WO2011072231A2 - Procédés et systèmes d'authentification personnelle - Google Patents

Procédés et systèmes d'authentification personnelle Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2011072231A2
WO2011072231A2 PCT/US2010/059905 US2010059905W WO2011072231A2 WO 2011072231 A2 WO2011072231 A2 WO 2011072231A2 US 2010059905 W US2010059905 W US 2010059905W WO 2011072231 A2 WO2011072231 A2 WO 2011072231A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
rfid
key
tag
rfid tag
reader
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/US2010/059905
Other languages
English (en)
Other versions
WO2011072231A3 (fr
Inventor
Jena Jordahl
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Individual
Original Assignee
Individual
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Priority to US13/515,238 priority Critical patent/US9467280B2/en
Publication of WO2011072231A2 publication Critical patent/WO2011072231A2/fr
Publication of WO2011072231A3 publication Critical patent/WO2011072231A3/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Priority to US15/289,416 priority patent/US20170250808A1/en
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3215Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a plurality of channels
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0492Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload by using a location-limited connection, e.g. near-field communication or limited proximity of entities
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • H04L9/3231Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H04L9/3273Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041Key generation or derivation
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06Authentication
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/80Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80Wireless
    • H04L2209/805Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/40Security arrangements using identity modules
    • H04W12/47Security arrangements using identity modules using near field communication [NFC] or radio frequency identification [RFID] modules

Definitions

  • the present application is directed generally to methods and systems for personal authentication, in particular, to methods and systems for personal authentication using radio frequency identification (RFID) devices.
  • RFID radio frequency identification
  • RFID systems may be vulnerable to unauthorized access if a third party uses an RFID reader to attempt to obtain information. If the RFID tag is a WORM (Write Once, Read Many) or a read-only tag, then if an unauthorized third party accesses the information on the tag, the security provided by the tag is breached and the tag must be replaced. Additionally, existing RFID system may not provide notification to the RFID holder if or when the RFID tag is being read.
  • WORM Write Once, Read Many
  • the systems and methods described herein are directed to a personal authentication system to increase security of information without the use of biometric information or the need to memorize and recite cumbersome passwords.
  • the system includes the use of one or more RFID tags that are disguised as everyday items, such as a key ring or jewelry.
  • the RFID tags are enhanced by using advanced cryptography. Additionally, the systems and methods described herein address measures to prevent unauthorized access by third parties.
  • FIG. 1 A is a block diagram of an embodiment of a system for personal authentication using RFID
  • FIG. IB is a block diagram of an embodiment of a system for personal authentication using RFID
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an embodiment of a system for creating personal authentication keys using RFID
  • FIG. 3 is a flow diagram of one embodiment of a method for creating personal authentication keys using RFID
  • FIG. 4 is a flow diagram of one embodiment of a method for responding to unauthorized RFID readers attempting to read the RFID keys
  • the system 100 includes one or more RFID tags 105a-105n and an RFID reader 110, in communication with a server 120 over a network 115.
  • the drawing depicts an RFID reader in communication with a server, in some embodiments, the system includes only the one or more RFID tags and the RFID reader.
  • Each RFID tag 105 contains a portion of an authentication key as well as data necessary to prevent unauthorized third party access.
  • the RFID reader 110 verifies the key and authenticates the user.
  • an RFID tag 105 is a passive, read- write identification (RFID) device.
  • RFID passive RFID tag is one that relies entirely on an RFID reader as its power source.
  • a read-write RFID tag can be added to or overwritten numerous times.
  • the RFID tag 105 can include an RFID chip and antennae.
  • the RFID chip can be an integrated circuit for storing and processing information and modulating and demodulating a radio-frequency signal.
  • the antenna is used to receive and transmit the radio-frequency signal.
  • Each RFID tag 105 can be accessed by an RFID reader 110 and can store information transmitted to it.
  • the RFID reader 110 emits radio signals that power up and activate the passive RFID tags 105.
  • the activated RFID tags 105 transmit data to the RFID reader 110 which collects the information
  • the RFID reader 110 is a device that is used to interrogate RFID tags 105.
  • the RFID reader 110 is a computing device that can include an RFID reader unit, which includes an antenna that emits radio waves. Responsive to the emitted radio waves, the RFID tags are powered up and respond by sending back their data.
  • the RFID reader 110 can also include storage element to store data necessary to authenticate a user once a key is presented.
  • the RFID reader 110 can be in communication with other computing devices, such as a server 120 used for electronic commerce to use data stored on the server 120 to
  • FIG. 1 B is similar to FIG. 1 A and will only be discussed in detail to the extent necessary.
  • FIG. IB is an exemplary embodiment of the system 100 described herein.
  • the RFID tags 105 can be in the form of common objects, such as a tiepin 105x, a watch 105y, and a wallet 105z.
  • An RFID tag 105 can also be a bead on a necklace, a stone on a ring, key ring, card, or other such inconspicuous item.
  • the RFID tag 105 can also be attached to common objects by a temporary adhesive, permanent adhesive, or other adhesion mechanism.
  • the RFID tag can be attached to common objects by other methods, such as clips, inserts, or magnets.
  • RFID tags can be vulnerable to third party unauthorized access. The present disclosure provides mechanisms to deal with third party attempts to access any of the RFID tags in the system described herein.
  • Each RFID tag 105 can be equipped with an auditory or visual mechanism to indicate that a tag is being read. For example, a tag can emit a tone or a series of short tones signifying that the tag is being read. Similarly, a tag can be equipped with a small bulb, such as an LED that will flash when being read by an RFID reader 110.
  • the system can include an RFID tag controller.
  • An RFID tag controller is a master device which signals to the RFID tags 105 to cease emitting sounds or lights for a specified period of time.
  • the RFID tag controller can be in the form of a device that includes a button. When the button is pushed by the user, the RFID tags within range receive a signal from the controller and temporarily stops emitting sounds or lights when the RFID tag is being read.
  • the system 200 includes the one or more RFID tags 105a-105n and an RFID reader 110 in communication with a computing device 210.
  • the computing device 210 communicates over a network 1 15 with a server 120.
  • Each RFID tag 105 is a read- write passive tag.
  • a user generates a key using methods described herein.
  • the key is transmitted to the RFID reader 110, which activates the RFID tags 105 and transmits the key or portion thereof to the RFID tag 105.
  • the client 210 communicates over the network 115 to a server 120 that receives the key and will later use it for authentication.
  • the computing device 210 can include an RFID reader 1 10.
  • the computing device is in communication with the RFID reader 210 through such means as USB or infrared.
  • the computing device can also be in communication with the RFID reader 110 over the network 115.
  • the computing device may be a handheld or mobile device, permitting the user to gain access to the system and generate or modify keys remotely.
  • the system can be hosted on a remote web server.
  • the remote web server may be accessed by a client computer or a handheld or mobile device, permitting the user to gain access to the system as long as they had access to an RFID reader 110 to read and write to the RFID tags 105.
  • the system generates the unique key for the user and communicates with the RFID reader 110.
  • the RFID reader 110 reads the RFID tag 105 and then writes the information provided by the system onto the tag 105.
  • the method 300 includes a user determining the number of RFID tags to use for personal authentication and loading the number to the client computer (Step 310).
  • the client computer then generates a key for use in personal authentication and assigns part of the key to the one or more RFID tags (Step 320).
  • the client computer then communicates with the RFID reader and writes the assigned portion of the key to the RFID tag (Step 330).
  • the client computer generates a password to be used in challenge-response authentication of RFID readers and transmits the password to the one or more RFID tags (Step 340).
  • the system described herein permits a user to determine the number of RFID tags 105a-105n to be used for personal authentication.
  • a user can choose as few as a single RFID tag 105 or may choose many RFID tags 105. Once the user chooses the number of RFID tags, they must load the number onto the client computer 210.
  • the client computer 210 uses the number to generate a key for use in the personal authentication system.
  • the key generated for use in the personal authentication system 100 can be generated using known methods of public key encryption.
  • Public key encryption uses mathematically related cryptographic keys, namely a public key and a private key. The keys are mathematically related but it is computationally infeasible to calculate the encryption of one key using the other.
  • the key can also be generated using known cryptography methods used in the art.
  • a client computer communicates with the RFID reader and writes the assigned portion of the key to the RFID tag 105.
  • the RFID reader is a component within the client computer. In other embodiments, the RFID reader is a hardware component in communication with the client computer.
  • the client computer communicates with the RFID reader to activate the RFID tags 105.
  • the RFID reader authenticates the RFID tags that belong to the system. Once the tags have been authenticated, the RFID reader writes the assigned portion of the generated key to the RFID tag 105. This is repeated until all RFID tags 105 have data transmitted to them. Once all data transmission to the RFID tags is complete, the RFID reader conducts a preliminary authentication check to ensure that all the RFID tags have been correctly written to and the combination of the tags works correctly.
  • the client computer 120 also generates multiple challenge- response combination.
  • the client computer generates responses and associates them with an identifier and transmits the responses and identifiers to the RFID tags for use in challenge-response authentication of RFID readers.
  • a challenge-response authentication is a protocol in which an RFID tag issues a question or "challenge" and the RFID reader must provide a valid answer or "response” in order to be authenticated. Once the RFID reader is authenticated, it can request the RFID tag to transmit the key fragment contained therein.
  • FIG. 4 is a flow diagram of one embodiment of a method for responding to an unauthorized RFID reader attempting to read the RFID tags 105 is depicted and described.
  • the method 400 includes an unauthorized RFID reader activating an RFID tag 105 containing all or part of an authentication key (Step 410).
  • the RFID tag 105 responds by transmitting a challenge question to the RFID tag 110 (Step 420).
  • an RFID reader activates an RFID tag 105 by emitting radio signals to power the tags.
  • the RFID tag 105 can emit a sound or flash a light, as described above, to signal to the person possessing the RFID tag that the tag 105 is currently being read.
  • the RFID tag transmits a challenge question to the RFID reader 110 previously transmitted to it from the client computer 210.
  • the RFID reader 110 In order to gain access to data on the RFID tag 105, the RFID reader 110 must provide the correct response. If the RFID tag 105 determines that the response received from the RFID reader 110 is correct, the RFID tag 105 authenticates the RFID reader 110 and permits the reader 110 access to the information on the RFID tag 105.
  • the RFID tag 105 transmits another challenge question and awaits a response from the reader 110. This step ma be repeated until the RFID tag 105 is depleted of challenge question. Alternatively, this step may be repeated for a pre-determined number of attempts by the RFID tag 105. If the RFID tag 105 does not receive a response from the RFID reader 110, the RFID tag 105 will lose power and turn off.
  • the tags could be reordered or switched out for other RFID tags 105.
  • the reordering or switched out RFID tags 105 would essentially create a new protected key.
  • the modified RFID tag 105 set Prior to the modified RFID tag being used for authentication purposes, the modified RFID tag 105 set would need to communicate with the client computer 105 and recorded so that the key would be updated to the modified set.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Life Sciences & Earth Sciences (AREA)
  • Biodiversity & Conservation Biology (AREA)
  • Biomedical Technology (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé permettant de créer des clés d'authentification personnelle, ledit procédé consistant à déterminer un certain nombre d'étiquettes RFID, à générer une clé, à diviser la clé en un certain nombre de parties, le nombre de parties correspondant au nombre d'étiquettes RFID déterminé, et à écrire chacune de la pluralité des parties de clé sur une étiquette RFID correspondante.
PCT/US2010/059905 2009-12-10 2010-12-10 Procédés et systèmes d'authentification personnelle Ceased WO2011072231A2 (fr)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US13/515,238 US9467280B2 (en) 2009-12-10 2010-12-10 Methods and systems for personal authentication
US15/289,416 US20170250808A1 (en) 2009-12-10 2016-10-10 Methods and systems for personal authentication

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US28537409P 2009-12-10 2009-12-10
US61/285,374 2009-12-10

Related Child Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US13/515,238 A-371-Of-International US9467280B2 (en) 2009-12-10 2010-12-10 Methods and systems for personal authentication
US15/289,416 Continuation-In-Part US20170250808A1 (en) 2009-12-10 2016-10-10 Methods and systems for personal authentication

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2011072231A2 true WO2011072231A2 (fr) 2011-06-16
WO2011072231A3 WO2011072231A3 (fr) 2011-11-17

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WO (1) WO2011072231A2 (fr)

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2015044522A1 (fr) * 2013-09-24 2015-04-02 Teknologian Tutkimuskeskus Vtt Dispositif rfid vestimentaire et système de communication
US11213773B2 (en) 2017-03-06 2022-01-04 Cummins Filtration Ip, Inc. Genuine filter recognition with filter monitoring system

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US8672222B2 (en) * 2010-05-03 2014-03-18 Avery Dennison Corporation Infrastructure-mounted RFID tags
BR112015021754A2 (pt) * 2013-03-12 2017-07-18 Intertrust Tech Corp sistemas e métodos de transação segura
US10872136B2 (en) * 2017-12-28 2020-12-22 Paypal, Inc. Using an NP-complete problem to deter malicious clients
US10872283B2 (en) * 2018-10-31 2020-12-22 United Services Automobile Association (Usaa) Wireless communications device with concealed value
US11465054B1 (en) 2019-12-04 2022-10-11 United Services Automobile Association (Usaa) Wireless communication device with concealed value in mobile gaming

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JP3656688B2 (ja) 1997-03-31 2005-06-08 栄司 岡本 暗号データ回復方法及び鍵登録システム
EP1520369B1 (fr) * 2002-05-31 2006-10-18 Scientific Generics Limited Systeme d'authentification biometrique
TW200504611A (en) 2003-04-25 2005-02-01 Sharp Kk Tags, and management method and management system using the same
KR101075651B1 (ko) * 2005-02-07 2011-10-21 삼성전자주식회사 개인 정보 보호를 위한 정보 보호 rfid 태그 및 방법
US20070206786A1 (en) 2005-08-31 2007-09-06 Skyetek, Inc. Rfid security system
US20080181398A1 (en) * 2007-01-26 2008-07-31 Ravikanth Pappu Methods and apparatus for enhancing privacy of objects associated with radio-frequency identification tags
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US20110002461A1 (en) * 2007-05-11 2011-01-06 Validity Sensors, Inc. Method and System for Electronically Securing an Electronic Biometric Device Using Physically Unclonable Functions
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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2015044522A1 (fr) * 2013-09-24 2015-04-02 Teknologian Tutkimuskeskus Vtt Dispositif rfid vestimentaire et système de communication
US11213773B2 (en) 2017-03-06 2022-01-04 Cummins Filtration Ip, Inc. Genuine filter recognition with filter monitoring system

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
WO2011072231A3 (fr) 2011-11-17
US20130108041A1 (en) 2013-05-02
US9467280B2 (en) 2016-10-11

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