JPS642233B2 - - Google Patents
Info
- Publication number
- JPS642233B2 JPS642233B2 JP55141567A JP14156780A JPS642233B2 JP S642233 B2 JPS642233 B2 JP S642233B2 JP 55141567 A JP55141567 A JP 55141567A JP 14156780 A JP14156780 A JP 14156780A JP S642233 B2 JPS642233 B2 JP S642233B2
- Authority
- JP
- Japan
- Prior art keywords
- reactor
- water
- water level
- signal
- suppression pool
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired
Links
- XLYOFNOQVPJJNP-UHFFFAOYSA-N water Substances O XLYOFNOQVPJJNP-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 claims description 71
- 230000001629 suppression Effects 0.000 claims description 8
- 238000002955 isolation Methods 0.000 claims description 7
- 239000007921 spray Substances 0.000 claims description 4
- 239000002826 coolant Substances 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000001816 cooling Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 229920000673 poly(carbodihydridosilane) Polymers 0.000 description 14
- 102100026897 Cystatin-C Human genes 0.000 description 7
- 101000912205 Homo sapiens Cystatin-C Proteins 0.000 description 7
- 238000009835 boiling Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000011109 contamination Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000002347 injection Methods 0.000 description 2
- 239000007924 injection Substances 0.000 description 2
- 238000005253 cladding Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000009833 condensation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000005494 condensation Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000000446 fuel Substances 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
- Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin
-
- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
- Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin
- Y02E30/30—Nuclear fission reactors
Landscapes
- Monitoring And Testing Of Nuclear Reactors (AREA)
- Structure Of Emergency Protection For Nuclear Reactors (AREA)
Description
【発明の詳細な説明】
本発明は、原子炉プラント、特に復水貯蔵タン
ク（以下、CSTと称する）およびサプレツシヨ
ンプール（以下、SPと称する）、と原子炉隔離時
冷却系（以下、RCICと称する）および高圧炉心
スプレイ系（以下、HPCSと称する）とを有する
軽水型の原子炉プラントに関するものである。Detailed Description of the Invention The present invention relates to a nuclear reactor plant, particularly a condensate storage tank (hereinafter referred to as CST), a suppression pool (hereinafter referred to as SP), and a reactor isolation cooling system (hereinafter referred to as The present invention relates to a light water reactor plant having a high pressure core spray system (hereinafter referred to as HPCS) and a high pressure core spray system (hereinafter referred to as HPCS).
第１図は、沸騰水型原子炉のRCICおよび
HPCSの系統構成と示すもので、１は原子炉、３
はCST、５はドライウエル、７はSP、１３は制
御器を示しており、制御器１３はCST水位低信
号とSP水位高信号を入力として、弁の切りかえ
信号を出力とするOR回路１３１より構成されて
いる。 Figure 1 shows the RCIC and
This shows the system configuration of HPCS, where 1 is the reactor, 3
is CST, 5 is a dry well, 7 is SP, and 13 is a controller, and the controller 13 is connected to an OR circuit 131 which inputs the CST water level low signal and the SP water level high signal and outputs the valve switching signal. It is configured.
RCICは、原子炉１がスクラムし、原子炉１が
隔離したときに、給水が止まり、逃し安全弁から
放出される蒸気により原子炉１の水位が低下する
のを防止するために設けられている系統である。
この系統は原子炉１の水位低信号によりポンプ２
を起動し、CST３の水を補給水としてバルブ４
を介し原子炉１に供給する。 RCIC is a system installed to prevent the water level of reactor 1 from dropping due to the steam released from the safety relief valve when the water supply is stopped and reactor 1 is isolated due to scram. It is.
This system is activated by pump 2 due to a low water level signal from reactor 1.
, and use the water from CST3 as make-up water to connect valve 4.
It is supplied to the nuclear reactor 1 via.
HPCSは、冷却材喪失事故（以下、LOCAと称
するる）時に炉心を十分に冷却し、燃料被覆管の
温度を規定値以下に抑えるための系統である。こ
の系統は原子炉１の水位低信号か、ドライウエル
５の圧力高信号によりポンプ６を起動し、CST
３の水をバルブ４を介し原子炉１へ注入する。な
お、HPCSはRCICのバツクアツプ用としても用
いられ、RCICからHPCSへの切り換えは手動で
行なわれる。 HPCS is a system that sufficiently cools the reactor core in the event of a loss of coolant accident (hereinafter referred to as LOCA) and keeps the temperature of the fuel cladding below a specified value. In this system, pump 6 is activated by a low water level signal from reactor 1 or a high pressure signal from dry well 5, and CST
3 of water is injected into the reactor 1 through valve 4. Note that HPCS is also used for backing up RCIC, and switching from RCIC to HPCS is done manually.
そして、この原子炉には、RCICおよびHPCS
の他に、第三の系統として、さらに別の信号を検
出して、SP７の水を原子炉１へ注水する系統が
設けられている。すなわち、CST３の水位計１
１により水位低信号を検出すると、制御器１３に
よつて、バルブ８および９を開とし、バルブ４を
閉とする。バルブ８の開により、SP７の水は
RCICを通つて原子炉１へ注水され、バルブ９の
開によりSP７の水をHPCSを通つて原子炉１へ
注水する。このようなRCICおよびHPCSの給水
源のCST３からSP７への切り換えは、SP７の検
出器１２により水位高信号が検出される場合にも
行なわれる。なお、SP７の水位は残留熱除去系
のポンプ１０を使用して調整（ドレン）するよう
になつている。 And this reactor has RCIC and HPCS
In addition, a third system is provided that detects yet another signal and injects SP7 water into the reactor 1. In other words, water level gauge 1 of CST3
When a low water level signal is detected by the controller 13, the valves 8 and 9 are opened and the valve 4 is closed. By opening valve 8, the water in SP7 is
Water is injected into the reactor 1 through the RCIC, and by opening the valve 9, water from SP7 is injected into the reactor 1 through the HPCS. Such switching of the water supply source of RCIC and HPCS from CST3 to SP7 is also performed when a high water level signal is detected by the detector 12 of SP7. Note that the water level of SP7 is adjusted (drained) using a pump 10 of a residual heat removal system.
このような従来の原子炉プラントは、原子炉１
が隔離された場合には、原子炉１中の蒸気が逃し
安全弁を通じSP７へ放出されるため、SP７の水
位が上昇する。しかし、残留熱除去系は蒸気凝縮
モードで運転されているので、SP７の水位が上
昇してもSP７の水はドレン不可能となり、SP７
の水位はさらに上昇し続け、ついには最高水位
（HWL）に達する。このような場合には、CST
３の水位が十分高くても、検出器１２はSP７の
水位高信号を検出するため、制御器１３は動作し
てOR回路１３１により弁の切り換えが行なわ
れ、RCICおよびHPCSの給水源がCST３からSP
７へ切り換えられることになる。このような
CST３からSP７への切り換えは、CST３中の水
位は高いので、不必要な操作であり、事故でもな
いのに、炉水はSP７の水の注水によつて汚染す
ることになる。このようにSP７の水が原子炉１
に注入された場合には、運転を再開する前に、炉
水を入れ換え、クリーニングを行なわねばならな
いため、経済性が非常に悪くなる。 Such a conventional nuclear reactor plant has a reactor 1
If the reactor 1 is isolated, the steam in the reactor 1 will be released to the SP7 through the safety relief valve, causing the water level in the SP7 to rise. However, since the residual heat removal system is operated in steam condensation mode, even if the water level in SP7 rises, the water in SP7 cannot be drained.
The water level continues to rise and finally reaches the High Water Level (HWL). In such cases, CST
Even if the water level at CST 3 is sufficiently high, the detector 12 detects the high water level signal at SP7, so the controller 13 operates and the OR circuit 131 switches the valves, so that the water supply source for RCIC and HPCS is switched from CST 3. SP
It will be switched to 7. like this
Switching from CST3 to SP7 is an unnecessary operation since the water level in CST3 is high, and although it is not an accident, the reactor water will be contaminated by the injection of SP7 water. In this way, water from SP7 is transferred to reactor 1.
If reactor water is injected into the reactor, the reactor water must be replaced and cleaned before restarting operations, which is extremely uneconomical.
本発明は、原子炉隔離時に、炉水がSPの水に
よつて汚染するのを防止するのを目的とし、通常
時は復水貯蔵タンクを給水源とする原子炉隔離時
冷却系および高圧炉心スプレイ系と、復水貯蔵タ
ンクの水位低信号またはサプレツシヨンプールの
水位高信号によつて給水源をサプレツシヨンプー
ルに切り換える手段とを有する原子炉プラントに
おいて、サプレツシヨンプールの水位高信号が与
えられた場合は、さらに冷却材喪失事故の検出信
号があつた場合にのみ前記の切り換え手段が動作
する構成となつていることを特徴とするものであ
る。 The purpose of the present invention is to prevent reactor water from being contaminated by SP water during reactor isolation. In a nuclear reactor plant having a spray system and a means for switching the water supply source to the suppression pool in response to a low water level signal in a condensate storage tank or a high water level signal in a suppression pool, a high water level signal in a suppression pool is provided. is provided, the switching means is characterized in that it operates only when a detection signal of a loss of coolant accident is received.
すなわち、RCICおよびHPCSの給水源切り換
えロジツクを変更し、LOCA信号をSP水位高信
号にAND回路で接続したロジツクとし、これに
よつて、LOCA時以外の事象による原子炉への
SP水の注入を防止するものである。 In other words, the water supply source switching logic of RCIC and HPCS was changed to a logic in which the LOCA signal was connected to the SP water level high signal with an AND circuit, thereby preventing the reactor from being affected by events other than LOCA.
This prevents the injection of SP water.
以下、実施例について説明する。 Examples will be described below.
第２図および第３図は、一実施例として、沸騰
水型原子炉のRCICおよびHPCSの系統構成を示
すもので、第２図はLOCA時、第３図は原子炉隔
離時の弁の状態を示すもので、第１図と同一の部
分には同一の符号が付してある。第１図の場合と
異なる点は、制御器１３が、LOCA信号とSP水
位高信号のAND回路１３２を有する点で、
LOCA信号はドライウエル（PCV）圧力高また
は炉水低の場合に与えられる。 Figures 2 and 3 show the system configuration of the RCIC and HPCS of a boiling water reactor as an example. Figure 2 shows the state of the valves during LOCA, and Figure 3 shows the state of the valves during reactor isolation. The same parts as in FIG. 1 are given the same reference numerals. The difference from the case in FIG. 1 is that the controller 13 has an AND circuit 132 for the LOCA signal and the SP water level high signal.
The LOCA signal is given when dry well (PCV) pressure is high or reactor water is low.
この原子炉プラントでは、SP水位高とLOCA
信号がAND回路１３２を介してOR回路１３１の
入力となつているので、SP水位高信号の場合で
かつLOCA信号のある場合は第１図の場合と同様
に、バルブ９が開かれ、バルブ４が閉じられ、
SP７の水はポンプ６により原子炉１の注入され
る。 In this reactor plant, SP water level height and LOCA
Since the signal is input to the OR circuit 131 via the AND circuit 132, when the SP water level high signal is present and the LOCA signal is present, valve 9 is opened and valve 4 is opened, as in the case of Fig. 1. is closed,
Water of SP7 is injected into the reactor 1 by a pump 6.
これに対して、LOCA以外の場合には、たとえ
SP水位高信号を検出したとしても、弁の切り換
えは行なわれない。従つて、SP７の水が不必要
に原子炉１へ注水されることはない。 On the other hand, in cases other than LOCA, even if
Even if the SP high water level signal is detected, the valve will not be switched. Therefore, water from SP7 is not unnecessarily injected into the reactor 1.
すなわち、例えば、原子炉隔離時においては、
RCICは原子炉１の水位低信号によりCST３の水
をバルブ４を介して原子炉１へ注水するが、この
時、第３図に示すように、たとえSP７水位高信
号を検出器１２で検出したとしても、制御器１３
による弁の切り換えは行なわれない。さらに、
RCICのバツクアツプ用としてのHPCSを用いた
としても弁の切り換えは行なわれない。よつて、
原子炉１がスクラム隔離された場合は、ドライウ
エル５の圧力高または原子炉１の水位低という
LOCA信号を検出しないので、CST水位低信号
を検出するまで、CST３の水を原子炉１へ注水
することになる。 That is, for example, during reactor isolation,
RCIC injects water from CST3 into reactor 1 via valve 4 in response to a low water level signal from reactor 1, but at this time, as shown in Figure 3, even if SP7 high water level signal is detected by detector 12. Even if the controller 13
No valve switching is performed. moreover,
Even if HPCS is used for backup of RCIC, valve switching is not performed. Then,
If reactor 1 is scram-isolated, the pressure in dry well 5 is high or the water level in reactor 1 is low.
Since the LOCA signal is not detected, CST3 water will be injected into the reactor 1 until the CST water level low signal is detected.
この実施例は、このように構成されているの
で、従来、原子炉隔離時には、事故でもないの
に、唯SP７の水位高という信号のみでも、不必
要にSP７の水が原子炉１に注入され、その結果
炉水が汚染されていたが、LOCA信号を弁の切り
換えロジツクに加えたので、LOCA以外の事象に
よる炉水汚染の防止が可能となつた。また、この
ように炉水の汚水が防止できるので、炉水を浄化
する期間が不要となつたので原子炉の稼動率を向
上させることができる。 Since this embodiment is configured in this way, conventionally, during reactor isolation, water at SP7 was unnecessarily injected into the reactor 1 even if there was no accident, even if there was only a signal indicating the high water level at SP7. As a result, the reactor water was contaminated, but by adding the LOCA signal to the valve switching logic, it became possible to prevent reactor water contamination due to events other than LOCA. Furthermore, since the reactor water can be prevented from becoming contaminated in this way, the period for purifying the reactor water is no longer necessary, and the operating rate of the reactor can be improved.
以上の如く、本発明の原子炉プラントは、原子
炉隔離時にSPの水による炉水の汚染を防止でき、
稼動率の高い原子炉を提供可能とするもので、産
業上の効果の大なるものである。 As described above, the nuclear reactor plant of the present invention can prevent contamination of reactor water by SP water during reactor isolation,
This makes it possible to provide a nuclear reactor with a high operating rate, and has great industrial effects.
第１図は、沸騰水型原子炉の従来のRCICおよ
びHPCSの構成を説明するための系統図、第２図
および第３図は、本発明の原子炉プラントの一実
施例の構成およびそれぞれ異なる状態における系
統図である。
１……原子炉、３……CST、４……バルブ、
５……ドライウエル、７……SP、８，９……バ
ルブ、１１……水位計、１２……検出器、１３…
…制御器、１３１……OR回路、１３２……AND
回路。
FIG. 1 is a system diagram for explaining the configuration of conventional RCIC and HPCS of a boiling water reactor, and FIGS. 2 and 3 show the configuration of an embodiment of the nuclear reactor plant of the present invention and the different It is a system diagram in a state. 1... Nuclear reactor, 3... CST, 4... Valve,
5...Dry well, 7...SP, 8,9...Valve, 11...Water level gauge, 12...Detector, 13...
...Controller, 131...OR circuit, 132...AND
circuit.
Claims (1)
炉隔離時冷却系および高圧炉心スプレイ系と、前
記復水貯蔵タンクの水位低信号またはサプレツシ
ヨンプールの水位高信号によつて前記給水源を前
記サプレツシヨンプールに切り換える手段とを有
する原子炉プラントにおいて、前記サプレツシヨ
ンプールの水位高信号が与えられた場合は、さら
に冷却材喪失事故の検出信号があつた場合にのみ
前記切り換え手段が動作する構成となつているこ
とを特徴とする原子炉プラント。1. Normally, the reactor isolation cooling system and high-pressure core spray system use the condensate storage tank as the water supply source, and the water supply source is activated by the condensate storage tank water level low signal or the suppression pool water level high signal. and means for switching the suppression pool to the suppression pool, when the suppression pool high water level signal is given, the switching means only when a coolant loss accident detection signal is received. A nuclear reactor plant characterized by being configured to operate.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP55141567A JPS5766393A (en) | 1980-10-09 | 1980-10-09 | Atomic power plant |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP55141567A JPS5766393A (en) | 1980-10-09 | 1980-10-09 | Atomic power plant |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| JPS5766393A JPS5766393A (en) | 1982-04-22 |
| JPS642233B2 true JPS642233B2 (en) | 1989-01-17 |
Family
ID=15294971
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP55141567A Granted JPS5766393A (en) | 1980-10-09 | 1980-10-09 | Atomic power plant |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| JP (1) | JPS5766393A (en) |
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KR20220127401A (en) * | 2021-03-10 | 2022-09-20 | 한국도로공사 | Method for producing three-dimensional scour map |
Families Citing this family (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPH02171595A (en) * | 1988-12-26 | 1990-07-03 | Toshiba Corp | Heat transfer pipe |
-
1980
- 1980-10-09 JP JP55141567A patent/JPS5766393A/en active Granted
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KR20220127401A (en) * | 2021-03-10 | 2022-09-20 | 한국도로공사 | Method for producing three-dimensional scour map |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| JPS5766393A (en) | 1982-04-22 |
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