WO2014096027A1 - Système de commande pour un véhicule automobile - Google Patents

Système de commande pour un véhicule automobile Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2014096027A1
WO2014096027A1 PCT/EP2013/077130 EP2013077130W WO2014096027A1 WO 2014096027 A1 WO2014096027 A1 WO 2014096027A1 EP 2013077130 W EP2013077130 W EP 2013077130W WO 2014096027 A1 WO2014096027 A1 WO 2014096027A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
control system
data
unit
communication module
control
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/EP2013/077130
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Hans Gregor MOLTER
Jochen HECHLER
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Aumovio Germany GmbH
Original Assignee
Continental Automotive Technologies GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Continental Automotive Technologies GmbH filed Critical Continental Automotive Technologies GmbH
Publication of WO2014096027A1 publication Critical patent/WO2014096027A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
    • G06F21/577—Assessing vulnerabilities and evaluating computer system security
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a control system for a motor vehicle having a vehicle network, which comprises a safety unit for increasing the safety in the vehicle network.
  • controllers In ordinary motor vehicles, it is increasingly known to provide a variety of electronic control devices for certain components and functions within the motor vehicle.
  • Such controllers are usually designed as programmable controllers and increasingly networked with their environment.
  • the controllers may be, for example, an engine controller, the control of doors and windows, the control of parental control, the measurement or monitoring of a variety of security relevant functions or functions to prevent, mitigate or detect intrusions and thefts.
  • different control devices are combined into a vehicle network associated with ⁇ communicate via one or more bus systems to each other, that is, with each other and / or transmit specific codes for control commands or measured values to a control center via a data bus.
  • the Verkryptung of the codes takes place mostly in each case in a control unit by an additional software and must be found and removed by an unauthorized user.
  • the Verkryptung by software has the disadvantage that the evaluation and, for example, a startup process, which the evaluation of a code and the cancellation of a Verkryptung needed, takes a relatively long time.
  • an unauthorized person in such a Verkryptung with feasible effort on material and time to recognize the Verkrptungsprogramm or a secret key and thus avoid the Verkryptung, manipulate or emulate in a separate control unit.
  • programmable control units can be customized at any time in terms of announcements and applications by changing the data required for this and possibly also complete program sequences. This allows subsequent changes in particular ⁇ sondere a later improvement or upgrade of the controller underlying control program. Ins ⁇ particular, it is possible in this way to subsequently modify changes in the control software, for example, the functional and / or the scope of the controller and thus the entire motor vehicle.
  • a disadvantage of such a later possibility of change is that unauthorized persons can misuse this possibility and, for example, without permission, subsequently modify the function and / or scope of performance of the control unit and thus be able to tune the entire motor vehicle. On the one hand, this has the disadvantage for the manufacturers and suppliers that they can be damaged by tuning-induced damage in the guarantee period and the associated costs.
  • a control system for a motor vehicle which comprises a safety unit.
  • the security unit has a coordination module which, in the case of a compromise of one or more modules of the security unit, compromises the one or more ⁇
  • Object of the present invention is to provide a control system or. to provide a control arrangement for a motor vehicle, which ensures a high degree of security, in particular a high protection against manipulation with perfect function.
  • this object is achieved by a control arrangement or a control system for a motor vehicle, which comprises at least two control devices which are interconnected via at least one vehicle network and which exchange data with one another via the vehicle network, as well as a safety unit connected to the vehicle network.
  • the safety unit in this case has a first means for detecting setting profiles for the at least two control units, a comparator for detecting a change of the settings of at least one control unit and for comparing the settings profiles with the new settings of the at least one control device, and a memory for Hin ⁇ terlegen of data obtained by the comparator, in particular, if the setting profiles differ from the changed settings significantly differ significantly from the changed settings on.
  • Such a control system has the advantage that it ensures a high degree of security, in particular a high protection against manipulation with perfect function. Significant here means that the changes are significantly different from the
  • Basic settings of the control units or of ge ⁇ usually made changes differ, especially about justified changes go beyond. Since data on changes, for example, changes, which subsequently modify the function and / or the scope of performance of the control units and thus tune the entire motor vehicle, stored back and thus reproducible, the risk that a manufacturer for induced by the changes made damage such as damage caused by tuning, liable in the warranty period and can be damaged by the associated costs, to be prevented.
  • Next tamper protection refers to the entire vehicle network and thus to all, connected to the vehicle network control units.
  • the security unit can in this case be integrated in one of the control units, or be formed separately from these as an independent element.
  • the settings profiles can be a vehicle profile and user-specific settings. Thus, it is ensured that changes in control devices, which are usually set directly by a manufacturer, such as a motor control or monitoring of a
  • the security unit further comprises a coordination module for initiating a safety-related action, if the adjustment profiles deviate from the changed settings, in particular deviate significantly from the changed settings.
  • a coordination module for initiating a safety-related action, if the adjustment profiles deviate from the changed settings, in particular deviate significantly from the changed settings.
  • the safety-related reaction can switch off the control units whose changed settings deviate from the setting profiles, in particular significantly from the
  • the functionality of the motor vehicle can be restricted in whole or in part and consequently be reacted directly and unequivocally to unauthorized changes.
  • failsafe ⁇ straightened reaction may also be a partial shutdown of the controller concerned or a transfer of the control unit concerned in a safe state.
  • the security unit further comprises an external communication module for transmitting the data of the comparator to an external unit.
  • a manufacturer or a supplier can be notified immediately after making the significant changes.
  • appropriate erfor ⁇ sary limited to changes for example, the control software for motor vehicles, before carrying out the changes in ⁇ play as a vehicle registration office to obtain an authorization or approval by a third party.
  • the vehicle network can be designed as a BUS system.
  • a communication network is created, which is composed of several control devices of individual electrical or electronic components of the motor vehicle, which are connected by the vehicle network as Kirunika ⁇ tion network, a bus with each other. So it is common to combine each different control units to a vehicle ⁇ network that communicate with each other via a bus system.
  • Various vehicle networks can then be connected to each other via gateways, so that data can be exchanged from the individual vehicle networks. Examples of such vehicle networks are CAN, LIN or MOST-BUS systems.
  • the security unit can testify ⁇ an internal Kommunikati ⁇ onsmodul for exchanging data between the safety unit and the at least two control devices as well as a coupled to the internal communication module cryptography module for He, storing, managing and / or processing of cryptic tographischen keys for by the internal Communication module received data include. This is based on the recognition that the security within a communica tion network ⁇ having a plurality of electrical or electronic devices with corresponding control devices, is considerably increased when a
  • Cryptographic module which generates and stores cryptographic key material in a secure manner.
  • cryptographic methods are used for the authentication of changes made, so that the security depends on the respective keys used.
  • Examples of such cryptographic methods are symmetric cryptographic methods such as AES, DES, 3-DES or IDEA and asymmetric cryptographic methods such as the ECC method, which uses the Operations on elliptic curves over finite fields, or the RSA method, where the encryption algorithm is based on the large-integer arithmetic and the keys are generated on the basis of two large primes.
  • ECC method which uses the Operations on elliptic curves over finite fields
  • the RSA method which uses the Operations on elliptic curves over finite fields
  • the RSA method where the encryption algorithm is based on the large-integer arithmetic and the keys are generated on the basis of two large primes.
  • the external communication module may be configured to exchange data between the control system and the external unit, as well as being coupled to the cryptography module for generating, storing, managing and / or processing cryptographic keys for data received by the external communication module.
  • external write and / or read accesses in which data is transmitted from an external unit, for example via data lines or via wireless connections to the control system, can be checked for their authorization.
  • the reprogramming of the control units usually takes place in that an external unit is connected to a data line of the control unit and then the required data is written via the data line to a programmable memory of the control unit.
  • the external communication module can be configured to permit a write and / or read access of the external unit to the control system only if a release has taken place by the cryptography module.
  • release is here understood that an authentication process has revealed that an authorization exists. That is, any process that wants to access data from the control system from outside writing and / or reading, for example via the data lines, 0
  • a secure cryptographic trust anchor for example, under sole control of an automotive ⁇ manufacturer produce in the vehicle, which gives cryptographic methods and their applications full effectiveness and can perform the cryptographic operations sufficiently fast to security based on cryptographic
  • the cryptographic module, the internal communication module and the external Kommunikati ⁇ onsmodul are designed as hardware modules.
  • these are not implemented by software, but stored in hardware, so by wiring. This is structured by the layout and the circuit so that attacks of various kinds and with very high effort with very high probability without success. Also, the evaluation is much faster, so that possible waiting times can be significantly reduced, especially in authentication processes or startup processes.
  • a firewall can be integrated in the external communication module and / or the internal communication module. Such a firewall will provide another security system. provided that protects the vehicle network or individual control ⁇ devices from unwanted access.
  • the memory may be configured to store data with high security priority.
  • the highest safety priority is understood to mean data of the highest security level, ie very confidential data and information.
  • sensitive content, or other confidential data of the control system are not read by an unauthorized person, that is unauthorized read access be prevented in the information and le ⁇ diglich authorized to access the information after appropriate authorization check. Since the memory is also used to store the data of the comparator, this can by providing system-wide
  • the invention also provides a motor vehicle comprising a control system as described above. Such a thing
  • Motor vehicle has the advantage that a high degree of security, in particular a high degree of manipulation protection for the control units of the motor vehicle is ensured while still functioning properly. Since data on changes in the settings of control units of the motor vehicle are stored in a memory and thus reproducible reproducible, if the settings differ significantly from the ge ⁇ changed settings, that is, for example, if unauthorized the function and / or scope of the control units subsequently modified and thus the entire
  • the security unit can be enclosed in a housing in such a way that, when the housing is opened, memory areas of the memory which contain data of the comparator and / or data with high security priority and of the communication module which contain a key and / or an encryption algorithm, deleted and / or destroyed.
  • This has the advantage that, for example, for a whole series of control systems, the same secret keys or cryptographic methods can be used, or asymmetric cryptographic methods can be used without the risk that an unauthorized person opens a control system of this series and aware the destruction of operability is tolerated in order to gain knowledge of the secret keys or methods, which can then be used for the unauthorized modification of other control systems of the same kind.
  • the security unit can be integrated at a Unzu ⁇ -reach place from the outside in the vehicle.
  • a control system for a motor vehicle is specified, which ensures a high degree of security, in particular a high protection against manipulation with perfect function.
  • the security can be further increased in a data exchange via the vehicle network or in a read / write access of an external unit to the control system by using a cryptographic module and thus by an authentication based on cryptographic methods.
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic block diagram of a
  • FIG. 2 shows a schematic block diagram of a motor vehicle according to exporting ⁇ approximately embodiments of the invention
  • Safety unit of a control system for a motor vehicle according to embodiments of the invention.
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic block diagram of a control system 1 for a motor vehicle according to embodiments of the invention.
  • control system 1 has a plurality of electrical or electronic components 2.
  • Components 2 in turn each have a control unit 3, wherein the individual control units 3 are interconnected to exchange data via a vehicle network 4. Is further shown in Figure 1 a connected to the vehicle network 4 security unit 5.
  • the secure ⁇ integrated unit 5 has a first means 6 which is configured to detect settings profiles for the control unit 3, a comparator 7, which is formed, a To detect change in the settings of at least one control unit 3 and to compare the settings profiles with the changed settings of the at least one control unit 3, and a memory 8 for storing data obtained by the comparator 7, if the setting profiles differ significantly from the ge ⁇ changed settings , on.
  • the safety unit 5 is shown as a separate component. Further however, the safety unit 5 can also be integrated into a control unit 3.
  • the first means 6 shown in FIG. 1 is embodied such that a vehicle profile and user-specific settings are detected as setting profiles, so that changes in the settings of control units 3, which are set directly by a manufacturer, for example a motor control or for the safety-relevant functions, as well as control devices 3, which a user can set according to his wishes and customs, for example, a seat adjustment, are detected.
  • the vehicle network 4 is formed as a BUS system 9.
  • vehicle buses may be, for example, one or more CAN buses.
  • Further examples of such vehicle networks 4 are LIN or MOST-BUS systems.
  • the memory 8 of the security unit 5 according to FIG. 1 is further configured to store data with high security priority.
  • the highest safety priority is understood to mean data of the highest security level, ie very confidential data and information. Thus can be ensured be confidential information or other confidential data of the control system 1 are not read by a non ⁇ unauthorized third party.
  • FIG. 1 also shows the safety unit 5 in an encapsulated housing, which is symbolized by the broken line provided with reference number 10. The housing is closed so that each opening leads to irreversible destruction of the functionality of the control system 1.
  • the safety unit 5 is further integrated in a non-accessible from the outside in the vehicle.
  • FIG. 2 shows a schematic block diagram of a
  • Safety unit 5 of a control system 1 for a motor vehicle according to embodiments of the invention. Components or components having the same construction or function as in Figure 1 bear the same reference numerals and will not be discussed separately.
  • the security unit 5 of FIG. 2 connected to the vehicle network 4 has a coordination module 11, an external communication module 12, an internal communication module 13 and a cryptography module 14.
  • the coordination module 11 of the security unit 5 according to FIG. 2 is designed to initiate a safety-related action if the adjustment profiles deviate significantly from the changed settings. In principle, all methods are suitable as safety-related reactions in order to clearly indicate the significant deviation.
  • the safety-related reaction is a shutdown of the control units 3 whose changed settings are significantly different from the ones in FIG Setting profiles differ. Furthermore, the safety-related reaction can also include a partial shutdown of the control units 3, the changed settings of which deviate significantly from the setting profiles, or a transfer of these control units 3 into a secured state.
  • the external communication module 12 is further designed to transmit the data of the comparator 7 to an external unit 15.
  • an external unit 15 a manufacturer and a supplier unauthorized changes in the settings of control units 3 can be displayed directly. Also, this may be an authorization or release by a third party, such as a vehicle registration office, obtained before execution of the changes.
  • the data transfer between the external communication module 12 and the external unit 15 is here symbolized by the arrow provided with reference numeral 16. This is designed wirelessly. Furthermore, the exchange of data between the external communication module 12 and the external unit 15 but also via data lines of the bus system 9 can take place.
  • An essential functional component of the security unit 5 according to FIG. 2 is also the cryptography module 14 with which cryptographic keys can be generated, stored, managed and / or processed.
  • the cryptography module 14 provides a secure environment for creating and managing cryptographic key material.
  • secure memory areas are provided which are protected against unauthorized reading and / or writing of any data, but in particular cryptographic keys. These memory areas are also configurable in terms of access and management of the data stored there. This way you can adjust if this data is again are exportable or should only be used within the security unit 5.
  • the cryptographic methods initiated by the cryptography module 14 may be symmetric cryptographic methods such as AES, DES, 3-DES or IDEA, as well as asymmetric cryptographic methods such as the ECC method using the operations on elliptic curves over finite fields RSA method in which the encryption algorithm is based on the large integer arithmetic and the keys are generated based on two large primes.
  • the illustrated cryptography module 14 further includes a random number generator 17 and a plurality of counters 18. The cryptography module 14 is thus able to 5 by means of internal commands of the security unit random numbers
  • Cryptography module 14 has a generic interface and configurable algorithms are implemented, meaning that the cryptography module 14 can be configured via the algorithmic boundary, with the generic interface remaining the same externally. In this way, any data can be encrypted or symmetrically or asymmetrically signed electronically or even a fingerprint of the data can be calculated. Furthermore, has the
  • Cryptography module 14 an interface 19, via which it can be connected to a PKI (Public Key Infrastructure).
  • PKI Public Key Infrastructure
  • an asymmetric key pair can be securely created and stored and a certification request for the PKI exported.
  • the internal communication module 13 of FIG. 2 is configured in this way to exchange data between the security to ensure unit 5 and the control units 3.
  • electronic signatures including the possibly associated certificate chain can be generated and checked.
  • the external communication module 12 is further configured to exchange data between the control system 1 and the external unit 15.
  • the external communication module 12 is designed to permit a read / write access of the external unit 15 to the control system 1 only if release has been performed by the cryptography module 14.
  • a "gate keeper ⁇ " which all checked externally incoming data and thus out controls every write and / or read access to its authenticity.
  • the cryptography module 14 is thus capable of protecting memory areas within the control system 1, which are outside the security unit 5, against unauthorized external read and / or write ⁇ accesses, can produce a more secure crypto tographischer trust anchor consequently.
  • the cryptography module 14, the internal communication module 13 and the external communication module 12 are further designed as hardware modules. This is much safer than software cryptography. In addition, the evaluation is much faster, so that possible waiting times in the evaluation of the data can be considerably reduced.
  • FIG. 2 shows a firewall 20 integrated in the external communication module 12 and in the internal communication module 13. This forms a further security system which protects the vehicle network 4 as well as the individual control units 3 against undesired access.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un système de commande pour un véhicule automobile, comprenant au moins deux appareils de commande (3) reliés l'un à l'autre via au moins un réseau (4) de véhicule, qui échangent des données l'un avec l'autre via le réseau (4) de véhicule, ainsi qu'une unité de sécurité (5) reliée au réseau (4) de véhicule, l'unité de sécurité (5) comprenant un premier moyen (6) pour détecter des profils de réglage pour lesdits au moins deux appareils de commande (3), un comparateur (7) pour détecter une modification des réglages d'au moins un appareil de commande (3) et pour comparer les profils de réglage avec les réglages modifiés dudit au moins un appareil de commande (3) ainsi qu'une mémoire (8) pour enregistrer des données obtenues par le comparateur (7), dans le cas où les profils de réglage s'écartent significativement des réglages modifiés.
PCT/EP2013/077130 2012-12-21 2013-12-18 Système de commande pour un véhicule automobile Ceased WO2014096027A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102012224194.9A DE102012224194B4 (de) 2012-12-21 2012-12-21 Steuersystem für ein Kraftfahrzeug
DE102012224194.9 2012-12-21

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2014096027A1 true WO2014096027A1 (fr) 2014-06-26

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PCT/EP2013/077130 Ceased WO2014096027A1 (fr) 2012-12-21 2013-12-18 Système de commande pour un véhicule automobile

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WO (1) WO2014096027A1 (fr)

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DE102014119287B4 (de) 2014-12-19 2022-11-10 Patty's Gmbh Vorrichtung zum Öffnen und Verschließen eines Raums
DE102015214791A1 (de) * 2015-08-03 2017-02-09 Continental Automotive Gmbh Verfahren zur Betriebsvalidierung einer Sensoreinheit, Sensoreinheit und Tachographsystem
DE102016210786A1 (de) * 2016-02-18 2017-08-24 Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft Komponente zur Anbindung an einen Datenbus und Verfahren zur Umsetzung einer kryptografischen Funktionalität in einer solchen Komponente
DE102016004963B4 (de) 2016-04-23 2017-11-23 Audi Ag Vorrichtung und Verfahren zur Rückstellung von Steuergeräte-Einstellungen im Kraftfahrzeug
DE102016224193B4 (de) * 2016-12-06 2024-10-17 Robert Bosch Gmbh Verfahren zur Überwachung eines Steuergeräts für ein Fahrzeug
DE102021112331A1 (de) 2021-05-11 2022-11-17 Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zum Erkennen eines manipulierten Steuergeräts eines Bussystems eines Fahrzeugs durch ein zweites Steuergerät des Bussystems des Fahrzeugs, computerlesbares Medium, System, und Fahrzeug

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DE4301436C2 (de) * 1993-01-20 1996-06-13 Kaiser Hans Christian Sicherungssystem
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DE10111286B4 (de) * 2001-03-09 2005-04-21 Audi Ag Steuerungssystem und Verfahren zur Steuerung von Kraftfahrzeugkomponenten
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DE102011002713A1 (de) * 2011-01-14 2012-07-19 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Bereitstellen von kyptographischen Credentials für Steuergeräte eines Fahrzeugs

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DE10128305A1 (de) * 2001-06-12 2002-12-19 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Steuereinheit
DE102004051637A1 (de) * 2004-10-23 2006-05-04 Continental Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zur adaptiven Einstellung einer Fahrzeugsteuerung
EP1760623A2 (fr) * 2005-08-18 2007-03-07 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Dispositif de sécurité pour appareils électroniques

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DE102012224194B4 (de) 2018-08-02
DE102012224194A1 (de) 2014-06-26

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