US4590470A - User authentication system employing encryption functions - Google Patents

User authentication system employing encryption functions Download PDF

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Publication number
US4590470A
US4590470A US06/512,887 US51288783A US4590470A US 4590470 A US4590470 A US 4590470A US 51288783 A US51288783 A US 51288783A US 4590470 A US4590470 A US 4590470A
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United States
Prior art keywords
encryption
signals
response signal
challenge
link
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US06/512,887
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English (en)
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Andrew R. Koenig
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Nokia Bell Labs USA
AT&T Corp
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AT&T Bell Laboratories Inc
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Priority to US06/512,887 priority Critical patent/US4590470A/en
Assigned to BELL TELEPHONE LABORATORIES, INCORPORATED A CORP. OF NY reassignment BELL TELEPHONE LABORATORIES, INCORPORATED A CORP. OF NY ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST. Assignors: KOENIG, ANDREW R.
Priority to CA000457409A priority patent/CA1222296A/en
Priority to EP84304538A priority patent/EP0131421A3/en
Priority to AU30396/84A priority patent/AU549619B2/en
Priority to ES534174A priority patent/ES534174A0/es
Priority to JP59144102A priority patent/JPS6039267A/ja
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/34—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/305—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals by remotely controlling device operation
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/33—User authentication using certificates
    • G06F21/335—User authentication using certificates for accessing specific resources, e.g. using Kerberos tickets
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/77—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in smart cards
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/36—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes
    • G06Q20/367—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes
    • G06Q20/3674—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes involving authentication
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2103—Challenge-response

Definitions

  • This invention relates to authentication systems that protect against unauthorized access to a facility, such as a building or a host computer.
  • computers have matured to the point where they are often relied upon to store and process sensitive information. Even banking functions such as fund transfers and dispensing of cash are now often controlled with computers. Naturally, such computers are attractive targets to interlopers wishing to gain unauthorized entry; particularly in systems that interact with users directly.
  • computer systems that permit electronic "dial-up" access generally control the access by identifying each authorized user with a secret password which is communicated to the computer during the initial protocol between the user and the computer system.
  • the password is most commonly sent through a typewriter-like terminal, through a key pad similar to that of a touch-tone telephone, or through a credit card-like device that contains an electronically readable magnetic strip.
  • a second way in which a password's integrity can be compromised is by intercepting the user's communication with the computer. This can be done by wiretapping and eavesdropping of the protocol between the user and the computer and recording the password as it is transmitted. Alternatively, the computer's "log on" protocol can be mimiced, thereby tricking the user into divulging the password.
  • a third, and the most common way, in which a password's integrity is lost is through misuse of the password by the user.
  • Computer users tend to be careless by selecting passwords that are relatively easy to guess. Sometimes users lend their passwords to others and forget to change them. Even having the computer system select the passwords does not solve the problem, because the resulting passwords are often so obscure that users tend to write them down and keep them in physical proximity to the teminals. Of course, that makes unauthorized access even easier.
  • the Dethloff device contains a microprocessing unit, a memory unit for controlling the microprocessor and a separate memory for storing the password.
  • the desired password is entered into the separate memory once, and the path to that memory is burned to permanently prevent reading or altering the password memory through the port by which the password was entered.
  • the card communicates with the host computer only through its I/O port which is connected to the microprocessor.
  • the Dethloff device divulges its password only when the correct query sequence is presented at its I/O port, but such a query can be designed to be so complex as to make the password practically unattainable by a possessor of the card.
  • the Dethloff device remedies the main drawback of the Flies device, but it is still subject to compromise through eavesdropping and/or protocol mimicing.
  • the Kent, et al., proposal suggests the use of both a memorized password and an authenticating device.
  • the authenticating device is an encryption key, either recorded on a magnetic-type card or stored in an inexpensive device containing the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm adopted by the U.S. Bureau of Standards.
  • DES Data Encryption Standard
  • the function F is a one-way mapping function which encrypts the password x and is such that each user password is the value needed by the system to authenticate the next password.
  • the Lamport system is quite powerful because each communication between the user and the host computer is unique and the function F, which is employed to authenticate the password, cannot be deciphered.
  • the drawback of the Lamport system is that the set of passwords is fixed apriori and is finite. That means that after a fixed number of communications the user must be given a new set of password functions.
  • FIG. 1 presents a block diagram of the authentication system of my invention
  • FIGS. 2 and 3 present diagrams of the system of FIG. 1 that depict two specific realizations for element 20 in FIG. 1;
  • FIG. 4 illustrates the two port realization for coder 30.
  • Rivest, Shamir and Adelman for example, have described one method which is based on the fact that it is easy to generate two large prime numbers and multiply them together, but it is computationally prohibitive to factor the resulting product.
  • This method which is described in an article titled "A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems," Communications of the ACM, Vol. 21, pp. 120-126, February 1978, can be summarized in the following steps:
  • the system of FIG. 1 employs the public-key two function concept, and enhances it by employing an essentially random message m in the authentication protocol.
  • essentially random I mean that the message is randomly selected from the domain of the encryption function f.
  • a user wishing to gain access signals the authentication equipment (elements 10 and 20 in FIG. 1) and that equipment initiates the authentication protocol.
  • Generator 10 selects an essentially random sequence as the challenge message m, element 20 challenges the user via line 111, the user operates on the signal of line 111 within coder 30 and responds on line 112, and element 20 evaluates the user's response.
  • FIGS. 2 and 3 present two essentially equivalent embodiments of the authentication system of FIG. 1, depicting different realizations for element 20 in more detail.
  • coder 21 encrypts the plaintext message m and sends the encrypted message f(m) to coder 30 via line 111.
  • Coder 30 decrypts the message and sends the decrypted message g(f(m)) back to element 20.
  • Element 22 compares the decrypted message to the original message and since f and g are inverses of each other, g(f(m)) equals m, and element 22 is satisfied.
  • the message m is sent to line 111 unaltered, the user encrypts the message in coder 30 and sends the encrypted message g(m) over line 112.
  • Coder 21 decrypts g(m) with the function f, developing f(g(m)), and element 22 compares f(g(m)) to m. Again, since g and f are inverses of each other, f(g(m)) equals m and element 22 indicates that access should be granted.
  • Generator 10 for example, is realized with an A/D converter having thermal noise at its input.
  • the random sequence of 1's and 0's out of the converter is loaded into a modulo n register and the output of the register is sent to element 20.
  • Comparison element 22 is a conventional comparison device comprising Exclusive OR and AND gates.
  • Coder elements 21 and 30 perform essentially the same function (encryption with f and g, respectively) and can therefore be implemented similarly.
  • the encryption requires raising an incoming numerical sequence to a predetermined power in predetermined modulo arithmetic. This is achieved through a multiplication and division process as described in the aforementioned Rivest, et al., article (Sec. VII-A) in a simple microprocessor under control of a stored algorithm.
  • the system of FIG. 1 is quite robust because it employs four parameters in the authentication protocol: the functions f and g, the modulos n (in the RSA method), and the essentially random message m. Because of the randomness in message m, even wiretapping and recording of a valid protocol sequence can be of no help in responding at a subsequent protocol.
  • FIG. 1 authentication system requires the user to possess local computing power, embodied in coder 30. Although such computing power removes the need for people to remember or write down their passwords, the existence of local computing power might make it possible to steal someone's password (the function g and the modulos n) by examining the memory within coder 30. This is avoided, in accordance with the principles of my invention, by implementing coder 30 in a portable device, such as a card or a key, and by arranging the device to have only two accessible ports: a power and ground port, and an I/O port. As shown in FIG.
  • such a device needs to contain only a microprocessor or some other computing device, e.g., procesor 31, which communicates with lines 111 and 112 via the I/O port, and a memory device 32 for storing the algorithm and the selected parameters, which communicates only with processor 31.
  • the power port merely supplys the necessary power to coder 30 and cannot divulge any information.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Mathematical Physics (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
  • Multi Processors (AREA)
US06/512,887 1983-07-11 1983-07-11 User authentication system employing encryption functions Expired - Lifetime US4590470A (en)

Priority Applications (6)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US06/512,887 US4590470A (en) 1983-07-11 1983-07-11 User authentication system employing encryption functions
CA000457409A CA1222296A (en) 1983-07-11 1984-06-26 User authentication system
EP84304538A EP0131421A3 (en) 1983-07-11 1984-07-03 User authentication system
AU30396/84A AU549619B2 (en) 1983-07-11 1984-07-09 User authentication system
ES534174A ES534174A0 (es) 1983-07-11 1984-07-10 Sistema de autenticacion del usuario en sistemas de comunicacion
JP59144102A JPS6039267A (ja) 1983-07-11 1984-07-11 ユーザ認証システム

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Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US06/512,887 US4590470A (en) 1983-07-11 1983-07-11 User authentication system employing encryption functions

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US4590470A true US4590470A (en) 1986-05-20

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US (1) US4590470A (de)
EP (1) EP0131421A3 (de)
JP (1) JPS6039267A (de)
AU (1) AU549619B2 (de)
CA (1) CA1222296A (de)
ES (1) ES534174A0 (de)

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ES8506954A1 (es) 1985-08-01
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AU3039684A (en) 1985-01-17
CA1222296A (en) 1987-05-26

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