WO2013100553A1 - Serveur, client et procédé pour vérifier l'intégrité des données dans un réseau basé sur le p2p - Google Patents

Serveur, client et procédé pour vérifier l'intégrité des données dans un réseau basé sur le p2p Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2013100553A1
WO2013100553A1 PCT/KR2012/011455 KR2012011455W WO2013100553A1 WO 2013100553 A1 WO2013100553 A1 WO 2013100553A1 KR 2012011455 W KR2012011455 W KR 2012011455W WO 2013100553 A1 WO2013100553 A1 WO 2013100553A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
file
metadata
integrity
verifying
verification
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PCT/KR2012/011455
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English (en)
Korean (ko)
Inventor
김민석
백석준
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Ahnlab Inc
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Ahnlab Inc
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
    • H04L67/104—Peer-to-peer [P2P] networks

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a peer-to-peer (P2P) based file transfer method, and in particular, in a P2P-based file update or data transfer using a P2P communication protocol, file transfer between users Create and distribute additional metadata verification files with the same hash value to verify the integrity of the metadata file when creating the metadata file used as the standard of the client.
  • P2P greatly improves the security of the P2P file transfer protocol by verifying the integrity of the metadata file by using the metadata verification file downloaded along with the metadata file to detect whether the metadata file has been tampered with.
  • a server, client, and method for verifying the integrity of data in an underlying network are examples of data in an underlying network.
  • P2P technology is a concept of gathering a large number of users into a network to share bandwidth and process information together within the network.
  • each client terminal functions as a client and a server, and is distributed. It is an efficient data transmission approach that allows users to acquire content efficiently and reliably in a collaborative environment.
  • P2P refers to a network communication model in which peer nodes of the same layer, unlike client-server models, transmit and receive files while simultaneously serving as clients and servers.
  • a plurality of host computers holding a desired file are searched on the Internet, and the plurality of searched host computers simultaneously request different blocks, thereby speeding up file transfer in a P2P network environment.
  • the torrent as described above may be used as an update technology of various programs including an anti virus program as a data transmission and download technology using the Internet.
  • a meta data file called a seed file having information on an update target file is essentially present.
  • This seed file is an important file that is used as a standard for file transfer between users in the torrent protocol. It is necessary to ensure that the seed file of the server and the seed file delivered to the client are identical.
  • the present invention verifies the integrity of the metadata file when generating a metadata file used as a criterion for file transfer between users in P2P-based file update or data transmission using the P2P communication protocol.
  • the client verifies the integrity of the metadata file using the metadata verification file downloaded together with the metadata file.
  • the present invention provides a server, a client, and a method for verifying data integrity in a P2P based network that can detect whether a meta data file has been tampered with, thereby greatly improving the security of a P2P based file transfer protocol.
  • the present invention described above is a server device for verifying data integrity in a P2P based network, comprising: a metadata file generator for generating a metadata file; and metadata for generating a metadata verification file for verifying the integrity of the metadata file.
  • a verification file generation unit an electronic signature unit for digitally signing the metadata verification file, a metadata verification file integrity checking unit for checking the integrity of the digitally signed metadata verification file, and an integrity verification of the metadata file
  • a control unit for generating a metadata verification file for transmitting the metadata file and the metadata verification file using a peer to peer (P2P) based protocol.
  • P2P peer to peer
  • the metadata verification file generation unit may set a hash value recorded in the metadata verification file to the same value as a hash value recorded in the metadata file.
  • the metadata verification file integrity checker may verify the integrity of the metadata verification file by checking the validity of the digital signature of the metadata verification file and whether the issuer of the digital signature is valid. .
  • the metadata verification file integrity checker if the validity of the digital signature is recognized and the certificate issuer is valid, and if the hash value of the metadata verification file and the hash value of the metadata file are the same, the metadata And verifying the integrity of the data verification file.
  • the P2P-based protocol is characterized in that the torrent protocol.
  • the meta data file may be a seed file having information on an update target file.
  • the present invention is a client device for verifying the integrity of data in a P2P-based network, a hash value of the metadata file and the metadata verification file of the metadata file and the metadata verification file when downloading the metadata file and the metadata verification file using a P2P-based protocol.
  • a metadata verification file integrity checker that checks whether the hash values are the same, an electronic signature checker that checks the validity of the digital signature digitally signed in the metadata verification file and whether the issuer of the digital signature is valid;
  • a controller that verifies the integrity of the metadata file using the verified metadata verification file, and performs P2P based data transmission using the metadata file when the integrity of the metadata file is verified.
  • the P2P-based protocol is characterized in that the torrent protocol.
  • the meta data file may be a seed file having information on an update target file.
  • the present invention also provides a method for verifying data integrity in a P2P based network, the method comprising: generating a metadata file, generating a metadata verification file for verifying the integrity of the metadata file, and verifying the metadata verification file; Performing a digital signature, checking the integrity of the digitally signed metadata verification file, and if the integrity of the metadata verification file is verified, the metadata file and the meta using a P2P based protocol. Transmitting the data verification file.
  • the generating of the metadata verification file may include setting a hash value recorded in the metadata verification file to the same value as a hash value recorded in the metadata file.
  • the checking of the integrity of the metadata verification file may include: validating a digital signature digitally signed in the metadata verification file; and if the digital signature is valid, a certificate issuer who issues the digital signature. Characterized in that it comprises the step of checking whether it is legitimate.
  • the checking of the integrity of the metadata verification file may include: a hash value of the metadata verification file and a hash value of the metadata file when the digital signature is recognized as valid and the certificate issuer is verified as being valid. And checking whether the same is the same, and verifying the integrity of the metadata verification file when the hash value of the metadata verification file and the hash value of the metadata file are the same.
  • the P2P-based protocol is characterized in that the torrent protocol.
  • the meta data file may be a seed file having information on an update target file.
  • the present invention also provides a method for verifying data integrity in a P2P based network, the method comprising: downloading a metadata file and a metadata verification file using a P2P based protocol, checking the integrity of the metadata verification file; If the integrity of the metadata verification file is verified, checking whether a hash value of the metadata verification file whose integrity is verified and a hash value of the metadata file are the same; If the hash values of the metadata file are the same, performing P2P based data transmission using the metadata file.
  • the checking of the integrity of the metadata verification file may include validating a digital signature digitally signed in the metadata verification file, and if the digital signature is valid, the certificate issuer who issued the digital signature is issued. And checking the legitimacy, and verifying the integrity of the metadata verification file if the certificate issuer is legitimate.
  • the P2P-based protocol is characterized in that the torrent protocol.
  • the meta data file may be a seed file having information on an update target file.
  • the integrity of the metadata file can be verified when generating a metadata file used as a standard for file transfer between users.
  • the client verifies the integrity of the metadata file using the metadata verification file downloaded along with the metadata file. It is possible to detect whether a file has been tampered with in advance, thereby greatly improving the security of the P2P type file transfer protocol.
  • the P2P communication protocol can be more easily applied to the reliable data transmission in the business environment.
  • FIG. 1 is a network configuration diagram of a system for verifying integrity of a P2P based update environment according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a detailed block diagram of a seed file generation server according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a detailed block diagram of a client according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is an operation control flowchart of generating a seed file to guarantee integrity in a seed file generation server of a P2P based update system according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 5 is an operation control flowchart for verifying the integrity of a seed file in a client of a P2P based update system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a network configuration of a system for verifying integrity of a P2P based update environment according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • an operation of verifying the integrity of the metadata file for P2P-based updating in the torrent protocol which is one of the P2P-based protocols, will be described as an example, but the same may be applied to other P2P-based protocols.
  • the seed file generation server 100 generates a metadata file, that is, a seed file for downloading and updating a distributed program using a P2P based protocol such as a torrent protocol. do.
  • the seed file generation server 100 may be a server of a company that develops and distributes a specific program for commercial purposes. For example, when the specific program is an anti-virus program, the company that developed the program. Can be your server.
  • the seed file generation server 100 updates a file by additionally generating a metadata verification file that can verify the seed file for verifying the integrity of the seed file, that is, a seed verification file.
  • a seed verification file By validating the seed file through the seed verification file, the client 300 may verify the integrity of the seed file. That is, the seed file generation server 100 generates and distributes a seed verification file paired with the seed file at the time of generation of the seed file. In this case, a hash value of the seed file is recorded in the seed verification file, and the seed file generation server 100 performs a digital signature from the digital signature server to distribute the seed verification file for integrity checking.
  • the file server 200 stores a file of a program provided by the seed file generation server 100 and uses a seed file to request a client 300 to download or update a file of a specific program. Or a server that provides update files.
  • the seed file generation server 100 is a server of a company that provides an antivirus program
  • the seed file generation server 100 may provide an antivirus engine program and a corresponding program to be provided to the client 300 in the file server 200.
  • the update file may be stored in the file server 200, and the file server 200 provides the stored program file and the update file to each client 300.
  • the client 300 may be a terminal device such as a PC of each user in which a torrent client program is mounted to enable torrent-based distributed file updating.
  • the client 100 downloads the seed file from the file server 200 when the torrent client program is executed, and then downloads a specific program desired by using the seed file.
  • the client 300 downloads the seed verification file when the seed file is downloaded and checks the integrity of the seed verification file, and then again checks the integrity of the seed file using the seed verification file, and the integrity of the seed file is verified. In this case, it is possible to cope with malicious external attack that manipulates the seed file by downloading or updating a desired program by using the seed file only.
  • FIG. 2 illustrates a detailed block configuration of the seed file generation server 100 according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the seed file generator 102 generates a seed file for enabling the download or update of a specific program using a P2P based protocol such as a torrent protocol.
  • a seed file refers to a metadata file that contains information about a file to be updated in a torrent-based distributed file update.
  • the seed file includes each update file as a large file and divided into predetermined sizes. The hash value information for the block is included.
  • the seed verification file generation unit 104 generates a verification file that can verify the seed file for verifying the integrity of the seed file. That is, the seed verification file generating unit 104 generates a seed verification file paired with the seed file at the time of generation of the seed file, and records a hash value of the seed file in the seed verification file. The same hash value is the same as the hash value recorded in the seed file so that the seed file can be verified by comparing the hash values.
  • the digital signature unit 110 performs a digital signature on the seed verification file using the digital signature key from the digital signature server 150 to check the integrity of the seed verification file itself.
  • the seed verification file integrity checker 112 verifies the integrity of the seed verification file by checking whether the digital signature signed in the seed verification file is valid, that is, issued by a valid certificate issuer and whether the digital signature is valid. Check it. In addition, the integrity of the seed verification file is checked by checking whether the hash value recorded in the seed verification file and the hash value recorded in the seed file match.
  • the communication unit 106 performs data transmission / reception with the file server 200 through a network such as the Internet for transmission of a data file or an update file of a specific program.
  • a communication unit 106 may support a P2P communication protocol including, for example, a torrent protocol.
  • the controller 108 controls the overall operation of the seed file generation server 100. That is, the controller 108 generates a seed verification file for verifying the seed file and the seed file through the seed file generator 102 and the seed verification file generator 104, and the seed signature verification with the digital signature unit 110.
  • the file integrity checker 112 controls the integrity of the seed verification file to be checked.
  • the controller 108 transmits the seed verification file and the seed file whose integrity is verified as described above to the file server 200 through the communication unit 106 so that each client 300 can be downloaded.
  • FIG. 3 shows a detailed block diagram of the client 300 according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the communication unit 302 transmits and receives data for torrent-based distributed file update with the file server 200 or another client through a network such as the Internet.
  • a communication unit 302 may support a P2P communication protocol including, for example, a torrent protocol.
  • the seed verification file integrity checker 308 checks the hash value recorded in the seed verification file and the hash value recorded in the seed file with respect to the seed verification file generated from the seed file generation server 100 to verify the integrity of the seed verification file. Check it.
  • the digital signature checker 304 checks the integrity of the seed verification file by checking whether the digital signature signed in the seed verification file is valid, that is, issued by a normal certificate issuer, and whether the digital signature is valid. .
  • the controller 306 downloads the seed file generated by the seed file generation server 100 and the seed verification file for integrity verification of the seed file from the file server 200 through the communication unit 302, and then checks the digital signature checker 304. ) To verify the integrity of the seed verification file.
  • the seed verification file integrity check unit 308 is controlled to check whether the hash value recorded in the seed verification file and the hash value recorded in the seed file match and verify the integrity of the seed verification file, thereby causing the seed file to be infected with malicious code. Verifies whether the file is a valid file. Subsequently, the controller 306 downloads or updates a desired program using the seed file only when the integrity of the seed file is verified, so that it can cope with a malicious external attack that manipulates the seed file.
  • the control unit 108 of the seed file generation server 100 controls the seed file generation unit 102 to generate a seed file for file transfer (S400).
  • a seed file refers to a metadata file that contains information about a file to be updated in a torrent-based distributed file update.
  • the seed file includes each update file as a large file and divided into predetermined sizes.
  • the hash value information for the block is included.
  • the controller 108 controls the seed verification file generating unit 104 to generate a seed verification file for verifying the integrity of the seed file (S402).
  • a hash value identical to a hash value recorded in the seed file is recorded in the seed verification file, and the hash value checks whether the hash value is the same when the integrity check of the seed file using the seed verification file is performed by the client 300. Is used to verify integrity.
  • the controller 108 controls the digital signature unit 110 to digitally sign the seed verification file with the digital signature key received from the digital signature server 150. (S404).
  • the digital signature is used to ensure the integrity of the seed verification file itself.
  • the digital signature is used to verify the integrity of the seed verification file itself by validating the digital signature at the client 300.
  • the controller 108 first performs seed verification before transmitting the generated seed file and the seed verification file to the file server 200. It will check if the file was created correctly.
  • the controller 108 controls the seed verification file integrity checker 112 to check whether the digital signature is valid for the seed verification file completed up to the digital signature, that is, whether the expiration date of the digital signature is valid (S406). .
  • the controller 108 determines that generation of the seed file has failed (S410), and again from the beginning. It will create a seed file.
  • the controller 108 checks the certificate issuer who issued the digital signature again and then, by a valid certificate issuer. It is checked whether it is an issued digital signature (S412). For example, if the seed file is generated for the distribution of the antivirus engine V3 program, the legitimate certificate issuer may be "AhnLab,” in which case the certificate issuer of the digital signature is not a subject other than "AhnLab.” In this case, it can be determined that the valid certificate issuer is not.
  • the controller 108 determines that generation of the seed file has failed (S410), and generates a seed file from the beginning.
  • the controller 108 verifies that the digital description has been issued by a legitimate certificate issuer.
  • the controller 108 checks the hash value of the seed verification file and checks whether it matches the hash value of the seed file (S416).
  • Such a hash value check of the seed verification file is performed in advance in case a hash value in the seed verification file is changed in the process of digital signature for self integrity of the seed verification file.
  • the controller 108 determines that generation of the seed file has failed (S410), and again from the beginning. It will create a seed file.
  • the controller 108 determines that the generation of the seed file is successful (S420).
  • the seed verification file is uploaded to the file server 200 to be distributed to the client 300 (S422).
  • FIGS. 1, 3, and 5 illustrates an operation control flow for verifying the integrity of the seed file in the client 300 of the P2P based update system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to FIGS. 1, 3, and 5.
  • step S500 when a torrent client program is started to install or update a specific program through torrent-based distributed file update, the control unit 306 of the client 300 may access a file server on a network such as the Internet through the communication unit 302.
  • step S500 the seed file uploaded from the seed file generation server 100 and the seed verification file are downloaded (S500, S502).
  • control unit 306 first verifies the integrity of the seed file whether or not it has been infected by malware before performing a download installation or update of a specific program using the seed file. do.
  • the controller 306 first controls the digital signature checker 304 to check whether the digital signature for the seed verification file is valid, that is, whether the expiration date of the digital signature is valid (S504).
  • the controller 306 determines that the seed file has failed to download (S508). Do not download, install or update specific programs.
  • the control unit 306 checks the certificate issuer who issued the digital signature again by a valid certificate issuer. Check whether the digital signature is issued (S510). For example, if the seed file is a seed file for the distribution or update of the antivirus engine V3 program, and the company that develops and distributes the V3 program is "AhnLab,” the proper certificate issuer is "AhnLab.” In this case, if the certificate issuer of the digital signature is a subject other than "AhnLab,” it may be determined that the certificate issuer is not a valid certificate issuer.
  • the controller 306 determines that the download of the seed file has failed (S508), and downloads, installs or updates a specific program using the seed file. Do not perform.
  • the controller 306 verifies that the digital description has been issued by a legitimate certificate issuer.
  • the controller 306 examines the hash value of the seed verification file and checks whether it matches the hash value of the seed file (S514).
  • the hash value check of the seed verification file is for verifying whether the seed file is a seed file distributed from a valid server. When the seed file is generated, the same hash value is recorded in the seed file and the seed verification file. This is to verify the integrity of the seed file by checking.
  • the controller 306 determines that downloading of the seed file has failed (S508), Do not download, install or update specific programs.
  • the controller 306 determines that the seed file has been successfully downloaded, and downloads the file using the seed file. By performing the download installation or update of a specific program (S518).
  • controller 306 terminates the torrent client program when the file download is completed and the download installation or update of the specific program is completed (S520).
  • the metadata file is generated when a meta data file is used as a standard for file transfer between users.
  • Create and distribute additional metadata verification files with the same hash value to verify the integrity.Clients use the metadata verification files downloaded along with the metadata files to ensure the integrity of the metadata files.
  • verifying it is possible to detect whether the meta data file has been tampered with in advance, thereby greatly improving the security of the P2P type file transfer protocol.
  • P2P communication protocols can be more easily applied to reliable data transmission in business environments.

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PCT/KR2012/011455 2011-12-29 2012-12-26 Serveur, client et procédé pour vérifier l'intégrité des données dans un réseau basé sur le p2p Ceased WO2013100553A1 (fr)

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KR10-2011-0146023 2011-12-29
KR1020110146023A KR101369250B1 (ko) 2011-12-29 2011-12-29 Ｐ2ｐ기반 네트워크에서 데이터의 무결성 검증을 위한 서버, 클라이언트 및 방법

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CN107861746A (zh) * 2017-12-06 2018-03-30 北京经纬恒润科技有限公司 一种车辆电子控制单元的刷新方法及系统

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KR20090013483A (ko) * 2007-08-02 2009-02-05 주식회사 플랜티넷 어플리케이션 프로그램 검증 및 실행 제어 방법
KR20100084335A (ko) * 2009-01-16 2010-07-26 케이티하이텔 주식회사 디지털 저작물의 통제를 위한 장치 및 방법
KR20100106110A (ko) * 2009-03-23 2010-10-01 삼성전자주식회사 시큐어 부트 데이터(Ｓｅｃｕｒｅ Ｂｏｏｔ Ｄａｔａ) 통합 관리 시스템, 시큐어 부트 데이터 통합 관리를 위한 메타데이터 생성 및 검증 방법, 이를 컴퓨터에서 실행시키기 위한 프로그램을 기록한 컴퓨터로 읽을 수 있는기록매체.

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN105069161A (zh) * 2015-08-26 2015-11-18 浪潮软件股份有限公司 一种数据交互的方法及装置
CN107861746A (zh) * 2017-12-06 2018-03-30 北京经纬恒润科技有限公司 一种车辆电子控制单元的刷新方法及系统

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