WO2012168888A1 - Transmission de données sécurisée à des nœuds de réseau dans un réseau - Google Patents

Transmission de données sécurisée à des nœuds de réseau dans un réseau Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2012168888A1
WO2012168888A1 PCT/IB2012/052867 IB2012052867W WO2012168888A1 WO 2012168888 A1 WO2012168888 A1 WO 2012168888A1 IB 2012052867 W IB2012052867 W IB 2012052867W WO 2012168888 A1 WO2012168888 A1 WO 2012168888A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
node
segment controller
service center
network
information
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/IB2012/052867
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Oscar Garcia Morchon
Daniel Martin GÖRGEN
Tim Corneel Wilhelmus Schenk
Javier Espina Perez
Marc Aoun
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Koninklijke Philips NV
Original Assignee
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV filed Critical Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV
Publication of WO2012168888A1 publication Critical patent/WO2012168888A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a system, a control unit and a method for secure data transmission to a node of a network.
  • wireless mesh networks attract more and more attention, e.g. for remote control of illumination systems, building automation, monitoring applications, sensor systems and medical applications.
  • a remote management of outdoor luminaires so-called telemanagement
  • this is driven by environmental concerns, since telemanagement systems enable the use of different dimming patterns, for instance as a function of time, weather conditions or season, allowing a more energy-efficient use of the outdoor lighting system.
  • this is also driven by economical reasons, since the increased energy efficiency also reduces operational costs.
  • the system can remotely monitor power usage and detect lamp failures, which allows for determining the best time for repairing luminaires or replacing lamps.
  • RF radio-frequency
  • a central controller In a star network, a central controller has a direct wireless communication path to every node in the network. However, this typically requires a high-power/high- sensitivity base-station-like central controller to be placed at a high location (e.g. on top of a building), which makes the solution cumbersome to deploy and expensive.
  • a mesh network the plurality of nodes does in general not communicate directly with the central controller, but via so-called multi-hop communications. In a multi- hop communication, a data packet is transmitted from a sender node to a destination node via one or more intermediate nodes.
  • Nodes act as routers to transmit data packets from neighboring nodes to nodes that are too far away to reach in a single hop, resulting in a network that can span larger distances. By breaking long distances in a series of shorter hops, signal strength is sustained. Consequently, routing is performed by all nodes of a mesh network deciding, to which neighboring node the data packet is to be sent.
  • a mesh network is a very robust and stable network with high connectivity and thus high redundancy and reliability.
  • FIG 1 a typical wireless network with mesh topology is shown.
  • the wireless network comprises of a central controller 60 and a plurality of nodes 10 (N) being connected among each other by wireless communication paths 40 in a mesh topology.
  • the wireless communication paths 40 between the nodes 10 can be constituted by RF
  • the nodes 10 and the central controller 60 can comprise a transceiver for transmitting or receiving data packets via wireless communication paths 40, e.g. via RF transmission.
  • a service center 80 is situated and serves for system
  • This entity normally communicates with one or more wireless networks over a third party communication channel 70, such as the Internet or mobile communication networks or other wired or wireless data transmission systems.
  • the service center 80 communicates with a central controller 60 of a corresponding network as a commissioning tool in charge of controlling or configuring this network.
  • a network can also be divided into segments, so that a node 10 belongs to exactly one segment having one segment controller 60. Therefore, the terms "segment controller” and "central controller” should be seen as exchangeable throughout this description.
  • any node 10 of the mesh network can communicate with the service center 80 via the segment controller 60.
  • high security standards have to be fulfilled in order to provide basic security services.
  • An example is protection against counterfeiting, i. e. preventing non-authorized nodes from joining the overall system.
  • Another example refers to enabling services from the service centre, e. g. when updating dimming patterns of luminaire nodes in a lighting system or when transmitting other configuration or commissioning information, in this case, it is important to ensure that only authorized nodes 10 of the network receive the information.
  • the nodes 10 must be identified by the system in order to avoid fraud and infiltration of the network by non-authorized nodes.
  • the identity of the system must be verified by the nodes 10 in order to avoid theft of node credentials by a hostile entity pretending to be the service center 80. Therefore, a two- way authentication is required.
  • WO 2010/023619 Al relates to commissioning a wireless network, wherein a network device being part of the network communicates with a device joining the network in a commissioning mode and provides joining information to the joining device, which is needed for network communication.
  • the invention is based on the idea to transmit information from a service center to a network node of a network, e.g. a wireless network, via an intermediate entity, e.g. a segment controller, which is authenticated and authorized by the service center.
  • an intermediate entity e.g. a segment controller
  • the service center as well as the controlling device or segment controller may also be represented by a certain network node, respectively.
  • Mutual authentication may correspond to a mutual security handshake, for instance a challenge- response based handshake, or the like. During the mutual authentication process, both parties might agree on a common key, so that a secure communication channel is set up between the involved entities. This idea may be particularly suited for commissioning nodes of a wireless network from the backend.
  • the configuration of single nodes may be performed on behalf of the segment controller without involving expensive end-to-end handshakes between the service center and the single nodes, while exhibiting security properties equivalent to a pure end-to-end handshake.
  • a system for secure data transmission to a node of a wireless network may comprise at least one node, at least one segment controller and a service center.
  • the service center may provide information for at least one of the nodes to the corresponding segment controller, e.g. configuration information, commissioning information or update information. This information may be provided from the segment controller to the node during or after mutual authentication.
  • the node may accept the information after successful authentication and after verifying that the segment controller is authorized by the service center.
  • the verification of the authorization of the segment controller by the node may be based on a security key, which is known to the service center and the node, but not to the segment controller.
  • the information provided by the service center may be encoded based on this security key.
  • the node may implement the received information only after successful authentication and verification. Therefore, means are provided enabling secure data transmission, e.g. for commissioning or service provisioning. Due to the verification of the authorization of the segment controller by the node and due to the mutual authentication between the segment controller and the node, an end-to-end handshake between the service center and the node may be mimicked, guaranteeing secure transfer of information, while waste of network resources is avoided. Moreover, dedicated node security domains may be created, thus preventing the theft of joining credentials of the network and protecting against counterfeiting by ensuring that a node cannot run in operational mode if it has not be authenticated.
  • a session key is derived by the entities involved in the mutual authentication process, so that both entities have the same session key available.
  • This session key may be derived based on at least one of the security keys associated to the respective entities and random data.
  • the session key generated during mutual authentication between the node and the segment controller may be a function of the node key and/or of the key of the segment controller.
  • the generation of the session key is also based on an identification number of the session, i. e. for one communication process such as a security handshake or other data transfer, so that the session key is only valid for this session.
  • This identification number may be any random number associated to the session.
  • the key generation may be based on symmetric-key cryptography or asymmetric-key cryptography, e. g. using a hash message authentication code (HMAC) or a cipher message authentication code (CMAC). Therefore, the session key may not only be limited to certain entities, but also to a certain time slot or communication. By means of the session key, a secure communication channel between two entities may be set up. Thus, only devices with the correct session key may be capable of participating in the communication. By locally generating the session key at the respective entities,
  • eavesdropping on the session key may be prevented.
  • the service center may be configured to provide a session-limited security key of the node to the segment controller.
  • the segment controller may generate the session key based on the session-limited security key of the node.
  • the segment controller may use a security key associated to itself and/or to the network or system.
  • the session-limited security key of the node may be generated by the service center using a session identity number, specific configuration parameters, and the security key of the node, which may be known to the service center. Therefore, the segment controller may be only informed about a session-limited security key of the node, which can be considered as a coded security key of the node, but not of the general security key of the node.
  • the service center may have to allow communication sessions between the segment controller and the node by providing the segment controller with the corresponding session-limited security key of the node. This further increases the security of the network. Moreover, since only a session-limited key of the node is transmitted, eavesdropping on this key does not allow unlimited access to the corresponding node.
  • the service center may know at least one of the security keys of itself, of the segment controller and of the node. However, it is preferred that the service center knows at least the security keys of the segment controller and the node. In contrast, the segment controller and the node may only know their own security keys.
  • the service center may be adapted to commission and/or to configure the segment controller.
  • the service center and the segment controller may be involved in a mutual authentication process, such as an end-to-end security handshake. After successful verification of each other's identities, the service center may commission and/or configure the segment controller, thus authorizing the segment controller for communication with network nodes.
  • the service center may be adapted to authorize the segment controller for commissioning and/or controlling the nodes. Hence, the service center may activate the segment controller as a controlling device for one or more nodes of the network.
  • the segment controller may thus be directly configured by the service center, while the node may be configured indirectly by the service center via the segment controller after successful configuration of the segment controller by the service center.
  • the first step requires direct connectivity with the service center.
  • the segment controller by configuring nodes via an intermediary entity, i.e. the segment controller, the required communication between the service center and the node is decreased, so that even a configuration of a large network comprising a plurality of nodes can be performed without much effort for the service center.
  • the segment controller Before providing the information to the node, the segment controller may verify that the node is the actual addressee of the information. Hence, the segment controller may provide the information to the node after mutual authentication between the segment controller and the node. Alternatively, the segment controller may provide the information to the node before completing the authentication process, e.g. during or even before the mutual authentication. This may be preferred in a large network using multi-hop transmissions, e.g. if the information is coded anyway using the security key of the node, so that eavesdropping or unauthorized modification of the information is prevented. Likewise, the service center may provide the information for the node to the segment controller after or during mutual authentication between the service center and the segment controller.
  • the node may transmit a confirmation message via the segment controller to the service center.
  • This confirmation message may be encoded twice, first with a common key associated to the segment controller and the node and second using a common key associated to the service center and the node.
  • the segment controller may decode the confirmation message and verify the authenticity thereof.
  • the segment controller may forward the single-coded confirmation message to the service center.
  • the service center may verify that the node has correctly received the information and/or that the node has correctly performed a requested action, e.g. a configuration process.
  • messages between the segment controller and the service center are transmitted in batches. For instance, if the service center provides information for a plurality of nodes, the service center may transmit a batch of messages including the information for the respective nodes to the segment controller. Likewise, if the segment controller receives confirmation messages from a plurality of nodes, the segment controller may collect the confirmation messages and transmit the confirmation messages in one batch to the service center. By these means, traffic via the third party communication channel may be further reduced. Moreover, in a large network, information provided by the service center may be the same for several nodes. For instance, in a lighting system, the configuration information will be the same for most of the luminaire nodes. Then, the service center may provide the configuration information to the segment controller, so that the segment controller may distribute the information to the respective nodes in an individual way.
  • At least one threshold time may be set for defining a maximum time period allowed between two predefined actions, e. g. between transmission of two predefined messages.
  • the threshold time may be set at the at least one of the node, the segment controller and the service center.
  • a threshold time is set for messages exchanged during an authentication process. For instance, the time for successful authentication between the segment controller and the node may be limited.
  • a threshold time may be defined at the service center between transmission of the information to the segment controller and receipt of the confirmation message of the node. In case that the threshold time is exceeded, an alarm may be triggered and/or reconfiguration may be requested. By these means, replay messages may be suppressed, wrong configurations dropped, or attempts for non-authorized configuration stopped.
  • the node may be configured such that information from the service center may only be accepted during a specified phase. For instance, configuration information and thus configuration of the node may only be allowed during a predefined configuration phase.
  • the network security can be further increased.
  • the segment controller and/or the service center may be aware of a current network phase.
  • messages between the segment controller and the node are encoded using a common security key associated to both the node and the segment controller.
  • messages between the segment controller and the service center may be encoded using a common security key associated to both the service center and the segment controller.
  • messages exchanged between the node and the service center via the segment controller may be encoded using the security key of the node, which may correspond to the security key of the node.
  • the service center provides the information for the node to the segment controller
  • the information may be encoded using the security key of the node (or any other key common to the service center and the node), which is not shared with the segment controller.
  • the nodes of the network correspond to luminaire nodes of a lighting system.
  • the system according to the present invention may be used for telemanagement of a lighting system such as an outdoor or street lighting system. By these means, the restricted resources of such a lighting system are met, while providing secure data transfer.
  • a control unit for secure data transmission to a node of a wireless network comprises an authentication unit adapted to mutually authenticate the node and a segment controller and to verify an authorization of the segment controller, wherein information provided from a service center via the segment controller is accepted in case of successful verification.
  • control unit is adapted to realize features as described above for embodiments of a system according to the present invention.
  • a method for secure data transmission to a node of a wireless network comprising the steps of mutual authentication of a node and a segment controller, verification of an authorization of the segment controller by the node and acceptance of the node of information provided from a service center via the segment controller in case of successful verification. Therefore, the method according to the present invention is adapted to be performed by the system or the control unit according to any one of the above-described embodiments of the present invention.
  • Fig. 1 illustrates an example of a wireless mesh network
  • Fig. 2 shows a flow diagram for illustrating a configuration process of a node by a service center via a segment controller according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • Fig. 3 shows a flow diagram of a process for configuring a segment controller according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • Fig. 4 shows a flow diagram of a process for configuring a node according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • Fig. 5 illustrates security connections between nodes, a segment controller and a service center according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Fig. 6 shows a control unit for a node according to an embodiment of the
  • Preferred applications of the present invention are actuator or sensor networks such us lighting systems, e.g., outdoor lighting systems (e.g. for streets, parking and public areas) and indoor lighting systems for general area lighting (e.g. for malls, arenas, parking, stations, tunnels etc.), smart energy systems, or pervasive healthcare systems.
  • lighting systems e.g., outdoor lighting systems (e.g. for streets, parking and public areas) and indoor lighting systems for general area lighting (e.g. for malls, arenas, parking, stations, tunnels etc.), smart energy systems, or pervasive healthcare systems.
  • the present invention will be explained further using the example of an outdoor lighting system for street illumination, however, without being limited to this application.
  • the telemanagement of outdoor luminaires via radio -frequency network technologies is receiving increasing interest, in particular solutions with applicability for large-scale installations with segments of above 200 luminaire nodes. Since radio frequency (RF) transmissions do not require high transmission power and are easy to implement and deploy, costs for setting up and operating a network can be reduced
  • the data packet transmission may alternatively use infrared communication, free- space-visible-light communication or power line communication.
  • the number of luminaire nodes 10 is extremely high. Hence, the size of the network is very large, especially when compared to common wireless mesh networks, which typically contain less than 200 nodes.
  • the nodes 10 typically have limited processing capabilities due to cost considerations, so that processing and memory resources in the luminaire nodes 10 will be limited.
  • security measures and communication protocols for transmitting data packets between single nodes 10 should consider the limited resources for efficient and secure data packet transmission.
  • the telemanagement system for an outdoor lighting control network is stationary, i.e. the luminaire nodes 10 do not move. Since the luminaire nodes 10 (e.g.
  • node positions will not change over time.
  • the physical positions of the nodes 10, for instance GPS-coordinates or other position data may be known in the system, enabling geographic or position-based routing using pre-programmed or predefined positions, so that no GPS receiver is required in the single nodes 10.
  • the nodes 10 do not need to send position information updates to other nodes 10.
  • the service center 80 provides information to a network node 10 via an authenticated segment controller 60.
  • a mutual security handshake or any other end-to-end security protocol can be used.
  • the security handshake should also allow for agreement on a common key associated to the involved entities in order to allow for the establishment of a secure communication channel.
  • configuration information i.e. wherein the service center 80 configures the node 10 via the segment controller 60.
  • any kind of data other than configuration information can be transmitted in this way. Therefore, the present invention is not limited to configuration processes.
  • a process of configuring a node of a wireless network by the service center 80 is described.
  • the nodes 10 of the network are associated to a segment controller 60. Therefore, before configuring the node 10 from the backend, the segment controller 60 and the service center 80 verify the identity of each other in a mutual authentication process (S310).
  • This mutual authentication process can relate to a challenge- response based handshake or any other end-to-end security protocol. During this
  • a common security key can be generated at both the service center 80 and the segment controller 60, so that a secure communication channel can be set up.
  • the service center 80 may configure the segment controller 60.
  • the service center 80 may activate operational functions of the segment controller 60, i.e. activate the segment controller 60 as a controlling device of the network or of the network nodes 10 (S320).
  • the service center 80 transmits a message including configuration information for a node 10 to the segment controller 60 (S330). This message may be encoded using a common key associated to the segment controller 60 and the service center 80. If the service center 80 knows a security key of the node 10, the configuration information for the node 10 may also be encoded using this security key of the node 10.
  • the segment controller 60 and the node 10 verify the identity of one other in a second mutual authentication process.
  • this authentication process may include the generation of a common security key to, e.g., secure the link based on common keys, random data and configuration parameters of segment controller and node.
  • the configuration information can be transmitted to the node 10 in the beginning of the mutual authentication process.
  • the node 10 verifies the authenticity of the message, e.g. using its own security key (S350). This may include verifying that the message originates from the service center 80 and that the segment controller 60 is authorized by the service center 80 to provide the message to the node 10.
  • the node 10 After successful verification of the authenticity of the message and successful mutual authentication with the segment controller 60, the node 10 accepts the received message and uses the configuration information for configuration (S360). After completed configuration, the node 10 may optionally send a configuration confirmation via the segment controller 60 to the service center 80 (S370).
  • the configuration confirmation is encoded twice, i.e. using the common key associated to the node 10 and the segment controller 60 and using the security key of the node 10, which is not known to the segment controller 60.
  • the segment controller 60 can verify the authenticity of the configuration message (S380). However, the segment controller 60 cannot change the configuration confirmation message, since the segment controller 60 does not know the second coding, i.e.
  • the segment controller 60 can check that the configuration confirmation comes from the actual node 10, but it cannot check the content of the configuration confirmation message. Then, in step S390, the segment controller 60 transmits the configuration confirmation message to the service center 80, so that the service center 80 can verify based on the security key of the node 10 that it is the correct node 10 that was configured and that the node 10 has been successfully configured with the correct parameters.
  • the segment controller 60 Since the segment controller 60 has direct access to the service center 80, a correct and secure commissioning or configuration of the segment controller 60 is fundamental. In general, any party accessing the service center 80 should be correctly authenticated and authorized and the corresponding communication channel should be secured. Moreover, the segment controller 60 is involved in all interactions between the service center 80 and the nodes 10 of the network. Therefore, the device involved in that link should be a trusted device. This is even more important for the example of configuring the nodes 10, i.e. when the segment controller 60 has to represent the service center 80 in some configuration tasks, such as node commissioning or the like. Hence, a correct and secure authentication of the segment controller 60 by the service center 80 is prerequisite. In fig.
  • an exemplary embodiment for the mutual authentication process between the segment controller 60 and the service center 80 is shown in further detail.
  • the service center 80 knows the security key of the segment controller 60 and of the network node 10, i.e. K segm ent and K no d e .
  • the segment controller 60 and the network node 10 only know their own security keys Ksegment and n ode, respectively.
  • a mutual challenge-response based handshake for mutual authentication is based on some keying material, which is known to both entities involved in the handshake, such as the security key of the segment controller 60 K se gment.
  • the segment controller 60 transmits a message Ml to the service center 80 including a random number r segm ent generated at the segment controller 60.
  • the service center 80 answers by transmitting a message M2 including a further random number r serv i ce generated at the service center 80.
  • the segment controller 60 Based on these random numbers r se g m ent and r serv i C e as well as on the security key K segm ent of the segment controller 60, the segment controller 60 generates a session key K sess i 0 n.
  • the session key K sess i 0 n may be generated using the following expression:
  • the session key Ksession may be a hash message authentication code function of the random numbers r segment and r serv i ce and the security key K segme nt of the segment controller 60.
  • the function can add further elements such as the identities of the involved parties.
  • a symmetric key cryptography can be used for the authentication process, e.g. based on a cipher message authentication code CMAC.
  • the segment controller 60 After generating the session key K seS sion, the segment controller 60 transmits a third message M3 to the service center 80.
  • the message M3 can be an output of a function that is used as an identification token.
  • the message M3 is based on a function of following parameters: identity Id seg ment of the segment controller 60, identity Id ser vice of the service center 80 and the random numbers r ser vice and r segm ent. Furthermore, the message M3 is encoded using the session key K sess ion, which is a common security of the segment controller 60 and the service center 80 limited to this handshake or session. Thus, a function for the message M3 may correspond to the following expression:
  • the service center 80 Upon receipt of the message M3, the service center 80 also generates the session key K sess i on using the same formula as the segment controller 60. By these means, the service center 80 can verify the authenticity of the message M3 using the session key K S e SS ion- If the verification is successful, the service center 80 can add the segment controller 60 to a list of authorized controlling devices and associate the segment controller 60 to the given network. Then, the service center 80 responds with a message M4, which is also a function of the identity Id se rvice of the service center 80, of the identity Id se g m ent of the segment controller 60 and of the random numbers r se g m ent and r serv i C e. Again, the message M4 is encoded using the session key Ksession. Therefore, the message M4 can be based on the following expression:
  • Verification by the segment controller 60 occurs after reception and successful verification of the message M4.
  • the segment controller 60 can be activated by the message M4 and include a security policy that moves to it to an operational state. In this state, the segment controller 60 can perform controlling functionalities such as
  • the segment controller 60 could comprise two modules 60a and 60b. In this case, the handshake occurs between the service center 80 and the module 60b via the module 60a of the segment controller 60.
  • a common authentication handshake is modified by generating a session key seS sion specific for the service center 80 and the segment controller 60, so that the session key K sess i on can be used to secure the communication link between these entities.
  • Non-authorized traffic may be dropped.
  • a successful authentication process provides both parties with an implicit proof that the same session key K sess i on has been generated at the service center 80 and at the segment controller 60.
  • the operation of a secure data transmission protocol is shown. Again, the protocol is exemplified using a commissioning procedure.
  • the segment controller 60 exchanges four messages N2, N3, N4 and N5 with the node 10, which encapsulate the messages ml, m2, m3 and m4. Therefore, this process resembles an authentication process or end-to-end handshake between the service center 80 and the node 10.
  • the data exchange of the messages N2 to N5 between the segment controller 60 and the node 10 is embedded in the exchange of two sets of messages l and N6 between the service center 80 and the segment controller 60.
  • the first set of messages l is transmitted from the service center 80 to the authorized segment controller 60 (e.g. as described above) and serves to provide the segment controller 60 with information required for configuring one or more network nodes 10.
  • the second set of messages N6 is transmitted from the segment controller 60 to the service center 80 and contains a configuration confirmation of the configured nodes 10.
  • the service center 80 is aware of the security keys Ksegment and K no de of the segment controller 60 and the node 10, respectively.
  • the segment controller 60 and the node 10 only know their own security keys K segm ent and K no d e , respectively.
  • the service center 80 After the segment controller 60 has been successfully authenticated and authorized, the service center 80 generates a random number for a session number r sess ion. Using the session number r sess i on and the security key Knode of the node, a session key K no d e _ S ession is generated.
  • the session key K no de_session may be generated using a message authentication code function as in the following expression:
  • the above r sess i 0 n can be generated by using as session a derivative of K sess ion,
  • K sess ion is the key bound to service center and segment controller specific to the previous handshake and random is a random number.
  • the service center 80 transmits to the segment controller 60 a message l including the session key no d e session, the session number r seS sion and a message ml , which includes information for the node 10 encoded with the security key K no d e (or a derivate of it, e.g., MAC(random, K no d e ) where random is a random number to be provided to the node) of the node 10.
  • the information of the message ml refers to configuration parameters for the node 10 and a security key K se g_ S yst_sess associated to the segment controller 60 as well as to the system and the current session.
  • the session key K seg _syst_sess can be generated according to the following expression:
  • K se g syst sess MAC (K se ement II system
  • the node 10 can be informed about the identity of the segment controller.
  • the message ml may correspond to the following expression:
  • Coml refers to the message number
  • Id refers to the identity or address of the respective entity
  • config. parms denotes configuration parameters
  • AE denotes an authenticated encryption function using no d e (or a key derived from it, e.g., as MAC(random, K no d e ) where random is a random number to be provided to the node).
  • the message Nl can be encoded using a common security key associated to the service center 80 and the segment controller 60, such as the session key sess i on or any other security key based on the security key K seg nient of the segment controller 60.
  • the segment controller 60 After having safely received the message Nl from the service center 80, the segment controller 60 transmits a message N2 to the node 10 including the session number Tsession and the message ml . In other words, the segment controller 60 forwards the encoded message ml without modifying it.
  • the node 10 Upon receipt of the message N2, the node 10 decrypts and verifies the authenticity of the message ml using the corresponding security key K noc j e (or a key derivated from it). Then, the node 10 stores the configuration information included in the message ml and starts a timer Thandshake-
  • the node 10 does not accept the received information, before the authentication process between the segment controller 60 and the node 10 has been successfully completed.
  • the node 10 For completing the authentication handshake, the node 10 generates a handshake key Khandshake, e.g. using the following expression:
  • the node 10 transmits a message N3 to the segment controller 60 including a message m2 encoded with the handshake key Khandshake-
  • This message m2 may be the result of a function, e.g. of:
  • MAC Com2
  • Tnode, Khandshake a random number generated by the node 10.
  • the segment controller 60 After having received the message N3 from the node 10, the segment controller 60 verifies the message N3 by means of the handshake key Khandshake- Only the correct segment controller 60 can generate the handshake key K andshake for verifying this message, since this requires either knowledge about the security key K seg nient of the segment controller 60, about the identity of the system and of the session, or knowledge of the session key K S eg_ sy st_sess. Moreover, the session- limited security key K no de_session of the node 10 is needed.
  • the service center 80 authorizes the segment controller 60 to transmit information to the corresponding node 10.
  • the segment controller 60 will reply with a message N4 including a message m3, which is also protected with the handshake key K andshake-
  • the message m3 may for instance relate to the result of the following function: HMAC (Com3
  • the node 10 accepts the information, which was included in the message ml.
  • the time period AT con f node corresponds to the time interval between receiving the messages N2 and N4 at the node 10. Therefore, the time period AT con f no d e serves as a threshold time defining a maximum time period, within which the authentication has to be completed.
  • the node 10 After accepting the information included in the message ml, the node 10 allows changes in its configuration parameters based on the configuration information of the message ml .
  • the service center 80 may include restrictions, so that some parameters can only be configured by the service center 80 itself. Examples of those parameters are the network identifier or a network address.
  • threshold times ⁇ or ⁇ 2 may be set at the segment controller 60, e.g. for the time between receiving and decoding the message N3 and transmitting the message N4 to the node 10 or between transmission of the message N4 and the receipt of a further message N5 from the node 10. These threshold times can be arbitrarily set and even be omitted in some embodiments.
  • the node 10 After receiving the message N4 from the segment controller 60 in due time and accepting the configuration information, the node 10 generates an acknowledgement ACK protected with the security key no d e (or a key derived from it) of the node 10 and transmits this acknowledgement ACK as message m4, which is further encoded or protected based on the handshake key Khandshake an d embedded in the message N5, to the segment controller 60.
  • the acknowledgement ACK can include the received configuration parameters and/or exchanged messages protected by a message integrity code MIC or message authentication code MAC generated with K no d e .
  • the acknowledgement ACK may be based on the following expression:
  • the segment controller 60 When the segment controller 60 receives the message N5 including the message m4 with the acknowledgement ACK, the segment controller 60 verifies the message N5 using the handshake key K andshake and forwards the acknowledgement ACK as message N6 to the service center 80. Hence, the verification or authenticity of the message N5 can be performed at the segment controller 60 before forwarding the acknowledgement ACK to the service center 80. That is, the segment controller 60 can prove that the message N5 comes from the actual node 10 and not from another (counterfeited) entity.
  • the acknowledgement ACK includes a message integrity code MIC or the like of the message m3 concatenated with the configuration parameters, wherein the MIC is protected by the security key K no de of the node 10.
  • the security key K no d e of the node 10 the service center 80 can verify the correct node 10 having received the information.
  • the configuration result e.g. the
  • the service center 80 can verify the successful transmission of information to the node 10 and the successful configuration. Furthermore, by including also the message m3 in the acknowledgement ACK, the service center 80 can verify that the actual segment controller 60 has transmitted the information to the node 10.
  • a further threshold time AT conf noc j e may be set, defining a maximum allowed time period between transmitting the first set of messages Nl and receiving the message N6 reporting the acknowledgement of the node 10. These threshold times further increase the robustness of the network.
  • Fig. 5 shows a basic principle of the data transmission process according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the service center 80 and the segment controller 60 have authenticated each other and established a secure communication channel (solid line).
  • the segment controller 60 is provided with the authorization to forward information from the service center 80 to one or more of the network nodes 10.
  • the segment controller 60 and each of the nodes 10 authenticate each other.
  • the nodes 10 accept data received from the segment controller 60 and employ the data correspondingly.
  • the node 10 can confirm the secure receipt of data via the segment controller 60 to the service center 80, so that the service center 80 can verify that the node 10 has correctly received and used the data.
  • an indirect authentication process is performed between the nodes 10 and the service center 80 (dashed lines), while direct authentication is performed between the service center 80 and the segment controller 60 as well as between the segment controller 60 and the nodes 10 (solid lines).
  • the indirect authentication is based on the transmission of data coded with the security key K no d e from the service center 80 via the segment controller 60 to the node 10 and by the transmission of the confirmation message coded twice, i.e. with the handshake key Khandshake associated to the segment controller 60 and the node 10 and with the security key K no d e , which is known to the service center 80, but not to the segment controller 60.
  • a security handshake is mimicked between the service center 80 and the node 10 via an intermediate entity (the segment controller 60), wherein the intermediate entity, i.e. the segment controller 60 and the node 10 do not possess the respective security keys of each other.
  • control unit 100 comprises an
  • the authentication unit 110 which can perform the mutual authentication process described above.
  • the authentication unit 110 of the control unit 100 operates to verify the
  • the control unit 100 of the node 10 can further comprise a configuration unit 120 for adjusting operation parameters of the node 10 based on information included in the received message.
  • a memory 130 and a transmission unit 140 can be included in the control unit 100 or in the node 10.
  • the control unit 100 of the node 10 is adapted to perform the above-described processes, which are performed at the node 10.
  • a joining node 10 verifies that it is joining an allowed network, because it can verify the identity of the service center 80.
  • the backend or service center 80 can verify the identities of joining segment controller(s) 60 and network nodes 10, so that it can prevent copied nodes 10 or segment controller(s) 60 from joining.
  • the segment controller(s) 60 and network nodes 10 can be associated to the network for future billing.
  • These aspects resemble the AAA (authentication, authorization, accounting) concept, in which after user authentication, an AAA server checks whether the user is authorized and accounts him for the consumed resources.
  • AAA authentication, authorization, accounting
  • the present invention can be applied, e.g. a lightweight Zigbee-IP or 6L0WPAN/C0RE in which the essence of the above handshake is implemented by means of TLS/DTLS.
  • means are provided for secure data transmission to single network nodes 10 of a wireless network from a backend, e.g. from the service center 80.
  • a backend e.g. from the service center 80.
  • operational keys are transferred in a secure way, so that key provisioning happens in a secure way.
  • the present invention the present invention

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Power Engineering (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

Pour une transmission de données sécurisée à un nœud d'un réseau assurant un surdébit de communication réduit au minimum et une protection améliorée du réseau contre une contrefaçon, l'invention concerne un système, une unité de commande et un procédé, dans lesquels un contrôleur de segment fournit des informations d'un centre de service à au moins un nœud, le nœud et le contrôleur de segment étant aptes à une authentification mutuelle et le nœud (10) étant en outre conçu pour vérifier une autorisation du contrôleur de segment (60) et accepter les informations en cas de vérification réussie.
PCT/IB2012/052867 2011-06-10 2012-06-07 Transmission de données sécurisée à des nœuds de réseau dans un réseau Ceased WO2012168888A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP11169394.1 2011-06-10
EP11169394 2011-06-10

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2012168888A1 true WO2012168888A1 (fr) 2012-12-13

Family

ID=46397344

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/IB2012/052867 Ceased WO2012168888A1 (fr) 2011-06-10 2012-06-07 Transmission de données sécurisée à des nœuds de réseau dans un réseau

Country Status (1)

Country Link
WO (1) WO2012168888A1 (fr)

Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US9344453B2 (en) 2011-06-10 2016-05-17 Koninklijke Philips N.V. Secure protocol execution in a network
CN106105142A (zh) * 2014-06-24 2016-11-09 谷歌公司 网状网络调试
WO2018162397A1 (fr) 2017-03-08 2018-09-13 Philips Lighting Holding B.V. Dispositif de commande, appareil destiné à être utilisé dans un luminaire, procédés de fonctionnement et serveur
US10567280B2 (en) 2015-02-03 2020-02-18 Google Llc Mesh network duplicate address detection
US11632847B2 (en) 2019-07-18 2023-04-18 Signify Holding B.V. Lighting device

Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2010023619A1 (fr) 2008-08-27 2010-03-04 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Mise en service d'un système de réseau

Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2010023619A1 (fr) 2008-08-27 2010-03-04 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Mise en service d'un système de réseau

Non-Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
"Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Systems management overview; X.701 (08/97)", ITU-T STANDARD, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, GENEVA ; CH, no. X.701 (08/97), 9 August 1997 (1997-08-09), pages 1 - 35, XP017462769 *
"Management framework for Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) for CCITT applications; X.700 (09/92)", ITU-T STANDARD IN FORCE (I), INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, GENEVA, CH, no. X.700 (09/92), 10 September 1992 (1992-09-10), XP017404120 *
"Security architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT applications; X.800 (03/91)", ITU-T STANDARD, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, GENEVA ; CH, no. X.800 (03/91), 22 March 1991 (1991-03-22), pages 1 - 48, XP017462866 *

Cited By (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US9344453B2 (en) 2011-06-10 2016-05-17 Koninklijke Philips N.V. Secure protocol execution in a network
CN106105142A (zh) * 2014-06-24 2016-11-09 谷歌公司 网状网络调试
CN106105142B (zh) * 2014-06-24 2017-12-15 谷歌公司 网状网络调试
US9948516B2 (en) 2014-06-24 2018-04-17 Google Llc Mesh network commissioning
US10567280B2 (en) 2015-02-03 2020-02-18 Google Llc Mesh network duplicate address detection
WO2018162397A1 (fr) 2017-03-08 2018-09-13 Philips Lighting Holding B.V. Dispositif de commande, appareil destiné à être utilisé dans un luminaire, procédés de fonctionnement et serveur
US11632847B2 (en) 2019-07-18 2023-04-18 Signify Holding B.V. Lighting device

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US9344453B2 (en) Secure protocol execution in a network
AU2007242991B2 (en) Method and system for providing cellular assisted secure communications of a plurality of AD HOC devices
US8385550B2 (en) System and method for secure wireless multi-hop network formation
JP5911569B2 (ja) ネットワークにおける敵対攻撃の回避
JP2024507208A (ja) セルラネットワークを動作させるための方法
JP2011514032A (ja) Ｉｄに基づく無線マルチホップネットワーク認証アクセス方法、装置及びシステム
CN105119785A (zh) 智能家居网络节点的配置方法、数据发送和接收方法
CN103888940B (zh) 多级加密与认证的wia‑pa网络手持设备的通讯方法
US20260052012A1 (en) Improved security establishment methods and systems
CN113163395B (zh) 一种终端与服务器通信、密钥配置的方法和装置
EP4250641B1 (fr) Procédé, dispositifs et système permettant d'effectuer une gestion de clé
Falk et al. Industrial sensor network security architecture

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application

Ref document number: 12730650

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1

NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: DE

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase

Ref document number: 12730650

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1