WO2009092088A1 - Procédé de contrôle d'une pluralité de centres de commande à des fins de commande et de soutien fonctionnels - Google Patents

Procédé de contrôle d'une pluralité de centres de commande à des fins de commande et de soutien fonctionnels Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2009092088A1
WO2009092088A1 PCT/US2009/031492 US2009031492W WO2009092088A1 WO 2009092088 A1 WO2009092088 A1 WO 2009092088A1 US 2009031492 W US2009031492 W US 2009031492W WO 2009092088 A1 WO2009092088 A1 WO 2009092088A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
control center
train
control
territory
signal
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/US2009/031492
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English (en)
Inventor
Robert B. Groves
Richard A. Allshouse
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Lockheed Martin Corp
Original Assignee
Lockheed Corp
Lockheed Martin Corp
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Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Lockheed Corp, Lockheed Martin Corp filed Critical Lockheed Corp
Publication of WO2009092088A1 publication Critical patent/WO2009092088A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/30—Trackside multiple control systems, e.g. switch-over between different systems
    • B61L27/33—Backup systems, e.g. switching when failures occur
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to railways in general, and, more particularly, to a method for controlling train transitions between regional control centers.
  • the present invention provides a way to automate the hand-off of control in a rail system and handle failover.
  • the methods disclosed herein operate within the transportation server of each control center.
  • the method is implemented as software suitable for running on the processor of a transportation server.
  • all relatively static data is stored redundantly at each control center, such that every center has a complete view of the transportation network. This reduces downtime and increases the probability that data is not corrupted in transit. This data is periodically validated between control centers and any modification of the data is immediately transferred to the others, with a positive acknowledgement required.
  • Dynamic data that is shared between the control center and train is stored only at the responsible control center and on the train itself. If the division between control centers is geographically based, any data that spans the border between control centers is tagged appropriately (e.g., an authority can be granted to a vehicle which exceeds the nominal territory handled by the control center, but it is tagged as "suspect" until validated by the next control center). Any valid control center can send a train the dynamic data so that the train acts independently of the control center with which it communicates. As a consequence, if control moves to a different center, the train will not be affected.
  • An aspect of the illustrative embodiment is to embed information in the messages that are transmitted between a train and control centers so that positive identification is inherent to the messaging (prevents spoofing).
  • FIG. 1 depicts a portion of a railway network including two network control centers operating in accordance with the illustrative embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 depicts a method in accordance with the illustrative embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 depicts the portion of the railway network depicted in FIG. 1, wherein one of the network control centers is communicating with the train.
  • FIG. 4 depicts a method pertaining to ascertaining the operational status of the two network control centers.
  • FIG. 5 depicts the portion of the railway network depicted in FIG. 1, wherein both of the network control centers are communicating with the train.
  • FIG. 6 depicts the portion of the railway network depicted in FIG. 1, wherein one of the network control centers is taking control of the territory that is normally controlled by the other network control center.
  • Safety-critical A safety-critical system is defined when at least one identified hazard can lead directly to a mishap (accident). Standard 1483
  • the fail-safely implementation means that all credible failures that could occur are examined and the occurrence of any one of them (or combination of failures in the event that the first failure is not self- evident) maintains the system in a safe state. That can be done either by forcing the system to a stop (or other safe state such as a less-permissive signal) or by transferring control to a secondary system, such as a redundant computer.
  • FIG. 1 depicts portion 100 of a railway network.
  • Two territories 102 and 106 are defined within portion 100.
  • Territory 102 is controlled by network control center 104 and territory 106 is controlled by network control center 108.
  • Train 110 is traveling through territory 102 on tracks 112 heading toward territory 106.
  • Each network control center 104 and 108 stores all relatively static data, such as the track database, etc. The purpose for this is to minimize downtime and increase the probability that such data is not corrupted in transit (i.e., if the data were not redundantly stored as described herein).
  • This data is periodically synchronized and validated between the control centers (and other control centers that are not depicted in FIG. 1). Any modification of such data is immediately propagated to all network control centers. A positive acknowledgment of the update is required.
  • Train 110 is provided with identifying codes for network control centers 104 and 108 (e.g., at installation, etc.). Likewise, the network control centers are provided with an identifying code for train 110. Imbedding the identifying codes in messages between the train and network control centers (or between network control centers) prevents spoofing.
  • Dynamic data that is shared between the control center and train is stored only at the responsible control center and on the train itself. This is distinct from the treatment of relatively static data, which is stored at all control centers, as disclosed above. If the division between control centers is geographically based, any data that spans the border between control centers is tagged appropriately. That is, an authority can be granted to a vehicle by a control center for territory that exceeds the nominal territory handled by that control center. But if such authority is granted, it is tagged as "suspect" until validated by nominal control center for the territory in question. Any valid control center can send a train the dynamic data so that the train acts independently of the control center with which it communicates. As a consequence, if control moves to a different center, the train will not be affected.
  • control center If and when a control center fails, other control centers will notice the failure during a periodic validation process. Once failure is noticed, the other control centers take over control (upon human confirmation, if so configured) what would otherwise be the failed controller's territory.
  • the control centers first determine which particular vehicles are affected and then upload all the dynamic data from those vehicles. Identification of the affected vehicles is based on the fact that it is those vehicles that will start to look for another control center when its health check of the formerly-controlling control center fails.
  • FIG. 2 depicts method 200 for controlling a train through a rail network accordance with the illustrative embodiment of the present invention.
  • "dynamic" data is transmitted between a train and a first control center.
  • the first control center is nominally responsible for controlling train traffic within a first territory in which the train is present.
  • "Dynamic" data is defined herein as data that is liable to change on a regular basis, such as authorizations, etc.
  • Dynamic data is distinguished from "static" data, which is defined herein as data that is not likely to change on a regular basis, such as a track map, etc.
  • static data which is stored at all control centers, dynamic data is shared only between (and stored only at) the train and the controlling control center.
  • the dynamic data is stored on both the train and at the first control center, as per operation 204.
  • a second control center is notified that the train is in the first territory, wherein the second control center is responsible for controlling traffic within a second territory that is adjacent to the first territory.
  • the first control center notifies the second control center of the presence of the train in the first territory.
  • the first control center issues a grant of provisional authority to enter the second territory. This grant is considered suspect until validated by the second control center, which nominally controls the second territory.
  • the second control center grants the train full authority to enter the second territory when it is determined that it is safe to do so. At this point, the train will still be in the first territory. The second control center issues no other control messages until the train enters the second territory.
  • FIGs. 3, 5, and 6 depict the practice of method 200 in the context of portion 100 of the railway system of FIG. 1.
  • FIG. 3 depicts communication between network control center 104 and train 110.
  • the train verifies that all messages come from a control center having a known identification code.
  • network control center 104 verifies that all messages it receives come from a train having a known identification code.
  • network control center 104 verifies the crew of the train via a logon or password.
  • network control centers 104 and 106 communicate.
  • control center 104 advises control center 106 of the existence of train 110 in territory 102.
  • control center 104 sends a message to control center 106 advising that it (control center 104) granted provisional authority to train 110 to enter territory 106.
  • the purpose for the provisional grant is to reduce the likelihood that train 110 will be forced to stop before the "handoff" to control center 106 occurs.
  • Additional communications between the control centers 104 and 106, and between the control centers and a train include the transmission of a "heart beat.” The heart beat is intended to gauge the health of the control center.
  • FIG. 4 depicts this process.
  • a first signal is transmitted from a first control center to a second control center, wherein the first signal is indicative of the operational status of the first control center.
  • a second signal is transmitted from the first control center to a train, wherein the second signal is indicative of the operational status of the first control center, as per operation 404.
  • a third signal is transmitted from the second control center to the first control center, wherein the third signal is indicative of the operational status of the second control center, in accordance with operation 406.
  • a fourth signal is transmitted from the second control center to the train, wherein the fourth signal is indicative of the operational status of the second control center, as per operation 408.
  • FIG. 5 depicts train 110 nearing territory 106.
  • Control centers 104 and 108 send and receive heartbeats, as per method 400. Furthermore, train 110 sends location reports to both of the control centers. Train 110 will enforce the limits of its authority ⁇ i.e., it will stop) unless any control center (other than control center 104) validates the provisional authority granted by control center 104.
  • network control center 108 communicates with approaching train 110 and grants full authority for the train to enter territory 106 as long as it is safe to do so.
  • FIG. 6 depicts a scenario in which control center 104 fails.
  • Network control center 108 loses the heartbeat from control center 104.
  • Control center 108 then communicates with train 110 to verify their loss of contact with control center 104. Once verified, control center 108 takes control over territory 102, which was formerly controlled by control center 104.
  • Control center 108 continues to use its own copy of static data, but retrieves all dynamic data from any trains that were under the control of control center 104 at the time the heartbeat was lost.
  • train 110 might not be directly aware of the failover of control center 104 since the train simply validates messages that come from valid control centers; it does not have knowledge, per se, of the control center that originates the message.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention se rapporte à une manière d'automatiser le transfert de commande de train dans un système de rails et de traiter le basculement.
PCT/US2009/031492 2008-01-17 2009-01-21 Procédé de contrôle d'une pluralité de centres de commande à des fins de commande et de soutien fonctionnels Ceased WO2009092088A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US2185508P 2008-01-17 2008-01-17
US61/021,855 2008-01-17
US12/356,387 US20090184211A1 (en) 2008-01-17 2009-01-20 Method to Monitor a Plurality of Control Centers for Operational Control and Backup Purposes
US12/356,387 2009-01-20

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2009092088A1 true WO2009092088A1 (fr) 2009-07-23

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PCT/US2009/031492 Ceased WO2009092088A1 (fr) 2008-01-17 2009-01-21 Procédé de contrôle d'une pluralité de centres de commande à des fins de commande et de soutien fonctionnels

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Country Link
US (1) US20090184211A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2009092088A1 (fr)

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EP3747727B1 (fr) 2018-05-31 2024-06-26 CRSC Research & Design Institute Group Co., Ltd. Système et procédé de traitement de données

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CN101934807B (zh) * 2010-08-24 2011-09-28 北京交大资产经营有限公司 基于列车控制系统的移动授权计算方法
US9648531B2 (en) * 2013-01-20 2017-05-09 Eci Telecom Ltd. Communication services to a moving platform
FR3025480B1 (fr) * 2014-09-04 2016-12-23 Alstom Transp Tech Infrastructure de radiocommunication pour un systeme de signalisation ferroviaire du type cbtc
CN106184297B (zh) * 2015-07-10 2018-09-14 海能达通信股份有限公司 一种轨道交通调度的方法及服务器、系统
DE102017217447A1 (de) * 2017-09-29 2019-04-04 Siemens Mobility GmbH Verfahren und Anordnung zum Durchführen eines Fahrbetriebs von spurgeführten Fahrzeugen in einem in Streckenbereiche gegliederten Streckennetz
CN115465338A (zh) * 2022-09-20 2022-12-13 上海富欣智能交通控制有限公司 动态选择管理员的方法及控制系统
WO2024072833A1 (fr) * 2022-09-26 2024-04-04 Parallel Systems, Inc. Système et/ou procédé d'administration ferroviaire
WO2024097239A1 (fr) 2022-10-31 2024-05-10 Parallel Systems, Inc. Système et/ou procédé de commande de rail
US11981363B1 (en) 2022-11-18 2024-05-14 Parallel Systems, Inc. System and/or method for remote operation of a rail vehicle
AU2024305290A1 (en) 2023-06-15 2025-12-11 Parallel Systems, Inc. Railway switch management system and/or method
WO2025019605A1 (fr) 2023-07-17 2025-01-23 Parallel Systems, Inc. Système et/ou procédé de surveillance de rail à distance

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