US7702898B2 - Method for authenticating and verifying SMS communications - Google Patents

Method for authenticating and verifying SMS communications Download PDF

Info

Publication number
US7702898B2
US7702898B2 US10/513,572 US51357205A US7702898B2 US 7702898 B2 US7702898 B2 US 7702898B2 US 51357205 A US51357205 A US 51357205A US 7702898 B2 US7702898 B2 US 7702898B2
Authority
US
United States
Prior art keywords
message
computational device
receiver
encrypted
codes
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Fee Related, expires
Application number
US10/513,572
Other languages
English (en)
Other versions
US20060098678A1 (en
Inventor
Clarence Nyap Tan
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Wireless Applications Pty Ltd
Original Assignee
Wireless Applications Pty Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Wireless Applications Pty Ltd filed Critical Wireless Applications Pty Ltd
Publication of US20060098678A1 publication Critical patent/US20060098678A1/en
Assigned to WIRELESS APPLICATIONS PTY LTD reassignment WIRELESS APPLICATIONS PTY LTD ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: TAN, CLARENCE NYAP
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of US7702898B2 publication Critical patent/US7702898B2/en
Expired - Fee Related legal-status Critical Current
Adjusted expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/72—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L51/00—User-to-user messaging in packet-switching networks, transmitted according to store-and-forward or real-time protocols, e.g. e-mail
    • H04L51/58—Message adaptation for wireless communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2101—Auditing as a secondary aspect
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2135—Metering
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2143—Clearing memory, e.g. to prevent the data from being stolen
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/061—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
    • H04W12/72—Subscriber identity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/12—Messaging; Mailboxes; Announcements

Definitions

  • the present invention is concerned with a method for facilitating secure transactions over a wireless medium.
  • the invention is concerned with a method for authenticating and verifying text messages sent to wireless devices such as cell phones.
  • SMS short message services
  • a message of up to 160 characters of text may be entered, by means of a sender phone's keypad, or by a PC keyboard via the Internet, and transmitted over a telephone network for display on a receiver phone's display screen.
  • SMS web-server provides a gateway to a telephone network in order to deliver the message to the addressed cell phone where it is displayed in standard SMS format.
  • a method for operating a first computational means to facilitate the secure transfer of a message between the first computational means and a second computational means comprising operating the first computational means according to the following steps:
  • the first computational means comprises a computer network server in communication with a cellular telephone network.
  • the computer network in question may be the Internet.
  • the message may originate at a content sender in the form of a personal computer connected to the first computational device by means of a network such as the internet.
  • the first computational means may comprise a cellular phone.
  • the second computational device will usually be a cellular phone and that the message will be delivered to the cellular phone in SMS format.
  • the step of forming an encrypted message will normally involve forming the key on the basis of the cellular phone's phone number and a personal identification number to be used by the owner of the cellular phone.
  • the step of transmitting the encrypted message to the cellular phone includes transmitting a message identifier that is associated with the encrypted message.
  • the cellular phone transmits both the encrypted message and the message identifier back to the first computational means.
  • the method may further include the step of the computational means generating an error code if the message identifier is not received back from the cellular phone within a predetermined time period.
  • the one or more codes comprise a PIN and CLI associated with the cellular phone.
  • the first computational means may check the PIN and CLI for consistency in length and/or field type.
  • the method further includes the step of sending an error status message to the content sender advising of any error conditions.
  • the method may include a step of encrypting the message with a private key of the first computational means and a public key of the second computational means
  • the method may be used to conduct financial transactions between a financial institution and a client of said institution where the client operates the cellular phone and the institution operates the computer network server.
  • a computer software product provided upon a computer readable medium, for execution by a computational device, the computer readable medium including instructions for:
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram of the entities involved during the performance of a secure messaging method according to a preferred embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 2 includes the entities of FIG. 1 and additionally shows messages that are transferred between the depicted entities during the secure messaging method.
  • FIG. 3 is a flowchart of a method of operation of a secure server handling messages outgoing to receiver according to a preferred embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a method of operation of a secure server handling messages incoming from a receiver according to a preferred embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 5 schematically depicts an application of a secure messaging method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 6 depicts the steps involved in a fund transfer operation according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 7 depicts the steps involved in a B-Pay operation according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 8 depicts the steps involved in a balance inquiry operation according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 9 depicts the parties involved in a transaction according to a further embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 10 depicts the steps involved in a transaction according to a further embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates the entities involved in a secure SMS transaction according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • Content sender 2 will typically be client workstation, for example a personal computer, at which a message to be sent to receiver 6 originates.
  • Security server 4 is a web-server in communication with the content sender.
  • the security server executes a software product that contains instructions for executing a method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the security server is able to establish communications with receiver 6 which is typically an SMS capable cell phone.
  • the communication between content sender 2 and security server 4 may be by means of an SSL (secure socket layer) Internet connection, for example.
  • Security server 4 provides a gateway between the content sender and a cell phone telephone network to which receiver 6 is a subscriber. It will be realised that the functionality of security server 4 may be integrated into content sender 2 .
  • the content sender 2 could comprise a cell phone. Accordingly, in other embodiments the present invention may be used to facilitate secure messaging directly between two computational devices comprising cell phones
  • security server 4 awaits an incoming data package 8 from content sender 2 .
  • Data packet 8 contains a message for receiver 6 along with the receiver's PIN number and telephone number or line identifier (CLI).
  • CLI telephone number or line identifier
  • security server 4 assigns a unique message identifier (MID) to the received data packet.
  • message identifier is stored in memory of security server 4 .
  • receiver's phone number (CLI) and PIN are retrieved from data package 8 .
  • the security server generates an encryption key from the PIN and CLI according to a standard algorithm. If two-way authentication is required a PKI (public key infrastructure) technique may be employed by which the message is encrypted with the private key of the sender and the public key of the receiver.
  • PKI public key infrastructure
  • the message is encrypted using the encryption key to produce an encrypted message Enc ⁇ Msg ⁇ .
  • the encrypted message and unique message identifier, MID are packaged to form a data package 10 .
  • Data package 10 also includes a text message, which is displayed on receiver 6 as a request to enter the user PIN.
  • Data package 10 is transmitted to receiver 6 at box 32 .
  • the security server then, at box 34 , purges itself of information from data packet 8 , including the message, PIN code, phone number, key and encrypted data.
  • a clock is started that records the time at which a message with the unique message identifier allocated in box 22 was transmitted.
  • the MID is stored on server 4 , along with a timeout value for future use as will be explained shortly.
  • Data package 12 Upon receiver 6 receiving data package 10 a text message requesting a PIN be entered is displayed. The user of receiver 6 then replies entering the PIN. Data package 12 is then transmitted back to security server 4 . Data package 12 contains the receiver's phone number (CLI), PIN and the information which was in data package 10 being the message identifier (MID) and the encrypted message Enc ⁇ Msg ⁇ .
  • security server 4 receives data package 12 from receiver 6 .
  • the security server obtains the message identifier MID and CLI from the data package and checks to see if the timeout value for that message identifier has been exceeded at box 40 . If the timer has indeed timed out then control diverts to box 41 where an error message is transmitted to the content server.
  • the message ID and user phone number are extracted from the incoming data package at boxes 42 and 46 .
  • the message ID is checked to see if it is valid.
  • the user's PIN code is extracted from the incoming data package.
  • a check is undertaken to ensure that the PIN and receiver phone number (CLI) are correct.
  • a key is generated from the receivers phone number and PIN.
  • the key is used to decrypt the encrypted message Enc ⁇ Msg ⁇ .
  • the decrypted message item 14 of FIG. 2 , is sent to receiver 6 using the receiver's phone number.
  • a status message along with the message identifier (MID) 16 , ( FIG. 2 ) is sent to the content sender 2 .
  • the status message comprises an error code that reflects whether or not the authentication and verification process terminated successfully.
  • the error code may indicate if the message identifier received back from receiver 6 was invalid, if the PIN and/or CLI from the receiver were invalid or if the decryption of Enc ⁇ Msg ⁇ from the receiver was unsuccessful. If no errors were encountered then the error message will indicate that the procedure was successful.
  • the security server purges from its memory the user PIN, receiver phone number, encryption key and the decrypted message.
  • a software product executable by security server 4 for implementation of the above method will preferably include instructions for
  • a stockbroker 70 on completion of a stock transaction deal for a customer having a receiver 6 (i.e. a cell phone), generates a message by means of content sender (personal computer) 2 .
  • the message is encrypted and sent to the customer's cell phone 6 .
  • the customer enters a PIN into receiver 6 which, along with the encrypted message and the customer's phone number (CLI) is sent back to secure server 4 .
  • This is normally done by using the “Reply” function that is available on most cell phones.
  • the secure server receives the response from the receiver 6 and decrypts the message using the CLI and PIN to generate the decryption key.
  • the decrypted message is then sent back to the receiver and a status message is sent to the content sender 2 either confirming that the message was successfully delivered or providing an error code if message delivery failed.
  • FIG. 6 is a flowchart of the interaction between a cell phone user 6 and the web-server 4 of a financial institution. Initially, at box 72 the cell phone user initiates a funds transfer by sending an SMS message, optionally with username, to secure web-server 4 .
  • the web-server verifies the user using the cell phone's CLI and the username that is in the message.
  • Web-server 4 responds with an SMS menu having a number of options. For example the options may be to make a balance inquiry or to make a funds transfer or a to make a payment.
  • the user receives the menu message and replies by selecting the desired option. For example user 6 may decide to make a funds transfer.
  • the secure web-server 4 verifies the user using the CLI and sends an appropriate response depending on which menu item the user selected at box 76 .
  • the secure web-server may send a request for user 6 to confirm on which of its accounts the funds transfer is to be performed.
  • the user enters any data necessary for the transfer to continue into cell phone 6 .
  • the data may be the amount to be transferred and identification of the account from which the amount is to be transferred and the destination account.
  • secure web-server 4 once again verifies the user on the basis of the cell phone's CLI.
  • An encrypted SMS message is sent confirming that the funds transfer is ready to proceed. Also sent is a non-encrypted message requesting the user to enter a PIN.
  • the user receives the request for PIN and returns the PIN and the encrypted message.
  • the server verifies the user using the cell phone's CLI, PIN and receipt of the encrypted message. Once verified, confirmation of the requested transaction is sent back to user 6 and displayed at box 87 on the user's cell phone. For example a message such as “You have transferred ⁇ amount> from ⁇ Account No. 1 > to ⁇ Account No. 2 >.” may be sent.
  • FIG. 7 is a flowchart of the exchange of information between the user of a cell phone 6 and the secure web-server 4 of a financial institution in order to make a B-Pay transaction.
  • the cell phone user initiates a B-Pay transaction by sending an appropriate SMS message, with username, to secure web-server 4 .
  • the web-server verifies the user by means of the cell phone's CLI and the username that is in the message.
  • Web-server 4 responds with an SMS menu having a number of options including a B-Pay transaction option and, for example, a balance option and a fund transfer option.
  • the user receives the menu message and replies by selecting the B-Pay transaction option.
  • secure web-server 4 verifies the user using the CLI and sends an appropriate response for example a query as to which account the B-Pay transaction amount should come from.
  • user 6 enters the account to be debited for the transaction and the B-Pay payee's code.
  • secure web-server 4 once again verifies the user on the basis of the cell phone's CLI.
  • An encrypted SMS message is sent to the user's cell-phone confirming that the funds transfer is ready to proceed and requesting the user to enter a PIN in the event that a transaction request has been confirmed.
  • the user receives the request for PIN and enters the pin number into cell phone 6 and transmits it web-server 4 .
  • a message including the PIN number and the encrypted message is returned to web-server 4 .
  • the server verifies the user using the cell phone's CLI, PIN and the receipt of the encrypted message. Once verified confirmation that the requested transaction is completed is sent back to the cell phone.
  • the cell phone displays the confirmation message.
  • FIG. 8 is a flowchart of the exchange of information between the user of a cell phone 6 and the secure web-server 4 of a financial institution in order to make a balance inquiry.
  • the cell phone user initiates a balance inquiry by sending an appropriate SMS message, with username, to secure web-server 4 .
  • the web-server verifies the user by means of the cell phone's CLI and the username that is in the message.
  • Web-server 4 responds with an SMS menu having a number of options including a balance inquiry option. Other options on the menu might be, for example an option to make a transfer of funds and an option to make a B-pay payment.
  • the user receives the menu message and replies by selecting the balance inquiry option.
  • the secure web-server 4 verifies the user using the CLI and sends an appropriate response for example a query as to which of the user's accounts the balance inquiry should be in respect of.
  • the user selects the account to be queried.
  • secure web-server 4 once again verifies the user on the basis of the cell phone's CLI.
  • An encrypted SMS message confirming that the requested balance is to be made available is sent back to the user along with a request that the user to enter his/her PIN.
  • the user receives the encrypted message and the request for PIN. The user enters the PIN into cell phone 6 and sends the PIN and the encrypted message back to the web server.
  • the server verifies the user using the cell phone's CLI and PIN and returned encrypted message. Once verified a non-encrypted message stating the account balance for the account in question is sent back to the user's cell phone 6 for display on the cell phone at box 125 .
  • FIG. 9 A further embodiment of the present invention will now be described with reference to an example depicted in FIG. 9 .
  • a party X 152 instructs his bank's server, host X 154 , to transfer funds to party Y's account, where host Y is a server of party Y's bank.
  • Party Y may be confident that the message from party X had not been tampered with en-route.
  • the hash is unique to a particular message—allegedly different content would have produced hashed output different to that received and successfully decrypted.
  • Confidentiality messages encrypted with party Y's public key can only be decrypted using party Y's private key.
  • Party X may be confident that his message to Y has not been tampered with en-route.
  • private keys are stored in an encrypted form, i.e. a synchronous form, on the server.
  • the only way to access such keys is to unlock them with a key supplied by the end user. It will be readily apparent that the method may be readily extended to allow users to host their own private keys on their phones or other devices.
  • Methods according to embodiments of the present invention may be readily adapted to other financial transactions between a remote cell phone user and a server of a financial institution.
  • the system may also be used to make credit card payments.
  • encrypted messages may be sent inside multi-media messaging service (MMS) pictures.
  • MMS multi-media messaging service
  • the message may be embedded inside an image according to steganography techniques. In this way, an image of a person can be used to verify an identity, while at the same time, embedded content in the image can be used to transmit information. That is, the originator of the message is both visually and electronically identified.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Power Engineering (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Mathematical Physics (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
  • Liquid Deposition Of Substances Of Which Semiconductor Devices Are Composed (AREA)
  • Crystals, And After-Treatments Of Crystals (AREA)
  • Control Of Transmission Device (AREA)
US10/513,572 2002-05-07 2003-05-07 Method for authenticating and verifying SMS communications Expired - Fee Related US7702898B2 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AUPS2170A AUPS217002A0 (en) 2002-05-07 2002-05-07 Clarence tan
AUPS2170 2002-05-07
PCT/AU2003/000535 WO2003096615A1 (en) 2002-05-07 2003-05-07 Method for authenticating and verifying sms communications

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
US20060098678A1 US20060098678A1 (en) 2006-05-11
US7702898B2 true US7702898B2 (en) 2010-04-20

Family

ID=3835743

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US10/513,572 Expired - Fee Related US7702898B2 (en) 2002-05-07 2003-05-07 Method for authenticating and verifying SMS communications

Country Status (7)

Country Link
US (1) US7702898B2 (de)
EP (1) EP1502383B1 (de)
CN (1) CN100539747C (de)
AT (1) ATE485691T1 (de)
AU (2) AUPS217002A0 (de)
DE (1) DE60334614D1 (de)
WO (1) WO2003096615A1 (de)

Cited By (31)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20080046988A1 (en) * 2004-10-20 2008-02-21 Salt Group Pty Ltd Authentication Method
US20080052769A1 (en) * 2004-05-31 2008-02-28 Manuel Leone Method And System For A Secure Connection In Communication Networks
US20090154706A1 (en) * 2007-12-14 2009-06-18 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Method and apparatus for establishing communication via service provider
US20090265552A1 (en) * 2008-03-28 2009-10-22 Celltrust Corporation Systems and methods for secure short messaging service and multimedia messaging service
US20110064208A1 (en) * 2005-11-07 2011-03-17 ACK Ventures Holdings, LLC, a Delaware corporation Service Interfacing for Telephony
US20110302405A1 (en) * 2010-06-07 2011-12-08 Marlow William J Mobile workforce applications which are highly secure and trusted for the us government and other industries
US8225380B2 (en) 2006-05-25 2012-07-17 Celltrust Corporation Methods to authenticate access and alarm as to proximity to location
US8260274B2 (en) 2006-05-25 2012-09-04 Celltrust Corporation Extraction of information from e-mails and delivery to mobile phones, system and method
US8280359B2 (en) 2006-05-25 2012-10-02 Celltrust Corporation Methods of authorizing actions
US20130275758A1 (en) * 2010-06-07 2013-10-17 Protected Mobility, Llc Secure messaging
US20140310793A1 (en) * 2011-12-28 2014-10-16 Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Company Limited Application login method and apparatus, and mobile terminal therefor
US8924706B2 (en) 2010-11-05 2014-12-30 Protected Mobility, Llc Systems and methods using one time pads during the exchange of cryptographic material
US8965416B2 (en) 2006-05-25 2015-02-24 Celltrust Corporation Distribution of lottery tickets through mobile devices
US8984271B2 (en) 2010-06-07 2015-03-17 Protected Mobility, Llc User interface systems and methods for input and display of secure and insecure message oriented communications
US8984273B2 (en) 2011-12-16 2015-03-17 Protected Mobility, Llc Method to provide secure multimedia messaging between peer systems
US9154612B2 (en) 2006-05-25 2015-10-06 Celltrust Corporation Secure mobile information management system and method
US9160719B2 (en) 2012-07-20 2015-10-13 Protected Mobility, Llc Hiding ciphertext using a linguistics algorithm with dictionaries
US9172680B2 (en) 2010-06-07 2015-10-27 Protected Mobility, Llc Systems and methods for enabling secure messaging, command, and control of remote devices, communicated via a short message service or other message oriented communications mediums
US9572033B2 (en) 2006-05-25 2017-02-14 Celltrust Corporation Systems and methods for encrypted mobile voice communications
US9763067B2 (en) 2013-05-28 2017-09-12 Protected Mobility, Llc Methods and apparatus for long-short wave, low-high frequency radio secure message service
US9848081B2 (en) 2006-05-25 2017-12-19 Celltrust Corporation Dissemination of real estate information through text messaging
US9852418B2 (en) * 2008-06-06 2017-12-26 Paypal, Inc. Trusted service manager (TSM) architectures and methods
US9934495B2 (en) 2006-09-13 2018-04-03 Google Llc Integrated system and method for managing electronic coupons
US10057061B1 (en) 2016-09-13 2018-08-21 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Secure digital communications
US10057225B1 (en) 2016-12-29 2018-08-21 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Wireless peer to peer mobile wallet connections
US10075300B1 (en) 2016-09-13 2018-09-11 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Secure digital communications
US10776777B1 (en) 2017-08-04 2020-09-15 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Consolidating application access in a mobile wallet
US10789594B2 (en) 2013-01-31 2020-09-29 Moshir Vantures, Limited, LLC Method and system to intelligently assess and mitigate security risks on a mobile device
US10853798B1 (en) 2016-11-28 2020-12-01 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Secure wallet-to-wallet transactions
US11595820B2 (en) 2011-09-02 2023-02-28 Paypal, Inc. Secure elements broker (SEB) for application communication channel selector optimization
US20250233856A1 (en) * 2024-01-16 2025-07-17 T-Mobile Innovations Llc Systems and methods for authenticating account changes in a wireless network

Families Citing this family (17)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20100191602A1 (en) * 2001-06-27 2010-07-29 John Mikkelsen Mobile banking and payment platform
JP4289186B2 (ja) * 2004-03-24 2009-07-01 株式会社日立製作所 認証機能を有する電話機および電話システム
GB2415574B (en) * 2004-06-21 2009-02-25 Vodafone Plc Authenticating messages in a telecommunications system
CN100450208C (zh) * 2005-11-03 2009-01-07 华为技术有限公司 短消息加密保护的实现方法与系统
CN100369074C (zh) * 2006-03-02 2008-02-13 西安西电捷通无线网络通信有限公司 一种实现sms4密码算法中加解密处理的方法
EP2165488A4 (de) * 2007-06-05 2015-08-26 Secure Mailbox Sweden Ab Direktkanal für sichere informationen
US9083680B2 (en) * 2008-01-18 2015-07-14 Tekelec, Inc. Systems, methods, and computer readable media for application-level authentication of messages in a telecommunications network
SE532406C2 (sv) * 2008-05-05 2010-01-12 Paysystem Sweden Ab Elektroniska betalningar i ett mobilkommunikationssystem
GB2495880A (en) * 2008-08-05 2013-04-24 Wms Gaming Inc Mobile-phone-based player account transactions method for wagering machine funding
GB2488766A (en) * 2011-03-04 2012-09-12 Intercede Ltd Securely transferring data to a mobile device
US8959604B2 (en) * 2011-11-25 2015-02-17 Synchronoss Technologies, Inc. System and method of verifying a number of a mobile terminal
CN102833709B (zh) * 2012-08-16 2016-05-11 小米科技有限责任公司 一种短信的发送方法、移动终端、服务器和系统
US9247432B2 (en) * 2012-10-19 2016-01-26 Airwatch Llc Systems and methods for controlling network access
US9088568B1 (en) 2013-09-11 2015-07-21 Talati Family LP Apparatus, system and method for secure data exchange
KR101379711B1 (ko) * 2013-11-14 2014-04-01 (주)지란지교소프트 전화번호를 이용한 파일 암호화 및 복호화 방법
CN104079581B (zh) * 2014-07-16 2017-07-11 金红宇 身份认证方法及设备
US11868206B2 (en) * 2021-05-11 2024-01-09 Sap Se Automated mass message processing

Citations (12)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0898397A2 (de) 1997-08-22 1999-02-24 Nokia Mobile Phones Ltd. Verfahren zur gesicherten Übertragung in einem Telekommunikationssystem
US6049613A (en) * 1997-03-07 2000-04-11 Jakobsson; Markus Method and apparatus for encrypting, decrypting, and providing privacy for data values
US20010056546A1 (en) * 1998-03-16 2001-12-27 Ogilvie John W.L. Message content protection and conditional disclosure
US20020034300A1 (en) * 2000-06-07 2002-03-21 Mikael Thuvesholmen Method and device for encrypting a message
US20020078351A1 (en) * 2000-10-13 2002-06-20 Garib Marco Aurelio Secret key Messaging
US20020184487A1 (en) * 2001-03-23 2002-12-05 Badamo Michael J. System and method for distributing security processing functions for network applications
US20030028620A1 (en) * 2001-06-20 2003-02-06 Ludger Woelfel Method of handling a data request
US20030142364A1 (en) * 2002-01-29 2003-07-31 Comverse, Ltd. Encrypted e-mail message retrieval system
US20030204726A1 (en) * 2002-04-25 2003-10-30 Kefford Mark Gregory Methods and systems for secure transmission of information using a mobile device
US6754484B1 (en) * 2000-07-10 2004-06-22 Nokia Corporation Short messaging using information beacons
US6912285B2 (en) * 2000-02-24 2005-06-28 Tumbleweed Communications Corp. Mechanism for efficient private bulk messaging
US6986036B2 (en) * 2002-03-20 2006-01-10 Microsoft Corporation System and method for protecting privacy and anonymity of parties of network communications

Family Cites Families (12)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FI112895B (fi) * 1996-02-23 2004-01-30 Nokia Corp Menetelmä ainakin yhden käyttäjäkohtaisen tunnistetiedon hankkimiseksi
CN1230324A (zh) * 1996-07-11 1999-09-29 格姆普拉斯有限公司 增强的短消息和同步与保护蜂窝电信系统中增强的短消息交换的方法
US5915021A (en) * 1997-02-07 1999-06-22 Nokia Mobile Phones Limited Method for secure communications in a telecommunications system
ATE442746T1 (de) * 1998-09-10 2009-09-15 Swisscom Ag Verfahren zum kaufen von waren oder dienstleistungen mit einem mobiltelefon
FI108813B (fi) * 1999-03-08 2002-03-28 Sonera Smarttrust Oy Menetelmä ja järjestelmä tietoliikennejärjestelmässä
EP1045598A1 (de) * 1999-04-12 2000-10-18 Lucent Technologies Inc. Individuelles Mobilitätsregistrierungssystem für die Registrierung von Benutzeridentitäten in einem Telekommunikationsendgerät
AU7905700A (en) * 1999-09-20 2001-04-24 Thomson Licensing S.A. Method for device registration in a wireless home network
JP3749640B2 (ja) * 1999-10-15 2006-03-01 株式会社東芝 Ｉｃカード利用装置、ｉｃカード及び記憶媒体
US7278017B2 (en) * 2000-06-07 2007-10-02 Anoto Ab Method and device for secure wireless transmission of information
WO2002001516A2 (en) * 2000-06-26 2002-01-03 Intel Corporation Method and apparatus for using a cellular telephone as an authentification device
FR2812424A1 (fr) * 2000-07-28 2002-02-01 Everbee Wireless Ltd Procede et systeme pour effectuer des transactions securisees de biens et de services au moyen d'un telephone mobile via un reseau de communication cellulaire
ITRM20010492A1 (it) * 2001-08-08 2003-02-10 Nexse S R L Metodo per la trasmissione sicura di dati tramite messaggi del servizio messaggi brevi, o sms (short message service), di telefonia radiomob

Patent Citations (12)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6049613A (en) * 1997-03-07 2000-04-11 Jakobsson; Markus Method and apparatus for encrypting, decrypting, and providing privacy for data values
EP0898397A2 (de) 1997-08-22 1999-02-24 Nokia Mobile Phones Ltd. Verfahren zur gesicherten Übertragung in einem Telekommunikationssystem
US20010056546A1 (en) * 1998-03-16 2001-12-27 Ogilvie John W.L. Message content protection and conditional disclosure
US6912285B2 (en) * 2000-02-24 2005-06-28 Tumbleweed Communications Corp. Mechanism for efficient private bulk messaging
US20020034300A1 (en) * 2000-06-07 2002-03-21 Mikael Thuvesholmen Method and device for encrypting a message
US6754484B1 (en) * 2000-07-10 2004-06-22 Nokia Corporation Short messaging using information beacons
US20020078351A1 (en) * 2000-10-13 2002-06-20 Garib Marco Aurelio Secret key Messaging
US20020184487A1 (en) * 2001-03-23 2002-12-05 Badamo Michael J. System and method for distributing security processing functions for network applications
US20030028620A1 (en) * 2001-06-20 2003-02-06 Ludger Woelfel Method of handling a data request
US20030142364A1 (en) * 2002-01-29 2003-07-31 Comverse, Ltd. Encrypted e-mail message retrieval system
US6986036B2 (en) * 2002-03-20 2006-01-10 Microsoft Corporation System and method for protecting privacy and anonymity of parties of network communications
US20030204726A1 (en) * 2002-04-25 2003-10-30 Kefford Mark Gregory Methods and systems for secure transmission of information using a mobile device

Cited By (59)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20080052769A1 (en) * 2004-05-31 2008-02-28 Manuel Leone Method And System For A Secure Connection In Communication Networks
US8296825B2 (en) * 2004-05-31 2012-10-23 Telecom Italia S.P.A. Method and system for a secure connection in communication networks
US20080046988A1 (en) * 2004-10-20 2008-02-21 Salt Group Pty Ltd Authentication Method
US8752125B2 (en) * 2004-10-20 2014-06-10 Salt Group Pty Ltd Authentication method
US8831199B2 (en) * 2005-11-07 2014-09-09 Ack Ventures Holdings Llc Service interfacing for telephony
US20110064208A1 (en) * 2005-11-07 2011-03-17 ACK Ventures Holdings, LLC, a Delaware corporation Service Interfacing for Telephony
US9197749B2 (en) 2005-11-07 2015-11-24 Ack Ventures Holdings, Llc Service interfacing for telephony
US8280359B2 (en) 2006-05-25 2012-10-02 Celltrust Corporation Methods of authorizing actions
US9154612B2 (en) 2006-05-25 2015-10-06 Celltrust Corporation Secure mobile information management system and method
US8260274B2 (en) 2006-05-25 2012-09-04 Celltrust Corporation Extraction of information from e-mails and delivery to mobile phones, system and method
US9680803B2 (en) * 2006-05-25 2017-06-13 Celltrust Corporation Systems and methods for secure short messaging service and multimedia messaging service
US20110145564A1 (en) * 2006-05-25 2011-06-16 Celltrust Corporation Systems and methods for secure short messaging service and multimedia messaging service
US9572033B2 (en) 2006-05-25 2017-02-14 Celltrust Corporation Systems and methods for encrypted mobile voice communications
US9848081B2 (en) 2006-05-25 2017-12-19 Celltrust Corporation Dissemination of real estate information through text messaging
US8965416B2 (en) 2006-05-25 2015-02-24 Celltrust Corporation Distribution of lottery tickets through mobile devices
US8862129B2 (en) 2006-05-25 2014-10-14 Celltrust Corporation Systems and methods for encrypted mobile voice communications
US8225380B2 (en) 2006-05-25 2012-07-17 Celltrust Corporation Methods to authenticate access and alarm as to proximity to location
US9934495B2 (en) 2006-09-13 2018-04-03 Google Llc Integrated system and method for managing electronic coupons
US20090154706A1 (en) * 2007-12-14 2009-06-18 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Method and apparatus for establishing communication via service provider
US8213619B2 (en) * 2007-12-14 2012-07-03 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Method and apparatus for establishing communication via service provider
US20090265552A1 (en) * 2008-03-28 2009-10-22 Celltrust Corporation Systems and methods for secure short messaging service and multimedia messaging service
US11521194B2 (en) * 2008-06-06 2022-12-06 Paypal, Inc. Trusted service manager (TSM) architectures and methods
US9852418B2 (en) * 2008-06-06 2017-12-26 Paypal, Inc. Trusted service manager (TSM) architectures and methods
US20180218358A1 (en) * 2008-06-06 2018-08-02 Paypal, Inc. Trusted service manager (tsm) architectures and methods
US9602277B2 (en) * 2010-06-07 2017-03-21 Protected Mobilty, Llc User interface systems and methods for secure message oriented communications
US20110302405A1 (en) * 2010-06-07 2011-12-08 Marlow William J Mobile workforce applications which are highly secure and trusted for the us government and other industries
US9172680B2 (en) 2010-06-07 2015-10-27 Protected Mobility, Llc Systems and methods for enabling secure messaging, command, and control of remote devices, communicated via a short message service or other message oriented communications mediums
US9143324B2 (en) * 2010-06-07 2015-09-22 Protected Mobility, Llc Secure messaging
US20130275758A1 (en) * 2010-06-07 2013-10-17 Protected Mobility, Llc Secure messaging
US8984271B2 (en) 2010-06-07 2015-03-17 Protected Mobility, Llc User interface systems and methods for input and display of secure and insecure message oriented communications
US8924706B2 (en) 2010-11-05 2014-12-30 Protected Mobility, Llc Systems and methods using one time pads during the exchange of cryptographic material
US12574733B2 (en) 2011-09-02 2026-03-10 Paypal, Inc. Secure elements broker (SEB) for application communication channel selector optimization
US12022290B2 (en) 2011-09-02 2024-06-25 Paypal, Inc. Secure elements broker (SEB) for application communication channel selector optimization
US11595820B2 (en) 2011-09-02 2023-02-28 Paypal, Inc. Secure elements broker (SEB) for application communication channel selector optimization
US8984273B2 (en) 2011-12-16 2015-03-17 Protected Mobility, Llc Method to provide secure multimedia messaging between peer systems
US20140310793A1 (en) * 2011-12-28 2014-10-16 Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Company Limited Application login method and apparatus, and mobile terminal therefor
US9160719B2 (en) 2012-07-20 2015-10-13 Protected Mobility, Llc Hiding ciphertext using a linguistics algorithm with dictionaries
US10789594B2 (en) 2013-01-31 2020-09-29 Moshir Vantures, Limited, LLC Method and system to intelligently assess and mitigate security risks on a mobile device
US9763067B2 (en) 2013-05-28 2017-09-12 Protected Mobility, Llc Methods and apparatus for long-short wave, low-high frequency radio secure message service
US10958442B1 (en) 2016-09-13 2021-03-23 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Secure digital communications
US11516018B1 (en) 2016-09-13 2022-11-29 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Secure digital communications
US10057061B1 (en) 2016-09-13 2018-08-21 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Secure digital communications
US10505731B1 (en) 2016-09-13 2019-12-10 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Secure digital communications
US11949796B1 (en) 2016-09-13 2024-04-02 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Secure digital communications
US10505743B1 (en) 2016-09-13 2019-12-10 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Secure digital communications
US10965469B1 (en) 2016-09-13 2021-03-30 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Secure digital communications
US11856108B1 (en) 2016-09-13 2023-12-26 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Secure digital communications
US11516019B1 (en) 2016-09-13 2022-11-29 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Secure digital communications
US10075300B1 (en) 2016-09-13 2018-09-11 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Secure digital communications
US10326601B1 (en) 2016-09-13 2019-06-18 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Secure digital communications
US10853798B1 (en) 2016-11-28 2020-12-01 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Secure wallet-to-wallet transactions
US10652223B1 (en) 2016-12-29 2020-05-12 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Wireless peer to peer mobile wallet connections
US11611543B1 (en) 2016-12-29 2023-03-21 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Wireless peer to peer mobile wallet connections
US11240217B1 (en) 2016-12-29 2022-02-01 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Wireless peer to peer mobile wallet connections
US11924186B2 (en) 2016-12-29 2024-03-05 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Wireless peer to peer mobile wallet connections
US10057225B1 (en) 2016-12-29 2018-08-21 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Wireless peer to peer mobile wallet connections
US12014366B1 (en) 2017-08-04 2024-06-18 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Consolidating application access in a mobile wallet
US10776777B1 (en) 2017-08-04 2020-09-15 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Consolidating application access in a mobile wallet
US20250233856A1 (en) * 2024-01-16 2025-07-17 T-Mobile Innovations Llc Systems and methods for authenticating account changes in a wireless network

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
AU2003225327B2 (en) 2007-07-19
AUPS217002A0 (en) 2002-06-06
AU2003225327B8 (en) 2009-06-18
CN100539747C (zh) 2009-09-09
WO2003096615A1 (en) 2003-11-20
DE60334614D1 (de) 2010-12-02
ATE485691T1 (de) 2010-11-15
EP1502383A1 (de) 2005-02-02
EP1502383B1 (de) 2010-10-20
AU2003225327A1 (en) 2003-11-11
HK1078708A1 (zh) 2006-03-17
US20060098678A1 (en) 2006-05-11
EP1502383A4 (de) 2009-09-09
CN1653746A (zh) 2005-08-10

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US7702898B2 (en) Method for authenticating and verifying SMS communications
US10595201B2 (en) Secure short message service (SMS) communications
US11540128B2 (en) Multi-factor authentication providing a credential via a contactless card for secure messaging
US10959093B2 (en) Method and system for provisioning access data to mobile device
US7610056B2 (en) Method and system for phone-number discovery and phone-number authentication for mobile communications devices
US7000117B2 (en) Method and device for authenticating locally-stored program code
JP2010178370A (ja) 選択呼出信号システム用のセキュア・メッセージング・システム
JP2003521154A (ja) 電子識別情報を発行する方法
KR20090089394A (ko) 네트워크의 클라이언트 장치로의 보안 패스워드 분배
EP3712792B1 (de) Verfahren und system zur bereitstellung von datenzugriff an mobile vorrichtung
US20110320359A1 (en) secure communication method and device based on application layer for mobile financial service
GB2434724A (en) Secure transactions using authentication tokens based on a device "fingerprint" derived from its physical parameters
US8117438B1 (en) Method and apparatus for providing secure messaging service certificate registration
WO2016178780A1 (en) Method and system for provisioning access data to mobile device
GB2384396A (en) Authentication messaging in a mobile communications network
EP1437024B1 (de) Verfahren und anorndung in einem kommunikationsnetz
HK1078708B (en) Method for authenticating and verifying sms communications

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AS Assignment

Owner name: WIRELESS APPLICATIONS PTY LTD,AUSTRALIA

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:TAN, CLARENCE NYAP;REEL/FRAME:023954/0264

Effective date: 20100208

STCF Information on status: patent grant

Free format text: PATENTED CASE

FPAY Fee payment

Year of fee payment: 4

MAFP Maintenance fee payment

Free format text: PAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEE, 8TH YR, SMALL ENTITY (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: M2552)

Year of fee payment: 8

FEPP Fee payment procedure

Free format text: MAINTENANCE FEE REMINDER MAILED (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: REM.); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: SMALL ENTITY

LAPS Lapse for failure to pay maintenance fees

Free format text: PATENT EXPIRED FOR FAILURE TO PAY MAINTENANCE FEES (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: EXP.); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: SMALL ENTITY

STCH Information on status: patent discontinuation

Free format text: PATENT EXPIRED DUE TO NONPAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEES UNDER 37 CFR 1.362

FP Lapsed due to failure to pay maintenance fee

Effective date: 20220420