US7929732B2 - Methods of identifier determination and of biometric verification and associated systems - Google Patents

Methods of identifier determination and of biometric verification and associated systems Download PDF

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US7929732B2
US7929732B2 US11/657,172 US65717207A US7929732B2 US 7929732 B2 US7929732 B2 US 7929732B2 US 65717207 A US65717207 A US 65717207A US 7929732 B2 US7929732 B2 US 7929732B2
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individual
error
correcting code
identifier
code word
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US20070183632A1 (en
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Julien Bringer
Paul Welti
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Idemia Identity and Security France SAS
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Morpho SA
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6245—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
    • G06F21/6254—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes by anonymising data, e.g. decorrelating personal data from the owner's identification
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/32—User authentication using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voiceprints

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to using biometric data.
  • verifying the identity of an individual may be based on comparing biometric data measured on individuals giving their identities with biometric data previously obtained in correspondence with said identities.
  • the grant of a right may be subject to biometric verification, where the term “grant of a right” should be understood very broadly (granting a driver's license, a travel ticket, a payment, access to premises, etc.).
  • a problem is associated with the nature of the biometric data used.
  • the discriminating power of that data can be very variable. Discriminating power corresponds to the ability to characterize an individual with greater or lesser precision.
  • biometric data such as the general shape of a hand or the length of a few fingers of the hand discriminates relatively little, since there is a relatively high probability of any two individuals presenting the same data.
  • biometric data such as the fingerprints of all ten digits of the hand, or such as the iris characteristics of the eyes presents a relatively high level of discrimination, such that there is a relatively small probability of any two individuals presenting the same data.
  • Some applications require biometric data to be used with strong discriminating power, since they relate exclusively or almost exclusively to particular individuals. This can apply for example to an application seeking to give specialized personnel access to a strategic site.
  • a drawback of highly discriminating biometric data is that it can invade privacy since it can make it possible to characterize an individual completely. Thus, it is not impossible that an application using highly discriminating biometric data could be misappropriated to find data relating to its users (in particular personal data, e.g. identity) outside the normal context of use.
  • An object of the present invention is to limit those drawbacks.
  • the invention thus provides a method of taking biometric data and of determining therefrom an identifier of determined discriminating power.
  • the method comprises the following steps relating to an individual:
  • the identifier as obtained in this way stems from biometric data relating to the individual. Nevertheless, it has its own discriminating power that is less than that of the initial biometric data. In other words, the identifier corresponds to controlled degradation of the initial biometric data.
  • the degradation is not invertible, i.e. because of the properties of the hashing function, it is practically impossible to find the code word when knowing only the hashed code word.
  • the discriminating power of the identifier is determined, possibly in advance, e.g. with reference to a level of discrimination desired for an application that provides for verification making use of said identifier.
  • the discriminating power can thus be selected depending on requirements. In particular it can be selected to be sufficiently weak to guarantee a certain level of privacy protection, whenever that is necessary.
  • the invention also provides a biometric verification method using a first data medium storing in association, for at least one individual in a set of individuals: an identity relating to said individual; the result of adding a first word of an error-correcting code associated with said individual and a first digital string obtained from biometric data relating to said individual; and at least one identifier of determined discriminating power obtained by applying a hashing function to the first error-correcting code word.
  • the method comprises the following steps relating to an individual of the set of individuals:
  • biometric verification is performed using an identifier having discriminating power that matches expectations. It is also based on initial biometric data, which may be obtained using conventional acquisition means, for example, regardless of the level of discrimination that is desired.
  • a plurality of identifiers having distinct determined discriminating powers can be stored for a given individual. An identifier is then selected from that plurality, where the selected identifier has discriminating power that best matches the level of discrimination desired for the application that is to be implemented.
  • the invention also provides an identification method using a first data medium storing in association, for each individual in a set of individuals: an identity relating to said individual; the result of adding a first word of an error-correcting code associating said individual with a first digital string obtained from biometric data relating to said individual; and at least one identifier of determined discriminating power obtained by applying a hashing function to the first error-correcting code word.
  • the method comprises the following steps relating to an individual of the set of individuals:
  • the invention also proposes a system comprising means for obtaining biometric data and digital processor means arranged to implement the above-mentioned method of determining an identifier of determined discriminating power from biometric data.
  • the invention also provides a system comprising means for obtaining biometric data and digital processor means arranged to implement the above-mentioned method of biometric verification.
  • the invention also provides a system comprising means for obtaining biometric data and digital processor means arranged to implement the above-mentioned identification method.
  • the invention also provides a computer program product comprising code instructions adapted to implement the above-mentioned method of determining an identifier of determined discriminating power from biometric data, on being loaded and executed by computer means.
  • the invention also provides a computer program product comprising code instructions adapted to implement the above-mentioned method of biometric verification, on being loaded and executed by computer means.
  • the invention also provides a computer program product comprising code instructions adapted to implement the above-mentioned method of identification, on being loaded and executed by computer means.
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram showing the steps of an enrollment stage enabling an identifier to be determined in accordance with the invention
  • FIG. 2 is a diagram showing steps of biometric verification in accordance with the invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a diagram showing additional steps of biometric verification in a particular implementation of the invention.
  • FIGS. 4 to 7 are simplified examples of digital strings used in the context of performing biometric verifications on the principles of the invention.
  • FIG. 1 shows an individual 1 for whom it is desired to determine an identifier of determined discriminating power, during a stage referred as an “enrollment” stage.
  • This discriminating power may be selected, for example, so as to comply with a level of discrimination required by an application implementing biometric verification.
  • the identifier as determined in this way can then be used during biometric verification, by providing a guarantee that the requirements of the application in terms of discrimination are satisfied.
  • the identifier is determined as follows.
  • Biometric data is initially obtained for the individual 1 .
  • This biometric data may be of various different types. Preferably, it presents relatively high discriminating power. Discriminating power is sometimes characterized by a “false acceptance” rate that corresponds to the probability of confusing any two people on analyzing their biometric data.
  • the biometric data obtained in the present example is thus advantageously selected to present an acceptable false acceptance rate that is below a predetermined threshold, e.g. 10 ⁇ 6 .
  • the data may thus relate to fingerprints or to the characteristics of the iris of an eye, for example.
  • the biometric data is advantageously obtained by acquisition using a sensor 2 .
  • the sensor is adapted to the kind of biometric data that it is desired to obtain.
  • it may be a conventional fingerprint sensor or a sensor of iris characteristics.
  • the digital string w 1 obtained in this way may be constituted by a string of binary digits, for example.
  • obtaining the string w 1 may comprise pre-orientation of fingerprint images in a particular direction, and extracting certain characteristics (e.g. minutiae or ridge directions).
  • certain characteristics e.g. minutiae or ridge directions.
  • an iris code can be extracted.
  • the individual is associated with a code word c 1 from an error-correcting code, which code word may be selected in random manner from the various words of the code.
  • This word is a digital string, e.g. a binary string, as is preferably identical in size to the binary string w 1 .
  • various error-correcting codes can be used.
  • the error-correcting code word c 1 is added to the binary string w 1 (step 4 ).
  • the term “add” is used to mean the exclusive OR operation ( ⁇ ), where adding the two binary strings is such that two identical bits having the same rank in both strings give rise to a “zero”, whereas two different bits of the same rank in the two strings give rise to a “1”. This produces a new binary string w 1 ⁇ c 1 .
  • An identifier H(c 1 ) is also calculated from the code word c 1 , where the function H is a hashing function (step 5 ).
  • a hashing function is a compression function serving to obtain information that is shorter than the initial information that was applied thereto. It also has the property of delivering results that are very different from initial information items that differ very slightly, i.e. it accentuates differences between distinct items of information, so as to avoid it being easy to rediscover the initial information from the result of hashing.
  • the hashing function H is selected in such a manner that the resulting identifier H(c 1 ) has determined discriminating power.
  • the hashing function selected implies a probability of collision, i.e. a probability of reaching the same condensed version from distinct strings, that corresponds to the false acceptance rate that is presented by the identifier H(c 1 ).
  • the hashing function is selected to have an equiprobable arrival space comprising a number of possible values that correspond substantially to the determined discriminating power of the identifier.
  • hashing function H derived from the SHA-1 function described in the FIPS 180-1 standard, “Secure hash standard”, published in April 1993 by the Federal Information Processing Standards organization, that produces condensed strings of 160 bits. Many other hashing functions could naturally also be used.
  • H(c 1 ) [SHA-1(c 1 )] i1, . . . , in , i.e.
  • the identifier as determined is a string of n bits corresponding to the bits of ranks i 1, . . . , i n of the binary string that result from applying the SHA-1 function to the code word c 1 .
  • H(c 1 ) thus has discriminating power of 2 n . Because of the properties of the function H, any arbitrary individual has one chance in 2 n of having the same identifier H(c 1 ) as the individual 1 , even if some other code word c 2 is associated with that individual.
  • n should be selected to be relatively small (e.g. less than 20). Conversely, if it is desired to be able to perform biometric verification in a highly discriminating manner, then n should be selected to be relatively large (e.g. greater than 20).
  • the information obtained relating to the individual 1 i.e. w 1 ⁇ c 1 and H(c 1 ) is subsequently stored in associated manner on a data medium (step 6 ).
  • the information is also associated with an identity I 1 of the individual 1 .
  • This identity which may consist in the surname and forename of the individual 1 , but could possibly be constituted by other types of information, can be given by the individual 1 (step 7 ) or else can be obtained by other means.
  • the identity is advantageously verified prior to being stored on the data medium.
  • all of the information is stored in an identity database 8 for storing information about a set of individuals 1 -m.
  • c 1 , H(c 1 ), and I 1 could be stored in association on a biometric token advantageously held by the individual 1 .
  • Other data media can also be envisaged, insofar as they can subsequently be interrogated when performing biometric verification.
  • the binary string w 1 characterizing the individual 1 is not stored as such, but only in the form w 1 ⁇ c 1 .
  • any person having access to the database cannot find a link between the identity I 1 and the binary string w 1 of the individual 1 .
  • Such a person knowing the identity I 1 will be incapable of deducing therefrom the binary string w 1 on the basis of data in the database 8 .
  • the identity I 1 cannot be deduced therefrom on the basis of data in the database 8 .
  • the binary string w 1 of the individual 1 and the identifier H(c 1 ) that is obtained are also stored with each other on a second data medium that may also be a database 11 or any other suitable medium (steps 9 and 10 ).
  • the biometric database 11 does not have identity information, such as the identity I 1 of the individual 1 , thereby guaranteeing that privacy is protected.
  • the system may be constituted by a simple apparatus, comprising the sensor 2 and digital processor means appropriate for processing the binary strings, or else it may be distributed amongst different apparatuses capable of communicating with one another by any manner that can be envisaged.
  • biometric verification can be performed using an identifier of determined discriminating power as described above.
  • This biometric verification can be implemented in the context of any application. For example, it may be a prelude to granting a right, as specified in the introduction.
  • the intended application requires a given level of discrimination, with reference to which the discriminating power of the above-described identifier has been determined.
  • biometric data is obtained from the individual 1 .
  • the biometric data in question is data of the same type as that which was obtained during enrollment. It may advantageously be obtained with a sensor that is the same or of the same type as the sensor 2 of FIG. 1 .
  • the resulting biometric data is then converted into a digital string, under the same conditions as during enrollment (step 12 ).
  • a binary string w′ 1 is thus obtained which may differ from the binary string w 1 to a greater or lesser extent. These differences are associated with the lack of reproducibility in biometric measurements performed using the sensor 2 .
  • two successive measurements of a fingerprint can differ because of variation in the angle of inclination of the finger or because of variation in the pressure exerted by the finger on the sensor between the two measurements.
  • a new binary string is calculated by adding w′ 1 and the string w 1 ⁇ c 1 as previously stored in the database 8 or any equivalent data medium (step 13 ).
  • the string w 1 ⁇ c 1 corresponding to the individual 1 is found in the database 8 , e.g. using the identity I 1 as given by the individual 1 .
  • w′ 1 ⁇ w 1 ⁇ c 1 can consist in a word c′ 1 of the error-correcting code to which the word c 1 belongs.
  • the decoding algorithm associated with said error-correcting code is advantageously used in order to find the word c′ 1 of the error-correcting code that is the closest to w′ 1 ⁇ w 1 ⁇ c l .
  • the success of this operation relies on the fact that the error-correcting code is designed to correct a certain number of errors in binary strings, where the differences between w′ 1 and w 1 are then thought of as errors.
  • the hashing function H as used in the above-described enrollment stage is then applied to the new code word c′ 1 (step 14 ).
  • the resulting condensed information H(c′ 1 ) is then compared with the identifier H(c 1 ) stored in the database 8 for the individual 1 (step 15 ).
  • the identifier H(c 1 ) is found in the database 8 , e.g. using the identity I 1 given by the individual 1 .
  • biometric verification can be considered as being a success, i.e. it is considered that the individual 1 being verified is indeed the individual who was previously enrolled as described with reference to FIG. 1 . It is thus possible to perform authentication from the identity I 1 given by the individual 1 .
  • biometric verification can thus be performed with a low level of discrimination in order to protect the privacy of the individual 1 , even when using biometric data that presents a relatively high level of discrimination.
  • step 15 After the verification performed in step 15 , other steps may optionally be implemented depending on the intended application. For example, a right might be granted to the individual 1 under such circumstances.
  • FIG. 3 shows an example of biometric verification including verification steps additional to those of the example of FIG. 2 .
  • Steps 12 to 14 are identical to those of FIG. 2 .
  • the corresponding binary string w 1 is found in the biometric database 11 or any other equivalent data medium, i.e. the string is found that presents the greatest similarity with w′ 1 and that is therefore likely to characterize the same individual 1 (step 16 ).
  • H(c′ 1 ) is then compared with the identifier H(c 1 ) (step 17 ). If they are equal, it can then be concluded that the individual 1 has already been biometrically recorded in the database 11 during prior enrollment.
  • This verification can be useful, for example, in order to avoid the individual 1 being subjected to a plurality of successive enrollments that could potentially allow that individual to have the same right granted more than once (for example a plurality of driver's licenses with different identities, etc.).
  • the relatively poor discriminating power of the identifier H(c 1 ) prevents any person who has access to the database 11 from finding the binary string w 1 characterizing the individual 1 on the basis of the identifier H(c 1 ), since a plurality of individuals can have the same identifier H(c 1 ). This ensures protection for the privacy of the individual 1 .
  • FIGS. 2 and 3 can be implemented by a system that advantageously makes use of a computer program.
  • the system may consist in a single apparatus, comprising the sensor 2 and the digital processor means needed for processing the binary string, or it may be spread over a plurality of apparatuses suitable for communicating with one another in any manner that can be envisaged.
  • the system may be the same as that described with reference to FIG. 1 and used during enrollment. The systems could equally well be distinct.
  • a plurality of identifiers having distinct discriminating powers are determined for the individual 1 .
  • t identifiers H 1 (c 1 ), H 2 (c 1 ), . . . , H t (c 1 ) having decreasing discriminating powers can be obtained and stored in association with the individual 1 in application of the principles described with reference to FIG. 1 .
  • biometric verification is performed as described with reference to FIG. 2 or FIG. 3 , using the identifier of discriminating power that corresponds to the level of discrimination required for said application.
  • an application requiring a high level of discrimination can require biometric verification using the identifier H 1 (c 1 )
  • an application requiring a low level of discrimination can require biometric verification using the identifier H t (c 1 ), for example.
  • the desired level of discrimination can be determined beforehand, possibly as a result of negotiation with the individual concerned.
  • biometric verifications with different levels of discrimination can be performed using a single biometric data set and thus using a single sensor, in a manner that is transparent for the individual concerned. Nevertheless, the privacy of the individual is guaranteed wherever necessary, even if biometric data with a relatively high level of discrimination is initially acquired for said individual.
  • FIGS. 4 to 7 show simplified numerical examples for better understanding the operation of the above-described invention.
  • FIG. 4 shows a binary string w 1 assumed to characterize an individual 1 .
  • such a binary string could advantageously comprise a larger number of bits, for example 20 or more bits.
  • the code C selected for this example is a simplified code. In practice, error-correcting codes that are more complex, such as those mentioned above, could advantageously be used.
  • a word of the code C i.e. m 3
  • c 1 m 3
  • the binary string w 1 ⁇ c 1 is determined, i.e. w 1 ⁇ m 3 , as shown in FIG. 4 .
  • the hashing function H used consists in selecting the second bit of a binary string, starting from the left.
  • H(c 1 ) is equal to 1, as shown in FIG. 4 by a box round the selected bit.
  • hashing function is particularly simple, for reasons of clarity. In practice, it is possible to use hashing functions that are more complex, such as those mentioned above.
  • FIG. 5 shows an example of biometric verification concerning the individual 1 .
  • a new binary string w′ 1 is obtained for the individual 1 , e.g. using a new biometric measurement.
  • This binary string w′ 1 has three differences relative to the binary string w 1 .
  • the bits that differ are ringed in the binary string w′ 1 of FIG. 5 .
  • the binary string w′ 1 ⁇ w 1 ⁇ c 1 is calculated and a search is made to find the word c′ 1 of the code C that is closest to this string. It is found that the string w′ 1 ⁇ w 1 ⁇ c 1 has three differences relative to the word m 3 .
  • calculating H(c′ 1 ) finds H(m 3 ), i.e. the binary value 1, as indicated by the box round the second bit of the word c′ 1 in FIG. 5 .
  • FIG. 6 shows an example of biometric verification relating to an individual 2 attempting to pass for the individual 1 .
  • the binary string w 2 characterizing the individual 2 is obtained, e.g. by performing a biometric measurement.
  • This string w 2 differs very considerably from the string w 1 relating to the individual 1 . Eleven bits (ringed in FIG. 6 ) differ between these two strings.
  • the string w 2 ⁇ w 1 ⁇ c 1 is calculated, and then the word c 2 of the code C is found that is the closest to this string, using the error decoding properties of the code.
  • the present invention can also be used in identification applications, i.e. to find the identity of an individual from a biometric measurement.
  • Steps 12 to 14 are implemented as described above, except that the string w′ 1 is added to all of the strings w 1 ⁇ c 1 , w 2 ⁇ c 2 , . . . , w m ⁇ c m stored in the database 8 relating to distinct individuals, or at least to a plurality of those strings.
  • H(c′ 1 ), H(c′ 2 ), . . . , H(c′ m ) it is verified whether it corresponds to the corresponding identifier H(c 1 ), H(c 2 ), . . . , H(c m ) that is stored in the database 8 .

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US20070183632A1 (en) 2007-08-09
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CA2573652C (fr) 2015-06-23

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