is certified electronic securities right portion S ₀ of the electronic securities are the electronic securities identification section S _{1 (x A)} and is One-to-one correspondence, electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _A )
That electronic securities S, (x _A) is attributable to certainly user A with, the electronic securities S (x _A) is not owned prove to double, to verify.

First, the processing unit of the neutral institution T verifies that the electronic securities right section S ₀ and the electronic securities identification section S ₁ (x _A ) have a one-to-one correspondence (step S 320). Therefore, the processing apparatus of NSO T, with the certificate number x _A calculates the hash function h (x _A), whereas, the hash function h (x _A) of the digitally signed certificate number digital prove ^dT The secret key d _T used in the letter C is decrypted with the public key e _T paired with the secret key d _T to calculate h (x _A ) ^{dT · eT} . Next, both (h (x _A ) and h (x _A ) ^{dT · eT} ) are collated, and if they match, the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _A ) and the electronic securities rights unit S ₀
Use the same secret key d _T , the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _A ) and the electronic securities rights unit S
₀ can be guaranteed to correspond one-to-one.
This verification prevents the user A from asserting a right different from the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _A ) to the issuer o.

Next, the processing device of the neutral institution T verifies that the electronic security S (x _A ) is indeed owned by the user A (step S330). This verification is performed using random numbers y _A , id _A , and c _A of the partial security numbers given by the user A. Specifically, the processing unit of the neutral engine T
The security number x _A and the random numbers y _A , id _A and c _A are x _A = f (y _A , f
(Id _A , c _A )). The security number x _A and the random numbers y _A , id _A , and c _A are x _A = f (y _A , f (i
d _A, satisfy the relationship of c _A)), the y _A, id _A, c since _A only user A can know, ECN S (x _A) is indeed the user A having these random numbers Guaranteed to own.

Lastly, the processing device of the neutral institution T verifies that the electronic certificate related to the ownership certificate is not the one for which the ownership certificate is required twice (step S340). For this reason, the processing device of the neutral institution T uses the electronic securities certification record database 30 in which the electronic securities for which the certificate of ownership has been issued in the past are registered, and records the history of the past certification of the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _A ). Search for. The electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x
_A ) The history of past certifications may be used for certification purposes,
Includes data such as who claimed ownership, who claimed ownership, and date and time of certification. By the history of this proof of ownership, the issuer o
Can find out that the electronic security is not the one for which double proof of ownership was required. The processing unit of the neutral engine T
The electronic securities certification record database 30 uses the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _A ) relating to the ownership certificate as a certified electronic securities identification unit.
Register with.

According to the above verification, the electronic securities right part S ₀ and the electronic securities identification part S ₁ (x _A ) of the electronic securities to be certified have a one-to-one correspondence, and the electronic security identification part S ₁ (x _A ) It is determined that the electronic securities S (x _A ) having the following attributes belong to the user A, and that the electronic securities S (x _A ) is not double-certified. As a result of the verification, if the ownership is valid, the device transmits a predetermined ownership certificate to the processing device of the issuer o (step S35).
0).

It should be noted that in the above-mentioned ownership certifying procedure, when certifying ownership, the owner (user A) sends a part of the random number of the security number including id _A specifying the identity to the issuer o. As will be apparent, the issuer o and the neutral institution T that have obtained such data cannot use such data to perform unauthorized transactions such as transferring the electronic securities.

In the ownership certification procedure, the random numbers y _A , id _A , and c _A of the partial security numbers given by the user _A , where y _A = f (a
_A , b _A ), the person who acquired y _A can obtain the random number a from y _A.
It is more difficult to determine _A and b _A as near as possible.
However, in order to transfer the electronic securities, the transfer user α cannot transfer the electronic securities without giving the random numbers a _A and b _A as described above. As a result, a third party who has acquired the data of the random numbers y _A , id _A , and c _A of the security number cannot use the data to make an illegal transaction for the electronic security.

Next, processing in the electronic securities erasing procedure by the processing system of this embodiment will be described.

FIG. 6 shows the flow of processing in the electronic securities erasure procedure by the processing system of this embodiment. In the electronic securities erasure procedure of this embodiment, if the user who requests the erasure of the electronic security is B, when requesting the erasure of the electronic security, the user B makes a request for the erasure of the electronic security and a request for the erasure of the electronic security. An electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _B ), an electronic certificate C,
The random numbers a _B , b _B , and z _B of the security number x _B are transmitted to the neutral institution T (step S400).

Here, S (x _B ) = <S ₀ , S ₁ (x _B )><> is a set of data inside S ₀ is an electronic securities right unit S ₁ (x _B ) is an electronic securities identification unit x _B is policy number ECN right portion S ₀ of the electronic securities are required to erase the data in the following be as previously described.

[0127] _{S 0 = <C, D,} h (C | D) do mod n o> C is described d _o of the digital certificate D is the rights and obligations related issuer secret key, _{n o} the public of the issuer key h (C | D) is C and the hash function h to the variable D (C | D) ^do the h | data mod n _o which was digitally signed by a (C D) _{d o} is the modulo _{n o} Although electronic certificate C contained in the electronic security rights section S ₀ indicating a are as previously described are the following data.

C = <n _T , e _T , h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp mod n _p > n _T , e _T is a security-specific public key d _p , n _p corresponding to the content of rights and obligations is a neutral institution The public key h (n _T | e _T ) is a hash function h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp with n _T and e _T as variables, and the digital signature of h (n _T | e _T ) with d _p The data mod n _T indicates that n _T is a modulus. The electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _B ) is as follows.

S ₁ (x _B ) = <x _B , h (x _B ) ^dT mod n _T > d _T and n _T are the secret key and public key of a neutral institution, respectively. H (x _B ) is a variable of x _B H (x _B ) ^dT is data obtained by digitally signing h (x _B ) with d _{T The} random number for calculating the security number x _B of the electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x _B ) has the following relationship: Fulfill.

[0130] _{x B = f (y B,} z B) y B = f (a B, b B) z B = f (id B, c B) a B, b B, random number c _B is policy number 0 <A _B , b _B , c _B <2 ^tt is a predetermined number of binary digits id _B is an issuer requesting erasure, user B's specific number f () is a hash function it processing apparatus NSO T requested to erase, an electronic securities right portion S ₀ of the electronic securities erased ECN identifying section S _{1 (x B)} and is a one-to-one correspondence, the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ that the electronic securities S with a _{(x B)} to (x _B) is attributable to certainly user a, the electronic securities S (x _B) has not been erased to double, to verify.

First, the processing unit of the neutral institution T verifies that the electronic securities right section S ₀ and the electronic securities identification section S ₁ (x _B ) have a one-to-one correspondence (step S 420). Therefore, the processing apparatus NSO T, with the certificate number x _B to calculate the hash function h (x _B), whereas, the hash function h (x _B) of the digitally signed certificate number ^dT digital certificates The secret key d _T used in the letter C is decrypted with the public key e _T paired with the secret key d _T to calculate h (x _B ) ^{dT · eT} . Next, both (h (x _B ) and h (x _B ) ^{dT · eT} ) are collated, and if they match, the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _B ) and the electronic securities rights unit S ₀ have the same secret key d _T Is used, it can be guaranteed that the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _B ) related to the erasure and the electronic securities right unit S ₀ have a one-to-one correspondence. This verification guarantees that the electronic securities S (x _B ) correctly corresponding to the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _B ) will be deleted.

Next, the processing device of the neutral institution T verifies that the electronic security S (x _B ) is indeed owned by the user B (step S430). This verification is performed using random numbers a _B , b _B , and z _B of partial security numbers given by the user B. Specifically, the processing unit of the neutral institution T determines that the security number x _B and the random numbers a _B , b _B , and z _B are x _B = f (f (a _B , b
_B), to confirm that satisfies the relationship of z _B). Security number x
_B and random numbers a _B , b _B , and z _B are x _B = f (f (a _B , b _B ),
If the relationship of z _B ) is satisfied, a _B , b _B , and z _B can be known only by the user _B , so that the electronic securities S (x
_B ) is indeed guaranteed to belong to user B. This can prevent erroneous erasure of another person's electronic security.

[0133] Finally, the processing unit of the neutral institution T verifies that the electronic security related to the erasure is not the one double-erased (step S440). For this reason, the processing device of the neutral institution T searches the electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x _B ) using the electronic security erasure record database 40 in which the electronic securities that have been erased in the past are registered. As a result of this search, if the electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x _B ) has not been erased, the electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x _B ) is registered in the electronic security erasure record database 40 as an erased electronic security identification unit. I do. In effect, registration in the electronic security erasure record database 40 prevents the subsequent use of the electronic security.

[0134]

As is apparent from the above description, according to the processing system and the processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities of the present invention, the following specific effects can be obtained. You can.

A plurality of issuers request the neutral institution T to freely describe complicated rights and obligations, and the digital signature is signed by the neutral institution T while keeping the security number secret, so that the rights and obligations are described. Can be issued electronic securities with a guaranteed correspondence between the security numbers and the security numbers.

When transferring the electronic securities, the electronic securities rights department and the electronic securities identification department have a one-to-one correspondence, must not be duplicated, and must be transferred under the agreement of the transferor , Can be guaranteed by the neutral authority T, and the transfer route can be kept secret from anyone.

When claiming possession of electronic securities, the electronic securities right section and the electronic securities identification section have a one-to-one correspondence,
It can be assured by the neutral authority T that the ownership is not double and that the ownership is claimed by the rightful owner.

When claiming the erasure of electronic securities, the electronic securities right section and the electronic securities identification section have a one-to-one correspondence,
The neutral institution T guarantees that double erasure is not required and that the erasure is requested by a legitimate owner, thereby preventing further use of the electronic security.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a diagram conceptually showing a data structure of an electronic security processed in the present invention.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing the configuration of a processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities according to the present invention and the overall processing flow;

FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a processing flow of a processing system of the present invention in an electronic securities issuance procedure.

FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing a processing flow of the processing system of the present invention in a transfer procedure of electronic securities.

FIG. 5 is a block diagram showing a flow of processing of the processing system of the present invention in a certification procedure for electronic securities.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram showing a processing flow of the processing system of the present invention in an electronic securities erasing procedure.

FIG. 7 is a block diagram showing a flow of processing of conventional electronic money.

[Description of Signs] 10 Electronic Securities Issuance Record Database 20 Electronic Securities Transfer Record Database 30 Electronic Securities Certification Record Database 40 Electronic Securities Erasure Record Database S (x) Electronic Securities S ₀ Electronic Securities Rights Department S ₁ (x) Electronic Securities Identification Unit x Securities number a Securities number random number b Securities number random number c Securities number random number id Specific number n Public key d Public key d Private key p Private key q Private key T Neutral organization o Issuer α Transfer user β Transferee A Certificate B requesting erasure B user requesting erasure

Claims (18)

[Claims] 1. A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral institution, wherein issuance of electronic securities. In the procedure, the processing device of the neutral institution generates a digital certificate that can be digitally signed only by the neutral institution, and the processing device of the issuer has the rights and obligations relationship with the digital certificate that can only be digitally signed by the issuer. While generating an electronic securities right part including the encrypted data of the description, generates a security number, generates blind signature data concealing the security number, the processing device of the neutral organization, the digital certificate and the digital certificate By inputting the blind signature data and digitally signing the blind signature data with the same private key as the digital signature of the digital certificate, A blind signed data that can be digitally signed only by a legislative institution, and the processing device of the issuer inputs the blind signed data and unblinds the digitally signed certificate that can be digitally signed only by a neutral institution. Acquiring a number, generating an electronic securities identification unit including a digitally signed security number by this neutral institution, and completing the electronic securities issuing procedure by combining the electronic securities right unit and the electronic securities identification unit. Processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying and erasing electronic securities. 2. The security number generated by the issuer's device is:
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the random number is calculated by three random numbers a, b, and c satisfying a relationship of the following expression and a specific number id of the issuer. Processing system for x = f (y, z) y = f (a, b) z = f (id, c) where x: security number f (): f (x, y) = f (x ′, y ′) X
One-way hash function that is difficult to find x ', y ≠ y' 3. A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral institution, wherein issuance of electronic securities. In the procedure, the processing unit of the neutral institution generates an RSA key n _T , e _T , p _T , q _T , d _T for each electronic security at the request of the issuer, and generates a public key n _T. , E _T with a secret key d _T to generate a digital certificate C, where C = <n _T , e _T , h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp mod n _p ><> The data set n _T , e _T is the security-specific public key d _p , n _p corresponding to the rights and obligations, and the neutral and private key and the public key h (n _T | e _T ) are n _T and e _T A hash function h (n _T | e _T ) ^{dp as} a variable is a data obtained by digitally signing h (n _T | e _T ) with a secret key d _p . The data mod n _p indicates that n _p is a modulus. The processing device of the issuer inputs the digital certificate C and the description D describing the rights and obligations of the electronic security, and and outputs the right part S _{0, here, S 0 = <C, D} , h (C | D) do mod n o> d o is the issuer of the secret key n _o is the issuer's public key h (C | D) is a hash function h (C to the variable C and D | be a D) the data mod n _o which was digitally signed by a private key _{d o} is _{n o} law (modulus) | is D) ^do h (C processor of the NSO showing the inputs and the digital certificate C and ECN right portion S _0, searches the digital certificate C in the electronic securities issuing record database, the digital certificate C is another The digital certificate C and the digital certificate Kagabu registers S ₀ to the electronic securities issuing record database as a set, the issuer of the processor, policy number random number a, b, c (0
<A, b, c <2 ^t , where t is a predetermined number of binary digits) and a blind coefficient r (0 <r <2 ^t , t is a predetermined number of binary digits), are randomly generated, The security number x is calculated using the issuer's specific number id, and then the blind signature data B in which the security number x is concealed by the blind coefficient r is calculated, where x = f (y, z) y = f (a, b) z = f (id, c) f () is x ≠ such that f (x, y) = f (x ′, y ′)
x ', y ≠ y' indicates the hard one-way hash function to find ^{a, B = r eT h (x} ) modn T h (x) is a hash function mod n _T to variable x to the n _T The processing unit of the neutral organization inputs the blind signature data B and the digital certificate C, and uses the secret key d _T used for the digital signature of the digital certificate C. said blind signature data B 'to generate where, B' blind signed data B digital signature ^{= (r eT) dT h (} x) dT mod n T = r · h (x) dT mod n T h (x) ^dT data the issuer processing devices that digitally signed h (x) is the private key d _T inputs the blind signed data B ', which was divided by the blind coefficient r electronic Identification of securities S calculated ₁ (x), _{wherein, S 1 (x) = <} x, h (x) dT mod n T> Subsequently, the electronic securities right portion _{S 0} and ECN identification unit S
₁ (x) by combining the electronic securities _{S (x) S (x)} = issuance of electronic securities, characterized in that to generate the _{<S 0, S 1 (x} )> to complete the registration procedure with the electronic securities Processing system for transfer, certification, erasure. 4. A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying and erasing electronic securities, comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral institution, wherein the transfer of electronic securities is performed. In the procedure, the processor of the transferred user obtains the electronic securities from the transferor and a part of the random number of the security number before transfer which can be known only by the transferor, and obtains a new security number exclusively for the transferred user. The new security number is concealed, and the new security number is concealed to generate blind signature data.The processing unit of the neutral institution, the blind signature data from the transferee, the security number before the transfer and only the neutral institution have a digital signature An electronic securities identification unit consisting of the obtained digitally signed security number, a part of the random number of the security number before transfer that only the transferor can know, and a digital number included in the electronic securities right part of the electronic security. Enter the certificate and Performing a verification calculation that the electronic securities identification unit and the electronic securities right unit before transfer are one-to-one correspondence via the digital certificate, and a part of the random number of the security number before transfer and the Using the security number of the security number identification unit before the transfer, the electronic securities identification unit before the transfer performs a verification calculation that the transferee has been given to the transferred user under the agreement of the transfer user, and performs a verification calculation before the transfer. While confirming that the electronic securities identification unit has not been transferred in the electronic securities transfer record database and registering the electronic securities identification unit of the transferee as a transferred electronic securities identification unit on the condition that it has not been transferred, Digitally signing the blind signature data with the same private key as the digital signature of the digital certificate, thereby generating blind signed data that can be digitally signed only by a neutral authority. The processing device of the transferor unblinds the blind-signed data to obtain a new digitally signed security number that can be digitally signed only by a neutral organization, and obtains the new security number and the digitally signed security number. Issuance, transfer, certification, erasure of electronic securities, characterized in that the electronic securities right section and the new electronic securities identification section are combined to complete an electronic securities transfer procedure. Processing system for 5. A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral institution, wherein the transfer of electronic securities is performed. In the procedure, the processing device of the transferred user β acquires the electronic securities S (x _α ) and the random numbers a _α , b _α , and z _α of the security number x _α of the transferred user α from the transferred user α. Generate new security number random numbers a _β , b _β , c β dedicated to the transfer user _β and a blind coefficient r _β (0 <r _β <2 ^t , where t is a predetermined number of binary digits), using a specific number idβ the transferee user beta calculates the new certificate number x _beta dedicated transferee user beta, followed by the policy number x _beta blind signature data B that concealed by the blind coefficient r _beta calculating a _{beta, where, S (x α) = <} S 0, S 1 (x α)><> Waso Set of the inside of the data _{S 0 = <C, D,} h (C | D) do mod n o> C is described d _o of the digital certificate D is the rights and obligations related issuer secret key, _{n o} is the issuer public key h of (C | D) is a hash function h to the variable C and D and the law | | (D C) data mod n _o which was digitally signed by a _{d o} is _{n o} (C D) ^do is h C = <n _T , e _T , h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp mod n _p > n _T , e _T is the public key d _p , n _p unique to the security corresponding to the rights and obligations public and secret key of institutions key h (n _T | e _T) hash function h to the variable n _T and _{e T (n T | e T} ) dT is h | digital by the (n _T e _T) d _p signed data mod n _p is S ₁ indicating that the n _p modulo _{(modulus) (x α) =} <x α, h (x α) dT mod n T> x α Securities number h of transfer user α _(x α) is a hash function h _(x α) to the variable _x α ^dT is h _(x α) the data was digitally signed by the _{d T x α = f (y} α, z _{α) y α = f (a} α, b α) z α = f (id α, c α) a α, b α, the _{c α 0 <a α, b} α, c α <2 t id α relocations The specific number f () of the user α is x ≠ such that f (x, y) = f (x ′, y ′)
x ', y ≠ y' difficult to find a one-way hash function _{x β = f (y β,} z β) y β = f (a β, b β) z β = f (id β, c β X _β is a new security number dedicated to the transferred user β a _β , b _β , c _β is 0 <a _β , b _β , c _β <2 ^t id _β is the specific number of the transferred user β B _β = processing apparatus of ^{_{r β eT h (x β)}} modn T h (x β) hash and variable _x β function e _T is public key the neutral institution corresponding to the private key d _T of neutral institutions, transferee From the user β, the blind signature data _Bβ , the electronic security identification unit S ₁ ( _xα ) before transfer, and the security number random numbers _aα , _bα , z
and _alpha, the inputs the digital certificate C contained in the electronic security rights section S ₀ of the electronic securities S (x _α), wherein the front transfer certificate number x _alpha from the hash function h a (x _alpha) The hash function h (x
_α ) ^dT is decrypted by the public key e _T paired with the secret key d _T used in the digital certificate C to calculate h (x _α ) ^{dT · eT} , and the two are compared to obtain the electronic security identification. It is verified that the section S ₁ (x _α ) has a one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities right section S _0, and then the security number x _α is x _α =
_{f (f (a α, b} α), z α) by verifying that satisfies the relationship, the electronic securities identification section S _{1 (x α)} is to be moved to under the transfer user alpha agreement user β, and by searching the electronic securities transfer record database for the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ ( _xα ), it is confirmed that the electronic securities have not been transferred. The electronic security identification unit S ₁ ( _xα ) is registered as the transferred electronic security identification unit, and the blind signature data B is obtained using the secret key d _T used for the digital signature of the digital certificate C.
The _beta and digital signature 'generated, where, B _beta' blind signed data ^{_{B β = (r β eT)}} dT h (x β) dT mod n T = r β · h (x β) dT mod n _T h (x _β) ^dT is h (x _β) a processor of the data the transferee user beta was digitally signed by d _T inputs the blind signed data B _beta ', the blind factor this r
by dividing by _β digital signed policy number h (x _β)
^dT mod n _T is obtained, and the identification part S ₁ (x
_β ), where S ₁ (x _β ) = <x _β , h (x _β ) ^dT mod n _T > Then, the electronic securities right unit S ₀ and the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x
_β ) to generate electronic securities S ( _xβ ) S ( _xβ ) = <S ₀ , S ₁ ( _xβ )> to complete the transfer procedure of electronic securities. Processing system for issuance, transfer, certification, erasure. 6. A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral organization, wherein the certificate of the electronic certificate is provided. In the procedure, the processing device of the issuer obtains an electronic security from a user who owns the electronic security and a part of a security number random number that only the user can know, and obtains the security number of the electronic security and a neutral organization. An electronic securities identification unit consisting of a digitally signed security number that has only been digitally signed, a digital certificate included in the electronic securities rights section of the electronic security, and a part of the security number random number, A request for proof of ownership is sent to the processing device of the institution, and the processing device of the neutral institution verifies that the electronic securities identification unit is in one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities rights unit via the digital certificate. And said Using a part of the certificate number random number and the security number of the security number identification unit, a verification calculation that only the user who owns the electronic security can know the random number of the security number is performed. A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, wherein a search is made in an electronic securities certificate record database, and the results of the search and verification are returned to the processing device of the issuer. 7. A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral organization, wherein the certificate of the electronic certificate is provided. In the procedure, the processing device of the issuer o includes the electronic securities S (x _A ) from the user A who owns the electronic securities, and a part y _A , id _A , of the random number of the security number that only the user A can know. obtains the c _a, the electronic securities identification section _S 1 of the electronic securities S (x _a) and (x _a),
Wherein the digital certificate C contained in the electronic security rights section S ₀ of the electronic securities S (x _A), a part of the policy number random number y
_A, id _A, send and c _A the processor of NSO T requires proof of possession, _{where, S (x A) = <} S 0, S 1 (x A)><> its inner the public of the issuer C is described d _o is the secret key n _o of the issuer of the digital certificate D is right and obligations | of a set of data _{S 0 = <(D C)} do mod n o C, D, h> key h (C | D) is C and the hash function h to the variable D (C | D) ^do the h | data mod n _o which was digitally signed by a (C D) _{d o} is the modulo _{n o} C = <n _T , e _T , h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp mod n _p > n _T , e _T is the security-specific public key d _p , n _p corresponding to the content of rights and obligations secret key and a public key h (n _T | e _T) hash function h to the variable n _T and _{e T (n T | e T} ) dp is h | digital by the (n _T e _T) d _p The signed data mod n _p indicates that n _p is a modulus S ₁ (x _A ) = <x _A , h (x _A ) ^dT mod n _T > x _A is the use of owning the electronic securities The security numbers d _T and n _T assigned by the party A are the secret key and public key of the neutral institution, h (x _A ) is a hash function with x _A as a variable, and h (x _A ) ^dT is h (x ^A ) the data was digitally signed by _{^{d T x a = f (y}} a, z a) y a = f (a a, b a) z a = f (id a, c a) a a, b a, c a is Random number of securities number 0 <a _A , b _A , c _A <2 ^tt is a predetermined number of binary digits id _A is a specific number of user A f () is f (x, y) = f (x ′) , Y ') x ≠
One-way hash function in which it is difficult to find x ′, y ≠ y ′. The processing device of the neutral organization T includes the identification unit S ₁ (x _A )
The hash function h from the policy number x _A, which is included in the
(X _A ) is calculated, and a hash function h (x _A ) ^dT of the digitally signed security number included in the electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x _A ) is used as a secret key d used in the digital certificate C. _T
And decrypted by the public key e _T paired with h (x _A )
By calculating ^{dT · eT} and comparing the two, it is verified that the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _A ) has a one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities rights unit S _0, and then the security number x _A is obtained. x _A =
_{f (y A, f (id} A, c A)) by calculating satisfy a relationship of a portion of the policy number random number y _A, i
Verify that d _A and c _A are known only to the user who owns the electronic security, search the electronic security certificate record database, and return the search and verification results to the processing device of the issuer o. A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities. 8. A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral organization, wherein the erasure of the electronic securities is performed. In the procedure, the processing unit of the neutral institution, the electronic securities identification unit consisting of the security number of the electronic security that is required to be erased and a digitally signed security number that can be digitally signed only by the neutral institution, Enter the digital certificate included in the electronic securities rights department and a part of the random number of the security number that can be known only to the issuer or user requesting the erasure of the electronic security, via the digital certificate A verification calculation is performed to confirm that the electronic securities identification unit is in one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities right unit, and the security number random number is electronically calculated using a part of the security number random number and the security number of the security number identification unit. Of securities A verification calculation is performed to confirm that only the issuer or user seeking erasure can know, the electronic securities identification section is searched in the electronic securities erasure record database, and the electronic security identification section has been erased on the condition that it has not been erased. A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, characterized by completing an erasure procedure of electronic securities by registering as an electronic securities identification unit of the above. 9. A processing system for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral organization, wherein the erasure of the electronic securities is performed. In the procedure, the processing device of the neutral institution, the issuer or user B requesting the erasure of the electronic security, the electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x _B ) of the electronic security that is required to be erased, and the electronic security digital certificate C, which is included in the electronic securities right part S ₀
And part of the security number random numbers a _B , b _B , and z _B that can be known only by the issuer or user B requesting erasure of the electronic security, where S (x _B ) = <S ₀ , S ₁ (x _B ) >><> is a set of data inside S ₀ is an electronic securities right section S ₁ (x _B ) is an electronic securities identification section x _B is a security number S of an electronic security which is required to be erased _{0 = <C, D, h} (C | D) do mod n o> C digital certificate D description of the rights and obligations d _o is the issuer of the secret key n _o is the issuer's public key h (C | D) is a hash function h (C whose variable C and D | to a D) data mod n _o which was digitally signed by a _{d o} is _{n o} law (modulus) | is D) _{d o} h (C _{C = <n T, e T} , h (n T | e T) dp mod n p> shown n _T, e _T securities-specific public corresponding to the right content Key d _p, n _p is the secret key of a neutral agency public key h (n _T | e _T) is a hash function as a variable n _T and _{e T h (n T | e} T) dp is h (n _T | e _T) and S ₁ data mod n _p which is digitally signed by d _p, which indicates that the n _p modulo _{(modulus) (x B) =} <x B, h (x B) dT mod n T> d T And n _T are the secret key and public key of the neutral institution, respectively. H (x _B ) is a hash function using x _B as a variable, h (x _B ) ^dT is data obtained by digitally signing h (x _B ) with d _T x _{B = f (y B, z} B) y B = f (a B, b B) z B = f (id B, c B) a B, b B, c B is a random number of policy number 0 <a _B, b _B , c _B <2 ^tt is a predetermined number of binary digits id _B is an issuer requesting erasure, user B's specific number f () is f (x, y) = f (x ′, y ′) X '≠
A one-way hash function in which it is difficult to find x ′, y ≠ y ′. Subsequently, the processing unit of the neutral organization calculates a hash function h (x _B ) from the security number x _B and obtains the electronic security identification. The hash function h (x _B ) ^dT of the digitally signed security number included in the part S ₁ (x _B ) is decrypted by the public key e _T paired with the secret key d _T used in the digital certificate C. By calculating h (x _B ) ^{dT · eT} and comparing them, it is verified that the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _B ) has a one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities rights unit S _0, and ID x _B is _{x B = f (f (a} B, b B), z B) by verifying that satisfies the relationship), part a _B of the policy number random number, b _B, is z _B electron Verify that only the issuer or user B seeking erasure of the security can know, Identifying portion S ₁ a _{(x B)} searching in an electronic securities erase record database, the electronic securities identifying unit S non erased condition
By registering _{1 (x B)} as an electron securities identification of erased, issues an electronic certificate, characterized in that to complete the erasing procedure of the electronic securities, transfer, certification, processing system for erasing. 10. A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral institution, wherein issuance of electronic securities. In the procedure, the processing device of the neutral institution generates a digital certificate that can be digitally signed only by the neutral institution, and the processing device of the issuer has the rights and obligations relationship with the digital certificate that can only be digitally signed by the issuer. While generating an electronic securities right part including the encrypted data of the description, generates a security number, generates blind signature data concealing the security number, the processing device of the neutral organization, the digital certificate and the digital certificate By inputting the blind signature data and digitally signing the blind signature data with the same private key that digitally signed the digital certificate, The issuer generates blind-signed data that can be digitally signed only by the institution, and the processing device of the issuer inputs the blind-signed data, performs unblind processing, and executes a digitally signed security number that can be digitally signed only by a neutral institution. And generating an electronic securities identification unit including the digitally signed security number by the neutral institution, and combining the electronic securities right unit and the electronic securities identification unit to complete the electronic securities issuance procedure. Processing methods for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities. 11. The security number generated by the issuer's device is calculated by three random numbers a, b, c satisfying the following relationship and the issuer's specific number id. A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing the electronic securities according to claim 10. x = f (y, z) y = f (a, b) z = f (id, c) where x: security number f (): f (x, y) = f (x ′, y ′) X
A one-way hash function that is difficult to find x ', y {y} 12. A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral institution, wherein issuance of electronic securities. In the procedure, the processing unit of the neutral institution generates an RSA key n _T , e _T , p _T , q _T , d _T for each electronic security at the request of the issuer, and generates a public key n _T. , E _T with a secret key d _T to generate a digital certificate C, where C = <n _T , e _T , h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp mod n _p ><> The data set n _T , e _T is the public key unique to the security corresponding to the right content d _p , n _p is the secret key and public key of a neutral institution h (n _T | e _T ) is the variable n _T and e _T The hash function h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp is data mo that is a digital signature of h (n _T | e _T ) with the secret key d _p d _np indicates that n _p is a modulus The processor of the issuer inputs the digital certificate C and the description D describing the rights and obligations of the electronic securities, and outputs the S _{0, here, S 0 = <C, D} , h (C | D) do mod n o> d o is of the issuer secret key n _o is the issuer of the public key h (C | D) the hash function h to the variable C and D show that the | | (D C) data mod n _o which was digitally signed by the private key _{d o} is _{n o} law (modulus) is (C D) ^do h processor of the NSO inputs and said digital certificate C and ECN right portion S _0, searches the digital certificate C in the electronic securities issuing record database, the digital certificate C is another electronic securities Said digital certificate C and the rights section of the electronic securities provided that they are not used ₀ and registered in the electronic securities issuing record database as a set, the issuer of the processor, policy number random number a, b, c (0
<A, b, c <2 ^t , where t is a predetermined number of binary digits) and a blind coefficient r (0 <r <2 ^t , t is a predetermined number of binary digits), are randomly generated, The security number x is calculated using the issuer's specific number id, and then the blind signature data B in which the security number x is concealed by the blind coefficient r is calculated, where x = f (y, z) y = f (a, b) z = f (id, c) f () is x ≠ such that f (x, y) = f (x ′, y ′)
x ', y ≠ y' indicates the hard one-way hash function to find ^{a, B = r eT h (x} ) mod n T h (x) is a hash function mod n _T of the variables x n _T Is a modulus. The processing unit of the neutral organization inputs the blind signature data B and the digital certificate C, and uses the secret key d _T used for the digital signature of the digital certificate C. said blind signature data B 'to generate where, B' blind signed data B digitally signed by ^{= (r eT) dT h (} x) dT mod n T = r · h (x) dT mod n _T h (x) ^dT is h (x) processor of the data the issuer digitally signed by the private key d _T a, enter the blind signed data B ', which was divided by the blind coefficient r Identification of electronic securities Calculate the section S ₁ (x), where S ₁ (x) = <x, h (x) ^dT mod n _T > Then, the electronic securities right section S ₀ and the electronic securities identification section S
₁ (x) by combining the electronic securities _{S (x) S (x)} = issuance of electronic securities, characterized in that to generate the _{<S 0, S 1 (x} )> to complete the registration procedure with the electronic securities Processing for transfer, certification, erasure. 13. A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral institution, wherein the transfer of electronic securities is performed. In the procedure, the processor of the transferred user obtains the electronic securities from the transferor and a part of the random number of the security number before transfer which can be known only by the transferor, and obtains a new security number exclusively for the transferred user. The new security number is concealed and generates blind signature data for concealing the new security number. An electronic securities identification unit consisting of the obtained digitally signed security number, a part of the random number of the security number before transfer that only the transferor can know, and a digital number included in the electronic securities right part of the electronic security. Certificate and enter Performing a verification calculation that the electronic securities identification unit and the electronic securities right unit before transfer are in one-to-one correspondence via the digital certificate, and a part of a random number of the security number before transfer and the transfer. Using the security number of the previous security number identification unit and the electronic security identification unit before the transfer, a verification calculation is performed to determine that the electronic security identification unit was given to the transferee under the agreement of the transfer user, While confirming in the electronic securities transfer record database that the securities identification unit has not been transferred, and registering the electronic securities identification unit of the transferee as a transferred electronic securities identification unit on the condition that it has not been transferred, Digitally signing the blind signing data with the same private key as that used to digitally sign the digital certificate, thereby generating blind signed data that can be digitally signed only by a neutral authority. The processing device of the third party unblinds the blind-signed data to obtain a new digitally signed security number that can be digitally signed only by a neutral organization, and obtains the new security number and the digitally signed security number from the new security number. For issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, wherein the electronic securities right section and the new electronic securities identifying section are combined to complete an electronic securities transfer procedure. Processing method. 14. A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying and erasing electronic securities, comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral institution, wherein the transfer of electronic securities is performed. In the procedure, the processing device of the transferred user β acquires the electronic security S (x _α ) and the random numbers a _α , b _α , and z _α of the security number xα of the transferred user α from the transferred user _α , and A new random number a _β , b _β , c _{β of} a new security number dedicated to the user _β and a blind coefficient r _β (0 <r _β <2 ^t , where t is a predetermined number of binary digits) are generated. Using the specific number id _β of the transfer user β, a new security number x _β dedicated to the transferred user _β is calculated, and then the security number x _β is concealed by the blind coefficient r _β for blind signature data B. calculating a _{beta, where, S (x α) = <} S 0, S 1 (x α)><> its Set S ₀ = side of the data <C, D, h (C | D) do mod n o> C is the digital certificate D rights and obligations described d _o is the secret key n _o of the issuer of the issuer public key h (C | D) is a hash function as a variable C and _{D h (C | D) d} o is h (C | D) data mod n _o which was digitally signed by a _{d o} is _{n o} law ( C = <n _T , e _T , h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp mod n _p > n _T , e _T is a security-specific public key d _p , n corresponding to the content of rights and obligations _p is a secret key and a public key of a neutral institution. h (n _T | e _T ) is a hash function h (n _T | e _T ) with n _T and e _T as variables. ^dp is h (n _T | e _T ). S ₁ is data mod n _p which is digitally signed by the _p to indicate that the n _p modulo _{(modulus) (x α) =} <x α, h (x α) dT mod n T x _α is policy number h of transfer user _α (x α) is x hash function h (x _α) ^dT to the variable _α is h (x _α) the data was digitally signed by the d _T x _α = f (y _α , z _α ) y _α = f (a _α , b _α ) z _α = f (id _α , c _α ) a _α , b _α , and c _α are 0 <a _α , b _α , c _α <2 ^t id _α is the specific number of the transfer user α. f () is f (x, y) = f (x ′, y ′) x ≠
x ', y ≠ y' hard one-way hash function to find the _{x β = f (y β,} z β) y β = f (a β, b β) z β = f (id β, c β X _β is a new security number dedicated to the transferred user β a _β , b _β , c _β is 0 <a _β , b _β , c _β <2 ^t id _β is the specific number of the transferred user β B _{β ^{= r β eT h (x β}} ) mod n T h (x β) the processing unit of the hash function e _T is the public key the NSO corresponding to the private key d _T of NSO to variable x _beta is to be From the transfer user β, the blind signature data B _β , the electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x _α ) before the transfer, and the security number random numbers a _α , b _α , z
and _alpha, the inputs the digital certificate C contained in the electronic security rights section S ₀ of the electronic securities S (x _α), wherein the front transfer certificate number x _alpha from the hash function h a (x _alpha) The hash function h (x
_α ) ^dT is decrypted by the public key e _T paired with the secret key d _T used in the digital certificate C to calculate h (x _α ) ^{dT · eT} , and the two are compared to obtain the electronic security identification. It is verified that the section S ₁ (x _α ) has a one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities right section S _0, and then the security number x _α is x _α =
_{f (f (a α, b} α), z α) by verifying that satisfies the relationship, the electronic securities identification section S _{1 (x α)} is to be moved to under the transfer user alpha agreement user β, and by searching the electronic securities transfer record database for the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ ( _xα ), it is confirmed that the electronic securities have not been transferred. The electronic security identification unit S ₁ ( _xα ) is registered as the transferred electronic security identification unit, and the blind signature data B is obtained using the secret key d _T used for the digital signature of the digital certificate C.
The _beta and digital signature 'generated, where, B _beta' blind signed data ^{_{B β = (r β eT)}} dT h (x β) dT mod n T = r β · h (x β) dT mod n _T h (x _β) ^dT is h (x _β) a processor of the data the transferee user beta was digitally signed by d _T inputs the blind signed data B _beta ', the blind factor this r
by dividing by _β digital signed policy number h (x _β)
^dT mod n _T is obtained, and the identification part S ₁ (x
_β ), where S ₁ (x _β ) = <x _β , h (x _β ) ^dT mod n _T > Then, the electronic securities right unit S ₀ and the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x
_β ) to generate electronic securities S (x _β ) S (x _β ) = <S ₀ , S ₁ (x _β )> and complete the transfer procedure of the electronic securities. Processing methods for issuance, transfer, certification, and erasure. 15. A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral organization, wherein the certificate of the electronic certificate is provided. In the procedure, the processing device of the issuer obtains an electronic security from a user who owns the electronic security and a part of a security number random number that only the user can know, and obtains the security number of the electronic security and a neutral organization. An electronic securities identification unit consisting of a digitally signed security number that has only been digitally signed, a digital certificate included in the electronic securities rights section of the electronic security, and a part of the security number random number, A request for proof of ownership is sent to the processing device of the institution, and the processing device of the neutral institution verifies that the electronic securities identification unit is in one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities rights unit via the digital certificate. Perform the above Using a part of the number random number and the security number of the security number identification unit, a calculation is performed to verify that the random number of the security number can be known only to the user who owns the electronic security, and the electronic security identification unit A method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, wherein a search is made in a security certificate record database, and the results of the search and verification are returned to a processing device of the issuer. 16. A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral institution, wherein the proof of the electronic security is provided. In the procedure, the processing device of the issuer o includes the electronic securities S (x _A ) from the user A who owns the electronic securities, and a part y _A , id _A , of the random number of the security number that only the user A can know. obtains the c _a, the electronic securities identification section _S 1 of the electronic securities S (x _a) and (x _a),
A digital certificate C included in the electronic securities right section S ₀ of the electronic security S (x _A ), and a part y of the security number random number
_A, id _A, send and c _A the processor of NSO T requires proof of possession, _{where, S (x A) = <} S 0, S 1 (x A)><> its inner the public of the issuer C is described d _o is the secret key n _o of the issuer of the digital certificate D is right and obligations | of a set of data _{S 0 = <(D C)} do mod n o C, D, h> key h (C | D) is C and the hash function h to the variable D (C | D) ^do the h | a (C D) data was digitally signed by _{d o} modn _o is modulo _{n o} (modulus) C = <n _T , e _T , h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp mod n _p > n _T , e _T is the public key d _p , n _p unique to the security corresponding to the rights and obligations The institution's private key and public key h (n _T | e _T ) are hash functions h (n _T | e _T ) ^dp with n _T and e _T as variables, and h (n _T | e _T ) is obtained by d _p Mod n _p indicates that n _p is a modulus S ₁ (x _A ) = <x _A , h (x _A ) ^dT mod n _T > x _A has an electronic security The security numbers d _T and n _T assigned by user A are the secret key and public key of the neutral institution, respectively. H (x _A ) is a hash function using x _A as a variable, and h (x _A ) ^dT is h (x _A ) the data was digitally signed by _{d T x a = f (y} a, z a) y a = f (a a, b a) z a = f (id a, c a) a a, b a, c a Is the random number of the security number 0 <a _A , b _A , c _A <2 ^tt is the predetermined number of binary digits id _A is the specific number of the user A f () is f (x, y) = f (x ', Y') x ≠
One-way hash function in which it is difficult to find x ′, y ≠ y ′. The processing device of the neutral organization T includes the identification unit S ₁ (x _A )
The hash function h from the policy number x _A, which is included in the
(X _A ) is calculated, and a hash function h (x _A ) ^dT of the digitally signed security number included in the electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x _A ) is used as a secret key d used in the digital certificate C. _T
And decrypted by the public key e _T paired with h (x _A )
By calculating ^{dT · eT} and comparing the two, it is verified that the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x _A ) has a one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities right unit S _0, and then the security number xA is x _A
= F (y _A , f (id _A , c _A )) to calculate a part of the security number random number y _A , i
Verify that d _A and c _A are known only to the user who owns the electronic security, search the electronic security certificate record database, and return the search and verification results to the processing device of the issuer o. A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities characterized by the following. 17. A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral organization, wherein the erasing of the electronic securities is performed. In the procedure, the processing unit of the neutral institution, the electronic securities identification unit consisting of the security number of the electronic security that is required to be erased and a digitally signed security number that can be digitally signed only by the neutral institution, Enter the digital certificate included in the electronic securities rights department and a part of the random number of the security number that can be known only to the issuer or user requesting the erasure of the electronic security, via the digital certificate A verification calculation is performed to confirm that the electronic securities identification unit is in one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities right unit, and the security number random number is electronically calculated using a part of the security number random number and the security number of the security number identification unit. Erasure of securities A calculation is performed to verify that only the issuer or user seeking the deletion can be known, the electronic securities identification unit is searched in the electronic securities erasure record database, and the electronic security identification unit has been erased on the condition that it has not been erased. A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, characterized in that the procedure for erasing electronic securities is completed by registering as an electronic securities identification unit. 18. A processing method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, comprising a processing device of an issuer, a processing device of a user, and a processing device of a neutral institution, wherein the erasing of the electronic securities is performed. In the procedure, the processing device of the neutral institution, the issuer or user B requesting the erasure of the electronic security, the electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x _B ) of the electronic security that is required to be erased, and the electronic security digital certificate C, which is included in the electronic securities right part S ₀
And part of the security number random numbers a _B , b _B , and z _B that can be known only by the issuer or user B requesting erasure of the electronic security, where S (x _B ) = <S ₀ , S ₁ (x _B ) >><> is a set of data inside S ₀ is an electronic securities right section S ₁ (x _B ) is an electronic securities identification section x _B is a security number S of an electronic security which is required to be erased ^{_{0 = <C, D, h}} (C | D) do mod n o> C digital certificate D description of the rights and obligations d _o is the issuer of the secret key n _o is the issuer's public key h (C | D) is a hash function h (C whose variable C and D | indicates that a D) data mod n _o which was digitally signed by a _{d o} is _{n o} law (modulus) | is D) ^do h (C _{C = <n T, e T} , h (n T | e T) dp mod n p> n T, e T securities-specific corresponding to the rights and obligations content Public key d _p, n _p is the public key h and the secret key of a neutral institution (n _T | e _T) is a hash function h to the variable n _T and _{e T (n T | e T} ) d p is h (n _T | e _T) the d _p by the digital signature data mod n _p is S ₁ (x _B indicating that the n _p modulo _{(modulus)) = <x B} , h (x B) dT mod n T> d _T and n _T are a secret key and a public key of a neutral authority, respectively. h (x _B ) is a hash function with x _B as a variable, and h (x _B ) ^dT is a digital signature of h (x _B ) with d _T data _{x B = f (y B,} z B) y B = f (a B, b B) z B = f (id B, c B) a B, b B, c B is a random number of policy number 0 <a _B , b _B , c _B <2 ^tt is a predetermined number of binary digits id _B is an issuer requesting erasure, user B's specific number f () is f (x, y) = f (x ′, y ') x ≠
A one-way hash function in which it is difficult to find x ′, y ≠ y ′. Subsequently, the processing unit of the neutral organization calculates a hash function h (x _B ) from the security number x _B and obtains the electronic security identification. The hash function h (x _B ) ^dT of the digitally signed security number included in the part S ₁ (x _B ) is decrypted by the public key e _T paired with the secret key d _T used in the digital certificate C. By calculating h (x _B ) ^{dT · eT} and comparing them, it is verified that the electronic securities identification unit S 1 (x _B ) has a one-to-one correspondence with the electronic securities rights unit S _0, and the security number x _B is _{x B = f (f (a} B, b B), z B) by verifying that satisfies the relationship, a portion of the policy number random number a
It verifies that _B , b _B , and z _B can be known only to the issuer or user B who wants to erase the electronic security, and searches the electronic security identification unit S ₁ (x _B ) in the electronic security erasure record database. , On the condition that it has not been erased, the electronic securities identification unit S ₁ (x
_A method for issuing, transferring, certifying, and erasing electronic securities, which completes the erasure procedure for electronic securities by registering _B ) as an erased electronic securities identification unit.