US4536647A - Pocket banking terminal, method and system - Google Patents

Pocket banking terminal, method and system Download PDF

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Publication number: US4536647A
Authority: US; United States
Prior art keywords: terminal; entity; data; logical combination; encrypting
Prior art date: 1983-07-15
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.): Expired - Lifetime

Application number

US06/514,011

Other languages

English (en)

Inventor

Martin M. Atalla

Ralph R. Bestock

Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)

Atalla Corp

Original Assignee

Atalla Corp

Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)

1983-07-15

Filing date

1983-07-15

Publication date

1985-08-20

1983-07-15 Application filed by Atalla Corp filed Critical Atalla Corp

1983-07-15 Priority to US06/514,011 priority Critical patent/US4536647A/en

1983-07-15 Assigned to ATALLA CORPORATON A CORP. OF CA reassignment ATALLA CORPORATON A CORP. OF CA ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST. Assignors: ATALLA, MARTIN M., BESTOCK, RALPH R.

1984-07-11 Priority to EP84108150A priority patent/EP0131906B1/de

1984-07-11 Priority to DE8484108150T priority patent/DE3485144D1/de

1984-07-16 Priority to JP59147421A priority patent/JPS6095681A/ja

1985-08-20 Application granted granted Critical

1985-08-20 Publication of US4536647A publication Critical patent/US4536647A/en

2003-07-15 Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Status Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/02—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/02—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
- G06Q20/023—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP] the neutral party being a clearing house
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/04—Payment circuits
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
- G06Q20/10—Payment architectures specially adapted for electronic funds transfer [EFT] systems; specially adapted for home banking systems
- G06Q20/108—Remote banking, e.g. home banking
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
- G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
- G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
- G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
- G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
- G07F19/211—Software architecture within ATMs or in relation to the ATM network
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption

Definitions

Automatic teller equipment has become well accepted as the versatile means through which customers can conduct basic banking business at any time and at diverse locations away from the bank.
the number of such automatic teller units is likely to increase dramatically in the future, at substantial expense to the banks and institutions that operate them, without fully satisfying customers' demands for banking services available at any time and at any location where the customer may be.
point-of-sale terminals are rapidly increasing in number and popularity among retailers who rely on them as versatile means for completing sale transactions with non-cash paying customers. Such customers prefer to pay with credit cards or checks which, in turn, are also tied to banks at diverse locations.
the non-cash-paying customer therefore, must rely on checks or credit cards as token indications of his established business relationship with his banking institution, and neither the retailer nor the customer can directly or immediately involve their respective banking institutions to transfer value from the customer to the retailer during the process of completing the transaction.
Data communications schemes over unsecured channels are known from the literature (see, for example, U.S. Pat. Nos. 4,283,599; 4,281,215; 4,268,715; and 4,315,101), but these schemes may not be adequate for actually transferring funds on deposit from one account to another.
the portable pocket-style banking terminal, method and system permit secured banking transactions such as deposits, withdrawals, and account-balance review by an individual at any location where a telephone or a point-of-sale terminal is available.
Each Pocket Banking Terminal (PBT, herein) includes conventional display and keyboard elements as well as a microprocessor and Data Encryption Standard (DES) as the encoding/decoding circuitry, and segregated memory registers containing codes and data that are uniquely under control of banks, retailers and the individual user.
DES Data Encryption Standard
deposits to the PBT are handled under codes and conditions which are distinct from the codes and conditions under which withdrawals from the PBT are handled.
Uniquely-encoded data-transfer encrypting schemes are set up between the PBT and bank using unsecured telephone lines with a high degree of immunity from unauthorized interception or manipulation of the transferred data.
FIG. 1 is a chart showing the pocket banking terminal and system of the present invention
FIG. 2 is an illustration of structural elements of the pocket banking terminal of the present invention
FIG. 3 is an illustration of one embodiment of a security-initialization unit and pocket banking terminal operatively coupled for initializing the terminal to operate with a particular user;
FIG. 4 is a signal-flow chart illustrating the initialization procedure associated with a pocket banking terminal assigned to a particular user.
FIGS. 5A, B, C and D illustrate the interaction between a pocket banking terminal and a bank in making deposit (or data interchange in making withdrawal).
FIG. 1 there is shown an embodiment of the present pocket banking terminal, method and system in which the customer of bank X possesses a pocket banking terminal 9 that is uniquely encoded for operation as a remote terminal.
Such customer may interact with numerous retailers, each of whom may have shared terminals, or point-of-sale terminals 11, 13, 15, etc., which communicate with respective banks A, B, C, etc., via conventional data interchange, or "switch", and clearinghouse operations 17.
the customer of bank X can make deposits to his PBT account via the pocket terminal 9, and can make withdrawals, as in sale transactions or cash withdrawals from automatic teller machines, via the pocket terminal 9.
Each such PBT has a display 18 and a key pad 19 of push-buttons designated by alphanumerics similar to those used on touch-tone telephone equipment.
each PBT includes a row of push-buttons, or keys, designated "DEPOSIT" 21, "WITHDRAWAL” 23, and “BALANCE” 25, and, as shown in FIG. 2, each PBT also contains a microprocessor 24, memory modules, and a Data Encryption Standard circuit module 26 (all circuits commercially available from Motorola Corp. and others) that operate to encrypt and decrypt applied data signals according to National Bureau of Standards encryption/decryption conventions.
the memory modules are separated into fixed-encoded memory modules 27 and working memory registers 29 in such manner that the contents of modules 27 are used to secure the data transfers to and from the registers 29.
the PBT is considered to be a portable extension of the account maintained at the user's bank X.
Deposits are made to the PBT from bank X and withdrawals are made from the PBT to shared terminals, such as point-of-sales terminals or automatic teller machines, or the like, via encrypted data links established between the PBT and bank X. Additionally, the balance on deposit in the PBT can be determined and displayed.
Several encrypting key codes must be initially established in modules 27 in order to render each PBT unique to an assigned customer. Thus, to make deposits to the PBT, it must be "conditioned" with requisite key codes including the identification code of bank X and the unique code number of the PBT.
This information may be included in the registers 29 in conventional manner using programmable read-only memories (PROM's), or the like, as a data word of several bits, the most-significant bits of which represent the bank identification code and the remaining significant bits of which represent the terminal number. This may be accomplished initially for each PBT without involving any customer. The scheme involved in initializing a PBT for a particular user will now be described.
PROM's programmable read-only memories
FIG. 3 there is shown a block schematic diagram of one embodiment of a Security-Initialization Unit (SIU) 31 by which a PBT is initially conditioned for a particular user who is a customer of bank X.
the microprocessor 33 of the SIU 31 may be coupled interactively with the microprocessor 24 of the PBT using conventional network techniques to operate the microprocessor 24 in a "slave" mode to the microprocessor 33.
another embodiment of the SIU simply controls the microprocessor 24 of the PBT and supplies the encryption keys thereto during initialization, as now described.
the PBT to be conditioned is connected to the SIU for interaction with the microprocessor 24 of the PBT for accessing the register 29 and memory modules 27 in the PBT.
the Data Encryption Standard module 26 receives the data accessed from register 29 of the PBT, including the composite bank I.D. number and the terminal number.
Bank X supplies its own unique master key code 37 (for deposits) and generates therefrom a Key-Exchange Key 1 (KEK 1 ) code 39 which is entered in the secured modules 27 of the PBT.
KEK 1 Key-Exchange Key 1
the particular customer now selects his own personal identification number (PIN) 41 which need only be known to him and which may be of arbitrary length.
This PIN may be entered through the keyboard 19 and is applied with the bank I.D. number and his own account number (or the terminal number) to the encryption module 26 which executes an irreversible encrypting algorithm 42 on such data to yield an 8-digit Personal Verification Number 1 44.
Algorithmic encryption schemes 41 of this type are disclosed in the literature (see, for example, U.S. Pat. No. 3,938,091).
One portion, say, the left half (most-significant bits) of PVN 1 is also entered into the registers 29 of the PBT.
the conditioning of the PBT for accepting deposits now requires that a new set of data be applied to the DES module 26 including PVN 1 and the composite bank I.D. and PBT terminal number.
the bank X applies its multilevel key code (for deposits) 46, and the DES module, under control of the processor 24, generates a Personal Verification Number 2 .
This PVN 2 is stored by the bank and one portion, say, the eight most-significant bits thereof, are also entered into the registers 29 of the PBT.
the entries thus made in registers 29 and in module 27 of the PBT are suitable for making deposits (and the special case of making withdrawals only via bank X).
this initialization process may also be performed using an external microprocessor 33 and associated modules 6, 41, etc., as shown in FIG. 3, with the microprocessor 24 of the PBT merely operating in "slave" mode to read and write in modules 27 and registers 29.
the registers 29 upon completion of the conditioning of a PBT, the registers 29 will have entered therein the composite bank I.D. and terminal number, the composite interchange code and terminal number, the left-half portion of PVN 1 , eight digits of PVN 2 , the left-half portion of PVN 3 , and the eight digits of PVN 4 , and the memory module 27 will have entered therein the KEK 1 and the KEK 2 .
the customer, with his secret and unique PIN, is now ready to operate the PBT which has been conditioned for him alone.
the above-described initialization may also be performed using another DES module 30 and associated microprocessor controller 33, as shown in FIG. 3, with the resulting Key-Exchange Keys and Personal Verification Numbers being entered into the registers 29 and memory modules 27 of a PBT via the microprocessor 24.
FIGS. 5A-5D illustrates how an authorized user communicates with bank X to make deposits to the PBT from his account at bank X.
the user attaches his PBT to a telephone network via a standard, modularized four-wire telephone connector 20 which, in turn, couples to the microprocessor 24, memory modules 27 and registers 29.
a telephone communication link 8 is established with bank X, for example, via conventional autodialing routine within registers 29 under control of microprocessor 24, and the user presses "DEPOSIT" button 21.
Another random number is generated by the PBT, and these two random numbers are applied to the DES module 26 under the control of the microprocessor 26 in the PBT, along with the KEK 1 (for deposits) that is accessed internally from memory modules 27 to yield an encrypted number in the PBT which shall serve as the Session Key (SK) 34 for this communication only.
This SK thus generated in the PBT is now applied to the DES module 26 as the encryption key along with data including PVN 1 , PVN 2 , the existing balance (all from registers 29) and the proposed new deposit 50 entered via keyboard 19 by the user.
This yields an encrypted message 52 which is transmitted to bank X via the telephone link 8 along with the composite bank number and terminal number (accessed from registers 29) and the random number generated by the PBT for this session.
the encrypted message, and the composite bank number and terminal number and the random number thus transmitted contain no useful information, if unauthorizedly intercepted, that could be used to compromise the bank's or user's security, so these messages and numbers may be transmitted in clear text without further encryption.
bank X When bank X receives the encrypted message, the composite bank number and terminal number and the random number generated by the PBT, bank X is able to re-generate the Session Key (SK) generated by the PBT and used thereby to encrypt the message and numbers transmitted to bank X.
SK Session Key
the composite bank number and terminal number and the bank's Master Key are applied to a DES module at the bank X where they are encrypted (as was done during the initial conditioning scheme) to yield an encrypted word that should match the Key-Exchange Key which is entered in the memory modules 27 of the PBT.
Bank X now applies to the DES module its own random number (previously transmitted to PBT for this session), and the random number received from the PBT, and the KEK just generated to yield a Session Key (SK) which should match the SK generated by the PBT for this session.
the SK thus generated by the bank can now be applied to the DES module to decrypt 54 the encrypted message transitted by the PBT.
the decrypted message includes the newly-created PVN 1 and PVN 2 that are the same as originally generated and entered in the registers 29 during the initial conditioning scheme. PVN 1 and the composite bank number and terminal number are then applied to the DES module along with the bank's multilevel key (for deposits) to yield the PVN 2 56 (as was done during the initial conditioning scheme).
the bank X checks the deposit account for the identified user to determine whether his balance on deposit is large enough to allow transfer therefrom of the proposed new deposit (also decrypted by the Session Key) to the PBT. If this comparison of balance and proposed deposit is favorable, bank X then applies to the DES module the old balance in the PBT, the resulting new balance in the PBT (upon addition of the proposed deposit), the random number generated by the bank for this session (and/or other return message such as balance left on deposit at bank X), along with the Session Key to yield an encrypted message.
This encrypted message is transmitted via the telephone link 8 to the PBT which can decrypt the message with its own, matching Session Key 34 to yield the old balance and the new balance.
the old balance thus decrypted is compared with the old balance present in registers 29, and if favorable (indicating no data alterations in transmissions to and from bank X), the new balance may be entered in register 29 to the exclusion of the old balance entry therein.
the return message, if any, is also decrypted and may be coded to activate the display 18 of the PBT.
the encryption keys established for deposit and balance operations are separate from the encryption keys established for withdrawal operations.
institutions which serve as a clearinghouse or data interchange or switch 17 for the point-of-sale terminals 11, 13, 15 of retailers may also control the security of the PBT. This is accomplished by introducing into the initialization scheme, as described in connection with FIG. 4, a set of key codes that the banking institutions do not have knowledge about.
the bank Master Key (for deposits) 37 is replaced with an interchange Master Key (for withdrawals) 36, and this is applied to the DES module along with a composite number including the interchange code and terminal number to produce an encrypted Key-Exchange Key 2 (for withdrawals) in manner similar to that described in connection with KEK 1 (for deposits).
the KEK 2 (for withdrawals) is entered in module 27 of the PBT.
the user of the PBT being initialized supplies his secret Personal Identification Number (PIN) 41, along with the terminal number and interchange code number (instead of bank number) to be encrypted in accordance with an irreversible algorithm 42 to yield a new 8-digit Personal Verification Number 3 , the left-half portion (most-significant bits) of which may be entered in registers 29.
PIN Personal Identification Number
interchange code number instead of bank number
Irreversible encryption algorithms are disclosed, for example, in the aforementioned U.S. Pat. No. 3,983,091.
the bank multilevel key (for deposits) is replaced with an interchange multilevel key (for withdrawals), and this is applied to the DES module along with the PVN 3 and a composite number including the interchange code and terminal number to produce the encrypted Personal Verification Number 4 (PVN 4 ), the eight most-significant bits of which may be entered in registers 29 for use in establishing Session Keys during a withdrawal transaction.
PVN 4 Personal Verification Number 4
the memory modules 27 When initialization of a PBT for a particular user is completed, the memory modules 27 contain entries of KEK 1 (for deposits) and KEK 2 (for withdrawals) which are secured therein using conventional means (e.g., Motorola 68705P5) against external access or alteration.
the registers 29 contain entries of the composite bank number and terminal number, the composite interchange number and terminal number, the left-half portion of PVN 1 (for deposits), the 8-digit PVN 2 (for deposits), the left-half portion of PVN 3 (for withdrawals), the 8-digit PVN 4 (for withdrawals), and an initial balance on deposit in the PBT. It should be noted that the left portions of PVN 1 and PVN 3 are stored in the PBT to facilitate first-level verification of the user's identity.
the full PVN 1 or PVN 3 is used in the "DEPOSIT" or "WITHDRAW” transaction.
the PBT thus initialized is capable of operating with a point-of-sale terminal or other shared terminal to complete a withdrawal transaction in manner similar to the operation of a deposit transaction, as previously described.
the authorized user attaches the PBT to a point-of-sale unit via standard, modular, four-wire telephone connector 20 for accessing the encrypted messages.
the user or point-of-sale retailer establishes telephone contact with the data interchange 17 (instead of bank X in the description of "DEPOSIT") and presses the "WITHDRAW" button 23. In addition, he enters his secret PIN.
the DES module 26 under control of the microprocessor 24 encrypts the PIN with the composite interchange number and terminal number using the same irreversible algorithm as was used during the initialization scheme to generate PVN 3 .
This encrypted number is then compared with the PVN 3 (for withdrawals) contained in register 29 and, upon favorable comparison of the left-half portions as an initial authorization check, the data interchange 17 is actuated to generate and transmit back to the PBT a random number.
the PBT also generates a random number which is applied to the DES module 26 with the random number received from the data interchange and the KEK 2 (for withdrawals) accessed from module 27.
the encrypted output serves as the Session Key for this withdrawal transaction.
the newly created PVN 3 , PVN 4 , and balance on deposit in the PBT from registers 29 are applied to DES module 26 along with the proposed amount for withdrawal (entered via keyboard 19).
the Session Key generated for this withdrawal transaction controls encryption of the applied number codes to yield an encrypted message at the output of DES module 26.
This encrypted message, and the composite data interchange code and terminal number, and random number generated by the PBT are all transmitted to the data interchange 17 via the telephone link 8. Note that these signals do not contain information which could be useful if intercepted during transmission over unsecured communication channels, so they may be transmitted in clear text without further encryption.
the composite interchange code and terminal number are encrypted in a DES module using the interchange Master Key and the same encryption scheme as previously used during the initialization scheme to yield KEK 2 (for withdrawals).
This KEK 2 is then used to control encryption in the DES module of the random number (received from PBT) and random number (generated at the data interchange) to yield a Session Key which should match the Session Key independently generated at the PBT.
This Session Key can now be used in the DES module to decrypt the received encrypted message, the PVN 3 , the PVN 4 , the balance on deposit at the PBT and the proposed amount of the withdrawal.
This encrypted PVN 4 is compared with the decrypted PVN 4 received from the PBT and, if favorable, the balance on deposit at the PBT is checked to determine whether it is larger than the proposed amount of withdrawal. If so, the withdrawn amount may be credited to the account of the retailer whose point-of-sale terminal is identified during the transaction. Additionally, the old balance in the PBT, the new balance (after the withdrawal) and the random number generated by the data interchange are encrypted in the DES module using the Session Key to yield an encrypted message which is returned to the PBT.
the return encrypted message received at the PBT is decrypted in DES module 26 using the Session Key generated for this transaction to yield the decrypted old balance and new balance.
the old balances are compared and, if matched (as an indication of unaltered transmissions out and back), the new balance is entered into registers 29 to the exclusion of the old balance, and the new balance may be displayed by display 18.
the pocket banking terminal, method and system according to the present invention permit basic banking transactions to take place at remote locations with a high degree of security against unauthorized use or alteration of data during data communications over unsecured communication channels.
the use of separate encryption keys for deposits under control of the bank or other deposit-account institution, and encryption keys for withdrawals under control of a retailer's representative assures a high degree of security against unauthorized or counterfeit transactions between the banks, the retailers and their customers.

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US06/514,011 1983-07-15 1983-07-15 Pocket banking terminal, method and system Expired - Lifetime US4536647A (en)

Priority Applications (4)

Application Number	Priority Date	Filing Date	Title
US06/514,011 US4536647A (en)	1983-07-15	1983-07-15	Pocket banking terminal, method and system
EP84108150A EP0131906B1 (de)	1983-07-15	1984-07-11	Taschenbankterminal; Verfahren und Anordnung für seinen Gebrauch
DE8484108150T DE3485144D1 (de)	1983-07-15	1984-07-11	Taschenbankterminal
JP59147421A JPS6095681A (ja)	1983-07-15	1984-07-16	ポケツト銀行端末の方法および装置

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number	Priority Date	Filing Date	Title
US06/514,011 US4536647A (en)	1983-07-15	1983-07-15	Pocket banking terminal, method and system

Publications (1)

Publication Number	Publication Date
US4536647A true US4536647A (en)	1985-08-20

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ID=24045451

Family Applications (1)

Application Number	Title	Priority Date	Filing Date
US06/514,011 Expired - Lifetime US4536647A (en)	1983-07-15	1983-07-15	Pocket banking terminal, method and system

Country Status (4)

Country	Link
US (1)	US4536647A (de)
EP (1)	EP0131906B1 (de)
JP (1)	JPS6095681A (de)
DE (1)	DE3485144D1 (de)

Cited By (108)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number	Priority date	Publication date	Assignee	Title
US4644497A (en) *	1982-12-28	1987-02-17	International Business Machines Corp.	Serial keyboard interface system with frame retransmission after non-timely acknowledgements from data processor
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EP0131906A2 (de)	1985-01-23

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