WO2012019659A1 - Véhicule à moteur comprenant un composant électronique présentant une mémoire de données, et procédé de détection d'une manipulation de données dans la mémoire de données - Google Patents

Véhicule à moteur comprenant un composant électronique présentant une mémoire de données, et procédé de détection d'une manipulation de données dans la mémoire de données Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2012019659A1
WO2012019659A1 PCT/EP2011/002060 EP2011002060W WO2012019659A1 WO 2012019659 A1 WO2012019659 A1 WO 2012019659A1 EP 2011002060 W EP2011002060 W EP 2011002060W WO 2012019659 A1 WO2012019659 A1 WO 2012019659A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
data
memory
secure
electronic component
value
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Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/EP2011/002060
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German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Martin Sedlmeier
Michael Weis
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Audi AG
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Audi AG
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Publication date
Application filed by Audi AG filed Critical Audi AG
Publication of WO2012019659A1 publication Critical patent/WO2012019659A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures

Definitions

  • a motor vehicle comprising an electronic component with data memory and method for detecting a manipulation of data in the data memory
  • the invention relates to a method for detecting a manipulation of data in a data memory of an electronic component of a motor vehicle.
  • the invention further relates to a motor vehicle with an electronic component, which has a data memory, as well as with an additional secure memory device, which has a secure data memory, which is protected against writing from outside the secure memory device.
  • an additional secure memory device which has a secure data memory, which is protected against writing from outside the secure memory device.
  • it must be ensured that some information stored in the motor vehicle, such as the total mileage of the vehicle, ie the odometer reading, or an anti-theft identification number, is protected against manipulation by an unauthorized person.
  • it is known to store such data in a secure storage device of the motor vehicle.
  • the data can be encrypted by a microcontroller and written in encrypted form in a non-volatile memory. Since the mechanism of encryption from outside the microcontroller is not visible, it is not possible to read the data stored in the non-volatile data memory in encrypted form in readable form directly from the data memory, ie bypassing the microcontroller, or in the non-volatile memory Data storage stored information, so for example, the tachograph, specifically overwrite with a false information. The necessary step of decryption or encryption can only be performed by the microcontroller. The secure data storage rather the secure storage device is thus protected by a write from outside the secure storage device.
  • a car may have other electronic components in which data is stored in a data storage unencrypted.
  • the software and payload for a display of a dashboard of the motor vehicle may be stored in such a data store, although in principle it is possible to manipulate the unencrypted data in the data memory
  • This also opens up the possibility of indirectly falsifying sensitive data stored in the secure storage device: If the electronic component is, for example, a control device of a display device for the mileage, it can be achieved by an appropriate manipulation of a (unencrypted) data memory of this control device that a read out from the secure memory area value for the mileage in the controller v changed and this changed value is shown on the display device. This has been observed in connection with a sale of used cars. Fraudsters have thereby tried to simulate a lower mileage of used vehicles.
  • the object is achieved by the method according to claim 1.
  • the object is also achieved by a motor vehicle according to claim 8.
  • Advantageous developments of the method and the motor vehicle according to the invention are given by the dependent claims.
  • a manipulation of data in a data memory of an electronic component of a motor vehicle is detected.
  • the data memory of the electronic component is coupled to a secure memory device of the motor vehicle.
  • the secure storage device has a secure data storage that is protected against unauthorized writing from outside the secure storage device.
  • Data is read from at least one memory area of the data memory of the electronic component. At least one initial test value is determined on the basis of this read-out data.
  • a determination of a test value means that a value is determined by means of an imaging or calculation rule as a function of the data read out.
  • An example of such a check value is a checksum, which is calculated from the read-out data.
  • the at least one initial check value is stored in the secure data memory of the secure memory device.
  • data are read again from the at least one memory area of the electronic component and again at least one test value is determined on the basis of the read-out data.
  • this at least one test value is determined according to the same mapping or calculation rule as the at least one initial test value.
  • the at least one check value determined again is then compared with the at least one initial check value stored in the secure data memory.
  • the secure storage device with the secure data storage may be a storage device of the type known per se from the prior art.
  • the secured memory device can be coupled directly or indirectly with the data memory of the electronic component. Indirect coupling can be provided, for example, by a microcontroller of the electronic components, which reads out data from the data memory and transmits them in unchanged or changed form to the secure memory device.
  • a microcontroller of the electronic components which reads out data from the data memory and transmits them in unchanged or changed form to the secure memory device.
  • the at least one memory area from which the data is read out may comprise the entire data memory. It is also possible to read only individual memory cells or smaller memory areas and to base them on the calculation of the test values. This advantageously reduces the computational effort in the calculation of the test values.
  • the calculation of the test values is preferably carried out in the secure memory device.
  • the test value can be the read-out data itself.
  • a copy of the data from the at least one memory area is stored in the secure data memory in this case.
  • one or more test values are calculated from the read-out data, which together require less memory space than the read-out data itself.
  • a hash value is calculated by means of a hash function or a message authentication code (message verification code) by means of a symmetric authentication function or by means of a hash function for determining the respective at least one check value on the basis of the respective read data.
  • the calculation of hash values by means of hash functions and the calculation of a message authentication code is known per se.
  • the use of such functions in connection with the calculation of the test values has the advantage that even if a relatively large amount of data is read from the data memory of the electronic component, only a very small number of test values, possibly even a single test value, is sufficient. to reliably detect a manipulation of the data in the data memory.
  • the at least one storage area is replaced by the secured storage facility. at random.
  • the calculation of test values preferably takes place by the saved memory device. It can be provided that for determining a respective at least one test value on the basis of respective read-out data, at least one intermediate test value is initially determined by the electronic component itself. In this case, it is then provided that the at least one intermediate check value requires less memory than the read-out data itself. The at least one intermediate check value is then transmitted to the secure data storage device. There, on the basis of the at least one transmitted intermediate check value, the at least one check value is determined by the saved memory device. By not transmitting the individually read-out data, but only the intermediate check values calculated therefrom, from the electronic component to the saved memory device, the amount of data to be transmitted between these two components for checking the data can advantageously be reduced.
  • the checking of the data in the data memory of the electronic component takes place in two stages.
  • only a part of the entire data memory of the electronic component is included by the at least one memory area from which the data is read out.
  • the initial test value is stored in the stored data storage of the secure storage device in the manner described.
  • another initial check value is determined, which is determined on the basis of the data from the entire data store. In other words, an initial total check value is determined.
  • the at least one test value for the at least one memory area is first compared in a first stage with the corresponding initial test value for this at least one memory area.
  • a test value is then determined again for the entire data memory. This is then compared with the further initial check value for the entire data store, ie the initial total check value.
  • This embodiment of the method according to the invention has the advantage that in the first stage the detection of a manipulation of the data in the at least one storage area can be carried out in a relatively short time due to the smaller amount of data. The first stage can therefore be carried out, for example, at a start of the motor vehicle, without the initialization of the data and the calculation of the test values, the initialization of the electronic component is significantly delayed.
  • the entire data is checked. It can be done at a later, more favorable for undisturbed operation of the electronic component time.
  • a key value stored in the saved memory device can additionally be used as the basis.
  • a check value then depends not only on the data read, but also on the key value.
  • a key value is used in the calculation of a test value if the calculation of the test value is based on the data of the entire data memory of the electronic component.
  • a driving-mode-relevant component of the motor vehicle is controlled by means of a control signal.
  • a control signal may be, for example, an immobilizer of the motor vehicle. If a difference of the compared test value is detected, a warning signal can also be generated by which a user of the motor vehicle is made aware of the detected manipulation of the data.
  • Another aspect of the invention relates to a motor vehicle with an electronic component, which has a data memory, as well as with an additional secure memory device, which has a secure data memory.
  • a secure data memory is to be understood as one which is protected against writing from outside the secure storage device.
  • the secure storage device is coupled to the data memory of the electronic component.
  • the secure storage device is designed to at least one memory area of the data memory of the electronic component to determine at least one initial test value. As in the case of the method according to the invention, this initial check value here again depends on data stored in the at least one memory area of the electronic component.
  • the secure storage device is further configured to store the at least one initial check value in the secure data store. Finally, it is designed to determine a test value from data from the at least one memory area again at a later time, that is to say after the initial test value has been stored, and to compare this with the stored initial test value.
  • the electronic component of the motor vehicle may be a control device for controlling a display device of the motor vehicle.
  • this is a display device for displaying such information stored in the secure data memory, e.g. a tacho stand.
  • the secure storage device can be installed as a separate device in the motor vehicle and, for example, be coupled to the data memory of the electronic component via a data bus, such as a CAN bus (CAN - Controller Area Network).
  • the secure storage device may also be provided together with the electronic component as a single device.
  • the electronic component and the secure storage device are integrated in an instrument cluster of the motor vehicle.
  • Such an instrument cluster is the one device that displays the milage of the motor vehicle, ie its total mileage. It comprises the display device for the odometer reading and also the control device for controlling the display device.
  • Fig. 1 is a schematic representation of a combination instrument of a
  • FIG. 2 shows a flow chart of an embodiment of the method according to the invention, which is executed during operation of the instrument cluster shown in FIG.
  • an instrument cluster 10 is shown schematically, which is installed in a passenger car, not shown.
  • the instrument cluster 10 is arranged in the passenger car in a dashboard above a steering column of the passenger car.
  • a display device 12 of the instrument cluster 10 can be viewed by a driver during the drive of the passenger car by spokes of a steering wheel through.
  • the display device 12 has a numeric display for a tacho stand of the passenger car.
  • the display device further display instruments, such as a speedometer, a speed indicator or a fuel gauge, have.
  • the display on the display device 12 is controlled by a control device 14 of the instrument cluster 10.
  • the controller 14 includes a microcontroller 16 and a flash memory 18.
  • the flash memory 18 is a block addressable nonvolatile data memory. Instead of the flash memory 18, another digital storage medium may be provided.
  • the microcontroller 16 is connected in each case to the display device 12 and the flash memory 18 via data buses 20 'and 20 ", respectively, A program for operating the microcontroller 16 is stored in the memory 18. Further, in the memory 18 there are graphic Information stored for generating a display by means of the display device 12 is also stored in the combination instrument 10, a secure memory device 22 having a microcontroller 24 and a memory module 26.
  • the memory module 26 is a nonvolatile memory in which stored information is also stored is then maintained if the memory module 26 is not supplied with voltage
  • the memory module 26 may be an EEPROM (electrically erasable programmable read-only memory)
  • the memory module 26 is connected to the microcontroller 24 via a bus 20 " coupled.
  • the microcontroller 24 has an encryption unit 28 and a calculation unit 30.
  • the latter accesses the memory 26 via the encryption unit 28.
  • the data is transmitted to the encryption device 28 where it is encrypted and then stored via the bus 20 '' in the memory module 20.
  • To read out a date the same is transferred from the memory module 26 Transfer the bus 20 "'to the encryption unit 28, there decrypted and then provided to the computing unit 30 in unencrypted form. All information stored in the memory module 26 is in the form of encrypted data, whereby the information against a Targeted changing protected from outside the secure storage device.
  • the microcontroller 24 is an internal memory 31, in which an identification number 10 'of the instrument cluster 10 is stored.
  • the identification number 10 ' has been stored in the flash memory 31 during the manufacture of the instrument cluster 10. In each copy of the series of instrument cluster from which the instrument cluster 10 is derived, another identification number is stored.
  • the microcontroller 24 of the secure memory device 22 and the microcontroller 16 of the control device 14 are coupled via a data bus 32. Via the data bus 32, digital data can be exchanged between the microcontroller 24 and the microcontroller 16.
  • the microcontroller 24 is also coupled to the flash memory 18 via the microcontroller 16.
  • the control device 14 and the secure storage device 22 may be provided on a common printed circuit board or as separate components.
  • the data bus 32 may be provided as a private data bus, i. H. in the form of lines used exclusively to transfer data between microcontrollers 24 and 16.
  • the data bus 32 may also be a data bus to which other devices may be connected.
  • the value for the odometer reading, as displayed on the numeric display of the display device 12, is stored in the memory module 26 as a tachograph value 34.
  • the calculation unit 30 periodically reads out the tachograph value 34 from the memory module 24.
  • the read-out speed value 34 is decrypted by the encryption unit 28.
  • the decrypted odometer value is then transmitted via the data bus 32 to the microcontroller 16.
  • the microcontroller 16 executes a corresponding program for displaying the tachometer value, which is stored in the flash memory 18.
  • the microcontroller 16 is caused to receive the tachometer value 34 transmitted via the data bus 32 and to form therefrom a graphic representation of the tacho-level value on the basis of image information from the flash memory 18. This is then displayed on the numeric display of the display device 12.
  • the data in the flash memory 18 is not encrypted. Therefore, they can be read out using other aids without the aid of the controller 16 and can also be modified in a targeted manner. This also allows you to change the program for displaying the speedometer value.
  • the combination instrument 10 ensures that such manipulation of the data in the flash memory 18 is independently detected by the combination instrument 10 and shown to a user of the passenger car. This ensures that, for example, when the passenger car is purchased, the user can experience the actual odometer reading of the passenger vehicle by looking at the display device 12.
  • the saving of the combination instrument 10 against unnoticed manipulation of the data in the flash memory 18 takes place in two phases.
  • an initialization phase P1 it is assumed that the flash memory 18 contains unadulterated data.
  • an image of such unadulterated data is therefore determined from the flash memory 18 and stored in the memory module 26.
  • a subsequent monitoring phase P2 the content of the flash memory 18 is checked using the image to see if the data in the flash memory 18 has been manipulated.
  • a program executed by the microcontroller 24 of the saved memory device 22 determines, in a step S210, memory areas 36 in the flash memory 18 whose data is to be monitored during the monitoring phase P2.
  • the determination of the memory areas 36 can be effected, for example, by generating values for memory addresses or memory address areas of memory cells of the flash memory 18 by the microcontroller 24.
  • the values can be generated in a random manner so that different values result for different combination instruments. It may also be provided to limit the possible values for such memory addresses in such a way that only those data which are particularly important for a reliable operation of the control device 14 are detected by the monitoring.
  • the calculation device 30 causes the microcontroller 16 to read out the data from the memory areas 36 of the flash memory 18 by means of corresponding instructions transmitted via the data bus 32 and the read-out data to the calculation unit via the data bus 32 30 to transfer.
  • the transmission of the data is shown symbolically in FIG. 1 by dashed lines.
  • intermediate values such as checksums, hash values or authentication values, are first calculated by the microcontroller 16 from the read-out data.
  • a check value is calculated from the data transmitted by the microcontroller, that is to say the data read from the memory areas 36 or the values calculated therefrom, in a step S214.
  • a hash function or a symmetric authentication function can be used to calculate the check value.
  • Such functions are collision-free, ie similar but not identical data result in completely different checksums.
  • Each bit of the underlying data affects the result of the calculation of the test value.
  • the check value is transmitted from the calculation unit 30 to the encryption unit 28 and stored by the latter via the bus 20 '"as an initial check value 38 in encrypted form in the memory module 26. Instead of a single initial check value 38, a plurality of such check values can also be calculated and stored in the memory device 26.
  • a check value based on the entire contents of the flash memory 18 can still be calculated by the computing unit 30.
  • the calculation unit 30 generates a corresponding command, by which the microcontroller 16 is caused either to transfer the entire contents of the flash memory 18 to the calculation unit 30 or to calculate intermediate values in the manner already described for the entire content and then to Calculation unit 30 transmitted.
  • the calculation unit 30 then calculates from this received data a second check value, which is likewise encrypted by the encryption unit 28 and stored as an initial total check value 40 in the memory module 26 in encrypted form.
  • the initialization phase P1 has ended.
  • the initialization can be carried out at a first commissioning of the instrument cluster 10, for example, the manufacturer of the same.
  • the initialization phase P1 can be performed again if, for example, in the context of servicing the passenger car, a new operating program or new user data is stored in the flash memory 8. This is then done by an authorized person who is able to restart the already described corresponding program of the microcontroller 24.
  • the combination instrument 10 automatically checks whether the data in the memory areas 36 coincide with those which were stored therein during the initialization phase P1. During the monitoring phase P2, it is checked by the calculation unit 30 in a step S218 whether a predetermined test condition is fulfilled.
  • a check of the data at a start of the car can be done.
  • a command to read the data from the memory areas 36 of the flash memory 18 is again generated by the computing unit 30 and transmitted to the microcontroller 16.
  • This reads out the data from the storage areas 36 in a step S220.
  • a corresponding transmission takes place with the data read again.
  • the calculation unit 30 again calculates a check value from the received data.
  • the calculation unit 30 reads out the initial test value 38 with the aid of the encryption unit 28.
  • the test value calculated during the monitoring phase P2 is then used with the.
  • Initial check value 38 compared. If these two values match, this means that the data in the memory areas 36 were not manipulated with high probability. In this case, it waits again until the test condition is fulfilled again (S218).
  • a warning is displayed on the display 12 in a step S226.
  • a user of the car can read that a change in the data in the flash memory 18 has been detected. It can also be provided to activate an immobilizer of the passenger car in the case of a detected manipulation in step S226.
  • the initial total check value 40 is stored in the memory module 26, when a second test condition is met, it may be provided to check the integrity of the entire contents of the flash memory 18.
  • the flash memory 18 may be a very large memory.
  • the checking of the entire flash memory 18 therefore preferably takes place during a period in which the processing of the data by the microcontroller 16 or the microcontroller 24 and the transmission of the data via the data bus 32 does not lead to another functionality of the Kom - biinstruments is affected. It can also be provided that the check of the entire memory contents of the flash memory 18 is carried out during a servicing of the passenger car.
  • the steps for checking the content of the entire flash memory 18 correspond to steps S220 to S226, so that they will not be explained separately here.
  • the examples show how the manipulation security in a graphics system of a combination instrument can be achieved without great effort from a secure area, i.e. the secure storage device, by monitoring the data integrity of an "insecure memory".

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  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
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  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
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  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention a pour but d'empêcher, dans un véhicule automobile, qu'une mémoire de données (18) d'un composant électronique (14) soit manipulée par une personne non autorisée, ce qui entraînerait une altération du mode de fonctionnement du composant électronique (14). L'invention est caractérisée en ce que la mémoire de données (18) est couplée à un dispositif de mémoire sécurisée (22) qui présente une mémoire de données sécurisée (26) protégée contre une écriture non autorisée. Des données sont extraites d'au moins une zone de mémoire (36) de la mémoire (18), données à partir desquelles une valeur de contrôle initiale (38) est calculée, laquelle est mémorisée dans la mémoire de données sécurisée (26). Pour la détection d'une manipulation de données dans la mémoire (18), des données sont à nouveau extraites des zones de mémoire (36), données à partir desquelles une valeur de contrôle est à nouveau calculée. En comparant cette valeur de contrôle à nouveau calculée à la valeur de contrôle initiale (38), une manipulation des données dans les zones de mémoire (36) est éventuellement détectée.
PCT/EP2011/002060 2010-08-07 2011-04-21 Véhicule à moteur comprenant un composant électronique présentant une mémoire de données, et procédé de détection d'une manipulation de données dans la mémoire de données Ceased WO2012019659A1 (fr)

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DE102010033716 2010-08-07
DE102010033716.1 2010-08-07

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WO2012019659A1 true WO2012019659A1 (fr) 2012-02-16

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Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102013221489A1 (de) * 2013-10-23 2015-04-23 Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Prüfung eines Zählerstandes eines Wegzählers in einem Fahrzeug
EP2980662A1 (fr) * 2014-07-30 2016-02-03 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Protection d'un composant d'automatisation avant des manipulations de programme par mise en correspondance de signature

Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20030055552A1 (en) * 2001-09-14 2003-03-20 Mark Akins Tamper detection for vehicle controller
EP1760623A2 (fr) * 2005-08-18 2007-03-07 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Dispositif de sécurité pour appareils électroniques
WO2008019189A2 (fr) * 2006-08-03 2008-02-14 Motorola, Inc. Stockage sécurisé de données

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20030055552A1 (en) * 2001-09-14 2003-03-20 Mark Akins Tamper detection for vehicle controller
EP1760623A2 (fr) * 2005-08-18 2007-03-07 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Dispositif de sécurité pour appareils électroniques
WO2008019189A2 (fr) * 2006-08-03 2008-02-14 Motorola, Inc. Stockage sécurisé de données

Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102013221489A1 (de) * 2013-10-23 2015-04-23 Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Prüfung eines Zählerstandes eines Wegzählers in einem Fahrzeug
DE102013221489B4 (de) * 2013-10-23 2016-11-03 Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Prüfung eines Zählerstandes eines Wegzählers in einem Fahrzeug
EP2980662A1 (fr) * 2014-07-30 2016-02-03 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Protection d'un composant d'automatisation avant des manipulations de programme par mise en correspondance de signature
US10007783B2 (en) 2014-07-30 2018-06-26 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method for protecting an automation component against program manipulations by signature reconciliation

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