WO2017003413A1 - Protection d'entrée physique pour un dispositif - Google Patents

Protection d'entrée physique pour un dispositif Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2017003413A1
WO2017003413A1 PCT/US2015/038196 US2015038196W WO2017003413A1 WO 2017003413 A1 WO2017003413 A1 WO 2017003413A1 US 2015038196 W US2015038196 W US 2015038196W WO 2017003413 A1 WO2017003413 A1 WO 2017003413A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
main body
psa
mounting panel
tamper tab
tamper
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/US2015/038196
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Edward O. Clapper
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Intel Corp
Original Assignee
Intel Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Intel Corp filed Critical Intel Corp
Priority to PCT/US2015/038196 priority Critical patent/WO2017003413A1/fr
Priority to TW105115741A priority patent/TWI707248B/zh
Publication of WO2017003413A1 publication Critical patent/WO2017003413A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/86—Secure or tamper-resistant housings

Definitions

  • This disclosure relates in general to the field of device protection, and more particularly, to physical ingress protection for a device.
  • FIGURE 1A is a simplified schematic diagram illustrating side plan view of a device with physical ingress protection, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure
  • FIGURE IB is a simplified schematic diagram illustrating an orthographic view of a device with physical ingress protection, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure
  • FIGURE 2A is a simplified schematic diagram illustrating an exploded orthographic view of a device with physical ingress protection, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure
  • FIGURE 2B is a simplified schematic diagram illustrating an exploded orthographic view of a device with physical ingress protection, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure
  • FIGURE 3 is a simplified schematic diagram illustrating a cutaway plan view of a portion of a device with physical ingress protection, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure
  • FIGURE 4 is a simplified schematic diagram illustrating a cutaway plan view of a portion of a device with physical ingress protection, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure
  • FIGURE 5 is a simplified schematic diagram illustrating an orthographic view of a portion of a device with physical ingress protection, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure
  • FIGURE 6 is a simplified schematic diagram illustrating an orthographic view of a device with physical ingress protection, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure
  • FIGURE 7A is a simplified schematic diagram illustrating an orthographic view of a device with physical ingress protection, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure
  • FIGURE 7B is a simplified schematic diagram illustrating an orthographic view of a device with physical ingress protection, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIGURE 7C is a simplified schematic diagram illustrating an orthographic view of a device with physical ingress protection, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIGURE 1A is a simplified orthographic diagram of physical ingress protection for a device 100, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • a device 102 with physical ingress protection can include a tamper tab 106.
  • Device 102 can be releasably secured or coupled to surface 104 using an adhesive or some other material or means to secure or couple device 102 to surface 104.
  • FIGURE IB is a simplified orthographic diagram of physical ingress protection for a device 100, in accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • device 102 has been removed from surface 104.
  • tamper tab 106 can be left behind as in indication that device 102 was removed from surface 104.
  • the material securing or coupling device 102 to surface 104 should be strong enough to hold device 102 on surface 104 but not so strong that device 102 cannot be removed from surface 104.
  • Regulated RFID devices used for tracking vehicles in toll road systems and controlled traffic regions are required to have tamper detection and prevention features.
  • the RFID device should provide protection from ingress of dust and/or water.
  • enclosures often need some type of protection and to identify when ingress to the device has occurred or may have occurred. What is needed is a system and method that can provide physical ingress protection for a device.
  • a device 102 can resolve these issues (and others).
  • Device 102 may be configured to allow for electronic tamper/intrusion detection of device 102 via separation of enclosure components (e.g., tamper tab 106) that are separately mounted to a common surface (e.g., surface 104).
  • enclosure components e.g., tamper tab 106
  • surface 104 e.g., surface 104
  • the mounting surface and an intermediary mounting medium can help prevent or limit ingress of substances into device 102.
  • device 102 can provide visible evidence of tamper detection thru a transparent mounting surface.
  • device 102 can be configured to include strategically- segmented enclosure components, combined with a specialized form and formulation of PSA (Pressure Sensitive Adhesive).
  • PSA Pressure Sensitive Adhesive
  • the combination of the enclosure partitioning and PSA attributes allow for both tamper detection and prevention or limiting of dust and water ingress at a lower economical cost than current conventional alternatives.
  • tamper tab 106 is a small "tab" of enclosure material disposed in a thru-hole in device 102. Tamper tab 106 can be a physically separate component, coupled to an electrically conductive element that makes contact with two pads on a circuit board inside device 106.
  • a pressure sensitive adhesive (e.g., double sided tape) can be used to secure or couple the device and the tamper tab 106 to a surface 104.
  • the PSA material can be die-cut into two separated regions. The first region is the main adhesion boundary, attaching the enclosure body to a surface such as a wall or windshield. Within that boundary is tamper tab 106.
  • the first region of PSA contains a hole sized such that tamper tab 106 is not in contact with the first region of PSA.
  • a second region of PSA material is sized and positioned to only be attached to the mounting face of tamper tab 106.
  • I ngress protection is im porta nt to the protect i o n of a device, as it both ensu res fu nction and prevents hard-to-verify tam pering methods which involve contaminating the device with dust or fluids.
  • Device 102 can be configured such that all seams of device 102 are within the boundary of the mounting surface (e.g. surface 104).
  • the boundary between device 102 and surface 104 can be fully covered with a PSA that includes a non-porous primary adhesion layer, a closed-cell foam center layer (if applicable), a non-porous secondary adhesion layer, and a non-porous liner affixed to the secondary adhesion layer for storage prior to installation.
  • the non-porous primary adhesion layer of the PSA conformally covers the main seam between the main case body and the mounting panel, providing a reliable ingress barrier. Without this approach, this seam would need to be sealed using other methods such as gaskets, glues or ultrasonic welding in addition to PSA being needed to attach the device. These alternative methods are much more expensive and less reliable than PSA such as the PSA described above.
  • PSA is needed to attach these devices, in addition to their sealing method, so the present invention eliminates the need for these sealing operations via strategic use of the PSA. This results in a cost benefit
  • a second ingress is the seam between tamper tab 106 and the mounting panel on device 102, which by function must not be bonded to the mounting panel of the main body of device 102. Since tamper tab 106 must easily be separable from device 102, a seam is inevitable and the conventional alternative sealing methods above are much less applicable.
  • the two primary situations where tamper seam ingress must be prevented are during shipping/storage or pre-installation and when device 102 is installed on surface 104. Prior to installation, the non-porous liner covers the gap and seam between tamper tab 106 and the mounting panel of device 102. Thus, during shipping and pre-installation storage, ingress is prevented. Once installed, the liner's function is replaced by surface 104, which again provides a non-porous boundary for the PSA and ingress is prevented
  • a security film may be used on the PSA substrate, and device 102 can be secured to a surface 104 that is transparent such as a window or windshield.
  • Security film or tape can include single-side printed tape with very low tear strength applied over a service/access boundary during production. The printing of such tapes is typically proprietary, containing a hologram or other difficult-to-copy graphic indicator. The tape is broken when unwarranted access occurs and the break can be detected by visual inspection through a transparent surface. The mounting tape surface facing the transparent surface is visible to an observer, through the transparent surface itself. Use of a printed security film in the mounting adhesion layer facing the transparent surface allows for visible evidence of removal to be observed, even if device is reinstalled on the transparent surface.
  • FIGURES 2A and 2B are a simplified exploded orthographic view illustrating an embodiment of device 102.
  • device 102 can include tamper tab 106, a main body 108, a mounting panel 110, mounting panel PSA 112, removable liner 114, and tamper tab PSA 116.
  • Tamper tab PSA 116 may be the same PSA as mounting panel PSA 112 or may be a different PSA than mounting panel PSA 112. Tamper tab 106 can be lightly retained in a pocket of mounting panel 110 with a very low force retention method such as a slip fit, etc.
  • FIGURE 3 is a simplified orthographic view illustrating an embodiment of a portion of device 102.
  • Device 102 can include tamper tab 106, main body 108, mounting panel 110, mounting panel PSA 112, and tamper tab PSA 120.
  • Tamper tab PSA 120 may be the same PSA as tamper tab PSA 116 or may be a different PSA.
  • Tamper tab 106 can be pushed against surface 104 by a compression mechanism 118. Compression mechanism 118 can provide an outward force on tamper tab 106, exerting force from the tab to the tamper contact pads on an internal circuit board (e.g., a printed circuit board).
  • an internal circuit board e.g., a printed circuit board
  • FIGURE 4 is a simplified orthographic view illustrating an embodiment of a portion of device 102.
  • Device 102 can include tamper tab 106, main body 108, mounting panel 110, mounting panel PSA 112, and tamper tab PSA 120.
  • Tamper tab PSA 120 may be the same PSA as tamper tab PSA 116 or may be a different PSA.
  • Tamper tab 106 can be held in place by a retention mechanism such as snaps, etc. If tamper tab 106 is fully retained in device 102, no compression force will translate thru the compression mechanism to surface 104 until tamper tab 106 is separated from device 106 by compression mechanism 118. Compression mechanism 118 can provide an outward force on tamper tab 106. In example, snaps or some type of securing means may be used to help hold tamper tab 118 in device and resist the outward force from compression mechanism 118.
  • FIGURE 5 is a simplified orthographic view illustrating an embodiment of a portion of serviceable chassis 100.
  • tamper tab 106 can be coupled to or in contact with tamper tab PSA 120 and compression mechanism 118.
  • Compression mechanism 118 may be a beryllium copper or plated brass formed spring contact. The positive compression of compression mechanism 118 can maintain continuity before, during, and after installation.
  • FIGURE 6 is a simplified orthographic view illustrating an embodiment of device 100.
  • Device 102 can be configured such that all seams of device 102 are within the boundary of the mounting surface (e.g. surface 104).
  • the boundary between device 102 and surface 104 can be fully covered with mounting panel PSA 112 that includes a non-porous primary adhesion layer, a close-cell foam center layer (if applicable), a non- porous secondary adhesion layer, and a non-porous liner affixed to the secondary adhesion layer for storage and installation.
  • the non-porous primary adhesion layer of the PSA conformally covers the main seam between the main case body and the mounting panel, providing a reliable ingress barrier.
  • FIGURE 7A is a simplified orthographic view illustrating an embodiment of device 102 secured to transparent or translucent surface 122.
  • Transparent or translucent surface 122 may be a window, windshield, frosted glass, or some other type of transparent of translucent material.
  • Device 102 can be secured to transparent or translucent surface 122 using security film 124.
  • Security film 124 can include single-side printed tape with very low tear strength applied over mounting panel PSA 112. The printing of such tapes is typically proprietary, containing a hologram or other difficult-to-copy graphic indicator.
  • FIGURE 7B is a simplified orthographic view illustrating an embodiment of device 102 secured to transparent or translucent surface 122. As illustrated in FIGURE 7B, device 102 has been removed from transparent or translucent surface 122. As a result, security film 124 has been broken.
  • FIGURE 7C is a simplified orthographic view illustrating an embodiment of device 102 secured to transparent or translucent surface 122.
  • device 102 has been put back after being removed as illustrated in FIGURE 7B.
  • the break can be detected by visual inspection of security film 124 through transparent or translucent surface 122.
  • the design or security features of security film 124 facing transparent or translucent surface 122 are visible through transparent or translucent surface 122.
  • Use of security film 124 in the mounting adhesion layer facing transparent or translucent surface 122 allows for visible evidence of removal to be observed, even if device is reinstalled on transparent or translucent surface 122.
  • Example Al is a device that includes a main body wherein the main body includes a mounting panel and a tamper tab located in the mounting panel, wherein the tamper tab is removably secured to the mounting panel, wherein the mounting panel and tamper tab are configured to secure the main body to a surface such that when the main body is removed from the surface, the tamper tab remains on the surface.
  • Example A2 the subject matter of Example Al may optionally include where a pressure sensitive adhesive (PSA) helps secure the main body to the surface.
  • PSA pressure sensitive adhesive
  • Example A3 the subject matter of any of the preceding 'A' Examples can optionally include where the PSA provides ingress protection for the main body to the surface.
  • Example A4 the subject matter of any of the preceding 'A' Examples can optionally include where a tamper tab PSA is located on the tamper tab and the tamper tab PSA is different than the PSA.
  • Example A5 the subject matter of any of the preceding 'A' Examples can optionally include security tape, wherein the security tape is located between the surface and the mounting panel.
  • Example A6 the subject matter of any of the preceding 'A' Examples can optionally include where the surface is transparent and the security tapes is viewable through the surface.
  • Example AA1 is an electronic components, where the electronic components are housed in a main body.
  • the main body includes a mounting panel, and a tamper tab located in the mounting panel.
  • the tamper tab is removably secured to the mounting panel and the mounting panel and tamper tab are configured to secure the main body to a surface such that when the main body is removed from the surface, the tamper tab remains on the surface.
  • Example AA2 the subject matter of Example AA1 may optionally include where a pressure sensitive adhesive (PSA) helps secure the main body to the surface.
  • PSA pressure sensitive adhesive
  • Example AA3 the subject matter of any of the preceding ⁇ ' Examples can optionally include where the PSA provides ingress protection for the main body to the surface.
  • Example AA4 the subject matter of any of the preceding ⁇ ' Examples can optionally include where a tamper tab PSA is located on the tamper tab and the tamper tab PSA is different than the PSA.
  • Example AA5 the subject matter of any of the preceding ⁇ ' Examples can optionally include security tape, wherein the security tape is located between the surface and the mounting panel.
  • Example AA6 the subject matter of any of the preceding ⁇ ' Examples can optionally include where the surface is transparent and the security tape is viewable through the surface.
  • Example Ml is a method that includes attaching a device to a surface inspecting the device to determine if the device has been tampered with, wherein one evidence of tampering is a missing tamper tab.
  • the device includes a main body and the main body includes a mounting panel.
  • the device also includes a tamper tab located in the mounting panel, where the tamper tab is removably secured to the mounting panel and the mounting panel and tamper tab are configured to secure the main body to a surface such that when the main body is removed from the surface, the tamper tab remains on the surface.
  • Example M2 the subject matter of any of the preceding 'M' Examples can optionally include where a pressure sensitive adhesive (PSA) helps secure the main body to the surface.
  • PSA pressure sensitive adhesive
  • Example M3 the subject matter of any of the preceding 'M' Examples can optionally include where the PSA provides ingress protection for the main body to the surface.
  • Example M4 the subject matter of any of the preceding 'M' Examples can optionally include where a tamper tab PSA is located on the tamper tab and the tamper tab PSA is different than the PSA.
  • Example M5 the subject matter of any of the preceding 'M' Examples can optionally include where inspecting the device to determine if the device has been tampered with further includes inspecting security tape, where the security tape is located between the surface and the mounting panel and is visible through the surface.
  • An example system SI can include a main body that includes a mounting panel and a tamper tab located in the mounting panel.
  • the tamper tab is removably secured to the mounting panel, wherein the mounting panel and tamper tab are configured to secure the main body to a surface such that when the main body is removed from the surface, the tamper tab remains on the surface.
  • An example system S2 can include where the first housing includes where a pressure sensitive adhesive (PSA) helps secure the main body to the surface.
  • PSA pressure sensitive adhesive
  • Example S3 the subject matter of any of the preceding 'SS' Examples can optionally include where the PSA provides ingress protection for the main body to the surface.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Casings For Electric Apparatus (AREA)

Abstract

Selon l'invention, des modes de réalisation particuliers concernent une protection d'entrée physique pour un dispositif. Un dispositif peut comprendre un corps principal, le corps principal comprenant un panneau de montage et une languette anti-sabotage située dans le panneau de montage, la languette anti-sabotage est fixée amovible à un panneau de montage, le panneau de montage et la languette d'anti-sabotage étant configurés pour fixer le corps principal à une surface de telle sorte que lorsque le corps principal est retiré de la surface, la languette d'anti-sabotage reste sur la surface.
PCT/US2015/038196 2015-06-27 2015-06-27 Protection d'entrée physique pour un dispositif Ceased WO2017003413A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/US2015/038196 WO2017003413A1 (fr) 2015-06-27 2015-06-27 Protection d'entrée physique pour un dispositif
TW105115741A TWI707248B (zh) 2015-06-27 2016-05-20 具有用於實體進入防護之機構的裝置及系統以及用於實體進入防護之方法

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/US2015/038196 WO2017003413A1 (fr) 2015-06-27 2015-06-27 Protection d'entrée physique pour un dispositif

Publications (1)

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WO2017003413A1 true WO2017003413A1 (fr) 2017-01-05

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PCT/US2015/038196 Ceased WO2017003413A1 (fr) 2015-06-27 2015-06-27 Protection d'entrée physique pour un dispositif

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WO (1) WO2017003413A1 (fr)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US11765816B2 (en) 2021-08-11 2023-09-19 International Business Machines Corporation Tamper-respondent assemblies with pressure connector assemblies

Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20070071968A1 (en) * 2003-10-27 2007-03-29 Iris Hermony Tamper evident tape
US7388484B2 (en) * 2005-08-16 2008-06-17 Honeywell International Inc. Conductive tamper switch for security devices
US20110290965A1 (en) * 2010-05-28 2011-12-01 William Kyle Virgin Mounting system for removably securing an object to a surface
US20120047374A1 (en) * 2011-11-03 2012-02-23 Cram Worldwide, Llc Tamper resistance extension via tamper sensing material housing integration
US8585315B2 (en) * 2010-09-02 2013-11-19 Vogel's Holding B.V. Connecting element and associated connection assembly

Patent Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20070071968A1 (en) * 2003-10-27 2007-03-29 Iris Hermony Tamper evident tape
US7388484B2 (en) * 2005-08-16 2008-06-17 Honeywell International Inc. Conductive tamper switch for security devices
US20110290965A1 (en) * 2010-05-28 2011-12-01 William Kyle Virgin Mounting system for removably securing an object to a surface
US8585315B2 (en) * 2010-09-02 2013-11-19 Vogel's Holding B.V. Connecting element and associated connection assembly
US20120047374A1 (en) * 2011-11-03 2012-02-23 Cram Worldwide, Llc Tamper resistance extension via tamper sensing material housing integration

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US11765816B2 (en) 2021-08-11 2023-09-19 International Business Machines Corporation Tamper-respondent assemblies with pressure connector assemblies

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
TWI707248B (zh) 2020-10-11
TW201706906A (zh) 2017-02-16

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