US6618809B1 - Method and security system for processing a security critical activity - Google Patents

Method and security system for processing a security critical activity Download PDF

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US6618809B1
US6618809B1 US09/284,567 US28456799A US6618809B1 US 6618809 B1 US6618809 B1 US 6618809B1 US 28456799 A US28456799 A US 28456799A US 6618809 B1 US6618809 B1 US 6618809B1
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security
user
processing
processor
security device
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Christian Wettergren
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Myspace AB
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Myspace AB
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/82—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices
    • G06F21/85—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices interconnection devices, e.g. bus-connected or in-line devices
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/82—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices
    • G06F21/83—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices input devices, e.g. keyboards, mice or controllers thereof
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/82—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices
    • G06F21/84—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices output devices, e.g. displays or monitors
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2211/00—Indexing scheme relating to details of data-processing equipment not covered by groups G06F3/00 - G06F13/00
    • G06F2211/007—Encryption, En-/decode, En-/decipher, En-/decypher, Scramble, (De-)compress

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method, a security system and a security device for data processing a security critical activity
  • firewalls between the local network and the public available networks open to any intruders filter the communication between the local network and the outside world by only allowing certain selected services to pass through. If other services are requested the passing through the firewall will only be enabled if a valid password is presented. The communication then eventually reaches either a personal computer or a server computer inside the local network.
  • This safety measure will of course increase the security, but will still not guarantee that the security critical activities are performed the way the user initially intended. Vulnerabilities in the implementation of the allowed, non-filtered, services may allow an intruder to intrude into the personal computer.
  • Another possible security measurement is to insert security mechanisms in the operating system, like requiring passwords for access to certain services.
  • Another common security measure is to use so called “active cards”, or “smart cards”.
  • active cards or “smart cards”.
  • These cards contain a small computing device having a processor, a memory and communication ports.
  • Such device may include a secret key, which is used to represent the user's identity in the networks.
  • the card is used together with a host system, and the host system can ask the card to perform security critical steps in activities with the secret key.
  • the host system cannot read the secret key, it is trapped inside the smart card.
  • the processor on the smart card cannot communicate directly with the user, it has to rely on the host system to relay the communication with the user without any malicious intervention. Hence, a smart card can do very little to protect itself against malicious software in a host system.
  • a compromised application may get the smart card to perform any action it normally can do, without having to involve the user.
  • the smart card can be ordered, by the application, to sign any digital document, and the user is not required to review it, nor to express any explicit act-of-will for the signature to be applied to the document.
  • MLS multi level secure
  • WO94/01821 discloses a trusted path subsystem for workstations, such as personal computers.
  • the system comprises a network computer, which is a MLS computer and a workstation.
  • the object of the invention is to provide safe communication between a trusted subsystem of the MLS computer and the workstation.
  • the workstation is connected to a trusted path subsystem which receives the encrypted data from the trusted system of the MLS computer and decrypts it without involving the workstation.
  • the application running on the MLS-system will be certain that the data received will be the same as the data sent from the trusted subsystem of the MLS computer, and vice versa.
  • this system is limited to the secure exchange of data between a trusted subsystem of a MLS computer and a network computer, basically tunnelling encrypted keystrokes and pixel writes from the application in the MLS-system to the trusted subsystem in the workstation.
  • the whole application is executing in a highly secure environment, the MLS system.
  • a lot of effort has been made to make sure that the whole application is secure.
  • the trusted subsystem will not guarantee that the application presents the same information on the “secured” screen as is later signed, since it lacks means for user involvement.
  • UK patent application GB 2 267 986 discloses a security device for a computer.
  • the object of this security device is to isolate the computer from the input/output devices, such as keyboard and mouse, when security critical activities are to be performed.
  • the security device comprises a processor storing a plurality of programs for operating the security device in either a transparent mode or a special handling mode.
  • the transparent mode the data inputted from the input/output devices is transmitted through the security device directly to the computer, i.e. the security device is in a passive mode.
  • the special handling mode the security device itself will perform the processing of the data by executing one of the stored programs without any involvement of the computer.
  • the processor of the security device When the processor of the security device receives a command, that is associated with any of the plurality of programs stored therein, it will start the special handling mode and execute one of the programs
  • the different programs stored in the processor of the security device all define different security critical activities.
  • the program may also in some cases require a password or the like before the security critical activity is executed. As soon as such password is received the program will execute the rest of the security critical activity automatically.
  • New programs to be stored in the security device can be loaded from the computer, without any user involvement in the loading process. Hence, the user can not be certain which steps are performed within the security device after loading a new program. Thus, the application itself may be compromised and since signing a block of data does not require any review or act-of-will from the user it is possible that activities are performed that the user did not initially intend.
  • system approach is meant that the system or application is able to do whatever the user can do.
  • a system is capable to simulate the user.
  • the user has to be involved in order to perform certain steps, i.e. such steps can not be simulated by the system or application.
  • the objective problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a method, a system and a device for processing security critical activities which is user-orientated and firmly involves the user in performing the security critical activities.
  • the user will be firmly involved every time a security critical activity is to be performed, i.e. the method is user based in contrast to the system based methods in prior art.
  • This approach according to the invention will always guarantee that the user has control over the security critical activity that is being executed on the security system, since an act-of-will of the user is required in order to perform such activities.
  • the method according to the invention provides a secure space in which the security critical activities are processed.
  • the security system By providing the security system according to the present invention with switching and crypto devices it is possible to encrypt the data from and to the input/output devices and thereby use the already existing lines of the computer to tunnel data to the security device.
  • the security system can be designed with a minimum of changes to the ordinary computer. The only additional equipment that is needed is, the security device, its connection lines and the switching and crypto devices.
  • the security system according to the present invention does not need an additional screen in order to create an secure space in which security critical activities can be performed.
  • FIG. 1 shows a block diagram of the security system according to the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 shows a block diagram of the security system according to a second embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 3 shows a flow chart of the general method according to the invention.
  • FIG. 4 shows a flow chart of a security step that proves the user presence.
  • FIG. 5 shows a flow chart of a security step that conceals data.
  • FIG. 6 shows a flow chart of a security step that reveals data.
  • FIG. 7 shows a flow chart of a security step that marks the origin of an activity.
  • FIG. 8 shows a flow chart of a security step that verifies the origin marking from an intended originator.
  • FIG. 9 shows a flow chart of a security step that performs an irrevocable step.
  • FIG. 1 shows a security system according to one embodiment of the invention.
  • a security system is used to perform security critical activities when the system is connected to a public network and comprises an arbitrary personal computer 2 , input/output devices such as a keyboard 4 , a mouse 6 , a display 8 , and a smart card reader/writer (r/w) 12 .
  • input/output devices such as a keyboard 4 , a mouse 6 , a display 8 , and a smart card reader/writer (r/w) 12 .
  • r/w smart card reader/writer
  • the personal computer 2 may be substituted by a terminal or the like without departing from the scope of the invention.
  • this also includes a processor to which a terminal is connected, i.e. the computer/terminal and the processor running the application do not necessarily have to have the same physical location.
  • the personal computer 2 is provided with a processor 14 , a read only memory (ROM) 16 and a random access memory (RAM) 18 .
  • Each physical input/output device 4 , 6 , 8 , 12 is connected to the computer 2 through a suitable communication interface 20 , 22 , 24 , 26 , which is well known to a person skilled in the art.
  • the display 8 is connected to the computer 2 via a screen device controller 10 .
  • Each input/output device 4 , 6 , 8 , 12 is also provided with a switching and crypto device 28 , 30 , 32 , 34 , the function of which is to be described below. It shall be understood that also the input/output devices 4 , 6 , 12 have device controllers, which in the shown embodiment are incorporated in the switching and crypto devices 28 , 30 , 32 .
  • the screen device controller 10 comprises a screen control circuit 36 and a screen memory 38 .
  • the screen controller 10 is connected to a security device 40 , comprising a processor 42 , a PROM 44 and a RAM 46 .
  • the processor 42 of the security device 40 is connected to the screen circuit 36 and to the screen memory 38 and also to the PROM 44 and the RAM 46 .
  • the processor 42 is also connected to and controls the switching and crypto device 34 provided in the screen circuit 36 .
  • the switching and crypto device 34 serves as blocking means, i.e. prevents the processor 14 of the computer 14 from getting access to the screen device controller 10 .
  • the security device 40 may also be provided in the computer 2 or in a separate space as long as the security device 40 is capable, without involvement of the processor 14 , of controlling the switching and crypto devices 28 , 30 , 32 , 34 , i.e. the processor 14 shall not at any time be capable of taking over control of the switching and crypto devices 28 , 30 , 32 , 34 , which is to be described below.
  • FIG. 2 shows an alternative embodiment of the security system, in which the security device 40 is incorporated within the computer 2 .
  • the screen device controller 10 is duplicated and the switching and crypto device 34 is acting as an ordinary switch, which is controlled by the security device 40 , in order to switch between the two screen control devices 10 .
  • the security system is used to perform security critical activities when the security system, i.e. the computer 2 , is connected and on-line with a network. If the computer is a stand-alone computer there is no need for a security device 40 , since no intruder is able to listen or compromise with the processed data.
  • the present invention is directed towards computers that are on-line with networks.
  • Security critical activities are activities that the user wishes to perform in privacy, i.e. without the danger of having an intruder listening to or compromising the security critical activity. Examples of such security critical activities are transferring money, signing documents, preparing confidential mails and the like
  • the security systems having the configuration as described above are operable in two different modes.
  • a first mode defined as the normal mode
  • the security system operates as an ordinary computer, that is the security device 40 is in a passive mode. How a computer connected to a public network operates is well known to the person skilled in the art and is therefore not further described.
  • a second mode defined as the secure management mode
  • the security device 40 takes over the control of the data processing in order to, in a reliable way, perform different security critical activities.
  • the security device 40 In response to a call at step 200 , when the security system is operating in the normal mode, from the processor 14 or any of the input/output devices, i.e the keyboard 4 , the mouse 6 , the display 8 or the smart card r/w 12 the security device 40 will be allocated at step 202 . The security device 40 then switches those of the switching and crypto device 28 , 30 , 32 , 34 associated with the input/output devices 4 , 6 , 8 , 12 to be used during the secure management mode into a protected mode at step 204 .
  • the security device 40 is provided with means for generating signals to the switching and crypto devices 28 , 30 , 32 , 34 . These means are preferably the processor 42 and program steps stored in the PROM 42 . When the requested ones of the switching and crypto devices 28 , 30 , 32 , 34 are switched into the protected mode the security device 40 is in control of the requested ones of the input/output devices 4 , 6 , 8 , 12 and the processor 14 of the computer 2 is no longer capable of receiving any unprotected data therefrom or sending any data thereto.
  • the switching and crypto devices 28 , 30 , 32 , 34 will encrypt all data that is transmitted from the input/output devices 4 , 6 , 8 , 12 .
  • the security device 40 is at all times the only device that can control the entering and leaving of the protected mode. Unencrypted requests to the switching and crypto devices 28 , 30 , 34 , 36 will not be executed, unless it is a request for a non-critical activity.
  • the switching and crypto devices 28 , 30 , 32 , 34 are associated with they can be provided with special functions.
  • the switching and crypto device 32 associated with the smart card r/w 12 has such a function and allows only certain non-critical security requests to be passed through to the smart card r/w 12 . If this precautionary measure is not provided there will be a chance of manipulating the smart card r/w 12 during normal mode in order to circumvent the security device 40 in the secure management mode.
  • the processor 42 of the security device 40 shown in FIG. 1 has direct access to the screen device controller 10 and therefore the switching and crypto device 34 only needs to perform a blocking function and not encrypting.
  • the switching and crypto device 34 has the function of an ordinary switch.
  • the security system can be designed with a minimum of changes to the ordinary computer.
  • the only additional equipment that is needed is the security device 40 , its connection lines and the switching and crypto devices 28 , 30 , 32 , 34 .
  • the security device 40 may be connected to or within the computer system in a number of ways, as shown in FIG. 2 or for example by providing separate physical lines between the security device 40 and the input/output devices 4 , 6 , 8 , 12 .
  • the embodiment shown in FIG. 1 is preferred since the security device 40 in this embodiment has direct control over the screen memory 38 and the screen control circuit 36 , which otherwise have to be duplicated
  • switching and crypto devices 28 , 30 , 32 , 34 When the switching and crypto devices 28 , 30 , 32 , 34 are not in the protected mode they act as an ordinary connection of an input/output device to a computer.
  • the security device 40 After taking over the control of the requested input/output devices 4 , 6 , 6 , 12 the security device 40 also takes control over all the data processing to be performed in the secure management mode at step 206 .
  • the security system By operating the security system this way, i.e. transferring the control of the data processing of an application running on the processor 14 and the control of the input/output devices 4 , 6 , 8 , 12 to the security device 40 , a secure space is created in which the security critical activities can be executed. Then, at step 208 , the security device 40 will start to process the security critical activities.
  • the security device 40 will involve the user, i.e. the execution steps performing the security critical activities, which are stored in the PROM 44 of the security device 40 , are not performed automatically. Therefore, at step 210 the security device 40 will check if the user has been involved. If the answer at step 210 is NO the security device 40 will check the time period during which the user has not been involved at step 212 . If the user is not involved within a certain time limit after a processing step has been performed the security device 40 is timed out and the normal mode is entered at step 214 . If the time limit has not yet lapsed the user involvement will again be checked at step 210 .
  • the security device 40 is provided with means for user involvement.
  • the means for user involvement is the essence of the present invention. This approach to security is completely different compared to the system orientated approaches used in prior art such as GB 2 267 986. The user involvement step will be described further in detail below.
  • the processing will be ended at step 218 and the result thereof will be transferred, at step 220 , to the processor 14 of the computer 2 , to an output device 12 , or remain in the security device 40 , for later use.
  • the transfer of the result is the last step in the secure management mode of the security system.
  • the security device 40 will thereafter, at step 222 , transfer the control of the input/output devices 4 , 6 , 8 , 12 , the switching and crypto devices/device controllers 28 , 30 , 32 , 34 and the control of the data processing from the security device 40 to the computer 2 by switching the switching and crypto devices 28 , 30 , 32 , 34 into normal mode.
  • This switching from the protected mode to the normal mode is, as mentioned above, only possible to perform from the security device 40 , and not from the processor 14 .
  • the switching and crypto devices 28 , 30 , 32 , 34 may be switched manual and not by the security device 40 .
  • the security device 40 must be able to reliably and securely determine the status of the switching and crypto devices 28 , 30 , 32 , 34 , in order to be able to decide whether the security critical activity can commence, or whether it has to be interrupted.
  • the security device 40 may furthermore be provided with an indicator, not shown in the figures, that indicates when the security device 40 is in control and the system is operating in the secure management mode. Such an indicator will make the user aware of when he is able to perform security critical activities.
  • This step is schematically shown in FIG. 4 and may be performed by letting the user present the identity token, for example through the smart card r/w 12 , or by letting the user enter a password. Also biometry such as voice recognition or fingerprints may be used to identify the presence of the user. If the user is not present further data processing in the secure management mode will be interrupted and the normal mode will be entered, else the processing of the security critical activity will continue. It shall be understood that the security device 40 may contain stored information about different users. This will allow different users to make use of the same security system.
  • Another step that can be performed by the security critical activity is to conceal data.
  • This step is schematically shown in FIG. 5 .
  • the user first requests that the security critical activity shall be performed with concealed result by using the keyboard 4 or the mouse 6 .
  • the request is then presented to the user on the screen 8 or in speakers.
  • the user then has to choose recipients of the concealed result by using the keyboard 4 or mouse 6 .
  • the reminder of the security critical activity is executed and the results are concealed with the selected recipients.
  • Yet another step, shown schematically in FIG. 6, that can be a part of the security critical activity is to reveal data to the user.
  • the secure management mode will be entered, either by request of the user or automatically if the concealed data contains a command to call and allocate the security device 40 .
  • the user Before the received concealed data is loaded into the security device 40 the user has to prove his presence in order to secure that only permitted data is loaded into the security device 40 . Thereafter, if the identity of the user is correct, he has to enter identities and keys, preferably by using the smart card r/w 12 .
  • the security device 40 will start processing and decrypt the concealed data and present the received data on a suitable output device, such as the screen 8 or speakers If the identities and keys are not valid the normal mode will be entered. It shall be understood that the order in which the presence is proved and the identities and keys are entered may be reversed without changing the outcome of this step.
  • a further step of a security critical activity concerns the generation and verification of an origin marking, schematically shown in FIGS. 7 and 8.
  • the generation of the origin marking starts with an user request for an activity with origin marking, through for example the keyboard 4 or the mouse 6 .
  • the request is then presented to the user on the screen 8 or on another output device and if the request is correct the user grants the activity. If the request is not granted the normal mode will be entered, but if granted the activity will be executed and selected results thereof are digitally signed for origin marking. Depending on the activity performed the user may interact during this process.
  • the user first has to determine and lock-in at least one intended originator by using an input device such as the keyboard 4 or mouse 6 .
  • the at least one intended originator is then presented to the user on the display 8 or the like and when the signed results are received each signature is checked to confirm the at least one intended originator. If the signature is valid the processing in the secure management mode will continue, else the normal mode will be entered.
  • An important step in a security critical activity is to permit the generation of an irrevocable step such as signing a document.
  • a request to perform such a step has to be made.
  • This request together with the arguments of this step are presented to the user on the screen 8 or the like and then the user has the option to alter or enter new arguments. Thereafter the user has to accept or refuse the request. In this way a firm user involvement is always guaranteed before an irrevocable step is performed.
  • the user has made his accept the processing continues. If the user has not made his accept within a pre-set time limit the normal mode will be entered.
  • the above described user involvement steps concern tasks such as signing legally binding documents, sending secret mails, performing payments, loading cash-cards, making secret phone calls etc. It is believed that there are numerous other high level tasks that can be performed in a secure way by using the user involvement steps above, and in particular also such tasks that will emerge as technology advances.
  • Sending secret mails would involve the steps of conceal and optionally also origin marking.
  • Load a cash-card would involve the steps of permit generation and origin marking which would correspond to making a request to load the cash-card.
  • the request is granted the loading of the cash-card would involve the steps of revealing the result and verifying origin marking.
  • Performing a secret phone call would require the steps of conceal, reveal, origin marking and verify origin marking to be involved continuously during the secret phone call.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Alarm Systems (AREA)
  • Electrotherapy Devices (AREA)
  • Control Of Vending Devices And Auxiliary Devices For Vending Devices (AREA)
  • Emergency Alarm Devices (AREA)
  • Hardware Redundancy (AREA)
US09/284,567 1996-10-30 1999-10-30 Method and security system for processing a security critical activity Expired - Lifetime US6618809B1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
SE9603962 1996-10-30
SE9603962A SE9603962D0 (sv) 1996-10-30 1996-10-30 Device and method for communication
PCT/SE1997/001817 WO1998019243A2 (en) 1996-10-30 1997-10-30 Method and security system for processing a security critical activity

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US (1) US6618809B1 (de)
EP (1) EP0939926B1 (de)
JP (1) JP2001508892A (de)
CN (1) CN1161695C (de)
AT (1) ATE248395T1 (de)
AU (1) AU735711B2 (de)
CA (1) CA2270076A1 (de)
DE (1) DE69724448T2 (de)
NO (1) NO992040L (de)
SE (1) SE9603962D0 (de)
WO (1) WO1998019243A2 (de)

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DE69724448D1 (de) 2003-10-02
EP0939926B1 (de) 2003-08-27
WO1998019243A3 (en) 1998-06-18
HK1024317A1 (en) 2000-10-05
ATE248395T1 (de) 2003-09-15
EP0939926A2 (de) 1999-09-08
AU735711B2 (en) 2001-07-12
AU4890197A (en) 1998-05-22
CA2270076A1 (en) 1998-05-07
NO992040D0 (no) 1999-04-28
SE9603962D0 (sv) 1996-10-30
WO1998019243A2 (en) 1998-05-07
CN1161695C (zh) 2004-08-11
NO992040L (no) 1999-04-28
JP2001508892A (ja) 2001-07-03
DE69724448T2 (de) 2004-06-09
CN1242847A (zh) 2000-01-26

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